inductum absque imperium

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INDUCTUM ABSQUE IMPERIUM

LAWRENCE OF ARABIA

by Murray Simons

His well balanced brain and disciplined imagination facilitated adaptation to the new

environment; and there shone forth a brilliant tactician, with a genius for leadership.

Such men win friends – such also find critics

– Field Marshal Viscount Allenby1

Lawrence was a remarkable man. As a British staff

officer in Cairo during WWI, he deployed deep into

Arabia and began a journey that created a legend. Over

the next few years, he fought at the tactical, operational,

strategic, and even political levels to realise a quixotic

dream. Not only did he demonstrate incredible

leadership at each level, but he did so absque imperium

- without any command authority.

The aim of this essay is to assess the competence in

command of TE Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia). The

paper addresses the topic in three parts. The first section

provides a background to Lawrence the person, the

campaign he served in, and an exploration of semantic

definitions. From here, it discusses whether Lawrence

was in fact a commander and his suitability as a case

study. Part Two evaluates Lawrence’s competence in command by considering his own

interpretation of command, a comparison study of his peers, and his application of

operational art.

The third part of the essay examines Lawrence’s performance as a leader. Using both

classical and post-industrial approaches, it examines the strengths and weaknesses of

his leadership style. Employing both the Great-man and Traits approach it examines

how Lawrence’s persona contributed to his leadership effectiveness. The essay then

employs Change Management theories and the Transformational Leadership model to

evaluate Lawrence’s performance in the context of post-industrial approaches.

Emphasis shifts towards the sociological and psychological effect of his actions rather

than the actions themselves. Drawing together the lessons of Lawrence’s command and

leadership, the paper concludes with an exploration of his remarkable ability to

influence without power - inductum absque imperium.

1 Speaking of E.T. Shaw, ‘better known to the public as Colonel T.E. Lawrence’ on the BBC, 19

May 1935 – the day of Lawrence’s death. Quoted in The Evening Post, 29 June 1935.

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PART I BACKGROUND

Thomas Edward Lawrence

Thomas Edward Lawrence was born on August 16, 1888 at Tremadoc in North Wales.

He was one of five illegitimate sons born to Sir Thomas Chapman and Sarah Junner.

The family relocated often during his early years but eventually settled down in the

University City of Oxford. Much of Lawrence’s unusual character is traceable back to

his childhood adventures and fascination with medieval history. He would plaster his

walls with knightly images of chivalry, valour, altruism, and scenes of siege warfare.

As an adolescent, he made epic bicycle journeys throughout the United Kingdom and

France studying historic architecture. He often endured severe, yet self-inflicted,

hardships for no logical reason.2 He was fluent in French, Greek, Latin, and later picked

up Arabic while travelling through the Levant completing his BA thesis on Crusader

castle designs.

After graduating, Lawrence returned to the Middle East and worked alongside German

soldiers on archaeological digs. During this time, he acquired many more skills that

were, unknown to him, preparing him for his later destiny. Not only did he improve his

German language abilities, but more importantly, he developed powerful leadership and

mediation skills. Another formative experience was his insightful appreciation of the

military situation. As the approaching war became inevitable, Lawrence assisted with

an undercover military intelligence reconnaissance through Petra to Aqaba. Lawrence

returned to England and enlisted soon after war broke out.

As an intelligence officer, Lawrence worked in Cairo where the British were carefully

monitoring the Arab-Turkish relationship. Keen to keep Germany’s ally busy

elsewhere, Britain supported the Arabs in their attempt to regain independence.

Lawrence deployed into the field as one of many British working with the Arabs.

Joyce and Davonport had charge of Egyptian forces and co-operated with the organising

and training of regular Arab troops. Davenport remained with Ali’s family, while Joyce

was later attached to Feisal. These two officers performed services in the revolt which

were not inferior to those of Lawrence…”3

He was not the only British officer liaising with the Arabs, yet his story is romanticised

through books, shows and the 1962 movie. His legend was also helped by the fact that

he was an eloquent writer who self-published many embellished accounts of his own

exploits. Of greatest fame is his tome Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He is also renowned for

2 Asher, M. 1999, Lawrence, The Uncrowned King of Arabia, The Overlook Press, New York, p

19. In later life, he even paid a Scotsman to whip him. See Mack, J.E. 2002, A Prince of our

Disorder: The Life of T.E. Lawrence, Harvard University Press, USA, p 242. 3 Mousa, S. 1966, T.E. Lawrence: An Arab view, Oxford UP, London, p 93.

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publishing on command, leadership, and guerrilla warfare tactics. However, not all

historians of the Revolt agree with Lawrence’s version.

The Arab Revolt

Following a 1908 coup, the weakened Ottoman Empire began declining even faster.

The Turks discarded their pluralistic, pan-Islamic policies and began openly

discriminating against their Arab citizens.4 In particular, the Arabs faced political,

cultural, and linguistic persecution which led to increasing calls for independence.

Secret societies formed in all major cities. By 1916, Sherif Hussein of Mecca had

sufficient numbers to lead a rebellion against a local Turkish garrison. ‘The Arab

Revolt’ had begun.

Sharif Hussein’s ultimate goal was to establish an independent and unified Arab State.

He created three armies, placing three of his four sons in charge of each.5 The southern

was led by Emir Ali, the eastern by Emir Abdullah, and the northern with Emir Feisal.6

The Arab freedom fighters captured Jeddah on 12 June and Taif on 21 September, but

they were outmatched trying to take Medina. Suddenly, the Revolt was losing

momentum.

The 28-year-old Captain Lawrence arrived in the Hajaz in October 1916, ostensibly on

an intelligence reconnaissance, but remained as a British field liaison officer. Upon

arrival in Arabia, according to Western accounts, he sought out a local leader through

whom he could influence the Arab Revolt.7 Lawrence teamed up with Emir Feisal,

effectively becoming his chief of staff. Together, so legend has it, they accomplished

miracles and earned their place in Arabian history.

The most significant achievement of the Revolt was the conquest of Aqaba following a

gruelling desert journey. This accomplishment was of particular significance to the

British who had recently suffered setbacks against the Turks. The capture of Aqaba not

only provided a valuable seaport in the area, it also crushed the Turkish regional

stronghold. Coinciding with this breakthrough was the timely replacement of Field

Marshal Murray, the British Commander-in-Chief in Cairo. Like many at the time,

Murray believed the Middle East campaign to be a mere sideshow to the real war in

Europe. The Arab Revolt therefore, was only ‘the sideshow of a sideshow’. In contrast,

Field Marshal Allenby, having just arrived from the trenches of Europe, saw potential

in these operations and increased the British support.

With increased matériel support, the Arab Revolt became stronger. Operations during

1917-18 expanded. Exploiting their strengths against Turkish vulnerabilities, the Arabs

4 The Arab Revolt, viewed 8 Sep 03, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_arabrevolt.html 5 Mousa, loc cit. 6 With which Lawrence was mainly preoccupied. 7 The Royal Jordanian website (http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/his_arabrevolt.html) on the Arab

Revolt makes no mention of Lawrence nor does General Liman von Sanders, a German officer

who wrote of his involvement in opposing the Arab Revolt. See von Sanders, L. 1927, Five Years

in Turkey (translated by the United States Naval Institute), Annapolis.

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conducted lightning raids on the exposed railway and communications lines stretching

through the desert. These raids tied up disproportionate numbers of Turkish soldiers in

the Hajaz, thus weakening their ability to repel the British led coalition force advancing

through Palestine.

As the Turks retreated northward, the Arabs pursued them up the Eastbank of the Jordan

River. Allenby’s three Corps progressed up through Beersheba, Gaza, and Jerusalem in

concert with the Arab effort. Both advancing armies fought major battles along the way.

The details of most remain contentious even today. Perhaps the most controversial is

the conquest of Damascus. In a desperate act to secure Syria for the Arabs, vice the

French, Lawrence claimed the Arabs arrived first. His politicking failed however, as

the English had already agreed to the infamous Sykes-Picot accord. France received the

Syrian mandate (from which they created Lebanon), while the British kept Palestine.

The Hashemite Royal Family eventually received Jordan, the Saudi Arabian peninsular

and Iraq which, at that time, also included Kuwait.

When the Arab Revolt came to an end, Lawrence returned to England. He assisted the

British Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, where he continued to promote Arab

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independence. Believing he had failed his Arab brothers, Lawrence became a recluse.

He enlisted in the Royal Air Force (RAF) at the lowest possible rank and assumed a

new name. After being discovered by the media, he took on another identity and served

in the Army before returning to the RAF where he saw out twelve years of enlisted

Service. In March 1935, soon after retiring, he was killed in a motorbike accident.

Definitions

Asking if Lawrence was a competent commander raises two questions. Was he a

commander and what defines competent? The following section begins by exploring

the numerous definitions for each, and justifying the selected interpretations.

Combining these two introduces another concept - operational art. The section

concludes by defining the 13 component parts of operational art. Relevant leadership

definitions appear at the start of their respective sections.

The Macquarie dictionary offers 18 separate definitions for command including verbs,

nouns, and imperatives. Within these are military, legal, and lay interpretations. The

Australian Defence Force (ADF) defines command as a noun:

The authority which a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over

subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and

responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment

of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the

accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare,

morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.8

The ADF definition emphasises the authority and responsibility invested in a military

officer and therefore, ‘makes command an attribute of the structure in which a

commander operates.’9 The focus of this paper however, is ‘competence in command’

meaning emphasis is placed on what was done not whether it was supposed to be done.

Therefore, this paper focuses on command as the verb not the noun.

Competent is defined as 'fitting, suitable, or sufficient for the purpose.'10 This implies

adequacy, not excellence. Furthermore, in terms of military performance, it need not

imply victory. For a competent commander who is severely outnumbered, or suffers

from external incompetence is largely blameless in defeat. Indeed, defeated

commanders often provide useful case-studies. It is therefore more important to study

the process of a commander. This process can be analysed through the application of

operational art.

Operational Art captures the essence of identifying, developing, integrating, and

applying strategic innovation11 using 13 operational building blocks.12 These include:

Operational Objectives, End-state, Centre of Gravity, Critical Vulnerabilities, Decisive

8 Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 0-2 Leadership manual, 2002. 9 Chessum, D.J. 2002, An Essay On Admiral Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa - A Study In Command

and Leadership, viewed 26 July 2003, < www.gwpda.org/naval/jellicol.htm> 10 ibid. 11 For more on strategic innovation see Cadden, S. 2003, ‘Major T. E. Lawrence’, Ages of

Operational Commanders, Vol 1, Canadian Command and Staff College 29, p 25. 12 The Australian Defence Force Publication 9 (ADFP 9) para 4.12.

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Points, Information Operations, Manoeuvre, Tempo, Attrition, Leverage, Operational

Pauses, Culminating Points, and Contingency Planning. These terms are taken from the

Australian Defence Force Publication 9 and are explained in annex A.

Operational art is relative to the level at which it is being employed. Because this paper

considers operational level command competence, it is necessary to assess Lawrence at

that level. It is therefore, also necessary to consider the difference between operational

and tactical command. This paper uses the Canadian Department of Defence

differentiation:

At the operational level, a successful commander must not only have professional

knowledge, intellect, and judgment to think at a higher degree than required at tactical

level of command, they must also have the ability to think at the macro level, understand

the political dimension, the ability to deliver an appropriate message to the media, and

the additional responsibilities that are associated with joint and combined command.13

Command is also contextual. When considering competence to command (imperium)

it is necessary to consider those being commanded. Particularly in the case of the Arab

Revolt, command authority is difficult to establish. For, in reality, no one had legal

command over the Arabs. Even Feisal14 had no real authority over other tribes. They

chose whether to follow and they came and went as they saw fit. Technically, these

Arab’s were subject to the Ottoman rule. Their role in the revolt was like any other

revolutionary Army - without any authority.

The Arab Revolt was an amorphous army made up of tribes who joined, or deserted,

the cause as it interested them. Even at the individual level, Arab fighters would

spontaneously abandon the campaign by returning to their tribe, only to be replaced by

a brother using the same rifle.

The Arabs of the Hajaz are all for the Sharif, some keenly enough to volunteer, others

less keen, but all well-wishers. Only, they are tribesmen, and as such are rebellious by

instinct. They hate the Turks, but they don’t want to obey anyone’s orders, and as a

consequence they turnout only as a mob of snipers or guerrilla fighters.15

At that time, anarchy transcended the Western notion of command in the desert. ‘The

Arabs, as he [Lawrence] knew, believed in individuals not in institutions.’16 There was

no legal binding on any of them. The only thing that held the campaign together was

exceptional inductum absque imperium - leadership.

Arguably, the legitimacy of command authority emerged as the Revolt matured. As the

Turks were pushed back, the cohesion and momentum of the Arab revolt grew. And in

the later stages, command authority was formally discussed and even transferred. But

Lawrence’s legitimacy as an operational commander was never clearly established.

13 Canadian Department of Defence, Land Force Command, quoted in Morneau, J.J. What Are

The Key Attributes Required By Operational Level Commander To Be Successful? viewed 9

September 2001, http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/amsc/amsc1/028.html, p13. 14 Emir Feisal was the Arab commander with whom Lawrence worked. 15 Lawrence discussing command over Arabs in a letter to his family on the 12th of February 1917

quoted in Wilson, J. Lawrence of Arabia: The authorised biography of T. E. Lawrence, p 369. 16 Mack, op cit, p 248.

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Lawrence’s Imperium

As a British officer, Lawrence never truly commanded Arab fighters.17 In fact, Arab

forces remained under the command of their own Arab leaders throughout the

campaign. At one stage though, temporal operational control18 of the northern Arab

Army transferred to the British General Headquarters (GHQ) in Cairo.

It was therefore decided that the Emir Feisal should become, in effect, an Army

Commander under Sir Edmund Allenby’s orders. All Arab operations north of Ma’an

were to be carried out by him under the direction of the British commander in chief.

South of Ma’an the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, was still to act as an

adviser to the Emirs Ali and Abdulla and were to be responsible for their supplies.19.

Lawrence did not even have legitimate command authority over British forces in the

Hajaz. He did however ask Clayton20 for command authority of British interests in the

desert following the success of Aqaba.21 In Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence

obliquely refers to the request through Clayton’s response ‘but [he] objected that actual

command could not be given to an officer Junior to the rest. He suggested Joyce as

commanding officer at Aqaba: a notion which suited me perfectly.’22

On occasions, Lawrence (claims to have been) granted tactical control of Arab fighters.

‘Feisal has authorised me to bring down the Fagair troops to Abdullah, use them myself,

or send them North as I think best.’23 It could also be said he had command over the

Arabs in his personal bodyguard. Controversy surrounds the exact numbers but in any

account this group never exceeded 50 men.

At the campaign level, Lawrence himself credits the success of the Revolt to the Arab

commanders: ‘It was an Arab war waged and led by Arabs for an Arab aim in Arabia.’24

Defending Lawrence’s writings, after his death, Lawrence’s brother Arnie, also

acknowledges campaign level command was retained by the Arab leaders.

…in fact, Allenby was the only European recognised as holding authority over any Arab

forces, and he exercised its solely through their commander, Feisal. The European

officers who served with them could give orders to no Arab except for the few in their

employment.25

17 Command is defined in the Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 0-2 Leadership

manual, 2002, as ‘the authority which a commander in the military Service lawfully exercises

over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.’ p xxv. 18 Temporal describes limitations in regards to either time, location, or both. Operational control

refers to authority granted to issues orders directly relating to an operation. It does not include

overall command authority. 19 Military operations: Egypt and Palestine (London, H.M.S.O., 1930), Volume 2, part 2, quoted in

Mack, op cit, pp 396-7. 20 Clayton was Head of Intelligence in Cairo (Lawrence’s immediate superior). 21 Following the success of the Aqaba raid, Lawrence asked for command over ‘Operation

Hedgehog’ the British Mission to the Arabs. See Asher, M. 1999, Lawrence, The Uncrowned

King of Arabia, The Overlook Press, New York, p263. 22 Second paragraph of Chapter LVII, Seven Pillars of Wisdom. 23 Wilson, op cit, p 381. 24 TE Lawrence in the introductory chapter to Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1939 edition). 25 AW Lawrence, 1966, ‘Comment’ in Mousa, op cit, p 279.

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At the operational level, the ADF definition shares two key words with other Western

military doctrines: ‘authority’ and ‘responsibility’. Lawrence had neither but exercised

both. Yet, in his own words, he was in command: ‘… I was unfortunately as much in

command of the campaign as I pleased.’26 Here he refers to his overwhelming influence

over the proxy Arab commanders who he astutely acted through. Lawrence was not a

commander but he did command.

Lawrence as a case study

So, if Lawrence was not a true commander, why choose him as a case study in

command? Indeed, many academics naïvely dismiss Lawrence as a poor case study for

command and leadership. Yet here military paradoxical logic27 applies; a pseudo-

commander makes a better case study than a legitimate one, for they28 must genuinely

earn success. In the words of Kenneth Blanchard: ‘the key to successful leadership

today is influence, not authority.’29 Lawrence is a brilliant case study for both command

and leadership.

Another common criticism of studying Lawrence is that he seldom told the truth. As is

fairly well-known, and will be explored in greater detail throughout the essay, much of

what is written of Lawrence is more fiction than fact. This criticism however applies

more to writings in the early part of last century. In recent decades biographers and

historians go to great lengths to unravel the layers of deception and distortion

surrounding the event is of the Arab revolt. It is worth pointing out however that

Lawrence’s motives may not have been entirely malicious.

Anything written by Lawrence himself is still regarded with suspicion. This essay

focuses more on alternative primary and secondary sources of those who have

meticulously researched and cross-referenced official records by witnesses and other

recounts of events and compares them with Lawrence’s own assertions. Where

Lawrence is quoted directly for historical facts, emphasis is placed on the fact that it is

Lawrence’s account. In particular, the impression Lawrence tried to present rather than

factual events. Lawrence’s accounts of facts and history may well be questionable, but

the articulation of his own thoughts and attitudes are generally worth accepting.

PART II COMMAND

This section explores Lawrence’s competence in command. Beginning with his

impression of the commanders he worked for, it then compares Lawrence with his

contemporaries before examining his personal command philosophy. The section

concludes with an analysis of his military strategy using the 13 components of

operational art as a framework.

26 Lawrence, T.E. 1939, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (Anchor Books edition, 1991), p 188. 27 As defined by Clausewitz: the worst weather is the best, a bad road is a good road, etc. 28 They is used as the non gender specific, third person singular. 29 For more see http://www.blanchardtraining.com/.

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Lawrence on his superiors

Lawrence had long held a vision for his involvement with the Revolt, but his

Commander-in-Chief, Murray, openly stated that he had no confidence in the Arabs’

ability to wage a successful war. Lawrence needed to work around Murray. He did this

by forming relationships with other influential people such as Sir Reginald Wingate,

Admiral Wemyss, and Ronald Storrs30 Lawrence used

these three men to influence Murray. Ultimately the

reluctant Commander-in-Chief relented and allowed

Lawrence to make contact with the Arabs,31 but in time,

Murray was replaced by Allenby.

Lawrence of Arabia remarked that Allenby’s mind was

like the prow of the Mauretania: there was so much

weight behind it that it did not need to be razor-sharp.32

Allenby’s reputation had preceded him. When Lawrence

learned of Allenby’s appointment, he identified the need to

build a new influence relationship. ‘This was news of the

biggest (sic), importantly concerning me.’33 Lawrence goes

on to speculate whether they would have trouble over the

next six months ‘teaching’ Allenby. ‘…our thought for

those first few days had been, not to defeat the enemy, but

to make our own chiefs let us live.’ But Allenby proved to

be a useful sponsor34 for both Lawrence and the Revolt.

Although Lawrence was consciously manipulating Allenby, he also respected him. His

references to Allenby’s abilities are mostly complimentary. One such example is when

Lawrence first met Allenby to announce the success of Aqaba. ‘Allenby was physically

large and confident, and morally so great that the comprehension of our littleness came

slow to him.’ Lindsay Baly describes how Allenby offered to do what he could for the

Arabs and how Lawrence, in turn, made promises back:

The Arab irregulars of Feisal belonged to Allenby’s command and he took a close interest

in them, liaising frequently with their brilliant but wayward and untruthful mentor,

Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence. With the help of attached British officers, Feisal’s

Arabs were breaking up the railway line...Lawrence promised Allenby Arab support on

this operation…35

30 Sir Reginald Wingate was the High Commissioner in Egypt (and a distant relative of Lawrence)

and Ronald Storrs was The Political Adviser representing the British Government to the Arabs. 31 The exact details of Lawrence’s release to the Hejaz remain controversial. Some maintain he

travelled on leave while others refer to it as a reconnaissance mission. Few, if any, suggest he was

sent to become involved in the Revolt. 32 Baly, L. 2003, Horseman, Pass By: The Australian Light Horse in WWI, Kangaroo Press, NSW,

p 96. 33 Lawrence, T.E., 1991 edition, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p 320 (end of chapter LVI). 34 See the later section on Change Management for a greater explanation of Sponsors. 35 Baly, op cit, p 177.

Field Marshal Allenby

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Because Lawrence had established himself into positions of influence without

authority, he had simultaneously made himself subservient to two masters. Such a

position is generally considered untenable and contrary to military protocol; yet

Lawrence used this to his advantage. He would sometimes play one off against the other

yet, ultimately, he had to make both believe that he served them alone. Apart from the

obvious problems this created, Lawrence also needed to keep the two men apart.36 It

was also necessary for him to be the primary conduit between them.

…not for the first or last time service to two masters irked me. I was one of Allenby’s

officers, and in his confidence: in return, he expected me to do the best I could for him.

I was Feisal’s advisor, and Feisal relied upon the honesty and competence of my advice

so far as often to take it without argument. Yet I could not explain to Allenby the whole

Arab situation, nor disclose the British plan to Feisal.37

Lawrence contrasted with contemporaries

To fully understand Lawrence’s abilities it is useful to contrast him with his

contemporaries. Lawrence was not the only European to work alongside the Arabs, yet

he remains the most successful and well-known. It is possible to compare Lawrence

with the many other British advisers operating in Arabia but they are no match as they

remain largely unknown. Similarly, there was no real comparison on the German-

Turkish side. Perhaps the best comparison is Lawrence’s nemesis, the French

commander assigned to the Arab forces – Colonel Edourad Brémond.

[Lawrence’s] main motivation throughout revolt…was ambition and hatred of the

French; a hatred so powerful that in some of the papers he wrote early in the war it is

difficult to tell whether the Turks or the French were the enemy.38

Brémond was in charge of the French military mission to Arabia. His goal was to win

Syria for France. But his plan was conventional and suffered from the stereotypical

French arrogance. He already had the support of the British39 and a combined Anglo-

French Brigade was earmarked for an operation40 where he intended to land the troops

under the guise of helping the Arabs, but to cut them off before the Revolt made its way

north. Syria was then to become France’s mandate; without the need for the politically

fought battles of the Sykes-Picot accord.41

36 Allenby and Feisal were two men who would not normally be allies and, in fact, they never

actually met until Damascus. Stiller, op cit, p 30. 37 Lawrence, T.E., 1935 edition, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp 385-6. 38 Knightly and Simpson 1969, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia, Thomas Nelson and Sons

Ltd, London, p 4. 39 Sir Reginald Wingate supported this plan. 40 From Sir Archibald Murray, Commander-in-Chief in Cairo. See Stiller, op cit, p 44. 41 This plan was in conflict with Lawrence’s vision to win Arabia for the Arabs. Lawrence’s goal

was the Arabs would be first to Damascus and therefore squeeze France out. As it happened the

Australian Mounted Division beat the Arabs to Damascus but Lawrence sought to rewrite the

history book’s to suit his only goal. In any account the French still got Syria.

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Brémond arrived in Arabia a month before Lawrence and had already made contact

with Emir Abdullah. He was on the verge of convincing the Arabs to work with the

French when Lawrence arrived. Brémond had many other advantages over Lawrence:

he had the political support of the Sykes-Picot accord, he had command authority, he

was a linguist and spoke perfect Arabic (unlike Lawrence on arrival), he had extensive

prior military training and experience, he had a reputation for culture and integrity, and

he had the support of the British.

But Brémond had a number of weaknesses that Lawrence exploited. He was arrogant,

blunt, and patronising. He spoke openly about France’s intentions on Syria, as well as

his distrust of the British. Furthermore, Brémond failed to build a trusting relationship

with Arab leaders; instead, relying on the righteousness of the French to prevail.42 His

arrogance cost France their influence in the campaign and led the French Commander-

in-Chief, Gen Joffrey, to telegram ‘this state of mind could have serious consequences

on the development about plans in the Levant.’43

Lawrence’s hostility to France was of long-standing and Brémond, a professional soldier,

did not conceal his distaste for Lawrence’s cheek and insolence.44

Lawrence was able to outmanoeuvre Brémond by contrasting his approach. Lawrence

avoided being arrogant with those he wished to co-operate with, he kept his personal

agendas secret, he refrained from criticising allies, and he chose a leader who could be

influenced rather than dominated.45 In short, Lawrence was the better man.

Lawrence on Command

Generalship, at least in my case, came not by instinct, unsought, but by understanding,

hard study and brain concentration. Had it come easy me, I should not have done that as

well.46

Despite Lawrence’s lack of military training, he had a deep enough understanding of

command to develop his own model. In Chapter XXXIII of Seven Pillars of Wisdom,

Lawrence explores both the meaning of command and his obligations. ‘…for my

personal duty was command, and a commander, like the master architect, was

responsible for all.’47 He goes on to describe his own command philosophy as a three-

part model capturing the essence of: strategy, aims, synergies, tactics, means toward a

strategic end, and their interrelationship. He distilled these into algebraic, biological,

and psychological elements.

Lawrence defines the algebraic element as a pure science. This aspect is mathematical

and inhuman; dealing with known variables, fixed conditions, space and time. He

postulates that these are formulable, and goes on to give ratios of soldiers and

ammunition necessary to cover areas of desert, or engage the enemy. This modelling

42 Stiller op cit p 44. 43 Quoted in ibid, p 42. 44 Mousa, loc cit. 45 Stiller, op cit, p 45 46 Colonel T. E. Lawrence, 1932, letter to Liddell Hart, quoted in Tsouras, op cit p 358 47 Seven Pillars of Wisdom, pp 197-201, 1942 limited edition Jonathan Cape (chapter 33).

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became essential in his calculations of stores

requests from Cairo – noting that this

‘commander’ did not have the luxury of a

headquarters logistics element. Given that

desert warfare was unlike anything in the

British Army textbooks, in terms of terrain,

climate, and infrastructure support,48 Lawrence

had to start largely from scratch. Furthermore,

WWI saw the exploitation, on both sides, of

many revolutions in military affairs (RMAs)

such as: airpower, wireless communications,

railway logistic support, mechanised armoured

vehicles, and machine guns.

The second factor of Lawrence’s command

model is Biological. Here command becomes

an art, for its measure is subjective, and

influence variable. Like the algebraic element, Lawrence had to start from a clean sheet

of paper, for he had neither military training, nor Army textbooks, dealing with raising

Arab Forces. Not to be confused with the final Psychological element, the Biological

speaks of raise, train and sustain regular, irregular and reserve Forces. As already

discussed, the reliable supply of trained fighting-men was indeed a critical part of the

Arab Revolt. Unlike the massed Armies fighting in the trenches of Europe, ‘Lawrence’s

Army’ was small. ‘We could not afford casualties.’49 And it was because of this,

Lawrence perfected his own guerrilla warfare doctrine.50

The third pillar of Lawrence’s command model strikes at the heart of leadership – the

psychological factor. Drawing on the classical works of Xenophon, Lawrence

plagiarises the label diathetics to describe the art of command-leadership in combat. ‘It

was more subtle than tactics, and better worth doing, because it dealt with

uncontrollables, the subjects incapable of direct command.’51 Emphasising the

importance of leadership, he later goes on to say ‘…the diathetic for us would be more

than half the command’. Indeed it was through his mastery of leadership that Lawrence

is famed. Lawrence’s theories and application of leadership are explored later this

paper.

Lawrence’s Command Strategy

As a staff officer, military adviser, and academic, publishing theoretical models is not

that remarkable; what distinguishes Lawrence was his successful application of

command principles in the field. Lawrence took his own theoretical model and

developed it into strategies at the grand, military, and tactical level. He then executed

them himself. This next section explores Lawrence’s competence in command by

assessing his strategic innovation in operational art.52

48 Even Egypt and The Sudan did not compare with Arabia at that time. 49 Chapter 33, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p 194 (1991 edition). 50 Particularly the problems with tribesmen deserting after raids with booty. 51 Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p 195 (1991 edition). 52 See annex A for a full description of these 13 elements.

Unloading British supplies in Aqaba

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Lawrence was under my command but, after acquainting him with my strategic plan, I

gave him a free hand. His co-operation was marked by the utmost loyalty and I never

had anything but praise for his work, which, was invaluable throughout the campaign.53

Lawrence had long dreamed of liberating the Arabs. His childhood fascination with

medieval chivalry, his passion for the Middle East, and his pre-war experiences in the

Levant, all prepared him for his climactic performance. Lawrence’s vision of a freed

people depended on them earning their own state. To do this, Lawrence knew the Arabs

had to be the first to Damascus.

…unlike Feisal, [Lawrence] had seen the reconnaissance reports about this mountainous

track. These had been prepared on Murray’s instructions during the summer of 1916.

At that time Lawrence had been specifically asked to consider whether the defences there

could be overcome.54

As a British intelligence officer in Cairo, Lawrence was privy to enough information to

steer the Arab Revolt harmoniously northwards to the ultimate goal. The Arabs could

not repel the Turks alone, but by working in concert with the Allied forces they could

make it. For Lawrence however, there were a number of hurdles. The first of which was

to escape from his desk job in Cairo.

Once in Arabia, Lawrence took stock of the situation and identified key personalities

to help realise his dream.55 It was necessary for him to identify both the strengths and

weaknesses of the Arab Revolt. He then considered the best way to exploit their

algebraic strengths and offset their weaknesses-which were mainly algebraic and

psychological.

Arab Strengths:

1. The desert (algebraic)

2. Manoeuvrability (algebraic)

3. Hit-and-run style of warfare or the “raid” (algebraic)

4. Ability to fight in small teams (algebraic)

5. Easily motivated with booty (psychological)

Arab Weaknesses:

1. No booty, no motive (psychological)

2. Intertribal conflicts and feuds (psychological)

3. Inability to fight in larger battalions or regiments (algebraic)

4. Less suitable for attacking fixed positions (algebraic)

5. Inability to maintain a fighting unit year-round (biological)

6. Lack of modern weapons (algebraic)

Adapted from Chapter XV, Seven Pillars of Wisdom and Stiller, 1997, op cit, p 26.

53 Field Marshal Allenby describing Lawrence in T. E. Lawrence by his friends, quoted in

Stiller, op cit, p 30. 54 Wilson, op cit, pp 293-5 55 The selection and influence of these personalities is discussed later in the paper.

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Lawrence needed to formulate and implement his own strategic plan – separate to both

the British and Arab Stratagem.56 However, because he served two masters and lacked

imperium, he often employed persuasive powers to resolve conflicts of intent.

Lawrence’s own campaign plan was a hybrid of both the British and Arab, yet was

distinctly different. His plan had an end-state (an independent Arab state), an

operational objective (the Arabs

getting to Damascus first), and a

decisive point (taking Aqaba).

Aqaba was of strategic

importance to everyone. For the

Turks it provided the main

southern port and a well-

defended stronghold to repel

Allied advances across the Sinai.

For Lawrence, without taking

Aqaba, the Revolt would be

limited to the Hajaz and

therefore, never make

Damascus.57 For the same the

reason, Brémond wanted to deny

the Arabs Aqaba by attacking

with European forces.58 Of

significance, all interested

parties had a different plan.

Brémond wanted a littoral

assault, Feisal advocated an

incremental coastal advance

from the South, while the British

sought to strangle it by flanking

to the North.

From his pre-war

reconnaissance, Lawrence knew

that the major defences faced out

to sea. The Turks never imagined

an attack from the rear, incorrectly assuming that the desert provided impenetrable

defence. The debate continues about Lawrence’s contribution to the Aqaba raid. Many

question, or even challenge, his leadership of the epic journey.59 While others, like

Asher, are convinced:

56 A classic the example of this was when both higher commands wanted to take Medina yet

Lawrence saw the dangers in this and successfully argued against it. 57 It was also important for matériel supply and Lawrence’s strategy of linking up with the Allied

the push for Damascus - see Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p 274, (1991 edition) 58 At this point Brémond was in danger of losing the allocated forces which had the secondary impact

of denying him both command and French influence in Arabia. 59 See Wilson, J. Lawrence Arabia The authorised Bibliography of T. E. Lawrence pp 1054-5 and

Mousa, op cit, pp 45, 51- 3, 66, and 85.

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Lawrence was the only individual sufficiently impartial to assume the direction of the

raid, and, for the first time, he had to abandon his habit of working through a Sharif, and

take on direct leadership himself.60

From Lawrence’s accounts, we would not only believe that it was his leadership but his

original idea.61 Regardless of his degree of involvement, Lawrence contributed

significantly to the operation. It also rates as the defining moment of his legend.

