hurricane katrina: impacts at four university chemistry departments in new orleans

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FEATURE Hurricane Katrina: Impacts at four university chemistry departments in New Orleans Hurricane Katrina in 2005 had a major impact on the university system in the New Orleans area. This paper describes the impact and the recovery efforts of four major universities in New Orleans and tells of the lessons learned during the recovery. By Matthew A. Tarr, Kurt R. Birdwhistell, Teresa T. Birdwhistell, Russell Schmehl INTRODUCTION The risks of hurricanes and tropical storms have been well known in the New Orleans area and throughout the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the US. However, the last major storm (cate- gory 3 or above) to directly impact New Orleans occurred 20 years prior to Katrina. Hurricane Elena made landfall near Biloxi, MS on the morn- ing of September 2, 1985 (see Figure 1). At the time, the evacuation of over 500,000 people was the largest to date. 1 Because of its distance from New Orleans and its weaker strength, Elena did not result in catastrophic damage to New Orleans. Prior strong storms that caused serious damage to New Orleans include Hurricanes Betsy (1965) and Camille (1969). The US National Hurricane center reports: The major river flooding in the Gulf Coast area came as Camille’s center moved east of lower Plaquemines Parish in southeastern Louisiana. Northerly winds pushed a mas- sive surge through the marshes, over both east and west bank Mississippi River levees in the region from Empire southward, removing almost all traces of civilization. 2 While each of these hurricanes was destructive, none was as catastrophic as Katrina. Storm related deaths from National Hurricane Center reports were four for Elena, 1 53 in Louisiana for Betsy, 3 and 139 in Louisiana and Mississippi for Camile. 2 In contrast, Katrina is ranked in the top five dead- liest Hurricanes in the US with the death toll estimated to be over 1,800. 4 The major cause of Katrina’s large casualty and damage rate was its massive storm surge, which was large in terms of both its height and its geo- graphic coverage. A storm surge of 24– 28 ft was recorded across a 20 mile stretch centered near Bay St. Louis, MS. 4 The eastern Alabama coast recorded storm surge of up to 10 ft, and metropolitan New Orleans experi- enced surge from 10 to 19 ft. 4 While the size and strength of Katrina may not have been paralleled by previous Gulf Coast storms, the effects of a storm of this magnitude are readily predictable based on the behavior of previous storms. In fact, the weather conditions (wind, storm surge, rainfall) associated with Katrina were effectively predicted by the National Hurricane Center. Further- more, over one million people evacu- ated from the metropolitan New Orleans area, indicating that a vast majority of residents perceived a high level of threat. The success of this eva- cuation is largely due to prior planning by the Louisiana Department of Trans- portation, whose evacuation plan was recently modified based on lessons learned during the 2004 evacuation for Hurricane Ivan. However, the rapid approach of Katrina limited the time available for storm preparations and evacuations, making routine pre- paredness even more critical. Many individuals did not become aware of the storm until late on Friday (August 26, 2005), and the storm made landfall early on the following Monday. As a result, preparations at the workplace may have been difficult or impossible, especially since home and family pre- parations were also necessary. Metropolitan New Orleans had a pre-storm population of about one mil- lion. According to July 1, 2005 US Census estimates, the two metro parishes with the highest populations were Orleans Parish (455,000 resi- dents) and Jefferson Parish (453,000 residents). 6 According to Matthew A. Tarr is an Associate Pro- fessor in the Department of Chemistry, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148, United States (Tel.: 504 280 6323; fax: 504 280 6860; e-mail: [email protected]). Kurt R. Birdwhistell is Professor and Chair in the Department of Chemistry, Loyola University New Orleans, Campus Box 5, New Orleans, LA 70118, United States (e-mail: [email protected]). Teresa T. Birdwhistell is a Professor in the Department of Chemistry, Xavier University of Louisiana, 1 Drexel Drive, Box 22, New Orleans, LA 70125, United States (e-mail: [email protected]). Russell Schmehl is a Professor in the Department of Chemistry, Tulane Uni- versity, 2015 Percival Stern Hall, New Orleans, LA 70118, United States (e-mail: [email protected]). 1871-5532/$32.00 ß Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society 15 doi:10.1016/j.jchas.2007.03.001 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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FEATURE

Hurricane Katrina: Impactsat four university chemistrydepartments in New Orleans

Hurricane Katrina in 2005 had a major impact on the university system in the New Orleans area. This paperdescribes the impact and the recovery efforts of four major universities in New Orleans and tells of thelessons learned during the recovery.

By Matthew A. Tarr,Kurt R. Birdwhistell,Teresa T. Birdwhistell,Russell Schmehl

INTRODUCTION

The risks of hurricanes and tropicalstorms have been well known in theNew Orleans area and throughout theGulf and Atlantic coasts of the US.However, the last major storm (cate-

Matthew A. Tarr is an Associate Pro-fessor in the Department of Chemistry,University of New Orleans, NewOrleans, LA 70148, United States(Tel.: 504 280 6323;fax: 504 280 6860;e-mail: [email protected]).

Kurt R. Birdwhistell is Professor andChair in the Department of Chemistry,Loyola University New Orleans,Campus Box 5, New Orleans,LA 70118, United States(e-mail: [email protected]).

Teresa T. Birdwhistell is a Professor inthe Department of Chemistry, XavierUniversity of Louisiana, 1 DrexelDrive, Box 22, New Orleans,LA 70125, United States(e-mail: [email protected]).

Russell Schmehl is a Professor in theDepartment of Chemistry, Tulane Uni-versity, 2015 Percival Stern Hall, NewOrleans, LA 70118, United States(e-mail: [email protected]).

