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1-1 International Decision Making in the Age of Genocide: Srebrenica 1993-1995 June 28 – July 1, 2015 The Hague Edited Transcript Session 1: Creating the “Safe Areas” Meeting room in The Hague TOM BLANTON: Good morning. Thank you very much for coming to the table. A reminder about our methodology: everything said at this table is on background for now but we are recording the session and will produce a transcript. 1 You will have the opportunity to correct your remarks before we release the transcript. One of our goals is to expand the historical record on Srebrenica. If you turn to your briefing books, you will find a summary of key points that we plan to address in each of the four sessions. 2 This morning we want to start with the eyewitnesses on the ground in the spring of 1993. We know this is an arbitrary date. There is an argument to be made that the sins that led to Srebrenica go back to 1 This transcript was annotated and edited for clarity by conference staff and participants in accordance with conference ground rules. 2 USHMM, “Conference Agenda,” June 28, 2015.

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  • 1-1

    InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeofGenocide:Srebrenica1993-1995June28–July1,2015

    TheHagueEditedTranscript

    Session1:Creatingthe“SafeAreas”

    MeetingroominTheHague

    TOMBLANTON:Goodmorning.Thankyouverymuchforcomingtothetable.A

    reminderaboutourmethodology:everythingsaidatthistableisonbackgroundfor

    nowbutwearerecordingthesessionandwillproduceatranscript.1Youwillhave

    theopportunitytocorrectyourremarksbeforewereleasethetranscript.Oneofour

    goalsistoexpandthehistoricalrecordonSrebrenica.

    Ifyouturntoyourbriefingbooks,youwillfindasummaryofkeypointsthat

    weplantoaddressineachofthefoursessions.2Thismorningwewanttostartwith

    theeyewitnessesonthegroundinthespringof1993.Weknowthisisanarbitrary

    date.ThereisanargumenttobemadethatthesinsthatledtoSrebrenicagobackto

    1Thistranscriptwasannotatedandeditedforclaritybyconferencestaffandparticipantsinaccordancewithconferencegroundrules.2USHMM,“ConferenceAgenda,”June28,2015.

  • 1-2

    thediplomaticrecognitionprocess[in1990-1992],thelackofprotectionforethnic

    minoritiesduringthatearlyperiod,thearmsembargo,orthefamousJimBaker

    comment,"Wedon'thaveadoginthatfight"whentheAmericanswentmissing.3

    ButforthepurposesofthisconferenceandourfocusonSrebrenica,wewant

    tobeginwithGeneralMorillon'svisittoSrebrenicainMarch1993.4MichaelDobbs,

    willyouleadusoffwithafewawkwardquestions?

    MICHAELDOBBS:Thankyou,Tom.Thisisthesecondinaseriesofconferencesthat

    weareorganizingunderthetitle"InternationalDecisionMakingintheAgeof

    Genocide,"lookingatthebigcrisesofthepost-ColdWarperiod.5Lastyear,wehada

    conferenceonRwandawithasimilarsetuparoundthetable.Wehadmembersof

    theUNSecurityCouncilontheleft,GeneralDallaireandtheotherUNpeacekeepers

    inthemiddle,andthepeoplewhonegotiatedtheArushaAccordsontheright.I

    thinkthat[formerUKrepresentativeontheUNSecurityCouncil]DavidHannayis

    sittinginexactlythesamechairthatyouoccupiedforourRwandaconference.You

    provideathreadofcontinuitybetweenthetwoconferences,asdoes[formerUS

    AssistantSecretaryofStateforHumanRights]JohnShattuck.

    ManyoftheofficialswhowereinvolvedinRwandadecision-makingwere

    alsoinvolvedinBosnia.Therearesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenthosetwo

    events.Oneofthesimilaritiesisthegapinperceptionsbetweenthepeopleonthe

    groundandthepeopleinNewYorkandthenationalcapitals.InthecaseofRwanda,

    itwasasifthedebatesweretakingplaceonthreedifferentplanets.Therewerethe

    peoplewhonegotiatedtheArushaAgreements,thepeacekeeperswhoimplemented

    theagreements,andtheUNofficialsinNewYorkwhosupervisedtheentireprocess.

    Therewasimperfectcommunicationbetweenthesethreegroupsofactors.We

    discoveredthattherewasimperfectcommunicationwithinthesameinstitution:at

    3SecretaryofStateJamesA.BakervisitedBelgradeonJune21,1991,meetingwithawiderangeofYugoslavleaders,fivedaysbeforetheoutbreakofwarbetweenSerbiaandSlovenia.Hiscomment“wedon’thaveadoginthatfight”wasreportedlaterbyNationalSecurityAdvisorBrentScowcroft.4GeneralPhilippeMorillonvisitedSrebrenicafromMarch10to13,1993,attheheadofaUNhumanitarianaidconvoywhilethetownwasundersiegebyBosnianSerbforces.5MoreinformationontheInternationalDecisionMakingprojectcanbefoundontheUSHolocaustMemorialMuseumwebsite.

  • 1-3

    theUnitedNations,forexample,betweentheSecretariatandtheSecretary-General,

    orbetweentheSecretariatandtheSecurityCouncil.Isuspectthatwewillfind

    similardisconnectsinthecaseofBosnia.

    Tosetthestageforourdiscussiontoday,IreadRupertSmith'sexcellent

    chapteronBosniainTheUtilityofForceinwhichhewritesthattheseedsforthe

    Srebrenicadisasterwere“sownwiththedecisionsmadeinthespringof1993:

    decisionstothreatenwithnointentiontoact,todeployforceswithnointentionto

    employtheirforce,decisionsmadeinnopoliticalcontextexceptfearofthe

    consequencesofactiontotheforce.”6Healsocommentsonthelackofany

    overarchingstrategy.Hesaystherewasnostrategicdirection,noachievable

    militarygoals,nomilitarycampaign,notheaterlevelmilitaryobjectives,only

    incoherence.Hetalksabout“theimperativetodosomethingandthescrambleto

    createapolicy.”WemaynotagreewithGeneralSmith’sassessment,butwewill

    certainlyhavetograpplewithhiscritiqueoverthenextcoupleofdays.

    Thismorning,wewilllookattheperiodfromMarch1993,whenGeneral

    MorillonarrivesinSrebrenicatoaccompanyahumanitarianconvoy,throughthe

    threeUNSecurityCouncilresolutionsthatestablishedtheSafeAreasandsetthe

    parametersfortheirprotection.7TheeventsofJuly1995areshapedbythe

    decisionstakenin1993.

    Afewquestionsforustoconsider:whatwasthenatureofthecommitments

    containedinthesethreeUNresolutions?Didthepeoplearoundthistable—UN

    ambassadors,membersoftheUNSecretariat,thepeacekeepers—haveaclearidea

    ofthepolicythatyouformulatedbackin1993?Howweretheresolutionsmeantto

    beimplemented?WhatwastheproperroleofUNPROFOR?Wasitaclassic

    peacekeepingmissionorwasitapeaceenforcementmission?DuringourRwanda

    conference,therewasalotofdiscussionabouttherulesofengagement,authorized

    underChapterVIoftheUNCharter.IntheBosnia“SafeArea”resolutions,youwill

    6RupertSmith,TheUtilityofForce:TheArtofWarintheModernWorld,150.7TheUNSecurityCounciladoptedResolution819onApril16,1993,callingonthewarringpartiestotreatSrebrenicaas“asafearea”.UNSCResolution824ofMay4addedfivemore“safeareas”:Sarajevo,Tuzla,Žepa,Goražde,andBihać.OnJune4,UNSCResolution836extendedUNPROFOR’smandate“todeterattacksagainstthesafeareas.”

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    findreferencestoChapterVII[e.g.in819and836]oftheUNCharter,butitis

    unclearwhetherthiswasmeanttobeaChapterVIImissionoraChapterVImission.

    Whatwastheproperroleofpeacekeepers?Shouldtheybestrictlyneutral,or

    shouldtheytakesidesintheconflict?[TurnstoDavidHarland,authorofthe1999

    UNreportonSrebrenica].InyourreportonSrebrenica,youconcludeattheendthat

    peacekeeperscannotbeimpartialwhenconfrontedwith"attemptedgenocide."8We

    shouldtalkaboutthat.Underwhatcircumstanceswasairpowermeanttobeused

    todefendtheenclaves?Weretherealternativestotheestablishmentof“Safe

    Areas”?WastheVance-Owenpeaceplanapossiblealternative?Wastherea

    strategyforendingthewarinBosnia,manystrategies,ornostrategyatall?Weare

    alsointerestedintherelationshipbetweenthehumanitariangoalsofUNPROFOR

    andthestrategicgoals.Istherealinkbetweenthetwo?Shouldoneservetheother,

    oraretheyentirelyseparate?

    SHASHITHAROOR:BeforewestartatMarch1993,surelywehavetounderstand

    whatUNPROFORwasdoingthereinthefirstplace:whyitwasdeployed,whatthe

    logicofitwas,whyitevenhadthenameitdidandeverythingelse.Morillon'svisit

    didnothappeninavacuum.TherewasayearandahalfofUNPROFORbeforethat.

    EverythingRupertSmithsaysinthatextractyoureadisabsolutelyaccurate,but

    thatispreciselybecauseofthewayinwhichthisoperationhadevolveduptothat

    point.

    DAVIDHANNAY:Ithinkitisworthspendinghalfanhourorsoonthecontext.The

    documents[inthebriefingbook]arefascinating,theyrecallmuchtome,butthey

    aretotallycontext-less.Youwouldnotknowfromthesepapers,forexample,that

    theSecurityCouncilandmemberstatesweregrapplingwiththebiggestsplitin

    NATOinlivingmemoryover“liftandstrike.”9YouwouldnotknowthattheSecurity

    8UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly,“ThefallofSrebrenica,”A/54/549,November15,1999,henceforth“1999UNSrebrenicareport.”9“LiftandStrike”referredtoaU.S.proposaltoliftthearmsembargoimposedontheBosniangovernment(andotherYugoslavrepublics)inSeptember1991anduseairstrikestoforcetheBosnianSerbstothenegotiatingtable.ThestrategywasadoptedbyBillClintonduringthe1992presidential

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    Councilwassettingupitsfirstwarcrimestribunal.10Youwouldnotknowthatthe

    SecurityCouncilwasimposingonSerbiathebiggestpackageofeconomicsanctions

    thathadeverbeenimposed.11So,thereisalotmissingfromthecontext,whichdoes

    notchangetheviewthatRuperthasrightlyexpressed,thattheSrebrenicadecision

    andtheSafeAreasdecisionweretakenwithoutproperconsiderationoftheir

    possibleconsequences,butrelatetothequestionofwhethertherewasastrategy.

    Therewasastrategy.Itwasabadstrategy,butitwasastrategy.Thestrategywas

    nottodoliftandstrike,nottodotheVance-Owenpeaceprocess,tosetupacriminal

    tribunal,toimposesanctionsonSerbia,andhopeforthebest.

    SHASHITHAROOR:Weneedtotalkaboutthebackground.WhydidMorillongoto

    Srebrenica?Whatsortofmissionwashedeployedon?Youcannotstartoffwiththe

    missionwithoutunderstandingwhathewasdoingthere.IwillbeasbriefasIcan,

    butunfortunatelyIamthepersonherewiththelongestUNinvolvementinthis

    issue.IwentoutontheveryfirstmissioninOctober1991that[UNUnder-

    Secretary-General]MarrackGouldingundertookwhentheEuropeanCommunity

    wasanxioustohandthisparticularhotpotatototheUN.Youmayrememberthe

    Europeanpeacemonitorsbeingcalled"icecreamsalesmen"afewmonthsbefore

    that.12TherewereEuropeanCommunitymonitorsinCroatiaandBosnia.Ourgoal

    wastoseewhetherapeacekeepingoperationwasviableforCroatia.Therewas

    enormouspoliticalpressureonusfromEuropetotakethison.Gouldingwas

    relativelynewtopeacekeeping,buthadbeenverythoroughlyschooledintheDag

    Hammarskjöldcatechismofpeacekeeping:thedoctrineofcompleteneutrality,not

    takingsidesintheconflict,deployinginhighlyvisibleconfigurations,vehicles

    campaign,andadoptedasofficialU.S.policyinMay1993,butabandonedbecauseofoppositionfromU.S.allies.See“DecisionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,"May17,1993.10TheInternationalCriminalTribunalfortheformerYugoslaviawasestablishedunderUNSecurityCouncilresolution827ofMay25,1993.11TheUNSecurityCouncilpassedResolution820onApril17,1993,restrictingimportsandexportsfromSerbiaandMontenegro.Previousresolutionsincluded713(1991),724(1991),757(1992)and787(1992).12SeveralhundredEuropeanobserversweredeployedtoCroatiaaspartoftheEuropeanCommunityMonitoringMissioninJuly1991.Croatsdubbedthem“icecreamsalesmen”becauseoftheiruniformofwhitesuitsandwhiteshoes,whichweredesignedtogivethemprotection.See,forexample,RayMoseley,“EuropeanPeaceTalksOfferLittleHopeofYugoslavSettlement,”ChicagoTribune,September25,1991.

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    paintedwhiteandallthatstuff.Thiswasthelogicwithwhichweapproachedthe

    entireconcept.

    UNPROFORwassetup[underUNSecurityCouncilResolution743of

    February21,1992]forpoliticalreasonseventhoughwementionedinourinitial

    reporttotheSecurityCouncilthattherewasnoreallyviableconceptof

    peacekeepingthatallsidesagreedupon.13Wecalledthepeacekeepingforce

    UNPROFOR,meaningUnitedNationsProtectionForce,whichreflectedGoulding's

    optimism.Wewerereallynotinthebusinessofprotectinganybodysignificantly.

