The Troubles: The IRA, British Strategy and NegotiationsBy Stephen Thompson

301074493Hist-486

April 20, 2011

The image of Ireland held by many portrays an emerald land rich in history,

culture, traditions. Northern Ireland, however, has a different image. It is seen as a land

rich in violence, conflict, and sectarianism. Northern Ireland was plagued by decades of

violence know as ‘The Troubles’. It lasted for roughly 30 years and would result in the

death of 3528, from civilians, to various terrorist groups, and to members of the security

forces.1 After years of conflict a relative peace was achieved. In 1998 the Good Friday

Peace Agreement (GFA) was signed and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the nationalist

republican paramilitary group behind much of the fighting against the British government

agreed to lay down its arms and cease its campaign of violence. Their campaign of terror

had plagued Northern Ireland and had spilled over into Ireland and mainland Britain. The

effective long term British strategy through both security forces and use of its intelligence

assets would hold the IRA to a stand still, but military defeat could not occur and the

political process would end the IRA armed campaign create a relatively stable and lasting

peace.

The conflict in Northern Ireland has no fixed beginning date but has its origins in

the 17th century. In 1609 James I introduced a policy for Protestant plantations in the Irish

province of Ulster. This resulted in the immigration of large amounts of Protestants into

Northern Ireland. The population would grow to become a corner of Ireland that was

populated by a majority of Protestants. But for the purposes of understanding the IRA’s

campaign one must focus solely on the 20th century. The IRA grew from the long history

of Irish rebels who opposed British rule. The first incarnation of the IRA was known for

their role in orchestrating the Easter Uprising of 1916 in Dublin. The revolt was put down

quickly and its leaders were put to death. The IRA would regroup and begin to wage a

1 Malcolm Sutton, CAIN: Sutton Index of Deaths, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status.html.

1

war of terrorism against the British. In 1922 the British rid themselves of the troubled

state and granted it its independence. But the Irish Free State would not gain control of

the north as the land was partitioned, and the six counties in the north, making up most of

the province Ulster, would remain part of the United Kingdom.

The IRA would remain in the background of Irish life and would continue its

campaign of violence with the 1956 to 1962 Border campaign. The campaign was aimed

at overthrowing the Northern Ireland government but would fail and became a part of the

IRA’s history that was relatively unimportant. However it maintained the myth of the

Irish freedom fighter fighting against British rule. This myth would be reinvigorated at

the end of the 1960’s because of ongoing social tensions created by the civil rights

movement.

The population of Northern Ireland consists of two groups: Catholics and

Protestants. The terms for the groups however are less a meaning of religious affiliation

and instead are used to describe which ethnic group a person would belong to.2

Essentially the terms denote a caste system and dictated social standards such as job

employment, housing placement, political parties one voted for, and the communities one

would live in. It is incorrect to assume that the conflict between the groups was one of

irrational hatred that eventually resulted in violence.3 When Northern Ireland was created

in 1922, it contained a minority of 33.5% Catholics was governed as a state that was

absolutely Protestant.4 The civil rights movement would begin in 1964 over the perceived

and real grievances of the Catholic minority.

2 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights to Armalites, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 7. 3 Ó Dochartaigh, Civil Rights, 7. 4 Ibid., 9.

2

The movement had several forms of grievances. First was the issue of

employment practices. No Catholics were employed as the head of any public department

of the Stormont government (Stormont being the seat of government in Northern

Ireland).5 A total 145 Protestants were employed in Londonderry Guildhall (the city

council) compared to 32 Catholics even in an area that was predominately Catholic.6

Overall, Catholics were more likely to be unemployed and if they were employed it

would be in low paying jobs; any Catholic who worked would most likely be making less

money for the same job done by a Protestant.7 Housing was another point of contention.

In Londonderry in 1963 there were only 33 homes built for Catholics, out of a total

applications made for 211 homes – forcing many to live in squalor-like conditions and

crowded housing.8 The political nature of Northern Ireland was another source of

contention in the civil rights movement.