1871-5532/$32.00

doi:10.1016/j.jchas.2007.03.001

gory 3 or above) to directly impactNew Orleans occurred 20 years priorto Katrina. Hurricane Elena madelandfall near Biloxi, MS on the morn-ing of September 2, 1985 (seeFigure 1). At the time, the evacuationof over 500,000 people was the largestto date.1 Because of its distance fromNew Orleans and its weaker strength,Elena did not result in catastrophicdamage to New Orleans. Prior strongstorms that caused serious damage toNew Orleans include HurricanesBetsy (1965) and Camille (1969). TheUS National Hurricane center reports:

The major river flooding in the Gulf Coastareacame asCamille’s centermoved eastoflower Plaquemines Parish in southeasternLouisiana. Northerly winds pushed a mas-sive surge through the marshes, over botheast and west bank Mississippi River leveesin the region from Empire southward,removing almost all traces of civilization.2

While each of these hurricanes wasdestructive, none was as catastrophicas Katrina. Storm related deaths fromNational Hurricane Center reportswere four for Elena,1 53 in Louisianafor Betsy,3 and 139 in Louisiana andMississippi for Camile.2 In contrast,Katrina is ranked in the top five dead-liest Hurricanes in the US with thedeath toll estimated to be over1,800.4 The major cause of Katrina’slarge casualty and damage rate was itsmassive storm surge, which was largein terms of both its height and its geo-graphic coverage. A storm surge of 24–28 ft was recorded across a 20 milestretch centered near Bay St. Louis,MS.4 The eastern Alabama coastrecorded storm surge of up to 10 ft,

� Division of Chemical Health

and metropolitan New Orleans experi-enced surge from 10 to 19 ft.4

While the size and strength ofKatrina may not have been paralleledby previous Gulf Coast storms, theeffects of a storm of this magnitudeare readily predictable based on thebehavior of previous storms. In fact,the weather conditions (wind, stormsurge, rainfall) associated with Katrinawere effectively predicted by theNational Hurricane Center. Further-more, over one million people evacu-ated from the metropolitan NewOrleans area, indicating that a vastmajority of residents perceived a highlevel of threat. The success of this eva-cuation is largely due to prior planningby the Louisiana Department of Trans-portation, whose evacuation plan wasrecently modified based on lessonslearned during the 2004 evacuationfor Hurricane Ivan. However, therapid approach of Katrina limited thetime available for storm preparationsand evacuations, making routine pre-paredness even more critical. Manyindividuals did not become aware ofthe storm until late on Friday (August26, 2005), and the storm made landfallearly on the following Monday. As aresult, preparations at the workplacemay have been difficult or impossible,especially since home and family pre-parations were also necessary.

Metropolitan New Orleans had apre-storm population of about one mil-lion. According to July 1, 2005 USCensus estimates, the two metroparishes with the highest populationswere Orleans Parish (�455,000 resi-dents) and Jefferson Parish(�453,000 residents).6 According to

and Safety of the American Chemical Society 15Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

As is true for anyaccident or disaster,prior planning and

preparedness are thekey to minimizingnegative impacts.

local studies,7 the October 2006 popu-lations were approximately 200,000for Orleans Parish (�44% of pre-storm) and 436,000 for Jefferson Par-ish (96% of pre-storm). The lowerpopulation recovery for Orleans Parish(coincident borders with the city ofNew Orleans) is reflective of the moreextensive damage that occurred there.Several levee breeches resulted inextensive flooding of Orleans Parish:80% of the city was flooded with up to20 ft of water in some areas.4 The USArmy Corps of Engineers reported thatthe city was cleared of flood water onOctober 11, 2005, a total of 43 daysafter the initial flooding.4 While Jeffer-son Parish sustained substantial flood-ing, the depth of water was much lowerthan in Orleans. Furthermore, floodwaters in Jefferson receded within 1–2 days of flooding, presumably due tothe integrity of the levees surroundingJefferson Parish. The greater accessi-bility to housing and educational insti-tutions and the operation of businesses(e.g., grocery stores, gas stations, hard-ware and building supply vendors,

Figure 1. Path of the five major hurricanes (Map from NOAA Coastal Services Center.5

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etc.), contributed to a rapid return ofresidents to Jefferson Parish.

As is true for any accident or disas-ter, prior planning and preparednessare the key to minimizing negativeimpacts. Examples of effective andineffective planning and preparednessare evident in many aspects of Katri-na’s saga. In this article, the prepara-tions, impacts, and recovery of fourNew Orleans chemistry departmentswill be discussed. These departmentsare at Loyola University of NewOrleans, Tulane University, the Uni-versity of New Orleans, and XavierUniversity of Louisiana. Each of theseuniversities is located in the city of

category 3, 4, or 5) that passed within 65 na

Journal of Chemical Hea

New Orleans. Figure 2 shows the loca-tion of each institution within the city.

INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL SUMMARIES

Loyola University

Loyola University is a Jesuit liberal artsuniversity with a pre-Katrina enroll-ment of approximately 5,800 students.Loyola is located on St. Charles Ave. inNew Orleans across from AudubonPark. This is one of the higher areasof the city near the large bend in theMississippi river. Compared to theother universities in New Orleans,Loyola had the least physical damage.Because Loyola is on relatively highground in New Orleans, we had nostanding water on campus. The campuswas surrounded by water for 7–10 daysand two buildings on campus had 2–3 ftof water in the basement. The MonroeScience building had 2 ft of water in itsbasement. The sports complex lost partof its roof during Katrina and there wasdamage to other roofs on campus. Asignificant part of the damage was due

utical miles of New Orleans since 1900.

lth & Safety, September/October 2007

Figure 2. Aerial photograph of New Orleans showing locations of (1) LoyolaUniversity of New Orleans, (2) Tulane University, (3) the University of New Orleans,and (4) Xavier University of Louisiana. Lake Ponchartrain is to the north of the city,and the Mississippi River can be seen in the southern portion of the photograph.Photograph from the US Geological Survey.8

One key part of thephysical plant

disaster plan was theuse of general

contractors as firstresponders foremergencies.

to the loss of power on campus forapproximately six weeks. Our total phy-sical damage estimate from Katrina wasapproximately $4.5 million.