Attacking Aqaba – photograph taken by Lawrence, July 6 1917

Knowing that the British did not want Aqaba attacked,62 Lawrence deliberately avoided

telling them until the operation was complete. ‘So I decided to go my own way, with

or without orders. I wrote a letter of apology to Clayton, telling him that my intentions

were of the best: and went.’63 However, his discretion had other, equally valuable,

motives. Operational Security (OPSEC) was critical to success and Lawrence employed

various information operations to deceive the enemy. Lawrence’s strategy was to attack

from the undefended North using a circuitous route across the supposedly impassable

Nefud desert. The Aqaba raid receives significant attention in most publications about

either Lawrence or the Arab Revolt because it epitomises the stuff of legends. Despite

the challenges, the Aqaba raid was a huge success.

Lawrence identified the Turkish Centre of Gravity (CofG) as their force projection and

Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) as the lines of communication, in particular the railway

and their isolation in the desert. Prior to the war, the Arab bureau estimated there are

only about 40 locomotives for the narrow gauge railway system south of Damascus.

They calculated 10 locomotives would be required for the Damascus-Beirut sector.

This left 30 to do the work south of Damascus. To run a train to Beersheba and Medina

required 20 engines per day. Beersheba was 40 hours from Damascus and Medina 100.

60 Asher, M. 1999, Lawrence, The Uncrowned King of Arabia, The Overlook Press, New York,

p266. 61 See both Seven Pillars of Wisdom and Revolt in the Desert. 62 Owing to certain quarters supporting the French motives (see Wilson J. op cit, p 366) and fear for

long-term British influence in Egypt (Wilson p 394 footnote 39 and p 397 footnote 8). 63 Final sentences of chapter XXXVIII, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p 226 (1991 edition) see also

Wilson, op cit, p 366.

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A certain number of engines would be under repair and engaged in local construction

or armoured train work. Turkish locomotives were therefore important targets. Each

engine put out of action would significantly reduce the enemy’s ability to move men

and supplies.64 When locomotives could not to the targeted then tracks were:

Dynamiters have been ordered to blow up not more than five rails per night, and so

something every night… I think a constant series of petty destructions of rails is the most

efficient means of keeping the line out of order. Large demolitions are no more difficult

to repair and the blowing up of culverts is a waste of time and explosives.65

Lawrence’s concept of operations (CONOPS) involved paralysing, vice destroying, the

Turks in Medina; conducting guerrilla warfare; exploiting the desert; and linking up

with the Allies to take Damascus. These also exploited manoeuvre, leverage,

information operations, tempo, attrition, and operational pauses.

At the beginning of the Revolt, the plan was simply to eject the Turks from Arabia.

Employing traditional military strategy of attrition and gradualism, the Arabs had

previously tried to take Medina. Now they were poised to try again. Lawrence however,

was visionary. Based on his theory on algebraic command, coupled with an analysis

of Arab strengths and weaknesses, he argued against attacking Medina. Without help

from Allied troops, the algebraic risk of failure was too high. However, such support

might compromise Arab control of the Revolt. Instead, Lawrence’s strategy was to keep

distant Turkish outposts in the desert with long lines of communication that were costly

to protect.66 In doing so he bled tens of thousands of Turkish troops away from the real

action of Palestine.

We must not take Medina. The Turk was harmless there. In prison in Egypt, he would

cost us food and guards. We wanted him to stay in Medina, and every other distant place,

in the largest numbers. Our ideal was keep his railway just working, but only just, with

the maximum loss and discomfort.67

Lawrence’s appreciation of leverage, manoeuvre, and attrition led to his preference for

guerrilla warfare. ‘Our cards were speed and time, not to hitting power, and these gave

us strategical rather than tactical strength. Range is more to strategy than force.’68

Lawrence’s development of guerrilla warfare was a significant antecedent to his fame

and his later publications influenced doctrinal developments worldwide. Such

unconventional tactics were frowned upon by his British contemporaries, who

considered the approach ungentlemanly. Their paradigm was face-to-face attritional

warfare. Yet, to Lawrence, ‘guerrilla war is far more intelligent than a bayonet

charge.’69

64 For more see Wilson op cit, pp 374-5. 65 T. E. Lawrence to CE Wilson 16 April 1917. Quoted in Wilson, op cit, p 389. 66 An independent historian, who was with Lawrence at the time, verifies the strategy. See Liddell

Hart, B.H. 1935, Lawrence of Arabia, p 213. 67 Chapter XXXVIII, Seven Pillars Wisdom p 225 (1991 edition). 68 Lawrence TE. The Science of Guerrilla Warfare, The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1929, quoted in

Tsouras, op cit, p 435. 69 Lawrence, TE, ‘The Science of Guerrilla Warfare’, Encyclopaedia Britannica 1929 quoted in

Tsouras P. G. 1994, Warrior’s Words a dictionary of military quotations.

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The dearth of independent reports makes it difficult to identify how well Lawrence

considered the remaining two elements of operational art (Culminating Points and

Contingency Planning). From his own accounts, Lawrence describes how he developed

both his plans and alternate courses of action, based on enemy disposition.

When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant –

and many an irrelevant – factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs,

language, appetites, standards – all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost

like my own side. I risked myself among them 100 times, to learn.70

Whether or not Lawrence actually gave much attention to planning alternates, he

certainly needed them. At the tactical level, the Arabs occasionally found themselves

outmatched by the Turks and equipment failure led to operational failure.71 At the

strategic level, Lawrence reached a personal culminating point following his capture,

torture, and rape at Derra. Lawrence’s apparent lack of contingency planning was also

tested when operations failed72 and, arguably, when thousands of men deserted with

loot after each raid.

This section considered Lawrence’s competence in command. Despite not being a

legitimate commander, his performance in the Arab Revolt was equal to any great

operational level commander. Lawrence distinguished himself not only by developing

his own strategic approach and guerrilla warfare techniques, but also by implementing

them effectively. By overlaying the operational art template, this section highlights how

well an untrained staff officer performed as a pseudo-commander in the chaos of war.

Accepting that the environment was sui generis, Lawrence’s performance in command

still provides valuable lessons today. Lawrence effectively managed the algabraic and

biological elements of command but his real strength was in the psychological realm.

Lawrence’s leadership abilities distinguish him as a true genius.

PART III : LEADERSHIP

Command at lower levels is closely linked with a direct style of leadership…

Leadership, essentially, is the art of influencing others to do willingly what is

required in order to achieve the aim or goal. It is the projection of the personality,

character and will of the commander.73

70 Colonel T. E. Lawrence, 26 June 1933, letter to the Liddell Hart, quoted in Tsouras, op cit, p 258. 71 The failure of explosives detonating at critical times was a common problem. 72 Arriving too late for a battle he was supposed to support, bombs failing to go off on bridges he

promised to destroy, and when Arabs committed acts which today would be classified as war

crimes. 73 Morneau, op cit, p 9.

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Command and military leadership are intertwined. This section examines the

definitions of military leadership and introduces four broad approaches for assessing

effective leadership. Within each of the chosen approaches, several complementary

sub-models are jointly employed to thoroughly examine Lawrence’s exceptional

leadership abilities. The models chosen reflect the development of leadership study and

are presented in chronological order. The first is the holistic, Great-leader model.74 This

is followed by the more focused study of traits. Both of these approaches are criticised

because they place too much

emphasis on who the leader is. To

balance this shortcoming, the paper

employs two post-industrial

approaches to test Lawrence’s

impact on the group he led. Change

Management and Transformational

theories overlay modern concepts on

a leadership performance nearly a

century before they were developed.

The paper finishes with short

exploration of an emerging area of

study – influence. Using a construct

developed by Richard Stiller, the

paper reveals Lawrence’s greatest

strength: inductum abseque

imperium (influence without

authority).

Great-man

The oldest and most traditional method of studying leadership is the Great-man

approach. Although out of vouge for decades, it was the leading approach at the time

of Lawrence and therefore, an appropriate starting point to assess his performance. The

general thesis is that leaders and followers are fundamentally different and by studying

great leaders, it is possible to identify common threads which can, in turn, be taught.75

It is a holistic approach focusing on leaders such as Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great,

Saladin and so on. Unlike the Traits Model, which grew out of Great-man, this approach

considered major influences and performances. Its popularity waned when it was found

too difficult to interpret76 yet has recently been revived with the advent of powerful

analytical databases.77

74 Great-man is synonymous with Great-leader. 75 Hughes, R.L., Ginnett, R.C., and Curphy, G.J. 2002, Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of

Experience (4th ed.) McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York. pp 166-7. 76 Such as Mann, R.D. 1959 ‘A Review of the Relationships between Personality and Performance

in Small Groups’, Psychological Bulletin 56, pp 241-70 and Stogdill, R.M. 1974, Handbook of

Leadership, New York: Free Press. 77 For example, Lord, R.G., DeVader, C.L., and Allinger, G.M. 1986, A Meta-Analysis of the

Relationships between Personality Traits in Leadership Perceptions: An Application of Validity

Generalization Procedures’, Journal of Applied Psychology 71 pp 402-10 well as Hogan, R.T.,

Curphy, G.J. and Hogan, J. 1994, ‘What do we know about Personality: Leadership and

Effectiveness?’, American Psychologist, 49, pp 493- 504.

Tibnine Crusader Castle in Lebanon, visited by

Lawrence 16 July 1909, (Author in foreground)

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One recent revival of the Great-man theory is by Eugene Jennings78 who believes that

all great leaders have a ‘conspicuous personality.’ Using others’ theories, Jennings

identifies three common great-leader personality types: Princes, Heroes, and Eventful

Man.

Jennings identifies the Prince type from Niccolo Machiavelli’s theory in ‘The Prince

and the Discourses’.79 The premise being that an insatiable desire for power over others

is what motivates great leaders. The Heroes type comes from the work of Thomas

Carlyles who identified ‘among the undistinguished ant-like masses are men of light

and leading, mortals superior in power, courage, and understanding’. These leaders are

readily identifiable as benevolent and charismatic.

Jennings drew on the work of Sidney Hooks80 for his Eventful Man personality type.

This is someone ‘whose actions have changed world history from what it would have

been without his influence.’81 This person demonstrates outstanding strength and

character at a pivotal time in history. While the claims of Lawrence would have us

believe he falls into this later type, his critics contest otherwise. Whether the Revolt

would have succeeded without Lawrence is debatable; but his charismatic personality

and ability to influence is generally undisputed. Lawrence best fits the Hero personality

type. While Jennings’ categories help label Lawrence as a leader, they do not provide

sufficient material to analysis why he was successful.

An important element of most Great-man theories is the emphasis of antecedents.

Studies generally select a great leader and then analyse the significant influences

leading to later success. Such influences include upbringing, education, role models,

and significant experiences. The plethora of biographies on Lawrence makes him a

classic case study.

Lawrence’s unusual background and extraordinary personality reveal much about his

subsequent successes as a leader. Lawrence’s yearning for adventure developed while

growing up and studying at the university city of Oxford. During this time, young

Lawrence established a reputation as being somewhat unusual. He often survived on a

self-imposed diet of bread and water, and regularly slept through the day so he could

work at night.82 His academic studies83 took him through the Levant where he was

inculcated with the local customs and languages. He then worked in Mesopotamia

alongside German soldiers at a British Museum excavation. His working knowledge of

the German and Turkish situation, coupled with his extensive local area knowledge and

expertise in Arabic culture prepared him well for his first military posting.