    Wehadobserverstobeginwithandlateravery,verysmallmilitarydeployment.

    WhenthetroublesbeganinBosnia,intheearlyspringof1992,Europeanmembers

    oftheSecurityCouncilasked[UNSecretary-GeneralBoutros]Boutros-Ghalito

    extendUNPROFORtoBosnia.Itisoftenoverlookedthatthe[April24,1992]report

    submittedbytheSecretary-Generalexplicitlysaid,"…inthelightofallthefactors

    bearingonthecurrentsituationinBosnia-Herzegovina,thedeploymentofapeace-

    keepingforcetherewasnotfeasible."14Itisthereinblackandwhite,apublic

    document.

    Manyofyouarenottooyoungtorememberthewonderfuloldsong,"Ifyou

    can'tbewiththeoneyoulove,lovetheoneyou'rewith."Sincetheycouldnotfind

    anyotherresponsetothiscrisisintheSecurityCouncil,theytooktheoneavailable

    mechanism,namelyUNpeacekeeping,andappliedittoasituationforwhichitwas

    manifestlynotsuited,astheSecretary-Generalhimselfsaidinblackandwhite.That

    ishowUNPROFORbackedintopeacekeepinginBosnia.

    Thecabletrafficthroughout1992fromthefield,uptotheMorillonvisitto

    SrebrenicainMarch1993,showsthemountingcontradictionsinsuchamandate.

    Youhaveapeacekeepingoperationwherethereisnopeacetokeep,withamandate

    designedtoprotectSerbianciviliansinCroatia,andCroatiancivilianscaughtupin

    thewar.ThatwastheoriginalmandateofUNPROFOR.ItwasinBosniaessentiallyto

    beablereportbacktotheCouncilthatitwasdoingsomething.WhenSarajevo 13Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution721(1991),”S/23280,December11,1991.14Boutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralPursuanttoSecurityCouncilResolution749(1992),”S/23836,April24,1992.

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    airportfelltotheSerbs,UNPROFORbecamethemechanismtoprizetheairport

    awayfromthem[inJune1992]andhanditovertointernationalsupervision.15In

    theabsenceofacoherentvision,UNPROFORwasexpectedtotakeallthison.Itis

    againstthisbackground,withoutanyverycoherentoragreedconceptorplanof

    operationsthatMorillongoestoSrebrenicainMarch1993.Thatisaveryshort

    summaryofsomethingfarmorecomplicatedandmessy,butprovidesthe

    DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsperspectiveatthetimethisSrebrenica

    adventurebegins.

    DAVIDHARLAND:Iagreewiththepointthatyoucannotunderstandthefallofthe

    SafeAreasuntilyouunderstandhowUNPROFORgotintoBosniainthefirstplace.

    WeshouldalsorememberthattheideaofSafeAreaswasextensivelydiscussedin

    1992longbefore“Srebrenica.”ItwasraisedbyAustriaandHungaryinparticular.

    Thereisaveryinteresting,andIthinkprofound,correspondencerelatingtothe

    establishmentofSafeAreas.16Theideaactuallycomesupinamessagefrom

    [AustrianforeignministerAlois]Mockto[InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

    PresidentCornelio]Sommarugaaskingabout“safetyzones”astheyarereferredto

    intheGenevaConventions.17Sommarugathenrepliessayingthattheyhavecertain

    characteristics:theyareabsolutelyunarmed,theyarefortheprotectionofhospitals

    andsoon.HeaskswhetherornottheUNSecretariathasbeenconsulted.Thenthere

    isanotherletterto[UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesSadako]Ogata.

    Ogatarepliesfirmlyontherecordthatthisisanabsolutelyterribleideawhich,if

    everused,shouldbelimitedtosimplyprotectinghospitalsbyagreement.The

    reasonIraisethisisbecauseitshowshowinternationaldecisionsaresometimes

    made.Anideaentersintoplayandisshapedandchanged.Thefactthatitentered

    intoplayasanideatobediscountedissomethingthatsometimesgetsforgottenas

    timegoesby.

    15UNSC,“Resolution758(1992),”June8,1992.16ForbackgroundondiscussionofUNSafeAreas,seeparagraphs45-51,of1999UNreportonSrebrenica,A/54/549.17AnnantoStoltenberg,“Safeareas,”UNDPKO,MSC-870,May28,1993.

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    MICHAELDOBBS:WewillcertainlylookattheoriginsoftheSafeAreasconcept,and

    thedifferencesbetweenthewayinwhichitwasappliedinplaceslikeKurdistanand

    Bosnia,butletusgotoLarryHollingworthnow.Larry,youaccompaniedGeneral

    MorillontoSrebrenicainMarch1993.Canyoudescribethecircumstancesofthis

    visitandwhatyourememberfromthevisit?

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:IwasinBosnia[withtheUnitedNationsHigh

    CommissionforRefugees]primarilytodeliverhumanitarianaid.Iworkedprimarily

    inSarajevo,butwewerealwaysremindedthattherewerethese[Muslim-inhabited]

    enclaves[inSerbian-controlledterritory],andthatweshoulddosomethingabout

    theseenclaves.18IhadmanagedtogetintoGoraždeandŽepa.Wetriedtogetinto

    Cerska,butwerekeptout.Wehadthreehumanitarianreliefconvoysdottedaround

    Bosnia.Wecouldnotmoveanyofthem.WespentthreedaysoutsideZvornik.

    Finally,MadameOgatasaid“enoughisenough”andpulledusallback.Thiswasthe

    veryfirsttimethatIfeltthatGeneralMorillonwasinterestedintheconvoys.Hegot

    agooddebrieffrommeandsaid,"Okay,weshoulddefinitelytrytogetbackinto

    Cerska."WhileIwaswaitinginthefirstconvoy[outsideZvornik]forthreedays,

    Kamenicafell.Morillonrangmeupandsaid,“Look,weshoulddefinitelytrytoget

    intoCerskaagainbutweshouldfirstofalldoanassessment.”Hesaid,“I'dlikeyou

    tocomewithme,bringa[WorldHealthOrganization]doctorwithyou.Ihave

    approvalandwewillgetintoCerska.WefirstofallflewtoZvornik.InZvornikwe

    pickedupanarmoredcarfromtheBritish.WetriedtogetthenintoCerskabutwe

    wereregularlystoppedintheforest.Idon'tknowwhetheritwastheBosnianside

    ortheSerbside,buttheycutdownlotsoftreesanditwasverydifficulttomove.

    WhenwegottotheoutskirtsofCerska,weweremetbythesoldiersofNaser

    Orić[commanderoftheArmyofRepublicofBosniaandHerzegovina28thDivision],

    whosaid,“You'retoolate,Cerskahasfallen.”Thiswasagreatblowforus.General

    Morillon,whowaswithus,said,“Okaylet'smoveonnow.WewillgotoKonjević

    Polje.”WhenwegotintoKonjevićPolje,theGeneraldecidedthathewouldgoback

    toZvornikandmeetupwithGeneralMladićandseeifwecouldmakefurther 18“Bosnia:AreasofControl,”September1994.

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    progresstotryandgetintoSrebrenica….Tocutalongstoryshort,thedoctor,Simon

    Mardel,walkedtoSrebrenica,theGeneralwenttoZvornik,andIreturnedto

    Sarajevo.ThegeneralthendecidedthatwehadtotakeaconvoyintoSrebrenica.He

    gotapproval[fromUNPROFORcommander]GeneralWahlgrenandfromKaradzić

    andMladić.

    Sooffwewent,withaverysmallconvoy.TherewasanUNMilitaryObserver

    vehicle,therewasaCanadianarmoredpersonnelcarrier,therewasasmallvehicle

    withMèdecinsSansFrontiéresinit,andtherewasmyself,withtwovehicles.That

    wasit.WeweregoingtoenteroverthebridgeatBratunac,buttheSerbstoldusthe

    bridgewasdownandwehadtogoonasideroad,whichhadnotbeenusedfora

    longtime.Weweretoldveryclearlythatitwasminedandwasunderameterof

    snow.SowemovedoffwiththeGeneral,whowasintheAPC.Weweregoingtoo

    slowlysohezoomedaheadofustogetintoSrebrenica.Iwasthenrunningthe

    convoy.Thefirstofourtruckshitamineandwasblownup.Unfortunatelythat

    meantthatthevehiclebehinditcouldnotmoveeithersincetheroadwasonlywide

    enoughforonevehicle.Alittlebitfurther,welosttheMSFvehicle,whichgotstuck

    inthesnow.EventuallywelimpedintoSrebrenica,lateatnight[March11,1993].

    GeneralMorillonwaswaitingattheoutercheckpointofSrebrenica.Weallwent

    togetherintoSrebrenicalateatnight.Wewenttothereceptioncommittee,Ithink

    Muhamed[Duraković]wasthere,intheroomatthetime.Wehadasmallbriefing

    andthenIspentabouttwohoursoutonthestreetswanderingaround.Itwasminus

    threedegreesatthetime,andthousandsofpeoplewereoutonthestreets.

    Thefollowingday[March12,1993]wemetwiththemayorandwithOrić.All

    seemedtobegoingwell.WehadtwoAmericanswithuswhoweredoing

    communicationsforus.Afterdoingtherecces,theGeneraldecidedwewouldgo

    backhome.Weallgotinourvehiclestosetoffandthoughtitwasrathernicethat

    theentiretowncameoutforus.Wethoughttheywerewavingusoff,buttheywere

    notwavingusoffatall.Theywerestoppingusfromleaving.Thegeneralsaid“Okay

    that'sit,wecan'tmove.”Wehadpeoplesaying,“Ifwecan'tgetout,youcan'tget

    out.”Thatwasthemessagethatwasgiventous.IthinkInowknowthebackground

    toit.WewenttothePTTbuilding.Thegeneralwasobviouslyworried.Hisgreatest

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    fearwasthathewouldbetakenhostageandherehewas,atleast"detained,"in

    Srebrenica.

    Weonlyhadonevehiclewithcommunications.CommunicationsintheAPC

    didnotworksomylittlevehiclebecameakindofheadquarters.Irememberthe

    general’schiefofstaff,PiersTucker,explainingwhathadhappenedtoBosnia-

    HerzegovinaCommand.Thevoiceontheotherendsaid,"So,youareprisoners?

    You'vebeentakenhostage."PiersTuckersaid,"No,no,no,we'vejustbeendetained,

    we'rejustnotallowedtoleave.”Ithoughtitwasalittlesubtlewayofputtingit.

    Thenextday,GeneralMorillonkepttohimself.Hecameupwithaplantoget

    upat2:00inthemorningandwalkawayfromthebuilding.PiersTuckerandhis

    bodyguardwouldpickhimupintheAPC,usingtheexcusethatwehadtomovethe

    vehiclebecausewecouldnotgetgoodradioreception.Theplanfellapartbecause

    peoplestoppedthemfrommovingthevehicle.Thegeneralhadtosneakbackinto

    thePTTbuilding.Hehidintheroom,whichgavetheimpressionthatperhapshe

    hadleft.Iwouldliketoaskyou[directsquestiontoMuhamedDuraković]whether

    youthoughthehadleft,orwhetheryoudidnotknowwhetherhehadleft.Inany

    case,fortwenty-fourhours,nobodycouldseehim.

    Hefinallycameoutandsaid,“Lar-ry…[ImitatesFrenchaccent,withrolling

    Rs]Ihaveaplan."HewassmokingDavidoffcigars[makesinhalingsound].

    “Lar-ry,you‘avaflag?"Isaid,"Yes,General."Hesaid,"AUNflag?"[Makes

    inhalingnoise]"Yes,General."Thenhesaid,"Lar-ry,you‘avatannoy?"Isaid,"I

    thinksoGeneral,yesIthinkso."Andhesaid,"Good."Hesaid,"Getmethemayor."

    SowegotthemayorandhetoldthemayorthathewantedeverybodyinSrebrenica

    tobeoutsidethebuilding.Sosureenough,anenormouscrowdofpeopleappeared.

    Hethensaidtome,"Lar-ry,whenInodmyhead,youputtheflagoutthewindow."I

    said,"Okay."

    Sowestoodonthisbalcony.Ihadnoideawhathewasgoingtosay,noidea

    atall.Hestoodupandhesaidtothepeople,"Icame‘ere[inhales]voluntarily,"he

  • 1-11

    said,"Icame‘ereto‘elpyou."Hesaid,"Iamnowputtingyouundertheprotectionof

    theUnitedNations."Henoddedhishead.Flagout.19[Laughter]

    Therewasthisenormouscheerfrombelow.Peoplewereclappingand

    cheeringandshoutingandIthoughttomyself,“There’sonlyeightofushere.”I

    rememberaCanadiansoldiersaidtome,"Doesthatmean,sirthatwecangoout

    andwalkaroundthetown?"Isaidtohim,"Noitmeanswecangetoutofhereand

    protectthetown."

    ThenextincidentwasthatwehadtoinformBHCommand,whichwasfun.I

    wentdownwiththeGeneralandwesatinthevehicle.Heexplainedwhatwas

    happeningtoBrigadierRoddyCordy-Simpson,andexplainedthathehadput

    SrebrenicaundertheprotectionoftheUnitedNations.IcouldhearBrigadierCordy-

    Simpsonsuckinginhisbreath.Theydecidedtotalkagainfourhourslater.The

    generalsaidtoCordy-Simpson,"Roddy,I‘aveaplan,Iwantthehelicopters‘erefor

    theevacuationtomorrow."AndCordy-Simpsonsaidtohim,"Umthatisnot

    consideredtobeagoodidea,sir."Morillonsaid,"Bywhom?"Cordy-Simpsonsaid,

    "ByBHCommand,sir.""Roddy,”theGeneralsaid,"IamBHCommand."