The information technology (IT)plan had two major components: (1)the backup of data from the mainframecomputer stored offsite and (2) a con-tract for offsite hardware backupsystems.

The data from the mainframe wasbacked up every week and shippedto Iron Mountain data protectionand recovery services. This includesall student records, financial affairsand course management data. The sec-ond part of the IT disaster planincluded a contract with Sungard Sys-tems. This contract allows Loyola todeclare an emergency and use the Sun-gard computers to run Loyola’s com-puter software systems. Loyoladeclared an emergency on September4, 2005 and was able to run payroll forthe university on September 9, 2005using this backup facility.

The Sungard contract has a highdaily premium, and consequently a less

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, Septe

expensive temporary computer solu-tion was needed for an extended per-iod of time. IT officials looked foranother solution and were able to pur-chase and setup a used IBM main-frame at the University of Houston.This system was up and running byearly October even though IT had toevacuate from Houston for hurricaneRita for 10 days. The computer systemon campus was restarted on October30, 2005. After its use was no longerneeded, the used IBM mainframe wasresold by Loyola in order to recoverthe capital outlay for its purchase. ITofficials at Loyola are to be com-mended for their disaster planningand implementation prior to and dur-ing this disaster.

Reestablishing communicationsbetween administrators, faculty, andstudents was one of our largest pro-blems. All phones, cellular or landline,with 504 area codes were not function-ing. Communication was first reestab-lished through a Loyola blog site set upby the Office of Financial Affairs.Within a week of the disaster word

mber/October 2007

had spread about the blog site andmany faculty, students, and adminis-trators had placed alternate contactinformation on the blog site. The blogsite was an effective pathway for theLoyola community to reconnect.

For students, the Office of StudentAffairs had utilized a Red Cross eva-cuation site in Baton Rouge (�70 milesWNW of New Orleans). This arrange-ment was found to be less than ade-quate for the needs of our students. Analternate facility is now available forstudents residing in on-campus hous-ing.

Physical plant personnel left oncampus had several problems: (1)communication was difficult, (2) phy-sical plant personnel ran out of sup-plies, and (3) diesel powered backupgenerators ran out of fuel. Some phy-sical plant personnel had their familiesstay on campus with them during theKatrina emergency which lead to sup-ply problems.

One key part of the physical plantdisaster plan was the use of generalcontractors as first responders foremergencies. These local contractorswere quickly able to do damage assess-ment and damage control resulting indecreased losses and decreased recov-ery time.

The Division of Academic Affairsfaced huge challenges after Katrinasuch as: (1) communicating withadministrators, students, parents,faculty, and staff; (2) retaining stu-dents, faculty, and staff; and (3) return-ing the campus to working order. Thecommunication issue was partiallysolved by collecting contact informa-tion from the Loyola blog site. Once IThad the Loyola web site active,employees were asked to sign in atthe human resources web site with

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alternate contact information. Facultymembers were able to access studentcontact information online in the sec-ond week of September and main-tained contact with advisees eitherthrough email or phone calls. Facultyand administrators visited universitiesthat received significant numbers ofLoyola students after Katrina and heldinformational sessions for the Loyolastudents. The various forms of commu-nications between students and facultypaid off with a 92% student return ratefor the spring 2006 semester. Anotherpositive administration response wasthe early commitment to continue pay-ing faculty and staff; this move helpedretention and eased some of the painfrom Katrina for faculty and staff.

The Loyola chemistry facilities wererelatively unaffected by Katrina. Wehad no problems with chemicals inthe ground floor stockroom, exceptfor some stored in refrigerators. Therewere surplus materials such as glass-ware, electronic components, andpaper supplies stored in the basementof Monroe Hall that were ruined by theintrusion of water in the basement. Thelack of power and air conditioning forsix weeks caused problems with var-ious computers and equipment.

The chemistry faculty and staff weredispersed all over the country fromMiami Florida to Seattle Washington.The faculty was able to maintain con-tact with each other and students byusing the online university registrationsystems. As a result of online advisingin the fall, almost 90% of our chemistrymajors returned to Loyola in the springof 2006.

Improvements in the InformationTechnology plan for 2006–2007include:

(1) E

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mergency communications willbe improved by use of an emer-gency e-mail system hosted offsite.All faculty and staff have assignedemergency emails addresses. Theemail system and an emergencywebsite hosted offsite will be acti-vated upon emergency declaration.

(2) T

he Blackboard course manage-ment system is now hosted offcampus. This will allow for conti-nuing online classes during anextended emergency declaration.

Financial affairs and student affairs

have implemented improvements totheir emergency plan: (1) all facultyand staff will be required to have theirsalary electronically deposited intotheir accounts; (2) Loyola now hasan official evacuation site in BatonRouge to house any of the on campusstudents that need an evacuation site;and (3) Loyola requires all students tosubmit a written evacuation plan tostudent affairs before they can obtainon campus housing.

The physical plant emergency planincludes the following changes: (1)physical plant will have two satellitephones and several non-504 cellularphones for improved communication;(2) in future emergencies, the numberof emergency personnel left on campuswill be reduced and no families will beallowed to stay at Loyola. There will bea 30 day stockpile of provisions andmedications for emergency personnel;and (3) Loyola will upgrade the size ofthe fuel tanks on our diesel generatorsused for back up power.

Academic affairs have made the fol-lowing changes to the emergency plan:(1) All faculty members will have aplan to offer online versions of theircurrent courses in the event of anemergency declaration. Most facultymembers will do this through theBlackboard course management sys-tem. (2) The deans of the various col-leges will keep an updated emergencycontact list for all current faculty andstaff members.

