Adv. SpaceRes.Vol. 7, No. 12, pp. (12)213—(12)218,1987 0273—1177/87$0.00 + .50Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1987 COSPAR

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONINPLANETARY EXPLORATION: PAST SUCCESSAND FUTURE PROSPECTS

JeffreyD. Rosendhal

Office of SpaceScienceand Applications, National Aeronauticsand SpaceAdministrationHeadquarters,Washington,DC20546, U.S.A.

ABSTRACT

A review is given of the ways in which the National Aeronauticsand SpaceAdministration(NASA) hasparticipated in international efforts to explore the solar systam. Pastexamplesof successfulinternational cooperativeprogramsaredescribed. Prospectsforfuture cooperative efforts are discussed with amphasis placed on current events, issues,and trends which are likely to affect possibilities for cooperation over the next 5 to 10years. Key factors which will play a major role in shaping future prospects forcooperation include the move towardsbalancing the budget in the United Statesand theimpact of the Challenger accident on the NASA program.

INTI~)DUCTION

Fran it’s very beginnings, international activities have played a very significant role inthe programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The foundation forthese international activities is to be found in the very legislation which createdNASA—the Space Act of 1958——which specifically instructed NASA to conduct its activities“So as to contribute materially to.. .cooperation by the United States and other nationsand groups of nations.”

Up to the present time, more than 1,000 agreaments involving 135 countries andinternational organizations have been made with the estimated contribution of NASA’spartners in these undertakings being in excess of $3 billion. A wide range of types ofactivities have been carried out in these cooperative programs which have included (inorder of increasing mutual interdependence):

o Personnel exchangeso Ground-based projectso Cooperative sounding rockets and balloon programso Participation of non—U.S. co-investigators on U.S. spaceflight experimentso Participation of U.S. co—investigators on non—U.S. spacef light experimentso Flight of U.S. developed instr~xnents on non—U.S. spacecrafto Flight of non—U.S. developed instrLnnents on U.S. spacecrafto Joint develop’nent of major space hardware

The benefits derived fran such international programshavebeen nunerous. Internationalagreamentshavepermitted accessto ground sites neededfor verifying spaceobservationsor locating equipuentfor making crucial measuraments.International agreenentshaveallowed the sharing of costs on major programstherebyreducing the costs of a program toeachside or allowing more expensiveefforts to be undertakenthan could havebeenafforded by a single country or organization. International programshavepermitted asharing of talent and expertiseand havecontributed in a major way to the strengtheningof international relationships. In the United States (andpres~.znablyelsewhereas wall),the fact that a program is an international one has also usually been helpful politicallyin gaining program approval.

In this paper, following sane very brief renarks on NASA’s approach to the formulation ofinternational programs, examples are given of NASA’s past successes in internationalcooperationin planetaryexploration aswell as across a wide rangeof other scientificdisciplines, and prospects for the future are discussed.

The perspective taken is a U.S. one. The present time (July 1986) is clearly a difficultone for the United States space program with many very canplex issues needing to beresolvedbeforeconfident predictions concerningfuture directions can be made.Therefore, the ccamentsmade in this papermust be understoodas being a personalassesamentat a particular manent in history of the major trendswhich appearlikely toaffect the future of international programs. While the enphasisin this paper is on

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planetary exploration, obviously many of these cannents will also apply to assessingprospectsfor cooperationin other areasof scienceas well.

NASA’S APPROP~1TO I TERNATIONAL COOPERATIVEP~)JDTS

A number of fundamentalprinciples have been usedby NASA to guide its approachto theformulation of international cooperativeprojects and are expectedto continue to be thebasis for future cooperative undertakings. It, therefore, appears useful to at leastmention these principles, the most important of which are:

o Cooperation is on a project—by—project basiso Each project must standon its own meritso Each partnermust developa discreteelenent of the project with its own resources.

Projectsare undertakenon a “no exchangeof funds” basiso The scientific results fran cooperativeprojects must be made publicly available

Theseprinciples and their application havebeendiscussedat length at many places/1/.For presentpurposes,the main point to be made is that our pastexperienceclearly showsthe most successfulinternational cooperativeprojects havebeen ones in which eachpartner is pursuing its own primary scientific and technological interests and a decisionhas been made to join forces as a result of a natural overlap in those primary interests.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: PAST STD2ESSES

International cooperation in planetary exploration beganin the 1960’s and has continuedup to the presenttime. Programswhich havebeenundertakenhave involved the full gamutof possibilities for cooperation.