    Thefollowingdaytherewerenohelicopters.Wespentaboutthreedays

    tryingtobringaconvoyin.Mytaskwastofindoutwheretoputthefood.Wehad

    200tonsoffoodcominginandapopulationofmaybe30,000veryhungrypeople.

    Whereareyougoingtoputthiswarehouse?Howareyougoingtoprotectit?How

    areyougoingtohandoutthefood?Wealsohadthetaskoftryingtoevacuatethe

    peopleinthehospitalwhichwastheworstthatanybodyhadeverseen.

    TheGeneralmanagedtogetapprovalforhimselftogooutandorganize

    anotherconvoytocomein.Whentheconvoyarrived,theyunloadedtheaidbutit

    wasalsoagreedthattheywouldtakeoutwomenandchildrenandmalesover60.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Letusreturntotheevacuationquestion,andwhetherthepeople

    wouldbeevacuatedorprotectedinplace,alittlelater.Ialsowanttoaskyouabout

    themediacoveragewhichwasveryimportant.Beforewedothat,wewouldliketo

    19FootageavailableinclipofBBCDocumentary,TheDeathofYugoslavia,Part5(YouTube).

  • 1-12

    hearfromMuhamed[Duraković],whowasinsidethetown.Couldyoudescribethe

    situationinsideSrebrenicaatthistimeandtheimpactoftheMorillonvisitandthose

    wordsofMorillon?Howdidyouinterpretthem?

    MuhamedDurakovic,R,withLarryHollingworth

    MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Thankyouverymuch.Itisanhonorandaprivilegetosee

    facesthatIhavenotseenfortwentyplusyears.WehavetoputGeneralMorillon’s

    visitinthecontextofhowthepopulationinSrebrenicawassurvivingatthattime.

    Thewinterof1992to1993wasthemostdifficultone.Manypeoplenotnativeto

    Srebrenica,whomanagedtosurvivetheonslaughtandethniccleansingintheDrina

    Valley,hadmovedintotheenclave.20Themostdifficultthingforuswasbeing

    unabletocommunicateoursituationtothoseoutsideSrebrenica.Peoplelivingin

    SarajevoortheBihaćpocket,andotherplacesaroundBosnia-Herzegovina,were

    alsoinaverydifficultsituation,butwefeltlikewewereinhabitingthislonelyisland

    inthemiddleofmurkywaters.Wehadverylittletohopefor.Thefirstsignthat

    someonewasthinkingaboutthepopulationofSrebrenicaandtryingtoassistus 20AccordingtoaJanuary1994surveyconductedbytheSrebrenicamunicipality,morethan16,000peoplefromothermunicipalitieshadfledtoSrebrenica,bringingthetotalpopulationto37,000.Seealso“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993.

  • 1-13

    camewiththeairdropsinFebruary1993.21IalwaysmentionLarryinmy

    presentationsonSrebrenica.

    Iwasseventeenyearsoldandinhighschoolwhenthewarstartedin1992.I

    wouldwalkawayfromSrebrenicaupintothemountains,hopingthatIwouldbethe

    luckyonetoseetheseairdrops.Thestrategywastodispersethefoodinmany

    differentlocationssothatitwouldnotendupontheblackmarket,sothatmany

    peoplewouldgetaccesstoit.Forthesafetyoftheaircraftandthepilots,thefood

    wasusuallydroppedfromveryhighaltitudes.Wewouldlookupintotheskyand

    heartheplanes,butnotbeabletoseethem.Wewouldstandinthemiddleofthe

    forestincompletedarknessat2:00inthemorning.Thenwewouldsuddenlyhear

    the"poof,poof,poof,"[makessuccessionofpoppingnoises]ofparachutesopening.

    Theskywouldlightupwithbrightcolors,yellowishandgreenish.Theseweresmall

    flareshangingonthecornersoftheseparachutes.ItwasasifChristmashad

    returnedtoSrebrenica.ActuallyitlookedlikealargeChristmastreefallingfromthe

    sky.MyimpressionwasconfirmedwhenImetMr.SantaClaushere[referringto

    LarryHollingworth,photoabove]whenhecametoSrebrenica.

    ThiswasthefirsttimeinmylifethatIhadmetforeigners.Iwasyoung,I

    livedinaverysmall,isolatedcommunity,andIwasnotverywelltraveled.Itwasan

    extraordinaryexperience.Herewerepeoplewillingtorisktheirlivestotravelto

    Srebrenicaunderverydifficultcircumstances.Youmayhavegottheimpressionthat

    youwerebeingdetained,butIthinkthelocalpopulationneverfeltlikeyouwere

    beingdetained.YouwerealwaysverywelcometocometoSrebrenica.Toexplain

    ourperspective,however,welearnedthroughthegrapevinethattheinternationals

    hadmovedtoCerska,andCerskafalls.ThentheyareinKonjevićPoljeandKonjević

    Poljeisquicklyrunover.WhentheyfinallycametoSrebrenica,thisseemedlikea

    verybadpattern.Thelessonwetookfromthiswas:iftheygo,wewillalldie.There

    weresomeattempts,asyoumentioned,topreventtheUNfromleaving,butitwas

    notreallyorganized.Itwaspurelyaccidental.

    21LaketoClinton,“PresidentialDecisionforHumanitarianAirDropsforBosnia,”TheWhiteHouse,February19,1993.

  • 1-14

    BythetimeyouarrivedfromKonjevićPolje[addressesHollingworth],

    peoplewhosurvivedtheCerskaandtheKonjevićPoljeonslaughtswerearrivingon

    footfromKonjevićPolje.IttakesatleastoneortwodaystowalkfromKonjević

    PoljetoSrebrenica.Bythetimeyouweregettingreadytoleave,thesepeoplewere

    comingintothetown.Theyhadnoplacetostay,sotheysatdownonthestreetsof

    Srebrenica.Itwasverycold,itwassnowing.Therewerewomenandchildren

    makingfiresinthemiddleoftheroad.Itmayhaveappearedtoyouthatsomeone

    wastryingtoblockyou,butinreality,thesepeoplehadnoplacetogo,theydidnot

    knowanyoneinSrebrenica.

    Ofcourse,whenfinallyGeneralMorillonmadethatfamousstatementfrom

    thePTTbuilding,wecitizensofSrebrenicafeltthatwehadsurvived.Wereally

    thoughtthiswastheendofoursuffering,wehaveagainbecomepartofthecivilized

    world,andwewillsurvivetheatrocitiestowhichwehavebeenexposedduringthe

    previousyear.

    MICHAELDOBBS:BeforeweaskhowthisinformationwasreceivedattheUN,could

    Larrytellushowthenewsgotout.IfMorillonhadmadethatdeclarationwith

    nobodytohearitexceptforthepeopleofSrebrenica,thatwouldhavehadacertain

    impact.Buttherewerejournalistspresent.Thatchangedthenatureoftheevent,

    right?

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:ThereweretwojournalistsinsideSrebrenica,whohad

    madetheirownwayin.OnewasaGermanphotographer,Phillippvon

    Recklinghausen,andtheotherwasacameramancalledTonyBirtley,whowas

    freelancingforABC.22Bothofthemweretherebeforewegotin.Theyhadtaken

    someverygoodfilm,buthadneverbeenabletogetitout.Theyfilmedtheepisode

    oftheflagcomingoutofthewindowandwhateverelse.Iwasleavingwiththe

    convoy,becausemyfinaltaskwastogetpeopleontheconvoywhichwasan

    absolutenightmarebecausethousandsofpeoplewentonthetrucks.AsIwasgoing 22VonRecklinghausenarrivedinSrebrenicaonFebruary8-9,1993,andwaswoundedinthearm,whenhesteppedonamine.Birtleyarrivedaroundthesametime.BothjournalistswereevacuatedfromSrebrenicabyhelicopter.

  • 1-15

    out,TonyBirtleysaidtome,“Willyoutakeoutallofmyfilm?”Itwasagamble

    becauseIcouldhavebeensearchedandIcouldhavelostthem.ItoldhimthatI

    wouldtakethemoutifhewaspreparedtotaketherisk.Itookthemandgavethem

    toABC.Theywerearoundtheworldandineverynewspaperwithinhoursof

    usgettingout.

    MICHAELDOBBS:HowlongbetweentheMorillonspeech[declaringSrebrenicato

    beundertheprotectionoftheUN]andthefilmappearingonthenews?

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Ithinkaboutfourdays.23

    MICHAELDOBBS:Itwouldbealmostinstantaneoustoday.Inthiscase,ittookfour

    daysandthefilmhadtobesmuggledout.

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:ItwasasadstoryforVonRecklinghausen.Hegavehis

    filmstosomebodywholostthem.Heshotabouttwelveweeks’worthoffilmwith

    littletoshowforit.

    VEREHAYES:Iwasat[UNPROFORBHCommand]atKiseljakonareccetotakeover

    fromCordy-Simpsonwhenallofthiswasgoingon.Hewasextremelyconcernedby

    whatwashappening.NotonlydidhehavetogetintouchwithNewYorkandthe

    UN,butinthenextdoorofficeFrenchSpecialForceswereplanninganindependent

    nationalcovertoperationtogoinandgetGeneralMorillonout.Idon'tknowhow

    widelyknownthatis,butitwascertainlytakenprettyseriouslyatthetime.

    TOMBLANTON:Ithinkatonepointyoudescribethesmokeofcigarettesleaking

    underthedooroftheofficetheywereusing.

    VEREHAYES:Yes,thedoorwaslocked.TherewerealotofGauloisesbeingsmoked,

    alotofcoffeegoingin.Itcertainlyfilteredaroundtheheadquarters.

    TOMBLANTON:MinisterMuratović.

    23ThefootageairedonABC’sWorldNewsTonightwithPeterJenningsonMarch16,1993.

  • 1-16

    HASANMURATOVIĆ:WeheardthatthearrivalofMorillonchangedthingsin

    SrebrenicabutIwouldliketoexplainwhyMorillonwenttoSrebrenica.Hewas

    responsiblefortheSarajevosector.HewenttotheTuzlasectorbyhisowndecision,

    withoutaskinganybody’sapprovalorevenopinion.Ourdeputyprimeminister,

    HakijaTurajlić,hadbeenkilledonJanuary8inaFrenchAPC.TheAPCstoppedata

    checkpointneartheairport,whereallnegotiationstookplaceandstayedtherefor

    twohourswiththeSerbs.The[Frenchpeacekeepers]didnotaskforanysupportin

    accordancewiththerules.Aftertwohourstheyopenedthedoorandthedeputy

    primeministerwaskilled[bytheSerbs].

    Laterintheevening,around1a.m.,wehadagovernmentmeetingto

    organizetheburialanddiscussthewholematter.GeneralMorillonappearedatthis

    meeting,eventhoughhehadnotbeeninvited.Hecameandsatontheside.Heasked

    ifhecouldcontributesomethingtotheburialorarrangeformoresecurityforthe

    burial.RusmirMahmutćehajić,theministerwhochairedthemeeting,accused

    Morillonofresponsibilityforthedeathofourdeputyprimeminister.Hesaid,"We

    suspectyouofhavingapartinit."Initially,Morillondidnotreact,butlatersaidit

    wasuntrue,andtriedtoproveitwasuntrue.Mahmutćehajićthenaskedhimto

    leavethemeetingandsaidthatwedidnotwanttodobusinesswithhimanymore.

    Weneverpublicizedoursuspicions,anddidnothaveanyevidenceabout

    Morillon’sinvolvement.24Butheprobablywantedtodosomethinggoodandprove

    thathewasnotinanywayinvolvedinthecase.HewenttoSrebrenicaallofa

    sudden,andthenwenttoBelgradeforseveraldaystonegotiatewithMilošević.This

    wasoutsidehisareaofresponsibilityattheUN.Hesucceededinnegotiationswith

    theSerbsandgothumanitarianconvoysintoSrebrenica,whichhadnotbeen

    allowedtopassforseveralmonths.Inouropinion,thiswasarewardbytheSerbs

    forhispartintheexecutionofHakijaTurajlić.

    24SeeJohnBurns,“BosnianMuslimsCriticizeU.N.OverOfficial’sKilling,”NewYorkTimes,January10,1993.ABosniangovernmentstatementissuedonJanuary9,1993,accusedMorillonoffailingtoprotectTurajlićandcoveringupeventsthatledtothekilling.Morilloncalledtheincident“atragedyoferrors”andthe“theworstblowofmycareer.”MuratovićsaidthattheBosniangovernmentsuspectedthatMorillonwasinvolvedintheTurajlićexecutionandwenttoSrebrenicatogetawayfromSarajevo.

  • 1-17

    TOMBLANTON:Thankyouverymuch.LetmeaskShashitodescribethereactionin

    DPKOtotheMorillon"declaration”placingthepeopleofSrebrenica“underUN

    protection.”

    SHASHITHAROOR:AsIsaid,wehadanunclearmandate.The“protection”partof

    UNPROFOR,asfarasBosniawasconcerned,essentiallymeantprotectionof

    humanitarianconvoys.Fromourpointofview,thehumanitarianmissionwas

    obviouslyextremelyimportant.Atthesametime,andthiswasverymuchGeneral

    Wahlgren’sviewasthecommanderontheground,wewereanxiousnottobe

    drawnintotheconflict.Wewerethereasapeacekeepingforce.Ourapproachwas

    basedonacomplicatedsetofpremises.Weneededtoprotecthumanitarianaid

    deliveriestoallsides.WeneededtoprotecttheUNpersonneldispersingthataid.

