indice anticorrupcion (1)

7/29/2019 Indice Anticorrupcion (1)

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GOVERNMENT

DEFENCE

ANTI-

CORRUPTION

INDEX 2013


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This Goernment Deence Anti-

Corrution Index is the rst eerreiew o corrution risk andcorrution ulnerability in DeenceMinistries and Armed Forces.

It oers goernments, armedorces, ciil society organisations,

and citizens detailed knowledgeand understanding o thecorrution risks in their nationaldeence and security

establishments.

Armed with this knowledgethey can ress or changeand imroement.


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2 Table o Contents

Table o Contents

3

8

12

20

32

38

42

43

Executie Summary

1. The Study

2. The Results

3. Analysis by Risk Area

4. Regional andThematic Comarisons

5. Actions

Glossary

List o Questions


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3Executive Summary

Corrution in deenceundermines national

and global security.It is dangerous, it isdiisie, and it iswasteul.

www.deenceindex.orgwww.ti-deence.org

Executie Summary


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4 Executive Summary

The Deence and Security Programme oTransparency International UK has beenworking with governments, deencecompanies, armed orces, civil societyand policy-makers to improve anti-corruption standards in the deence sectorsince 2004. Our objective is to ensure thatstrong, eective mechanisms are in placein governments and companies to prevent

corruption in deence, and to empowercivil society to demand transparencyand accountability in this sector.

Corruption in deence is a vital issueor many nations and or global security.It is dangerous, it is divisive, and it iswasteul.

IT MATTERS FOR CITIZENS

Corruption oten leads to impunity,undermining public trust. It threatenscitizens security, such as when the

militarys ability to act with impunityputs peoples lives at risk.

IT MATTERS FOR ARMED FORCES,

SOLDIERS, AIRMEN AND SAILORS

They are put at risk by unnecessaryor poor-quality deence equipment.

IT MATTERS FOR COUNTRIES

Corruption at the top o a deenceestablishment can enable capture othe state by a small clique. Militaryownership o businesses by the militarycan stife the economy. Deenceprocurement is oten subject to lessscrutiny than other sectors, and canthereore be much more corruption-prone and wasteul than other sectors.

IT MATTERS FOR WORLD SECURITY

Arms races can be star ted just to satisythe greed o individuals; internationalsecurity can be put at risk throughcorrupt agendas being pursued underthe guise o international cooperation.

There are an increasing number ogovernments that are concerned that their

deence and security establishments arecharacterised by integrity, public trust, andno tolerance or corruption. We will doeverything we can to support such eorts.This Index makes levels o corruption riskacross governments visible, and allowsdecision-makers and citizens to monitorthe progress made in reducing this risk.

THE STUDY

This is a brand new tool and is the result oa major two-year study. This Index provides

governments and citizens with inormationon how their deence ministries and armedorces compare to others in tackling deencecorruption. It measures the degree ocorruption risk and vulnerability ingoernment deence establishments the deence ministry, the armed orces,and other government institutions in thatcountry (such as auditing institutions) thatmay infuence levels o corruption risk inthe sector. It orms a basis or reorm orconcerned governments, and serves as atool to identiy where to concentrate eorts.

As a part o this Index, 82 countriesacross the globe were subject to expert,independent assessment. These countriesaccounted or 94 per cent o global militaryexpenditure in 2011 (USD 1.6 trillion).

Corrution indeence aectscitizens, soldiers,nations and you.


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5Executive Summary

pROCUREMENT

Technical Requirements /Specications

Single Sourcing

Agents / Brokers

Collusive Bidders

Financing Packages

Osets

Contract Award, Delivery

Subcontractors

Seller Infuence

pOLITICAL

Deence and Security Policy

Deence Budgets

Nexus o Deence &National Assets

Organised Crime

Control o I ntelligenceServices

Export Controls

FINANCE

Asset Disposals

Secret Budgets

Military-owned businesses

Illegal Private Enterprises

pERSONNEL

Leadership Behaviour

Payroll, Promotions,Appointments, Rewards

Conscription

Salary Chain

Values & Standards

Small Bribes

OpERATIONS

Disregard o Corruption inCountry

Corruption within Mission

Contracts

Private Security Companies

They were selected according to the size otheir arms trade, the absolute and per capitasize o their militaries, and a proxy o thesize o their security sector.

Each country was assessed using acomprehensive questionnaire o 77questions, clustered into ve risk areas:political risk, nance risk, personnel risk,

operations risk, and procurement risk. Eacho these ve areas in turn has specic riskareas, as shown in the diagram below.

The analysis was subjected to multiplelevels o peer review to minimise the risk obias and inaccuracies in the responses.Governments were given opportunities tocomment on the drat and to provideadditional commentary i they desired. Eachgovernment has received a comprehensivereport outlining our ndings or eachquestion, with reerences to all the sources

we used. These assessments are madepublic on our website.A second index has also been developed

that addresses deence companies,analysing the anti-corruption systems o129 major global companies. This index,the Deence Companies Anti-CorruptionIndex (www.comanies.deenceindex.org), was published by TransparencyInternational UKs Deence and SecurityProgramme, on 4th October, 2012.

29Deence Corrution Risks


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6 Executive Summary

THE RESULTS

The countries are placed inone o six bands accordingto their nal score. The levelo corruption risk associatedwith each band is as ollows:

BAND CORRUpTION RISK

A VERY LOW

B LOWC MODERATED HIGH*E VERY HIGHF CRITICAL

*Band D, due toits size, has beenurther divided into

the higher perormingBand D countries,D+, and the lowerperorming Band Dcountries, D-.

BAND % IN BANDCOUNTRIES

AUSTRALIA, GERMANY

AUSTRIA, NORWAY, SOUTH KOREA,SWEDEN, TAIWAN, UNITED KINGDOM,UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA,CHILE, COLOMBIA, CROATIA, CZECHREPUBLIC, FRANCE, GREECE,HUNGARY, ITALY, JAPAN, LATVIA,POLAND, SLOVAKIA, SPAIN

BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, CYPRUS,INDIA, ISRAEL, KENYA, KUWAIT,LEBANON, MEXICO, NEPAL, SERBIA,SINGAPORE, SOUTH AFRICA,THAILAND, UKRAINE, UNITED ARAB

EMIRATES (UAE)BANGLADESH, BELARUS, CHINA,ETHIOPIA, GEORGIA, GHANA, JORDAN,KAZAKHSTAN, MALAYSIA, PAKISTAN,PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY,RUSSIA, RWANDA, TANZANIA, TURKEY

AFGHANISTAN, BAHRAIN, COTED'IVOIRE, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ,MOROCCO, NIGERIA, OMAN,PHILIPPINES, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA,SRI LANKA, TUNISIA, UGANDA,UZBEKISTAN, VENEZUELA, ZIMBABWE

ALGERIA, ANGOLA, CAMEROON,DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO,EGYPT, ERITREA, LIBYA, SYRIA, YEMEN

A 2%

B 9%

C 20%

18%

36%

18%

E 22%

F 11%

D-

D+

D


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7Executive Summary

TYpES OF CORRUpTION RISK

The index ound varying degrees ocorruption risks or the ve risk areas: political corrution risk: The capacity olegislatures to hold deence establishmentsto account is severely limited. There areminimal ormal mechanisms or scrutiny odeence policy in 45 per cent o countries,and evidence o highly eective mechanisms

in only 12 per cent o countries studied. Financial corrution risks:

Considerable secrecy surrounds nance indeence and security. Three-quarters ocountries examined do not publicly revealthe percentage o secret deence andsecurity expenditure.

personnel corrution risk: Over 70per cent o the countries examined possessrobust payment systems, and in nearly 90per cent o countries at least some ormalmeasures are in place or personnel ound

to have taken part in corruption. However,signicant improvements are necessaryto support whistle-blowers in the deencesector. Whistle-blower protection is lackingin 76 o the 82 countries examined.In addition, very little attention is paid tobetter preparing personnel in sensitivepositions, such as increasing starotation and training.

Oerations corrution risks: Theoverwhelming majority o nations lack anymilitary doctrine addressing corruption riskon operations, and have not institutionalisedanti-corruption training or monitoringmechanisms or use in the eld.

procurement corrution risks:Serious challenges are observed in this keyrisk area. Transparency is largely absent,and proper controls o complex componentso the procurement cycle, including sub-contractors, brokers, nancing packages,and osets programmes, are oten lacking.

Only two countries, Australia and Germany,have high levels o transparency, and strong,institutionalised activity to addresscorruption risk (Band A). This unexpectedlysmall number o countries shows thatdeence anti-corruption measures are stillin their inancy. This holds true even amongthe many OECD countries that are amongthe 82 nations analysed, which generally

have strong government institutions andrule o law.

About 30 per cent o the countries havegenerally high or moderate transparency,with some activity to address corruptionrisks, but with shortcomings (Band Band Band C).

The rest o the nations have poor results,with 57 o the 82 countries, or 69 per cent,scoring in the bottom three bandsD, E

and F. This includes 20 o the largest 30arms importers in the world assessed,and 16 o the largest 30 arms exportersassessed.1 This disappointing result showsthat deence risk in most countries is poorlycontrolled, with correspondingly highvulnerability to corruption.

1 2011 data. Source: SIPRI Arms TransersDatabase, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values .php Accessed 6 November 2012.

ACTIONS

Deence Leaders: Carry out adetailed analysis o the corruption risksin your deence sector. Publish policies,budgets, and procurement plans, andencourage and respect public andlegislative scrutiny. Make secrecy a

legitimate exception, not the norm.