The chemistry department madesmall improvements to its emergencyplan: (1) the chair will update yearlythe emergency contact information forthe department; (2) we have assignedpersonnel to shut down various com-puters and equipment; and (3) allfaculty members will use Blackboardcourse management systems to con-tinue their courses online in the eventof a prolonged evacuation.

Loyola is currently struggling withimplementation of a new post-Katrinastrategic plan for the university. For thenext few years we will be workingthrough the implications of the strate-gic plan and increasing the incomingclass size to balance the budget of theuniversity. Every year around the startof hurricane season, the university will

Journal of Chemical Hea

be focusing on reviewing and updatingour emergency plan.

Tulane University

Tulane University is a private institu-tion that, prior to hurricane Katrina,had 10 (including Newcomb College,Tulane College, Engineering, Medi-cine, Law, Business, Architecture,Public Health, Social Work and Con-tinuing Studies) separate schoolsenrolling approximately 12,000 stu-dents. The University has two maincampuses, in uptown New Orleanson relatively high ground directly adja-cent to Loyola University and onTulane Avenue in a section of the citythat had several feet of floodwater fol-lowing Katrina. In the months follow-ing the storm, the Tulane Board ofAdministrators and upper administra-tion, in consultation with the Presi-dent’s Faculty advisory committee,reorganized the University to a groupof nine colleges. The sciences wereincorporated into the new School ofScience and Engineering. Classesresumed in January of 2006, with themajority of the damage to the physicalplant of the uptown campus repairedand a very high fraction of returningstudents. As of October 2006, Tulane’senrolment stood at a little more than10,500 (88% of pre-Katrina).

The Tulane Chemistry Departmentfaced a variety of difficulties before andafter hurricane Katrina. There weresome significant difficulties and alsosome significant successes in dealingwith the storm and its aftermath. Thelessons learned from Katrina revolvedaround issues relating to planning andpreparedness. In addition, for someaspects of long-term departmentaloperation, a quick post-storm responseis necessary, and such a responsedepends on being allowed access tosections of the community that mayeither be inaccessible or haverestricted access. The discussion belowoutlines a few aspects of the hurricaneKatrina experience that impacted theTulane Chemistry Department in a sig-nificant way.

Several times in recent years therehad been voluntary evacuations of thecity because of approaching stormsand, each time, no storm hadappeared. In 2004, with the approach

lth & Safety, September/October 2007

of hurricane Ivan, the storm made itspresence in the gulf four days beforeactually making landfall and the timefor evacuation seemed ‘‘adequate.’’Still, during the Ivan evacuation andearlier evacuations, there was no pro-vision to ensure the safety of all thefaculty, staff, graduate students andpostdocs that made up the core per-sonnel of the department; that is to say,there was no plan to guarantee thatevery person who wanted to evacuatewould be able to do so. Because thepeak of hurricane season coincideswith the start of the academic yearand, for the Tulane chemistry depart-ment, that means the addition of firstyear graduate students late in August,the potential existed that persons whohad just arrived (some from China,India and other countries) would needto be evacuated. This is what indeedhappened when hurricane Katrinaarrived. Entering graduate studentshad just taken their placement examson Thursday and Friday, August 25and 26 and were in the process ofregistering for courses when it becameapparent that evacuation would benecessary. Because of the fact thatplans had not been made ahead ofthe arrival of the students and thatthe storm arrived on a weekend onlya few days after the arrival of the firstyear students (when the new studentswere difficult to locate), several of thefirst year students did not evacuate andremained on campus with a small bandof students and faculty who decidednot to leave the city. When the studentswere evacuated a few days after thestorm and when it became apparentthat the city would be closed for anindefinite period, Chemistry facultymembers arranged for new studentsto begin their graduate work at otherinstitutions including the University ofNotre Dame, Rensselaer PolytechnicInstitute and the University of SouthFlorida. The students remained atthese institutions for the fall semesterand, with the exception of the studentswho went to South Florida, theyreturned to initiate their studies atTulane in the spring semester of 2006.

Several lessons were learned fromthis personnel situation. The depart-ment now has a plan for each studentin the event of future evacuations. New

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, Septe

students are assigned partners fromamong students, faculty and postdocsin order to provide communicationlinks for everyone in the department.All personnel register their contactinformation (including alternate emailand cell phone address) and short termevacuation plans with a member of thedepartmental staff; this information ismade freely available to faculty inorder to re-establish communicationswith as many personnel as possible asquickly as possible following a majorstorm. The University has also takenmeasures to provide a mirror web siteso that communication can be restoredusing the university e-mail systemshortly after a storm. Of course, thisassumes personnel evacuate to loca-tions that are not affected by the storm;even with these measures severalChemistry Department faculty andstaff members would have been unableto establish electronic communica-tions of any kind following hurricaneKatrina. More difficult issues arise ifthe evacuation period is prolonged, aswas the case with hurricane Katrina.For those living in locations where anatural disaster could result in a long-term evacuation, it is a good idea tomake advance agreements with otherinstitutions that can provide housingand basic work facilities for smallgroups of people.

One aspect of hurricanes not com-mon to many other large-scale naturaldisasters is that there is generally sig-nificant warning of impending difficul-ties. Thus, there is ample time to takemeasures necessary to brace the phy-sical facilities for the storm. At Tulane,departmental staff took care of secur-ing the office, stockroom, major equip-ment facilities and importantdocumentation. In addition, individualresearch groups worked to securelaboratories and specialized instru-mentation. Even though the advancewarning was relatively short for hurri-cane Katrina, the department sufferedfew problems as a result of inadequatephysical preparation.