    Wealsoneededtoensurethataiddeliverieswerenotusedbyonesideinthe

    conflicttomakeusapartytotheconflict.

    NoneofushadaproblemwiththeideaoftheUNsteppingasideandallowing

    Westerngovernments,iftheywanted,totakesidesandendthewar,buttherewas

    absolutelynoindicationofthenecessarypoliticalwillintheWesttodothat.

    ThebandaidapproachthattheSecurityCouncilwaspushingwasinfacta

    reflectionoftheabsenceofpoliticalwillforadefinitiveconclusionoftheconflict.

    Wethereforefoundourselvesmanagingapeacekeepingoperationundertherules

    ofpeacekeepingwithalltheusualconfigurationpatterns,includingwhitevehicles,

    liaisonwithallpartiesandsoon.ThiswasatatimewhentheSerbswerereluctant

    tolethumanitarianaidthroughbecausetheythoughtitbolsteredthemilitary

    strengthoftheiropponents.TheBosnianshopedthatattacksonhumanitarian

    convoyswouldirresistiblydragtheUNintotheconflictontheirside.Wewere

    caughtinthemiddle.

    ObviouslywehadnoproblemwiththeUNgoingtoSrebrenicaanddelivering

    aid.ThatiswhattheUNwassupposedtobedoing.However,weweresomewhat

    takenabackbythedramaticdeclarationbyMorillon.Wedidnotdisavowhimatany

    pointbecausewealsorecognizedthatsignificantvoicesontheSecurityCouncil

    welcomedhisstatement.Wewantedtoseehowwecouldinterpretthatinaway

  • 1-18

    thatwouldkeepusviableasapeacekeepingforcewhichiswhattheCouncilwanted

    ustoremain.Iamsorrythatisnotaverycoherentreplybutnothingaboutthis

    affairwascoherentatthetime.Thiswasthesetofballswithwhichwewere

    jugglingaswetriedtodealwiththesituation.

    TotakeupDavidHarland'spointabouttheearlierdiscussionsonSafeAreas:

    thesediscussionswererelatedtoveryspecificideasofsafehavenswhichrequireda

    numberofelementstobeviableininternationallaw.TheICRCconceptwasbased

    ondemilitarization.Wewerehappytodothis,buthowdoyoudemilitarize

    SrebrenicawhentheBosnianarmysaysitisdefendingitsownpeoplethere?You

    don'tdemilitarize.Whentheyfireoutfromthisareaandarefiredbackupon,what

    istheroleoftheUN?ArewejoiningtheBosnianArmy?Theseweresomeofthe

    fundamentaldilemmasthatwefacedbecauseofthepeacekeepingnatureofour

    mandate.

    TOMBLANTON:AmbassadorWalker.

    JENONNEWALKER:Ithinkseveralthemesareemerginghere.Thefirst,obviously,is

    thefollyofcallingsomethinga“protectionforce,”orevena“peacekeepingforce,”

    whenhasnointentionofprotectinganyone.Itisa“violationobservingforce”rather

    thanapeacekeepingforce.Thenotionofbeingneutralbetweentheattackerandthe

    victimoftheattackerputstheUNandparticipatingcountriesinanimpossible

    position.Iamalsostruckbythenumberofthingsthatweredonetolookasifwe

    weredoingsomethingwhen,infact,wewerenotwillingtodoanythingserious.

    ThisverymuchincludesthegovernmentforwhichIworked.IwasintheClinton

    administrationthefirstnineteenmonthsorso[from1993tomid-1994].We

    believedverymuch—notthroughoutthegovernment,butatleastintheWhite

    House—thattheWestoughttodothekindofthingsRupertSmithtalksaboutinThe

    UtilityofForce,butwewerenotwillingtoparticipateinsuchaneffortourselves.

    WethoughtourEuropeanalliesoughttobetakingalotmoreriskthanwe

    werepreparedtoassumeourselves.Wethereforedidvariousperipheralthingsto

    makeusfeelthatwewereorasifweweredoingsomethingandmakeitappearto

  • 1-19

    theoutsideworldthatweweredoingsomething.Iamgratifiedtohearthatyou

    thoughtthefooddropswereuseful.Itoothinktheywereuseful.Itwasthefirst

    initiativewetookbutitwasperipheraltothebasicproblem.Itwasameliatory

    ratherthantryingtosolvetheproblem.OurattitudetowardthecreationoftheSafe

    Areaswasexactlythesame.WethoughtitwasfollytocallsomethingaSafeArea

    thatwehadnomeansorintentofkeepingsafe.Butwehadzeropoliticalormoral

    credibilitybecausewewerenotwillingtoparticipateourselves.Afteryearsof

    blatheringinNATOaboutsharingrisksandresponsibilities,wewerenotwillingto

    participate.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Tofollowuponthat.PresidentClintontookofficeinJanuary

    1993aftercriticizingthepreviousBushadministrationforditheringonBosnia.He

    promisedamoreenergeticapproach.Soyoucomeintoofficeandthe“tarbaby,”as

    SenatorMcCaincalledit,ishandedtoyou.25Whydidyounottakeamoreenergetic

    approach,aswasadvocatedduringthecampaign?

    JENONNEWALKER:Avarietyofunsatisfactoryreasons.PresidentClinton's

    majoradvisersweredeeplydivided.[ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff]

    ColinPowell,whospokewithgreatauthority,didnotwantusengagedatall.None

    ofusfullyappreciatedtheimportanceofPresidentClinton'sdraftevasion.Colin

    wouldhavetoldsomefavoritereporterthatthisdraft-dodgingPresidentwasrashly

    riskingAmericanlives.Almostalltheprincipalschangedtheirminds,noonemore

    oftenthan[SecretaryofState]WarrenChristopher.[NationalSecurityAdvisor]

    TonyLakeconsistentlywantedamorerobustAmericanengagement.Buthedidnot

    wanttoputthepresidentinthepositionofchoosingbetweenhisadvisers.Clinton

    wasevenmoreneuroticthanmostpoliticiansaboutwantingtobelovedby

    everybody.Sowedrifted.

    Wedidsomeusefulperipheralthings.WedeliveredBosnianagreement

    toVance-Owen,whichtheworldforgets.Wedidsobygettingridofaprovisionthat

    25SeeMichaelWines,“ConflictintheBalkans;SenatorWhoSawWarUpCloseDoesn’tWanttoSeeAnother,”NewYorkTimes,May5,1993.

  • 1-20

    wouldhavemeantthedissolutionofBosniaunlesstheSerbsagreedotherwise.26

    Butallofthesethingswereperipheraltothebasicproblem.“Liftandstrike”was

    ourfirstseriousproposal.ThedebateinWashingtonduringthoseearlymonthswas

    betweenanairstrikecommitmentonlyandairstrikeslinkedtoliftingthearms

    embargo.27

    Thereason“liftandstrike”waschosenwasbecausewebelieveditwould

    giveusanendpointofthestrikecommitment.Wewouldhaveacertainnumberof

    monthsduringwhichwewouldhelparmandtraintheBosnians.Theywouldthen

    beontheirown.Ofcourse,thiswasnonsense:oncewehadgonethatfarin

    supportingtheBosnians,wewouldhavebeencommittedtotheirdefenseifthey

    continuedtobeattacked.Thiswasacarryoverfromthe“Vietnamsyndrome”:there

    hadtobeanexitpoint.

    WedidnotgetreallyseriousuntilAugust1993,whenweproposedtoNATO

    aseriousairstrikethreatwithseriousintenttocarryitout.28Wegotboggeddown

    inthe“dualkey”issue,whichwasanothermess.Weslowlygotmoreseriousastime

    wenton,butalotofpeoplediedwhileweweredelaying.Thatisnotasatisfactory

    answerbutit'sthebestonewehave.

    SHASHITHAROOR:AmbassadorWalkermentionedtheVance-Owenplan.29Ithink

    itisimportanttounderstandthatthiswasthelinchpinoftheinternational

    community'sstrategyatthetime.Weshouldhavementionedthisearlier.TheUN

    26TheVance-OwenPeacePlan[VOPP)dividedBosniainto10cantons,orsemi-autonomousregions,eachdominatedbyaseparateethnicgroup.TheplancalledforSarajevotobeadministeredjointly,underinternationalauthority.BosnianPresidentIzetbegovićagreedtothepeaceplaninaceremonyintheUNbuildinginNewYorkonMarch25,1993,onconditionthattheSerbsalsosign.BosnianSerbleaderRadovanKaradzićoriginallyagreedtotheplanonApril30,butitwasrejectedbytheRepublikaSrpskanationalassemblyonMay6.Inhisbook,BalkanOdyssey,OwenacknowledgesthatUSenvoyReginaldBartholomewwas“helpfulinnursingtheBosnia-Herzegovinagovernmentoverthefinalhurdle.”TheBosniangovernmentobjectedtotheplanonthegroundsthatthecentralgovernmentwouldlikelyhavebeentooweaktoruleovertheethnicallydividedcountry.27The“liftandstrike”policyenvisagedliftingthearmsembargoagainstBosnianMuslimsandCroatsaccompaniedbythethreatofairstrikesagainstBosnianSerbforcesiftheycontinuedshellingcivilians.28RogerGeorge&GeorgeKolttoDirectorofCentralIntelligence,“LikelyAlliedReactionstoUnilateralUSActionsinBosnia,”NIC1046/93,August5,1993.29SeeBoutros-Ghali,“ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheActivitiesoftheICFY:PeaceTalksonBosniaandHerzegovina,”S/25479,March26,1993,foradetaileddescriptionofVance-Owenandthepositionsofthewarringparties.

  • 1-21

    wastryingtopush--andtheUSwasonboardatthetime--apeacesettlementthat

    wouldhavebeendestroyedhadwebeenobligedtotakesideswithoneofthethree

    parties.ThechancesofVance-Owenhappeningwouldhavebeenunderminedifwe

    hadfoundourselvestakingthesideoftheBosnianarmy.WhiletheUSmayhave

    beencaughtupinitsowninternaldeliberations,theUSbackedVance-Owenand

    broughttheBosniangovernmentonboard,asAmbassadorWalkerhasmentioned.

    JENONNEWALKER:Ourofficialpositionwasthatwewouldnotendorseanything

    thatallthepartieshadnotacceptedbutquietlyRegBartholomew[Clinton’sspecial

    envoyonBosnia]gottheBosnianagreement.I'mnotgoingtopretendthatthere

    wasanythingcoherentaboutourpolicy.

    DIEGOARRIA:TheSecurityCouncil’sconcernaboutthesituationinSrebrenicawas

    promptedbythevideosHollingworthhastalkedaboutthatwereshownonTV[on

    March16,1993].TherewasaTVscreenoutsidetheroomwhereinformalsessions

    oftheSecurityCouncilwereheld.WesawvideoofeventsinSrebrenicathathadnot

    beenbroughttoourattentionbytheUNSecretariatorbytheUNPROFORmedia

    personnel,andevenlessbytheUKandFrancewhobothhadasignificantmilitary

    presenceinBosnia.Thispromptedmetoconveneanurgentmeetingofthenon-

    alignedmembersoftheUNSC:Pakistan,Morocco,CapeVerdeandVenezuela.We

    tookadvantageofthefactthatthePakistanrepresentative,JamsheedMarker,was

    presidingovertheCouncilatthistime.Acouncilmeetingwasheldthateveningat

    ourrequest.ThatwashowSrebrenicaenteredtheagendaoftheSecurityCouncil:

    viaajournalist’svideo,andnotbytheUNSecretary-Generalasshouldhavebeenthe

    case.

    IneverbelongedtoalesswellinformedgroupthantheUNSecurityCouncil.I

    saythisnotasajoke.Itisatruefact,anditwasdonenotbyignorancebutbydesign.

    Onlythepermanentmembersarefullyinformedaboutwhatishappeningonthe

    ground.TheUNSecretariataccommodatesthesepowersbyhidinginformation,or

    aswesawlater,evenbyhelpingtocoverupoperations,aswiththecaseofthe“slow

    motiongenocide”thatoccurredbeforetheireyesinSrebrenica.Sucharealityhelps

  • 1-22

    toexplainsomeofthepositionsoftheCouncilnotonlyinBosniabutlaterin

    Rwanda.ThesamebehaviorappliestotheP5membersoftheCouncilwhichdonot

    shareenoughinformationtotheothernon-permanentmembers.Theyputaside

    theirobligationundertheChartertopreservepeaceandsecuritytoaccommodate

    theirnationalinterest.

    Acaseinpoint:thekillingofHakijaTurajlićinJanuary1993whileenrouteto

    SarajevoairportinanUNPROFORAPC.Ipersonallytooktheinitiativetoinvestigate

    hismurder.TheSerbsshothimafteraFrenchcolonel[PatriceSartre]openedthe

    door.TheFrenchtroopsneitherreturnedfire,norcalledforreinforcements.

    UNPROFOR,aswellastheUNSecretariat,carriedonaverymediocreevaluationof

    thecase.Atthetime,Ievenrequestedtheadviceofaformerattorneygeneralin

    CanadaaswellasanAmericanprosecutor.Theybothdeclaredthatjusticehadnot

    beenservedinthecase.IfheSerbscouldmurdertheDeputyPrimeMinisterof

    BosniawhileunderUNprotection,thatshowedtheycouldliterallygetawaywith

    murder.

    ColonelSartrewaslaterpromotedanddecoratedinFranceforhis“bravery.”

