ABC News Closeup, 35, 72 Abrams, Richard K., 31, 72,

196-7, 216 Accord, The, 51-2, 82, 104-8,

159 Ackley, Gardner, 159 Aldrich, Nelson, 82 Alesina, Alberto, 322, 332, 356 Almon Lag, 122, 149-154 A1t, James, 322 American Bankers Association,

253 Anderson, Robert, 55, Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: as an alternative to signaling, 21-22, 207-212, 286-8, 340

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: Burns, 160

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: Chairman sponsor­ship of, 290

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: Congressional in­fluence over, 302-3

Appointments to Federal Re-serve: constraints on, 288-

INDEX

-90 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: Martin, 106, 158 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: Miller, 163, 306 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: model of, 288-308 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: objectives of, 287-93

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: political vs. nonpo­litical, 82-6, 103-5, 289, 294-7, 341, 349-51

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: reliable vs. unreli­able, 202-204, 207-212, 289,297-300

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: screening of candi­dates, 293-300

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: under Bush, 307-8

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: under Carter, 305

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: under Eisenhower,

362 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY

304 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: under Ford, 305 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: under Johnson, 304 Appointments to Federal Re­

serve: under Kennedy, 304

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: under Reagan, 307-8

Appointments to Federal Re­serve: Volcker, 165-6, 306

Association of Reserve City Bankers, 253

Auerbach, Robert D., 31, 35, 72,224,255,322,334,356

Bach, George Leland, 47, 54, 87, 97, 103

Bade, Robin, 332, 356 Baker, Howard, 166 Baker, James, 204, 307 Danian, King, 332, 356 Banking Act of 1933, 58, 91,

101, 340 Banking Act of 1935, 14, 44.,

50, 82, 101, 107 Barth, James, 196, 216 Beck, Nathaniel, 30, 31, 72,

226, 242, 274 Bernanke, Ben, 198, 216, 242 Bibby, John F., 226, 242 Black, Eugene, 49, 94 Blinder, Alan, 198, 216, 242 Blumenthal, Michael, 164, 306 Borins, Sanford, 36, 72 Brady, Nicholas, 37, 69, 167-8 Brunner, Karl, 130, 147

Bryan, William Jennings, 83 Bryce, James, 325 Buchanan, James, 55, 72 Burdekin, Richard, 324, 356 Burns, Arthur, 54, 110-11, 118,

160-3, 193, 322, 333, 356 Burns, Arthur: defender of

Fed prerogatives, 161-2, 169

Burns, Arthur: partisan loyalist vs. sound money devotee, 161-2, 167-9, 180, 262-4

Cagan, Philip, 328, 356 Calmfors, Lars, 329, 356 Cameron, David, 329, 356 Canterbery, E. Ray, 56-57, 72 Central Bank: autonomy in

decline, 341 Central Bank: autonomy pro­

duces monetary stability, 330-2, 350-1

Central Bank: indices of au­tonomy, 331-32, 350

Central Bank: legal autonomy, 332-36, 350-1

Central Bank: reforms to in­sure autonomy, 351-3

Chandler, Lester, 45, 47, 72, 87, 90, 97-98, 115

Chappell, Henry, 127, 139, 147, 300, 322, 356

Chernow, Ron, 90, 115 Clifford, A. Jerome, 11, 27, 49,

51-2, 54-5, 72, 84-5, 89-90, 104-8, 115, 290

Commision on Money and Cre-dit, 351

Congressional concern for mo-

Index

netary policy management, 87-8, 107-9, 155-7

Congressional Oversight Hear­ings, 112, 222-3, 225-30

Congressional signaling, 232-41 Congressional signaling: Fed

responses to, 221-2, 232-41

Congressional threat to Fed po­wers, 108-9, 169, 178-82

Congressional threat to Fed po­wers: measurement of, 170-3

Consumer Advisory Council, 10-20

Coolidge, Calvin, 46, 92 Corporatism and inflation, 329-

31 Cost push inflation, 63, 329 Craft, Vanessa, 118, 124, 127,

147 Crissinger, Daniel, 46, 92 Crihfield, John, 305, 324 Cukierman, Alex, 329, 331,

352-3, 356 Cullity, John P., 36, 61, 72,

160, 162, 193 Currie, Lauchlin, I 02 Darby, Michael, 37, 68 Darman, Richard, 37, 68 Dawes, R.M. , 329, 357 Delano, Frederick A., 84 Depository Institutions Deregu-