78 For more on this see Jennings, E.E. 1972, An Anatomy of Leadership Princes, Heroes and

Supermen, New York, Harper. 79 Machiavelli, N. 1950, The Prince and the Discourses, New York, The Modern Library. Based on

his 1521 book ‘The Art of War’. 80 For more see Jennings, loc cit. 81 ‘Leadership Theories’ available at

www.hmse.memphis.edu/faculty/walls/Leadership%20Theories. 82 Belt, D. 1999, ‘Lawrence of Arabia – A Hero’s Journey’, National Geographic, January. 83 Lawrence, T.E. 1909, ‘The influence of the Crusades on Medieval European military

architecture’, BA thesis, Oxford University.

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Lawrence had a number of influential role models throughout his life. Perhaps the

greatest of these was the legendary Salāh al-Dīn Yūsuf (Saladin). Lawrence spent most

of his life fascinated by the events of the crusades and the Middle East; both of which

were influenced by this great Arab military leader.84 Saladin features often throughout

Lawrence’s later writings and is used as a benchmark for his own, and others,

performance.85 ‘Lowell Thomas tells us that one of Lawrence’s first moves on entering

Damascus was to visit the tomb of Saladin.’86 Other famous personalities who

influenced Lawrence were King Richard the Lionheart, Clausewitz,87 Lenin,88 Lord

Nelson,89 Napoleon and, in later life, Winston Churchill. A review of Lawrence’s pre-

war life also reveals a number of other, less famous, yet powerful personalities who

shaped both his command and leadership style. These influences emerge as observable

traits.

Trait Theory

The study of leadership traits is nearly as old as recorded history. Following logically

from the Great-man theory, the traits approach seeks common personality, intellectual

and physical traits of the greatest leaders. For decades, if not millennia, scholars

believed short-listing key leadership traits would formalise leadership education. Like

the Great-man theory however the traits model has many critics.

Traits approach leaves a lasting legacy the field of leadership education yet is fraught

with problems. Every study produces a different list of critical leadership traits and the

lists vary in length from one or two characteristics up to thousands. Traits are also

difficult to assess. Most are relative, contextual, subjective, and dynamic. For example,

honesty is interpretable culturally, legally, and socially. A leader who is honest in one

setting may not be in another and indeed may be a better leader if they are selective in

their honesty. The difficulties in analysing traits mirror the difficulties in teaching

them.90 Deliberately inculcating values and ethics is as challenging as instilling

personality traits. Some traits, such as intellect and charisma, are even considered

innate.

The traits model still provides some relevance to the contemporary study of leadership.

It provides us with an initial framework to study the performance of great leaders as

well as developing and selecting potential leaders. Although many traits are difficult to

instruct, others can guide leadership education. From an academic perspective, the

construct also provides a foundation to develop other models.91 In the case of Lawrence,

reviewing his dominant traits reveals both strengths and weaknesses.

84 Saladin was actually Kurdish but is revered throughout the Arab speaking world as their greatest

leader. For more see Maalouf, A. 1984, Les croisades vues par les Arabes (The Crusades

through Arab Eyes), translated by Rothschild, J., Al Saqi Books, London. 85 Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1991 edition), p 321 and Mack, J.E. 2002, A Prince of our Disorder:

The Life of T.E. Lawrence, Harvard University Press, USA, pp 298-9. 86 Mousa, op cit, p 203. 87 Seven Pillars of Wisdom (1991 edition), p 188. 88 Mack, op cit, p 329. 89 ibid, p 339. 90 Walsh, J, and Cox M., 2002, Leadership Development and Knowledge Transfer, The Canadian

Forces Leadership Institute, Royal Military College, Kingston, Ontario, p11. 91 Such as the post-industrial models which develop methods of influence.

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At twenty one, Lawrence was in full possession of his faculties: the superb memory for

facts, the razor-like and confident intuition (occasionally razor-like enough to cut

himself), the ability to strike an impressive pose, to juggle fantasy and reality, to charm,

seduce, amuse, convince and motivate others…92

Lawrence was endowed with many powerful leadership traits. In fact his own

leadership doctrine was so well respected he even published on the subject, to his

contemporaries, during the campaign itself.93 ‘Many British officers observed firsthand

the steadfastness with which Lawrence personally adhered to the tenets of his twenty-

seven points, work[ing both] …through and with the Arab leaders…’94 But these were

intra-dependent leadership attributes Lawrence learned to cleverly interweave at

appropriate moments.

One of Lawrence’s other important characteristics was his intellect. In his entry

examinations for Oxford University, out of 4,500 applicants, he earned first place in

English and third in religious studies.95 But he had no real training in either leadership

or warfare.96 His self-taught knowledge in

both was however, extensive. Being fluent

in both Latin and Greek, he was a student of

both classical era warfare and siege

techniques of the Middle Ages.97 As already

discussed, his expertise in the Crusader

campaigns included the legendary

leadership of Saladin. Lawrence also read

widely on modern military strategists.

…and yet I was untrained. In military

theory I was tolerably read … past

Napoleon to Clausewitz and his school,

to Caemmerer and Molke … Jomini and

Willisen, I had found broader principles

in Saxe and Guibert and the eighteenth

century. However, Clausewitz was

intellectually so much the master of

them…98

Charisma is an overarching trait of all the

greatest leaders. It ‘is a kind of personal

aura, visible in arresting eyes and audible in

a compelling voice.’99 Lawrence was

blessed with a high degree of natural charisma serving him well in the desert. His ability

to inspire others with his infectious enthusiasm, tenacity, and passion was evident both

92 Asher, op cit, p77. 93 ‘Twenty-seven Articles’ published in the Arab Bulletin #60, August 20, 1917. Reprinted in

Annex D. 94 Mack, op cit, p 205. 95 Asher, op cit, p38. 96 The two exceptions being that he reportedly served as a private in the Royal Artillery for six

months between school and university and a brief period of part-time service while at university. 97 Mousa, op cit, p 2. 98 Lawrence, T.E. 1939, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (Anchor Books edition, 1991), p 188. 99 Adair, J. 1989, Great Leaders, The Talbot Adair Press, England, p 243.

Key themes of leadership in Twenty-

seven Articles, by T.E. Lawrence, 1917.

Start slowly, take your time before

becoming involved

Deal only through their commanders

Stay in touch with the commander

Respect the sub-chiefs

Avoid fraternization with commoners

Maintain a low profile throughout

Learn their culture

Let them do things their way

Learn and use their fighting tactics

Dress like them

Wear only the best

Respect their religion

Do not mix tribes together

Do not discuss women freely

Keep a sense of humour

Never lose your temper

The full text is included in Annex D.

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on the battlefield and in the command tents at night. While his impassioned speeches

served him well with the Arabs, he was less successful with the British hierarchy. To

many, Lawrence imbued the attributes of an eccentric madman.

Paradoxically, for all his achievements, Lawrence also had a number of very negative

‘dark-side’ traits.100 Small in stature, effeminate101 and sadomasochistic102 are attributes

seldom attributed to combat legends; yet Lawrence was each of these and more. Over

the years he vacillated between exhibitionist and recluse. He struggled with his failures

and eventually crumbled to a shadow of his earlier glory. ‘After the war, Lawrence,

who could have run for office and won a landslide, or had any post he wanted in the

Empire, drifted aimlessly.’103 Yet the most well-known criticism of Lawrence was his

ability to embellish stories.

Lawrence’s imagination, however, was so fertile that it could not rest until it had

fabricated a new story.104

Lawrence is infamous for exaggeration. He was not only self-aggrandising but also a

prolific liar. Modern day biographers go to great pains to convince readers they dug

below the façade Lawrence himself created. Any account, not independently verified,

is questioned. Lawrence himself confesses to being ‘on thin ice’,105 contending it was

merely a means to an end. As a leader however, the axiom ‘those who lie for you will

lie against you’ is important. To many, Lawrence was dishonest and lacked integrity.

In fairness to Lawrence, he himself acknowledges his distortions of the truth. On one

occasion, Lawrence claims with‘… no one should mistake this narrative of mine for

history. This book [Seven Pillars of Wisdom] is the bone of history, not history

herself.’106 Yet on another occasion he analogises the tome with the hypocrisy of the

Revolt:

It is meant to be the true history of political movement whose essence was a fraud in the

sense that its leaders did not believe the arguments with which they moved its rank and

file: and also the true history of the campaign to show how lovely the back of a

commander’s mind must be.107

Perhaps the best defence of the Lawrence’s fabrications comes from his most critical

biographer. Suleiman Mousa, an Arab historian, has few good things to say about

Lawrence; in fact his book is largely an attack on the legend of Lawrence. Yet Mousa

explains the cultural difference between Arab and Western use of metaphors in history.

100 For more on ‘dark-side’ traits, see Hughes, et al, op cit. 101 Widely believed to have been homosexual, although this assertion is equally often disputed. 102 He would often go days without food just to test himself. He often enjoyed pain and suffering

when self-imposed and displayed immense resilience against the hardships of the desert. “…for

my masochism remains and will remain amoral” Lawrence in Mack, op cit., p343. 103 LoBaido, A. C. 2000, The real Lawrence of Arabia, viewed 13 March 2003,

http://darringtonoutback.com/L.htm p 7. 104 Mousa, op cit, p 85. 105 Australians of Arabia …& Lawrence – Notes /Quotes, viewed 13 March 2003,

www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Senate/3541/aoalbk3.html 106 Lawrence T.E. quoted in Knightly and Simpson, the secret lives of Lawrence of Arabia, p 5. 107 Lawrence to Florence Hardy, August 15, 1923, letters, p 427, quoted in Mack, op cit, p 347.

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Lawrence’s descriptive powers and his dramatic and imaginative tendencies were real

assets to him. This is something we understand and the Arab world, but many of those

who wrote about Lawrence in the West took his sayings at face value and accepted his

book as an authentic history of the Arab revolt. By doing so, they were being less than

fair to Lawrence, for they were reading more into his remarks and actions and he had

intended by them.108

From the traditional British Army perspective, Lawrence also lacked a number of other

basic officer qualities. Out of the desert, and in proper uniform, he was considered both

shambolic and undisciplined.109 Many believed he had ‘turned native’ and displayed

questionable loyalty.110 ‘Lawrence anguished over his clash of loyalties between the

British and the Arabs, and became

increasingly angry when he thought the Arabs

were being duped by the politicians.’111 Yet he

was well aware of the Sykes-Picot accord and

naïvely ignored it; another poor quality for a

leader. While this final aspect led to his

ultimate failure, he was still an effective

leader. To understand why, it is necessary to

consider the effect of his actions through the

prism of post-industrial leadership models.

Change Management

Change management theories provide

concrete frameworks for implementing good

leadership. While the earliest theories of

leadership were the holistic and treated the

subject exclusively as an art, contemporary

studies provide scientific taxonomies;

examples of which include many change

management theories. This recent body of

work has produced a number of effective

management tools – many of which are

equally applicable to military leadership.