There was great concern with how the Stormont government operated. Of

particular concern was the issue of gerrymandering electoral districts in Catholic areas so

it would produce a Unionist party or other Protestant party majority in electoral districts

that were predominately Catholic.9 By doing so the government created a situation in

where political grievances could not be aired in a democratic manner. Politics was part of

the divided caste system in Northern Ireland where one voted for your own caste. No

party that appealed to both Protestants and Catholics got more than 30% of the vote,

which the Northern Ireland Labour Party managed to achieve in the 1962 general

5 Chris Ryder, The RUC, (London: Methuen, 1989), 103. 6 Ryder, RUC, 103. 7 John Darby, Scorpions in a Bottle, (London: Minority Rights, 1997), 81. 8 Ryder, The RUC, 103. 9 Paul Dixon, Northern Ireland – The Politics of War and Peace, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2008), 66.

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election, but did not form the government.10 The civil rights movement would be taken to

the streets across Northern Ireland during the summer of 1969.

The stability of Northern Ireland began deteriorating as Catholics and Protestants

clashed in the streets. On August 14, 1969 the British Army was deployed on the behest

of the Northern Ireland government as a measure to attempt to restore civil order. The

army would begin offering nightly support to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as

riots took place throughout cities such as Londonderry and Belfast. On October 10, the

Hunt Report was released and recommended that the auxiliary force of the Ulster Special

Constabulary or the ‘B-Specials’ be dissolved. This created a lapse in the ability to deter

the ongoing violence by removing from the police the members who had local knowledge

of IRA activity and began to handicap the intelligence capacity of the security forces.11

By 1970 the IRA began to gain support in Belfast. In the same year the IRA

would split into two factions: the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA (PIRA –

which will be referred to as the IRA for the purpose of this essay). The split came over

the direction the organisation would take and would result in the IRA gaining the

advantage by winning over 9 of the 13 units.12 The IRA claimed that their first purpose

was to act as defenders of the Catholic communities against Protestant attacks carried out

by rioters.13 The Catholic community at this time still placed faith in the ability of the

British Army to restore order. However this belief would be quickly eroded.

Two issues occurred that would turn popular Catholic community support over to

the IRA. The first took place in late March 1970 when barricades began to be constructed

10 Ibid., 58.11 George Styles, Bombs Have No Pity, (London: William Luscombe, 1975), 75.12 M.L.R. Smith, Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement, (New York: Routledge, 1995), 91.13 Smith, Fighting, 91.

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following a series of riots in the Ballymurphy housing estate in West Belfast. Barricades

allowed for the controlled access to the community and had already been placed up in

other Catholic areas, such as the housing estates of Bogside and Creggan in Londonderry.

The British Army allowed these barricades to remain up and this created an entrenching

effect as the IRA became the de facto defenders and resulted in community support and

growing membership. The second took place in the Lower Falls area of Belfast when the

British Army imposed an illegal curfew in order to execute raids in search of weapons.

The night would result in the shooting death of 4 Catholics by the army.14 This gave the

IRA its greatest weapon – angry young men.

The IRA believed it was the legitimate heir to revolutionaries that had fought and

won Ireland’s independence.15 Their fight was linked to the concept of self-determination

as stated by an IRA member, “Our Movement (sic) bases itself on Ireland’s National (sic)

rights, and the right of the Irish people to the ownership of Ireland… That is the main

basis on which we rest our case. We also rest it on the natural and historic right of

resistance to British rule.”16 The IRA began a bombing campaign focusing on economic

targets in October 1970. These targets ranged from factories, hotels, pubs or various

shops. Attacks could be as small an attempt as slipping crude incendiary devices into coat

pockets at a department store set to a timer to go off after the store closed, or as large as a

bomb placed inside a hotel lobby.17As the next year came around the Army Council, the

leadership of the IRA, extended the armed campaign to include members of the security

forces as legitimate targets for attack. These announcements would continue until

14 Ibid., 92.15 Ibid., 94.16 Ibid., 94. 17 Styles, Bombs, 109.

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October 1971 when the Council announced that it had engaged in an armed offensive

campaign of resistance against the British Army.18

The understanding of the IRA was that a limited war against the British would

eventually force the government to engage in negotiations in favour of the IRA’s terms:

the complete withdrawal of the British government and military from Northern Ireland.

The IRA aimed to create psychological pressure on the local population that would then

force their government to take action. The IRA’s use of terror would upset the economy

and make the political price of controlling the province too much to bear. The IRA was

viewing the ongoing decolonisation struggles throughout the British Empire as a case in

point. In Cyprus, Aden, and Palestine, limited but sustained violence against the British

Army brought about a withdrawal. The case of Aden was that 36 soldiers died and forced

the British to leave. This would be the IRA’s magic number.19

Violence spread out across the province and continued to grow steady. In 1971

there were 1756 shooting attacks, 1515 bombing attacks and 174 deaths. In 1972 there

were 10,628 shootings, 1853 bombings and 467 deaths – 208 of those killed were IRA

members.20 This year would also be the most violent averaging 17 shooting incidents and

4 bomb attacks per day.21 Also during this two-year period 58 members of the RUC and

Ulster Defence Regiment were killed and over 1000 injured.22 The IRA said of this period

that, “By causing such terror we demonstrated that whatever steps the Army (sic) took,

the [IRA] would continue the campaign; half a million people in Belfast would be kept

wondering where the [IRA] would strike next and would be forced to tell the British to

18 Smith, Fighting, 95. 19 Ibid., 97.20 Ibid., 95.21 Ibid., 100.22 Ibid., 99.

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make peace with us.”23 By September 1971 a poll conducted by the Daily Mail found that

over 60% of British citizens wanted the British Army to withdraw from the province.24

But the role of the British government in trouble province would take on a new role.

In April 1972 the Stormont parliament was abolished and Direct Rule by

Westminster was imposed. This move was called one of the most important decisions by

carried out by a politician since Irish Home Rule was granted in 1885.25 This would give

the Westminster government the ability to directly rule over the province without the

need to deal with the Stormont parliament and would result in a shift of the government’s

overall strategy to the conflict.

The strategy in 1970 was that in order for the peace progress to even begin the

IRA would need to be defeated by the army however this would present two part problem

for the government. First because in order to carry out the peace process the military had

to target paramilitaries carrying out terrorist attacks; second that the actions by the army

were seen as political actions by Catholics and Protestants.26 The initial strategy was that

the trust of the Catholic population could be regained and that the IRA would be won

away from using violence to meet their political goals. In order to do this the government

made one of the biggest blunders in an anti-terrorist campaign: they reduced military

operations in the Catholic areas and ended up reducing the pressure placed upon the IRA

operations. This in effect allowed the IRA to regroup and further extend and deepen their

support in the Catholic areas due to the lack of army presence and added to the idea that

they were the defenders of the community, not the army.

23 Ibid., 100. 24 Ibid., 100.25 Peter R. Neumann, Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in Northern Ireland 1969-1998, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 69.26 Neumann, Britain’s Long War, 70.

7

The army was frustrated by the government’s lack of willingness to clamp down

on civil liberties when they asked for curfews and identity cards to be imposed.27 The

government recognised the army’s need for low-grade intelligence on IRA actions and

agreed for the breach of the community barricades. On July 31, 1972 Operation

Motorman took place with a strength of 31,000 troops entering the barricaded Catholic

communities and conducting mass arrests in Londonderry and to a lesser extent in

Belfast.28

The IRA campaign would spread to the British mainland. On November 21, 1974

the Birmingham pub bombings occurred and resulted in the death of 17 people and the

injury of 120. The public outrage over the attack resulted in the British Home Secretary

introducing the Prevention of Terrorism Acts into parliament. The acts proscribed the

IRA as an illegal terrorist organisation and conferred the powers to police for arrest

without warrant based on reasonable belief that an individual had been involved or

instigated acts of terrorism or any person who gave refuge to a terrorist. This would be

akin to an official declaration of war against the IRA.

The British government faced a strategic dilemma. It recognised that military

force could not solve the solution in its entirety. But it was in fact facing a force that was

challenging the legitimate government’s authority and engaging in an open act of

insurgency. It was believed that heavy-handed security measures would have an

alienating effecting on the Catholics and push them closer to the IRA. The military

wanted to increase its presence in the province and engage in more oppressive measures

to return the situation to one of relative stability so that security could be returned to

27 Ibid., 78.28 Ibid., 78.

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police control like any normal functioning society. The government would need to work

to use both military force and attempt to improve the relationship between both Catholics

and Protestants.

The policy of internment without trial had been used to round up mass amounts of

suspected terrorists and hold them indefinitely. This policy was one of contention due to

its ability to hold prisoners without proper judicial proceedings. The policy would switch

to selective detention. This would be done by the continuous harassment of known

paramilitary members by arresting and re-arresting them and imprisoning them or

attempting to turn them into informers. The police and the military also began to change

their approach to the IRA with the introduction of undercover units as a means to

improve the surveillance and collection of information on paramilitaries and their

activities. The introduction of the British Special Air Service (SAS) was one such change

in the military’s approach.

The British SAS is a Special Forces military unit that is capable of engaging in a

wide range of intelligence gathering and terrorist targeting activities. On January 7, 1976

the deployment of the SAS was announced. Starting only at 11 members the unit strength

would be expanded to 60 within two months.29 The unit was mainly focused on the South

Armagh area that was a predominately Catholic county and also adjacent to the Republic

of Ireland border.30 This made the area a stronghold for the IRA as it allowed the fluidity

to move across the border and the community support for their actions in the area. The

SAS would use ambushes against IRA members after conducting surveillance and would

use a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy against them.31 However the government came to the

29 Martin Dillon, The Dirty War, (London: Hutchinson, 1988), 162.30 Toby Harnden, Bandit Country – The IRA & South Armagh, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), 116.31 Neumann, 107.

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conclusion that even the SAS operations were too much for a situation where the military

was expected to use a minimum amount of force when engaging. Overall the new

approached had a positive effect on the conflict. Deaths began to drop: in 1976 there were

297 and by 1978 there were 81. Protestant paramilitary groups in Belfast were greatly

affected by the arrest and re-arrest policy and helped to reduce operations by 90%.32

The 1980’s would be a hardening of attitude towards the IRA after the election of

Margaret Thatcher in 1979. It should be noted that during her time as prime minister that

there was not an actual increase in the level of force used by security forces even after

such incidents as the 18 killed soldiers at Warrenpoint and the murder of the Lord

Mountbatten, both in 1979. After these attacks Sir Maurice Oldfield, a former head of

British MI-6 foreign intelligence service was appointed as the Security Co-ordinator for

Northern Ireland. This would put him in direct control over all intelligence in the

province. Oldfield is credited with inspiring two new aspects to be used against the IRA:

the first, called ‘taking out’, was engaging in targeted assassination operations against the

middle level IRA leaders; the second, called ‘turning’, was inspired by his experience

with dealing with double-agents from the Soviet KGB intelligence service.33

Turning would involve the arrest of a targeted individual who were perceived to

be suitable to becoming an informer and then followed by the use of ideological

persuasion and other inducements. The best place for this to take place was in a police

station after a target had been arrested and specifically done soon after the arrest when the

target was more stressed and the police were in control.34 Inducements often include large

32 Ibid., 108. 33 Steven Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland, (Oxford: University Press, 1995), 46.34 Greer, Supergrasses, 47.