    FormonthsIkeptaskingforareviewofthecase,butthisneverhappened.Itwasa

    monumentalcrimethatwasshamefullycoveredupbyallparties.

    DAVIDHANNAY:AlittlefromtheBritishpointofviewaboutthebackgroundtoall

    this.BritishinvolvementinBosniawastransformedbackinAugust1992asaresult

    oftheLondonConference.30Havinghadpracticallynomilitaryontheground,we

    actuallysentasubstantialnumberforahumanitarianprotectionoperationthrough

    theterriblewinterof1992-1993.31Intheautumnof1992,CyVancehadwarned

    thattherecouldbemillionsofpeopledeadinBosniathatwinterunlesssomething

    wasdone.32TheBritishgovernmentwasthereforeinthisuptoitsneck.

    30TheUnitedNationsandtheEuropeanCommunityconvenedameetinginLondononAugust26-27,1992,thatchargedtheInternationalConferenceontheFormerYugoslavia[ICFY]withnegotiatingapeacesettlement.31AccordingtodatacollectedbytheUnitedNationsPeacekeepingwebsite,therewere2,874UKtroopsinUNPROFORasofDecember31,1992.32See,forexample,“VancetoUN:TroopsareneededinBosnia,”ChicagoTribune,October15,1992.

  • 1-23

    WehadalotoftroopsdeployedbyMarch1993,buttheywereneither

    deployednorequippedtofightawar.ShortlybeforeClintontookoffice[onJanuary

    20,1993],JohnMajor,whowasthenprimeminister,goteverybodytogetherin

    DowningStreet,includingalotofministers,military,andmyselfbackfromNew

    York.Heasked,"Whatarewegoingtodo?"Theviewofthatgatheringwaswemust

    telltheAmericansthatwemustdowhateverwedotogetherbecauseotherwiseit

    wasnotgoingtowork.Thatmessagemayhavebeenpassed,butitcertainlydidnot

    resonate.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Whatdatewasthat?

    DAVIDHANNAY:ItwouldhavebeenthefirstweekofJanuary1993,beforethe

    presidenttookover.AfterthetransferofpowerintheUS,thefirstthingthat

    emergedoutofwhatseemedtousfairlyconfuseddiscussionswas"LiftandStrike."

    LiftandStrikewasanightmareforanyonewhohadtroopsonthegroundinBosnia.

    Hadthatpolicybeenaccepted,thefirstthingyouwouldhavehadtodowasto

    extractyourtroops.NoneoftheEuropeanswantedtodothatbuttheyalsodidnot

    wanttobeputintoapositionwheretheSerbswouldconsidertheirtroopsthe

    enemy.Thisiswhatpreoccupiedeveryoneduringthosethreeorfourmonthsatthe

    beginningof1993.ItwastearingNATOapartuntiltheUnitedStatesdroppedthe

    policywhichcausedacertainloweringoftension.

    AtthesametimetherewasnorealalternativepolicytotheVance-Owen

    peaceprocess.IagreeverymuchwithwhatJenonnesaid.TheUnitedStatesdid,

    betweenclenchedteeth,givesomesupporttoitintheearlyweeks.Reg

    BartholomewcertainlygottheBosniangovernmenttoagreetoit.33Butwhenwe

    weredraftingoneoftheseresolutions[UNSC820]inApril,wetriedtogetthe

    SecurityCounciltotelltheBosnianSerbsthattheinternationalcommunitywould

    sticktotheVance-Owenplanuntilhellfrozeoverandtheyhadbetterrealizethat.

    Thatwastherightdiplomaticmovetomake.AfteragreatdealofdebateinNew

    Yorkwhich,alas,allcameoutinthepublicdomain,theUnitedStatesrefusedtoput

    33SeeMarkTran,“IzetbegovicagreestodivideBosnia,”TheGuardian,March26,1993.

  • 1-24

    theword"endorse"intoaresolution.Afteralotoftoingandfroingwith

    Washington,weweretoldthatthefurthestSecretaryofStateWarrenChristopher

    wouldgowastoputtheword"commend"in.34ThatwastheendofVance-Owen.

    Thepeaceplanwasdead.AsShashisaid,thiswasthebiggamethateveryonewas

    playing.TheVance-Owenpeaceplanwasthestrategy,butitwaskilledinthemiddle

    oftheaction.Srebrenica,ofcourse,wasgoingonallthistime.

    JORISVOORHOEVE:Irememberthattheliftandstrikepolicy,evenwhenitwasn't

    supportedanymorebytheUSadministration,lingeredoninCongressuntilthe

    springof1995.IhadquiteanargumentatthetimewithSenatorMcCainwho

    advocatedliftandstrike.ItwasalsostrikingattheMunichconference,inFebruary

    1995thattheentireAmericandelegationwasstilltalkingaboutliftandstrike,

    whichweinEuropethoughtwasthewrongpolicy.

    MICHAELDOBBS:WeshouldexaminesomeofthesespecificUNResolutions.Let’s

    beginwiththefirstone,UNSC819,adoptedonApril16,1993.35Itwasfollowedby

    theSecurityCouncilvisittoSrebrenica,ledbyDiegoArria,onApril25.Howwasthis

    resolutionpassed?Whatdiditactuallysay?Howwasitmeanttobeimplemented?

    WehaveaninterestingdynamicaroundthetablebetweentheSecurityCouncil

    memberswhopassedtheresolutionandthepeacekeepersonthegroundwhotried

    toimplementtheresolutionasbestastheycould.PerhapsDiegoArriacouldtellus

    whattheresolutionwasmeanttoachieve.ThenwewillaskGeneralHayesto

    describehowUNPROFORattemptedtoimplementtheresolution.

    34UNSC,“Resolution820(1993),”S/RES/820,April17,1993.U.S.policy-makersopposedtheVance-Owenpeaceplanonbothmoralandpragmaticgrounds.DuringaFebruary24,1993pressconference,AlbrightstatedthatVance-Owenplanamountedto“rewardingaggressionandpunishingthevictims.”Christopherearlierpubliclyexpresseddoubtsaboutthe“feasibility”and“practicality”oftheVance-Owenformula,tellingtheSenateForeignRelationsCommitteethattheUSshould“investigateotheroptions.”(SeeJohnGoshkoandJuliaPreston,“U.S.officialsresistpressuretoendorseBosniaPeacePlan,”WashingtonPost,February4,1993.)35UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.

  • 1-25

    DIEGOARRIA:TheSecurityCouncilapprovedamissiontoBosniaandSrebrenica,

    [April23-26,1993],thatIhadtheprivilegetolead.36Tomysurprise,itwasthefirst

    missioneversentbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCounciltothetheaterofconflict.

    AssoonaswelandedinSarajevoIfoundoutwhythiswasthecase.Therewasa

    policyofkeepingnon-PermanentmembersoftheSecurityCounciluninformed.We

    landedinSarajevothinkingweweregoingtonegotiatesomething,butitwas

    alreadyfinished.Ademilitarizationagreementhadalreadybeensignedbythe

    partiesonApril18,withtheassistanceofGeneralHayes.37

    Wethoughtitwasveryimportant,andevenBoutros-Ghaliagreed,thatwe

    shouldtakeacontingentofinternationaljournaliststoSrebrenicatoreinforcethe

    resolution.ThejournalistswhotraveledwithusfromNewYorkwereprevented,by

    UNPROFOR,fromtravelingwithustoSrebrenica.Eventhedelegationmembers

    werealmostpreventedfromenteringSrebrenica.GeneralHayeswillrememberthat

    therewerediscussionsthatmorninginZvornik,andthattheyalmostdidnotallow

    theSecurityCouncilmemberstotraveltoSrebrenica.AndréErdöswasalsothere.

    Youcanimagineourreactiontothesituation.

    Intheend,weforcedourwaythrough.IwentwithGeneralHayesinoneof

    thehelicopters.MycolleagueshadtowaitinZvornikwithaSerbcoloneluntilwe

    gottotheotherside.UNPROFORevencooperatedindisarmingthemembersofthe

    delegationofourcamerasduringthevisit.Irefusedtogiveupmycameraandtook

    theonlyphotoswhichwerelaterusedbyReuters.UNPROFORhadaladyfilmingthe

    wholethingbutIhaveneverbeenabletoseethatvideo.

    MICHAELDOBBS:LetusrecallthelanguageofUNSC819,whichsays,"...acting

    underChapterVIIoftheCharteroftheUnitedNations,"i.e.thepeaceenforcement

    provision,theSecurityCouncil"demandsthatallpartiesandothersconcernedtreat

    SrebrenicaanditssurroundingsasaSafeAreawhichshouldbefreefromanyarmed

    attackoranyotherhostileact."Howdidyouthinkthatresolutionwouldbe

    enforced? 36UNSC,“ReportoftheSecurityCouncilMissionEstablishedPursuanttoResolution819(1993),”S/25700,April30,1993.37SefirHalilović&RatkoMladić,“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.

  • 1-26

    DIEGOARRIA:Wedidnothaveanyhopeofthathappening.Wewereaddressing

    internationalpublicopinionratherthantheCouncilitself,describingthe

    devastationofthepeopleofSrebrenica.ItwasnotdifficultfortheCounciltoagree

    ontheresolution,becausetherewerenocommitmentsonthepartofanybody.It

    waspourlagalerie[“forthepublicgallery”],astheFrenchwouldsay.Itwasa

    resolutionwithoutanycostorconsequencesexcepttoaccommodatetheSerbs.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Whenyoupassedthatresolution,didyouthinkthatUNPROFOR

    hadthedutytoenforceitbyitself,orthatitshouldreachagreementwiththeparties

    onhowtoenforceit?Howwastheresolutionmeanttobeenforced,inyourview?

    DIEGOARRIA:WewerenotverywellinformedabouttherealitiesofUNPROFOR,

    whichbythewayisamisnomer.Withsuchagrandiosename,UnitedNations

    “ProtectionForce,”wethoughtsomethingwouldbedone.Afewdayslater,of

    course,wediscoveredthatthiswasnotthecase.

    Inproposingthetextoftheresolution,IhadwritteninSpanish,“Areas

    Protegidas,”or“ProtectedAreas.”TheUSandUKtranslatedthisas“SafeAreas”and

    theFrenchas“ZonesdeSecurité.”Thiswasmorethanjustsemantics.“Protected”

    wouldhavemeantreallyenforcingtheresolution.“Safe”meantnothing,asweall

    foundoutveryquickly.Therewerenoobligationsunderthe“SafeArea”concept.

    SHASHITHAROOR:IfyoureadUNSC819carefully,youwillseethatitcallsonthe

    partiestotreatSrebrenicaassafe.Itenjoinsnonewresponsibilitiesonthe

    internationalcommunity,ifthepartiesfailtotreatSrebrenicaassafe,UNPROFOR

    hastheresponsibilitytoactinself-defense.Oneofthefundamentalproblemswe

    hadthroughoutthisoperationisthatdiplomaticdraftingconductedwith

    greatfinesseandaplombbyveryskilleddiplomatsservedasanendinitself.Itwas

    notlinkedtooperationalrealitiesontheground.

    WhileweweretalkingintheSecurityCouncilaboutUNSC819,ontheground

    unknowntous,GeneralWahlgren,GeneralHalilović(theBosniancommander),and

    GeneralMladićhadnegotiatedandsignedademilitarizationagreementthatwasnot

  • 1-27

    explicitlycalledforin819.38Wehadnotaskedforitbecauseitwouldlookasifwe

    weretakingsidesagainsttheBosnians.Wehadnotaskedforitbecausewedidn't

    thinkforGod'ssakethatitcouldbeviablyimplementedbyus.

    IwanttodrawyourattentiontotheAnnancableofApril23,1993whichI

    confessIwrote.39TheseareourinstructionstoWahlgrenfollowingaphonecallI

    hadwithhimearlier.Withoneortwoexceptions,mostofthecablessignedbyKofi

    Annanweredraftedbyme.InthiscablewetellWahlgrenthat"...the

    demilitarizationofSrebrenicawasastepagreedbytheparties,notoneproposedby

    theUnitedNations."WetellWahlgrenthatUNPROFORismerely"lendingitsgood

    officestohelpbothpartiesfulfillthecommitmentstheyhavemadetoeachother."

    Wewereextremelyconsciousthroughoutofthesevereoperationallimitations.

    Ialsohaveasentenceheresaying,"...however,UNPROFORtakesonamoral

    responsibilityforthesafetyofthedisarmedthatitclearlydoesnothavethemilitary

    resourcestohonourbeyondapoint."Iwrotethesewordsinsomedistressbecause

    thiswasnotanactionweinheadquartershadauthorizedorrecommended.

    UNPROFORhadtakeniton.Ofcourse,theSerbsweregoingtousethisasawayto

    disarmtheirrivals.40But,equallynow,itgotembeddedintotheconcept.Ifthe

    BosnianMuslims,ortheBosnianArmyofficially,hadnotbeendisarmed,and

    thereforecouldcontinuetofightoutofthepocket,didthepocketsuddenlystop

    beingaSafeAreaintermsofwhattheCouncilintendedin819?

    Ikeepharpingbacktothecentraldilemma:whatwasourrole?Thebestthing

    wouldhavebeeniftheUShadmadeuptheirmindsearlyenough,talkedtotheBrits

    andtheFrenchandsaid,“PulltheUNoutandlet'sgotowar.”Thatwouldhavebeen

    thesimplest,clearestthing,buttheywerenotdoingthat.TheyhadtheUNdeployed

    there,makingpeaceasanoperation,tryingtobeneutralamongtheparties,trying

    toensurethattheUNpresencedidnotbecomeamilitaryadvantagetoanyoneof

    theparties,whileatthesametimeallthiswasgoingoninthecapitals,withoutany

    coherentconclusions.IwouldcommendthiscablenotbecauseIwroteitbut 38“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.39AnnantoWahlgren,“Srebrenica,”UNDPKO,MSC676,April23,1993.40ThecableaddedthatDPKOsaw“noneedforUNPROFORtoparticipateinhouse-to-searchesforweapons”givenWahlgren’spublicstatementsthatSrebrenicawas“fullydemilitarized.”