In ground—based laboratories, 20 nations either are now participating or haveparticipatedin the past in the study of lunar samplesobtained fran the Apollo missions. In theearliest involvanent on flight missions, non—U.S. scientists were included on the scienceteamsof the Pioneer6—9 missions. Pioneer6 was launched in 1965. Most of the recentU.S. planetarymissionshavealso included non—U.S. scientists on the scienceteamsandsanehave involved the provision of non-U.S. instrumentson the spacecraft as well.Specific examplesof non-U.S.manbershipon scienceteamswhich can be cited include theMariner 10, Viking, Pioneer-Venus, andVoyager missions. A German neutral massspectraneterwas included on the Pioneer—venus Probes. The continuation of this practiceup to the present time is illustrated by the fact that the recent selectionofinvestigators for the Mars Observer mission included two German scientists on the GainnaRay Spectraneter Team and a French team manber on the Radio Science Team. The Ulyssesmission (with ESA) and the Galileo mission (with the Federal Republic of Germanyprovidinga major experiment on the probe and a retropropulsion module for the main spacecraft)provide examplesof current programsinvolving a major sharing of spacehardwareand otherresources. Theselatter two programsalso provide examplesof both the bestand worstaspectsof international cooperation. When such programsare progressingwell they can govery smoothly indeed, but when such a program runs into difficulties in one place therecan be a very major impact on the partner.

The most recent example of successful international cooperation in planetary explorationhas involved the exploration of Halley’s Canet—an exploration which involved a trulyextraordinary pooling of resources across a wide range of activities. The InternationalHalley Watch, an effort to makea canprehensiveset of ground—basedobservationswhich wascoordinated by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, involved over 1,000 astronaners in 51countries. The great successof the InteragencyCoordinatingGroup (IACO) on Canet Halley(whosememberswere NASA, the EuropeanSpaceAgency (ESA), the JapaneseInstitute of Spaceand Aeronautical Science (ISAS), and the Soviet IntercoanosCouncil (IKI) togetherwiththe International HalleyWatch) hasprovideda graphic demonstrationthat the major spacepowers are, indeed, capableof working together to meet a cannongoal. The great value ofcoordinated mission planning was, perhaps, best shown by the use of precision tracking ofthe Soviet Vega spacecraft to refine the orbit of the canet to permit a crucial finaladjustmentof the trajectory of the ESA spacecraftGiotto. Scientists fran the UnitedStates were directly involved in both the Giotto and Vega missions with more than 30 U.S.co—investigators being involved on the Giotto mission alone. Although the U.S. wasclearly a junior partner in these missions, the U.S. scientific carLnunity will be able toparticipate in the scientific analysis of the data and the results fran all of the Halleyactivities will be made available to the world scientific catmunity.

Looking beyond the planetary program, NASA’s involvement in successful internationalcooperative programshas cut across a wide range of scientific disciplines. Examples ofsuch programsaregiven in Table 1 which highlights a number of major examplesofsuccessfulinternational programswhich haveeither beencanpletedor which havebeenapprovedand are now underway. Acronyes contained in this Table are defined in the

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Appendix to this paper. Countries or organizations listed are those which made or aremaking significant hardware contributions to the program. Additional cooperative programswhich have beenunder discussion for sane time and for which significant elements areeither at or near the approval stage include the IOPEX/Poseidon program (with ~ES) tomeasurethe global circulation of the ocean,the International Solar Terrestrial PhysicsProgram (involving NASA, ESA, and ISAS) to carry out a canprehensivemultipoint study ofthe physics of the magnetosphere,and the High Energy Solar PhysicsMission (with ISAS) tostudy energeticprocesseson the Sun at the next solarmaximum.

TABLE 1 NonplanetaryExamples of SuccessfulCooperativeProgramsInvolving Flight Hardware

Mission Discipline Participants

Past Missions

AMPFE Space Plasma Physics US, Germany, UKANS tJV and X—ray Astronany Netherlands, USAriel I, II Cosmic Ray Physics, Space UK, US

Plasmas, other disciplinesCOSMOS Life Sciences USSR, USHEAO—3 Cosmic Ray Physics US, Denmark, FranceHellos Heliospheric Physics Germany, US, Italy

AustraliaIRAS IR Astronany US, Netherlands, UKISEE—l, 2, 3 Space Plasma Physics US, ESA, France, UK, Germany,

Netherlands, ItalyItJE UV Astronany US, ESA, UKOAO—3 liv and X-ray Astronany US, UKO~—2and 4 Aeronany US, FranceOSO—8 Solar Physics US, FranceSearch and Rescue Camnunications US, USSR, Canada, France