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sums of money, a new identity, or a new home or given a new life away from the United

Kingdom.35

Under Oldfield the “Department” would be created and would bring together all

aspects of intelligence gathering included: MI6, MI5, SAS, RUC Special Branch, and

Bronze Section RUC Special Patrol Group.36 A large budget was given to the Department

as it spent some 300 million pound sterling on closed-circuit television cameras

throughout the province and included infrared technology that could even detect and

record movements in the dark. The RUC already possessed a sophisticated computer

system network but this was upgraded with digital and data communications system

called MSX – this allowed all police stations, and patrol vehicles to access to the

computer network system.37

An informer turned over under this new system was called a “supergrass”. This

new system gained momentum in 1982 due to several factors: First was the threat of

informers being murdered by their own paramilitary groups if they had been discovered

assisting the police; second was that many paramilitary members had served prison

sentences for offences carried out during the 1970’s and the threat of being processed by

the judicial system again could see them spend significantly longer sentences in prison;

third was the long nature of the conflict, many paramilitary members were giving

personal sacrifices to a movement that was yielding little in returns. Many saw the need

to put their own families first and the opportunity to start their lives away from the

conflict.38 The media dubbed 1982 as the “year of the supergrass” when it became more

widely known to the public. In just a two year period from 1981 to 1983 there were a 35 Ibid., 47. 36 Ibid., 48. 37 Ibid., 48. 38 Ibid., 50.

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total of 27 supergrasses and resulted in the arrest of 600 suspects based on the evidence

they provided.39

The conflict became a stalemate as the British remained staunchly opposed to

giving into the IRA and the IRA unwilling to cease fighting. Political processes remained

in the background for much of the conflict. Negotiations were taking place between

British government and Irish government in 1985, which would lead to the Anglo-Irish

Agreement (AIA). This would give help coordinate both the Irish and British

governments on solving cross-border issues and a step towards recognising that Dublin

would have a role in the ending the conflict as well. The IRA sought to prevent this and

engaged in attacks throughout 1985 to disrupt talks.40 It was at this time the IRA was

rethinking its campaign of armed violence and while publicly attacking the AIA, both in

the literal and figurative sense; its leaders were offering praise for the positive step

forward.41

The AIA would be the first step in a ten-year period in which substantial steps

would be taken towards ending the conflict. But years of war and the propaganda used by

both republicans and unionist, those who wanted Northern Ireland to join the Republic of

Ireland and those who wanted it to stay with Britain, made diplomacy difficult because

they represented their communities who wanted their leaders to represent what was best

for them first.42 The key problem was to attempt to bridge the gap between the two

ideologies and bring community leaders together in order to form a lasting peace

agreement.43

39 Ibid., 57. 40 Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Fein 1985 to Today, (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 1993), 134.41 Dixon, Northern Ireland, 216.42 Ibid., 214. 43 Ibid., 210.

12

Britain was required to balance these sentiments in order to create an

environment conducive to creating peace. The British government also had to declare

itself a neutral arbitrator in the negotiations but in another sense it was directly involved

and not neutral. The clash of perspectives was great between the republicans and

unionists. Republicans needed to show groups like the IRA and its supporters that the

campaign it waged was not in vain and that they would have more power through politics

than through violence to make changes, all with the backing of support from the Republic

of Ireland. The unionists saw this as a surrender to terrorism and that it would alienate its

followers, while the British government had given reassurance of its support to the

unionists position.44

The Downing Street Declaration (DSD) was published on December 15, 1993 and

would be another step forward in pushing both sides of the conflict to peace talks. The

DSD was written in a way to be purposefully ambiguous and open to interpretation by

republicans and unionists.45 Its contents called for the history of violence to be overcome,

for the promotion of cooperation with the North and South Ireland, and called for the

creation of government institutions that would allow for fair treatment of all. The

following year another milestone took place.

