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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND

ISLAMIC LAW IN THE POSTMODERN

AGE: STRIVING FOR AN OVERLAPPING

CULTURAL CONSENSUS

Qasim Aziz Butt

Mr. Qasim Aziz Butt holds an LLB from the University of London International

Programme obtained in 2010 from Pakistan College of Law. In 2012 he has joined

the Civil Service of Pakistan as a career diplomat and has represented the

Government of Pakistan at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva.

He is currently posted in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the

Government of Pakistan.

52 Pakistan Law Review [Vol: IX

ABSTRACT

International Human Rights contained in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and Islamic Law have been understood, more often than not,

as incompatible and mutually exclusive discourses. This paper aims at

overcoming the disturbing ‘aut-aut’ perception which appears to be

spreading globally, mostly due to the prevailing monolithic projection of

Islam and Islamic Law which is offered to the public at large. After

highlighting the variety of Muslim scholarship on the topic of fundamental

rights and human dignity, the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam

will be analysed and its capability to express and represent the vivid

complexity of Islamic jurisprudence on Human Rights will be critically

assessed. The last part of this research illustrates how a constructive

dialogue between all the parties involved in the debate is more than just a

possibility and recommends it as a dire need of our time.

2018] International Human Rights and Islamic Law 53

INTRODUCTION

Within academic prophesies of ‘clash of civilizations’1 and

‘Islamofascism’,2 Islam has persistently been portrayed as being

incompatible with modernity and norms of International Human Rights.

This research aims at exploring the complex relationship between

International Human Rights and Islamic law. It will seek to promote a

dialogue which is mutual rather than a ‘solitary dance’.3

Although the relationship between Human Rights and Islam has

attracted the attention of many erudite jurists, nevertheless the debate on this

area has raised theoretical and practical questions which continue to require

answers. These questions have existed as background arguments focusing

upon religious and cultural differences as a major cause of conflict in the

post-cold war era. Even during the cold war period, when the debate on

human rights mostly revolved around the clash between Soviet and western

worldviews, modern interpretations of the concept were referred to as

dominated by occidental thought4 and thus alien to the Islamic tradition. In

overcoming these alleged tensions between Human Rights and Islam, one

needs to first understand the concept of Human Rights as only then can an

attempt towards reconciliation between the two be plausible. The post-

modern world holds a plurality of views and perspectives on Human Rights

and Islam. This research will explore the different dimensions and

perspectives and look for ‘unity in diversity’ rather than embracing the

dominant ‘clash of paradigms’ view.

The following research is divided into five parts. First, an

exploration shall be made of the concept of Human Rights as expounded in

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR). Secondly,

regardless of the conceptual differences between the western and the Islamic

approach, an attempt shall be made to present Islam as subscribing to a

1SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF

WORLD ORDER (New York: Simon and Schuster) (1996). 2Christopher Hitchens, Defending the term Islamofascism. It’s a valid term. Here’s

why, Slate Online Platform, (2007) http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_

politics/fighting_words/2007/10/defending_islamofascism.html. 3Abdullahi An-Naim, Book Review of International Human Rights and Islamic Law

by Mashood Baderin, 15(2) European Journal of International Law, 395–404

(2004). 4ADAMANTIA POLLIS & PETER SCHWAB eds., HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (New York, NJ: Praeger) (1979) 1-18. The authors

argued that the concept of human rights was essentially a western construct and for

that very reason, one of limited applicability beyond the occidental world.


Human Rights doctrine. This part will also examine the conflicting areas

between Islamic law (Shari’a) and International Human Rights. Thirdly, an

analysis of the positions taken by various scholars shall be made on this

issue, which range from traditional conservatives to liberal humanists within

the Muslim world. Following this, a particular reference to the provisions of

the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, 1990 (CDHRI) will be

made in regards to its relevance within the variety of stances taken by the

Islamic world. This is the secondary aspect of this article; whilst the primary

focus will remain on the jurisprudential basis of human rights within Islam.

A further dimension to the debate is given by the International Ethical and

Humanist Union’s (IEHU) claim that CDHRI undermines the universality of

UDHR by offering a culturally specific alternative to it;5 this view will be

addressed and analysed. Finally, an attempt will be made to discover a

possibility of reconciliation between Shari’a and Human Rights by re-

evaluating existing views on this issue.

I.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Human rights are ‘inalienable rights’, consisting of basic

entitlements and freedoms that all people possess, merely by virtue of being

human. The United Nations Charter reaffirmed ‘faith in fundamental human

rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person’ and committed all

member states to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human

rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,

language or religion’.6 While there is widespread acceptance of the

importance of Human Rights in the international arena, there exists, since

the early stages of the adoption in 1966 of the UN International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on

5International Ethical and Humanist Union (IEHU), Joint Statement on the Cairo

Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (2008) https://iheu.org/islamic-law-vs-

human-rights/. 6United Nations Charter, Preamble, Articles 55 and 56.


Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), considerable confusion as

to their precise nature and role in international law.7

Although international protection of human rights is considered to

be a modern phenomenon, the evolution of these rights into their present

form has taken centuries. A detailed analysis of the classical formulation of

human rights is beyond the scope of this paper, nevertheless a brief outline

shall be presented about the development of the idea from its ancient natural

law tradition to its modern manifestation in form of the UDHR.

The concept of human rights has its origins in Greek and Roman

natural law tradition and this idea continues to be closely allied with

questions of ethics and morality. Natural law viewed certain rights to exist

as a result of higher law than positive or man-made law.8 Such inalienable

rights like right to life, liberty and property were identified by the

philosopher John Locke as existing on the basis of a social contract. He

argued that these rights cannot be surrendered within the social contract that

has been entered into by people wanting an end to the difficult conditions

they were confronted with in the state of nature. Natural law theory enabled

the resorting to a higher kind of law that was able to provide a powerful

method of restraining arbitrary power.9 Locke had a lasting influence upon

the political philosophy that laid the foundations of classical liberalism. His

influence was reflected in both the American Bill of Rights (1776) and the

French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789). However,

these two documents were about the rights of the ‘citizens’ rather than

‘human beings’.

The human rights tradition was rigorously formulated by the

philosopher Immanuel Kant who postulated that each man was an end in

itself and not a means to an end. Kant argued that ‘the rights of man must be

held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power must make’.10 Such

arguments presented human rights as being closely related to human dignity.

7MOSES MOSKOWITZ, THE POLICIES AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (New York:

Oceana Publication) (1968) 98-99. 8MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge: CUP) (8th ed., 2017) 211.

For a critical analysis of the tendency to project modern human rights views on

politically expedient tolerant attitudes in the ancient world, see Robartus J. Van Der

Spek, Cyrus the Great, Exiles and Foreign Gods: A Comparison of Assyrian and

Persian Policies on Subject Nations, in MICHAEL KOZUH et al, eds., EXTRACTION

AND CONTROL: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF MATTHEW W. STOLPER, 68 Studies in

Ancient Oriental Civilizations (Chicago, IL: Oriental Institute) (2014). 9SHAW, supra previous note. 10Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in HANS REISS ed., KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2nd ed., 1991) 125.


However, understanding human dignity in Kantian terms as a form of moral

autonomy and connecting this autonomy to universal rights of freedom and

participation are specifically modern interpretations.11

With the rise of positivism in the 19th century, the natural law theory

was considered widely redundant because of its non-empirical methodology.

Further, Marx also denounced human rights as a fabrication of the capitalist

society, which had alienated man from his true nature. According to

Marxism, an individual is part of society and must not be seen in an

antagonistic relationship with it where rights are needed.12 Even

traditionalists and those with religious inclinations in the west also rejected

the idea of human rights for a considerable period and it was only in 1960s

that the Catholic Church endorsed its necessity during the Second Vatican

Council.13

A. Background to the UDHR

Keeping in mind the diversity of opinions regarding the notion of

human rights, it seems incomprehensible that a document like the UDHR

could ever have been written and almost unanimously agreed upon by

different nations. One may speculate that it would be impossible to draft

such a document in our present postmodern world, where ethnic, religious

and cultural differences have gained immense prominence. It was possibly

due to the fact that decolonization was still underway when the UDHR was

being drafted, that it did not face much challenge from newly born nation

states, which refrained from questioning the hegemony of western human

rights discourse and from asserting their own moral traditions. The notorious

academic prophecy of clash of civilizations and the challenge of radical

Islam still lay in the future.