Solar Physics US, Netherlands, UK,Spacelab-l Multidisciplinary ESA, USSpacelab—2 X—ray Astronaisy, Solar US, UK

Physics

Present Missions

GRO Gantna-ray Astrophysics US, GermanyHST nv/Optical Astronany US, ESAROSAT X-ray Astronany Germany, US, UKUARS AtmosphericPhysics US, UK, France, Canada

As is ‘avident, fran theseexamples, therehavebeena large number of successfulprograms.Any discussion of NASA’s ability to carry out successful international cooperativeprogramsmust include not only a consideration of the planetary program but must also beplacedwithin this larger framework of a long history of successesin internationalefforts in many fields of science. It is true that there have been saneunfortunateevents in the recent past (most notably the abrupt cancellationof the U.S. spacecraftportion of the Ulysses program) which have raised the issue of the ability of the U.S. tomake secure cctTrnitments, but, in fact, the preponderance of experience has beenpositivewith a large number of cooperativeprojects having beenundertakenand brought to asuccessfulconclusion. Any balancedassessmentof the future of international cooperativeprojects must be basedon this history and the numerousexamplesof success.

Thereare, of course, now sanefundamentaluncertaintiesconcerningthe future resultingf ran the impact of the Challengeraccident. This subject will be addressedin thediscussion by prospects for future cooperation.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: FUTURE PROSPEL~TS

The American humorist, Mark Twain, oncecamientedthat “Predictions are very difficult tomake especiallywhen they deal with the future.” Despite suchdifficulties it does appearpossible to makea number of general remarksconcerningprospectsfor future cooperation.

First a vigorous program of solar system exploration has historically been an importantelement of the total NASA program and is expected to remain an Important element in thefuture. The plans developedby NASA’s Solar System Exploration Cannittee (SSEC) /2/, /3/over the past several yearsreflect the best thinking of the U.S. scientific cc*tinunity

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concerningfuture programsand should continueto provide the basic blueprint for NASA’splanetary explorationprogram. With the start of the Venus RadarMapper and the MarsObserverduring the past few years, the work of the SSEC hasobviously alreadyhad asignificant impact and hasbeen a major factor in the steps which havebeen taken torevitalize the U.S. planetary program. No plan has an infinite lifetime and such plansusually remain valid for a 5—7 year period. Should a lengthy delay in implementing SS~program occur as a result of recent events, NASA might have to rethink its strategy forthe exploration of the solar system. However, it doesnot appearthat NASA has reachedthat point yet.

International cooperationwill continueto be an important part of NASA’s total programplanning. The truth of this statementcan be most easily demonstrated by noting that anumber of major NASA programswhich haveeither recently been startedor whoseapproval isnow before the U.S. Congress are, in fact, international ones which involve a majorsharing of space hardware. These include:

o The Space Stationo U.S. participation in the Japanese and European elements of the International

Solar—Terrestrial Physics programo The U.S./French TOPEX/Poseidon program

If NASAhad any reservations about the value of international programs, it certainly wouldnot be basing so much of its future on such cooperative efforts.

At the present time there are a number of trends becoming evident which will undoubtedlyaffect both prospectsfor cooperativeprogramsand the nature of that cooperation. Themost important of theseappearto be:

The increasing cost and complexity of missions now under consideration. In particular,very large and ambitious missions such as sample returns fran comets and planets appear tobe beyond the financial capabilities of individual countries or agencies but could be doneif the costs were to be shared among several partners.

The increasing capability of NASA’s potential partners. It is clear that the increasingequity of technical ability (strikingly illustrated by the international flotilla of spaceprobes arriving at Halley’s Comet and the successes of the ESA Giotto, Soviet Vega, andJapanese Suisei and Sagagaki missions) moans that cooperation will be undertaken on a muchmore equal basis than has been the case in the past and that the partners in internationalprograms will want to have a greater voice in the planning, management, and operation ofmissions——a trend which is evident in the current Space Station negotiations. Thisincreasing equality also means that NASAwill not be able to be the senior or dominantpartner in all projects. This is not surprising since there are far too many possiblemissions for any one country or agency to expect to be able to take the lead on them all.Once again the comet missions provide a possible model for the future. As noted earlier,the U.S. was clearly a junior partner on the Vega and Giotto missions. From a purelypersonal perspective, the success of these projects benefited everyoneinvolved andconvincingly demonstrated that junior partnership is not necessarily all bad. It shouldbe noted, however, that the U.S. planetary community does not necessarilycompletelysharethis viewpoint.