Change management, like other post-industrial leadership models, places emphasis on

non-coercive influence and two-way relationships. It represents a paradigm shift away

from the transactional approaches to leadership which define leadership as “…having

a vision or agenda of one’s own, coupled with the ability to articulate one’s message,

108 Mousa, op cit, p 35. 109 Asher, op cit, p 130. 110 In the desert we have written our names: With the Australian Light Horse in the Middle East,

Television documentary (ABC Video), Discovery Channel, 25 April 2003. 111 Rooney, D. 1999, Military Mavericks, Cassell & Co., London, p 87.

Change Management Jargon

Emergent strategy – the whole team is

involved in developing the plan.

Strong culture – synergistic effect of

group cohesion through common values

and a shared goal.

Communication – sharing of ideas,

Openness information

Employee empowerment – devolution of

authority, freedom, skills to make

decisions and Trust.

Horizontal structure – small teams with

horizontal linkages networked together

Servant Leadership – devoted to giving

things away (power, ideas, recognition) to

achieve the vision. No desire for personal

gain.

Systems thinking – the whole team is

aware of the big picture as well as their

own contribution.

Team learning – everyone helps the

group succeed collectively rather than

pursuing individual goals.

Derived from Daft, op cit, pp750-60.

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gain support through transactional means, and bring one’s own goals to fruition.’112 In

contrast, post-industrial models, such as change management, value followers as much

as leaders.

Learning Organisation is a change management label given to groups who embrace

change. Such organisations engage everyone in problem-solving and strive for

continuous improvement based on lessons of experience.113 The concept also requires

tolerance to paradigms shifts, systems thinking, a shared vision, empowered employees,

strong culture, horizontal structure, and servant leadership.114 These concepts were

unheard of in Lawrence’s time, and would have been inconceivable to his peers, yet

Lawrence embraced almost all of them.115 Some were beyond his control,116 yet he

always adapted events to suit his goal.

Paradigms shifts,117 shared vision,118 and

empowered employees119 were perhaps

Lawrence’s greatest achievements. Lawrence

may not have heard of a learning organisation

but he created one.

Resilience is another concept introduced

under the umbrella of change management.

Like most change management tools,

resilience is equally applicable to military

leadership and is valuable when analysing the

leadership effectiveness of someone like

Lawrence. Individual resilience has five

contributing attributes: positive, focussed,

proactive, flexible, and organised.120

Lawrence rates highly on the first four but not

so well on the last. In fairness to him

however, he was not in a position to develop

a highly structured plan. When he embarked on the field expedition from Cairo, he was

to have little idea of his future influence on the Arab Revolt.

Energy is another important aspect of resilience. This is broken-down into mental,

physical and emotional resources.121 Clearly Lawrence excelled in all three. Although

accounts exist of his occasional failure in the last two, they need to be considered in

context with how hard he pushed himself. His physical endurance outstripped many

112 Heifetz, R., and Sinder, R. 1988, Political leadership: Managing the public’s problem solving. In

R. Reich (Ed.), The power of public ideas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p 180. 113 Daft, D.L. 1996, management, (4th ed), The Dryden Press, p382. 114 ibid. pp 750-60. 115 Emergent strategy would be the only exception. 116 Horizontal structure existed automatically because he lacked imperium. Strong culture presented

problems with tribal feuds, yet Lawrence worked hard to resolve these issues. 117 Guerrilla warfare raids were not new to the Arab tribesmen but were foreign to Lawrence’s fellow

British officers. 118 Lawrence achieved a great deal by uniting warring tribes in pursuit of a common goal. 119 Lawrence’s ability to extrinsically motivate Arab tribesman was crucial to the Arab Revolt.

Without their involvement, the Arabs would have no claim to Arabia. 120 Harrington, et al, op cit, p 31. The list expands to seven when considering collective resilience,

Connor, 1998, op cit, p 67. 121 Harrington, et al, op cit, p 35.

Human Due Diligence Roles

Advocate – the individuals, or groups,

who want to achieve a change but lack

the power to sanction it.

Sponsor – the individual, or group,

with the power to sanction or

legitimise the project

Change agents – the individuals, or

groups, responsible for facilitating the

implementation of the change.

Targets – the individuals, or groups,

affected by the change.

From Harrington et al, op cit, p 56

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Arabs who grew up in the environment and his emotional rollercoaster reflected the

extreme challenges he set himself. It is true however, he was deeply troubled by both

his illegitimacy and, it would appear, his sexuality.122 Despite this, his energy had a

significant positive effect on his followers.

Human Due Diligence (HDD) is a phrase coined by a leading change management

company ODR123 to reinforce the importance of team members.124 While ODR applies

the concept to business management, it is in effect, simply good leadership and the

degree of its application can be used to critique leaders such as Lawrence. HDD

emphasises the importance of explicitly defined roles, communication strategies,

resilience at local rather than organisational level, and cultural issues involving the team

members.

Although unaware of such a label, Lawrence was a master of HDD. Roles refer to

sponsors, targets, advocates, and change agents;125 As an advocate,126 Lawrence sought

at least one or more of the other three role types. He chose Allenby as the sponsor,

Feisal as the key change agent and the Arab tribesmen as the targets. Allenby provided

the matériel and Feisal the legitimacy (to the Arab tribesmen). The change effected,

was the unification of warring tribes to achieve a common goal – be the first to

Damascus and earn the right to an independent Arab nation.

Communication strategies varied depending on the setting and operation. It is unfair to

compare the communication abilities of a dessert campaign during WWI with modern

day systems. He did however, employ wireless radio, messengers, carrier pigeons and

the Australian Flying Corps when he could.127 Lawrence also exploited the difficulties

of communication to his advantage. Occasionally he would take advantage of the slow

delivery times to implement decisions he knew were contrary to higher command

wishes.128

Communication also involves the eloquent articulation of a vision at the interpersonal

level. Lawrence is renowned for both his charisma and command of the English

language. His ability to convey messages accurately, or on occasions deliberately

inaccurately, greatly enhanced his power of influence over the British. While his Arabic

was not as strong, he clearly had sufficient ability to persuade some of the most difficult

tribesman. Lawrence’s astute use of communication skills exemplifies his command of

influence.

122 He reworded early drafts of Seven Pillars because they revealed too much about his sexuality.

Because of his discreetness, even today significant mystery still surrounds his sexuality. 123 ODR is a US-based, global company specialising in Change Management consultancy. 124 Harrington, et al., op cit, pp 20-25. 125 ibid. pp 53-58. 126 ‘An advocate is a person who wishes a specific change without having the legitimation (authority,

power) to implement it.’ H. Agustoni of ODR Switzerland, email 17 April 2003,

[email protected]. 127 Hamilton, J, Duchess of, 2002, First to Damascus: the Australian Light Horse and Lawrence of

Arabia, Griffin Press. 128 One example being when he wrote to Cairo advising he intended to attack Aqaba. By the time the

letter arrived the operation was over.

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Transformational Leadership

Transformational leadership is a contemporary approach to leadership study. Although

its genesis is credited to the 1970s work of MacGregor Burns,129 its current popularity

is due to the significant advancement made by Joseph Rost.130 Today it is generally

accepted as, not only a legitimate post-industrial model,131 but also the leading

approach.132 Its attraction lies in the emphasis placed on the relationship between leaders

and followers, rather than simply who the leader was. It considers the how and why,

not the what or who.

Transformational leaders are those leaders who motivate subordinates to perform beyond

normal expectations above their own self-interest. Transformational leaders inspire,

motivate, challenge, and stimulate their subordinates. They respect people as individuals

and their behaviour causes them to become role models for followers.133

Transformational leadership, vice

transactional,134 is attractive because of its

transferability.135 It is more powerful than

the extrinsically motivated transactional

approach because it appeals to the

followers’ values and sense of purpose. It

is more enduring because followers

become emotionally involved in the

process. While revolutionary and

exciting, the approach is so radically

different to previous theories, because it

does not suit assessing an individual. In

fact, Rost offers a number of suggestions

for leadership development; the first

being ‘Stop concentrating on the

leader.’136 He goes on to denounce lists,

inventories, and tests for leadership traits

and characteristics. However, scope still

exists for an effects-based, rather than

platform-based, analysis.

129 Burns, M. 1978, Leadership, Harper and Row, New York. 130 Rost, J.C. 1991, Leadership for the Twenty-First Century, Praeger, New York. 131 Alan Hinge, University of Canberra, e-mail August 2003, [email protected]. 132 LTC Chan Kim Yin and MR Daniel Lee, Fundamental Choice: A Starting Point for Leadership

and Motivation in a Learning Organisation available at www.mindef.gov.sg/sAndafti/pointer/

Supplement/26-36.htm. 133 Australian Army Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 0-2, Leadership, p xxix. 134 Hughes et al, op cit, p402. 135 Once a follower is inspired, they do not expect further exchanges (payments) to continue

following in a new setting. 136 Rost, J.C. 1993, ‘Leadership Development in the New Century’, Journal of Leadership Studies,

Nov, p 102.

Four Classes of Action

idealised influence, or the role modelling of

personal values,

inspirational motivation, or the use of

mission and vision to provide meaning and

challenge to the follower’s work,

intellectual stimulation, or actions that

challenge the followers to expand their

abilities,

individual consideration, or actions that

attend to the unique developmental and

performance needs of each follower (e.g.,

mentoring and/or coaching).

From: Yin and Lee, Fundamental Choice: A

Starting Point for Leadership and Motivation in

a Learning Organisation

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/Supplement/26-36.htm

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/Supplement/26-36.htm

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Transformational leadership is further refined into a four-part

architecture. Based on the work of Peter Senge,137 Chan Kim Yin

and Daniel Lee from Singapore coined four classes of action of

transformational leaders.138 They place these four models in the

active-effective quadrant of Bass and Avolio’s leadership

spectrum.139 They identify the idealised influence is the most

effective and inspirational motivation is the most active.

Lawrence epitomised both of these. With the tribesmen, he

employed transactional leadership at the macro level but

idealised influence with smaller groups.140 With the Arab leaders

he perfected inspirational motivation.

Lawrence was a master at motivating others. At one moment he was uniting warring

tribal leaders with visions of strategic-level nationalism and at the next, while

conducting tactical level guerrilla operations, he was an inspirational leader of

capricious men. By blending these two styles, he juxtaposed intrinsic and extrinsic

motivation on the same battlefield.141 To use Moskos’ I/O construct,142 Lawrence

epitomised institutionalism at the higher echelons of Arabic command and exploited

occupationalism with the tribesmen. Lawrence’s employment of extrinsically

motivated mercenaries suited many of his smaller assaults since he lacked formal

command. Indeed upward-leadership143 was another effect Lawrence achieved when he

successfully targeted senior Arab chiefs to provide him with proxy imperium to achieve

military objectives. ‘…while Lawrence’s intellect was remarkable, his ability to charm

and manipulate his superiors was even more egregious.’144

Instrumental in motivating others was his ability to build rapport. Lawrence is famous

for wearing Arab dress. He knew this had an enormous effect on those whom he sought

to influence. Coupled with his willingness to wear the same clothes was his acceptance

of their ways. ‘They taught me that no man could be their leader except he ate the rank’s

food, wore their clothes, lived level with them, and yet appeared better in himself’145

He was also famed for his ability to communicate with them—but not just by speaking

Arabic. In his Twenty-Seven Articles, he advised others to ‘get to know their dialect of

137 Senge, P., Kleiner, A., Roberts, C., Ross, R., Roth G., and Smith B. 1999 The Dance of Change,

Doubleday. 138 LTC Chan Kim Yin and MR Daniel Lee, Fundamental Choice: A Starting Point for Leadership

and Motivation in a Learning Organisation by at <www.mindef.gov.sg/sAndafti/pointer/

Supplement/26-36.htm> 139 Taken from Bass, B.M., & Avolio (1994). Improving organizational Effectiveness Through

Transformational Leadership. CA: Sage Publications. 140 He used the extrinsic motivation of loot to encourage mass support from disinterested tribesman

but has role modeling of courage and passion inspired smaller groups on more dangerous

missions such as the raid on Aqaba. 141 Simons 1999, op cit, p 4. 142 Charles Moskos coined the terms Institutionalism and occupationalism to differentiate

intrinsically and extrinsically motivated personnel with respect to military service. Moskos,

C.C., Jr. 1977, ‘From Institutionalism to Occupationalism – Trends in Military

Organizationalism’, Armed forces and Society, v4 No 1 pp 41-50. 143 Upward-leadership refers to a leader’s ability to influence a superior to act in a way the junior

wants. The concept comes from a work in progress, Transformational Leadership in the

RNZAF, to be published by the RAAF Aerospace Studies Centre, Canberra, in 2004. 144 Asher, op cit, p 77. 145 T.E. Lawrence, quoted in Adair, op cit. p 238.