We were not, however, prepared forthe very long period that the depart-mental facilities would be withoutelectricity (more than two months)because of flooding of the buildingpower mains located in the basement

mber/October 2007

of the building. This situation led toseveral difficulties. Immediately wewere faced with the problem of gettingcryogens to the superconducting mag-nets of the NMR spectrometers locatedon the fifth floor of the building, sincethe freight elevator was inoperable.Thanks to the efforts of Tulane’sNMR technician, Qi Xiao, membersof Tulane’s physical plant staff, andvarious cryogen suppliers who wereable to provide materials under verydifficult conditions, we were able touse a generator to control the freightelevator, once a week, and transportcryogens (in the dark) to the spectro-meters. This activity went on for morethan two months, but saved the mag-nets from quenching. Other instru-ments, such as departmental FTIRspectrometers, were left idle sinceno dry air purge could be provided.Amazingly, when power was restoredand the instruments were allowed todry for a few weeks, they all were ableto function nearly as well as beforethe storm. However, some refrigera-tors left uncooled for two monthsrepresented an environmental pro-blem and most of them were removedand disposed of under contract witha waste disposal firm; there waslittle the department could havedone to prevent this problem sinceaccess to the city was highlyrestricted in the weeks following hur-ricane Katrina.

Overall, Tulane’s Chemistry Depart-ment fared reasonably well in the after-math of hurricane Katrina. We weretaken by surprise by the magnitude ofthe flooding and by the response oflocal officials who closed the city toits citizens for an extended period. Themost significant ways in which ourresponse will be different in futurestorm evacuations is to make sure allemployees and students have viableevacuation plans and to plan inadvance for post-storm communica-tion, relying heavily on internetresources (since cell phone servicecan be restricted because of damagedtransmission towers and high callvolume).

The University of New Orleans

The University of New Orleans (UNO)isapublic institutionofferingbachelors,

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masters, and Ph.D. degrees. UNO firstoffered classes in 1958, marking theopening of the first racially integrated,public university in the South. Prior toKatrina, enrolment was slightly over17,000 students, with about 4,000 ofthese being graduate students. Thisenrolment ranked UNO as the secondlargest university in Louisiana. Further-more, the graduate enrolment was thesecond largest among public institu-tions in the state.* Prior to Katrina,approximately 77% of UNO undergrad-uates were from the metropolitan NewOrleans area; this number has changedlittle since the storm. Graduate andundergraduate enrolments for thespring 2006 semester were about 66%of pre-Katrina values. Only smallchanges in the racial/ethnic make upof the student body have occurred sincethe storm. Pre-Katrina, 54% of studentswere white compared to 58% post-Katrina. The university is located onthe south shore of Lake Pontchartrain.The site was originally a naval air sta-tion which was built up above the sur-rounding land. Consequently, most ofthe university lies on high ground.

The UNO Chemistry Department ishoused in two adjacent buildings: theSciences Building and the ChemicalSciences Building. These were builtin 1962 and 1996, respectively. Trans-formers and related electrical facilitiesfor the Sciences Building were in abasement. The more modern ChemicalSciences Building has no basement, soall electrical equipment was aboveground. While the basement of theSciences Building was flooded, neitherbuilding had substantial flooding to theground floor. The chemistry stock-room and teaching laboratories arelocated on the ground floor of theSciences Building.

Discussion about the disaster and itseffects will focus on four areas: (1) pre-storm preparations, (2) the situationduring and immediately following thestorm, (3) longer term recovery, and(4) changes for future preparedness.

* Tulane University’s pre-Katrina grad-uate and professional enrollment wasslightly higher than UNO’s graduateenrollment. UNO does not have amedical school or a law school.

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The discussion will focus on issuesmore relevant to chemistry, and somegeneral university evacuation plansand emergency procedures will notbe discussed.

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, UNOposted important announcements,including weather advisories and eva-cuation plans, through its web site. TheChemistry Department regularly com-pleted quarterly safety inspections ofthe lab facilities. A chemical inventorywas partially maintained by the chem-istry stockroom. This inventory wasmaintained more as a record of pur-chases, and once chemicals werereceived they were no longer tracked.As a result, many items in the inventorywere no longer present because thechemicals had been used and/or dis-posed of. In addition, chemicals onhand were often not in their originallocations due to sharing of chemicalsbetween labs of a single professor orsometimes between research groups.Material safety data sheets were main-tained in a central location within eachresearch group, and were generallystored in the same room as the chemi-cals. Departmental safety policyrequired that all hot plates be turnedoff and unplugged when not in use. Tapwater feeding condensers is shut offwhen not attended. In accordancewith EPA regulations, waste chemicalswere stored in labs in small quantitiesbefore being brought to a central dis-posal location. Intermittent power andwater outages were handled on a perincident basis utilizing an informal sys-tem of notification.

The first major problem resultingfrom the storm was loss of communi-cation. The UNO web site and e-mailwere not functional. Furthermore,faculty, staff, and student cell phonesbased in the New Orleans area wereinoperative due to damage to the cel-lular infrastructure. A vast majority ofchemistry faculty, staff, and studentsevacuated prior to the storm. How-ever, the locations to which individualsevacuated were not known by others.Consequently, it was difficult to locateall members of the department afterthe storm. Over a period of days toweeks, individuals were locatedthrough alternate e-mail addressesand non-local cell phones (e.g. some

Journal of Chemical Hea

non-resident graduate students haveout of state cell phones).

In addition to lack of informationabout personnel, little if any informa-tion was available about the chemistrybuildings, equipment, chemicals, etc.Furthermore, the status of the univer-sity was unavailable for several days.As a result, it was difficult for chemistrypersonnel to develop a plan of actionin the immediate aftermath of thestorm. Through substantial efforts,the university was able to maintainpayroll operations with only smalldelays. Because of this success, univer-sity personnel were able to maintainfinancial stability, which facilitatedtheir return to work functions.