Increasing space budgets outside the U.S. Increases, such as those approved eighteenmonths ago for the ESA science program, mean that our potential partners may, inprincipal, be able to undertake more expansive or ambitious programs which, in turn, couldhave the benefit of providing more opportunities for cooperation. Given the general worldeconomic situation, however, one important question which needs to be asked is “How longthis trend is likely to continue?”

Develo~nent of new alliances in which the U.S. is not always a key partner and may noteven be a partner at all. The broad international participation in the Soviet Vegamissions and the Soviet/French collaboration in gamma—ray astronomy provide just a fewexamples of major cooperative activities which have had either limited or no U.S.involvement. In contrast to the situation twenty years ago, the U.S. is obviously nolonger in the position of having a substantive influence on every major developuent inspace science.

Budgetary prospects in the United States over the next several years. It is clear franactions taken by the U.S. Presidentandthe U.S. Congressover the last year that a majoreffort is now underwayto try to balancethe budget in the United Statesduring the nextfive years. This move to balancethe budgetmay very well mean a level budget for NASA asa whole during this periodwhich, in turn, would undoubtedlysignificantly limit prospectsfor new activities in all areas of the NASAprogram. The space science program as a wholeand the planetary exploration program in particular are not isolated f ran the generaleconomic environment in which NASA is operating. The potential impact of stringent budget

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limitations has been compounded by the January 28, 1986, destruction of the Space ShuttleChallenger.

The impact of the Challengeraccident. The suspensionof all launchesfollowing theaccidenthad an immediate impact on the planetary exploration program with thecancellation of the March Shuttle flight to study Halley’s Comet and the planned Maylaunchesof the Ulyssesand Galileo programs. The subsequentdecision to cancel theShuttle-Centaurprogram has introducedadditional uncertaintiesconcerningthe launch ofGalileo and Ulysses and the planning for future missions requiring high energy upperstages. It is clear that there will be delays of two years (or more) in the launch of allof NASA’s major scientific missions. Since many of these missions have substantialinternational involvement, any lengthy delays will have a significant impact which goeswell beyond NASA’s own program and could well affect the prospects for future cooperativeprograms. Within NASA, significant additional costs are likely to result fran the need tosustain large scientific and engineering teams, particularly for missions which hadessentially been completed and which ware to be launched in 1986. If such extra costshave to be absorbed within a fixed NASA budget envelope, the impact on other scientificprograms could be severe. In addition to the obvious impacts of launch delays and extracosts, the accident has also raised a number of important and difficult policy issueswhich will need to be resolved as part of the process of reconstituting the U.S. spaceprogram. Focusing on the planetary exploration program, perhaps the most important ofthese issues is whether the U.S. will return to the use of expendable launch vehicles.Key questions which will have to be answered in considering this issue and arriving at aconclusion include “Who will supply these vehicles?” and “How will they be paid for?”There is no doubt that the Challenger accident will have a profound impact on the entireNASA program and it may wall take sane time before the extent and depth of that impact isgenerally understood.

On a more positive note (and looking beyond the near term difficulties), prospectsforinternational cooperationshould be enhancedby the fact that there is a clear commonalityof scientific interest in exploring the solar system amongprospectivepartners. Lunarmissions of various types (most notably a polar orbiter) have been discussed in the plansof a number of space agencies. Mars missions have also figured prominently in programplanning in the U.S., the Soviet Union, and ESA with Mars Rover and/or Sample Returnmissions being of particular interest. It is evident that there is widespread interest inpossible cooperative asteroid and comet missions. For example, NASA has been discussingpossible participation in the Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby mission with the FederalRepublic of Germany for quite sane time, and comet sample return missions appear in bothNASAand ESA planning documents. There also are identified possibilities for cooperationin the exploration of the outer solar system with the cooperation on the Cassini mission(a Saturn orbiter and Titan probe) being actively discussed by NASA and ESA. Missionsunder consideration would lend themselves to the full gamut of possibilities forcooperation ranging f ran the coordination of separate missions to major shared hardwareprograms. The desirable degree of interdependence of possible cooperative programsclearly needsto be carefully considered and is likely to depend as much (or perhaps evenmore) on economic, political, and diplomatic considerations as on scientific and technicalones.

