Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2008DOI: 10.1163/187465608X363463Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201 www.brill.nl/chcocontributionsto the historyof conceptsConceptual History and Politics: Is the Concept of Democracy Essentially Contested?Oliver HidalgoInstitut fr Politikwissenschaft der Universitt RegensburgAbstractTis article surveys the history of the concept of democracy from Ancient times to the present. According to the author, the conceptual history of democracy shows that the overwhelming success of the concept is most of all due to its ability to subsume verydierenthistoricalideasandrealitiesunderitssemanticeld.Moreover,the historical evolution of the concept reveals that no unequivocal denition is possible because of the signicant paradoxes, aporias, and contradictions it contains. Tese are popular sovereignty vs. representation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality, individual vs. collective, and, nally, the synchronicity between similarities and dis-similarities.Teubiquitoususageofdemocracyinpresent-daypoliticallanguage makes it impossible to speak of it from an external perspective. Tus, both demo-cratic theory and practice are suused with empirical and normative elements.Keywordsdemocracy, conceptual history, conceptual politics, normative theoryTe concept of democracy has been associated at dierent points in history with some very opposing ideas: while the ancients used the term toidentifytheeectiveruleofthemanyorevenofthewholepeople (despite the fact only a minority were considered citizens and the popula-tion was constricted to a small area), modern thinkers employ it in order torefertoasocietyinwhichpeopleareabletoelectandcontroltheir rulers as a means to guarantee freedom, equality, and the pursuit of self-interest for all individuals.1 Tere are also countless other forms of govern-1)ForacomprehensiveanalysisofancientandmoderndemocraciesseeMosesI.Finley (1980), Fritz Gschnitzer (1995), and Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick (1996). O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201177ment which adopt patterns, (sub-)types, and varieties of decision-making processes that have also been labelled democratic, making it hard to keep orientation. Tis myriad usage of the concept leads to a spate of distinc-tions and qualications. Most traditionally, one can speak of democracies that are liberal or republican, direct or representative, consensual or majori-tarian, market or socially oriented. More recently, other variants acquired prominence such as participatory, deliberative and grassroots democracies, orevenalternativeslikedemarchy,skeweddemocracyandnon-partisan democracy. Finally, considering how democracies have evolved worldwide, even the possibility of a specic Islamic transformation of democracy or of a socialist and anarchist brand of democratization might expand the scope of the concept in the future.If a typology is plausible (a di cult task as it is, since nowadays the basic traits of a direct democracy -initiatives, referenda and recalls take place within the representative system and the people sometimes not only han-dle legislative but certain executive and judicial powers as well), we cannot avoid the suspicion that the government of the people, by the people, and for the people (Abraham Lincoln) might just as well mean everyone and everything.2Rather than succumbing to a mood of dismay, we must take into con-sideration W. B. Gallies classical statement that democracy like justice or artsisyetanotheroneamongthoseessentiallycontestedconcepts which lack unique standards of denition.3 Furthermore (and fortunately) the contest seems to concern rst and foremost the interpretation of the concept, not the concept of democracy itself.4 Obviously then the question that must be made is whether it is possible to nd arguments and criteria toassesswhatisthebestinterpretationoftheconceptofdemocracyor whether all there is to be done is to accept a juxtaposition of competing versions.Tisapproachimpliesasecond,deeperproblem,namely,the extenttowhichconceptualhistorymighthelpinacquiringanormative perception of democracy. At rst glance, there can only be an answer in the negative: conceptual history (here understood as the description and anal-ysis of concrete historical semantics, origins, derivations and alterations of 2)Giovanni Sartori (1992), 11.3)See Walter B. Gallie (1956).4)SeesomeconsiderationsconcerningnormativeconceptspresentedbyStephenLukes (1974) and Rainer Forst (2003), 50-52. 178O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201concepts) apparently belongs to the empirical paradigm in social sciences,5 therefore a normative notion of democracy (and not only a reection of the social and moral impact of democratic ideas and values) can only be informed by political philosophy. However, simply considering what the entire range of the history of political ideas is able to oer would be much too simple. Instead, we must acknowledge the importance and thus pro-ceedtoanalyzethehistoricalandconceptualcontextsthatprovidethe framework for the development of a normative theory of democracy after the linguistic turn.6 It is therefore possible to separate conceptual history from an abstract history of ideas even if it remains closely bound to norma-tivetheories.Tispresentsthepoliticalphilosopherswithanadditional task. Tey must also make an eort to clarify the extent to which the con-ceptualhistoryofdemocracymightfunctionasabasisforanykindof conceptual politics7 depending on whether they are able to