Damage to the chemistry departmentresulted from several causes. Althoughflood waters did not directly damagefacilitieson thegroundfloor andhigher,substantial damage was caused to theelectrical supply equipment, includingunderground power cables serving theentire university. As a result, the depart-ment was without electricity or air con-ditioning for several months.Temperature sensitive chemicals storedin refrigerators and freezers weredamaged when cooling was lost.Furthermore, air and moisture sensitivecompounds stored in glove boxes werealso compromised. Even compoundsnot requiring a glove box were affectedby the high humidity, and many chemi-cals that were in the stockroom weredamaged by the moisture. Closed con-tainers storing volatile compounds (e.g.diethyl ether) experienced dramaticincreases in internal pressure whenthe building temperature rose in theabsence of air conditioning. Fortu-nately, no fires or explosions resultedfrom any of these conditions.

Lack of air conditioning alsoresulted in mold contamination, espe-cially in areas where wind-blownwater entered buildings. The necessityfor mold remediation resulted in sub-stantial delays in re-occupying thebuildings. Although mold presentedan important long-term problem, lackof access to the buildings presented animportant short-term problem. Severalsuperconducting magnets (3 NMR, 1FT-ICR-MS) quenched because cryo-genic fills could not be maintainedfollowing the storm. While these

lth & Safety, September/October 2007

quenches did not pose safety hazards,the cost and length of returning theseinstruments to operation prevented oncampus research which relies on thisequipment. NMR facilities were notrestored until around June, 2006.

Unlike other campus buildings, thechemistry facilities had little damagedue to vandalism and theft. A largeamount of such damage occurred tothe campus when storm victims wereevacuated from flooded areas to theUNO campus which remained dry.Lack of food, water, and securityresulted in substantial vandalism andtheft on campus. Although notflooded, the Sciences Building andChemical Sciences Building wereencircled by standing water, possiblypreventing vandalism and theft duringthis period.

Soon after Katrina, many chemistryprofessors relocated their researchprograms to alternate locations. Thisstrategy was possible only due to thewillingness of other researchers, andtheir universities, to provide temporaryspace. However, as researchersreturned to UNO, additional healthand safety issues became apparent.Lack of working fume hoods dramati-cally limited the types of proceduresthat could safely be carried out.Furthermore, return of functioninghoods to the southern half of the Che-mical Sciences Building resulted inunusual air flow patterns. Conse-quently, chemical work with pyridinein a functioning hood resulted in astrong pyridine odor in a nearby, butunconnected room. During the spring2006 semester, undergraduate chemis-try teaching labs normally held in theScience Building were moved to alter-nate locations due to lack of adequateventilation.

The Louisiana Department of Envir-onmental Quality and the US EPAinspected our chemical holdings andprovided guidance for disposal. Ori-ginally, FEMA funding for disposal ofstorm-damaged chemicals was antici-pated, but such funding did not mate-rialize. Consequently UNO had tocover the cost of disposal.

A general lack of security also posedpotential threats. In addition toreduced UNO police force staffing(about 50% of normal staff), there

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, Septe

was a lack of security in the surround-ing areas. As a result, students, faculty,and staff were potentially at a higherrisk of crimes such as theft and rob-bery. Furthermore, chemicals andlaboratory equipment were not wellprotected from theft or accidentalexposure to unauthorized personnel.Exacerbating this problem was thecommon practice of propping openexterior doors to provide air circula-tion in the hopes of mitigating moldgrowth. The Department of HomelandSecurity is concerned about access topotentially harmful chemicals and bio-logical agents. This concern was heigh-tened by post-Katrina securityinadequacies.

The mental and physical state of labworkers posed another health andsafety concern. Fatigue, stress, andother distractions related to Katrinaand post-Katrina life resulted in thepotential for increased risk of labora-tory accidents. Fortunately, this riskdid not result in any accidents.

Following Katrina, a number ofchanges have been made at UNO.Facilities for remote web hosting arenow in place in the event of a localfailure. A full back up system is avail-able at Louisiana State University(LSU, Baton Rouge) and a limited sys-tem is available through a commercialsite. These systems will allow for emer-gency communications via web post-ings, e-mail access, and on lineteaching resources. Following Katrina,UNO’s web site was temporarilymoved to LSU. The fall 2005 semesterwas subsequently conducted via online courses beginning in October2005. In the event of a future incident,the ability to immediately transfer webservices to an alternate site will sub-stantially reduce delays in communica-tions and conversion to on linecourses.

In addition to alternate web hostingfacilities, the university has also imple-mented additional alternate communi-cation mechanisms. Key universityofficials have access to a range of alter-nate devices, such as satellite cellphones, out of state cell phones (notdependent on local phone service asNew Orleans based cell phones are),and two way radios (including statepolice bands). Furthermore, a toll free

mber/October 2007

information line, based off-site, is inplace to allow distribution of informa-tion to the general university commu-nity. Departments are now expected tokeep a contact list of all personnel (e.g.faculty, staff, postdocs, graduate stu-dents) that includes cell phone num-bers and non-UNO e-mail addresses(after the storm, all UNO e-mail wasdown, but access to commercial e-mailsites such as Yahoo was available). Oncampus data transfer contingencies arealso in place. A limited access LANwill be available and will be poweredby emergency generators. Satellite andcellular data transfer options are alsoplanned, though funding limitationsmay prevent their implementation.These provisions will allow for impor-tant on campus functions in situationswhere key personnel have access tocampus. Such functions include accessto student data systems and payrollsystems.