Future successful implementationof international cooperativeprogramswill requirecarefully coordinated planning. It is clear that the planning processis becomingincreasingly complicated as it becomes more and more difficult to mesh intrinsicallydifferent planning, budgeting, and program approval cycles, as well as differentexperiment selection processes. However, recent successes (e.g., the IOPEX,’Doseidonmission, the SOHO/Cluster and GEOTAIL components of ISTP, and the HESPprogram) haveequally clearly shown that coordinated planning can be done given sufficient lead time andprovided that all parties have sufficient patience, humor, and nerve (as well as a strongstomach) throughout the planning and negotiation process. It is also necessary for allparties to take the trouble to understand and include in the program planning theconstraints under which their partners must operate (e.g., the need in the United Statesfor carrying out an open canpetition for flight opportunities). Over the past severalyears a number of substantive steps have been taken to improve program coordination andplanning. For example, regular planning meetings are now being held between ESA and NASAto discuss possibilities for cooperation, assess progress, and consider program issues inboth space science and applications. The Standing Senior Liaison Group has provided amechanism for carrying out similar kinds of discussions between NASAand the Japanesespace science and applications camiunities. The IACG (discussed earlier) has provided anextremely valuable mechanism for the coordination of individual programs and, as afollow—on to this activity, working groups have now been established to examine planningin the areas of solar—terrestrial science, radio astronomy, and the exploration ofplanetary and primitive bodies. It is evident from these examples that a great deal ofeffort is being expended to ensure that various National and agency plans are being farmore carefully coordinated than has been the case in the past.

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Finally, it must be recognized that it is not possible to divorce scientific interestsfrom the general political and diplomatic situation within the U.S. Goverrment. NASA isencouraged to undertake international cooperativeprogramsbecausesuchprogramscontribute to meeting the country’s foreign policy objectives. However, NASA does notdetermine foreign policy in the U.S. This means that whatever cooperative programs NASAproposes must be consistent with current policy as set by the President and the Departmentof State. In particular, although there are clearly areas of mutual scientific interest,diplomatic issues will ultimately determine the real prospects for cooperation with theSoviet Union. The existence of mutual scientific interest is a necessary but not asufficient condition for cooperation. In addition, technology transfer is becoming anincreasingly sensitive issue in the United States. Potential cooperative programs willhave to be carefully structured to take into account that sensitivity.

(DNCUJDING REMARKS

It is evident from extensive discussions with individual scientists fran various countriesand fran an examination of the plans of the various space agencies that the camiunity ofscientists throughout the world has a shared vision concerning what can and should be doneto explore the solar system. Despite all the potential difficulties, the numerousexamples of past successes clearly demonstrate the importance of continuing to carry outprograms on an international cooperative basis. Looking beyond the near term problemsfacing the U.S. space program, NASA looks forward both to new opportunities for theexploration of the solar system and to new opportunities for the exploration of thepossibilities for such cooperation.

REFERENCES

1. J. M. Logsdon, U.S.—European Cooperation in SpaceScience: A 25—year Perspective,Science223, 11—16 (1984)

2. PlanetaryExploration Through Year 2000: A Core Program, Part One of a Report by theSolar System Exploration Ccmmittee of the NASAAdvisory Council, National Aeronauticsand Space Administration, Washington, DC (1983)

3. Planetary Exploration Through Year 2000: An Augmented Program, Part Two of a Reportby the Solar System Exploration Ccmtnittee of the NASA Advisory Counci 1, NationalAeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC (1986)

APPENDIXACRONYMDICTIONARY

ANPFE Active Magnetospheric Particle Tracer ExplorersANS Astronanical Netherlands SatelliteCNES French Centre National d’Etudes SpatialeESA EuropeanSpace AgencyFRG Federal Republic of GermanyGRO Gaima Ray ObservatoryHEAO High Energy Astronomical ObservatoryHEEP Japanese High Energy Solar PhysicsHST Hubble Space TelescopeI~ Interagency Coordinating GroupIKI Soviet Intercosmos CouncilIRAS Infrared Astronomical SatelliteISAS Japanese Institute of Space and Aeronautical ScienceISEE International Sun—Earth ExplorerIUE International Ultraviolet ExplorerNASA National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationOAO Orbiting Astrophysical ObservatoryOGO Orbiting Geophysical Observatory050 Orbiting Solar ObservatoryROSAT Roentgen Satellite50(10 Solar and Heliospheric ObservatorySN Solar Maximum MissionSSNC Solar System Exploration Committee (NASA)TOPEX The Ocean Topography ExperimentliARS Upper Atmospheric Research SatelliteUK United KingdanUS United States of AmericaUSSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics