how a k-award has advanced a research career: a search for unity in diversity christopher keane

How a K-Award Has Advanced

a Research Career:a Search for Unity in Diversity

Christopher Keane Assistant Professor

Behavioral & Community Health SciencesUniversity of Pittsburgh

[email protected]

AHRQ Conference 2008

mailto:[email protected]

Disciplinary Expertise Prior to K-Award:

• Experimental design and survey design

• Statistical analysis, regression etc.

• Sociology of public health

• Organizational theory relating to contracting

• Biology (had never used in my health studies)

New Disciplinary Approaches Mid-K-Award:

• Experimental economics & game theory

• Modeling of complex adaptive systems

• Philosophy of sociality

• Additional organizational theory & practice

• Neuroeconomics & social neurology

• Psychology of behavior change

Challenge: How to Integrate These Diverse Approaches?

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation (One Unifying Theme):

• Experimental games of trust & cooperation

• Social neurology of trust & cooperation

• Modeling trust & cooperation in systems

• Philosophy of trust & cooperation

• Organizational theories of trust & cooperation • Psychology of behavior change & trust

New Disciplinary Approaches to Study of Trust & Cooperation in Health:

New Partners• Trust & cooperation games in food choices

Two new partners from experimental economic • Social neurology of trust & cooperation

No partners, yet. • Modeling trust & cooperation in health systems

Two new partners, computational modelers• Philosophy of trust & cooperation

A philosopher & computational modeler of trust• Organizational theories of trust & cooperation

Several new partners from other departments• Psychology of behavior change & trust

Several new partners


New Grants (2008 onwards)• Trust & cooperation games in food choices

Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers• Social neurology of trust & cooperation

Incorporated theory into above, could study directly• Modeling trust & cooperation in health systems

Recently funded study of public health systems• Philosophy of trust & cooperation

Incorporated into above studies, especially the game• Organizational theories of trust & cooperation

Incorporated into study of public health systems• Psychology of behavior change & trust

Incorporated into above and HIV study (likely funded)


• Trust & cooperation games in food choices Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers

Approaches:

Conduct several experimental games followed by interviewing

Modeling behavior using conditional rules

Computational simulation of the behavior and social networking


• Trust & cooperation games in food choices Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers

Commitment, Cooperation & Dilemma in Health Choices: Modeling Inter-temporal and Interpersonal Coordination

What food types do people pick when sharing with others, as opposed to when choosing only for themselves?

How do unhealthy or healthy food choice behaviors spread through social networks?

Commitment, Cooperation & Dilemma in Health Choices • Trust & cooperation games in food choices

Funded study of my experimental game with vouchers

Trust Game: At start of game, two players are each given a $10 voucher by the experimenter.All gifts are doubled, = $20 in vouchers

1) Choose whether or not to give your voucher:a) Give b) Keep

2) Choose the type of food voucher:a) Pizzab) McDonald’sc) Café Oned) Café Two

We present the restaurant name, location, menu, for each restaurant.

The Cafés offer healthier options, but we don't label them healthy or unhealthy. All are on campus.

* Investigators will rate the restaurants with the NEMS-R (Saelens et al 2007)

Please don’t quote without permission of author, Christopher Keane

Proposer makes 1st

move

P gives & R gives back, (Reciprocal giving)

P gives & R keeps, (P trusts, but R is selfish)

P & R both keep(Reciprocal selfishness)

P keeps, but R gives, (not likely)

Respondermakes 2nd

move

P keeps the$10 voucher

R keeps the$10 voucher


R keeps the$10 voucher

P gives the$10 voucher

R gives the$10 voucher


R gives the$10 voucher


Four Variations of the GameFour Variations of the GameInter-personal versionInter-personal version Inter-temporal versionInter-temporal version

Turn takingTurn taking

Choice 1Choice 1

Choice 2Choice 2

n = 40 students, randomly n = 40 students, randomly assigned to P or R.assigned to P or R.

P keeps or donates $10*P keeps or donates $10*

R keeps or donates $10* R keeps or donates $10*

Any donation to other player Any donation to other player is doubled.is doubled.

n = 20 students, each plays n = 20 students, each plays alone.alone.

At Time 1, player invests $10 for At Time 1, player invests $10 for Time 2 or takes it home* Time 2 or takes it home*

At Time 2, player can keep or At Time 2, player can keep or invest $10 in Time 3*invest $10 in Time 3*

Any investment in future time Any investment in future time point is doubled.point is doubled.

Choose at Choose at once:once:““dictator”dictator”versionversion

n = 40 studentsn = 40 students

One player chooses the One player chooses the payoff distribution in one payoff distribution in one decision* decision*

n = 20 students*n = 20 students*

One player can choose the One player can choose the payoff distribution in one payoff distribution in one decision* decision*

All subjects choose type of $10 restaurant voucher (choose 1 of 4 restaurants)All subjects choose type of $10 restaurant voucher (choose 1 of 4 restaurants)Please don’t quote without permission of author, Christopher Keane

Proposer makes 1st

move

Respondermakes 2nd

move

P keeps orgives the

$10 voucher


R keeps orgives the

$10 voucher

Please don’t quote without permission of author, Christopher Keane

Trust Game with Restaurant Vouchers, Between Proposer & Responder: One Pattern I Hypothesize is Common

Mirroring

Intending

Mirror Intention

R’s View

Search

for Balance

Search for AnalogousBalancing

Implementing

Mirror Implementation


Search

forBalance

Search

for Balance

P Gives(Pizza)

R Gives(Pizza)

Search

for Balance

R Gives(Pizza)

P Gives(Pizza)

Search

for Balance

R Keeps(Café 1)

P Keeps(Café 1)

Search

for Balance

P Keeps(Café 1)

R Keeps(Café 1)

R’s View

of P’s View

Christopher Keane, 2008, Please don’t quote without permission of author.