Legislators: Ensure a strongcommittee is in place to monitorand oversee deence, security, andintelligence issues. Establish a suitablesub-committee that can ensure robustquestioning o all topics withheldrom public oversight in the nameo national security.

Ciil Society: Bring this subject tothe level o national dialogue, andactively monitor and oversee deencepolicies, budgets, and activities. Actas a conduit between citizens and thedeence establishment and demandaccountability.

Deence Comanies: Ensure strongethics and compliance systems arein place in your company. Use thebenchmark provided by the sisterindex to this report to evaluate yourcompanys anti-corruption systems.

One-page summaries and detailedcountry assessments are available onour website: www.deenceindex.org


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8 The Study

The Study

Transparency International UK (TI-UK)has been working to improve anti-corruptionstandards in the deence sector since 2004.During the course o this work, governmentshave repeatedly asked us what constitutesgood practice in avoiding and preventingcorruption risk. The Government DeenceAnti-Corruption Index is a key part oanswering that question, alongside the

Deence Companies Anti-Corruption Index,which was published by TI-UK on 4thOctober 2012. For a comprehensiveexplanation o the methodology andquestionnaire and the detailed results orboth indices, please visit the indiceswebsite at: www.deenceindex.org

This Government Deence Anti-CorruptionIndex seeks to measure the degree ocorruption risk in goernment deenceand security establishments thedeence and security ministries, the armed

orces, and other government institutionsin that country (such as auditing institutions)likely to infuence levels o corruption riskin the sector.

One important word o caution.This analysis is inevitably based on theinormation that we can glean rom publicsources or rom MOD ocials willing todiscuss the topic. Sometimes, ourinormation will be incomplete, inaccurateor out o date. The remedy is part o beingan accountable Deence Ministry: all nationsshould ensure that their integrity systemsand controls are transparent and open topublic scrutiny.

THE COUNTRIES

We analysed 82 countries across the globe.They were selected according to the size otheir arms trade, the absolute and percapita size o the military, a proxy o thesize o their security sector, and on ensuringa geographically diverse set o countries.2

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The research or each country was carriedout using a detailed questionnaire o 77questions clustered into e risk areas,which ollow the TI-UK Deence and SecurityProgrammes typology o risks in the sector.These risk areas are:1. political risk: the risk o deencelegislation and controls being compromisedby corruption.2. Finance risk: the risk o abuse o large,potentially secretive deence budgets andincome.

3. personnel risk: the risk o corruptionamong armed orces and deence ministrypersonnel.4. Oerations risk: the risk o corruptionoccurring during military operations at homeand abroad.5. procurement risk: the risk o corruptionin the process o purchasing deenceequipment and arms.

2 It should be noted that although the generic termcountry is used throughout the study, in twoinstances we include non-independent territories:Taiwan, and the Palestinian National Authority.


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9The Study

These risk areas, in turn, are associatedwith particular sub-topics, as shown inthe typology that ollows. The number oquestions that are asked o each topicis also shown on the diagram.

The number o questions within eachcategory and sub-category were deemedrepresentative o the degree o importanceo each topic we assigned to each category

and sub-category, so no articial weightingwas used. A list o all the questions is alsoprovided at the back o this report.

pROCUREMENT

Technical Requirements /Specications

Single Sourcing

Agents / Brokers

Collusive Bidders

Financing Packages

Osets

Contract Award, Delivery

Subcontractors

Seller Infuence

pOLITICAL

Deence and SecurityPolicy

Deence Budgets

Nexus o Deence &National Assets

Organised Crime

Control o I ntelligenceServices

Export Controls

FINANCE

Asset Disposals

Secret Budgets

Military-owned businesses

Illegal Private Enterprises

pERSONNEL

Leadership Behaviour

Payroll, Promotions,Appointments, Rewards

Conscription

Salary Chain

Values & Standards

Small Bribes

OpERATIONS

Disregard o Corruptionin Country

Corruption within Mission

Contracts

Private Security Companies

10

7

1

2

2

1

2

6

2

1

4

5

2

2

4

1

2

1

1

1

7

2

1

1

1

3

1

1

3

29Deence Corrution Risks


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10 The Study

THE ASSESSMENT pROCESS

The questionnaire was answered by a leadcountry assessor, whose responses werereviewed by two independent peerreviewers. Assessors used a wealth omaterial to come to their conclusions:media articles, specialist books and papers,and interview research. The researchersrecruited were independent specialists

across academia, journalism, and theanti-corruption movement, including TInational chapters. We sought individualsbased in-country and who had access toknowledge on the ground. In recruiting theset o researchers or each country, wesought to include individuals with variedexperience. The country research wascarried out across three stages, betweenJuly 2011 and November 2012.

The answer to each question is scoredrom 0 to 4, and detailed model answers

were provided or assessors and reviewersguidance. They are detailed on the Questionand Model Answer Document, available romwww.deenceindex.org. This helpedstandardise the responses across countriesand ensure a tight ocus on deencecorruption risk. Assessors were required toprovide a paragraph o narrative justicationor their scoring, and to list reerences, oreach question. Through in-depth analysis oeach risk area, an overall picture o acountrys deence corruption risk wasdeveloped.

In total we had more than 200 assessorsand peer reviewers. The country researchwas carried out across three stagesbetween July 2011 and November 2012.

GOvERNMENT REvIEW OF THE RESULTS

We encouraged all o the governments tocollaborate in the assessment.3 This originalaspect o index methodology enabledvaluable dialogue between governments andresearchers, and helped ensure accuracy inassessor responses. To encourage dialogue,

we sent the drat results to each

government where we had been givena point o contact (34 o the 82), and sentthe nal drat assessment to all DeenceMinisters too. Fourteen provided a detailedreview (Australia, Austria, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, CzechRepublic, Germany, Latvia, Norway, Poland,South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Ukraine).Other governments have responded to the

research through acknowledgement orsubmission o a set o general comments:these are available on our website,www.deenceindex.org.

This analysis is based on publicinormation and our inormation willthereore sometimes be incomplete.This may be remedied simply by up todate inormation being provided by theDeence Ministry.

In the meantime, we welcomeresponses rom nations on innacuracies

and omissions, and we will publish suchresponses on the Index website.

TRANSpARENCY INTERNATIONAL REvIEW

We invited Transparenct InternationalNational Chapters, where present, toundertake a review. In addition, theTransparency International Deence andSecurity Programme's (TI-DSP) team carriedout detailed standardisation and consistencychecks across all countries to ensure thatthe scores or each question werecomparable, and in line with the modelanswers. TI-DSP is ultimately responsibleor the nalised scores and banding.

Assessor comletes Questionnaire

peer Reiew x 2Goernment

Reiew

TI National Chaters Reiew

Standardisation

3 Where governments were late in responding toour invitation, they were invited to submit a report inresponse to the assessment which will be publishedseparately on our website.


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11The Study

THE SCORING

Each question was scored rom 0 to 4,using detailed model answers or guidance.Narrative justications and lists o relevantreerences were provided by assessors ortheir scoring.

Ater being scored rom 0 to 4 on eachquestion, countries were scored overall inbands rom A to F based on the percentage

o marks they were awarded across theentire survey. The number o questions setor each category and sub-categoryrefected the importance o speciccorruption risks, and as such was reliedupon instead o any articial weighting toderive the overall scores.

QUESTION SCORING pRINCIpLES

High transarency;strong, institutionalisedactivity to addresscorruption risks.

Generally high transarency;

activity to address corruptionrisks, but with shortcomings.

Moderate transarency;activity to address corruptionrisk, but with signicantshortcomings.

Generally low transarency;weak activity to addresscorruption risk.

Low transarency;very weak or no activityto address corruption risk.

BANDING BRACKETS

Band Lower % Upper % CorruptionScore Score Risk

A 83.3 100 Very low

B 66.7 83.2 Low

C 50.0 66.6 Moderate

D 33.3 49.9 High

E 16.7 33.2 Very high

F 0 16.6 Critical

Due to the large number o countriesclustered in Band D, countries weresubdivided into D+ and D- sub-bands.The cut o mark was 41.6 per cent,the mid-point in the Band D range.

0

1

23

4


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12 The Results

82 COUNTRIES

The Results

Distribution o countries in bands

2%9%

20%

18% 18%

22%

11%

D+

F

A

B

C

D

E


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13The Results

A 2 CountriesAUSTRALIA, GERMANY

B 7 CountriesAUSTRIA, NORWAY, SOUTH KOREA, SWEDEN, TAIWAN,

UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES

C 16 CountriesARGENTINA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, CROATIA, CZECH REPUBLIC,FRANCE, GREECE, HUNGARY, ITALY, JAPAN, LATVIA, POLAND, SLOVAKIA, SPAIN

D 30 CountriesD

+BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, CYPRUS, INDIA, ISRAEL, KENYA, KUWAIT,

LEBANON, MEXICO, NEPAL, SERBIA, SINGAPORE, SOUTH AFRICA, THAILAND,

UKRAINE, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE)

D-

BANGLADESH, BELARUS, CHINA, ETHIOPIA, GEORGIA, GHANA, JORDAN,

KAZAKHSTAN, MALAYSIA, PAKISTAN, PALESTINE, RUSSIA, RWANDA,

TANZANIA, TURKEY

E 18 CountriesAFGHANISTAN, BAHR AIN, COTE D'IVOIRE, INDONESIA, IRAN, IRAQ, MOROCCO,

NIGERIA, OMAN, PHILIPPINES, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SRI LANKA, TUNISIA,

UGANDA, UZBEKISTAN, VENEZUELA, ZIMBABWE

F 9 CountriesALGERIA, ANGOLA, CAMEROON, DRC, EGYPT, ERITREA, LIBYA, SYRIA, YEMEN


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14 Results by Band

Only two countries,Australia and Germany,

are laced in Band A,indicating a ery lowleel o corrution risk.Nearly 70 er cent o

countries score in BandsD, E, or F, indicating high,ery high, or critical risko corrution in deence

and security.