lation and Monetary Con­trol Act of 1980, 340

Dewald, William G., 196, 216 Dillon, Douglas, 56-59 Distributed lags, 121, 149-53

363

Douglas, Paul, 52, I 06 Eccles, Marinner, 51, 101-5,

108-9,290 Economists as reliable partisan

FOMC members, 298-300 Eichengreen, Barry, 97, 115 Employment Act of 1946,

340-41 Epstein, Gerald, 115, 332, 357 Expansionist School, 94-100 F AC index: influence on

FOMC voting, 265-8 FAC index: construction of,

257-8 Farm Relief Bill of 1933, 49,

100 Fed-watching, 222-5, 337-40 Federal Advisory Council,

10-20, 46, 84, 87, Ill, 251-73

Federal Advisory Council: conventional view, 254-6

Federal Advisory Council: symbiotic view, 255-6

Federal Advisory Council: Treasury influence over, Ill, 255

Federal Reserve: as sound money oracle, 32, 255

Federal Reserve: as whipping boy, 32, 255

Federal Reserve: confrontation with Administrations, 57-62

Federal Reserve: disclosure, 223, 335

Federal Reserve: political vs. non political appointees,

364 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY

82-8,103-5,256,289, 294-7, 341, 349-51

Federal Reserve: secrecy, 223, 335

Federal Reserve: self -censor­ship, 335

Federal Reserve: structure of, 10-20

Federal Reserve Act (1913), 17, 82-4, 254, 288

Federal Reserve Bank, 10-20 Federal Reserve Bank: direct­

orates, 10-20 Federal Reserve Bank of New

York: resentment of, 92-9 Federal Reserve Chairman:

function of, 10-20 Federal Reserve Reform Act

(1978), 288, 341 Federal Reserve System: func­

tions, 10-20 Federal Reserve System: pri­

vate sector representation within, 89-100, 252, 272-273, 348-354

Federal Reserve System: strug­gle for authority within, 39-47, 82-6, 100-3, 105

Feldstein, Martin, 68, 166 Ferguson, Thomas, 11 S FOMC voters: ease and tight-

ness groups, 295-300 FOMC voters: reliable and un­

reliable groups, 207-212, 297-300

FOMC voting, 295-300 FOMC: composition, 102-3 FOMC: index, 266

FOMC: structure and func­tions, 10-20

Forgan, James, 46 Formalism: pitfalls of, 157,

342-43 Frey, Bruno, 72 Friedlaender, Ann F., 31, 72,

196, 216 Friedman, Milton, 30, 45, 73,

94-8, 108, 115, 132, 147, 193

Froyen, Richard, 31, 72, 73 196-7, 216

Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act, 341

Gamber, Edward N., 216 Garrad, Winston, 85 Giannini group, 1 OS Gildea, John, 132, 202-4, 217,

242, 285, 295, 322, 323, 357

Glass Steagall Act of 1932, 50, 95

Glass, Carter, 10, 83, 91, 102-3 Gold reserve backing, 49 Gold standard, 47, SO, 88. 90,

94-100, 119, 348 Golden, David , 31 Goodfriend Marvin, 336 Governors' Conference, 85 Granato, James, 331, 358 Granger causality, 126, 266 Greenspan, Alan, 18, 37, 118,