Another change in UNO’s emer-gency plan includes tightly controlledaccess to the campus. Although accessto the campus was restricted afterKatrina, multiple entries were madethat circumvented security points.While most of these accesses were byindividuals who had legitimate reasonsto enter the campus, their presencecaused two problems: (1) uncontrolledentrance caused increased risks to per-sonnel and property through potentialexposure to hazardous and sensitiveareas and (2) it became difficult forsecurity personnel to identify illegiti-mate entry due to the high rate oflegitimate but unauthorized entry. Inaddition, because security outside ofthe campus was not guaranteed, uni-versity personnel were at risk duringtransit to and from the campus. Inorder to eliminate these issues, thenew policy will include the followingmeasures during a general state ofemergency: (1) campus access willonly be allowed via university providedshuttles from a safe, remote location,(2) all access will require pre-author-ization, and (3) clearly visible identifi-cation tags will be required at all timesduring campus access. In addition tothese measures, tighter security isneeded in sensitive areas, such as thosethat are dangerous or could be furtherdamaged by entry.

21

Improved systems for chemical andbiohazard inventories are being inves-tigated. Implementation of such sys-tems will allow rapid assessment ofrisks and disposal needs in the eventof small scale or large-scale incidents.Furthermore, improved inventory willassist in the determination of propersecurity measures required in eacharea.

Xavier University

Xavier University of Louisiana is asmall liberal arts school located nearthe geographic center of New Orleans.One week after opening the 2005–2006 academic year with a record4,100 students, Hurricane Katrina hitNew Orleans and flooded the campus(see Figure 3). The ground floor ofevery building on campus had 6–8 ftof water in it. The Central Plant, whichsupplies power to the University, wascompletely destroyed. There was alsowind damage, including the loss of abrand new green house built on top ofthe Norman C. Francis Science Build-ing. All equipment, computers, andpaper files located in ground flooroffices and storage areas were lost.

Nonetheless, the decision was madeto try to reopen the University in Jan-uary 2006. As soon as the flood watersreceded, the campus was fenced off andreconstruction began. The ground floorof every building had to be gutted andrefurbished. In many cases mold hadgrown well above the ground floor leveland presented a real challenge for reme-

Figure 3. Photograph of flooding at XavierPhoto courtesy of Xavier University.

22

diation. Faculty members were notallowed on campus during this timefor both safety and security reasons.

During this rebuilding period,administrators, faculty, staff, and stu-dents were scattered around the coun-try. Many students (�1,500) attendedschool elsewhere. Many faculty mem-bers found temporary positions atother universities. The HowardHughes Medical Institute generouslyallowed faculty to apply for anHHMI-funded sabbatical for the2005–2006 academic year. In spite ofbeing displaced, faculty took on thetask of locating the students to findout what their plans were and encou-rage them to return to Xavier when itreopened. Their efforts paid off. Whenthe University reopened in January2006, 3,098 (75%) of the 4,100 stu-dents returned. Xavier offered a fullacademic year of classes from Januarythrough August, so that students whowere not able to attend school else-where would not be behind. The Uni-versity returned to a normal schedulefor the fall 2006 semester.

Even though Xavier reopened forbusiness in January 2006, repairs arestill not complete. Xavier has had tocome up with much of the estimated$50 million in repair costs on its own.To date the University has onlyreceived a partial settlement from itsinsurance provider and partial supportfrom FEMA. Most of the rest of themoney has come from generous dona-tions from various non-profit organi-

University campus shortly after Katrina.

Journal of Chemical Hea

zations, private donations, and evenforeign countries. Qatar, for example,pledged $5 million to provide financialassistance to students displaced by thehurricane and another $12.5 million tobuild an expansion of the College ofPharmacy.

From the perspective of the Chem-istry Department at Xavier University,we were very lucky. The ChemistryDepartment and its stockroom arelocated on the third floor of the Nor-man C. Francis Science Building andreceived no water damage. An old che-mical waste storage bunker near theloading dock had been eliminated dur-ing recent renovations, so there wereno chemicals on the ground exposed towater. There were two �808 freezersfull of biochemicals, all of which werelost. A couple of small lab refrigeratorsno longer functioned after power wasrestored, presumably from the fumes ofthe chemicals that were stored in them.There were no other problems observedwith chemicals in the Department.Moisture sensitive chemicals were dis-posed of to avoid any potential hazards.We were also lucky with respect toinstrumentation. Our NMR is a perma-nent magnet model, so loss of cryogensand quenching the magnet were not anissue. The humidity did ruin the opticson several infrared spectrophot-ometers. Generous donations haveallowed us to replace the damagedequipment. It is not clear yet whatinstrumentation failures may yet occurfrom exposure to high heat and humid-ity for four months. Rust keeps showingup in unexpected places!

Communications were extremelyimportant during the four months thatXavier was closed and its employeeswere located all around the country.Shortly before the 2005–2006 aca-demic year began, Xavier had set upan emergency website at a remote loca-tion in the Midwest. The website pro-vided a way to disseminateinformation and proved to be a vitallink until the e-mail server was broughtup at another remote location (Phila-delphia) in October.

Xavier was fortunate to have a con-nection with a construction companythat allowed the University to startwork on repairs almost immediately.Other universities that had construc-

lth & Safety, September/October 2007

Easy access toemergency responseprocedures is critical

to successfulhandling of an

emergency.

tion companies on retainer (e.g.,Tulane) were also able to start repairsrelatively quickly. Limiting access tothe campus, although frustrating forthe faculty, sped up the pace of thereconstruction.

Because the Chemistry Departmentreceived only minimal losses, we wereable to share our lab space with DillardUniversity. Dillard’s lab facilities werecompletely destroyed by HurricaneKatrina.The Hilton Hotel in downtownNew Orleans opened its doors to Dil-lard University, housing both studentsand faculty and offering classroomspace, but they had no facilities forchemistry labs. Xavier was able to offerlab space to accommodate all of theirofferings for the spring 2006 semester.

