historical study of distributed operations
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Historical Study Of Distributed Operations. Operation Vigilant Resolve Fallujah, Iraq. 4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004. Overview of Distributed Operations. Taking Dispersion to another level Present a less defined target to the enemy Operations in smaller units More autonomous small units - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Historical Study Of Distributed Operations
Operation Vigilant ResolveFallujah, Iraq
4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004
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Overview of Distributed Operations
• Taking Dispersion to another level
• Present a less defined target to the enemy
• Operations in smaller units
• More autonomous small units
• Leadership and decision making at lower levels
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Why study Fallujah?
Operation Vigilant Resolve is
one of the closest real life
examples of U.S. Marines
conducting distributed-like
operations.
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Why study Fallujah?
• Patrols conducted by squad sized units
• Units dispersed all around Fallujah
• Squad Leaders taking more control of situations
• Varying patrol routes and times, trying to present ambiguous targets to the enemy
• Relying on fire support
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Operation Vigilant ResolveFallujah, Iraq
4 APR 2004 – 9 APR 2004
Overview of Combat Model
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Designing the
Fallujah Model
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Designing the Combat Model
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Designing the Combat Model
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Designing the Combat Model
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Designing the Combat Model
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Designing the Combat Model
• Each blue agent represents a fire team with an M16,M203, and an M249
• Blue agents typically operated in squad-sized units (3 agents)
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Designing the Combat Model
• Red agents were designed to blend in with the local population, giving them a first shot advantage.
• Move in teams of 3-4
• Carry AK47s and RPGs
Before and After Engaging
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Fallujah TimelineDay One (Step 0-720)
• Marines push into city with Tanks and Helos
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Fallujah TimelineDay One (Step 0-720)
• Marines attack a mosque in NW corner.
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Fallujah TimelineThroughout (Step 0-3600)
• Insurgents fire from towers of Central Mosque as Marine snipers patrol SE perimeter
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Fallujah TimelineDay Two (Step 720-1440)
• Heavy fighting in NW neighborhood
• AC130 called in for support
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Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160)
• Gunfight at train station
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Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160)
• Fighting in the South
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Fallujah TimelineDay Three (Step 1440-2160)
• Small skirmishes along Marine Defensive positions on the Northern Perimeter
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Fallujah TimelineDay Four (Step 2160-2880)
• Gun battle between 200 Marines and 800 insurgents in NW.
• Fire support
called in.
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Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600)
• Building to building raids with fire support
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Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600)
• Insurgents try to run road blocks
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Fallujah TimelineDay Five (Step 2880-3600)
• More skirmishes on Northern perimeter
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Stealth and Red Kills
Blue Stealth doesn’t effect Red Kills
Red Stealth greatly reduces Red Kills
Huge decrease in number of Red Kills at 90 Red Stealth
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Stealth and Blue Killed
Blue Stealth significantly reduces blue kills
Red Stealth significantly increases blue kills
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Red Force Size
Increasing size of red force leads to much greater rate of increase in Red Casualties than in Blue Casualties
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Communications Accuracy
Communications Accuracy has little effect
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Communications Latency
• Comms Latency has even less effect
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Lessons Learned
• Impact of Red Stealth emphasizes the value of having first-shot advantage. It is possible that we could use DO to attain a similar advantage or to take that advantage away from our enemies.
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Lessons Learned
• In a very distributed force (the red force) throwing more numbers at the enemy doesn’t result in a significant advantage. This is an argument for DO at the squad level (smaller units).