167-8 Greider, William, 36-7,73,

115, 117' 193, 256, 274, 286,306,335-36,357

Grier, Kevin T., 213, 221, 242,

Index

303, 322, 357 Griffiths, W, 148, 150 Hakes, David, 132, 147 Hamlin, Charles S., 85 Harding, Warren, 45-6, 49 Harding, W.P.G., 84, 89, 92 Harrison, William, 93-8,

327-30 Harrison, William B., 342, 357 Hastings, Delbert, 274 Heller, Walter, 56-60 Herren, Robert Stanley, 166,

193 Hetzel, Robert L., 27, 226, 242,

323, 358 Hibbs, Douglas, 323 Hill, R., 148, 150 Hoover, Herbert, 47, 97 Hoover, J. Edgar, 158 Humphrey, George, 53 Inflation: as an addiction, 327-

-30 Inflation: costs of, 328 Inflation: costs of monetary

policy, 108, 326-32 Inflation: unanticipated, 327-8 Janis, Irving, 323, 358 Johnson, Harry G., 196 Joint Commision on Agricul-

tural Inquiry, 87 Jones, David M., 37, 69, 74 Judge, George, 148, 150 Kalman filter, 127 Kane, Edward, 31, 74, 222,

243,291,305,323,358 Katz, Bernard, 72, 193 Karamouzis, Nicholas, 217,

256, 275

Kemp, Jack, 166 Kemp-Roth Act, 13, 66 Kennedy, David, 60 Kennedy, Edward, 166

365

Ketti, Donald F., 12, 27, 47-8, 53-4, 56, 59, 61, 63-4, 74, 83, 89, 93, 97, 102-3, 105-6, 109-10, 115, 161-2, 165, 193, 226, 243, 251, 253, 274, 289

Khoury, Salwa S., 196-97,217 Kudlow, Lawrence, 37 Lags: in response to Adminis-

tration signaling, 121 Lags: reporting, 121 Laney, Leroy, 74, 332, 356 Laxalt, Paul, 166 Lee, T., 147, 150 Lindley, James Thomas, 254,

274 Linkages, 13-5 Liquidationist School, 48, 94--

100 Lombra, Raymond, 30, 217,

256,275,285,300,324, 358

Luckett, Dudley, 31, 130, 148, 196,217

MacRae, Duncan, 30, 74 Maisel, Sherman, 36, 58-9, 74,

115, 158, 162, 193, 221, 226,243

Margin Interview, 37, 74, 117 Martin, Preston, 166, 285 Martin, William McChesney,

18, 35-37, 106, 118, 158-9, 302

Mayer, Thomas, 27, 217, 222,

366 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY

243, 322, 323, 333, 334, 358

McAdoo, William, 85 McCabe, Thomas, 52, 105,

108-9, 158 McCracken, Paul, 60, 266 McCubbins, Matthew, 226, 243 McGregor, Rob, 127, 139, 147,

300, 322, 356 McKinney, Marie, 64, 74,

163-4, 193 Mellon, Andrew, 45-6, 85, 87,

89, 255, 272-3 Meltzer, Allan H., 130 Meyer, Eugene, 49, 93, 95 Miller, Aldoph, 47, 84, 88, 90,

94 Miller, G. William, 18, 61-5,

118, 163-5, 302 Miller, Paul, 302 MISERY index, 206-15 Monetary excesses: institution-