  • 1-28

    becauseitencapsulatessomeoftheoperationaldilemmasthat819gaveusandthat

    franklyweforesaw.David[Hannay]willprobablyrememberthatwehadalittle

    meetingintheofficeofthePresidentoftheSecurityCouncilwhereIreadout

    Wahlgren'scableadvisingagainsttheadoptionofsucharesolution.TheEuropeans

    wereveryclearinanycasethattheyweregoingtogoaheadwiththis,andwedidgo

    aheadwithit.Thiscablesummarizestheoperationalconsequencesthatwewere

    tryingtoclarifytoUNPROFORwhichmeanwhilehadtakenonestepbeyondwhat

    eithertheCouncilorweinDPKOhadanticipatedinactuallysigninga

    demilitarizationagreement.

    MICHAELDOBBS:LetusgotoGeneralHayes.YoureceivedUNSC819andhadthe

    taskofimplementingit,togetherwithGeneralWahlgren.Canyoudescribehowyou

    wentabouttryingtoputfleshontotheresolutionandapplyittowhatwasactually

    happeningonthegroundinBosnia.

    VEREHAYES:Yes,certainly.BeforeIdo,canIjustcomebacktosomethingthat

    AmbassadorArriasaidaboutUNPROFORpreventinghimfromgettinginto

    Srebrenica.Thatisactuallytotallyincorrectfrommypointofview.Wedid

    everythingwecouldtogetyouin.Theproblemwasthatwecouldnotgetthe

    journalistsin.SinceIknewthatwasgoingtohappen,Ihadtodecidewhetherwe

    tookyouandothermembersofthedelegationinsothatyoucouldseetheplaceor

    nobodywouldgetinatall.IalsofinditslightlystrangethatmembersoftheSecurity

    CouncilthoughtthatwewereoperatingunderaChapterVII,asopposedtoa

    ChapterVI,mandate.Iwouldhavethoughtthatwouldhavebeenobvious.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Soyourunderstandingwasthatyouwereoperatingunder

    ChapterVIoftheUNCharter,andthiswasnotaChapterVIIoperationatall?

    VEREHAYES:WewereoperatingunderChapterVI.Forus,ChapterVIwasa“cook

    andlook”operation,aswerathercheekilydescribedit.That'sallyoucoulddo,

    “cookandlook.”ThewayChapterVIIwentwasthattheUNissuedthewarrantsand

    theUnitedStatesmadethearrests.

  • 1-29

    Tocomebacktowhatwashappening.TherewasameetingatSarajevoairport

    onApril17-18,1993.AnagreementwassignedbetweenMladićandHalilović.41The

    negotiationstartedatnoononSaturday,April17,andlasteduntil2a.m.onSunday,

    April18.Thequestionarose,whowasgoingtoberesponsibleforthedetails?I

    lookeddownthetableatGeneralsWahlgrenandMorillon,wholookedbackdown

    thetableatme,andItookiton.Weneededtogetsomeclarificationonthephrase,

    "allparties…treatSrebrenicaanditssurroundingsasaSafeArea."42Obviously,that

    phrasemeantdifferentthingstodifferentparties.

    Tocutalongstoryshort,wenegotiatedalldaySundayandalldayMonday.

    Wehadseventy-twohoursinwhichtogettheagreementimplemented.43Otherwise

    itwouldhavefallenapart.WealsohadtogetorderstotheCanadians,whohad

    movedintoSrebrenica,onwhattheyweremeanttodo.Asacommanderonthe

    ground,youlooktoyourhigherheadquarterstotellyouwhattodo.Youdonottry

    tomakeitupasyougoalong.Wehadtogivethe145-manCanadiancontingentled

    byLt.ColTomGeburtsomeorders,sohecouldactuallydosomething.44Ieventually

    decidedonmyowninitiativethattheSrebrenica"SafeArea"hadtobeextendedout

    fromthetownitself.Welookedatthemapsanddidaquicksurveyofthehigh

    pointsaroundthetown.Thereisamaphere.45WewentanddrewtheSafeAreaon

    themap,extendingouttothepointsfromwhichyouhadadirectlineofsight,with

    theabilityfordirectfireintothetownitself.Thatwaswherewedrewtheareatobe

    definedasaSafeArea.Itwasverysmall,about4.5kilometersbyabout1.5

    kilometers.Tome,itwasthekernelofanutwhichwouldbeextended.

    WedidnotdisarmtheBosniansinthepocket.Weaskedthemeithertoleave

    theareawehaddesignatedtobedemilitarizedastheSafeAreaor,iftheywere 41SefirHalilović&RatkoMladić,“AgreementfortheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”April18,1993.42UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.43TheagreementsignedatSarajevoairportbetweenMladićandHalilović(Point4)specifiedthat“thedemilitarizationofSrebrenicawillbecompletewithin72hoursofthearrivaloftheUNPROFORCompanyinSrebrenica.”Theagreementalsoprovidedfortheevacuationof500seriouslywoundedandsickcivilians.44AnApril22,1993NYTarticlebyJohnBurnsreportedthatUNPROFORhad“nocontingencyplans”intheeventofaSerbattackonSrebrenica.ColonelTomGeburt,oftheRoyalCanadianRegiment,wasreportedtobe“tearingouthishair”attheprospectofhavingtodefendthecity,orevenhisownmen.Therulesofengagementwereunclear.45HayestoUNPF-HQ,“ReportontheDemilitarizationofSrebrenica,”HQBHCommand,April21,1993.

  • 1-30

    goingtostay,handtheirweaponsin.ThisbecameadebatewiththeSerbswhen

    theywerecominginwithadelegationtosigntheagreementandhadtoleavetheir

    weaponsbehind.ItalsobecameadebatewithNaserOrić,whowasintheareawith

    hisbodyguardscarryinghisweapons.WhenIgotinthere[onApril21,1993]with

    theBosniangovernmentandBosnianSerbdelegations,wegotoutatthecompound

    wheretheweaponshadbeengathered.NaserOrićwasstandingthere.Ihadtosay

    tohim,"You'rearmedinthisarea.It'snotintheagreement."Hesaidthatnobody

    hadtoldhimverymuchabouttheagreement,andhedidnotknowwhatwasgoing

    on.Isaid,"You'renotmeanttobeinthisareawithaweapon.I'mgoingtogetthe

    delegationsoutofthevehicle.WhenIturnaround,ifyou'restillherearmedinthe

    area,Iwillhavetoarrestyou."I'mnotsurewewouldhavehadmuchsuccess

    arrestingNaserOrićbutwhenweturnedaroundhehadgone.

    Wethenputthetwopartiestogetherinvehiclesanddrovearoundthearea.

    Wehadagreedthattheareahadtobemarkedonthemapwhichthenhadtobe

    confirmedandmarkedontheground.Soyouactuallyhadmapandground

    markingssoyouknewwheretheareawas.Wewentaroundthatarea,cameback

    andsignedanagreement.Neithersidewasparticularlyhappywithit.Ourintention

    wasthattherewouldbeabufferzone,controlledbytheBosnians,extendingout

    fromtheareadecreedtobesafetothefrontlines,whichwerealotfurtheroutat

    thattime.Wewentbackseveraltimestotryandextendtheareabutwerenever

    abletodoso.Neithersidewaspreparedtomakeanyconcessions.Thatishowit

    endedup,asjustthatverysmallareaaroundthetownitself.

    WhenAmbassadorArriacamewithhisdelegation,Imadeanerrorwitha

    journalistforwhichIapologize.IhadheardtheAmbassadortalkingonBBCRadio4

    abouttheUNdisarmingBosnians[inSrebrenica].Inowthinkhewasunawarewhat

    washappeningontheground.ImadethemistakeofsayingthatIwasn'tquitesure

    thattheAmbassadorknewwhathewastalkingaboutwhichcauseda

    furorunderstandablywiththeAmbassador.Thatcoloredour

    subsequentdiscussions.[Laughter]

    IfwehadnotleftthejournalistsbehindinZvornik,you,Ambassador,would

    nothavebeenabletogetintoSrebrenicaandseeit,eveninthelimitedwaythatyou

  • 1-31

    didseeit.Atthetime,asfarastheSerbsonthegroundwereconcerned,theUNand

    yourdelegationactuallyhadnoauthoritytogoinwithouttheirpermission.There

    wasnothingwecoulddoaboutit.

    DIEGOARRIA:ThesmallercountriesintheSecurityCouncildonothavearmies.My

    friendDavid[Hannay]onceremarkedthattheAmbassadorfromVenezuelawasnot

    goingtomarchintoSrebrenicawithVenezuelansoldiers.Isaid“Heisright,butwe

    donothavetheprivilegeofsittingpermanentlyintheSecurityCouncil,either.”

    Publicopinionwasfundamentalinthisissue.Weknewtheimportanceofbringing

    thejournalists.General[Hayes],yousaidsomethingatthetimeaboutUnited

    NationsSecurityCouncilResolutionsbeing“woolly-headed.”46Thiswasthefirst

    timeIheardthatexpression.Isaid,“Howcanageneralwhoisnottheforce

    commanderaddresstheSecurityCouncilinthatway?”Thesearepoliticalmatters.I

    thoughtthatyouweregettinginvolvedinpoliticalnegotiations.Youtalkedjustnow

    aboutwantingtoarresttheBosniancommanderinSrebrenica[NaserOrić].Ithink

    thatwouldhavebeenanabuseofpowerwhichwouldhavehadconsequences.

    VEREHAYES:Idonotthinkitwouldhavebeenanabuseofpowerbecausethe

    agreementbetweenthetwopartiessaidthattherewouldbenoarmedpeoplein

    thatarea.Itwouldsimplyhavebeenimplementinganagreementthathadbeen

    madebetweentheparties.

    ANDRÉERDÖS:InHungary,wewerelookingtotheUnitedStatestoplayan

    importantrole.InJanuary1993,wereceivedinformationfromUSsources,whichis

    notincludedinthisbooklet.USofficialsmetwithnon-permanentmembersofthe

    SecurityCouncil,andsaidthattheUSwasreadyformoreradicalsteps,includinga

    moreactivemilitaryrole.Itseemstheywereunabletotakethesestepsbecauseof

    oppositionfromtheUnitedKingdom,FranceandRussia.Theyaddedthattheyalso

    hadtotakeintoconsiderationYeltsin’sinternalpoliticalproblems.InMay1993,we

    46SeeJohnPomfret,“UNdelegationvisitsshell-scarredBosnianEnclave,”WashingtonPost,April26,1993quotedanonymousUNpeacekeeperscallingrecentSecurityCouncilresolutionsonBosniaas“woolly-headed”and“sovaguetheywerealmostimpossibletoenforce.”

  • 1-32

    heardthesamething.USdelegationsourcessaidthattheUnitedStateswasreadyto

    conductairstrikesaslongastheywerenotopposedbythemajoralliesandthe

    SecurityCouncil.Thisshowsthat,quiteapartfromalltheinternalYugoslav

    problems,suchasnationalismandsoon,amajorprobleminvolvedrelations

    betweenwesterncountries.Thiswasoneofthereasonswhythewardraggedon

    until1995.

    OBRADKESIC:TheGenevaConventionsdiscusstheprotectionofciviliansandthe

    organizationofsafeareas.47AsfarasSafeAreasareconcerned,therearetwo

    elementsthatareequallyimportant.Thefirstisthattheydependonthewillofthe

    belligerents.Combatantforcesmusthavethewilltoconcludeanagreementand

    defineaSafeArea.Thesecondpartisdemilitarization.Wasthiswhatwasinthe

    mindofthepeopledraftingtheUNSecurityCouncilResolutionorwasitmorea

    case,asAmbassadorWalkersuggested,creatingtheperceptionof“doing

    something”withoutactuallyunderstandingwhatyouweredoing?

    MICHAELDOBBS:Justtoaddtothat,therewasnomentionof“demilitarization”in

    theUNSecurityCouncilResolution.Itwassomethingthatwasaddedbythepeople

    ontheground.ShashimentionedhisApril23cablewhichstatesexplicitlythat“we

    seenoneedforUNPROFORtoparticipateinhouse-to-housesearchesforweapons.”

    Inotherwords,DPKOwasbackingoffsomeofthecommitmentsthathadbeen

    madeontheground.

    SHASHITHAROOR:Yes,wewerecaughtinacleftstick.Wehadnotproposedthis

    thingtobeginwith.Wedidnotthinkwehadthecapacitytoenforceitand

    implementit.Atthesametimewewereunderthetremendousmoralpressurein

    theSecurityCouncilandinthemediathatweweregivingaidandcomforttoethnic

    47“Safetyzones”werecreatedundertheGenevaConventionsinMadridin1936duringtheSpanishCivilWarandinShanghaiin1937duringtheJapanesebombardment.Article15oftheFourthGenevaConvention(1949)on“TheProtectionofCivilianPersonsinTimeofWar”providesfor“neutralizedzones”intendedtoshelter“woundedandsickcombatantsornon-combatants”and“civilianpersonswhotakenopartinhostilities.”Protocol1Article60on“Demilitarizedzones”prohibitswarringpartiesfromextendingmilitaryoperationstodemilitarizedzones.

