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1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1099 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 6474 of 2016) TEESTA ATUL SETALVAD …Appellant(s) :Versus: THE STATE OF GUJARAT Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1083 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6477 of 2016) JAVED IFTEKHER AHMED ANAND …Appellant(s) :Versus: THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s) AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1084 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6476 of 2016) CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE & PEACE …Appellant(s) :Versus: THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s) AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1085 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6475 of 2016) SABRANG TRUST …Appellant(s) :Versus: THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1099 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 6474 of 2016)

TEESTA ATUL SETALVAD …Appellant(s)

:Versus:

THE STATE OF GUJARAT …Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1083 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6477 of 2016)

JAVED IFTEKHER AHMED ANAND …Appellant(s)

:Versus:

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1084 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6476 of 2016)

CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE & PEACE …Appellant(s)

:Versus:

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1085 OF 2017 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.6475 of 2016)

SABRANG TRUST …Appellant(s)

:Versus:

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …Respondent(s)

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J U D G M E N T

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

1. The common question posed in these appeals centres around

the sweep, purport and applicability of Section 102 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”),

which reads thus:

“102. Power of police officer to seize certain property.-

(1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. (2) Such police officer, if subordinate to the officer in charge of a police station, shall forthwith report the seizure to that officer. (3) Every police officer acting under sub-section (1) shall forthwith report the seizure to the Magistrate having jurisdiction and where the property seized is such that it cannot be conveniently transported to the Court or where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation for the custody of such property, or where the continued retention of the property in police custody may not be considered necessary for the purpose of investigation, he may give custody thereof to any person on his executing a bond undertaking to produce the property before the Court as and when required and to give effect to the further orders of the Court as to the disposal of the same. Provided that where the property seized under sub-section (1) is subject to speedy and natural decay

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and if the person entitled to the possession of such property is unknown or absent and the value of such property is less than five hundred rupees, it may forthwith be sold by auction under the orders of the Superintendent of Police and the provisions of sections 457 and 458 shall, as nearly as may be practicable, apply to the net proceeds of such sale.”

2. The bank accounts, in all nine, of the appellants have been

seized on the instructions of the Investigating Officer as a sequel to

the complaint filed by the members of Gulberg Co-Operative

Housing Society, registered by D.C.P. Police Station, bearing CR

No.1/2014, on 14th January, 2014 for offence punishable under

Sections 406, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section

72A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The bank accounts

were seized and intimation in that behalf was given to the

concerned Magistrate on 21st January, 2014. The appellants filed a

petition before the Bombay High Court, being Writ Petition

(Criminal) No.173/2014, for quashing of the FIR and for setting

aside the freezing order which, however, was rejected on 4th

November, 2014 with liberty to the appellants to approach the

jurisdictional court. Against the said decision the appellants

preferred special leave petition before this Court, being Special

Leave Petition (Criminal) No.3330/2014, which was allowed to be

withdrawn on 5th May, 2014 with liberty to the appellants to move

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before the Competent Authority. The appellants then filed Special

Criminal Application No.2710/2014 before the High Court of

Gujarat at Ahmedabad. That application was, however, withdrawn

on 29th September, 2014 with liberty to approach the concerned

Magistrate for appropriate relief.

3. The appellants thereafter moved formal applications before the

Metropolitan Magistrate’s Court at Ahmedabad, being

Miscellaneous Application Nos.175-178/2014 which were dismissed

by common order dated 28th November, 2014 passed by Additional

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad. Aggrieved, the

appellants filed four separate revision applications before the High

Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, bearing Criminal Revision

Application Nos.249-252 of 2015. While the said revision

applications were pending, the anticipatory bail application filed by

the appellants in connection with the alleged offence came to be

rejected by the High Court by a speaking order dated 12th February,

2015. That order has been challenged by way of Special Leave

Petition (Criminal) No.1512/2015 which has been converted into

Criminal Appeal No.338/2015 and is pending for consideration by a

larger Bench in terms of order dated 19th March, 2015. The

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appellants have been given interim protection of stay of arrest

during the pendency of the said appeal.

4. The other relevant fact to be noted is that additional offences

have been added to the FIR in relation to which the bank account

freezing directions were issued by the Investigating Officer,

punishable under Sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code

(“IPC”). Besides, the Competent Authority under the Foreign

Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976 issued orders on 23rd July,

2015, categorising the authorization in respect of Citizens for

Justice and Peace Trust (“CJP Trust”, appellant in Criminal Appeal

No.1084/2017), as “prior permission”. In so far as the Sabrang

Trust (appellant in Criminal Appeal No.1085/2017), vide order

dated 9th September, 2015 the Competent Authority suspended its

authorisation. It is also relevant to note that FIR has been

registered by the Competent Authority of CBI in respect of violation

of Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 1976. On 8th July, 2015

the appellants have been granted anticipatory bail in respect of the

said offence.

5. Be that as it may, the criminal revision applications preferred

by the appellants before the High Court of Gujarat, challenging the

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order dated 28th November, 2014 passed by the Magistrate rejecting

the prayer for lifting of the bank account freezing, were finally heard

and dismissed vide common judgment dated 6th/7th October, 2015.

This order is the subject matter of the present appeals. In other

words, the limited issue to be addressed in the present appeals is

about the justness of the action of the Investigating Officer of

freezing of stated bank accounts of the appellants in connection

with FIR registered as CR No.1/2014; and the correctness of the

approach of the Magistrate in rejecting the request for de-freezing

the bank accounts of the appellants as affirmed by the High Court

vide impugned judgment.

6. The genesis of the freezing of the bank accounts of the

appellants is the registration of the FIR bearing CR No.1/2014 on

4th January, 2014. The same reads as follows:

“First Information Report of Offence under police Jurisdiction

(under Sec.154 of Cr.P.C)

1. Dist. Ahmedabad Po.St. D.C.P. Year-2014.

First Information no. I CR No.01/2014 Dt.4/1/2014.

2. Law

(1) IPC sec.406, 420, 120(B) and The I.T. Act. 72(A)

(2) ---

(3) ---

3. (A) Date of offence occurred and date:- year

from 2007 to till today.