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Arabic, not yours.’146 Elsewhere in the same publication, he warned against making

culturally insensitive acts or discussing taboo topics. Such a depth of understanding,

and respect for their ways, earned him immeasurable respect.

Lawrence was widely respected for the colourful leadership he gave this cosmopolitan

group. British other ranks were amazed at his casual attitude and friendly approach – in

severe contrast to most officers – and he dominated the entire operation. He cut a

dramatic and impressive figure when he appeared in dazzling white Arab robes.147

Transformational leadership emphasises the importance of coping with complexity,

ambiguity, and uncertainty. For Lawrence, this was yet another hallmark effect. Not

only was he required to move between the shifting sands of both British and Arab

cultures, but he united opposing forces in the desert. He was an astute sociologist who

played the groups off against each other to achieve a desired effect. What remains

remarkable is that he achieved all this without authority.

Inductum Absque Imperium

…[Lawrence] appeared to radiate a magnetic influence.

- Sir Herbert Baker148

The final section of this essay explores Lawrence’s incredible ability to influence those

whom he had no authority over. As has been exposed many times, Lawrence had no

authority in the desert yet, his impact on the Arab Revolt is widely accepted as

significant. His ability to influence without imperium provides valuable insight into

pure leadership. Interestingly, Lawrence’s power of influence emerged long before the

war and continued until his death.

As a child Lawrence was not very gregarious. He shied away from team sports and

only had a small circle of friends.149 Once in the

Middle East however, his natural ability to lead

became apparent. On the archaeological dig

sites in Carchemish, Lawrence quickly rose

above his British peers by inspiring Arab

workers to become passionate about their work.

His creation of intrinsic motivators became

more powerful than the competing German

extrinsic motivation of money.150 His entire

leadership style starkly contrasted the German

autocratic approach and on occasions, he even

influenced German officers over whom he had

no authority.151

146 Lawrence, 1917, loc cit. 147 Rooney, op cit, p 91. 148 Quoted in Asher, op cit, p208. 149 Asher, op cit, p 41. 150 ibid, pp 82 and 112. 151 One famous example was when Lawrence extracted a reluctant public apology from German

officer for beating an Arab.

Lawrence in Damascus Oct 1918

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Lawrence’s performance during the Arab revolt is perhaps the most remarkable. It was

during this time his power of influence was tested the most. As a 28-year-old Captain,

Lawrence did not have authority to even communicate directly with General Allenby

let alone influence him. As a Christian152 Westerner, Lawrence held even less authority

in the eyes of the xenophobic Arabs. The secrets to his success are articulated in his

1917 publication The Twenty-seven Articles and the famous Seven Pillars of Wisdom.

The lessons from which, are distilled in a recent paper titled Influence is Power.153

Lawrence’s Pillars of Wisdom 1. You do not need to be in a position of power. You need only be in a position to

influence those in power.

2. Find the Prophet [sponsor]. This is the person whom you will influence to make your

vision a reality.

3. Keep your agenda a secret from those who would undermine it.

4. Share your agenda with those whom you trust. This will allow you to drum up support

when the time is right.

5. Focus your vision by giving it a goal. Give your vision a “Damascus.”

6. Do not seek permission to influence those in power.

7. Seize the opportunities to influence events as they come your way.

8. Do not allow yourself to be identified too closely with one leader. You will lose the

confidence of those whom you seek to influence. You will also rise and fall that leader.

9. If you serve more than one master then you influence them best by mainly keeping

them apart.

10. You must be trusted at your word to influence most effectively

11. When you do not have the support of the leader, then gain the support of the

subordinates.

12. Be patient. The leader will hear good things about you through the subordinate and

eventually you will gain a position of trust.

Adapted from Stiller, R. 1997, Influence As Power, loc cit.

Stiller also identifies failures in Lawrence’s power to influence. He believes Lawrence

could have achieved even more if he hadn’t ‘crossed the line.’154 By crossing the line,

Stiller means stepping ‘into a position or using tactics that are based on power.’155 In

Lawrence’s case, taking on symbols of power included having bodyguards, high status

Arab clothing, and seeking fame. This process began after Aqaba and culminated with

the eventual failure in Damascus.156 Stiller believes Lawrence knew he had crossed the

line and therefore retreated to Britain and deliberately sought anonymity.

The Arab Revolt failed to win an independent Arab nation. Lawrence was crushed but

did not give up. Back in Britain, having shed all symbols of power, he began lobbying

for the British government to hand over their Persian spoils of war.157 Through his

network of powerful friends, such as Churchill and Trenchard, Lawrence continued to

influence by ventriloquism.

152 Lawrence was in fact an atheist but to the Arabs he was a Christian. 153 Stiller, loc cit. 154 ibid, pp 46-51. 155 ibid, p 52. 156 When the Arabs failed to earn their independent nation. 157 Jordan, the Saudi Arabian peninsular, and Mesopotamia (Iraq and Kuwait)

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…his influence was out of proportion to his position only this time he held no rank higher

than the equivalent of corporal as he had done before however Lawrence exerted his

influence not by assuming power directly but by engaging and sometimes capturing the

minds of those who held power and then through the force of his intellect and personality

persuading these individuals to carry out what he had urged.158

By the time Lawrence died, almost all British mandated land in the Middle East had

been handed over to the Hussein Royal Family.159 Although not as complete as he would

have liked, Lawrence eventually realised his dream.

Conclusion

This essay assesses TE Lawrence’s competence in command. Despite lacking formal

training or even a position of authority, Lawrence displayed remarkable abilities as a

commander. Lawrence not only developed a command philosophy but he applied it to

his own campaign plan. Lacking imperium, Lawrence worked hard to implement his

strategy through the authority of legitimate British and Arab commanders. This was

particularly challenging when the Arab and British goals differed. Additionally,

Lawrence had to develop new tactics and overcome significant operational difficulties

to achieve the aim. The overlay of operational art to examine Lawrence’s competence

in command reveals his exceptional abilities.

Lawrence was a natural leader. To explain the extent and reason for his success this

essay employs four general models. Using the Great-man approach Lawrence’s

background and influences were examined. This highlighted a number of relevant and

insightful factors for the development of future leaders. The second model applied was

the Traits approach to leadership. This analysis highlighted a number of strong

character traits Lawrence shares with other great leaders like courage, charisma, and

intelligence. Paradoxically however, despite his success, Lawrence also displayed a

number of negative personality traits. The worst of these were dishonesty, indiscipline,

and inconsistency. The dichotomy of characteristics reinforces a major weakness in the

Traits model.

To overcome the problems of traditional models it was necessary to move beyond who

he was and examine what effect he achieved. Using post-industrial models, Lawrence’s

influence was analysed. Change Management and Transformational Leadership

approaches both reveal that Lawrence was ahead of his time. Nearly a century before

the concepts were articulated, Lawrence of Arabia was applying influence through

resilience, energy, rapport, and bipolar motivation approaches. He created a learning

organisation and embraced concepts that had yet to be invented.

The final assessment of Lawrence’s performance employs the work of Stiller. Focusing

on Lawrence’s ability to influence without power, a number of strengths and

weaknesses are evident. Lawrence was a master at influencing others but he was

susceptible to the lure of power. As the campaign progressed Lawrence began to

158 Mack, op cit, p325 159 The notable exception being Palestine where the Jews were fighting to (re)establish their

homeland.

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acquire many detrimental symbols of authority. The corrupting effect of these

undermined his real strength. Lawrence lost influence and lost Damascus. Aware of his

mistake he retreated to anonymity and began afresh. Without any status symbols he

worked steadily to achieve his dream. Before he died, the Arabs got their independent

nation.

This paper applied modern concepts of both command and leadership while testing

Lawrence’s performance. Despite never being taught any of them, Lawrence was

visionary in both development and application. He was ahead of his time yet

misunderstood by many.

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Annex A

Glossary

Attrition. Attrition is the reduction of military effectiveness or capability of either

friendly or enemy forces caused by the continued loss of personnel or materiel. Rates

of attrition determine the progress and likely outcome of a campaign embracing the

direct approach.

Centre of gravity. That characteristic, capability or locality from which a military

force, nation or alliance derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight at that

level of conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may consist of a number

of key elements.

Contingency planning. Contingency plans are designed to provide responses for

events that can reasonably be anticipated in an area of responsibility.

Critical vulnerabilities. A characteristic or key element of a force that if destroyed,

captured or neutralised will significantly undermine the fighting capability of the force

and its centre of gravity. A critical vulnerability is not necessarily a weakness but any

source of strength or power that is capable of being attacked or neutralised. A successful

attack on a critical vulnerability should aim to achieve a decisive point in an operation

or campaign. A force may have a number of critical vulnerabilities.

Culminating points. A culminating point is the point in time and location where a force

will no longer be stronger than the enemy and risk losing the initiative. This may be

due to reduced combat power, attrition, logistics, dwindling national will or other

factors. To be successful, the operation must achieve its objectives before reaching its

culminating point.

Decisive points. A major event that is a precondition to the successful disruption or

negation of a centre of gravity of either combatant. A decisive point is created normally

by successfully attacking or neutralising a critical vulnerability. Operational level

planning aims to exploit an enemy’s critical vulnerabilities in a sequence or matrix of

decisive points known as lines of operation. The key determinant of a decisive point is

its effect on the enemy. Identifying decisive points is a fundamental part of campaign

planning. During the course of the campaign, opportunities may present themselves—

or may need to be created—which require a rapid reappraisal of, and adjustment to, the

previously determined decisive points. Disruption of the centre of gravity is achieved

by successfully attacking the critical vulnerabilities on which it depends. Decisive

points may also relate to the protection of one’s own campaign plan.

Inductum Absque Imperium influence without authority (latin)

Information Operations (IO). Actions taken to defend and enhance one’s own

information, information processes and information systems and to affect adversary

information, information processes and information systems. It is a fundamental

resource that is central to the commander’s decision-making processes.