al defenses against, 340-44 Monetary history: importance

0~ 157,170,342-3 Monetary institutions: impor­

tance of, 157, 170, 342-3 Monetary policy: activism, 54-

6, 346-7 Monetary policy: and material­

ism, 354-5 Monetary policy: and redistri­

butive policy, 12-14, 58-61, 63,67-8, 336-7

Monetary policy: as a morality play, 339

Monetary policy: costs of, 326-39

Monetary policy: costs of in­flation, 108,326-32

Monetary policy: costs of lob­bying, 338

Monetary policy: costs of mo­nitoring, 338

Monetary policy: costs of sig­naling,338

Monetary policy: costs of threats, 224-5, 338

Monetary policy: credibility, 33

Monetary policy: denial as de­fense mechanism, 333

Monetary policy: during great depression, 93-108

Monetary policy: erosion of safeguards over monetary excess, 340-4

Monetary policy: measurement of private influences up­on, 257-270

Monetary policy: misdirection, 337-40

Monetary policy: neoclassical criticism of, 19-20, 346-8

Monetary policy: obfuscation, 333

Monetary policy: politicization of, 12-15, 340-3

Monetary policy: power of ap­pointment, 239-40, 286-88, 340

Monetary policy: pressures on 1914-1939,44-49,81-104

Monetary policy: private non­banking influences upon, 252,270-3

Index

Monetary policy: projection as defense mechanism, 333

Monetary policy: psychopa­thology of, 332-6

Monetary policy: public choice approach, , 336-7

Monetary policy: rational exp­ectations criticism of, 348

Monetary policy: responsive­ness during transitions to new Administration, 118-120, 157-8

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to banking industry signaling by Chairmen, 261-5

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to ease and tightness signaling, 127-29, 131-39, 174-80, 257-70

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to F AC index, 257-70

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to signaling in gener­al, 30, 119-20, 155-58, 251-56

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to signaling under different Administrations, 129-39, 174-80

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to signaling under different Chairman, 132-39, 158-69

Monetary policy: responsive­ness to threat-augmented signaling, 173-80

Monetary policy: rules vs. dis-

367

cretion, 104, 346-8 Monetary policy: selective re­

sponsiveness to signaling, 134-9, 169-181

Monetary policy: signaling by source and by Administra­tion, 130-2, 174-80

Monetary policy: symbioses, 60,63

Monetary policy: targeting procedures, 197-201

Monetary policy: telegraphed by Chairman, 228-32

Monetary policy: time lags in response to signaling, 121

Monetary policy: uncertainity, 337-40

Monetary policy: under Bush Administration, 68-9, 175-77

Monetary policy: under Carter Administration, 61-5, 160-3, 175-77

Monetary policy: under Eisen­hower Administration, 55-6

Monetary policy: under Ford Administration, 61-5, 130, 160-63, 175, 178

Monetary policy: under John­son Administration, 57-60, 175

Monetary policy: under Ken­nedy Administration, 56-59, 158

Monetary policy: under Nixon Administration, 60-2, 15-9-60, 175-7

368 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY

Monetary policy: under Rea­gan Administration, 65-9, 175-177

Monetary policy reforms: bases for, 344-7

Monetary policy reforms: cen­tral bank autonomy, 351-2

Monetary policy reforms: in­centives, 224, 351-4

Monetary policy reforms: len­gthening Chairman's term, 352-4

Monetary policy reforms: pra­cticable vs. radical, 224, 348-9

Monetary policy reforms: pri­vate sector influences, 272-3

Montagu, Norman, 46 Moran, Mark, 226, 238, 243 Moran, Michael, 30, 300 Morgenthau, Henry, 51, 103-4 Multicollinearity, 123 Murray, Alan, 16, 27, 289, 323,

358 National Association of Busi­

ness Economists, 273 National Monetary Commision,

82 Neal, Walter, 349 Neoclassical criticisms of mon­

etary policy activism, 239-40,286-88,348

Net threats: as a dependent variable, 110, 213-S

Net threats: measurement of, 170-3

Net threats: to Fed powers,

110, 38-39, 155-7, 169, 182

New Deal, SO-l, 100-4 New Frontier, 13, SS-1 Newton, Maxwell, 36, 39, 74,

129, 148 Nonstationarity, 122 Nordhaus, William, 30, 74, 148 Office of Management and the

Budget, 37, 39, 68 Open Market Investment Com­

mittee, SO, 89, 91 Open Market Policy Confer­

ence, 91 Operation Twist, 56-57, 120,

158 Parkin, Michael, 332, 356 Patman, Wright, 54, 109-11,

157. 256, 351 Peg, The, Sl-53, 104-7 Persson, Torsten, 343, 358 Pierce, James, 74, 226, 242 Poterba, James, 31, 73 Political Business Cycle, 30,