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(B) Date declared of offence (Po.St.) :- 4/1/14

Time:-14:15

(C) Station diary entry no. 07/2014 Time : 14:15

4. How got information :- Oral or writing :- Writing.

5. Offence place :

(A) Distance of offence from po.st. and direction.

Beat no. / Chawky name…:-

(B) Address :- Gulberg Society, Meghani Nagar,

Ahmedabad and by the interest

(C) If the offence has occurred outside the police

station then name of that police station….:-

6. Complaint / Information :-

(A) Name : Firozkhan

(B) Name of Father : Saeed Khan Pathan

(C) Birth Date/Year : ………………

(D) Nationality : Indian

(E) Passport No………….. Dt. ……………

(F) Occupation : Business

(G) Address : 15, Shukan Residency, 2nd floor,

Opp. Sonal Cinema, Vejalpur Road, Ahmedabad City.

7. Name, Add and details of Accused :-

(1) Teesta Setalvad Resi. Nirant, Juhu Tara

Road, Mumbai

(2) Javed Anand (Husband) Resi. Nirant, Juhu

Tara Road, Mumbai

(3) Tanveer Jafri

(4) Chairman of G.B.Soc. Salim Sandhi.

(5) Secretary of G.B.Soc. Firoz Gulzar M.Pathan

and others who come out after inquiry.

8. Reason for late information :-

9. Narration of Property if lost or theft

10. Total price of theft

11. Accident (if death) death :- ……

12. Details of 1st Information :- ………

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The facts of this case are such that as mentioned on

above date, time and place, the accused named in

had conspired and exhibited the photographs and

video of Gulberg Society and other affected areas

and the accused had put up on the CJP and

Sabrang‟s websites with the help of internet against

the wishes of the complainant and on the website

appealed wealthy people to deposit donation in the

CJP‟s IDBI bank account as well as Union Bank of

India Account of Sabrang and thereby obtained

deposits of crores of rupees and used the money for

personal use by diverting in different institutions

with one/same address thereby indulging in wrong

activities in the name of religion and used Rs.

1,51,00,000/- for personal use between 2009 and

2011 thereby committed breach of trust & cheated

the victims by using internet.

13. Details of act done after registration of the

offence:-

Dtd. 04/01/2014

My name is Firozkhan Saeedkhan Pathan, Aged 41,

Business. Re.15, Shukun Residency, 2nd Floor, Opp.

Sonal Cinema, Vejalpur Road, Ahmedabad City (M)

9974240961.

On being asked personally, I am giving this

complaint that I am residing at the above mentioned

address with my family since 2004 and own a Relief

Cyber Café at Relief Road.

In the year 2002, I was residing in Bungalow No. 18,

at Gulbarg Society, Chamanpura, Omnagar Road at

Meghaninagar, with my family at the time of Godhra

Riots. This bungalow was in the name of my uncle

Anwarkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan. In this bungalow

the nominee was my aunt Jetunbibi Anwarkhan

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Pathan. But this massacre time my elder father

Anwarkhan Ahmedkhan Pathan was killed. Thus,

this bungalow is on the name of his wife Jetunbibi

Anwarkhan Pathan who was residing there. This

bungalow no. 18 was three storied. On the ground

floor in two rooms my elder uncle Anwarkhan

A.Pathan and his wife were lived. And other two

rooms my younger uncle Rashidkhan A.Pathan and

his wife Jamilabanu and my grandmother

Kherunnisha A. Pathan lived in it. On the Second

floor two rooms where my uncle Anwarkhan‟s son

Asiamkhan A.Pathan and his wife Suraiya and their

son Azar lived. And in other two rooms my elder

father Anwarkhan‟s younger son Akhtar Khan A.

Pathan and his wife Sajedabanu and their son

Sadab and daughter Farin resided. On the third

floor, I myself, my father and my mother Jehunnissa

and my younger brother Imtiyazkhan Saeedkhan

Pathan were residing. In the year 2002, after

Godhra incident, our Gulbarg Society too was burnt

by anti-social elements and 68 persons killed

including my grand mother Kherunnisha A. Pathan

Aged 80 and my uncle Anwarkhan A. Pathan Aged

70, my mother Johurannisha Saeedkhan Pathan

aged 57, my uncle‟s wife Jamilabanu Rashidkhan

Pathan aged 45 and my elder father Anwarkhan‟s

son Akhtarkhan A. Pathan and his wife Sahedabanu

Akhtarkhan and his son Sadabkhan A.Pathan. We

lived at Dariyakhan Ghummat, Shahibaug relief

camp for three months. At that time Raiskhan

Azizkhan Pathan and Teesta Setawad met us and

told that they run one NGO and had taken an

interview. They told that they would publish the

interview in their magazine namely Communalism

Combat and would help you economically and legally

and also assured of help whenever needed. I did not

know Raiskhan and Teesta Setalwad before this

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time. After that, we have taken a flat on rent at

Rakhial and live there for one year, and then, in the

year 2004, we lived in a flat which on rent, at

Juhapura for one and half year. And after that we

lived in Ambar tower flat No.28, taken on rent and

lived for one and half year there. After that in the

2007 lived in Firozalla, Nr. Vejalpur and then in the

2010, we shifted 15, Shukun Residency, 2nd floor,

Opp. Sonal Cinema, Vejalpur with my family. After

Godhra Riots, we organized programme for paying

our tribute to our departed souls at Gulbarg Society

on the 28th Feb every year and read Quran there. At

this time, one NGO CJP‟s Ms. Setalvad arrived from

Mumbai assured support in the Gulberg Society‟s

case. This Teesta Setalvad helped us till the trial

went on. She helped us only for the trial case and

not economically.

Then in the year 2007, Teesta Setalvad‟s man one

Raiskhan A. Pathan, resident of Mumbai and at

present residing in Ajit mill compound, Ajit Residency

flat, at Rakhial. They told us that we lived in a

rental house and are tired of paying rent since 2002.

So, went to sell Gulbarg Society, then Raiskhan told

us that he has to talk with her and then reply us.