Results by Band


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15Results by Band

Only two o the 82 countries assesseddemonstrate a ery low level o corruptionrisk, placing them in Band A.

These two countries share severalcharacteristics:

Strong accountability and highleels o transarency. Their parliamentsare empowered to eectively scrutinisedeence and security institutions and policy.

Each country is highly transparent regardingall sources o deence income and eectiveinternal audit mechanisms are in place ordeence ministry expenditure.

The nations intelligence services are

held accountable to citizens through strong,independent oversight by parliament.

There is strong control of nancial

corruption risk. There is no evidence oo-budget military expenditures in thesecountries. Accountability is enorced throughstrong provisions regulating the

classication o inormation. Transparent and active defenceprocurement oversight mechanisms arein place.

Germanys military owns businesses,

but their operations and nances aregenerally transparent and public.

Oen ublication o ay rates andallowances o personnel, in conjunctionwith robust, well-established paymentsystems in deence institutions.

Solid standards or the riatesector. Furthermore, there arerequirements (compliance and businessconduct programmes) o companies biddingor work or the MODs or armed orces.Nonetheless, even these countries did notscore well throughout, highlighting roomor improvement:

Secrecy. In Australia, the level o

deence budget expenditure allocated tosecret spending is not publicly disclosed bytheir government.

CSO Engagement between CivilSociety Organisations and deence andsecurity institutions on topics o deence,including corruption, is a weak point orGermany.

Operations risk is the most vulnerable

area or the band. Neither country directlyaddresses corruption as a strategic risk inoperations through military doctrine.

Variations are apparent between the twocountries within the band. Germanyperorms more poorly in the eld ooperations, lacking ocused systems oanti-corruption training and monitoring inthe eld. Australia perorms more poorly innance, where transparency concerningsecret items in the budget is lacking.

A 2 CountriesAUSTRALIA, GERMANY


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16 Results by Band

Corruption risk or countries in Band B isassessed to be low. This group representsonly 9 per cent o all countries in the index.They perorm strongly in several commonareas:

Salary chains in defence and security

establishments are transparent; paymentsystems are robust.

Across most countries in the band,

deence and security institutions are legallyremoved rom holding any interests innatural resource exploitation.

In Taiwan and South Korea, the armed

orces are to be noted or standards ostrictness and discipline, in whichbehaviours such as receipt o acilitationpayments are likely to be punished severely.

Areas o concern among countries inBand B relate to:

Secrecy. Countries in this band,

on average, perorm worse in the areao control o spending on secret items thancountries in Band C. While in Norway,South Korea, and Sweden, the level osecret spending is not publicly available,in the United States, over 8 per cent o thedeence budgeta high proportionisdedicated to secret items and programmes.

Corrution Risk Assessment.Countries in this group tend to do little toregularly assess and identiy the greatestcorruption risks in deence and securityinstitutions.

Oerations. Almost all countries withlow overall corruption risk display their weakscores in operations. Within this category,

training specic to corruption risks onoperations is a particular area that needsto be addressed.

Whistle-blowing. Evidence o robustmechanisms acilitating whistle-blowing,and protecting whistle-blowers, are inplace only in Norway, Taiwan, and theUnited States.

procurement Risk. Regulation

and control over the use o agentsand intermediaries within the deenceprocurement process is not strong.Transparency requirements o deenceprocurement nancing packages, andcontrols o sub-contractors, aregenerally weak.

In terms o band variation, there isconsiderable deviation in the area o nancecorruption risk. South Korea and Swedenemerge as the poorest perormers in the

band in this area. Norway, the UK, Taiwanhave more developed controls. There isinteresting convergence in procurementcorruption risk. In this risk area, robustanti-corruption controls are seen acrossthe band in the elds o government policy,procurement strategy, and contract delivery.

B 7 CountriesAUSTRIA, NORWAY, SOUTH KOREA,

SWEDEN, TAIWAN, UNITED KINGDOM,

UNITED STATES


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17Results by Band

Twenty per cent o countries were ound tohave moderate corruption risk, placed inBand C. Overall, countries in Band C exhibitstrong perormance in comparison to thelower bands in the area o nance. Thereare strong controls in the South Americancountries o Argentina and Colombia, andthe Eastern European countries o Latvia,Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia. In Latvia,

or example, the State Audit Oce conductseective asset disposal scrutiny, inormationon secret expenditure is available to thelegislature, and there are no o-budgetitems. Yet this is not an entirelycomprehensive nding. Brazil and Greece,in particular, exhibit a lack o adequatecontrols with regard to asset disposals,spending on secret items, and relatedlegislative scrutiny and audit.

In this group, consistent with countries inBands A and B, operations corruption risk

demands attention. Major problems acrossBand C countries are seen relating to a lacko anti-corruption guidelines and training incontracting, and the monitoring o corruptionrisks in the eld. The control o procurementrisks within the band is also limited. A ocuson due diligence requirements bygovernments with regard to deenceprocurement oset contracts is lacking inall nations across the band apart romColombia, Greece, and Poland. In Chile,military exceptions to public procurementlaws create corruption risk, as does thehandling o osets by a government agencyprimarily in place to promote economicproduction.

Conormity o bidding companieswith compliance and business conductprogrammes is also lacking in countriesin Band C. Government requirements withregard to anti-corruption programmes orsubcontractors and subsidiaries aregenerally lacking. Croatia is noteworthyor its poor perormance in managingprocurement risk, with either no or very

ew institutionalised activities to ensuretransparency in the deence procurementprocess.

Some trends are apparent: Limited ciil society engagement

with deence and security institutions ishighlighted in all countries apart romArgentina and Bulgaria. France, Brazil,and Chile stand out as countries wherethere is no evidence to suggest any suchinteraction takes place.

proisions to encouragewhistle-blowing and to protect whistle-blowers, is another weak point or Band Ccountries. In Czech Republic, France,Hungary and Spain there is little evidenceo any mechanisms to acilitate corruptionreporting in deence and security institutions.

All countries in the band except Greece

and Poland lack adequate oversight opersonnel in sensitie ositions morevulnerable to impropriety.

In Band C, defence institutions generally

have nothing to do with their countrysnatural resource exloitation. Where theydo have controlling or nancial interests in it,appropriate scrutiny is undertaken.

C 16 CountriesARGENTINA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA,

CHILE, COLOMBIA, CROATIA,

CZECH REPUBLIC, FRANCE, GREECE,

HUNGARY, ITALY, JAPAN, LATVIA,

POLAND, SLOVAKIA, SPAIN


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18 Results by Band

Thirty-six per cent o the countriesassessed by the index are ound to havehigh corrution risk, placing them inBand D. They span all ve regions.

Band D illustrates variable characteristics,with countries exhibiting strong systems insome areas and very poor systems in others.Some positive eatures are:

payment systems and ersonnel

receiing ay in a timely manner.Most countries score well, except Rwanda,Ethiopia and Tanzania. Belarus and Mexicoalso have shortcomings.

Mexico, Nepal and Lebanon dedicate

less than 1 per cent o deence expenditureto secret sending.

Ghost soldiers in the military.There is little evidence o ghost soldiers ctitious soldiers that exist only on thepayroll o deence institutions and can beused as a way to siphon unds. In Russia

and Thailand, however, such cases havebeen reported in the past ve years. International anti-corrution

instruments. Most countries in this grouphave ratied international anti-corruptioninstruments. Only three countriesPakistan,Palestine and Kenyahave signed but notratied them. More than hal the countrieshave shown evidence o compliance.

Controlling risks related to organisedcrime within deence ministries. Highscores are achieved by Kuwait and the UAE,along with Bangladesh and Tanzania.

Absence o riate militarycontractors. Most countries in this groupdo not use private military contractorsalthough regulations to ensure strongcontrols i they are used are almostuniversally lacking. Kuwait, China, Jordan,Ethiopia, and Rwanda show highcorruption risk in this area.

Particularly high risks within this groupare associated with:

Whistle-blowing. Several countries

Russia, Cyprus, Turkey, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Kuwait, and Pakistanhaveno mechanisms or eective whistle-blowing.Only one country, Singapore, encourageswhistle-blowing in deence institutions,illustrating eective and well-established

legislation and mechanisms. Risk assessment. No country applies

corruption risk assessment in the sectoras a regular practice.

Exenditure on secret items androgrammes. Twenty-our o the 30countries located in Band D do not disclosethe level o expenditure dedicated to secretspending.

Legislatie scrutiny andarliamentary debate. Many countries donot audit secret budgets. Lack o meaningulscrutiny in China is a notable problem: highlycentralised structures ensure a wealth oregulation in the deence sector, but theconcentration o power itsel createscorruption risk.

Ealuation o corrut risks in the eldduring oerations. There is little evidencethat any country in Band D regularly deploystrained proessionals who are able to monitor

corruption risk in the eld during missions. Guidelines or training on corrutionrisks in contracting on oerations. Not asingle country in Band D trains its staspecically with regard to this corruptionrisk, although Bosnia and Herzegovina hasrelevant guidelines or deployed sta.