The UDHR was drafted by the UN Commission on Human Rights

from early 1947 to late 1948 and despite heated debates between members

11Heiner Bielefeldt, Autonomy and Republicanism: Immanuel Kant's Philosophy of

Freedom, 25 Political Theory 524-558 (1997). 12Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, Deutsch–Französische Jahrbücher (1844)

translated into English by Andy Blunden, Matthew Grant and Matthew Carmody,

2008/9, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/. 13See DERMOT A. LANE ed., VATICAN II IN IRELAND, FIFTY YEARS ON: ESSAYS IN

HONOUR OF PADRAIC CONWAY, (Dublin: Peter Lang AG Internationaler Verlag der

Wissenschaften) (2015).


of the commission,14 they were still able to rise above their differences and

develop a document based on consensus. Hence, the Declaration was passed

by the General Assembly in 1948 by a vote of 48 with eight abstentions. It is

pertinent to note at this juncture that apart from the Soviet Bloc and

apartheid South Africa, the only other nation who abstained from voting was

Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia saw the whole idea of a universal declaration as

incompatible with the supremacy of their divine scripture, the Quran.15

B. Nature and Content of the UDHR

The UDHR is not a legally binding document; in fact, it was never

intended to be one. According to Antonio Cassese16, the objective of the

declaration was to find the lowest common denominator of all states. Few

will dispute the importance of UDHR as the first comprehensive Human

Rights document of modern times. The influence of this document has been

such that even states that abstained from signing it and perceived it as an

incomplete document, did not vigorously oppose its creation.17

Since the UDHR was never designed to be a legally enforceable

document, the Commission on Human Rights was asked by the General

Assembly to prepare two separate covenants, one consisting of Civil and

Political Rights (ICCPR) and the other consisting of Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The drafting of these covenants took some time

due to the ideological debates18 over them. It is these covenants upon which

the enforceability of the UDHR is dependent. However, arguably19 some of

14Especially between P.C. Chang of China and Charles Malik of Lebanon who got

into an argument about the philosophical and theological basis of human rights. 15Abdullahi An-Na'im objects that, ‘…far from derogating from the universality of

the principles of the Declaration, the Saudi abstention, ostensibly based on Islamic

religious grounds, in fact demonstrates the equal untenability of discrimination on

grounds of either race, in the case of South Africa, or religion, in the case of Saudi

Arabia’. See Donna E. Artz, The Application of International Human Rights in

Islamic States, 12(2) Human Rights Quarterly, 202, 217 (1990). 16See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford: OUP) (2005). 17The constructivist view states that the UDHR derived its authority not by appeal to

pure reason, but through acceptance on part of the states that there was a need for it.

Cf. Wade Mansell, & Joanne Scott, Why Bother about a Right to Development?

21(2) Journal of Law and Society 171–192 (1994). 18It was a time of cold war, and the Soviet conception of human rights was quite

different from the first world’s view, championed by USA. 19Peter Bailey, The Creation of UDHR, Universal Rights, http://www.

universalrights.net/main/ creation. htm.


the provisions20 of UDHR have become part of customary international law

and hence apply to even those nations who have not ratified these two

covenants.

Having addressed the nature of UDHR, it is appropriate to view its

content, which consists of thirty articles with the rights arranged in four

columns, according to Cassin’s famous metaphor of the Greek temple.21 The

first column relates to individual rights like fundamental right to life, liberty,

and security, habeas corpus and due process in legal proceedings, and equal

protection before the law.22 The second column pertains to the rights of

individuals in relation to others and to various groups in civil society23 that

include the right to freedom of movement, asylum, privacy, marriage,

personal integrity, and the right to property. The third column concerns

spiritual, public, and political liberties24 and covers freedom of thought,

conscience, and religion, freedom of opinion and expression, and of

democratic participation. Finally, the fourth column concerns economic,

social, and cultural rights.25

C. Challenges to the Universality of UDHR

The UDHR containing the said rights proclaimed itself to be a

document of universal applicability. However, since its adoption, the

declaration had to constantly face challenges that seemed to undermine its

purpose and universality. It is widely viewed amongst many Muslim nations

and developing countries that human rights, as enshrined in UDHR,

provides a ‘western’ understanding of human rights, which according to

Iran’s former representative to the UN Said Rajaie-Khorassani, was ‘a

secular understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition’ which could not be

implemented by Muslims without trespassing upon Islamic law.26 Even in

20For instance, the prohibition of torture, the abolition of slavery and the right of

self-determination are widely considered part of customary international law. 21MICHELINE ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO

THE GLOBALIZATION ERA (Berkley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California

Press) (2008). 22Articles 3-11. 23Articles 12-17. 24Articles 18-21. 25Articles 22-27. 26David G. Littman, Universal Human Rights and 'Human Rights in Islam', 45(2)

Midstream 2-7 (1999).


the west, cultural relativists, such as Pollis and Schwab27 on the left and

Huntington28 on the right, rejected universal human rights as a manifestation

of Eurocentric arrogance or as an illusion doomed to collapse.

In response to the said criticisms Bielefeldt argued that, although the

concept of human rights did have its origins in the west that does not

necessarily mean that human rights cannot be universal.29 Thus, as Senghaas

points out, culturally essential interpretations of human rights are misleading

and should be rejected as these rights are ‘achievements brought about in

long-lasting political conflicts during the process of modernization in

Europe. They are by no means the eternal heritage of an original cultural

endowment of Europe.’30 The awareness of hermeneutics has revealed that

human rights don’t have roots in previously mentioned traditional ideas and

the fate of the idea is not determined by the past. Hence, the modern idea of

human rights characterizes the standpoint from which one can

retrospectively discover humanitarian motives.31 If the essence of human

rights is to guard human dignity, then its roots can be traced back to many

cultures and not just to the occidental tradition. This can be seen in the study

conducted by UNESCO, which has traced the roots of the idea of human

rights in a variety of cultures across the globe.32 This cross-cultural dialogue

is a recurring theme in international human rights literature. Some writers

have underscored the need for a cross-cultural discourse in sharing human

right concerns and practices with non-western societies, whilst others have

dismissed the call for engaging non-western cultures in a dialogue as being

27Supra note 4. From their stance it appears that a major threat to human rights’

universality is cultural relativism. 28Supra note 1. 29Heiner Bielefeldt, ‘Western’ versus ‘Islamic’ Human Rights Conceptions? A

Critique of Cultural Essentialism in the Discussion on Human Rights, 28(1)

Political Theory 90-121 (2000). 30DIETER SENGHAAS, WOHIN DRIFTET DIE WELT? UBER DIE ZUKUNFT FRIEDLICHER

KOEXISTENZ (Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Suhrkamp) (1994) 112, quoted in

English by HELENA KENNEDY, DO HUMAN RIGHTS TRAVEL? (London:

Counterpoint Publications) (2004) 55. 31Bielefeldt, supra note 29. The word ‘humanitarian’ is used here in its general

meaning of ‘concerned with human welfare’. 32UNESCO, Cultural Rights as Human Rights, 3 Studies and Documents on

Cultural policies (1970) http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0000/000011/

001194eo.pdf. See also Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights

Debate, 17(4) Human Rights Quarterly 587-617 (1995).


counterproductive, since it can only lead to compromising the universality

of human rights.33

It can be concluded that human rights are an idea that seeks to

recognize human dignity in a legally binding structure. It constitutes the

minimum political and legal standard a country should adhere to in order to

recognize the inherent dignity of human beings. Despite its limited scope the

notion of human rights in UDHR has had immense influence upon the world

since its adoption by the General Assembly.

II.

ISLAMIC DOCTRINE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Modern notions of human rights are generally considered a product

of secular humanism. However, this assumption is problematic for those

who like to approach the notion of human rights from a religious point of

view. An argument will follow in regards to Islamic tradition containing

humanitarian motives and their presence being traceable back to the original

sources of Shari’a.

Although Islam supports certain human rights, there is no doubt

that some international human rights norms can conflict with it. The conflict

is not because Islam lacks a human rights doctrine but is rather due to its

different approach. The interpretations of modern international human rights

law depend heavily on human rationality and exhibit strong notions of

western political liberalism unrestrained by any religious orthodoxy.34 Their

standpoint can be summarised in the proposition that human liberty has a

very close connection with the idea of human rights and is in fact antecedent

to it. The Islamic perspective on liberty is that it must be exercised within a

33The works of Abdullahi A. An-Na’im represent the views of the proponents of

cross-cultural dialogue, while the writings of Rhoda Howard represent those of its

opponents. 34Mashood Baderin, Dialogue among Civilizations as a Paradigm for achieving

Universalism in International Human Rights - A case study with Islamic Law 2(2)

Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law 21 (2001).


certain amount of religious consciousness.35 Any fruitful attempt towards

reconciling these two approaches is only possible if one identifies the

underlying theoretical difference between Islamic and international

conceptions of human rights. In the following passages, the authorities for

legal protection of certain civil and political rights will be identified within

the primary sources of Shari’a, the Quran and the Sunnah.

A. Basic Human Rights in Islam

The Islamic doctrine of human rights does not consist of one

singular source. Therefore, authority or nass for the protection of some

general and basic human rights may be found in the Quran, Sunnah and

Fiqh (Jurisprudence) as developed by the classical jurists36 of early Islam.

Evidence will follow as to the concern for human welfare that is behind

certain rights having their origin traced back to the original sources of

Islamic law, thus establishing the fact that Islam does contain a human rights

doctrine.

1. Right to life and security

Islam upholds the absolute value of human life; the protection of

which is the foremost aim and purpose of Shari’a, second only to the

protection of religion itself. In this regards the Quran says: ‘whosoever

killeth a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth,

it shall be as if he had killed all mankind.’37 From Islamic perspective, life is

a God given gift and no one should be deprived of it without legal

justification.38

35AFZALUR RAHMAN, READINGS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, VOL. I LIBERTY

(London: Seerah Foundation) (1987) 129. 36One can find the term haquq-al-aadmiya, which literally means ‘rights of man’, in

the works of Al Mawardi (972-1058 CE). 37Quranic verse 5:32. For all Quranic verses quoted in the present article, see

MARMADUKE PICKTHALL, THE QURAN TRANSLATED (Washington, DC: ICSFP)

(2005). 38Quranic verse 6:151 ‘…And that ye slay not the life which Allah hath made

sacred, save in the course of justice’.


2. Right to Justice

The importance of justice for all in human society in the Quran is

emphasized as a right to seek justice and duty to do justice.39 In this context,

the Quran uses two concepts: Adl40 and Ihsan,41 wherein individual merit is

stressed, which does not depend on one’s lineage, gender, race or religion

but rather on ‘just action’.

3. Right to liberty and freedom

As mentioned earlier, Islam is concerned with human liberty and

freedom but in a theocentric rather than anthropocentric sense. Therefore,

the scope of this right may be limited when compared to other rights. Within

the sphere of liberty, the Quranic position on religious freedom in Islam is

quite clearly articulated in chapter 2, verse 256, ‘There is no compulsion in

religion’. There is further stress laid upon the importance of human choice

in matters of faith; ‘(It is) the truth from the Lord of you (all). Then

whosoever will, let him believe, and whosoever will, let him disbelieve.’42

However, the exact scope of this right has been a matter of dispute for quite

some time despite the unambiguous Quranic position and will be addressed

in greater detail later in this section.

4. Right to Privacy

Islam recognizes that no one’s right to privacy should be encroached

upon or unduly influenced. The Quran strictly emphasizes the importance of

this right and lays down certain rules regarding it.43 The sanctity that has

39Quranic verses 5:8 ‘O ye who believe! Be steadfast witnesses for Allah in equity

and let not hatred of any people seduce you that ye deal not justly. Deal justly, that

is nearer to your duty. Observe your duty to Allah. Lo! Allah is Informed of what ye

do.’ and 4:36 ‘(Show) kindness unto parents, and unto near kindred, and orphans,

and the needy, and into the neighbour who is of kin (unto you) and the neighbour

who is not of kin and the fellow traveller and the wayfarer and (the slaves) whom

your right hands possess.’ 40Adl is defined as ‘to be equal, neither more nor less’. See ASIF A. A. FAYZE &

TARIQ MAHMOOD, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW (Bombay, India: OUP) (5th

ed., 2009). 41Riffat Hassan, Are Human Rights compatible with Islam? http://www.religious

consultation.org/hassan2.htm. 42Quranic verse 18:29. 43Quranic verse 24:27 ‘O ye who believe! Enter not houses other than your own

without first announcing your presence and invoking peace upon the folk thereof.

That is better for you, that ye may be heedful’ and 28 ‘And if ye find no one therein,

still enter not until permission hath been given. And if it be said unto you: Go away

again, then go away, for it is purer for you. Allah knoweth what ye do’.


been attached to this right is illustrated by the Prophet instructing his

followers that a man should not even enter his own home surreptitiously.44

5. Right to knowledge

Acquiring knowledge is a religious duty for all Muslim men and

women. The very first verse that was revealed to the Prophet Mohammed

attests to the importance of this 45 along with the famous Prophet’s prayer

‘Allah grant me knowledge of the ultimate nature of things’. Baihaqi reports

that the founder of Islam went so far as to instruct his followers to ‘seek

knowledge even though it be in China’.46 It can be inferred from the

importance given to the duty to acquire knowledge imposed on all Muslims

by Quranic sources and by the Sunnah, that there exists in Islamic law a

right to knowledge as the natural counterpart of that obligation.

6. Right to Honour and Respect

Islam prohibits defamation and protects every person’s honour and

reputation which is the essence of human dignity.47 According to Islamic

Law if it is proved that someone has attacked the honour of another person,

then irrespective of the fact whether or not the victim is able to prove

himself a respectable and honourable person, the culprit will in any case be

punished unless he proves the truth of his statement.48

In the aforementioned brief presentation affirming Islamic

provisions for civil and political rights, it is evident that there is nothing

inherently inconsistent in the teachings of the Quran and Sunnah against the

primary norms of international Human rights. However, due to the

theocentric basis of human rights in Islam, the conflict between international

44ABU UL’ALA MAUDUDI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Leicester: Islamic Foundation)

(1st ed., 1976) 12. 45Quranic verses 96: 1 to 5 ‘Read: In the name of thy Lord who createth, Createth

man from a clot. Read: And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous, Who teacheth by the

pen, Teacheth man that which he knew not.’ 46MUHAMMAD S. CHAUDHRY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM (Lahore: All Pakistan

Islamic Education Congress) (1993) 53. 47 Quranic verse 49:11 ‘O ye who believe! Let not a folk deride a folk who may be

better than they (are), nor let women (deride) women who may be better than they

are; neither defame one another, nor insult one another by nicknames. Bad is the

name of lewdness after faith. And whoso turneth not in repentance, such are evil

doers’. 48In Shari’a falsely accusing someone of rape or indecent act is a crime known as

Qazaf for which there is a strict punishment. For further elaboration see Maududi,

supra note 44.


human rights and Islamic doctrine is inevitable in certain areas. These

conflicting areas between Shari’a and human rights will now be addressed.

B. Conflicting areas between Shari’a and Human Rights

There exist basic areas of conflict between Islamic tradition and

international human rights. Those conflicts will be discussed here from a

more theoretical stance, but it is worth briefly mentioning here, from a more

legal and political point of view that if major abuses take place in Islamic

countries, they do not necessarily, for the most part, have an Islamic

rationale.49 Hence, any Islamic rationale provided by those governments for

violating international human rights must be scrutinized rather than

presumed.50 Professor Jack Donnelly, in addressing this issue from a more

jurisprudential perspective, quotes Abdul Aziz Said, who presents human

rights in Islam as existing ‘only in relation to human obligations. Individuals

possess certain obligations towards God, fellow humans, and nature, all of

which are defined in the Shari’a. When individuals meet these obligations

they acquire certain rights and freedoms which are again prescribed by the

Shari’a.’51 He argues that in Islam, as well as in other non-Western cultures,

those who do not accept these obligations have no rights, and any claims of

freedom that they make upon society lack justification. Thus, he argues that

an individual's pre-qualification to rights is integral to the Islamic tradition

whose ‘social and political precepts…reflect a strong concern for human

good and human dignity’52, but cannot be equated to the notion of human

rights as individual entitlements which underlies the international human

rights discourse. This rejection of individualism in favour of communalism

is explained by Cherif Bassiouni as the absence of the distinction in Islamic

social concept between the individual and the state, which is more prevalent

in the western philosophical and political perceptions. Thus, the individual

49Bielefeldt, supra note 32. 50Since most Muslim states adhere selectively to Islamic law, and only to the extent

that local politics dictate, hence it is essential to investigate reasons, other than

religion, that may lie behind policies that are officially claimed to be based on

Shari’a. See Baudouin Dupret, Book review of Islam and Human Rights: Tradition

and Politics by Ann Elizabeth Mayer, 15(1-2) Journal of Law and Religion 571-574

(2000-2001). 51Abdul Aziz Said, Precepts and Practice of Human Rights in Islam 1(1) Universal

Human Rights 63, 73-74 (1979) quoted in J. Donnelly, Human Rights and Human

Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights 76 The

American Political Science Review 303, 307 (1982). 52J. Donnelly, supra previous note, at 307.


and the state do not necessarily stand in conflict with each other. The

consequence of this relationship is that there is no apparent need to delineate

individual rights in contraposition to the state.53 Polemicists like Dr. Talal

Asad also do not endorse Donnelly’s argument that Islam does not grant

inalienable rights. He argues that despite areas of conflict, Islam by

recognizing the legal capacity of every individual does grant certain

‘inalienable’ rights though not equal rights in the modern sense.54

Such explanations however have not discontinued the existence of

major areas of conflict between Shari’a and international human rights on

issues like gender and religious equality, religious freedom, capital

punishments and freedom of expression. Due to the timing of the

development of Shari’a, it’s hardly surprising that the model of classical

Shari’a would differ from the modern universal human rights concerning

these issues, which require a detailed analysis.55

1. Women in Islam

There is little disagreement about the fact that Islam vastly

improved the position of women in the Arabian Peninsula within few years

of its emergence. Professor Fazlur Rahman states that the most effective

change brought about by Islam was ‘the fact that woman was granted “fully-

fledged” capacity’.56 In comparison to this in pre-Islamic Arabia individual

property rights for women were virtually non-existent and even their very

existence as women was such a burden that could only be shrugged off by

burying them alive in infancy. With Islam came a wave of change in the

form of inalienable economic, social and legal rights, which in consequence

raised the status of women. This was evident in such areas as dower in

marriage, which at one time was owed to a father and now belonged to the

53Cherif Bassiouni, Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights in

the Islamic Criminal Justice System, in CHERIF BASSIOUNI ed., THE ISLAMIC

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications) (1982) 3-23. 54Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Islam, Human Rights and

the Secular – A conversation with Talal Asad and Abdullahi An-Na’im, Georgetown

University (29 Sep 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TiTaE863jBI.

Examples of categories of people who, although not equal to others, do possess

legal capacity include slaves, non-Muslims and women. 55Bielefeldt, supra note 32. 56FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press) (2nd ed., 1979)

38.


daughter whose sense of social security and freedom within her marriage

was consequently enhanced.57

However, the idea of complete gender equality is alien to the

classical model of Shari’a58 , in which practices like polygamy, have been

declared to be incompatible with ICCPR by the United Nations Human

Rights Commission (UNHRC)59. The Committee on the Elimination of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) went as far as observing in its

General Recommendation 21 that: ‘Polygamous marriages contravene a

woman’s right to equality with men and cause emotional and financial

distress. Therefore, such marriages ought to be discourages and prohibited’.

The issue of Polygamy, practiced in many Muslim countries, is thus an area

of conflict between traditional Shari’a and international human rights

regarding gender equality.

Divorce is yet another area of concern. Traditionally, a husband has

the advantage of unilaterally repudiating a marriage (talaq) under Muslim

family law, whereas a wife’s right to dissolve the marriage is limited to

‘self-redemption’ (khula), mutual agreement with husband (muhbaraa’h)

and judicial order on specific legal grounds known as faskh.60 In contrast to

this position the UNHRC has observed that ‘grounds for annulment and

divorce should be same for men and women’.61 This has been further

supported within the provisions of CEDAW62, which requires states to

ensure that husbands and wives have the same rights and responsibilities

during marriage and at the time of dissolution.

Islamic law of inheritance further poses a serious threat to the issue

of gender equality and this has been pointed out both by academics and

treaty bodies. The UNHRC in its General Comment 28 has emphasized that

women should have equal rights of inheritance with men.63 In view of this,

57Quranic Chapter 4:4 ‘And give unto the women, (whom ye marry) free gift of

their marriage portions; but if they of their own accord remit unto you a part thereof,

then ye are welcome to absorb it (in your wealth)’. 58WIEBKE WALTHER, WOMEN IN ISLAM FROM MEDIEVAL TO MODERN TIMES,

(Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener Publishing) (1993) 47. 59UNHRC General Comment 28, paragraph 24. 60Faskh could be translated as ‘annulment’. Mufti Muhammad Yousuf Danka, The

Shari’ah Ruling of Obtaining Khula and Faskh Nikah the Civil Court, in Croydon

Masjid and Islamic Centre, (01/03/2013) http://www.croydonmosque.com/pdf/

The_Shariah_Ruling_of_Obtaining_Khula_and_Faskh_Nikah_the_Civil_Court.pdf. 61UNHRC, supra note 59, at 26. 62Article 16 (1) (c). 63Id.


the Islamic inheritance rules providing double share to males in comparison

with a single to females, is considered to be serious discrimination against

women. Although many Islamic scholars have tried to justify this rule on the

ground that women have no financial obligations and on this basis the rule is

not discriminatory, such a stance is arguably questionable in present day

world where two-income families are the norm rather than the exception.

There is further argument concerning the curtailment of women’s

freedom of movement and occupation on the basis of the Islamic code of

dress, in particular the veil (hijab). This dress is perceived to limit women

moving in society freely and obtaining jobs in a variety of professions that

require such clothing that allow the whole face of the employee to be

visible. In the United Kingdom, for example, in the context of teaching

children, an employer’s refusal to employ or continue to employ women

teachers who wear a veil was not considered discriminatory by the judiciary

in Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council. 64 A case can therefore

be made that the Islamic rule imposing a veil on women amounts to

discrimination, as it is an indirect limitation on their employment

opportunities.

2. Religious minorities and their Rights

Historical evidence shows that Islam is tolerant towards religious

minorities.65 Despite this there have been incidents of mistreatment and

discrimination of non-Muslims in the Muslim world, however, when judged

by the standards of the day, Muslims generally showed more tolerance and

humanity in their treatment of religious minorities than did the Christian

West.66 Nevertheless, in the present day it has been alleged by human rights

NGOs67 that religious minorities within Muslim nations are victims of

serious discrimination.

In regards to minorities within an Islamic state under the traditional

principles of Shari’a, non-Muslim citizens or dhimmis68 (protected citizens)

64[2007] UKEAT 0009_07_3003 (30 March 2007). 65Timur Kuran, The Economic Ascent of the Middle East’s Religious Minorities:

The Role of Islamic Legal Pluralism, 33(2) The Journal of Legal Studies 475-515

(2004), https://doi.org/10.1086/422707. 66ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS

(Boulder, CO: Westview Press) (3rd ed. 1998). 67Human Rights Watch (HRW) has persistently pointed out such violations in its

reports. 68This concept was limited to ‘people of the Book’ i.e. Christians and Jews but later

was extended to other non-Muslims.


were obliged to pay poll tax known as jizya and enjoyed limited religious,

civil and political rights when compared to a Muslim citizen. Thus,

traditional Islamic legal system assigned different rights and ranks to people

of different religious beliefs.69 The status of non-Muslims as secondary to

Muslims impacts upon their political power and social aspirations by being

excluded from positions of power like heading a Muslim state, military or

judiciary. Missionary work to convert Muslims is also strictly forbidden

even though non-Muslims are free to practice their own religion, and this

point will be dealt with in detail while dealing with apostasy.70 Furthermore,

Islam restricts inter-religious marriages through the rules of Shari’a, which

substantially collides with Article 16 of the UDHR that provides for right to

marriage ‘without limitations due to race, nationality or religion’.

In contrast to the said traditional stance taken in regards to non-

Muslims, such Muslim scholars as Javed Ahmed Ghamdi71 argue that non-

Muslim minorities living today in Muslim countries can be classified as

mu’ahids (citizenship by contract)72.Therefore, keeping in view the general

welfare of the state, through mutual consent, any contract can be made with

non-Muslims in regards to their rights, thus allowing leeway for more liberal

arrangements which would still remain within the ambit of Shari’a

principles as understood by the author. However, this view is not prevalent

amongst majority of Islamic scholars and the area remains predominantly in

conflict with international human rights.

3. Apostasy

The rules concerning apostasy are another area of conflict between

Islamic law and UDHR. Apostasy is generally prohibited and abhorred in

Islam, despite the categorical Quranic verse that ‘there is no compulsion in

religion’73. The contempt towards apostasy was primarily the basis upon

which such Muslim countries as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan

resisted the inclusion of the words ‘freedom of religion includes freedom to

change one’s religion or belief’ in Article 18 of the ICCPR. These states

69Bielefeldt, supra note 32. 70Infra Chapter II, Section B, Subsection 3. 71Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Citizenship and the Rights of a Citizen, (2010) http://

www.javedahmadghamidi.com/meezan/view/citizenship_and_the_rights_of_a_citiz

en. 72The Treaty of Medina between the Prophet and the Jewish tribes is an example of

such citizenship. 73Quran 2, 256.


pressed for the deletion of the clause74 however, HRC has interpreted Article

18 to include that the freedom of religion includes the right to change one’s

own religion by free choice. Such a situation is problematic for Muslim

countries as in their belief system apostasy is outrightly prohibited under

Islamic law and thus freedom of religion comprising of a right to change

one’s religion is arguably undermined.

Despite the Quranic emphasis on freedom of conviction and moral

autonomy, most classical jurists contend that a person who renounces Islam

or converts to another religion commits a crime of ridda (apostasy)

punishable by death. Since the Quran is unequivocal in supporting religious

freedom,75 classical jurists rely, in advocating death penalty for ridda

(renouncing Islam), on hadith, and the precedent of Abu Bakr, the first

Caliph’s declaration of jihad against Arab apostates. This orthodox Islamic

position however, arguably contradicts the practice of Prophet Muhammad

who is reported76 to have pardoned Abdullah bin Sa‘d, an apostate, upon the

plea from Osman bin Affan after Muslims conquered Makkah. Abdullah

was pardoned even though he was still, as the narration indicates, in a state

of ridda and was yet to re-embrace Islam. If ridda was indeed a hadd

crime77, the Prophet would not have been able to pardon such a violation of

the laws of Shari’a. Therefore, contrary to general belief, Islam does grant

freedom of conviction and religion to change one’s religion. It is only if

ridda develops into a serious act of rebellion against an Islamic state, it is

arguable that punishment may become justifiable.78

74The objection was based on the contention that the Quran forbids a Muslim to

change his faith. Dr. Jamil Al-Barudi, the Saudi Arabian delegate to the UN General

Assembly when the UDHR was discussed and voted, argued that the right to change

religion would insult Muslims and invite missionaries into the Arabian Peninsula

thereby violating the UN Charter's prohibition on interference in domestic affairs.

See Irene Oh, Islamic Voices and the Definition of Human Rights, 53(3) Journal of

Church and State 376, 392-393 (Summer 2011). 75The punishment of apostasy is clearly reserved to Allah alone by Quranic Chapter

4: 137 ‘Lo! those who believe, then disbelieve and then (again) believe, then

disbelieve, and then increase in disbelief, Allah will never pardon them, nor will He

guide them unto a way.’ 76See Sirat Rasul Allah the earliest survived sirah by Ibn Hisham. 77In Islamic law or Shari’a, hadd usually refers to the class of punishments that are

fixed for certain crimes that are considered to be ‘claims of God.’ 78Louay Safi, Human Rights and Islamic Legal Reform, www.iiu.edu.my/deed/

articles/human3.pdf.


4. Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression is generally allowed in Islam subject only to

the rules of Shari’a. Article 18 of the ICCPR protects freedom of expression

as a qualified right subject to not breaching another’s right to a good

reputation. The absence of this right within the Muslim world received

much publicity during the Salman Rushdie affair in the late 1980’s (author

of the book ‘The Satanic Verses’) and has made the headlines again after the

Charlie Hebdo’s events in 2015 in Paris. This misunderstood view of

Islamic sources was further indulged by many Muslim countries that

resorted to an interpretation of Shari’a in a way to regulate penal laws of

their countries by condemning the exercise of free speech on ‘sensitive’

religious matters. This has led to preventing even historical criticism of

Holy figures for fear of being prosecuted, which has been argued as a

serious curtailment of freedom of expression. Dissenting opinions on such

matters are generally not appreciated within Muslim nations where the

offence of blasphemy is used to justify such curtailment on freedom of

expression.

In recent years, an effort was made to reconcile freedom of

expression and ‘defamation of religion’ in the United Nations Human Rights

Council (UNHRC) by adoption of landmark Resolution 16/18.79 The

Resolution rests on the rationale that, as a default, more expression is the

best antidote to intolerance, coupled with policies and laws to tackle the root

causes of discrimination. This is also the crux of the UN Rabat Plan of

Action.80 Resolution 16/18 reconciled increasingly polarized views on the

best way to tackle intolerance and discrimination on the basis of religion or

belief and replaced divisive calls at the UNHRC (and the Commission

before it) for States to combat ‘defamation of religions’, a concept

analogous to ‘blasphemy’. Paragraph 5(f) of Resolution 16/18 represents a

consensus in favour of States criminalizing incitement to imminent violence

on the basis of religion or belief, and echoes States’ broader obligations

under Article 20(2) ICCPR to prohibit ‘any advocacy of racial, national or

religious hatred that constitutes incitement to hostility, discrimination or

79UNHRC Resolution 16/18, Combating intolerance, negative stereotyping and

stigmatization of, and discrimination, incitement to violence, and violence against

persons based on religion or belief, (Adopted on 24 March 2011). 80Rabat Plan of Action, Annex to the Annual report of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Human Rights, (11 January 2013), https://www.ohchr.org/

Documents/Issues/Opinion/SeminarRabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf.


violence.’ However, the scope of these commitments and obligations

(respectively) remains a contentious issue at the UNHRC.81

5. Capital Penal Punishments

The international human rights treaty bodies have indicated that

Islamic criminal punishments such as amputation, flogging and stoning to

death are in violation of prohibition on torture and other inhuman or

degrading punishments under international human rights law.82 Article 7 of

the ICCPR categorically condemns degrading punishments. However,

Muslim countries argue that corporal punishments under Shari’a do not

amount to torture because these are lawful sanctions under Islamic law and

under the sole prerogative of the state. Some Islamic scholars have justified

the practice of such punishments on the basis of deterrence theory of

punishment.83 They appear to ignore that modern sociological studies on

criminality ascribe comparatively greater crime deterrence’s impact to the

likelihood of punishment than to its gravity.

In the preceding discussion, the areas of conflict have been

identified to some extent and it appears that despite the fact that Islam

prescribes to a human rights doctrine there exists serious conflict between

some of the norms of international human rights and the Islamic doctrine.

The following section shall discuss the various efforts to reconciliate these

two doctrines.

III.

NEW AND OLD VOICES:

REFORMS AND RECONCILIATION

For many academics, international human rights are a modern legal

phenomenon that sets minimum legal and political standards for human

beings. Being somewhat modern in origin, it leads to the assumption that it

81UNHRC Resolution 16/18: Consolidating consensus through implementation,

https://www.article19.org/resources/un-hrc-resolution-16-18-consolidating-

consensus-through-implementation/. 82Concluding Observations of UNHRC: UN Document CCPR/C/79 Add 25. 83JOHN ESPOSITO, WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM (Oxford:

Oxford University Press), (2002) 151.


cannot draw from Islamic or any other religious tradition. However, the

Islamic tradition does recognize the idea of human dignity and on that basis

reconciliation is possible despite the said areas of conflict.84 In reference to

the existing conflicts, the question that arises is whether and how practical

solutions can be achieved? In answer to this question, different positions

have been put forward by several Muslim scholars.85 In this part of the

research, a variety of different opinions concerning this issue will be

critically evaluated. When addressing these opinions it has to be emphasized

that like every other religion, Islam is not monolithic when it comes to

matters of interpretation thus differences of opinion within the Muslim

world are inevitable.

A. Conservative Voices

When it comes to the compatibility debate between Islam and

human rights, the conservative approach probably dominates the debate

within the Muslim world. Abu Ala Maudoudi is an archetypal figure in

Islamic legal and political scholarship. His views primarily leaned towards

the conservative interpretation of this issue. However, rather than rejecting

the notion of human rights altogether, Maudoudi did argue in favour of

redefining these rights within the framework of the Shari’a. Nevertheless, it

is arguable that such ‘Islamisation’ of human rights is achieved at the cost of

universalism and will not be acceptable to the occidental world. This,

Maudoudi explained in his book ‘Human Rights in Islam’, is due to ‘the

people of the west having the habit of attributing everything good to

themselves and try to argue that it is because of them that the world got this

blessing, otherwise the world was steeped in ignorance and completely

deprived of these benefits’86. Even if one does not agree completely with

Maudoudi one cannot deny that there is some partial truth in his claim

regarding western arrogance that stamps from a belief in having a superior

civilization.87

84Bielefeldt, supra note 32. 85Bielefeldt, supra note 29. 86MAUDOUDI, supra note 44, at 13. 87Luigi Nuzzo, Rethinking eurocentrism. European legal legacy and Western

colonialism, in MASSIMO BRUTTI & ALESSANDRO SOMMA eds., DIRITTO: STORIA E

COMPARAZIONE. NUOVI PROPOSITI PER UN BINOMIO ANTICO, (Munich: Max Planck

Institute for European Legal History) (2018) 359-378.


However, the conservative argument Maudoudi represents does not

solve the problem. While adopting modern human rights language,

Maudoudi fails to address critically the above-mentioned conflicts between

Shari’a and human rights. Moreover, his writing on ‘equality of human

beings’ reveals a restricted understanding of equality, wherein he rejects ‘all

distinctions based on colour, race, language or nationality,’88 but overlooks

issues like gender and religion. This shows a dismissive approach towards

two of the main issues over which traditional Shari’a and modern human

rights collide.89

Hence, it appears that Maudoudi’s approach leads to a superficial

and uncritical ‘Islamisation’ of human rights, that is, an ideological

conception which is certainly not less essentialist than purely ‘Western’ or

‘Christian’ readings of human rights.90 A similar critique was also presented

by Iranian spiritual leader Ayatollah Tashkiri whilst participating in the

German-Iranian conference on human rights in Tehran (1994).91 Such

exclusive Islamisation of human rights under conservative thought, rather

than solving the problems, has created further ones. In order to address the

simplistic views presented by the conservatives, new voices were raised that

began joining the debate within the Muslim world.

B. Moderate Voices and Pragmatic Reforms

The compatibility of Islamic law with modern notions of democracy

and human rights has attracted the attention of many moderate thinkers

within the Muslim world, who have urged for a need towards pragmatic

reforms. Professor Mashood Baderin has engaged in such a debate and

promoted the need for developing a mutual dialogue for arriving at some

form of reconciliation. In his seminal work ‘International Human Rights and

Islamic Law’, Baderin starts from the premise that there is a difference

between ‘universality of’ human rights and ‘universalism in’ human rights.

Few will dispute the ‘universality of’ human rights that emanate from the

acceptance on part of the nation states in recognizing the importance of such

rights through the signing and ratifying of the international human rights

documents. However, ‘universalism in’ human rights concerns actual

88Id. 89Bielefeldt, supra note 32. 90Id. 91As quoted by Bielefeldt, supra note 32.


interpretation and application of the human rights idea.92 This distinction

was relevant for Baderin’s purpose because it would help reach a consensus

between international human rights and Islamic law. In this regards Baderin

discussed four categories of responses to the human rights debate. Firstly,

the view that there is an inherent incompatibility and discord between

human rights and Shari’a; secondly, that true human rights can only be

recognized under Islamic law (conservative argument); thirdly, that

international human rights, as an idea, is part of cultural imperialism that

must be rejected; and finally, the compatibility claim that believes in the

possibility of reconciliation.

In discussing the said categories Baderin rejected the discordant

view on the basis of superficiality and endorsed the compatibility claim.

Nevertheless, Baderin also recognizes the conceptual difference between the

Islamic doctrine and international human rights. He proposed a framework

for mediating between both these systems so as to lessen or even remove the

tensions in order for reconciliation to be achieved. For achieving the

purpose of this framework, he employed the concept of ‘maqasid-al-

Shari’a’ (goals of Shari’a) and ‘maslahah’ (welfare) from Islamic

jurisprudence along with the human rights principle of ‘margin of

appreciation’ from western jurisprudence.

Baderin argued that the protection of human rights within Muslim

countries could be enhanced through the said Islamic concepts. He,

therefore, criticized those orientalists that presented Islamic law as

essentially a defective system that is beyond redemption or mediation.93 In

response to such views, Baderin argued that whenever a conflict arises

between Shari’a and international human rights, the protection of human

rights could be enhanced by making use of ‘maqasid-al-Shari’a’ and

‘maslahah’. However, in case the conflict is a serious one, then Muslim

countries should be granted some ‘margin of appreciation’ and excused in

implementing such a right.

The limitations within Baderin’s approach are quite evident as

argued by Ann Elizabeth Mayer and his solutions have the potential of being

92MASHOOD BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAM (Oxford: OUP)

(2003) 23. 93See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 66. Building upon the technique of Edward Said,

Prof. Strawson has also presented a critique of Mayer’s work on the same lines.

John Strawson, Encountering Islamic Law, Paper presented at Critical Legal

Conference, September 9–12, in Oxford, UK (2009), http://www.witness-

pioneer.org/vil/Articles/shariah/jsrps.html.


misused by Muslim governments. Relying on the doctrine of margin of

appreciation by Islamic governments to escape obligations of international

law can result in policies of discrimination, persecution and repression.94

Perhaps anticipating criticisms, Baderin insisted that there need be no fear of

adverse consequences, since his ‘Islamic’ margin of appreciation would be

reflective of public sensibility and morality, rather than protecting

governments. However, in practice, powerful states inevitably determine

how rights are treated in Muslim countries; history shows how minorities

and disfavoured groups suffered when a majority sensibility determined the

level of human rights protection without any safeguards for vulnerable

groups.95

In regards to Islamic punishments as being contrary to prohibitions

on torture under international law, Baderin concedes that the Quranic source

precludes the possibility of their direct repeal. In the face of this apparent

deadlock, he argues that it is feasible and more pragmatic to seek

reconciliation between the Hudud punishments and international human

rights law through indirect means of strict evidential and procedural shields

available under Shari’a.96

Despite criticisms levelled at Baderin, he is considered a voice of

moderation and pragmatism in the human rights debate. Many Muslim

countries have opted for pragmatic reforms rather than seek a theoretical

consensus on human rights debate. This is evident from several Muslim

countries having restricted the unrestrained right of husbands to repudiate a

marriage by limiting the use of ‘triple talaq’ (talaq-al-bidda). Secondly,

although slavery is not outrightly prohibited under Shari’a, no Muslim

country authorises this practice today. Finally, some Muslim nations have

gone as far as changing their laws of inheritance in order to seek conformity

with international human rights through reforming national family law.

Perhaps, this is what Baderin means by his ‘Islamic’ margin of appreciation

meeting with public sensibilities, which have not responded negatively to

such reforms.

94Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Reviewed works: International human rights and Islamic

law by Mashood Baderin, 99(1) The American Journal of International Law (Jan.,

2005) 302-306. 95Id. 96Baderin, supra note 92, at 85.


C. Liberal Voices and Self-Critical Re-Evaluation of Shari’a

Unlike conservative circles who deny any conflict between Islam

and human rights, liberal Muslims consider the issue of reconciliation to be

a real challenge. There has been a wave of change since the beginning of the

twentieth century which has witnessed an increasing numbers of Muslim

revivalists urging the need for reform in Islamic law to meet the needs of

time. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim is a distinguished name in the Islamic

discourse on Human Rights who has persistently pressed for cross-cultural

dialogue on human rights. An-Naim, along with other liberal Islamic

scholars, is aware of the limits of pragmatic discourse, imposed by the

unchallenged superiority of Shari’a as a divine and unalterable set of legal

norms, which lead towards precarious legitimacy of human rights.

Consequently, human rights will either continue to suffer from not

being considered fully legitimate or, alternatively, conceptual differences

between Shari’a law and human rights will need to fall back into the

resulting ‘Islamized’ version of human rights.97 Thus the need for

progressive tendency towards interpreting classical Shari’a arises, which in

the words of Dr. Fazlur Rahman means that,

whereas the spirit of the Quranic legislation exhibits an obvious

direction towards the progressive embodiment of the fundamental

human values of freedom and responsibility in fresh legislation,

nevertheless the actual legislation of the Quran had partly to accept

the then existing society as a term of reference. This clearly means

that the actual legislation of the Quran cannot have been meant to be

literally eternal by the Quran itself.’98

An-Naim or even Fazlur Rahman are not the first to raise such

issues of evolution in Islamic law and its compatibility with the norms of

modernity. Earlier 20th century Muslim reformers like Muhammad Iqbal of

India and Muhammad Abduh of Egypt pressed for a fresh interpretation of

Islamic law. Muhammad Iqbal argued that there was a need for

reconstructing religious thought of Islam completely in modern times by

exercising extensively the practice of ijtihad (independent reasoning). This

97Bielefeldt, supra note 32, at 17. 98RAHMAN, supra note 56, at 39.


was used as a jurisprudential tool by early jurists of Islam to formulate the

classical model of Shari’a.99

Some reformers even went further by calling into question the

mainly juridical connotations of Shari’a.100 In conjunction with this process

of thought many liberals have emphasized that human dignity can be best

protected under Shari’a if it is only seen as an ethically guiding concept

(huda) rather than a strict legal code.

However, Abdullahi An-Naim has gone even farther, in striving for

reconciliation by building upon the works of his late Sudanese teacher

Muhammad Mahmood Taha. By developing a new hermeneutics approach

to Classical Shari’a, An-Naim came up with a highly controversial

interpretation of the Quran. Conscious of the fact that a critical attitude

towards Shari’a can only be justified if one can show that it is a human

creation and not divinely eternal in nature, he persists in arguing that there is

a general misconception amongst majority of Muslims about the nature of

Islamic law as eternal and representing the whole of Islam. For An-Naim,

Shari’a is nothing but a part of the whole of Islam and is not eternal. Rather,

it is a human interpretation of the eternal sources i.e. Quran and Sunnah.

Having fully embraced this underlying rationale the author was then enabled

to introduce a new interpretive approach towards Quranic injunctions.

The need for such a new interpretive approach was also emphasized

by An-Naim’s late teacher Taha. Unlike Muhammad Iqbal, Taha argues that

exercising ijtihad is not enough for the cause of reconciliation because

ijtihad can only be exercised under Shari’a if there are no categorical

injunctions of Quran and Sunnah regulating the area. Since some of the

categorical injunctions of Quran and Sunnah are in direct conflict with

modern international human rights norms, consequent limitations on the use

of ijtihad won’t help bring Islamic law in conformity with the norms of

international human rights. Building upon this argument, Taha introduced a

new and bold method of interpreting the Quran in his book, The Second

Message of Islam. In traditional exegesis, the Quran distinguishes between

Surahs (Chapters) that were revealed in Makkah and the rest that were

revealed to the Prophet in Medina. For Taha and An-Naim this division

implied theological ranking wherein, the Surahs of Makkan period

contained the eternal theological message of Islam, whilst the Medinan ones

99See MUHAMMAD IQBAL, RECONSTRUCTION OF THOUGHT IN ISLAM (Lahore: Sang-

e-Meel Publishers) (1930). 100Muhammad Said al-Ashmawy, L'islamisme Contre L'islam, 1 Égypte/Monde

arabe 211-219 (1990), http://ema.revues.org/204.


mostly referred to the context specific needs and circumstances of the first

Muslim community and cannot be immediately applied to modern

society.101

According to the said principles, the Makkan Quran, consisting of

eternal principles within the Islamic revelation, emphasized upon human

solidarity and established the principle of justice for all, regardless of

religion, gender, or race. The Madinan Quran, however, placed the solidarity

of male Muslims above all others, thereby giving rise to discrimination

against women and non-Muslims. For this reason, An-Na’im contends, one

finds contradictions between the Makkan and Madinan Quran. While the

Makkan Quran emphasizes upon freedom of religion and peaceful

coexistence amongst different religions, the Madinan Quran exerts Muslims

to compel the unbelievers to accept Islam and introduced measures that

discriminate against women and non-Muslims. Hence, by relying on

classical jurists using the principle of naskh (abrogation) to discard early

Quranic statements that appeared to contradict later statements, An-Na’im

called for the application of reverse naskh, i.e. the abrogation of the

Madinan Quran whenever it contradicts with the Makkan.102 In this regards

An-Naim argues that,

unless the basis of modern Islamic law is shifted away from those

texts of the Quran and Sunnah of the Medina stage, which

constituted the foundations of the construction of Shari’a, there is

no way of avoiding drastic and serious violation of universal

standards of human rights. There is no way to abolish slavery as a

legal institution and no way to eliminate all forms and shades of

discrimination against women and non-Muslims as long as we

remain bound by the framework of Shari’a.103

In order to achieve reform in line with his arguments within the

Muslim world, An-Naim stressed on the existence of secular states, which

raised a further problem concerning legitimacy of a secular state in Islam. In

his most recent book, ‘Islam and the Secular State’, An-Na`im presents

Islamic arguments for the separation of Islam and the state in regulating the

relationship between Islam and politics. He argues that since Islam decrees

Muslims to practice their religion through voluntary conviction thus, the

101ABDULLAHI A. AN-NA'IM, TOWARDS AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION. CIVIL

LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (New York: Syracuse

University Press) (1990) 54. 102Louay Safi, supra note 78, at 3. 103AN-NAIM, supra note 101.


state should not impose Shari`a. Further, the idea of a secular state is not

alien to Islamic history and the state enforcing Shari`a can undermine its

political authority, leading to possible public hypocrisy (nifaq). For instance,

if one considers how some Islamic scholars assert apostasy being punishable

by death even though the Qur'an does not provide such punishment. Thus, if

a state enforced the views of such scholars, then some Muslims subjects of

that legal system may be forced to contradict their own beliefs, violating

their personal freedom of religion, and being forced to follow positive laws

which they would perceive as undermining the coherence of Islam itself.104

However, Talal Asad in his critique to An-Naim’s work, argues that it’s

difficult, if not impossible, to separate religion from politics because in

order to protect religion the state has to inevitably define religion, by taking

upon itself the right to decide what religion is and what it is not. History

teaches us that this results in shifting the way in which people regard what is

essentially religion and thus support or dismiss what is presented as being an

essential part of religion.105

The methodology presented by An-Naim appears to present a

solution to the problem of reconciliation but it is not without its critics. The

main argument against his stance is that it undermines the divinity of the

holy book, Quran. Since the majority of Muslims consider the Quran to be

the literal word of Allah, abrogating almost one third of the Quran won’t be

acceptable to such Muslims. An-Nai’m’s radical approach towards the

Quran may even be opposed by those who agree that there is a need for

fresh interpretation. Furthermore, such an intellectualized attitude toward

Shari’a won’t appeal to ordinary Muslims around the world. On this very

basis, some have argued that An-Naim’s liberal approach may have little

influence outside of the academic debate.

It is important to mention that An-Na'im is not the only

contemporary Muslim scholar who has called for a new hermeneutics

approach to reading of the Quran, although there are a few who share his

specific methodology. Fazlur Rahman, for instance, criticizes the common

exegesis of the Quran as ‘piecemeal, ad hoc, and often quite extrinsic.’106

The Egyptian professor Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, another liberal thinker, has

proposed the need for new hermeneutics to critically recapture the guiding

spirit of the Quran and Sunnah. For him some of the historic details are not

104ABDULLAHI A. AN-NAIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE

FUTURE OF SHARI’A (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) (2008). 105Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs, supra note 54. 106FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNITY: TRANSFORMATION OF AN

INTELLECTUAL TRADITION (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) (1982) 4.


part of the essential message of Islam and should not be a hurdle in the way

of justice and equality.107 Besides these, a feminist reading of the Quran has

also been presented by Dr. Riffat Hassan on the basis of strict monotheistic

creed of Islam that negates any sort of social hierarchies and power

relations.108

Regardless of the important contributions made by such liberal

voices within Islamic jurisprudence concerning human rights, these have

always been repressed and marginalized by Islamist regimes. Ann Elizabeth

Mayer presents this as a tragedy, which is among the reasons that cause

most Muslim countries having despotic regimes, lacking in legitimacy,

which have used the name of Islam to justify their own violations of

constitutional rights along with violating serious international human rights

obligations.109 The Arab spring movement, which was portrayed as a wave

of democratic renaissance in some Islamic North-African and Middle

Eastern countries, has brought very little change to that author’s description.

Nevertheless, despite being marginalized these new voices from within the

Islamic world are persistently making their mark on such an important

debate. This arguably represents the ever brightening flame of resistance

that may lead towards an age of reformation in Islamic thought.

IV.

THE CAIRO DECLARATION:

ALTERNATIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY?

In the previous part of this work it has been shown that there exists

much diversity within the Muslim world regarding the human rights debate.

In this section, a detailed analysis of the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights

in Islam (CDHRI) will be made. It shall be evaluated whether CDHRI is

actually an alternative to UDHR or is it just a complementary document

107Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, The Concept of Human Rights, the Process of

Modernization and the Politics of Western Domination, 4 Politik amd Gesellshaft:

International Politics and Society 434-437 (1998). 108Riffat Hassan, On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective, in ARLENE

SWIDLER ed., HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS (New York: The Pilgrim

Press) (1982) 63. 109See Mayer, supra note 94.


which deepens understanding of UDHR and adds a further dimension to the

debate on human rights and Islam.

A controversy regarding the CDHRI was fuelled by the

International Ethical and Humanist Union (IEHU), an NGO working for the

protection of international human rights. On 28th of February 2008, a joint

written statement was submitted by the IEHU, Association for the World

Education (AWE) and the Association of World Citizens (AWC), all non-

governmental organizations on the roster of the Human Rights Commission

regarding CDHRI. It was argued in this statement that the CDHRI

undermines the universality of international human rights as enshrined under

the UDHR.110 In order to opine on the said allegation a detailed analysis of

the provisions of CDHRI will follow.

As referred to earlier in this research, when UDHR was adopted in

1948 almost every Muslim nation adopted it with the exception of Saudi

Arabia. With the passage of time, Muslim countries realized the need for

asserting their own religious and cultural identity on the international

platform. This arose in the backdrop to the gradual increase in cynical

attitude within the Islamic world towards international law in general and

human rights in particular. One such response could be seen in the above

mentioned statement of Iranian representative to the United Nations Said

Rajaie-Khorassani, who referred to the UDHR as nothing but ‘a secular

understanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition’, which could not be

implemented by Muslim countries without violating the injunctions of the

Quran and Sunnah.111

Nevertheless, as Muslim countries became more conscious about

the issue of human rights, the CDHRI was adopted on August 5, 1990 by 45

members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to serve as

‘guidance for the member states in the matters of human rights.’112 Such has

been the influence of CDHRI that at the 1993 World Conference on Human

Rights in Vienna, Iran, supported by several other Islamic States, pressed for

the acceptance of the Cairo Declaration as an alternative to the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights. This objective was partly achieved in 1997

when the Cairo Declaration was included by the Office of the High

110Supra note 5. The Secretary-General has received the ensuing written statement

which was circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution

1996/31 on 28 February 2008. 111Litman, supra note 26. 112Id.


Commissioner for Human Rights as the last document113 in an official

compilation of international human rights instruments.114

In each part of the preamble and of its twenty-five articles, the

Declaration takes Islamic philosophy as its starting point and source of

inspiration. Article 24115 and 25116 for instance establish the primacy of

Shari’a overall other rights and freedoms that are granted under domestic or

international law in application of the Declaration and indicate Shari’a as

the only tool for clarification of all CDHRI provisions. It appears as if the

Cairo Declaration continues in maintaining the confusion between Muslim

Religion and Shari’a law. Thus, several rights are recognised ‘within the

framework of Shari’a’ (Article 12) or as open to be exercised in ‘a

legitimate way’ (Article 15) or only in ways that are not contrary to Shari’a

(Article 16).117

Consequently, such provisions as Article 10 of the Declaration

relating to freedom of conscience are articulated in such a way that only

proclaims the freedom to be a Muslim by declaring Islam the only religion

of true and unspoiled nature.118 Although freedom of expression is contained

in Article 22, it is also curtailed by the fact that free opinion should not be

‘contrary to the principles of Shari’a’.119 Further, nowhere in the declaration

is equality between non-Muslims and Muslims mentioned. The issue of

gender equality though, contained in Article 6, maintains that women and

men are equal in dignity but this does not necessarily mean equality in rights

and therefore the position of gender equality remains uncertain.

On the basis of the above-mentioned criticisms, IEHU argued that

the provisions of the Cairo Declaration limit and curtail certain rights

113Id. 114OHCHR, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments: Volume II:

Regional Instruments (New York and Geneva: OHCHR Publications) (1997). 115Article 24 of CDHRI: ‘All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration

are subject to the Islamic Shari’ah’. 116Article 25 of CDHRI: ‘The Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of reference for

the explanation or clarification of any of the articles of this Declaration’. 117MOHAMMED CHARFI., ISLAM AND LIBERTY: THE HISTORICAL

MISUNDERSTANDINGS, (London: Zed Books) (2005), p 68. 118Article 10 of CDHRI: ‘Islam is the religion of true unspoiled nature’. It is

prohibited to exercise any form of pressure on man or to exploit his poverty or

ignorance in order to force him to change his religion to another religion or to

atheism.’ 119Article 22(a) of CDHRI: ‘Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion

freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah’.


granted under UDHR. Further, it seems to undermine the universality of

international human rights by proclaiming the supremacy of Shari’a. Such a

situation, it was argued, gives the readers of the Declaration an impression

that CDHRI is an alternative to UDHR.120 However, while clarifying this

impression on Human Rights Day, 10 December 2007, the Ambassador of

Pakistan, addressing the Human Rights Council on behalf of the OIC,

referred to CDHRI as ‘not an alternative, competing worldview on human

rights. It complements the Universal Declaration as it addresses religious

and cultural specificity of the Muslim countries’.121

The said stance of the Pakistani Ambassador was criticized by the

IEHU who argued that CDHRI cannot be a complementary document

because it conflicts with UDHR by establishing supremacy of Shari’a. Such

an argument of course cannot lead one to believe that CDHRI is an

alternative to UDHR because not every country in the world believes in the

religion of Islam. Furthermore, unlike UDHR this declaration has not yet

been translated into legally binding international covenants. The question

then arises as to the precise status of CDHRI.

In attempting an answer, the Cairo Declaration can be basically seen

a politically authoritative statement on part of the Muslim states that points

towards them as also having a human rights document. Some authors122 see

it as a response to UDHR and western hegemony with regards to human

rights discourse. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to state that even though the

CDHRI has been endorsed by all members of the OIC, yet it still fails to

take into account the diversity of opinion that exist within the Muslim

world. It is arguably representative of the conservative point of view that

believes in ‘Islamisation’ of human rights. On the basis of this argument it is

reasonable to resist any attempt to grant CDHRI the same status as UDHR.

120Supra note 5. 121Ambassador Masood Khan, Statement of Pakistan’s Permanent Representative

to the United Nations on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, on

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Geneva, 10 December 2007,

http://www.pakistanmission-un.org/2005_Statements/CHR/sthrcamb_10dec07.htm 122See Littman, supra note 26.


V.

IS RECONCILIATION A POSSIBILITY?

In this article it has been shown that the human rights debate has

triggered a chain- reaction within the Muslim world and as a consequence a

diversity of opinions has arisen on this issue. The conservative circles

outrightly deny the possibility of any clash between Islam and the norms of

human rights, thereby simply merging the language of modern human rights

with Classical Shari’a.123 The Cairo Declaration came about as a practical

manifestation of such a view and consequently it won’t be preposterous to

say that the conservative argument reflects the sentiments of the majority of

Muslims around the globe.

However, the practical implications of such a conservative approach

may be very drastic for international human rights as well as Muslims.

Instead of a genuine reconciliation, a mere aiming for an Islamisation of

human rights may end up leading towards relativism which could defeat the

very purpose of such a dialogue, insofar as every one of the two sides of the

dialogue would either feel compelled to entrench their respective position or

to consider any approach as equally relevant. The risk with both positions is

to defeat the very purpose of human rights, which is to ensure the basic

dignity of the human person wherever it is and this cannot be achieved by

either of the previous stances: the first seems to impair dialogue itself, the

second may lead to fundamental dignity violations as mentioned above. So,

instead of being defensive and resorting to obscurantism, Muslims need to

tackle the issue of human rights head on. It has to begin with acknowledging

that there is a genuine need for addressing the issue forthrightly,

courageously and without the slightest amount of equivocation and

confusion.124

A move towards such acknowledgment began and is picking up

momentum despite the dominant voices of conservatism trying to drown it.

It has been shown in this research that the call for reformation is quite

persistent amongst the marginalized moderate and liberal thinkers within the

Muslim world itself, who have argued in favour of adopting a self-critical

attitude towards the model of classical Shari’a with respect to human rights.

An evaluation on the existing views concerning this debate was made and

within it the possibility of reconciliation between Islam and international

human rights was sought. During the course of writing this article a few of

123Bielefeldt, supra note 32, at 614. 124David. F. Forte., Calling for an Islamic Reformation, 54(1) The Review of

Politics 161-162 (Winter, 1992).


the following findings were made which may enhance the possibility of

reconciliation.

Firstly, by using the concept of ‘overlapping’ consensus employed

by Professor John Rawls, reconciliation may become a possibility. The term

refers to how supporters of different comprehensive doctrines can agree on a

specific form of political organization. These doctrines can include religion,

political ideology or even morals 125 and though this is not a factual but a

normative consensus yet it opens the door for pluralism in modern society.

The need of the time is to aim for a cross-cultural overlapping consensus.

Since universalism in international human rights is not something that

actually exists, hence it needs to be ‘constructed’ through constantly

engaging in mutual dialogue. Adoption of UNHRC Resolution 16/18 was a

practical manifestation of this dialogue.

Although the modern notion of human rights appears to be best

protected under a democratic setup, it needs to be acknowledged that

democracy can only prosper in a society where pluralism is accepted by

majority of its populace. So, in this regard efforts should be made to raise

awareness regarding the issue of tolerance and pluralism within the Muslim

world, wherein the responsibility primarily lies with the educated Muslim

intelligentsia.

The analysis so far conducted seems to show that the majority of

Muslims perceive human rights to be an alternative ‘civil religion’ that

threatens their own sense of identity. This is a major misconception and it

needs to be clarified that human rights standards are not yardsticks to judge

or evaluate religions and cultures. Human rights are there to set legal and

political threshold of protection of the individual against the state, and

therefore their scope is limited. There is no need to fear such an idea

because the human rights discourse can never answer the existential

questions regarding the meaning of life and how human ought to live.126

It became further evident that there is a need for new Islamic

hermeneutics to re-evaluate the model of classical Shari’a as emphasised by

An-Nai’m. However, one does not necessarily need to embrace An-Nai’m’s

radical approach. An interpretive approach coupled with gradual and

pragmatic reforms will be more beneficial and effective for the cause of

reconciliation. Therefore, building on An-Naim’s value for reconciliation of

human rights and Islam through the support of culture, and Jason Foster’s

125JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (New York: Columbia University Press)

(1993) 133. 126Bielefeldt, supra note 32.


‘reverse moderate relativism theory’127 of taking other legal systems as

benchmarks to enhance the cross-cultural dialogue on human rights, a

proposition can be put forward where culture is not used only as a support of

human rights, but as a methodology to provide clearer definitions that

should encourage compliance.128 The impact of such reforms will go beyond

just mere academic influence.

The legitimacy, effectiveness and continuity of such reforms will

arise if these come from within the Muslim world itself. Any imposing of

such reforms by outer forces, in particular from the non-Muslim world may

cause a reaction that will have a substantial potential of disrupting the

process of reformation and reconciliation. It needs to be realized that the

Muslim world should be left to learn from its own experiences as the

western world did. Authentic reforms are indigenously rooted and nationally

owned.

CONCLUSION

One may conclude from this debate that Muslim countries cannot

remain isolated from the influence of international human rights; the

importance of which is ever increasing. The underlying Islamic

jurisprudence regarding the issue of human rights suggests that there is a

genuine possibility of reconciliation and efforts should be made to achieve

it. It should be born in mind that a cross-cultural dialogue will not

undermine the universality of international human rights as the UDHR is not

a finished or frozen document. Charles Malik believed that over time the

Declaration’s principles would ‘either bring to light an implicit agreement

already operative, perhaps dimly and unconsciously, in the systems and

ways of life of the various peoples, or consciously and creatively advance

127The example around which this theory is formed is third generation solidarity

rights, in terms of how Islamic concepts of duties can be used to influence

understanding third generation rights in the human rights debate. See Jason Foster,

Reverse Moderate Relativism Applied: Third generation International Human

Rights from an Islamic Perspective, Working Paper 235 (Berkley CA: University of

Berkley Press) 1, 1-7 (2004), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?

article=1569&context=expresso. 128Jumana Shehata, Islam and Human Rights: Revisiting the Debate, 1(1) Arab

Insight 73-88 (2007).


further the area of agreement’.129 Engaging in a cross-cultural hermeneutics

on human rights may help in moving towards the universality which UDHR

proclaims, but this achievement still lies in the future and a serious

consideration of the Islamic discourse on human rights may further this

cause.

129Madame Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement for

Human Rights Day 2007, http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/view01/

3D951CA81B3A42FAC12573AD003B007A?opendocument.


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