After some time we the members of society were

went at M.M. Tirmizi‟s office which is at Mirzapur

and arranged a meeting there. In this meeting,

Gulbarg Society members, Raiskhan Pathan, Teesta

Setalwad and M.M. Tirmizi were present. When

Raiskhan told Teesta Setalvad that the members of

the Gulbarg Society wanted to sell their houses, she

got angry at Raiskhan and told us that we all should

not indulge in selling the society and informed that

she would handle it in her own way and asked

Raiskhan to leave the office. Thereafter Ms. Setalvad

organised a meeting of the members of the society

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and informed chairman, secretary to make a survey

of Then a matting held the members of the society

and told that chairman and secretary surveyed the

society and expressed her wish to make a museum

at this place. I will pay you the value of your houses

within a month.

After this, in 2008, on 28.2.208, when all of us

members and residents of the Gulberg Society

gathered there to commemorate the dead, Teesta

Setalvad had also visited and held a meeting. At this

meeting affected persons following Godhra from

Naroda Gaam, Queishi Yunusmiya and Odh village‟s

Anwarmiyan and Saeed Radeeq Ahmed and Hasan

Khan Pathan and Yusuf Vora and Jaffer Khan

Pathan as also affected persons from Nroda Patiya,

Sardarpura, Visnagar (Deepda Darwaza), and

Pandharwada were also present at the meeting.

Every year since 2007 Teesta Setalvad held

meetings calling affected persons and media persons

and made CDs of the opinions of affected persons

and their plight and talked of making a museum

there. At this meeting, son of former MP Ahsan Jafri,

Tanvir Jafri was also there and spoke of putting a

statute of his father Ahsan Jafri and building a

Museum there.

Then on 28.2.2009, a meeting of the members and

residents of Gulberg society and other victims from

all over Gujarat and the media and other important

people was held when all members of the society

had told her that you had said in the 2007 meeting

that within a month we would be paid. Until now no

money has been paid. Hence pay us the money, we

said. She said that we are collecting funds and as

soon as funds are collected we will be paid, we were

informed. Then, in the years 2010 and 2011 again,

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on 28.2.2002, she organized functions when also

members had asked questions, but she had made

excused and not given the money.

On 28.2.2012, this Teesta Setalvad organised a

larger, well planed programme at Gulberg Society

where the affected persons of riots, media‟s persons

and Muslim leaders had gathered. At that time, all

over Gulberg society, photos of dead persons on a

Projector were shown. Banners displayed showed as

if the Museum had been created. A large stage was

made a Shobha Mudgal, a famous classical artist

was called and a programme was held. Members of

our society had opposed this and said that since you

had not given any monies to the members and falsely

projected that you had made a museum and collected

donations, since then, strong opposition between

society members and Teesta Setalvad began. Hence

Teesta Setalvad took Tanvir Jafri, and the Chairman

and the Secretary into her confidence and in a

confidential meeting resolved that any persons who

are members of the society could sell sale their

houses to any persons of their choice regardless of

caste or religion at the price of your choosing. Now

none of the built homes will be used by us for the

Museum. The resolution that was passed by which

other society members had opposed it. In our

opposition we had said that for 12 years since the

incident took place, and since 2007, you had on the

excuse of a Museum being built amassed crores of

rupees and this fund you did not use for the Society

or for riot victims, you have not paid any monies. You

have breached our trust and cheated us. Along with

this Teesta Setalvad and resident of Surat, Tanveer

Ahsan Hussain Jafri together, from 2007 to 2012

conducted programmes, made CDs and sent to her

sister, Nargis Jafri and his younger brother Zuber

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who lived in USA via email and through hard copies.

There, they organised seminars, showed CD‟s and

wrongfully collected funds and collected crores of

rupees for this. At these seminars, now and then,

Teesta Setalvad, Tanveer Jafri, as also their persons,

Father Cedric Prakash and R.B. Shree Kumar (Retd.

D.G.P.) had visited America.

This Teesta Setalvad and Tanveer Jafri and other

persons jointly planned a conspiracy of gathering

photos etc of affected persons of Gulberg Society and

other affected locations and displayed these on the

CJP and Sabrang website and on internet against

our desires.

Then the bank account numbers of the CJP. Institute

Bank A/c. in IDBI No.014104000204736 and the

Sabrang Bank Account @ Union Bank of India

No.369102010802885 were displayed on the

internet and appeals for the fund and crores of

rupees were collected in the bank accounts. This

fund was fraudulently used for their personal

expenses through the creation of different

organisations at the same address.

We got this information under an RTI application:-

that the CJP NGO had, from 2009 to 2011 had

collected Rs.63 (sixty-three) lakhs and the Sabrang

Trust had collected Rs.88 (eighty-eight) lakhs from

local and foreign countries. The members of these

trusts not amassed these funds through

misrepresentation but also used these funds for

personal reasons. These funds were not used for the

benefit of the members of Gulberg Society. Apart from

this also, crores of rupees have also been amassed

by them and used for personal reasons and

committed a breach of trust and cheating with

affected persons.

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Therefore, a complaint against Teesta Setalvad, her

husband Javed Anand, who both live at „Nirant‟

bungalow, Juhu Tara Road, Mumbai and Tanveer

Jafri, and Chairman of Gulberg Society, Salimbhai

Sandhi and Secretary Firoz Gulzar Mohammed

Pathan and others who may be involved after

investigations, this is my complaint for a detailed

and lawful investigation. The persons unknown are

named as etc. This complaint is true as per my

knowledge which has been read and understood by

me and thereafter signed. I have received a copy of

my complaint.

Sd-

(C.B.Gamit)

(P.S.I. Crime)

(S.O.G. Crime)

Ahmedabad City.

Sd- Asst.-

Adl. Chief Metro Magistrate Court-11 A‟bad.”

7. Simultaneously, with the registration of the aforementioned

FIR, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Cyber Cell, Crime

Branch, Ahmedabad issued instructions to the Union Bank of

India, Juhu Tara Branch, Mumbai and IDBI, Khar Branch, Mumbai

to seize the stated bank accounts pertaining to Sabrang Trust, CJP

Trust, Teesta Atul Setalvad and Javad Anand, appellants herein.

Intimation about the seizure of concerned bank accounts was given

to the concerned Magistrate on 21st January, 2014. On the

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applications for de-freezing of the concerned bank account filed

before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court No. XI, Ahmedabad, it was

mainly contended that - the Investigating Officer had failed to

comply with the mandate of Section 102 of Cr.P.C., by not

informing the Magistrate of the action of freezing of the accounts;

the Investigating Officer has not given prior notice to the account

holders before freezing of their bank accounts; the appellant CJP

Trust, in any case, is not named as accused in the alleged crime

and is not associated with the same in any manner; the concerned

Trust maintains proper accounts which are duly audited and there

is no trace of any illegality committed in respect of receipt and

expenditure; the contributions made by foreign fund is after due

approval of the Competent Authority; the attempt of freezing of the

bank accounts of the Trust and also personal accounts of the

Trustees, in particular private appellants, was motivated and an

attempt to stifle them from carrying on their social welfare

activities; the bank accounts had no causal connection with the

commission of alleged offence in respect of which investigation was

in progress and more so, not even one donor has come forward to

question the intention or activity of the concerned Trust. These

contentions have been duly considered by the Magistrate whilst

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rejecting the application submitted by the appellants for de-freezing

the accounts. The Magistrate took the view that the private

applicants were the Trustees of the Trusts whose bank accounts

have been seized and preliminary investigation revealed substantial

discrepancies in the accounts, including that the accounts of the

Trusts were not audited for the relevant period and the transactions

and huge withdrawals from the bank accounts raised suspicion

regarding the commission of the alleged offence. It is further held

that since the investigation was at the nascent stage and was in

progress and the private appellants were seemingly not cooperating

with the investigation, the prayer for lifting of seizure of the bank

accounts cannot be acceded to. Accordingly, the applications came

to be rejected vide a common order dated 28th November, 2014 by

the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.XI,

Ahmedabad.

8. Before the High Court, more or less similar arguments were

canvassed on behalf of the appellants. The High Court in paragraph

15 of the impugned judgment adverted to the gist of contentions

recorded by the Magistrate as under:

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“15. The questions which raised in the Lower Court, as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners, were (A) That seizer of accounts was illegal in absence of prior notice, (B) The action of freezing of accounts in absence required intimation to the Magistrate concerned was illegal, (C) The accounts could not have been freezed for all times to come and the object of the investigation could have been achieved by requiring the petitioners to execute a bond to compensate the State, if at all the case against the petitioners was made out, (D) Freezing of accounts could have been resorted only as a sequel to crime and not for the purpose of discovery of crime, (E) The accounts had nothing to do with proceeds of crime and therefore continued seizure was unnecessary. (F) That accounts were Foreign Contribution Regularization Accounts (FCRA) under the authorization of the Home Ministry, and therefore, local police had no authority to freeze them.”

9. The High Court then adverted to the arguments of the

appellants as advanced, in paragraphs 16 to 24. The first point was

about the absence of prior notice to the appellants before the

freezing of the bank accounts, which has been rejected following the

Bombay High Court Full Bench decision in the case of Vinoskumar

Ramachandran Valluvar V. The State of Maharashtra1. The

High Court then noted the contention of the appellants that the

Audit Reports of the accounts concerned were submitted to various

authorities, like Charity Commissioner, Home Ministry etc., who

1 (2011) Cri.L.J. 2522 (Bom.)

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neither raised any objection nor found any irregularity in the

accounts. Further, different contributories including Human

Resources Development Ministry, have contributed to the corpus of

the Trust and none of the contributors or donors have ever raised

any objection about the activities of the appellants. The High Court

also noted that even United Nations Organization was one of the

donors. For obtaining donations from the said organizations, strict

procedure and formalities are required to be complied with and

have been so complied with and only thereafter the donation

amount has been released. The concerned authorities did not find

any irregularities in the transactions in question. It was then

contended that freezing of accounts cannot be for indefinite period.

The appellants can be allowed to operate the accounts upon

execution of a bond and that would subserve the interest of justice.

The appellants also contended that the accounts were re-audited by

the Chartered Accountants and no irregularity or illegality has been

found during the said re-audit. In case there is any illegality or

irregularity, the same can be deciphered by examining the entries in

the books of accounts and the vouchers in the relevant documents

which are already furnished to the Investigating Agency. It was

contended that freezing of the accounts of the Trust, in particular,

19

operated for receiving donations under the FCRA, was motivated

and to completely paralyse the working of the

Trust. It was contended that there can be no presumption that the

use of the funds from the accounts in question was not for private

purpose. It was also contended that the appellants and their

chartered accountants and auditors were extending full cooperation

with the investigation. The principal argument of the appellants was

that the power under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. could not have been

exercised as no material was produced by the investigating

authority to support the fact that the property in question was

parted with to indicate the commission of alleged offence of cheating

or breach of trust or for that matter forgery of the record. These

contentions were countered by the respondents. The High Court

then considered the relevant material placed on record and the

affidavits filed by the investigating authority highlighting the

suspicious transactions done from the stated bank accounts and

the conduct of the appellants, including the incorrect statements

made by the appellants on oath in the proceedings before the Court

regarding the maintenance of the accounts of the two Trusts. The

High Court also adverted to the decision of the coordinate Bench

while rejecting the anticipatory bail application preferred by the

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appellants and inference drawn in support of the conclusion as to

why the prayer for anticipatory bail should be rejected. The same

has been extracted in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the impugned

judgment, which read thus:

“37. From the aforestated facts this Court drew following inference thus: „Thus, from the above, it is evident that the accounts were also not audited for a long period of time, and it is only when the FIR was registered wherein serious allegations of misappropriation of lacs of rupees have been alleged that all of a sudden the accounts from April, 2003 to March, 2008 were got audited in the year 2014. 38. On the basis of the facts available on record as aforestated, this Court assigned the reasons as to why custodial investigation was necessary; they were as under: (a) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and CJP, a total amount of Rs.1,69,84,669=00 have been transferred to the Sabrang Communication & Publishing Pvt Ltd, a company owned by the petitioners. (b) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and of CJP, an amount of Rs.46,91,250=00 and Rs.28,34,804=00 were transferred to the personal accounts of the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 respectively. (c) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and CJP, the petitioners have withdrawn Rs.1,08,73,782=00 as cash.

21

(d) From the accounts of the Sabrang Trust and CJP, the petitioners have paid Rs.29,66,121=00 towards Credit Card payments. (e) The petitioners have endeavored to explain the credit card payment running into lakhs of rupees by stating that all such personal expenditure were repaid to the NGO Page 40 of 48 HC-NIC Page 40 of 48 Created On Fri May 06 16:33:26 IST 2016 R/CR.RA/249/2015 JUDGMENT accounts. This employment of public donations to personal use needs to be investigated. The petitioners have not submitted any debit/ credit vouchers and/or cheques details to prove their statement. (f) Upon scrutiny of the saving accounts Nos.014104000142595 & 014104000142601 of the petitioner nos. 1 & 2 with the IDBI, Mumbai, it was noticed that both the accounts were opened on 30.04.2005. The FCRA permission from MHA for CJP and Sabrang Trust was granted in November, 2007. Proposal to purchase the Gulbarg Society was mooted by petitioner no.1 orally in December, 2007 and formally in January, 2008, Resolution was passed by the society accepting her proposal in June, 2008 and thereafter the advertisements commenced and monies started pouring in. Further no substantial income of any nature, except from the CJP and Sabrang Trust, is noticed in both the above mentioned personal accounts of the petitioners, which were further invested in fixed deposits, shares and mutual funds such as ICICI Prudential, Reliance Capital, Kotak Mahindra, Franklin Templeton etc. (g) The donations received by the Sabrang Trust and CJP are utilized for personal purposes. (h) Receipt of donations to the tune of Rs.29,20,000=00 from Ashoka Foundation, Arlington, USA, in the personal accounts of Ms. Setalvad and Rs.6,05,442=00 as foreign remittance in Ms. Setalvads personal account.

22

(i) Monthly withdrawal of salary by both the accused from all the six accounts of CJP, Sabrang Trust and Sabrang Communications. It also appears that the custodial interrogation is necessary for the following reasons : 1. The case of the prosecution is based on cogent documentary evidence received from the Charity Commissioner, Mumbai, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, various Banks, etc. Financial details received from these authorities require detailed investigation. 2. The petitioners have never remained present before any investigating agency and have employed every means to avoid the due process of law. The petitioners seek to avoid custodial interrogation by the investigating authorities by dismissing cogent documentary evidence as accounting jugglery. Approximately 44% of the total donations received in the Sabrang Trust and approximately 35% of the total donations received in the CJP, were transferred to their personal accounts. 3. Cash withdrawal running into over Rs 1.09 crore need to be further scrutinized and examined wherein Rs.50,000=00 to Rs.5,00,000=00 have been withdrawn as cash on a single day. 4. Credit card details received from the UBI and Citi Bank revealed expenditure of purely personal nature running into lacs of rupees being serviced from the CJP and Sabrang Trust accounts through cheques signed by the petitioners.”

23

10. After having noticed the relevant material, the High Court

proceeded to consider the contentions germane for answering the

issue regarding de-freezing of the bank accounts and answered in

the following words:

“39. This Court is conscious of the fact that question of custodial investigation is not under consideration. The endeavour of the Court is to point out material in possession of the investigating agency in relation to the accounts in question and the conduct of the petitioners. It is required to be noted that the affidavit-in-reply, in the same terms as in the aforestated bail applications, has been filed by the State in these petitions also. From the aforestated

facts, it cannot be disputed that the investigating

agency has in its possession a considerable

material entitling it to freeze the accounts of the

petitioners under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. The power to seize the tainted property or the property which is doubted as tainted, on the basis of substantial material under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. is not in dispute. It is also settled legal position that the investigating agency, while investigating the matter, is the master of its case; the Courts would be loath to interfere in the investigation in absence of serious irregularity or illegality aimed at mala fide impairing the right of the accused rather than serving public interest. It may be true that the action of the investigating agency at the inception may not be regular, but the Court cannot be oblivious to the collection of substantial material by the investigating agency justifying the action under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, it is insignificant at this stage,

when the investigation has progressed to a

material point, to ponder around the question as

to whether the act of freezing the accounts was a

sequel to crime or the crime was detected later. If

24

the arguments to that effect advanced by the

learned counsel for the petitioners is accepted at

this stage, it would advance the public injustice

rather than serving the ends of justice. De-freezing

accounts on the basis of such arguments, may

paralyze the investigation, which cannot be

approved as an act ‘in the interest of justice.’ 40. Having found the aforestated serious material against the petitioners, it cannot be said that the execution of the bond by the petitioners is a suitable alternative. Securing the public interest rather than money is the central point of consideration when theft or manipulation of accounts meant for the beneficiaries, is alleged. It is rightly contended by the learned Public Prosecutor that when the investigating agency is wanting to ascertain the extent of the tainted accounts, and when on the basis of material, the whole corpus of the accounts is under the cloud of doubt, at this stage, mere execution of bond is not going to serve the purpose of law. 41. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted in the affidavit-in-rejoinder in Para 5.2, that the petitioners have controverted the facts as regards non-auditing of accounts by the petitioners for a continuous period of six years or so as alleged by the State with appropriate material. That is not the only

question on which the investigation is based as

indicated in detail. Irrespective of the accounts

being audited or not, serious discrepancies have

been noticed by the Court in the audited accounts

submitted to the Charity Commissioner and in the

bank statements etc. It is apparent from the

affidavit-in-reply filed by the State that they have

noticed and compared various entries in the

audited accounts with the statements of the bank

accounts. Further, this is not a stage where the

Court will appreciate the case as if in a trial. The question is whether there is a material with the investigating agency justifying freezing of accounts under Section 102. The purpose of Section 102 obviously is to find out the truth after noticing the

25

material raising doubt about the commission of offence. At this stage, it is not incumbent upon the investigating agency to justify the material as if in a trial and it would be suffice for it to justify the material for the purpose of investigation. If justifiable

material for investigation is available, the Court

would not sit in appeal over such justification, as

investigation is in the absolute domain of the

investigating agency, and as pointed out earlier,

the Court may interfere only in exception

circumstances.

42. As indicated above, prima facie the entire accounts are in serious clouds of doubt, and therefore, freezing thereof could be the only remedy with the investigating agency. The law must be allowed to take its own course, even at the cost of causing inconvenience to the accused or others, and therefore, the petitioners cannot be heard to complain that the consequence of legal action has translated into paralyzing its activities. 43. It is also rightly contended by the learned

Public Prosecutor that arguments of the learned

counsel for the petitioners justifying the

transactions or offering justification as to certain

entries are more in the nature of defence than valid

arguments at this stage. Such facts are required to be considered at this stage by the investigating agency on cooperation of the petitioners, and later, in the trial, if at all the case is found against the petitioners by the investigating agency for trial, and if the cognizance of the offence as alleged is taken by the competent Court. Therefore, arguments that the trusts are registered under the FCRA 1976, and that it has various reputed contributors or the donors including the Human Resources Development Ministry or that the trusts have avowed objects of brining about the communal harmony and helping the victim and providing legal aid to them must fail.

26

44. The arguments impugning the freezing of the accounts under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. without notice to the petitioners are to be noted for rejection for the simple reason that the Section 102 does not contemplate issuance of any such notice, and for the purpose of investigation, no notice to the suspect can be expected under the law. Section 102 of Cr.P.C. is an important step towards investigation and in view of settled legal position that accused cannot have any say in investigation, notice to the suspect is out of question. The intention of the investigating agency is not required to be revealed to the suspect at that crucial stage, else, a message of alert would be received by the suspect creating a huge room for manipulation and or destruction of evidence. 45. It is noticed from the impugned order that the notice of the seizure or freezing of the accounts or its intimation was sent to the competent magistrate, and therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners has fairly not pressed the said argument. 46. It is also misconceived to argue that the seizure in exercise of powers under Section 102 of Cr.P.C. would be valid only if the accounts in question contain the proceeds of crime. 47. There appears to be no substance in the argument that it is only Human Resources Development Ministry which can exercise power of freezing or seizing of the account. There is nothing in the language of any of the provisions of FCRA 1976 to infer any fetters on the powers of the police to investigate even those accounts in which the authorization to obtain the donation even from a foreign national is granted under the FCRA Act. No fetters, therefore can be read in the powers of investigating agency investigating the case under the Cr.P.C.

27

48. True it is that the learned Government Public

Prosecutor rightly concedes against perennial

freezing of accounts; however, it is for the

investigating agency, probably on conclusion of the

investigation to determine the extent of the

accounts tainted with crime and to De-freeze the

rest, if at all such Defreezing is warranted in the

facts and circumstances of the case. This issue can be answered from another angle as contended by the learned Public Prosecutor. If upon conclusion of the investigation, a part of accounts is found to be tainted, obviously it would amount to stolen property within the meaning of Section 410 of IPC, and in such an eventuality, by no stretch of imagination, a stolen property can be released before trial or acquittal of accused. 49. The argument as to applicability of the penal provisions invoked against the petitioners cannot be gone into at this stage when the investigation is at crucial point and the material in this regard is yet to be placed before the Court after conclusion of the investigation. In fact, in view of the settled legal position that accused has no role to play in the investigation except as indicated in Cr.P.C., the question as to applicability of a particular provision is required to be left to the discretion of the investigating agency and then to the Court as and when and if the report under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. is filed.”

11. In the present appeals, the appellants have largely reiterated

the stand taken in the proceedings before the Magistrate and the

High Court, wherefrom the present appeals have arisen. The

appellants contend that to justify the freezing of the bank accounts

the investigating authority must demonstrate that the monies held

28

in these accounts are connected with the commission of the offence.

The investigation of the alleged offence has been a roving one and

the police has investigated the entire accounts of the appellants

even beyond the period referred to in the FIR. Further, the seized

accounts have nothing to do with the subject matter of the FIR. CJP

Trust has no concern with the appeal made by the Sabrang Trust

on its website. The donations were invited by Sabrang Trust to be

deposited in its account displayed on the website. Notably, the

grants/donations made by the donors for executing specific projects

and the amounts were and still are supposed to be spent in

accordance with the agreements. The donors are private parties and

none of them has complained about the embezzlement of their

funds. The donors have been furnished with relevant information

and accounts concerning their donations. In the written

submissions filed by the appellants it is submitted that the

provisions of law sought to be invoked against the appellants and

the transactions in question must necessarily result in commission

of some offence by the appellants so as to invoke Section 102 of the

Code; whereas keeping in mind the ingredients of Sections 405 &

406, there is nothing to indicate that the said offence is made out

against the appellants. Only that private person who has

29

contributed can be heard to make grievance about entrustment and

criminal breach of trust. Not even one donor has come forward to

make such grievance. Similarly, the ingredients of offence of

cheating specified in Section 415 to be an offence under Section

420, required dishonest or fraudulent inducement of any person to

deliver any property to the accused. None of the donors have come

forward to make grievance in that behalf. It is submitted that it is

well settled that if the property is not suspected of commission of

offence, it cannot be seized under Section 102 of the Code. For, the

police officer can seize only such property which may be alleged or

suspected to have been alleged in the commission of offence.

Reliance has been placed on M.T. Enrica Lexie and Anr. v.

Doramma and Ors.2 and Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal

(II), T.N. v. State of T.N. and Ors.3 to contend that in the absence

of due procedure as specified by Section 102 of the Code, seizure of

bank accounts would be illegal and more so, when it has been done

to stifle all the activities of the Trust. The counsel for the appellants,

during the course of argument, had invited our attention to various

documents and also explained the entries relied upon by the

respondents, which according to the appellants was a tenuous plea

2 (2012) 6 SCC 760 3 (2005) 8 SCC 771

30

to link the stated bank accounts with the crime under

investigation. Details have been given in the written submission as

to how the entries in the books of accounts have been distorted and

misread by the respondents.