  • 1-33

    cleansersandkillersandsoon.Thelastthingwewantedwastobeseenasaiding

    andabettingtheSerbs.WecouldnotaffordtotaketheBosnianside"militarily,"but

    wecouldmorally.WedidhaveaproblemtakingtheSerbsidesincetheywere

    besiegingatownwithcivilians.Itwascomplicatedbythefactthatthisagreement

    hadalreadybeensignedbyallpartiesincludingtheBosnianArmy.Sowesaid,“Let

    thepartiesfulfilltheirobligationstoeachotherbutdon'tgoaroundbeingthe

    enforcersofthisagreement.”Thatwasourguidance.

    TOMBLANTON:YouhaveasentenceinyourApril23cable,mentioningthe

    "...strongfeelingamongstseveralMemberStatesthatUNPROFORshouldnot

    participatetooactivelyin'disarmingthevictims.'"48

    SHASHITHAROOR:Thatisright.IknewthatpeoplelikeDiegoArriaandAndré

    ErdöswerecertainlysayingthatsortofthingintheCouncil,aswerethePakistanis

    andothers.Therewerealotofverystrongvoicesonthissubject.Iwouldsaythe

    principalauthorsofUNSC819weretheBrits.DavidHannaycanspeaktothe

    thinkingbehindit.Atthetime,Davidassuredusthatthepartieswerebeing

    enjoinedtotreattheSafeAreaassafeandtherewerenonewobligationsfor

    UNPROFOR.Thedemilitarizationagreementlookedverymuchlikeanewobligation

    whichiswhywe[inDPKO]triedtopushitbackandsay,“Don'tdomorethanyou

    absolutelyhaveto.”Letthemkeeptheirwordtoeachother.

    VEREHAYES:Tobeclearonthedemilitarization,whatweweresayingwas,“you

    eitherhandinyourweaponsandstayintheareaoryouleavethearea.“Those

    peoplewhowantedtostayintheareaweredisarmedbyvoluntarilyhandingin

    theirweapons.Iftheydidnotwanttohandintheirweapons,theyhadtomoveout

    oftheSafeArea.We,theUN,didnotactuallydisarmanybody.

    SHASHITHAROOR:Thatisright.Ourguidancefittedinverymuchwiththewayyou

    sawit.IhaveasentencetheretellingGeneralWahlgren,"...givenyourownpublic

    statementsthatSrebrenicaisfullydemilitarized..."Frankly,wetookthiswith 48AnnantoWahlgren,“Srebrenica,”UNDPKO,MSC676,April23,1993.

  • 1-34

    severalpinchesofsalt,butthatiswhatWahlgrenwassayingofficially,inpublic.

    Thatwasanotherreasonwhyweshouldnotgoarounddoinghousetohouse

    searches.Iseefromaseparatedocumentthat[onApril8]30,000roundsof

    ammunitionwerefoundinSrebrenicasoitwasnotinfactdemilitarized.49

    VEREHAYES:ThatammunitionwasfoundinaUNHCRconvoygoingtoSarajevo

    acrosstheairport.IthadnothingtodowithSrebrenica.Thatwasbeforeanything

    happenedwiththeSrebrenicaagreementandwasoneofthereasonswhytheSerbs

    becamesoinsistentonsearchingUNHCRconvoys.50

    ZLATKOLAGUMDŽIJA:Ifeellikeaguineapigwhosurvivedanexperiment.Iam

    honoredtobeherewiththescientistswho,let'ssay,“helpedussurvive.”Ithinkthat

    HasanMuratovićmadeanimportantpoint.ThekillingofDeputyPrimeMinister

    HakijaTurajlićwasaclearsignalthatyoucandoanythingyouwantandnotbe

    49WahlgrentoAnnan,“High-LevelMilitaryMeetinginBelgradeof9April1993,”UNPF-HQ,Z-495,April11,1993.ThedocumentsupportsHayes’memorythattheammunitionwasdiscoveredinaUNHCRconvoyinSarajevo.50ForMladic’saccountofhistalkswithWahlgrenandMorilloninBelgrade,seehisdiaryentry,“MeetingwithGeneralsWalgren(sic)andMorillon,”April9,1993.

    ZlatkoLagumdžija,left,withHasanMuratović

  • 1-35

    punished.Afewweeksafterhismurder,Iwasresponsibleforthenegotiationswith

    MorillonandSadakoOgataonhumanitarianactivitiesasactingprimeminister.We

    triedforweekstoevacuatewoundedkidsfromSarajevoontheemptyplanesthat

    weredeliveringthefood.Itprovedimpossible.Theytoldusthatthepeoplewho

    killedTurajlićwouldnotallowit.

    Atonepointthingsgotsodesperatethatwerefusedtoacceptfoodin

    Sarajevountilfoodwasdeliveredtotheenclaves,firstwithparachutes(those

    “Christmastrees”)andthenwithconvoys.WegreetedUNSCResolution819with

    enthusiasm,notbecauseoftheresolutionbutbecauseofthementionofChapterVII

    oftheUNCharter.51

    Weheardmanytimes,andagaintoday,thatUNPROFORdidnotwanttobe

    draggedintotheconflict.IdebatedthisquestionmanytimeswithLarry

    Hollingworth,bothbeforeandafterIwasseriouslywoundedonMay22,1993.What

    does“beingneutral”mean?Doesitmeanoccupyingthemiddlegroundbetweentwo

    warringsides?Isitgeometric?Oristheresomeotherlogictoit?Ifyoudemonstrate

    neutralitybytakingthemiddlegroundbetweenakillerandhisvictim,thenyou

    betrayyourownvalues,inwhichcaseweshouldrethinkeverythingwearedoing.

    DAVIDHANNAY:ItisperfectlyclearfromwhatLarryHollingworthsaidthat

    MorillonactedonhisownwhenhemadehisspeechfromthebalconyofthePTT

    buildinginSrebrenicawiththeflag.Oncethatbecamepublic,thechoice[wefacedin

    theSecurityCouncil]waswhethertodisownhimortosupporthim.Itwasassimple

    asthat.YouaskedhowUNSC819cametobewritten.Themainpeoplebehindthe

    resolutionweretheEuropeans,whowerenotpreparedtodropMorillondespitethe

    factthathehadactedwithoutanyauthoritywhatsoever.Therewasabsolutelyzero

    enthusiasmfortheSafeArea,asdescribedinUNSC819,certainlyinmygovernment.

    OurviewwasmuchclosertotheviewsofMrs.OgataandtheICRCaboutSafeAreas

    thanitwastothosewhowantedamilitarizedSafeArea.IneversawfromLondon

    anycriticismoftheSafeAreaagreement,asitwasnegotiatedbyUNPROFOR

    betweentheBosniansandtheBosnianSerbs.Ithinktherewasafeelingthatitwas 51UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.

  • 1-36

    notideal,toputitmildly,buttheagreementmadeitslightlymoresustainable.The

    stormofprotestthateruptedovertheagreementmeantthatitwasneverrepeated

    inanyoftheotherSafeAreas.

    [BREAK]

    TOMBLANTON:Oneofthepolicyquestionsthatwehavenotyetdiscussedisthe

    dilemmaoverwhethertoprotectrefugeesinplace,intheSrebrenicaSafeArea,or

    evacuatethem.Ifyouorganizedevacuations,youcouldbeaccusedofsanctioning

    ethniccleansing.Butwealsoknowthattheword“protection”inthetitleof

    UNPROFORwasanaspiration,notareality.Larry,canyouaddressthechallenge

    youfaced?

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Thefirstpointistoask,whatdothelocalpeoplewant?

    Whataretheirwishes?Iftheywanttoleave,areyouimprisoningthembykeeping

    themin?Itisagreatdilemma.Wedidnotwanttoaidethniccleansing,butwealso

    didnotwanttokeepthemasprisoners.Myopinionalwaysis,whatistheviewof

    thepeoplethemselves?Ifpeoplegenuinelywanttoleave,weshouldletthemgo.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Thefirstevacuationswerelimitedtothesickandtheveryelderly.

    AnumberofevacuationconvoyswereorganizedbutatacertainpointtheBosnian

    governmentcalledahalt.Whatwasyourperceptionofwhatthelocalpopulationin

    Srebrenicawantedtodo?

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Thepeoplewereinthemostdirestraitsyoucanimagine.

    Therewasnowayintheworldthatwewereabletosustainthemtoanythinglikea

    minimumstandard.Iamnotsurprisedthattheywantedtogo.Theyknewfullwell

    thatwiththeconditionsthatwereimposedonus,theywerenevergoingtobe

    sustained.Iamnotsurprisedthateverysinglepersonwantedtogo.

    Theywereallfrightenedthattheirfamilieswouldbeseparated.Thewomen

    andchildrenthoughtthat,iftheygotout,theSerbswouldshellthecitywithallthe

    meninsideit.

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    MICHAELDOBBS:Whatdidyourfriendswanttodo,Muhamed?

    MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:InSrebrenicain1993,itwasobviousthatstayinginareas

    thatweremeanttobeethnicallycleansedmeantcertaindeath.Everyonewastrying

    tosustainlifeasmuchaspossible.Themenwantedtoatleastgettheirwivesand

    childrenoutassoonaspossibletogivethemachanceofsurvival.Mostciviliansin

    Srebrenicawantedtogetoutassoonaspossible.I'mtalkingfrommyownpersonal,

    privateexperience.Yourmainobjective—today,too,incertainpartsoftheworld—

    isthepreservationoflife.Youhavetosavethosewhoarecaughtinthemiddle

    betweentwowarringpartiesandaredirectvictimsoftheatrocities.Thatdidnot

    reflecttheview,perhaps,ofthepoliticalstructureofSrebrenica.Theyfeltthat

    ifthewomenandchildrenleftSrebrenica,itwouldbecomeamucheasierterritory

    tooccupy.

    Ifyouhaveonlyonebulletinyourgun,andyouknowthatyourwifeandkids

    areamileawaybehindyoufacingcertaindeath,youwillstandyourgroundno

    matterwhat.Youwillfighttothelastdropofyourblood.Butifyourwifeandkids

    arenolongerinSrebrenica,thenyouwilldowhateveryoucantojointhem,evenif

    thatmeansthatfightingyourwayoutthroughalmostonehundredmilesofNo

    Man’sLand.FromthepointofviewoftheBosnianmilitaryleadership,evacuating

    civiliansfromSrebrenicameantweakeningthemoraleofthefightingforcein

    Srebrenica.Theydidnotrepresentthefeelingofthemajorityofthepeoplewhoonly

    wantedtosurvive,tolivesomewhereelseifSrebrenicawasnolongeraviable

    option.

    AsfarasthedemilitarizationofSrebrenicaisconcerned,mypersonalview

    andtheviewoftheBosnianauthoritiesatthatparticulartimewasthattheCanadian

    troopswerehighlyprofessional.Theycameinanderectedcheckpoints.One

    ofthecheckpoints,onthesouthsideofthetown,wasonehundredmetersaway

    frommyhouse.Iwasabletoaidthesecheckpointsasamemberofthelocalpolice.

    Wewouldsearchanyoneenteringorleavingtheenclave.Thiswasajointeffortby

    UNPROFORandthelocalpolicewhoweretheretoensurethattheagreementwas

    followed.

  • 1-38

    IfthelocalpoliceorUNPROFORfoundanyonewithweaponsatthese

    checkpoints,theweaponswereseizedanddestroyedonthespot.Ifsomeonewas

    foundcarryingaconcealedhandgun,thepeacekeeperwouldtakethemagazineout

    ofthepistolanddestroythepistolbythrowingitunderanAPC.Thiswasatthe

    beginningwhenthedemilitarizedzonewasconfinedtoSrebrenicaanditssuburbs.

    LateronthiswasextendedsouthwardstoOP[ObservationPost]Echo,OPFoxtrot

    andtheotherobservationpoints.

    LARRYHOLLINGWORTH:Wemustrememberthatatleast50percent,ifnotmore,

    ofthepopulationofSrebrenicawerefromoutsideSrebrenica.Theyhadfledtheir

    ownvillagesforwhattheythoughtwasabetterplace.Whentheyfoundthatitwas

    actuallytheworstplaceonGod'searth,it'snotsurprisingthattheywantedtoleave.

    MUHAMEDDURAKOVIĆ:Iagree.

    HASANMURATOVIĆ:Whethertoleaveorbeprotectedinsideasafezoneisan

    immoraldilemma.Whenthe[Srebrenica]safezonewascreated,therewasno

    clearlydefinedfinalgoal.Whatwasthefinalintentionwiththissafezone?Howlong

    wasitmeanttostayinplace?Whathadtobedonetoenablepeopletoleavethe

    areaortodefendthemselves?Wasthereanyothersolution?Wesawwhatthe

    bettersolutionwas,bothinBosniaandlaterinKosovo:equipanarmytoprotectthe

    place,withtheassistanceofairstrikes.Letthearmyfight,andgivesupportfromthe

    air.Orevenreprimandseriously.WhentheSerbswereorderedtosurrender

    weaponsinSarajevo,theysurrenderedtheirweaponsbecauseitwasanultimatum.

    ButtheywerenotreprimandedseriouslyinSrebrenica.Instead,therewere

    negotiationswiththem.

    EverypeacekeepingforceinBosniaandevery[foreign]civilianorganization

    wassupposedtofollowtheoveralllineoftheUN,buttheyalsoworkedandfollowed

    thelineoftheirowngovernments.DeploymentsofUNpeacekeepersreflected

    politicalinterestsofdifferentcountriesfromwhichtheycome:TurksandEgyptians

    inSarajevo,FrenchbetweenPaleandSarajevo,andbetweenBanjaLukaandBihać,

    theSpanishinMostar.