124, 209 Political versus nonpolitical

appointees to the Federal Reserve, 82-6, 103-S, 289, 294-7,341, 349-Sl

Poole, William, 30, 74, 346, 358 Potts, Glenn, 31, 130, 148, 196,

217 Power of appointment to the

Federal Reserve (See Ap­pointments to Federal Reserve)

Power of appointment to the Federal Reserve: as an

Index

alternative to signaling, 21-22,207-212,286-8, 340

Price level stability goal for monetary policy, 88, 348--50

Progressivism, 83, 104 Proxmire, William, 110, 163,

166 Psychopathology of monetary

policy, 332-6 Psychopathology of monetary

policy: denial, , 333 Psychopathology of monetary

policy: obfuscation, , 333 Psychopathology of monetary

policy: projection, , 333 Puckett, Richard, 130, 148 Quadriad, 56, 104 Rational expectations criticism

of monetary policy, 327, 347

Reaction functions: difficult to fit for the eighties, 212-5

Reaction functions: estimation of, 124-6, 195-200

Reaction functions: interpreta­tion of, 196-200

Reaction functions: shifts in, 119-20, 157-9, 197

Reaction functions: stability of, 34, 228

Real Bills Doctrine, 48-9, 88, 119

REAL RATE index, 206-15 Reconstruction Finance Corpo­

ration, 99 Regan, Donald, 68, 204

369

Regime changes, 119-20, 157-8 Reserve Banks, 1-5, 46-7, 89-

104 Reuber, G.L., 196, 217 Reuss, Henry, 110, 166 Riefler, Winfield, 52, 106 Rist, Charles, 90 Robertson, Ross M., 274 Rose, R., 358 Rose, Sanford, 75 Roos, Lawrence, 286 Roosa, Robert V., 56 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 48-9,

97, 100-4 Sachs, Jeffery, 322 SAFER index (See also Signal­

ing/ Administration) SAFER index: absolute value

of, 206-15 SAFER index: construction of,

117-18 SAFER index: influence on

FOMC voting, 301 Sapp, Robert, 193, 217 Sargent, Thomas, 328, 358 Schacht, Hjalmar, 90 Schirm, David, 254, 274 Schmitter, P., 329, 359 Schneider, Friedrich, 72 Schorr, Juliet, 332, 357 Schultz, Charles, 64 Schwartz, Anna, 30, 45, 94-8,

108, 132 Schwartz, Thomas, 226, 242 Schweitzer, Robert, 15, 27, 73,

193,217,242,252,274, 287. 295, 323, 341

Seger, Martha, 37, 166, 307

370 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY

Separation of powers and mon-etary policy, 88-9, 350

Sickles, Robin, 196, 216 Signaling (See also SAFER) Signaling/ Administration, by

Administration, 129-39, 174-180

Signaling/ Administration: alte­natives, 286-87

Signaling/ Administration: by source, 130-32

Signaling/ Administration: costs of, 202-205, 286, 338

Signaling/ Administration: model of, 204-6,

Signaling/ Administration: non-responsiveness during transition to new Admin­istration, 119-20, 157-8

Signaling/ Administration: re­sponse to ease and tight­ness, 127-29, 131-9, 174-80

Signaling/ Administration: se­lective responsiveness to, 134-9, 169-81

Signaling/ Administration: shifts in, 200

Signaling/ Administration: threat-augmented, 173-82

Signaling/ Administration: time lags in monetary policy response to, 121

Signaling/ Administration: time trends in, 200-1

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Bush Administration, 68-9, 175, 203-4

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Carter Administration, '61-5, 175-5,202-4

Signaling/ Administration: un­der different Chairmen, 132-9

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Eisenhower Adminis­tration, 55-6, 204

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Ford Administration, 61-5, 175-7

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Johnson Administra­tion, 57-60, 175, 202, 204

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Kennedy Administra­tion, 56-59

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Nixon Administration, 60-2, 175-7' 203

Signaling/ Administration: un­der Reagan Administra­tion, 65-9, 175, 177

Signaling/ Administration: sources within, 130-32,

Signaling/banking industry, 258-65

Signaling/banking indus try: Fed Responsiveness to ease and tightness signal­ing by, 260-1

Signaling/banking industry: selective responsiveness to, 262-4

Signaling/banking industry: under different Chairmen, 261-5

Index

Signaling/Congressional, 232-41

Signaling/Congressional: mea­surement of, 222, 228-40

Signaling/Congressional: re-sponses to, 232-40

Snyder, John, 52 SOMC index, 268-70 Sprinkel, Beryl, 65, 68 Sproul, Allan, 52, 105 Steagall, Henry, 102-3 Stockman, David, 165 Strong, Benjamin, 29, 45-7, 85,

87. 88-99, 97 Strong, James G., 81 Sullivan, Mark, 97 Supply-Side Coup, 64, 119,

166, 200-4, 306 Supply-Side: opposition to

Volcker, 166-7 Supply-Side: Republican ease

oriented Tabellini, Guido, 343, 358 Taft, William Howard, 83 Targets of monetary policy,

197-201 Taylor, John, 33, 75, 330, 359 Temin, Peter, 95, 98, 115 Thaler, R.H., 329, 357 Thomas, Senator, 49 THREAT index: construction

of, 170-3 THREAT index: influence on

FOMC voting, 30 I THREAT index: influence on

monetary policy, 17 3-182 Threats to Fed powers, 38-39 Timberlake, Richard, 15, 27,

51, 75, 104-5, 115, 358 Time lags, see Lags

371

Tootell, Geoffrey, 297, 394 Treasury: debt refunding, 46,

51-3, 104-7 Treasury: interaction with

Federal Reserve, 39, 46, 51-3, 104-7

Truman, Harry, I 05-6 Tufte, Edward, 75 Type II error, 233 Unreliable appointees, 202-

203, 207-12, 297-300 Vencil, Daniel, 36, 68, 158-9,

193 Volcker, Paul, 18, 35-36, 83,

111, 118, 166-8, 285 Volcker, Paul: appointment to

Federal Reserve, 306 Volcker, Paul: defender of Fed

prerogatives, 38-39, 165, 181-2

Volcker, Paul: partisan loyalist vs. sound money devotee, 166-9, 181-2, 262-4

Wagner, Richard, 55 Wahar, Mark, 356 Wallace, Neil, 328, 358 Waller, Christopher, 304, 324 Wallich, Henry, 285, 290, 324 Warburg, Paul, 46, 84, 89 Waud, Roger N., 31, 72, 196-7 Weidenbaum, Murray, 65, 165 Weingast , Barry, 226, 238,

243, 303 Weintraub, Robert E., 31, 35,

75, 161-2, 226, 243 Weist, Philip, 196, 216

372 THE PRESSURES ON AMERICAN MONETARY POLICY

Wells, Wyatt, 36, 61-3, 66, 75, 111, 116, 194,203,217

Wheeler, Burton, 49, 100 Wheelock, David C., 90, 94, 96,

98-9, 116 Whittlesey, C.R., 275 Wicker, Elmus, 75, 91, 96, 99,

116 Willett, T., 74, 324, 332, 356 Williams, John S., 87 Wilmerding, Lucius, 81 Wilson, Woodrow, 10, 29, 83-5,

254 Winston, Garrad, 46 Witte, William, 285, 323, 324,

358 Wood, John H., 196,217, 305,

324 Woolley, John T., 12, 27, 30,

31,36,75,116,225-6, 243, 251, 253, 255, 275, 286, 289, 324, 359

Wright, James, 166 Yeager, Leland, 330, 358 Yohe, William, 254, 274 Young,Roy,46,94,96