institutions of democracy
DESCRIPTION
INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY. Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures. WEEKLY READING. Smith, Democracy , chs. 5-6 Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes). INTRO: CHILEAN ELECTIONS. Round One (12/13/09) Sebasti án Piñera ( Alianza por Chile ) 44.06 - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
Presidentialism, Parties, and Legislatures
![Page 2: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
WEEKLY READING
• Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6
• Modern Latin America, ch. 6 (Andes)
![Page 3: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
![Page 4: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
INTRO: CHILEAN ELECTIONS
• Round One (12/13/09)– Sebastián Piñera (Alianza por Chile) 44.06– Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 29.60– Marco Enríquez-Ominami (Independent) 20.14– Jorge Arrate (Juntos Podemos Más) 6.21
• Round Two (01/17/10)– Piñera (Alianza) 51.61– Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Concertación) 48.39
![Page 5: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
![Page 6: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
![Page 7: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
BACKGROUND
• 1970 election:– Salvador Allende 36.6– Jorge Alessandri 35.3– Radomiro Tomic 28.1
• 1964 election:– Eduardo Frei Montalva 56.1– Salvador Allende 38.9– Julio Durán 5.0
![Page 8: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
OUTLINE
1. Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation
2. Presidentialism or parliamentarism?
3. Proposals for reform
4. The legislative arena
5. The plight of political parties
6. Sources of disenchantment
![Page 9: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES
• Survival and consolidation of democracy
• Avoidance of the past (and military coups)
• Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?
![Page 10: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
THE “NEW INSTITUTIONALISM”
• Individuals seek to maximize gain
• Institutions (rules) shape incentives
• And can therefore determine behavior
• Ergo, institutional design can affect the collective behavior of political actors
![Page 11: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?
• Presidentialism:Head of government (president) is directly electedFixed term in officeCannot be removed by legislature (except through
impeachment)Selects cabinet ministersHead of government is also head of stateSeparation of legislative-executive powers
![Page 12: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
• Parliamentarism:Voters elect MPs MPs select head of government (PM)MPs approve cabinet appointmentsPM (and cabinet officers) dependent on
continuing confidence of parliamentHead of government (PM) is not head of stateFusion of legislative-executive powers
![Page 13: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS
• Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime
• Avoid polarization from zero-sum game
• Avoid paralyzing deadlock
• Thus superior durability of parliamentary regimes
![Page 14: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS
• Clarity of fixed time horizon
• Checks and balances
• Democratic election of head of government
• Not the cause of immobilism (PR the cause)
• Empirical findings result from “selection bias”
![Page 15: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
• Brazil
• Argentina
• Chile
• Why not?– Insistence on election of chief executive– Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty– Low esteem for congress, parties– Politics of nostalgia
![Page 16: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS
• Electing presidents:Plurality vs. MRO [reflections on Chile, 1970-2010]MRO a “magic bullet”Reelection or not?
• Power domains:Constitutional or partisan?Bureaucracy, judiciary, militaryDecree authority
![Page 17: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA
• Electoral Systems:SMDs and two-party politicsPR and multi-party politicsEffects of district magnitudeClosed-list vs. open-list ballotsThe problem of term limits
• Institutional Performance:Essentially “reactive” legislaturesRemoving presidents?
![Page 18: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
LEVELS OF POPULAR TRUST(1996-2007)
• Church ~ 70%
• Armed Forces ~ 50%
• Media (TV+print) ~ 40%
• Congress ~ 30%
• Parties ~ 20%
![Page 19: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES
• Diversity of party systems
• Levels of popular confidence
![Page 20: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Figure 6-1. Average Number of Political Parties: Selected Countries, 1940-77 and 1978-2000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
Brazil
Bolivia
Argentina
Number of Parties1978-2000
1944-1977
![Page 21: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Counting Political Parties:
N = 1 / (Σ pi2)
Where pi is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)
![Page 22: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Figure 6-3. Levels of Confidence in Political Parties, 1996 and 2000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Paraguay
Mexico
Ecuador
Colombia
Chile
Central America
Bolivia
Brazil
Argentina
Percentage responding "a lot" or "some" confidence
1996
2000
![Page 23: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT
• Weakness of representative institutions + judiciary branch (i.e., rule of law)
• Constraints on modern-day democracy• Inadequate policy performance • Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal”
democracy• Thus 55% would support authoritarian
government if it could improve economic situation (2004)
![Page 24: INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022062304/56813985550346895da117c7/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
AND THE RISE OF THE LEFT
• Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998)
• Lula, Brazil (2002)
• Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)…
• Reliance on democratic elections
• Vote as popular protest
• Possibilities of winning
• Challenge of governing