12. The respondents, on the other hand, submit that the

investigation is still in progress and the appellants have not given

full cooperation to the Investigating Officer. Rather, the appellants

have caused hurdles in the smooth progress of the investigation of

the alleged crime. The record would reveal that proper procedure for

seizure of the bank accounts was followed and that considering the

nature of allegations in the FIR and the material gathered during

the investigation thus far, would require elaborate investigation

with regard to the subject matter of the FIR. The High Court had

elaborately analysed the material on record while considering the

prayer for grant of anticipatory bail of the private appellants and

prima facie found substance in the allegations against the

appellants of misuse of funds received by them through various

donors and that the appellants were not ready and willing to

cooperate with the investigation. The respondents would submit

that since the investigation is in progress and the material already

gathered throws up circumstances which create suspicion of the

31

commission of the alleged offence, therefore it is imperative to

continue the seizure of bank accounts until it is necessary and till

the completion of the investigation. If the Investigating Officer

eventually finds that the accounts are not tainted with the crime, he

would not hesitate to defreeze the same or to exclude the untainted

amounts.

13. We have heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel along

with Ms. Aparna Bhat, appearing for the appellants and Mr. Tushar

Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General along with Mr. Ajay

Chokshi, appearing for the State of Gujarat.

14. The sweep and applicability of Section 102 of the Code is no

more res integra. That question has been directly considered and

answered in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D.

Neogy.4 The Court examined the question whether the police officer

investigating any offence can issue prohibitory orders in respect of

bank accounts in exercise of power under Section 102 of the Code.

The High Court, in that case, after analysing the provisions of

Section 102 of the Code had opined that bank account of the

accused or of any relation of the accused cannot be held to be

4 (1999) 7 SCC 685

32

“property” within the meaning of Section 102 of the Code.

Therefore, the Investigating Officer will have no power to seize bank

accounts or to issue any prohibitory order prohibiting the operation

of the bank account. This Court noted that there were conflicting

decisions of different High Courts on this aspect and as the

question was seminal, it chose to answer the same. In paragraph 6,

this Court noted thus:

“A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 102 indicates that the Police Officer has the power to seize any property which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the commission of any offence. The legislature having used the expression „any property‟ and „any offence‟ have made the applicability of the provisions wide enough to cover offences created under any Act. But the two preconditions for applicability of Section 102(1) are that it must be „property‟ and secondly, in respect of the said property there must have been suspicion of commission of any offence. In this view of the matter the two further questions that arise for consideration are whether the bank account of an accused or of his relation can be said to be „property‟ within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 102 of the Cr.P.C. and secondly, whether circumstances exist, creating suspicion of commission of any offence in relation to the same………..”

15. After analysing the decisions of different High Courts, this

Court in paragraph 12, expounded the legal position thus:

33

“Having considered the divergent views taken by different High Courts with regard to the power of seizure under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and whether the bank account can be held to be „property‟ within the meaning of the said Section 102(1), we see no justification to give any narrow interpretation to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is well known that corruption in public offices has become so rampant that it has become difficult to cope up with the same. Then again the time consumed by the Courts in concluding the trials is another factor which should be borne in mind in interpreting the provisions of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the underlying object engrafted therein, inasmuch as if there can be no order of seizure of the bank account of the accused then the entire money deposited in a bank which is ultimately held in the trial to be the outcome of the illegal gratification, could be withdrawn by the accused and the Courts would be powerless to get the said money which has any direct link with the commission of the offence committed by the accused as a public officer. We are, therefore, persuaded to take the view that the bank account of the accused or any of his relations is „property‟ within the meaning of Section 102 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a police officer in course of investigation can seize or prohibit the operation of the said account if such assets have direct links with the commission of the offence for which the police officer is investigating into. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court of Bombay committed error in holding that the police officer could not have seized the bank account or could not have issued any direction to the bank officer, prohibiting the account of the accused from being operated upon.”

34

16. After this decision, there is no room to countenance the

challenge to the action of seizure of bank account of any person

which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of the

commission of any offence.

17. In the present case, FIR has been registered at least against

three private appellants, naming them as accused. CJP Trust has

not been named as an accused in the FIR. But the investigation

thus far, according to the respondents, reveals that Teesta Atul

Setalvad and Javed Anand are actively associated with the said

Trusts and have carried out transactions which may be found

under circumstances suspicious of the commission of the alleged

offence. That is still a matter of investigation. For the present, the

Investigating Officer is of the view that there are certain

circumstances emerging from the transactions done from these

bank accounts which create suspicion of the commission of an

offence. It is on that belief he has exercised his discretion to issue

directions to seize the bank accounts pertaining to CJP Trust.

18. As regards the procedure for issuing instructions to freeze the

bank accounts, it is noticed that the same has been followed by

giving intimation to the concerned Magistrate on 21st November,

35

2014 as required in terms of Section 102 of the Code. There is

nothing in Section 102 which mandates giving of prior notice to the

account holder before the seizure of his bank account. The

Magistrate after noticing that the principle stated by the Division

Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Dr. Shashikant D.

Karnik v. State of Maharashtra5 has been overruled in terms of

the Full Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of

Vinoskumar Ramachandran Valluvar (supra), rightly negatived

that contention. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court has

expounded that Section 102 does not require issuance of notice to a

person before or simultaneously with the action attaching his bank

account. In the case of Adarsh Co-operative Housing Society

Limited v. Union of India & Ors.6, the Division Bench of the

Bombay High Court once again considered the issue and rejected

the argument that prior notice to the account holder was required

to be given before seizure of his bank account. It also noted that the

bank account need not be only of the accused but it can be any

account creating suspicion about the commission of an offence. The

view so taken commends us.

5 (2008) Cri.L.J. 148 (Bom.) 6 (2012) Cri.L.J. 520 (Bom.)