Robust due diligence requirementsor oset rogrammes which are lackingin every country in Band D. Cyprus does,however, ensure that oset contracts aresubject to the same level o competition asthe main deence contracts, while the UAEdisplays considerable transparency withregard to osets.

Transarency o nancing ackageso deence rocurement contracts. Fiteencountries in the band ail to disclose anyinormation at all with regard to the nancingpackages o deence procurement contracts.Bangladesh and Singapore do, however,provide more inormation.

Control o subcontractors andsubsidiaries in deence rocurement.The governments o the vast majority o

countries in Band D do not require deenceprocurement contractors to ensure thattheir subcontractors and subsidiaries adoptanti-corruption programmes. Among thenations in the band, only India appears tocontrol this risk.

D+15 Countries

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, CYPRUS,

INDIA, ISRAEL, KENYA, KUWAIT,

LEBANON, MEXICO, NEPAL, SERBIA,

SINGAPORE, SOUTH AFRICA, THAILAND,

UKRAINE, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

D- 15 CountriesBANGLADESH, BELARUS, CHINA,

ETHIOPIA, GEORGIA, GHANA, JORDAN,

KAZAKHSTAN, MALAYSIA, PAKISTAN,

PALESTINE, RUSSIA, RWANDA,

TANZANIA, TURKEY


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19Results by Band

Twenty seven countries - one third o thetotal - have little or no transparency o theirdeence anti-corruption mechanisms andcontrols. Band E and Band F countries areassessed to have ery high and criticalrisk o corruption respectively. Together,they make up one third o all countriesassessed in the index. A majority o thecountries in this group are rom the Middle

East and North Arica (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Arica.

The two principal characteristics o theMENA countries in this group are theircentralised control with little or no publicscrutiny and instabilityor proximity toitwhich has a bearing on corruptionrisk in the sector.

Libya, or example, in the atermath othe Qadda regime, lacks institutionalisedmechanisms to handle corruption risk inthe sector and has a legacy o centralised

control in which transparency and scrutinywere anathema.The deence and securitysector in Syria, meanwhile, is stronglyguarded against any civilian oversight andis tightly the remit o presidential control.Even where legislation exists, it is believedto be ignored. In Yemen, traditionally,deence and security institutions werepart o an elite patronage network in thecountry, with considerable involvementin corrupt activities.

Countries in these bands rom Sub-Saharan Arica, meanwhile, have otensuered rom a legacy o confict, instability,poor governance, and internal divisions allo which create or exacerbate corruptionrisk in the deence sector. In Angola there isa legacy o civil war and political dominance

o the central party, along with a lack otransparency, considerable o-budgetexpenditure, and military interest incommerce. Eritrea exhibits very poor results,beset by networks o patronage, highlysecretive government and, again, a legacyo confict.

Countries rom outside o these twoprincipal regions are also represented in this

group. Uzbekistan was ound to have veryhigh corruption risk, where the propensityor executive control or infuence overoversight and debate undermines thepotential or corruption to be addressed.In the Philippines and Indonesia, nancialcorruption risk is a concern. For example,controls o asset disposals are weak, andsignicant o-budget expenditure createsconsiderable corruption risk. Sri Lankaexhibits similar faws in the eld o nance,and corruption risk there is exacerbated by

centralised presidential control, limitedopportunity or scrutiny, and a lack otransparency. Finally, Venezuelademonstrates severe lack o transparencyand poor enorcement o existing legislation,leading to weak perormance across all verisk categories. Aghanistans placement inBand E is a positive result, given theinstability o the country.

E 18 CountriesAFGHANISTAN, BAHRAIN,

COTE D'IVOIRE, INDONESIA, IRAN,

IRAQ, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, OMAN,

PHILIPPINES, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA,

SRI LANKA, TUNISIA, UGANDA,

UZBEKISTAN, VENEZUELA, ZIMBABWE

F 9 CountriesALGERIA, ANGOLA, CAMEROON, DRC,

EGYPT, ERITREA, LIBYA, SYRIA, YEMEN


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20 Analysis by Risk Area

This Index helsgoernments and ciil

society to tackle corrutionin deence and security byanalysing the roblem ine key risk areas in this

sector: olitical, nancial,ersonnel, oerations,and rocurement.

Analysis by Risk Area


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21Analysis by Risk Area

15

10

2025

30

35

40

45

50

pOLITICAL RISKFINANCIAL RISK

pERSONNEL RISKOpERATIONS RISK

pROCUREMENT RISK

Aerage integrity scores by risk area all countries


24/52

22 22

pOLITICAL CORRUpTION RISK

There were some positive results in thepolitical context o the deence and securitysector. The bulk o governments have signedup to international anti-corruptioninstruments, though the on-going challengeremains or signatory status to be matched by

ull compliance. Links between the militaryand natural resource exploitation are a knowncorruption risk in the sector; however, in over55 per cent o the assessed countries withsignicant natural resources, deenceinstitutions do not have links with naturalresource exploitation or, i they do, these linksare reported to be subject to credible publicand parliamentary scrutiny.

Yet corruption risk in the area is, overall,considerable, with countries awarded anaverage o just 42 per cent o the available

marks. The capacity o legislatures to holddeence establishments to account isseverely limited. There are no or ew ormalmechanisms or scrutiny o deence policy inover 45 per cent o countries, and evidenceo highly eective mechanisms in only 12per cent o countries. Other concerns in therisk area relate to the ollowing:

There is no evidence of independent

external oversight o intelligence servicespolicies, budgets, and administration in halo the countries assessed.

Government willingness to engage with

civil society organisations on the matter oanti-corruption initiatives in the deence

sector is very limited, with only Australiaound to have a policy o engagement withthem on corruption in deence, and toprotect them legally.

Some degree of regular assessment

o areas o greatest corruption risk in theDeence Ministry was ound in ewer than10 per cent o countries.

Such results may illuminate why thereare largely sceptical public perceptionso corruption in deence. Researchersound evidence that only in 15 per cento countries do the public trust thedeence establishments commitmentto anti-corruption.

POLITICAL CONTROLS ONDEFENCE IN BULGARIA

Bulgaria has strong controls in place toaddress political corruption risk in deenceand security. It has active mechanisms orlegislative scrutiny and parliamentaryoversight o deence policy. Deence andsecurity institutions show engagementwith civil society organisations (CSOs),and rom July 2011 the Ministry oDeence has sent a bulletin to CSOsinorming them o the latest developmentsin the Ministry. In addition, the MODappears to encourage public dialogue othese issues, and drat MOD policydocuments are discussed in workshopsinvolving opinion-ormers and academia.



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26/52


FINANCE CORRUpTION RISK

Financial corruption risk in the deencesector takes numerous orms. It concernsthe degree to which asset disposals aremonitored, controlled, and transparent. Itinvolves potentially illicit use o budgetsearmarked as secret, oten kept rom public

and legislative oversight in the name onational security, and o spendingconducted o the ocial governmentbudget. It concerns corrupt behaviourassociated with both licit and illicit military-owned businesses and with unauthorisedprivate enterprise by military personnel.

The largest overarching problem in theeld o nancial corruption risk was ound tobe secrecy. It is common or governments tojustiy secrecy and opaqueness withreerence to national security, yet the criteria

or what is justiably kept secret orlegitimate national security purposes isrequently unclear or too broad.

More specicially: Three-quarters of the countries

examined do not publicly reveal thepercentage o deence and securityexpenditure dedicated to secret itemsrelated to national security and theintelligence services.

In 40 per cent of countries assessed,

a legislative committee is provided with no

inormation on secret spending and in hal ocountries, legislators are not provided withaudit reports on secret items or secretprograms are not audited at all.

There are no controls of asset disposals

in our-tenths o the countries assessed, orvery little public knowledge o such controls.

CONTROLS ON DEFENCESPENDING IN COLOMBIA

In Colombia, less than 1 per cent o theoverall deence budget is spent on secretitems. The very small proportion o thebudget that is spent on secret items issubject to audits that are available tothe legislature.

There are also robust controls omilitary asset disposals, and o-budgetexpenditure is illegal, resulting in a strongscore or Colombia in the area o nancialcorruption risk control.


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Asset Disposal Controls

Asset Disposal Scrutiny

Percentage Secret Spending

Legislative Access to Inormation

Secret Program Auditing

O-budget Spending in Law

O-budget Spending in Practice

Inormation Classication

Mil. Owned Business Exist

Mil. Owned Business Scrutiny

Unauthorised Private Enterprise

ASSETDISpOSALS

LINKS TOBUSINESS

SECRETBUDGETS

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

4 3.3 2.5 1.9 0.8 0

3 2.7 2.6 1.4 0.4 0.1

2 1.1 1.8 0.4 0.1 0

3 3.4 2.4 1.2 0.3 0

4 3.6 1.9 1.2 0.3 0

3.5 3.4 3.2 1.6 0.4 0

4 2.7 2.3 1.9 1.1 0.3

3 3.1 2 1.1 0.7 0.2

3.5 3.9 2.6 1.8 1.8 0.1

4 2 2.3 1.6 0.5 0

3 3.3 2.6 2.4 1.3 0.7

FOCUS OF QUESTION QUESTIONNUMBER

SCOREBAND A

SCOREBAND B

SCOREBAND D

SCOREBAND C

SCOREBAND E

SCOREBAND F

Secret budgets were one o

the most roblematic areas.Only a ew countries haeound a good balancebetween necessary secrecy

and secure legislatie scrutiny.

Aerage score or each question by band: Finance


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26

pERSONNEL CORRUpTION RISK

Corruption risk in personnel relates to controlo impropriety among armed orces andcivilian personnel in the deence and securitysector. It was in this risk area that countriesperormed best relative to the others.Over hal o the countries in the index were

awarded 50 per cent or more o the availablemarks in this area.

Deence Ministries perormed best onthe ollowing:

Having a well-established payment

system or personnel characterised bytimeliness and accuracy. Over 70 per cento the countries examined possess robustpayment systems, and the development oautomated systems or payment o salariesand allowances was ound to be a driving

orce in preventing such risk in modernarmed orces and deence ministries. Avoidance of the problem of non-

existent, ghost soldiers on the payroll.Over 40 per cent o nations analysed seemnot to have this problem at all ; in only 10per cent o nations does this seem to bean unaddressed issue.

In nearly 90 per cent of countries

at least some ormal measures are inplace or personnel ound to have takenpart in corruption.

Yet there remain major areas in whichmost governments perorm poorly.

In most countries, there is little evidencethat whistle-blowers are protected romreprisal when they attempt to reportimpropriety. Signicant improvements arenecessary to ensure eective legislationexists to support whistle-blowers in thedeence sector, which was lacking in 76

o the 82 countries examined.Across the majority o countries, there is

also a marked lack o special attention paidto personnel in positions particularlyvulnerable to corruption risk, such as specialvetting, rotation o personnel, or extratraining. With respect to the Index questionidentiying this particular risk, countries areawarded, overall, only slightly over 30 percent o the available marks. In 53 o the 82countries analysed, such special attentioneither does not exist, or its existence is

unveriable.

CONTROL OF PERSONNELCORRUPTION RISK

In Australia, robust legislation is in place

to deal with personnel proven to becorrupt. Code o Conduct breaches otenlead to employment termination. In the USA, the Defense Departments

Encyclopaedia o Ethical Failure includes acollection o cases o corruption and

resultant actions. The Standards oConduct Oce oversees codes o conductthroughout the Department o Deense



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Public Commitment

Measures or Corrupt Personnel

Whistleblowing

Special Attention to Sensitive Personnel

Numbers o Personnel Known

Pay Rates Openly Published

Well-established Payment System

Objective Appointments

Objective Promotions

Bribery to Avoid Compulsory Conscription

Bribery or Preerred Postings

Ghost Soldiers

Chains o Command and Payment

Code o Conduct Coverage

Code o Conduct Breaches Addressed

AC Training

Prosecution Outcomes Transparent

Facilitation Payments

LEADERSHIp

pAYROLL ANDRECRUITMENT

SALARYCHAIN

CONSCRIpTION

vALUES,STANDARDS,OTHER

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

3 2.9 2.4 1.7 0.9 0.4

4 3.4 2.5 2.5 1.8 1

3.5 2.4 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.1

4 2.7 1.5 1.5 0.7 0.1

4 3.6 3.3 2.3 1.2 0.4

4 3.7 2.8 2.4 1.9 0.7

4 3.7 3.4 3.3 2.6 1.4

4 3.1 2.3 2.1 1.8 0.8

3.5 3.1 2.4 2 1.3 0.6

3 1.8 1.9 0.8 1

4 3.3 2.2 1.4 0.7 0.3

4 4 3.7 3 1.9 1.2

4 3.9 3.4 2.6 1.8 0.2

4 3.3 2.3 1.8 1.2 0.7

4 3.1 2.2 1.8 0.8 0.2

3.5 2.4 1.7 1.3 0.9 0.4

3.5 3 2.3 1.5 0.8 0.4

3 2.7 2.6 2.4 1.4 0.3

SCOREBAND A

SCOREBAND B

SCOREBAND D

SCOREBAND C

SCOREBAND E

SCOREBAND F

Aerage score or each question by band: personnel


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OpERATIONS CORRUpTION RISK

The corruption risks involved in thecomplexities o military operations are poorlyunderstood as well as poorly controlled. Theaverage operations integrity score acrosscountries is 28 per cent, which is telling interms o the lack o controls countries have

installed that embrace corruption as astrategic issue, institutionalise operationaltraining and operational corruptionmonitoring, and control contracting whilein theatre.

Just two countries have comprehensive

military doctrine addressing corruptionissues.

In two-thirds of countries, there is

no known training in corruption issues orcommanders to ensure they are clear onthe corruption issues they may ace

during deployment. Over 90 per cent of countries do notdeploy personnel or corruption monitoringon operations or peacekeeping missionson a regular basis.

Countries only perormed better regardingthe use o private military contractors. Theuse o private military contractors increasesthe risk o corruption i democratic andormalised controls are lacking, and i theactivities and operations o theseorganisations lack transparency.Nevertheless, this result was oten becausecountries do not use private militarycontractors, rather than because there wasevidence o eective legislation that eitheroutlaws them completely or controls theiruse and the attendant corruption risk.

MIXED OPERATIONALCONTROLS IN SWEDEN

While corruption is not explicitly reerredto as a strategic issue in operations inSwedens military doctrine, there iscomprehensive anti-corruption trainingor commanders, and legal advisors

qualied to report back on corruption risksare deployed in missions. There is,however, a lack o transparency withrelation to the activities o private militarycontractors operating in Sweden, althoughlaws in place are capable o punishingthem or wrongdoing.


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Military Doctrine

Operational Training

AC Monitoring

Controls on Contracting

Private Military Contractors

CONTROLSIN THE FIELD

52

53

54

55

56

1.5 2.1 1.4 0.7 0.3 0

3 2.4 1.7 1.1 0.4 0

2.5 2.7 1.3 1 0.5 0.1

2.5 2.4 1.2 0.8 0.3 0.1

3.5 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.3 1


SCOREBAND A

SCOREBAND B

SCOREBAND D

SCOREBAND C

SCOREBAND E

SCOREBAND F

In two-thirds o countries,

training and doctrine toinorm commanders aboutthe corrution issues theymay ace during deloymentare lacking.

Aerage score or each question by band: Oerations


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30

pROCUREMENT CORRUpTION RISK

Procurement risk is a complex area. Theprocurement cycle is elaborate, involvingdecision-making about procurementrequirements, which may be opportunisticor politicised or, alternatively, quantiedand democratically planned. It may involve

tendering processes or large and elaboratecontracts. The execution o the deal mayinvolve complicated nancing packages,osets programmes, and brokers.

The bulk o countries do well in certainprocurement sub-risks. In over 45 per cento the countries in the index there aremechanisms or companies to complainabout malpractice in procurement andcompanies do not, in these countries,believe it to be dangerous to complain. In27 countries included in the index, there is

a policy to disclose deence purchases.

Yet the results suggest that the overallperormance o countries with regard toprocurement corruption risk in thedeence sector is weak:

There is either no evidence of

procurement oversight mechanisms, oronly evidence o highly opaque and inactiveprocurement oversight mechanisms,in 40 per cent o the countries analysed.

Where offsets contracts are used,

30 per cent o governments are not knownto impose any due diligence or auditingrequirements on these complexarrangements at all. Transparencyconcerning these contracts is at best veryrestricted in 60 per cent o these countries.

In 45 per cent of countries, details

o the nancing package o deenceprocurement contracts are not madepublicly available.

In over 65 per cent of countries, there

is no evidence that the government ormallyor inormally requires the main contractorto ensure that its subsidiaries andsubcontractors adopt anti-corruption

programmes.

Thus unique risks associated with the armstrade drive the poor result. Where there arechains o sub-contractors, brokers andintermediaries, large rents to be soughtand elaborate contracts subject to mixeddegrees o transparency, the potential orcorruption is clear.

SECRECY IN SINGAPOREANDEFENCE PROCUREMENT

In Singapore, the deence and securitysector is characterised by the absence otransparency, particularly in the elds oprocurement and nance corruption risk.In procurement, only abbreviatedinormation on the procurement cycleprocess is made public, and details arereleased about actual or intendedpurchases only sporadically. The lack otransparency made it troublesome toidentiy procurement oversight, lowering

the Singaporean procurement integrityscore urther.



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Legislation

Transparent Procurement Cycle

Oversight Mechanisms

Purchases Disclosed

Standards Expected o Companies

Strategy Drives Requirements

Requirements Quantied

Open Competition vs Single-Sourcing

Tender Board Controls

Anti-Collusion Controls

Procurement Sta Training

Complaint Mechanisms or Firms

Sanctions or Corruption

Due Diligence

Transparency

Competition Regulation

Controls o Agents

Transparency o Financing Packages

Subsidiaries / Sub-Contractors

Political Infuence

GOvERNMENT

pOLICY

CApABILITY

GAp

CONTRACTDELIvERY /SUppORT

TENDERING

OTHER

OFFSETS

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

3 3.4 2.4 2.1 1 0.7

4 3 2.6 1.4 0.5 0.4

4 3.3 2.6 1.7 0.9 0.3

3.5 3.3 2.8 1.8 1.3 0.6

4 3.3 1.4 1 0.8 0.1

4 3.1 2.4 1.3 0.4 0.2

4 3.1 2.7 1.8 1.1 0.4

3.5 2.3 2.4 2.2 1.2 0.2

3 2.9 2.6 1.8 0.9 0.2

4 3.1 2.1 1.2 1 0.6

3.5 3 2.6 1.8 0.9 0.2

3.5 3.3 2.9 2.3 1.8 0.8

4 3.3 2 1.9 1.4 0.3

3 2.8 1.4 0.9 0.6 0

4 2.8 1.5 1.1 0.6 0

3.5 2.4 1.9 1 0.6 0

4 2.4 2.2 1.6 0.3 0.4

2.5

3.5

3

2

2.3

3

2

0.8

2.5

0.9

0.4

1.9

0.2

0

1.6

0.2

0.2

0.9

SCOREBAND A

SCOREBAND B

SCOREBAND D

SCOREBAND C

SCOREBAND E

SCOREBAND F

Aerage score or each question by band: procurement


34/52

32 Regional and Thematic Comparisons

Regional and Thematic

ComarisonsRegional bandings

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

UNITED STATES

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL,CHILE, COLOMBIA

MEXICO

VENEZUELA

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

AUSTRALIA

SOUTH KOREA,TAIWAN

JAPAN

INDIA, NEPAL,SINGAPORE, THAILAND

BANGLADESH, CHINA,MALAYSIA, PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN, INDONESIAPHILIPPINES, SRI LANKA

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

GERMANY

AUSTRIA, NORWAY,SWEDEN, UNITED KINGDOM

BULGARIA, CROATIA,CZECH REPUBLIC, FRANCE,GREECE, HUNGARY, ITALY,LATVIA, POLAND,SLOVAKIA, SPAIN

BOSNIA, CYPRUS,SERBIA, UKRAINE

BELARUS, GEORGIA,KAZAKHSTAN, RUSSIA,TURKEY

UZBEKISTAN

AMERICAS ASIA-pACIFIC EUROpE &CENTRAL ASIA


35/52

33Regional and Thematic Comparisons

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

SOUTH AFRICA,KENYA

GHANA, TANZANIA,ETHIOPIA, RWANDA

UGANDA, NIGERIA,COTE D'IVOIRE, ZIMBABWE

CAMEROON, DRCANGOLA, ERITREA

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

ISRAEL, LEBANON,KUWAIT, UAE

JORDAN, PALESTINE

BAHRAIN, IRAN, IRAQ,MOROCCO, OMAN, QATAR,

SAUDI ARABIA, TUNISIA

ALGERIA, EGYPT, LIBYA,SYRIA, YEMEN

MIDDLE EAST &NORTH AFRICA

SUB-SAHARANAFRICA


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34

Countries with high military exenditure as % GDp, 20104

Six of the nine countries in Band F have

military expenditure as a proportion o GDPin excess o 2 per cent; no countries thathave military expenditure o this magnitudeare located in Band A.

All but one of the ten countries that spend

over 4 per cent o their GDP on militaryexpenditure (the USA) are located inBands D, E, or F.

All but two of the twelve countries that

spend between 3 and 3.9 per cent o theirGDP on military expenditure are alsoclustered in the lowest three bands.

Regional and Thematic Comparisons

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

CHILE,COLOMBIA

KUWAIT,SINGAPORE

GEORGIA,RUSSIA

AFGHANISTAN,BAHRAIN, MOROCCO,SRI LANKA

ALGERIA,YEMEN

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

UNITED STATES

ISRAEL,LEBANON,UAE

JORDAN

OMAN,SAUDI ARABIA

ANGOLA,ERITREA,SYRIA

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

SOUTH KOREA,TAIWAN,UNITED KINGDOM

FRANCE,GREECE

CYPRUS, INDIA,SERBIA, UKRAINE

CHINA, PAKISTAN,TURKEY

IRAQ, QATAR

EGYPT

2.0 - 2.9% 3.0 - 3.9% OvER 4.0%


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35

To arms imorters by olume o imorts, 20115

4 Or nearest year or which data is available.Source o deence as proportion o GDP data: SIPRIMilitary Expenditure Database, http:// milexdata.sipri.org, Accessed 2 November 2012.5 Source o arms import data: SIPRI ArmsTransers Database, http: //www.sipri.org/databases/armstransers, Accessed 1 November 2012.

Twenty of the biggest arms importers

by volume imported over $500 million oarms in 2011. O these, only ve countriesshowed very low or low corruption risks(Bands A and B).

Among the very highest importers

by volume, countries are clustered inBand D and Band E, indicating clearneed or improvement.

Regional and Thematic Comparisons

A

B

C

D+

F

E

D

NORWAY,UNITED KINGDOM,UNITED STATES

CHILE

SINGAPORE,THAILAND

AFGHANISTAN,IRAQ,VENEZUELA

ALGERIA,

EGYPT

A

B

C

D+

D

E

F

AUSTRALIA

SOUTH KOREA

INDIA,UAE

CHINA,PAKISTAN,TURKEY

MOROCCO,SAUDI ARABIA

$0.5 - $1.5bn OvER $1.5bn


38/52


39/52

37Regional and Thematic Comparisons

With high levels o projected growth, BRICand Next 11 countries ace particularlyrelevant corruption risks in the deencesector, which are likely to become moresignicant over time. For example, economicgrowth and greater market activity may

increase the potential and incentive ormilitary participation in commerce, creatingattendant corruption risk. More diligence indeence anti-corruption is highly necessary,in view o the clustering o the BRIC / Next11 countries in Band D- and Band E inparticular.

Most OECD countries are parliamentarydemocracies with willingness to promotetransparent government and market-basedeconomic activity, and almost all possessa ree civil society and media. OECDcountries account or eight o the ninecountries in the top two bands. However;complacency is a major issue 62 percent o OECD countries are not in Bands Aor B, and, as the analysis o these bandsshowed, even countries perorming wellhave concrete areas needing improvement.Furthermore, many o these OECD countriesare major arms exporters. They have otenbeen similarly complacent about theirresponsibility to ensure high standardsamong their national deence companies.

OECD COUNTRIES

D+

FA

B

C

D

E

8%

29%

48%

10%

5%

BRIC & NEXT 11

D+

FAB

C

D

E

7% 7%

7%

14%

36%

29%


40/52

38 Actions

Actions

1. Analyse the corrution risks inyour national deence and security

establishments, and deelo andimlement an action lan to tacklethe identied risks. Use the detailedinormation in this index as a startingpoint. Consider setting up a dedicatedunit within the Deence Ministry,charged with overseeing anti-corruption initiative and controls.Consider also setting up a Taskorcethat can develop a commonunderstanding o the corruption risksand remedies across the armed orces

and MOD.Invite civil society oracademic experts into a committeethat will have oversight o progresso the anti-corruption initiative.

2. Make secrecy the excetion,not the norm. Publish the deencebudget in detail each year, includingthe percentage o the budget that issecret. Ensure that secret spending issubject to oversight that is secure butnonetheless is independent o themilitary and the executive.

3. Engage ciil societyorganisations in the process o

increasing transparency andaccountability. They can be valuablepartners in carrying out reorm. Opendiscussion demonstrates to the outsideworld, and within your ministries, thatyou are serious about addressing theissue o corruption.

4. Develop an accessible code oconduct, and provide regular,in-deth anti-corrution trainingon integrity and countering corruption.

5. Address rocurementcorrution risks. Ensure thatprocurement and policy decisions areopen and based on published strategicneeds. Promote air competitionbetween bidding companies, andensure that osets contracts aresubject to due diligence and auditing.Publish inormation on agents andintermediaries used by thegovernment, as well as nancingpackages. Require bidding companiesto ensure that their subsidiaries andsub-contracted companies haveanti-corruption mechanisms in place.Subsequent to purchase, conductindependent audits o all majordeence procurements.

6. Strengthen ersonnelmanagement mechanisms. Set up

robust whistle-blowing channels andprotection or whistle-blowers. Identiysensitive positions associated withhigh corruption risks andinstitutionalise appropriate vetting,rotation, and post-retirementrestrictions.

7. Address corrution as astrategic issue on oerations.Ensure military doctrine containsprovisions on addressing corruption

risk, and acknowledges the impactcorruption can have on operationalabilities. Reduce the risk corruptionposes to troops by setting up controlso suppliers in the eld and providingrigorous anti-corruption monitoringduring deployment.

8. Demand high anti-corrutionstandards o the other goernmentsand comanies when exortingequiment. Exporting governmentshave a responsibility to ensure thattransactions are not corrupt on thepurchasing side by importinggovernments and deence companies.

DEFENCE & SECURITY MINISTERS,MINISTRY HEADS & CHIEFS OF DEFENCE


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39Actions

1. Use this Index as a tool ormonitoring corrution risk in this

sector, and to open a dialogue aboutthe subject in parliament and with thedeence establishment. Identiy allies incivil society and the media, as well asdeence establishments, and worktogether to investigate any cases odeence corruption, research issues,and develop reorm plans.

2. Set u or strengthen acommittee that oersees deence.This needs to be staed with

members with deence expertise,and provided with sucient powersto check executive power on deencepolicy. Where levels o legislatureoversight in your country all belowinternational best practice, push orgreater controls.

3. Question toics withheld romyour scrutiny in the name o

national security. Legislate only orprovisions that ensure secretivepractices are subject to secureindependent oversight. Ensure thatcitizens are able to access inormationon the size o the armed orces, and onassets owned by the Ministry oDeence and the armed orces, suchas land, housing, and equipment.

4. Ensure that that there is awell-established and unctioning

rocess or deence budgetingwhich clearly provides or legislativeoversight and independent control.Citizens should be able to accessdetailed deence budget inormationin a timely manner.

5. Equi rocurement oersightbodies with the caacity to carry

out eectie monitoring. Reviewprocurement rules and practices toclose loopholes. Ensure thatlegislators have access to inormationon the procurement and lie cyclemanagement o equipment. Wherethis is sensitive inormation, thereshould be a group o security-clearedlegislators who can access thisinormation.

LEGISLATORS


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40 Actions

1. Demand that deence andsecurity establishments be

accountable and oen. Assume anactie role in monitoring andoerseeing deence olicies,budgets, and actiities. Use theinormation in this index to advocateor reorm in the sector, and to bringthis subject into the national dialogue.Work with the media and citizens touse the inormation in this Index tomake demands or greateraccountability in this crucial area.

2. Seek engagement with thedeence and securityestablishment. This may include

members o the armed orces or theMOD/MOI, legislative committees on

deence and security, or auditors. Fewdeence establishments work activelywith civil society, so initiate contactthrough meetings, workshops, orconerences, and nd allies committedto reorm. As a representative ocitizens, encourage accountability bythe national deence establishment,and be a link between the two.

3. Adocate or a transarentdeence budgeting and

rocurement rocess that canbe easily understood by citizensand the media.

4. Lobby goernments to remoeunnecessary secrecy clauses

in the name o national security.

5. Deelo urther research, usingthe Index as a starting point. Look intoareas o vulnerability or your country,and work with other organisations,think tanks and academics to discovermore about the problemsandpotential solutions. Use this researchto connect with governmentinstitutions, with the media, and withany other interested organisations.

CIvILSOCIETY


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41Actions

1. Initiate discussions withgoernments on joint ways to

strengthen integrity and reducingcorrution risk in deence.Encourage dialogue and recognisethat the problem o corruption indeence will only be eradicatedthrough joint eorts.

2. Use the data in this Index, andin the Deence Companies Anti-Corruption Index, to deelo adetailed understanding o wherecorruption risks lie.

3. Commission an indeendentassessment o your companys ethics

and compliance systems and publishthe report. This will help governmentsdetermine which suppliers have themost robust anti-corruptionprogrammes.

4. Disclose your agents,intermediaries, and subcontractors.Corruption is associated with opaquemiddlemen and chains o sub-contractors. Make it easier orgovernments to identiy the brokers

and companies you use, and workwith them to ensure all transactionsare clean.

5. publicly declare osetobligations and ublish oset

erormance annually.Conduct thorough due diligenceon osets contracts, and ensurethey are audited.

A more detailed set orecommendations or companies canbe ound in our Deence CompaniesAnti-Corruption Index 2012

DEFENCECOMpANIES


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42 Glossary

Glossary

Agents and Brokers: Middlemen usedby governments and companies in theprocurement process.

Asset Disosals: The process o selling,auctioning or otherwise disposing omilitary assets, which can include: landand buildings, single use military equipment(which cannot be used or civilian purposes),

equipment or materiel in construction,transportation equipment, plants andmachinery, and IT or communicationssotware.

Collusie bidding: Also known as collusion,this is a phenomenon that occurs whensupplier companies supposedly competingagainst one another secretly agree on whowill win the contract. These companies mayhave agreements or sharing the prots, orrotating the contract between the bidders,

or or agreeing who is to be the successulbidder in a range o dierent contracts.

Comulsory Conscrition: Mandatorymilitary service, usually or individualso a set age.

Corrution Within Mission: Wheninternational orces intervene in a country,they can be a source o corruption.Corruption within mission reers tocorruption by an intervening orce and islinked to disregard o corruption in country.

Disregard o Corrution In-Country:When on military operations abroad,the ailure o a countrys armed orces toaddress the corruption risks in the countrythey are operating in.

Exort Controls: Legal mechanisms inplace, enorced by governments, to limitand control the export o arms.

Financing package: The detailed way inwhich purchases are paid or, which mayinclude interest rates, commercial loans orexport credit agreements, and may coverthings like a xed price or equipmentmaintenance ees. It may speciy timeperiods or a government to pay or theequipment, or example, and penaltiesincurred or late payment.

Ghost Soldiers: Fake soldiers that existonly on the payroll o deence institutionsand can be used as a way o siphoningunds.

Illegal priate Enterrises: A orm omisuse o assets whereby an individualuses deence assets or connections toproteer; or example, the payment oexorbitant ees to cronies or consultancyor other services, or the use o service

personnel or private work.

Military-Owned Businesses: Civilianbusinesses or deence companies owned,in whole or part, by the government deenceestablishment or the armed orces. Thisdoes not include private businesseslawully owned by individuals in thedeence establishment.

Osets: Arrangements made bygovernments and companies whenentering a procurement contract requiringthe company to reinvest a percentage o thevalue o the deal in the importing country.

Salary Chain: The path that moneytakes rom the national treasury toindividual soldiers.

Seller Infuence: Pressure or lobbyingby one government to another, in order toencourage the purchasing government to

award a contract to a company due to acompanys nationality or due to politicalissues, rather than due to the merit othe companys bid.

Single Sourcing: Also known as non-competitive deence procurement, singlesourcing reers to procurement carried outwithout a usual competitive bidding process

between companies; instead, one supplier isused and its bid is not compared to others.

Small Bribes / Facilitation payments:Bribes paid or demanded in order to receivebasic services, pass checkpoints, or tospeed administrative procedures.

Subcontractors: When a company hiredto do a project contracts a company toundertake some or all o the workassociated with the project, the company

is said to be subcontracted; thissubcontractor may, in turn, subcontractthat work urther, leading to a chaino subcontractors.voluntary Conscrition: an establishedperiod or programme o military service thatindividuals o a certain age may opt in or outo; this may orm a part o a wider nationalservice programme.

priate Military Contractors:see Private Security Companies.

priate Security Comanies: Companiesthat provide security and related services,such as training, either to governments orprivate institutions. The term may also beused to reer to Private Military Contractors,whose activities may extend to providingsoldiers-or-hire and mercenary activity.


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List o Questions

pOLITICAL

1. Is there ormal provision or eective andindependent legislative scrutiny o deencepolicy?2. Does the country have an identiable andeective parliamentary deence and securitycommittee (or similar such organisation) to

exercise oversight?3. Is the countrys national deence policydebated and publicly available?4. Do deence and security institutions have apolicy, or evidence, o openness towards civilsociety organisations (CSOs) when dealingwith issues o corruption? I no, is thereprecedent or CSO involvement in generalgovernment anti-corruption initiatives?5. Has the country signed up to internationalanti-corruption instruments such as, but notexclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the

OECD Convention?6. Is there evidence o regular, active publicdebate on issues o deence? I yes, does thegovernment participate in this debate?7. Does the country have an openly statedand actively implemented anti-corruptionpolicy or the deence sector?8. Are there independent, well-resourced,and eective institutions within deence andsecurity tasked with building integrity andcountering corruption?9. Does the public trust the institutions odeence and security to tackle the issue obribery and corruption in theirestablishments?10.Are there regular assessments by thedeence ministry or another governmentagency o the areas o greatest corruptionrisk or ministry and armed orces personnel,and do they put in place measures ormitigating such risks?11. Does the country have a process oracquisition planning that involves clear

oversight, and is it publicly available?12. Is the deence budget transparent,showing key items o expenditure? Thiswould include comprehensive inormationon military R&D, training, construction,personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposalo assets, and maintenance.12a. Is there a legislative committee (orother appropriate body) responsible or

deence budget scrutiny and analysis in aneective way, and is this body provided withdetailed, extensive, and timely inormation onthe deence budget?12b. Is the approved deence budget madepublicly available? In practice, can citizens,civil society, and the media obtain detailedinormation on the deence budget?13.Are sources o deence income other thanrom central government allocation (romequipment sales or property disposal, orexample) published and scrutinised?

14. Is there an eective internal audit processor deence ministry expenditure (that is, orexample, transparent, conducted byappropriately skilled individuals, and subjectto parliamentary oversight)?15. Is there eective and transparent externalauditing o military deence expenditure?16. Is there evidence that the countrysdeence institutions have controlling ornancial interests in businesses associatedwith the countrys natural resourceexploitation and, i so, are these interestspublicly stated and subject to scrutiny?17. Is there evidence, or example throughmedia investigations or prosecution reports,o a penetration o organised crime into thedeence and security sector? I no, is thereevidence that the government is alert andprepared or this risk?18. Is there policing to investigate corruptionand organised crime within the deenceservices and is there evidence o theeectiveness o this policing?

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19.Are the policies, administration, andbudgets o the intelligence services subjectto eective, properly resourced, andindependent oversight?20.Are senior positions within the intelligenceservices lled on the basis o objectiveselection criteria, and are appointees subjectto investigation o their suitability and priorconduct?

21.Does the government have a transparentand well-scrutinised process or arms controldecisions that align with internationalprotocols?

FINANCIAL

22.How eective are controls over thedisposal o assets, and is inormation onthese disposals, and the proceeds o theirsale, transparent?

23. Is independent and transparent scrutiny oasset disposals conducted by deenceestablishments, and are the reports o suchscrutiny publicly available?24.What percentage o deence and securityexpenditure in the budget year is dedicated tospending on secret items relating to nationalsecurity and the intelligence services?25. Is the legislature (or the appropriatelegislative committee or members o thelegislature) given ull inormation or thebudget year on the spending o all secretitems relating to national security and militaryintelligence?26.Are audit reports o the annual accountso the security sector (the military, police,and intelligence services) and other secretprograms provided to the legislature (orrelevant committee) and are theysubsequently subject to parliamentarydebate?27. O-budget military expenditures arethose that are not ormally authorised within

a countrys ocial deence budget, otenconsidered to operate through the back-door. In law, are o-budget militaryexpenditures permitted, and i so, are theyexceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?28. In practice, are there any o-budgetmilitary expenditures? I so, does evidencesuggest this involves illicit economic activity?