  • 1-39

    Wemustbearinmindthesedualroleswhenexaminethedecisionsthatwere

    taken.TherewasnoconsensusbetweenEuropeancountriesonwhattodo.There

    weredifferentpoliciesanddifferentviews.ThecreationoftheSafeArea,asMadam

    Ogatasaid,wasdubiousfromallpointsofview.52Youcanprotectahospital,youcan

    protectthepopulation,onlyifyouhelpthemtodefendthemselvesandhavean

    overallgoalinmind.TheUNmissionneverhadclearlydefinedgoalsinBosnia.They

    livedfromtodaytotomorrow,attemptingtosolveday-to-dayproblems.

    CARLBILDT:IwasnotaroundatthetimebutIwasinvolvedinasimilarsituationin

    Žepain1995.Thequestionis:ifyouassistinbringingpeopleoutofadifficult

    situation,areyouanaccompliceinethniccleansingorgenocide,ornot?Thisisboth

    amoralandpoliticaldilemmaforinternationalorganizations,whenfacedwith

    situationslikethis.Thewarcrimestribunal,ICTY,dealtwiththisintheZdravko

    Tolimircasebutwasunabletomakeupitsmind.Firstthetribunalsaid:yes,youare

    anaccompliceinacrime.Thentheychangedtheirpositionandsaid:no,youcannot

    reallysaythat.53Thefactthattheygobackandforthonthisissueillustrateshow

    difficultthisis.Ofcourse,ithasvastimplicationsforotheroperationsaroundthe

    world.

    MICHAELDOBBS:Whatisyourpersonalview?

    CARLBILDT:Myviewisthatyouhavetolookateachsituationasitis.Itis

    difficulttohaveanoverridingprinciple.Youarenormallyinterestedinsavinglives.

    Thehumanitarianimperativeisoftenwhatdrivespeopleinsituationslikethis.

    52See,forexample,HannaytoFCO,“Bosnia:MrsOgata’sviewsonSafeAreas,”Telno1903,May29,1993.Ogatawarnedthatsafeareascouldturninto“largescalerefugeecamps…closedinbythesurroundingmilitaryforces.”53ThisissuerelatestoArticle42(b)oftheICTYStatute,whichgivesthetribunalauthoritytoprosecutethecrimeofgenocide,specifically“causingseriousbodilyormentalharm”with“intenttodestroy,inwholeorinpart,anational,ethnical,racial,orreligiousgroup.”TheICTYAppealsChamberruledinApril2015thattheTrialChamberhadfailedtoestablishthattheMuslimsexpelledfromŽepa(incontrasttotheMuslimsexpelledfromSrebrenica)hadsuffered“seriousmentalharm”risingtothelevelofgenocide.Seeparagraphs216-217,AppealJudgment.ThisreversedthefindingcontainedinParagraph758ofthe2012TrialChamberjudgment.

  • 1-40

    JORISVOORHOEVE:Ientirelyagreewiththeoverridingprincipleofsavinglives.

    Thattakespriorityovernotcooperatingwithethniccleansing.

    IwouldputSecurityCouncilResolution819,whichwediscussedthis

    morning,inthecategoryof"fake"actions.Fakeactionscreatetheimpressionthat

    somethinghasbeendecidedandisbeingdonewheninactualfactnothingwas

    decidedordone.TheonlyoperationalpartoftheresolutionwasthattheSecretary-

    Generalshould"increasethepresenceofUNPROFOR."54Theresolutiondoesnotsay

    whatUNPROFORshoulddo.ThereismentionofChapterVII,butthatismeaningless

    becauseitdoesnotsaywhatpartisunderChapterVII.MembersoftheSecurity

    Councilwoulddobetternottovoteforsuchfakeresolutions.Thereareother

    resolutionsthatweremuchstronger:forexample,UNSCresolution836,whichalso

    invokedChapterVIIandallowedtheSecretary-Generaltouse"airpowerinand

    aroundthesafeareas...tosupportUNPROFORintheperformanceofitsmandate."55

    ThatwasaverysignificantresolutionthatmadeuseofChapterVII.

    ThesecondpointIwanttomakeisverysimilartotheoneraisedbyMr.Bildt.

    IdrawattentiontotheproposalsmadebyMrs.Ogatain1992.Shefavored

    evacuationofthepopulationofSrebrenicaandnegotiationsbetweentheBosnian

    governmentandtheBosnianSerbs[onalandswap].56TheBosnianswouldhave

    receivedapieceoflandnearSarajevothatwouldhaveimprovedthedefensibilityof

    SarajevoandmadeitpossibletorelocatethepopulationofSrebrenicapreventively.

    IunderstandthedilemmafacedbytheBosniangovernment.Iknowtherewere

    discussionsintheBosniangovernmentonapreventiveevacuation.Therewere

    ministersinfavorofpreventiveevacuation,butintheendtheydecidedagainst.

    Politicalandethicalquestionswereconfused,notonlyintheUnitedNations,but

    alsoinBosnia.

    TOMBLANTON:LetmeaskDavidHannaytorespond.Ithinkthatyouhaveargued

    thattheso-called“fakeresolution,”819,didactuallyachievesomething,namely

    54UNSC,“Resolution819(1993),”S/RES/819,April16,1993.55UNSC,“Resolution836(1993),”S/RES/836,June4,1993.56SadakoOgata,“StatementtotheInternationalMeetingonHumanitarianAidforVictimsoftheConflictintheformerYugoslavia,”July29,1992.

  • 1-41

    headingoffaSerbianoffensiveagainstSrebrenica.HadtheVance-Owenplan

    actuallybeenadopted,wemightbelookingbackattheestablishmentoftheseSafe

    Areasasatriumphforinternationaldiplomacy.Isthatanaccuratereflectionofyour

    view?

    DAVIDHANNAY:TheseSafeAreasresolutions—819inthecaseofSrebrenica,and

    836settingouttheoverallpolicy—wereneverdesignedasanythingotherthana

    shorttermexpedient.Theyhadtobefittedintoawiderpoliticalstrategywhichhad

    toinvolvepeacenegotiationsandasettlement.ThedestructionofVance-Owenin

    thespringof1993wasdisastrousbecauseitknockedawaythatoption.Ittookthree

    yearstoreconstructthe[peacenegotiation]optionwhichcametobeknownas

    Dayton.TheSafeAreasshouldneverhavebeenseenasalong-termsolutionto

    anything.Theywereashort-termexpedientthatneededtobefittedintoaproper

    politicalandmilitarystrategybutneverwas.

    As1993and1994woreon,theexpedientbecamemoreandmore

    threadbare,aswewillseewhenwetalkaboutGoraždeandBihać.Bythetimeofthe

    Srebrenicamassacre,itwascompletelyworthless.Thereasonitwasworthlesswas

    becausenoonedidanythingaboutthepoliticalframework.Tomymind,the

    destructionofVance-Owenwasadisaster.IfyoureadtheJointActionProgram,you

    canseewhatthesignatoriesthoughtaboutpreservingVance-Owen.Theymakea

    vaguereferenceto“buildingontheVance-Owenprocess,”butitwasbasically

    dead.57Thatwasarealdisaster.TheSafeAreaswereanexpedientthatbecamea

    policy.

    TOMBLANTON:Jenonne,canyouaddressthat?

    JENONNEWALKER:IagreewithmostofwhatDavidhassaid.Iplaceless

    importancethanhedoesonVance-Owen.Obviouslyifthereisapeaceagreement,

    thereisapeaceagreement,whetherit'stheVance-Owenplanoranyother.What

    waslackinginalltheUNResolutions,andcertainlyinAmericanpolicyandinthe

    57PermanentRepresentativesofFrance,Spain,theRussianFederation,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates,“Jointactionprogramme,”S/25829,May24,1993.

  • 1-42

    JointActionProgram,wasanywillingnesstomaketheSerbsstoptheiraggression.

    ThefirstseriousthingthatwasdoneintheWestwastheNATOdecisioninAugust

    1993totakeseriousmilitaryaction,airaction,againstanyonewhocontinued

    shellingciviliansettlements,whichofcoursemeanttheBosnianSerbsandtheir

    Serbbackers.58ItworkedinFebruary1994,thefirsttimeitwastested,whenwe

    issuedanultimatumtotheSerbsaboutpullingtheirweapons20kilometersbeyond

    Sarajevo.59Atthelastminute,withRussianhelp,theycompliedbecausetheyreally

    believedNATOairstrikeswerecoming.Hadthatpolicybeencontinued,things

    mighthavebeenbettersooner.

    TheJointActionProgramtookmostofusinWashingtonbysurprise.Icannot

    rememberwhytheseniorEuropeanofficialswereintown.Therehadbeensome

    otherevent.Thenextday,Igotaphonecallfromsomeonequiteseniorinthe

    DefenseDepartmentsaying,issomethinghappeningattheStateDepartmentthat

    wearebeingcutoutof?Isaid,noofcoursenot,Iwouldknowaboutit.Allofuswere

    takenbysurprisewhenWarrenChristopherandhiscolleaguescameoutwiththe

    JointActionProgram,whichwasfakepolicy.Itgavenobonestoanything.Ihaveno

    ideawhyChrisandhiscolleaguessigneduptothat.Mostofusthoughtitwasan

    embarrassment.IaskedTonyLakeafterwardifhehadknownthiswasgoingon.He

    wasevasive.ItwasmaybetheonlytimeIfailedtogetastraightanswerfromTony.I

    don'tknowifhewasalsotakenbysurprise.Itwasonlythewillingnesstomove

    fromneutralitytousingforcetostopaggressionthatmadeitpossibletoimplement

    Vance-Owen,Dayton,oranyotherpeaceplan.

    Washingtonfinallycametoawillingnesstoseriouslygetbehindapeaceplan

    inthespringandearlysummerof1994.WeagreedthenwiththeWestEuropeans,

    theEU,thatwewouldjointheminendorsingaplan,includingamap,iftheywould

    agreethatanyonewhodidnotaccepttheplanwithinacertainperiodoftimewould

    58Secretary-GeneralofNATO,“PressStatementbytheSecretary-General,”August2,1993.59“DecisionstakenattheMeetingoftheNorthAtlanticCouncilinPermanentSession,”February9,1994.“SummaryofConclusionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,”USNationalSecurityCouncil,February18,1994.

  • 1-43

    faceseriousNATOairstrikes.60Afterthat,therewasaperiodofpinprickairstrikes

    untilthingsfinallybecamesobadthatWashingtonsaiditwouldactaloneif

    necessary.Itwastheenforcementthatmattered,nottheVance-Owenmaporthe

    Daytonmaporanyothermap.

    TOMBLANTON:Peter,youhadjustarrivedinCroatiainJune1993,andinheriteda

    SafeAreaortwo?

    PETERGALBRAITH:I'mstruckbythedisconnectbetweentheincoherentpolicyin

    Washingtonandthingsactuallygoingontheground,eventhoughtheywerewell

    reportedatthetime.FirstawordabouttheVance-Owenpeaceplan.Ifyoulookatit,

    youwillseealotofblue.

    Farfrombeingapeaceplan,thatmapacceleratedtheconflictbetween

    BosniaksandBosnianCroatsastheBosnianCroatstriedtoseizetheterritory

    offeredthembythemap.61Bythesummerof1993,therewaslittletheClinton

    administrationcoulddotofollowthroughonthepresident’scampaignpledgesto

    helptheBosniangovernment.ThiswasbecauseofthewarbetweentheMuslims

    andtheCroats.Ifyoulookatthemap,youseeCroatiatothewestofBosniaand

    Serbiatotheeast.TherewasnoaccesstotheBosniangovernmentareasaslongas

    theMuslim-Croatwarwasgoingon.

    WithoutmuchpolicyguidancefromWashington,theUSembassyinZagreb

    inthesummerof1993beganpressuringtheCroatiangovernmenttoendthe

    atrocitiestheBosnianCroatswerecommittinginBosnia.62ThroughForeign

    MinisterMateGranicandDefenseMinisterGojkoSusak,Igotembassyofficersinto

    theheliportnearMostarwherethousandsofBosnianswerebeingheldinappalling

    conditions.InJuly,IhadaverycontentiousmeetingwithMateBobaninwhichI

    60InJuly1994,aContactGroupmadeupoftheUnitedStates,Russia,Britain,France,andGermanyproposedamapwitha51/49percentterritorialcompromisebetweentheMuslim-CroatFederationandtheBosnianSerbs.ThebasicprinciplesoftheContactGroupproposalwereacceptedatDayton.ForU.S.strategyduringthisperiod,seeLaketoClinton,“Bosnia–NextSteps,”TheWhiteHouse,July19,1994.61FightingflaredbetweenBosnianCroatsandMuslimsaftertheCroatianDefenseCouncilgavetheBosnianarmyadeadlineofApril15,1993towithdrawfromareasdesignatedasCroat-dominatedcantonsundertheVance-OwenPeacePlan.62“DecisionsofPrincipalsCommitteeMeetingonBosnia,”May17,1993.

  • 1-44

    pressedhimtoreleasethedetainees.Bytheendofthesummer,wesecuredthe

    releaseofabout5,000Bosniakprisoners.Wegotaccesstotheheliportinspiteof

    theoppositionoftheUSambassadortoBosnia[VictorJackovich]whowasbasedin

    Vienna.Butthat’sanotherstory.

    ProposedVance-Owenpeaceplan,1993

    TOMBLANTON:SothereweredivisionsevenwithintheStateDepartmentandeven

    betweenUSambassadors?