Intending & Implementing as Mirrored Balancing

Mirroring

Intending

Mirror Intention

MirrorDomain

FocalDomain

Search

for Balance


Implementing



Search

forBalance

Search

for Balance

SimulateCondition

SimulateAction

Search

for Balance

SimulateCondition

SimulateAction

Search

for Balance

SimulateCondition

SimulateAction

Search

for Balance

PerceiveCondition

TryAction


Food is often a “social choice” that partly depends on what we project others want. Social eating may affect college students’ long-term eating habits & health.

Inter-temporal and inter-personal cooperation and trust may operate similarly. A clear computational model may elucidate this more general inter-agent trust & cooperation.

What we eat is a function of social ecology, including the food environment: what restaurants are available locally, what social networks surround our eating.

A similar framework for modeling trust & cooperation may apply similarly between health organizations.

Significance

Modeling Public (P) & Private (R) Provider Decisions: A Trust Game? (Give = Provide Care to Uninsured)

Mirroring

Intending

Mirror Intention

R’s View

Search

for Balance


Implementing



Search

forBalance

Search

for Balance

Search

for Balance

Search

for Balance

Search

for Balance

P Keeps R Keeps

R’s View

of P’s View

Keane 2008, Using data from Keane 2005. Please don’t quote without permission of author.

P Gives R Gives

P Gives R Gives P Keeps R Keeps


• Modeling trust & cooperation in health systems Recently funded study of public health systems

• Organizational theories of trust & cooperation Incorporated into study of public health systems

“Adaptive Systems Indicators” for Public Health System Emergency Response


Designed to capture the adaptive system processes of public health emergency response.

Assumes public health systems are dynamic networks of human actors who consider:

• Inter-organizational trust in their networks,

• the relative complexity of emergency response rules,

• the Diversity or partners, degree of centralization,

• Tension between top-down & bottom-up decisions.

These factors predict system performance (Choi & Brower 2006, Comfort 1999, 2005, Epstein 2006, Keane 2005, 2008 Axelrod & Cohen 2000)



Measures the properties of networks of public health decision makers that we hypothesize result in effective emergency response:

• inter-organizational trust• degree of centralization-decentralization• connectivity• diversity and participation in decision-making• necessary redundancy in networks• relatively simple decision rules

These factors predict system performance (Choi & Brower 2006, Comfort 1999, 2005, Epstein 2006, Keane 2005, 2008, Axelrod & Cohen 2000)


“Adaptive Systems Indicators” (ASIs) for Public Health System Emergency Response

• inter-organizational trust• degree of centralization-decentralization• connectivity• diversity and participation in decision-making• necessary redundancy in networks• relatively simple decision rules

Initial plan is to measure the ASIs in (a) 12 to 20 public health system networks, including local health departments and their private partners, and (b) approx. 300 local health departments.

The ASIs would supplement existing emergency response guidelines.

The ASI is my contributions to a R01.

PublicHealth Schools

TransitEMS

MentalHealth

Hypothetical Public Health System Legal Network

Level 1

Level 3

Level 2

with 3 as the most directive

We designated 3 levels of mandated relationship,

State Statutory Relationship Worksheet (network matrix)

PublicHealth

EMS MentalHealth

Schools Transit

PublicHealth XX 33EMSEMS 00 XX 00Mental Mental HealthHealth XX 22SchoolSchoolss 33 XXTransitTransit 11 XX

. . . etc.

Level 1

Level 3

Level 2

Rows indicate the organization that state law requires to Initiate contact with other organization (Column).

The network framework is my contribution to R01 grant

Integrating New Approaches to Study of Public Health Systems & Health Behavior:

Integrated Study of: • Adaptive Systems Indicators, & • Public Health System Legal Network for• Computational Modeling of PH Response Systemto improve Public Health System Emergency Response

• Trust & cooperation games in food choices Current study of trust and social food choice• Experimental trust game with restaurant vouchers• Computational modeling of trust & projection in networks

• Modeling trust in adaptive network• Organizational theories of trust & decisions

• Experimental trust games with policy makers?• I’m working on this one

Dilemma: How to flexibly expand expertise via pre-planned mentors?

• Experimental economics & game theory• Neuroeconomics & social neurology• Computational modeling of adaptive systems• Philosophy of sociality• New organizational theory & practice, • Psychology of trust and behavior change etc.

One Strategy: Use “Coordinating mentor”

Planning Growth & Inter-Disciplinarity in my K-Award

• Unlike a traditional grant, career award allows training, to develop expertise in new areas

• therefore requires more flexibility for research agenda, to acquire and apply new ideas

• Perhaps use “Coordinating mentor”

• Flexible approach resulted in publication in very different of prestigious journals, representing sociology, anthropology, health policy, public health practice, medical practice, health management (publications in over a dozen different journals), and a diversity of grants.

• diversity of research with unified theory

how a k-award has advanced a research career: a search for unity in diversity christopher keane

Documents

study of trust cooperation

cooperation dilemma

food choicesfunded study

health systemsrecently

health systemstwo new

modeling behavior

experimental design

food choicestwo new