29. In law, are mechanisms or classiyinginormation on the grounds o protectingnational security subject to eective scrutiny?30.Do national deence and securityinstitutions have benecial ownership ocommercial businesses? I so, howtransparent are details o the operations andnances o such businesses?31.Are military-owned businesses subject totransparent independent scrutiny at arecognised international standard?32. Is there evidence o unauthorised private

enterprise by military or other deenceministry employees?

pERSONNEL

34.Do the Deence Ministry, DeenceMinister, Chies o Deence, and SingleService Chies publicly committhrough,or example, speeches, media interviews, orpolitical mandatesto anti-corruption andintegrity measures?35.Are there eective measures in place orpersonnel ound to have taken part in ormso bribery and corruption, and is there publicevidence that these measures are beingcarried out?36. Is whistle-blowing encouraged by thegovernment, and are whistle-blowers inmilitary and deence ministries aordedadequate protection rom reprisal orreporting evidence o corruption, in bothlaw and practice?

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37. Is special attention paid to the selection,time in post, and oversight o personnel insensitive positions, including ocials andpersonnel in deence procurement,contracting, nancial management, andcommercial management?38. Is the number o civilian and militarypersonnel accurately known and publiclyavailable?

39.Are pay rates and allowances or civilianand military personnel openly published?40.Do personnel receive the correct pay ontime, and is the system o payment well-established, routine, and published?41. Is there an established, independent,transparent, and objective appointmentsystem or the selection o military personnelat middle and top management level?42.Are personnel promoted through anobjective, meritocratic process? Such aprocess would include promotion boards

outside o the command chain, strong ormalappraisal processes, and independentoversight.43.Where compulsory conscription occurs,is there a policy o not accepting bribes oravoiding conscription? Are there appropriateprocedures in place to deal with such bribery,and are they applied?44.With regard to compulsory or voluntaryconscription, is there a policy o reusingbribes to gain preerred postings in therecruitment process? Are there appropriateprocedures in place to deal with such bribery,and are they applied?45. Is there evidence o ghost soldiers,or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?46.Are chains o command separate romchains o payment?47. Is there a Code o Conduct or all militaryand civilian personnel that includes, but is notlimited to, guidance with respect to bribery,gits and hospitality, conficts o interest,and post-separation activities?

48. Is there evidence that breaches o theCode o Conduct are eectively addressed,and are the results o prosecutions madepublicly available?49.Does regular anti-corruption trainingtake place or military and civilian personnel?50. Is there a policy to make public outcomeso the prosecution o deence servicespersonnel or corrupt activities, and is there

evidence o eective prosecutions in recentyears?51.Are there eective measures in place todiscourage acilitation payments (which areillegal in almost all countries)?

OpERATIONS

52.Do the armed orces have militarydoctrine addressing corruption as a strategicissue on operations?

53. Is there training in corruption issues orcommanders at all levels in order to ensurethat these commanders are clear on thecorruption issues they may ace duringdeployment? I so, is there evidence that theyapply this knowledge in the eld?54.Are trained proessionals regularlydeployed to monitor corruption risk in theeld (whether deployed on operations orpeacekeeping missions)?55.Are there guidelines, and sta training,on addressing corruption risks in contractingwhilst on deployed operations orpeacekeeping missions?56.Are private military contractors employedand i so, are they subject to a similar level oscrutiny as or the armed orces?

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46

pROCUREMENT

57. Does the country have legislation coveringdeence and security procurement withclauses specic to corruption risks, and areany items exempt rom these laws?58. Is the deence procurement cycle process,rom assessment o needs, through contract

implementation and sign-o, all the way toasset disposal, disclosed to the public?59.Are deence procurement oversightmechanisms in place and are these oversightmechanisms active and transparent?60.Are actual and potential deencepurchases made public?61.What procedures and standards arecompanies required to have such ascompliance programmes and businessconduct programmes in order to be able tobid or work or the Ministry o Deence or

armed orces?62.Are procurement requirements derivedrom an open, well-audited national deenceand security strategy?63.Are deence purchases based on clearlyidentied and quantied requirements?64. Is deence procurement generallyconducted as open competition or is there asignicant element o single-sourcing (that is,without competition)?65.Are tender boards subject to regulationsand codes o conduct and are their decisionssubject to independent audit to ensure dueprocess and airness?66.Does the country have legislation in placeto discourage and punish collusion betweenbidders or deence and security contracts?67.Are procurement sta, in particularproject and contract managers, specicallytrained and empowered to ensure that

deence contractors meet their obligationson reporting and delivery?68.Are there mechanisms in place to allowcompanies to complain about perceivedmalpractice in procurement, and arecompanies protected rom discriminationwhen they use these mechanisms?69.What sanctions are used to punish thecorrupt activities o a supplier?

70.When negotiating oset contracts, doesthe government specically addresscorruption risk by imposing anti-corruptiondue diligence requirements on contractors?Does the government ollow up on osetcontract perormance and perorm audits tocheck perormance and integrity?71.Does the government require highstandards o transparency o all osetcontracts and programmes?72.Are oset contracts subject to the samelevel o competition regulation as the main

contract?73.How strongly does the government controlthe companys use o agents andintermediaries in the procurement cycle?74.Are all principal aspects o the nancingpackage, including payment timelines,interest rates, commercial loans or exportcredit agreements (and others, as applicable),publicly available prior to the signing oprocurement contracts?75.Does the government ormally require thatthe main contractor ensures subsidiaries andsub-contractors adopt anti-corruptionprogrammes, and is there evidence that thisis enorced?76.How common is it or deence acquisitiondecisions to be based on political infuence byselling nations?

List o Questions


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47Thanks

Thanks

TI-UK would like to thank the UKDepartment or International Development(DID) and the Swedish InternationalDevelopment Cooperation Agency ortheir generous support.

We would like to thank the many individualsin Deence Ministries and Armed Forcesaround the world who acted as our Points

o Contact and who corresponded tocorrect errors and omissions. They andtheir superiors deserve great credit orengaging in this analysis with the intento enabling improvement.

We are indebted to the ollowingindividuals on the matter o methodologicaladvice: Agata Slota, Alexandre Hamard,Georgeta Elisabeta Ionescu, Indira Carr,Michael Macaulay, Nathaniel Heller andMonika Shepard o Global Integrity,

Peter Foot, Jonathan Eyler-Werve andSusan Rose-Ackerman.

Thank you to Transparency InternationalPalestine (AMAN) or translating thequestionnaire into Arabic.

This study could not have been undertakenwithout the excellent contributions o theindependent researchers and peer reviewerswho worked tirelessly on this opaque anddicult topic.

We have also enjoyed exceptional supportrom TI national chapters, who requentlycarried out the research or review or theircountry. Here, these individuals andorganisations, where they have been happyto be reerenced, are listed alphabetically.Starred names are pseudonyms, and the listis purposeully incomplete due to manyresearchers requesting anonymity:

Abbas Alkhidir, dm Fldes, AnastassiyaZagainova, Anton Pominov, Bartosz Czepil,Bonas Owinga, Boris Demidov, CharlesGaroalo, Christalla Yakinthou, ClaudiaPompa, David Fouquet, David Ondrcka,Diego Hernan Martinez, Dorothy Asare-Kumah, Droits Humains Sans Frontires,Ekanem Bassey, Elly Omondi Odhiambo,Eric Lerais, Ermias*, Ernie Ko, Eunhye Song,

Eve Sariyiannidou, Evrim oksyler, FanniGyurk, Federica Di Camillo, Feras Milhem,Fernando Diez, Francine Jacome, FredericWiesenbach, Gabriel po, GitaSubrahmanyam, Grzegorz Makowski,Harika Masud, Hashem alShamy*, HazemBalousha, Itekhar Zaman, James Stocker,Jan Peter Gerhard, Jean-Philippe Pouget,Jennier Philippa Eggert, Joanna Buckley,John Clark*, Joseph Blair*, KakhaKhandolishvili, Kerry Hutchinson, KristinaMani, Laura Hilger, Lawrence Saez, Liliya

Akhmadullina, Maria Dubilei*, Maria TeresaBia, Maria Yulikova, Marko Milosevic,Martha Moletas, Matthew Bordewick,Maurizio Tinnirello, Mi Lennhag, MichaelNelson, Mohammad Ehsan, Mona Chalabi,Mutegi Njau, Mwangi Kibathi, Olga Nazario,Pamela Huerta Uribe, Paul Adepelumi, PaulOmondi, Paula Cristina Roque, PuthenveetilRadhakrishnan, Rebecca John*, Rebecca Py,Renee Horne, Ricarda Bier, RobertBlaszczak, Rocco Raa*, Salam Haez,Sameer Punyani, Samer Libdeh, Sen Doyle,Seane Mabitsela, Srgio Praca, SusannaWandros*, Suthikorn Kingkaew, TheAnti-Corruption Council o Ukraine, BelgradeCenter or Security Policy, TI Austria, TI BiH,TI Colombia, TI Hellas, TI Hungary, TI Kenya,TI Nepal, TI Serbia, TI Sri Lanka, TI Taiwan,TI Turkey, TI Uganda, Tylere Couture, TyrionSangowa*, Victor Pea, Vitus AdabooAzeem, Wacdan Aybakar*, Yekoz*, ZahidShahab Ahmed, Zeinab Abul-Magd


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Study authors : Oliver Cover, Tehmina Abbas,Leah Wawro, an

indice anticorrupcion (1)

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