Many faculty and staff members losttheir homes in the hurricane. To housethem until they could get back on theirfeet, Xavier converted two large park-ing lots into FEMA trailer parks.Xavier was able to close one of thetrailer park facilities recently, but stillhas faculty and staff members living intrailers in the other trailer park.

Xavier had no mechanism for evac-uating students living in the dorms.Consequently, a number of studentswere stranded on campus for severaldays after the storm. Even though staffstayed on campus with the students tosupervise them and help take care oftheir needs, this was a traumaticexperience for many of the affectedstudents. Xavier has since madearrangements with Southern Univer-sity in Baton Rouge to accept our stu-dents in the event of an evacuation.Each student has to prepare a personalevacuation plan at the beginning of theschool year, so they know exactly whatthey should do in such a situation.

Hurricane planning has beenextended to the entire University. Eachdepartment or academic unit hasdeveloped a detailed plan to beenacted in case of evacuation. Eachperson has a set of responsibilities tofulfill before leaving town. Eachemployee was also charged with creat-ing his/her own evacuation plan.Xavier now maintains informationfor how to contact its employees if theyare forced to evacuate.

In addition to preparing an evacua-tion plan, the Chemistry Department

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, Septe

and the College of Pharmacy have sub-mitted lists of all chemicals in stock, inwhich room(s) they are located, andhow much is on hand. Prior to Hurri-cane Katrina, faculty members main-tained such a database for areas undertheir supervision, but there was nocomprehensive list and the administra-tion did not have access to the infor-mation.

Xavier now has an agreement withanother university to host its computersystems in case of an evacuation. Fol-lowing Hurricane Katrina, differentcomputing modules (e.g., fiscal, infor-mation technology) were mounted onservers in different locations depend-ing on the location to which thesupervisors had evacuated. The mod-ules became available over a span oftime and could not communicate witheach other effectively until they wererelocated to Xavier. Having a singlefacility where all the computing sys-tems can be mounted will speed theiravailability and improve their func-tionality.

Faculty members are now required toinclude disaster contingencies in theircourse plans. All courses are automa-tically set up on an electronic class-room management system(Blackboard). Course syllabi mustinclude instructions for continuedinstruction in case of an evacuation.Faculty members are encouraged todevelop on-line teaching modules incase of another long term evacuation.

CONCLUSIONS

Easy access to emergency responseprocedures is critical to successfulhandling of an emergency. The abilityto contact all personnel is essential.Knowledge of chemical and biologicalhazards, including their specific loca-tions, is also vital in an emergencysituation. Although not necessarilyneeded during an emergency, dataand other records (e.g., grades, payroll)are crucial for continued operation atany level (e.g., single lab or whole uni-versity). Therefore, a sufficient systemof data protection should be in place.Such a system should include off-sitestorage. In addition to professionaldata, personal data should also be safe-

mber/October 2007

guarded. For example, insurance docu-ments, mortgage documents, wills,immunization records, etc. should allbe copied and stored in a separatelocation. These items are all neededduring recovery from a disaster, butcan easily be lost as the result of thedisaster (e.g., fire, flood).

Security is another important issue ofemergency preparedness. Sufficientplanning and preparation should bemade to ensure that valuable items(e.g., equipment) are protected duringan evacuation. Furthermore, hazardousmaterials should not be accessible tounauthorized personnel, whether inan emergency situation or not. The levelof such security at most universities islikely well below that required.

Although a disaster of the magnitudeof Katrina is not likely to occur in mostpeople’s lives, threats from smallerincidents are more common. Suchincidents include theft, vandalism, fire,lightning, and water damage (e.g., frombroken pipes or improperly used cool-ing systems). The best way to avoidsubstantial loss from such incidentsis to have a well developed plan thatis regularly assessed to ensure compli-ance and preparedness. While thisreport focuses on issues related to uni-versity chemistry departments, indivi-duals should ensure that local, state,and federal agencies have effectiveemergency plans in place.

Despite much difficulty, all fourchemistry departments represented inthis article are making good progresstoward recovery. Even with continuedreorganizations, repairs, equipmentreplacements, and funding shortages,each department is moving forwardwith productive educational andresearch activities. Such productivityis an important contribution to therecovery of each university, the city,and the entire region.

23

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors thank the organizers(Frankie Wood-Black and MortonHoffman) of the symposium at theSept. 2006 ACS National meeting atwhich this material was first presented.M. Tarr acknowledges useful inputfrom the UNO Safety Officer (DavidRichardson).

REFERENCES1. National Hurricane Center tropical

cyclone report for Hurricane Elena

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(1985), available at http://maps.csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/reports.jsp.Accessed January 10, 2007.

2. National Hurricane Center tropical cy-clone report for Hurricane Camille(1969), available at http://maps.csc.-noaa.gov/hurricanes/reports.jsp. Ac-cessed January 10, 2007.

3. National Hurricane Center tropical cy-clone report for Hurricane Betsy (1965),available at http://maps.csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/reports.jsp. Accessed Janu-ary 10, 2007.

4. Knabb, Richard D.; Rhome, Jamie R.;Brown, Daniel P. Tropical Cyclone

Journal of Chemical Hea

Report Hurricane Katrina 23–30 August2005, National Hurricane Center, 20December 2005, at http://maps.csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/reports.jsp. Acces-sed January 10, 2007.

5. http://maps.csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/viewer.html Accessed January 10, 2007.

6. http://factfinder.census.gov/AccessedJanuary 10, 2007.

7. Varney, James. ‘‘Resident count comesin low; N.O. population less than190,000 people,’’ Times-Picayune,October 6, 2006. National Section, p. 1.

8. http://nmviewogc.cr.usgs.gov/viewer.htm Accessed January 10, 2007.

lth & Safety, September/October 2007