On August 31, 1994 the IRA called for a ceasefire under the impression of a

document released by the republican movement call TUAS. This document had two

meanings: Tactical Use of Armed Struggle to those traditional republicans who read it;

while others such as the English, Irish and American government who were now involved

in the peace talks read it as Totally UnArmed Struggle.46 The permanence of the ceasefire

44 Ibid., 215-216.45 Ibid., 235.46 Ibid., 236.

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was held as important in order that the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, could not use the

threat of violence if negotiations broke down or did not go in their favour. United States

Senator George Mitchell released a report on January 24, 1996 that stated that

paramilitary groups will not decommission their arms in order for all-party negotiations

to take place but it stated that such verified decommissioning needed to be part of the

process.47 The response would be clear from the IRA on decommissioning.

On February 9, the IRA broke the 18-month ceasefire when it bombed the Canary

Wharf at London’s Dockside killing 2, and wounding over 100. Both the British and Irish

governments called for a return to a ceasefire and for elections to take place for elected

representatives to take part in the all-party talks.48 However the year would continue to be

a peak in violence. July is the traditional marching season for members of the Orange

Order, a fraternal Protestant organisation linked to the conquering of Northern Ireland by

King William III. The prevention of the march through a Catholic community by the

RUC resulted in 3 days of rioting and sympathy protests taking place all over Northern

Ireland. The RUC would allow the march to take place only because they lacked the

ability to maintain order. RUC Chief Constable Flanagan said of the event, “The country

stared into the face of a great difficulty and crept right to the edge of the abyss.”49 There

was a real fear that this violence could have escalated into a civil war. The situation

would diminish after the end of the marching season and the next year would show real

progress.

On July 20, 1997 the IRA agreed to another ceasefire. Talks would begin on

September 9 and by April 10, 1998 the Good Friday Agreement was signed. The

47 Ibid., 255.48 Ibid., 256.49 Ibid., 261.

14

Agreement would bring about a 108 member assembly elected by proportional

representation through single transferable vote and would have both the legislative and

executive powers over matters that were responsible of the province’s government. This

assembly would contain checks and balances that would prevent a domination of power

by the Protestant majority. Members would be required to state on ballots whether they

held unionist or republican views. The executive of the First Minister would be elected by

cross-community support and the rest of the ministers would be appointed based upon

party strength in the assembly.50 The agreement also consisted of an improvement of

intergovernmental relations with the Irish and British government.

Reconciliation and equality was a major part of the agreement as it sought to close

the gap between Catholics and Protestants. The British government would implement the

European Convention on Human Rights and create a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.

In addition to this both an Equality and Victims Commission would be created. The

justice system would also be dealt with; one of the issues was the RUC. The RUC

represented a Protestant police force that faced mixed opinions. A poll from January 1996

in the Belfast Telegraph showed 74% of Catholics believed changes had to take place in

regards to the RUC, while 71% of Protestants wanted it to remain the same.51 The

agreement did not mention decommissioning of arms but stated that paramilitary groups

that had engaged in a complete ceasefire would be eligible to have their members to

receive an early release in two years from prison.52

Peace had come to Northern Ireland – somewhat. The agreement meant left many

dissatisfied, with mixed opinions but most expressed that the nationalists/republicans had

50 Ibid., 265-266.51 Darby, Scorpions, 108.52 Dixon, Northern Ireland, 267.

15

been favoured by the agreement. 53 The IRA underwent a split by members who opposed

the agreement. In July 1998 the Real IRA aided by the Continuity IRA detonated a car

bomb in a shopping district in Omagh killing 29 people and injuring 310 – it would be the

most destructive bomb in terms of human life loss of the entire conflict.54

Westminster would devolve its power to the new Stormont government on

December 2, 1999. But this would be suspended in 10 weeks time in order to prevent an

election from taking place that would have likely resulted in the election of parties that

would weaken the power of moderates. The British would return power on May 29, 2000.