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Leverage. This refers to possessing a marked advantage in a particular capability, and

the advantage that can be gained by exploiting that capability.

Manoeuvre. The concept of manoeuvre fully embraces the indirect approach and its

application across maritime, land and air environments. However, due to the higher

mobility of air assets and the rapidity with which they can change their tasking or

offensive/defensive stance, manoeuvre is normally a tactical action for military air

assets. An extract of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation definition is: Employment

of forces ... through movement in combination with fire or fire potential, to achieve a

position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.

Operational Art Thirteen elements consisting of: Operational Objectives, End-state,

Centre of Gravity, Critical Vulnerabilities, Decisive Points, Information Operations,

Manoeuvre, Tempo, Attrition, Leverage, Operational Pauses, Culminating Points, and

Contingency Planning. From ADFP 9 (ADDP 5.0)

Operational pauses. Operations cannot always be conducted continuously, and there

may be a need for periodic pauses to consolidate and to prepare for subsequent activity.

Tempo. Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy. It incorporates

the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. Tempo

is a critical determinant of operational logistics.

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Annex B

Key Personalities

Abdulla ibn Hussein , Emir (later king) - son of Hussein ibn Ali and commander of

the eastern Arab Army.

Ali ibn Hussein, Emir - son of Hussein ibn Ali and commander of the southern Arab

Army.

Bérmond, Colonel Edouard – the head of the French military mission in Arabia

(including Moroccan and Algerian forces) arrived September 1916.

Churchill, Sir Winston (later the Right Hon.) a supporter of Lawrence both during

and after the Arab Revolt.

Clayton, Col Gilbert, Head of Intelligence in Cairo during Lawrence’s tour.

Feisal ibn Hussein, Emir (later Sheriff and then King of Iraq 1920) - son of Hussein

ibn Ali and commander of the northern Arab Army-Given the rank of

Lieutenant General by Allenby. Lawrence’s chosen leader to spearhead

the Arab Revolt to Damascus.

Hussein ibn Ali, Sheriff of Mecca – held captive for 18 years (released following the

1908 Young Turk coup), raised his four sons with both academic and

desert educations in preparation to lead the Arab Armies of the Revolt he

started.

McMahon, Sir Henry – The British High Commissioner in Egypt at the beginning of

the Arab Revolt

Murray, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald – Commander-in-Chief of the

Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (275,000 men). Replaced by Allenby

during 1917 following disasters of Gallipoli and heavy losses at Gaza.

Saladin, (Salah al-Din Yusuf) the great Arab commander who fought against King

Richard the Lionheart during the fourth crusade. Arguably the most

powerful leader in Arab history and a role model to many (including

Lawrence).

Storrs, Ronald – Oriental Secretary of the Residency (Secretary to the British High

Commissioner in Egypt). A supporter of Lawrence and the Arab Revolt.

Trenchard, Sir Hugh, (later Marshal of the RAF, Lord) – a supporter and mutual

friend of Lawrence. Together with Winston Churchill, he protected

Lawrence after the war

Wemyss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn – a strong supporter of the Arab Revolt who

monitored the events closely and assisted with naval operations in the Red

Sea.

Wingate, Sir Reginald – Governor-General of the Sudan, appointed British High

Commissioner in Egypt November 1916 (replacing McMahon)

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Annex C Chronology of Key Events

1888

Aug 16 Lawrence born in Wales

1909 First trip to the Middle East

1911 Began archaeology work in the Middle East

1914 Jan 10 Lawrence assists with a covert reconnaissance trip to Aqaba

Nov Eventually permitted to enlist into the Army

Dec 15 Transferred to Cairo as an intelligence officer

1916

Mar 18 Lawrence awarded French Légion d’Honneur for Intelligence work in Cairo

June 5-6 Arab Revolt begins, attack on Medina

June 9 Capture of Judah

June 10 Capture of Mecca

Oct 12 Lawrence departs for Hejaz (on leave/reconnaissance)

October Commencement of operations against the Hajaz railway

Nov 11 Lawrence returns to Cairo from his first foray to Arabia.

Nov 25 Lawrence is officially posted into the field as a ‘temporary liaison officer’

1917

Mar-Apr Lawrence meets with Sherif Abdulla and conducts two railway raids

Apr 14 Lawrence returns to Hajaz and formulates the Aqaba plan

May 9 Party depart on first leg of Aqaba journey

Jun 3-20 Lawrence conducts covert reconnaissance into northern Syria

July 6 Arab party (led by Lawrence?) captures Aqaba

July 10 Lawrence arrives in Cairo with news of Aqaba

Aqaba established as main base for Feisal’s rebels

Lawrence alternates between Cairo and Hejaz planning and conducting raids

Nov-Dec Winter slows offensive operations

Nov 8 Lawrence fails to blow the railbridge at Yarmuk; losing Allenby’s confidence.

Nov 20 Lawrence enters Derra but is captured, tortured and raped. Escapes back to Aqaba

Dec 11 Lawrence is invited to the official Allied entry into Jerusalem.

1918

Jan 28 Lawrence leads an attack on Jerrico

Feb-Jul Lawrence alternates his time between British HQ and operations against the Turks

Aug 4 Attempt to take Mudowwara began, called off after being spotted by Germans

Sep 27 Battle (massacre) of Tafas

Oct 1 Capture of Damascus

1935

May 19 Lawrence died from head injuries following a motorcycle crash

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Annex D The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence

The Arab Bulletin,

20 August 1917

The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and

to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually

while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in

the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu; townspeople or Syrians require

totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person's need,

or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not

a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same time we have a great

chance there; the Sherif trusts us, and has given us the position (towards his

Government) which the Germans wanted to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at

once retain his goodwill and carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it

all the interest and skill we possess.

1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs

form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner

circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with yourself and them.

2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and

tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect

inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you

can understand their allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop

bricks. Be a little stiff at first.

3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party

in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or

advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency's sake) of dealing with

his underlings. Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone.

Let him see that this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole

executive of your joint plans.

4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense

before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but

ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve

them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from

him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold

him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly,

but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. Live

with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be naturally with him in his tent.

Formal visits to give advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual

talk. When stranger sheikhs come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer

service, clear out of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence

of the Sherif, it will do the Arab cause much harm.

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6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual

intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to avoid going behind or beyond

the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given them on your advice, and in so disclosing

the weakness of his position you altogether destroy your own.

7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold

yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif, with respect. He will return your

manner and you and he will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious

matter among the Arabs, and you must attain it.

8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate,

too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any

tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above

jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its

inevitable feuds. Sherifs are above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only

principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled always with a

Sherif's, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When the moment comes for action

put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow suit.

9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as the natural aristocracy

of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a

commanding position, and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be

universally acknowledged as the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad,

in manner and life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money would be

insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree and the

Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf.

10. Call your Sherif 'Sidi' in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary

names, without title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh 'Abu Annad', 'Akhu Alia' or

some similar by-name.

11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly

and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations

are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in front of you like a banner and hide your own

mind and person. If you succeed, you will have hundreds of miles of country and

thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show.

12. Cling tight to your sense of humour. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the

most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double

your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry

further and last longer than the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody

is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour. Do not cause a

laugh at a Sherif except among Sherifs.

13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant

obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but what you have really done is to

build a wall between you and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when

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everything is being done wrong, but the less you lose your temper the greater your

advantage. Also then you will not go mad yourself.

14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have the patience to bear

with them. The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are

willing to follow your advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone

else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom

their real fund of goodwill.

15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably

than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for

them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will

not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed

gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present

without giving a liberal return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate

certainty be known) if you require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them

ask you for things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow

to milk.

17. Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against

the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably to British obstinacy

of dictation) is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick headcloth

forms a good protection against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends

will be ashamed of you in public.

18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you

are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arab kit when

with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in

uniform. It is, however, dangerous and difficult. They make no special allowances for

you when you dress like them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are

not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign theatre,

playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an anxious stake.

Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak naturally

before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character:

while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier

to win in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in

the comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught.

19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and

you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. Dress like a Sherif, if they

agree to it.

20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and

customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus

level with them, for the European to beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have

stronger motives for our action, and put more heart into it than they. If you can surpass

them, you have taken an immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of

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living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood language, the savage food, strange

clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy and quiet, and the

impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months on end,

provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the

climate, and the Turks, that this road should not be chosen without serious thought.

21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and

avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score

heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there

is little religiosity, little fervour, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their

conduct that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share

in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and intense as to

be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature

to them as is sleep or food.

22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary

tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for

till you know them your advice will be no good to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations

of tribal raids have taught them more about some parts of the business than we will ever

know. In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your

unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred men, and

if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, while admirable

company commanders, are too 'set' to learn to handle the equivalents of battalions or

regiments. Don't attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu

have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they

will attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage

that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country

(don't take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a

proportion of the better men, are great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe

cannot give orders to men from another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed

tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win.

Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying to

defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more unorthodox and

Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they lack

initiative and expect you to. Don't play for safety.

23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but always

there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons

(they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments

for one course or other. Allusion is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike

concise expression. Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There

is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of

them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and

possible course of action in nearly every case.

24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out

of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation,

but many failures. In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in

feelings and blood and language, are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in

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tactics, unable to adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette,

swollen-headed to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for more

than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their troops on the road

and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough to give any) would be more

readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab

townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor

relations are much more objectionable than poor strangers.

25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult

a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless

in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look

to us, if translated literally

26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you

will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he

will undo on trek much of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and

make coffee for you, and leave you if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots

or washing. They are only really possible if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in

the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects owning them,

so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an Ageyli or two when you

go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels.

27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of

them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and

your companions all the time: hear all that passes, search out what is going on beneath

the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep

everything you find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and

no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one thing only,

and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips that would counteract

the painful work of weeks. Your success will be proportioned to the amount of mental

effort you devote to it.

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Annex E

Additional Photographs

This intelligence map was produced by Lawrence in 1914 following his pre-war

reconnaissance through the area. The map provided the British with valuable

information and saved countless lives.

of 48

A Bedouin shelter in the Sinai. Lawrence passed through here many times when

transiting between Cairo and the Hejaz. Photo by the author.

Feisal’s Army

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Arab tribesmen taking a close look at a Bristol B2B biplane aircraft. Aipower was only

one of many RMAs exploited during this war. All of the technology RMAs were

introduced by the Western powers but the development of guerrilla warfare (a strategy

RMA) was organic to the Arab Revolt. Photograph by TE Lawrence.

Railway repair work was a full time activity for the Turkish forces of the Hejaz.

http://www.telstudies.org/gallery/photos/1914-18/r191.htm

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Railway bridge across the Yarmuk at Tell el Shehab. Lawrence was supposed to blow

this up to delay retreating Turkish soldiers from reinforcing Damascus (Nov 1918). His

plan was nearly identical to the Aqaba raid but the execution was plagued by a number

unexpected problems: weather, compromised OPSEC, disclosure by neutrals, and

jittery supporting elements (Indian machine gunners and Serahiyyan Arabs).

The inhospitable terrain of the Hejaz. Lawrence exploited guerrilla warfare tactics and

Arab local knowledge to out-manoeuvre a conventional enemy. Photograph taken just

outside of Ma’an (author in foreground).

inductum absque imperium

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