36

19. In the case of Sri Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal (supra),

the Court while considering a transfer petition under Section 406 of

the Code, seeking transfer of the case pending before the Principal

Sessions Court, Chenglepet, to any other State outside the State of

Tamil Nadu, adverted to the circumstance of a motivated order

passed under Section 102 of the Code for freezing of 183 bank

accounts of the Mutt on the ground that the head of the Mutt was

involved in a murder case. In that context, it observed that the

power vested under Section 102 of the Code cannot be stretched to

irrelevant matters, to extremes and to a breaking point. The power

must be exercised cautiously, failing which, the discretion exercised

by the authority would be tainted with arbitrariness. In paragraph

23, the Court observed thus:

“…Again, the action of the State in directing the banks to freeze all the 183 accounts of the Mutt in the purported exercise of the power conferred under Section 102 CrPC, which had affected the entire activities of the Mutt and other associated trusts and endowments only on the ground that the petitioner, who is the head of the Mutt, has been charge-sheeted for entering into a conspiracy to murder Sankararaman, leads to an inference that the State machinery is not only interested in securing conviction of the petitioner and the other co-accused but also to bring to a complete halt the entire religious and other activities of the various trusts and endowments and the performance of pooja and other rituals in the temples and religious places in

37

accordance with the custom and traditions and thereby create a fear psychosis in the minds of the people. This may deter anyone from appearing in Court and give evidence in defence of the accused……..”

The Court did not lay down as a proposition that it is impermissible

to freeze multiple bank accounts, even though circumstances

emanating from the nature of transactions effected from the

concerned bank accounts and the conduct of the account holders

created suspicion of the commission of an offence. The Court while

directing lifting of seizure of bank accounts had noted that the Mutt

could not be paralysed by freezing of all its bank accounts in the

guise of a direction issued under Section 102 of the Code. Further,

the continuation of the seizure of all the bank accounts even after

completion of the investigation of the case and filing of charge-sheet

was unwarranted.

20. In the case of M.T. Enrica Lexie (supra), the Court noted in

paragraph 7 that agencies had completed their respective

investigations and vessel was seized in exercise of power under

Section 102 of the Code. In Para 16, the Court noted the

concession given by the counsel for the Government that the vessel

was not the object of the crime or the circumstances which came up

38

in the course of investigation that create suspicion of the

commission of any offence. In that case, it was alleged that while

the fishing boat was sailing through the Arabian Sea, indiscriminate

firing was opened from the vessel in question, as a result of which

two innocent fishermen who were on board, died. The Counsel for

the State had also conceded that the vessel was no longer required

in connection with the offence in question. Indeed, in paragraph

14, the Court made the following observations:-

“14. The police officer in course of investigation can seize any property under Section 102 if such property is alleged to be stolen or is suspected to be stolen or is the object of the crime under investigation or has direct link with the commission of offence for which the police officer is investigating into. A property not suspected of commission of the offence which is being investigated into by the police officer cannot be seized. Under Section 102 of the Code, the police officer can seize such property which is covered by Section 102(1) and no other.”

These observations are in no way different from the proposition

expounded in the case of Tapas D. Neogy (supra).

21. Keeping these principles in mind and the material on record, it

is noticed that the prosecution has alleged that the two Trusts are

run by the private appellants and other accused. They were actively

involved in collecting huge funds as donation in the name of

39

providing legal assistance to the 2002 Gujarat Riot Victims. Such

donations received by the two Trusts had never reached the victims,

the members of the Gulberg Society in respect of which grievance

has been made in the subject FIR. Further, substantial

discrepancies have been noticed from the bank accounts, copies of

audited account statements and Balance Sheet. The final account

did not tally with the accounts, as submitted. The appellants did

not offer credible explanation in that regard, much less

satisfactory. According to the respondents, the conduct of the

appellants of non-cooperation during the investigation strengthens

the suspicion of the commission of an offence. They provided

incorrect information. It is also a case of non-disclosure and

suppression of material facts. These circumstances create suspicion

of the commission of offence under investigation. It is alleged by

the respondents that the appellants deliberately and intentionally

did not disclose that they have already opened new accounts and

transferred huge sums of money after knowing that stated bank

accounts of the appellants were seized on 21.01.2014 by the

investigating agency. The details of the two newly opened accounts

were not forthcoming. Further, in the proceedings filed before

different Courts, incorrect plea has been taken by the appellants,

40

suggestive of the fact that their accounts were not compliant and

duly scrutinized by the Competent Authority.

22. Suffice it to observe that as the Investigating Officer was in

possession of materials pointing out circumstances which create

suspicion of the commission of an offence, in particular, the one

under investigation and he having exercised powers under Section

102 of the Code, which he could, in law, therefore, could

legitimately seize the bank accounts of the appellants after following

the procedure prescribed in sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) of

the same provision. As aforementioned, the Investigating Officer

after issuing instructions to seize the stated bank accounts of the

appellants submitted report to the Magistrate concerned and thus

complied with the requirement of sub-Section (3).

23. Although both sides have adverted to statement of accounts

and vouchers to buttress their respective submissions, we do not

deem it necessary nor think it appropriate to analyse the same

while considering the matter on hand which emanates from an

application preferred by the appellants to de-freeze the stated bank

accounts pending investigation of the case. Indisputably, the

investigation is still in progress. The appellants will have to explain

41

their position to the investigating agency and after investigation is

complete, the matter can proceed further depending on the material

gathered during the investigation. The suspicion entertained by the

investigating agency as to how the appellants appropriated huge

funds, which in fact were meant to be disbursed to the unfortunate

victims of 2002 riots will have to be explained by the appellants.

Further, once the investigation is complete and police report is

submitted to the concerned Court, it would be open to the

appellants to apply for de-freezing of the bank accounts and

persuade the concerned Court that the said bank accounts are no

more necessary for the purpose of investigation, as provided in sub-

Section (3) of Section 102 of the Code. It will be open to the

concerned Court to consider that request in accordance with law

after hearing the investigating agency, including to impose

conditions as may be warranted in the fact situation of the case.

24. In our opinion, such a course would meet the ends of justice.

We say so also because the explanation offered by the appellants in

respect of the discrepancies in the accounts, pointed out by the

respondents, will be a matter of defence of the appellants.

42

25. We clarify that at an appropriate stage or upon completion of

the investigation, if the Investigating Officer is satisfied with the

explanation offered by the appellants and is of the opinion that

continuance of the seizure of the stated bank accounts or any one

of them is not necessary, he will be well advised to issue instruction

in that behalf.

26. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed.

…………………………….CJI. (Dipak Misra)

…………………………..….J. (A.M. Khanwilkar)

New Delhi;

15th December, 2017.