implementation & monitoring presentation
DESCRIPTION
Non-legislative Policy MakingTRANSCRIPT
Implementa*on &
Monitoring
Biruk Terrefe Lukas Kupfernagel
Outline (1) Conceptualiza;on (2) Types of Non-‐legisla*ve Implementa;on (3) OECD Indicators (4) Discussion
1. Conceptualiza*on
“New Modes of Governance: Policy Making without Legisla*on?” – Heri;er (2002)
⏏
Aims of New Modes of Governance
(a) Include private actors in policy formula;on (b) While being based on public actors (c) Are only marginally based on legisla;on
*Open Method of Coordina*on*
Is non-‐legisla5ve governance more effec5ve?
Stakeholders of New Modes of Governance
1. Commission (e.g. EU) = possibility to expand European policies in light of na;onal resistance
2. Member-‐state governments (e.g. Italy) = allows more autonomy in shaping policy
Creates Problem of interdependence
(mul5-‐layered policy making)
Guiding Principles of New Modes of Governance
(a) Voluntarism – non-‐binding targets (b) Inclusion – actors involved par;cipate (c) Subsidiarity – measures decided by member states
Mechanisms of New Modes of Governance
(1) Diffusion and learning (2) Persuasion (3) Standardiza;on of knowledge (4) Repe;;on (5) Time management
Importance of Implementa5on and Monitoring for Democra*c
Governance
“Open Coordina;on would lend itself to avenues that press for accountability from below and help improve ‘good governance’ in Europe.” -‐ De La Porte et al.
2. Types
Substan*ve Targets Procedural Norms
Reputa5on Mechanisms, Publica5on and mutual learning
Voluntary Accords
1. Substan;ve Targets – Type 1 Reputa5on Mechanisms, Publica5on and mutual learning
Informa*on pooling leads to mutual coopera*on &
learning
Avoid lengthy legisla*on process
Problem Solving under regional and
local diversity
“Brain-‐storming” leads to experience
pooling
Monitoring Benchmarking is
essen*al
Third Party Support
S*ll inefficient = sanc*ons
“Naming and Shaming” Mechanism
Case Study #1: Ireland
(a) Broad Economic Policies as non-‐binding framework
(b) Ireland did not obey in 2001 (c) Open Shaming (d) Ireland rejected the recommenda;ons
1. Substan;ve Targets – Type 2 Voluntary Accords
Several Perspec*ves on AZrac*veness of Voluntary Accords
Set up by private and public actors
Collec*ve ac*on leads to collec*ve
sanc*oning, if policy fails
Problems with Voluntary Accords
(1) O^en ini;ated by legisla;ve bodies (2) Lack of ins;tu;onal framework (3) May cost more ;me (4) Selec;ve Par;cipa;on
Case Study #2: Union Environment Ac*on Program
2. Procedural Norms – Type 1
Third Party Authority (Back up)
Recommended vs. Obligatory
Codes
How to deal with
problems?
Increasing compe**on (beneficial)
Problems with Procedural Norms
(1) Costs may be high (crea;ng new ins;tu;ons) (2) Interest Groups are not representa;ve (3) Hierarchy has to exist (as third party back up)
Case Study #3: Treatment of employees in EU
(a) Incen;ve to create a uniform code for companies on how to treat their employees
(b) Commission invited companies to ac*vely par*cipate in crea;ng code themselves
(c) Lack of results lead to take over of legisla*ve bodies
3. Indicators ⏏ “Government at a Glance 2011” -‐ OECD (2011)
OECD Methodology
Needed for Effec5ve Implementa5on
(a) Poli*cal-‐ins*tu*onal capacity-‐ ability to generate both par;cipa;on and poli;cal support
(b) Instrumental capacity – have strong incen;ves to apply the proposed instruments
Indicator #1
Reliability: 1. Binary Indicator 2. Authority of government-‐wide oversight
i. Only 50% were allowed to monitor impact assessment (2008)
ii. Broad based reform agenda vs. administra;ve simplifica;on ini;a;ves
3. Crea;on of ministries i. 28 members assigned ministers to regulatory body ii. 15 members report on progress to parliament
Existence of a regulatory oversight body
Results
Indicator #2
Reliability: 1. Binary Indicator 2. Compliance and Enforcement of Regula;on
i. 21 OECD countries consider compliance and monitoring in development of regula;on
ii. 14 countries have policy guidance for regulators
3. Risk based enforcement
Existence of Framework for Compliance Assessment
Results
Indicator #3
Reliability: 1. Sustains confidence à high poli;cal-‐ins;tu;onal
capacity i. increased civic par;cipa;on
2. Publica;on mechanisms i. Publishing of plans for renewed or reformed regula;on ii. Publishing views of par;cipants in consulta;on process
i. 20 OECD countries include view of stakeholders on dra^ resolu;on
Availability of Regulatory Informa;on to General Public
Results
Indicator #4
Reliability: 1. Binary Indicator 2. Regula;ng Impact Analysis (RIA)
i. Examines costs, benefits and effects of exis;ng regula;on i. ex ante and ex post
ii. 24 OECD countries reported quan;fying costs (2008) iii. 16 OECD countries reported quan;fying benefits (2008)
3. Automa;c Review Mechanism i. 6 OECD countries had such a framework in 2008 ii. 12 countries reported sun seing
Existence of Evalua;on Mechanisms
Results
These are indicators for legisla*ve policy making How do we measure the implementa;on and monitoring of non-‐legisla*ve policy-‐making?
Problems of Non-‐legisla*ve Policy-‐Making
Indicators for effec;ve implementa;on and monitoring depend on each policy
General Indicators: (1) Seing of ;me frames (2) Existence of Monitoring Ins;tu;on (3) Existence of Advisory body (which consults stakeholder’s views)
Example of Indicators for a non-‐legisla*ve policy
Target:
Suggested Indicators:
‘Banning of all ships from EU Ports, that have been held for EU checks twice in 2 years. A black list will be created and updated every 6 months.’
-‐ EU Commission under “Safety at sea/mari*me pollu*on” framework
-‐ Rate of black list updates measured per month -‐ Existence of ins;tu;on that monitors this
-‐ (European Mari;me Safety Agency) -‐ Number of safety checks conducted -‐ Loss of profits for ship companies
Discussion 1. Is non-‐legisla*ve policy-‐making a feasible
way to implement and monitor policies? 2. Should governments set ;me frames for certain policies (i.e. sunseing)?
Works Cited
OECD (2011), Government at a Glance 2011, OECD
Publishing.doi: 10.1787/gov_glance-‐2011-‐en
Heri;er, A. (2002). New Modes of Governance in Europe:
Policy-‐Making without Legisla5ng? Max Planck Project
Group. Bonn: Common Goods: Law, Poli;cs, Economics.