However the IRA and other paramilitary groups placed a continuing burden on the peace

process. By 2001 the IRA had still not acted on decommissioning its arms. Violence

sparked again as loyalist paramilitaries withdrew their support for the GFA in July and

riots would be occurred from 2001 and again into 2002.55

The IRA became less terrorist and more criminal after this point in time. One

most notable event carried out by the organisation was the Northern Bank robbery,

resulting in the theft of 26.5 million pounds sterling. However this trend would be short

lived. On July 28, 2005 the IRA called an end to its armed campaign and that it was ready

to begin its final act of decommissioning of its arms. The loyalist paramilitaries also

began to decommission, in 2007 the Ulster Volunteer Force claimed it had deactivated

and stopped all operations. The Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters,

issued a statement on November 11, 2007 stating, “The Ulster Defence Association

believes that the war is over (sic) and we are now in a new democratic dispensation that

53 Ibid., 287.54 Ibid., 293. 55 Ibid., 299.

16

will lead to permanent political stability…”56 By January 6, 2010 the UDA announced it

had put all its weapons beyond use.57

For hundreds of years there have been tensions between the Protestant and

Catholic communities in Northern Ireland, starting from the time of the Ulster

plantations. The partition of Ireland in 1922 would create a part of Ireland that was

Protestant with a Catholic minority and the politics of government governed in a way

with little regard to Catholics. By the 1960’s criticism was being voiced at the inequality

and poor living conditions and unemployment the Catholics faced and would result in a

civil rights movement. This movement would be the spark to tensions that would become

open hostilities for the next 30 years.

The Irish Republican Army was the original group that fought for Irish

independence against the British. The IRA in Northern Ireland would claim this as part of

their heritage and legitimise their movement in their eyes by claiming the historical

legacy as freedom fighters. The civil rights movement gave the IRA an opportunity to

take up the role as defenders of the Catholic communities from Protestant rioters. The

communities would construct barricades that would become IRA recruiting grounds and

gain public support and allowed the IRA to engage in an insurgency. The IRA would

insurgency would involve the beginning of a violent bombing and targeted shooting

campaign against civilian, economic and security force targets.

The 1974 Birmingham bombings would bring about public action in the United

Kingdom to enact anti-terrorism legislation. This legislation would result in a shift in

policy towards intelligence gathering and use by such groups as the SAS and the policy 56 Conflict Archive on the Internet, “'Remembrance Day Statement' by the Ulster Defence Association,” http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uda/uda111107.htm. 57 Ibid., “Extracts from the Decommissioning Statement by the Ulster Defence Association,” http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uda/uda111107.htm.

17

of police primacy to deal with terrorists. The supergrass system would prove helpful but

overall the military was not in a role to ‘win’ an anti-terrorist campaign. The military in

all operational aspects could quite possibly have defeated a terrorist campaign but the

root of the problem would have remained untouched.

The conflict was solved not by SAS ambushes and prison sentences but a long-

term diplomatic effort. A continuous attempt of diplomacy was carried out between the

British government and various republican elements. By 1994 the IRA had declared a

ceasefire only to break it again 18 months later. The negotiations represented a difficulty

for both sides as each feared of gaining less than the other and elements within these

groups saw it as surrendering to the other in some form.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 would cut through the hearts of the

community while some opposed it and others like the Real IRA were willing to use

violence to continue on fighting. The 21st century would see a sharp rise in violence only

to fade off as paramilitary groups on both sides of the conflicts began to decommission

their arms and by 2010 the last of the largest loyalist paramilitaries had decommissioned

its arms.

The Troubles is a defining part of the history of Northern Ireland and represents

how deep tensions can spill over into violence. The British military could never win such

a war, not because of a lack of ability or means by lack of means but because the tension

was created by inequalities. By coming together to engage in negotiations and both sides

willing to makes concessions Northern Ireland was able to overcome open sectarian

violence. The Troubles would become an example of how terrorism could be defeated by

both the military and the politics to reach an endgame.

18

Bibliography

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