extrapolate the best interpretation of the concept of democracy. However, rst I would like to discuss, briey, democracy as a historical concept, before showing that conceptual history also leads to the necessity of a normative concep-tion that reects the aporias and contradictions of democracy.1.Te Concept of DemocracyAs it is well-known, ancient Greece is the birthplace of democracy.8 Te word (which means the rule by the people) was invented bytheAtheniansinordertodenetheirpoliticalsystemafter462/461 B.C., particularly after Ephialtes put in place the proposals of Cleisthenes in 508/507 B.C, disempowering the aristocratic Areopag and turning most 5)Trough his writings on Quentin Skinner and Reinhart Koselleck, Kari Palonen (2002) intendstoturnthehistoryofconceptsintoasubversivecritiqueofnormativepolitical theory.6)Arno Waschkuhn (1998), part 3. 7)Conceptual politics is my translation of Reinhard Mehrings concept of Begrispolitik by which he wants to characterize both the method of Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck in contrast to their own conceptions of sociologist or historian of concepts. See Reinhard Mehring (2006), 31, as well as the analogy to Hermann Lbbes concept of Ideenpolitik. For the conceptual politics of Max Weber, see also Kari Palonen (2005). 8)Some authors argue that the historical origins of democracy can be found already in the Sumerian City and the rst republics of ancient India but these examples are at best democ-racies avant la lettre which makes them irrelevant for this article. O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201179of the important political decisions to the assembly constituted exclusively by male citizens.9 At the time, the rst principles of democracy were free-dom and equality all citizens being free by birth each one would accept the other as an equal,10 and henceforth by ruling they accepted to be ruled in return. After the second half of the fth century, democracy also meant that o cials were to be controlled by xed laws and by the peoples vote and as stated in Pericles funeral oration which survived thanks to Tucy-dides that citizens would be ensured the right to live on their own behalf without being educated and guarded by the state and its public norms.11Te rst historian to mention the concept of was obviously Herodotus.Nevertheless,wemustretraceitsoriginsatleastbacktothe tyrannyofthePeisistratides12andtheAthenianSeaUnion13whenthe nobles position was weakened while that of the citizens the was strengthened.Moreover,theetymologicalderivationoftheword alsoshowsthereplacementoflaw(nomos)asconstitutional concept(,)byanemphasisonpower,thatisarche (, ) and kratia (), respectively.14Tese shifts show evidence that the concept of democracy was above all an attempt to identify political reality in ancient Athens. Today one can hardly call democratic the political system in Attica, which included slav-eryandexcludedallwomenandforeignersfromcitizenship.Tiscon-versely makes it much easier to adopt the concept of in order todescribepresent-daypoliticalconditions.However,theverysingular and complex circumstances that led to the development of the rule by the peopleinAthenshardlycomparewithotherpoliticalcontextsanderas. Rather than applying contemporary standards of democracy, one should be able to contextualize the claims of the ancient Greeks. In this light, it is nosurprisethatmanythinkersinancientGreeceamongthemPlato (whoassociateddemocracywithchaosandanarchy),butalsoSocrates, Xenophonandothershopedforanaristocraticwindofchangeinthe city of Athens, leading them to lament the loss of moral order and authority 9)Kurt A. Raaaub (1995), Jochen Martin (1995), and Jochen Bleicken (1995). 10)See Aristotle (1280a), 5-7 and 24; (1291b), 32-38; and (1301a), 28-32. 11)Werner Conze et al. (1972), 828. 12)Michael Stahl (1987) and Konrad Kinzl (1995). 13)Kurt A. Raaaub (1995), 36. 14)Christian Meier (1983). 180O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201and to call for the rule of the best (), or of the ones distinguished by their bravery () instead of the rule of the many, the mob ().15 Nevertheless, they were also capable of developing a readiness to accept an arrangementcompatiblewithdemocraticrealityinAthens.Socrates famously preferred to die rather than to break the democratic laws of the city; Xenophon returned to Athens after the reconciliation between Ath-ensandSparta;Platomadeaninterestingdistinctionbetweenagood andabadformofdemocracy,whichissupposedtohaveinuenced Aristotlesconceptionofasanamalgambetweenoligarchyand democracy and therefore as a compromise between the quality of govern-ment and the peoples participation.16 Te mixed constitution subsequently became the only conceivable form of Greek democracy outside Athens and its Sea Union.17 Later the Romans put a new emphasis on law as a system, including democracy only as a supplement. Teir concept of res publica connectingmonarchic,aristocraticanddemocraticelements18wasa model of constitution deemed to be the best insurance against instability, from Polybius to Machiavelli.After the fall of the republic and the rise of the Roman Empire the con-cept of democracy was submitted to new assessment as a result of political circumstances.WhileAeliusAristidescalledtheImperiumromanuma commondemocracyoftheworld,underoneman,thebestrulerand director,19 Cassius Dio stressed that real democracy could only exist under a monarchy, whereby the Platonic formula of justice (Doing ones own) wassupposedtobenolongeraristocraticbutdemocratic.20Ultimately, 15)Early supporters of democracy like Herodotus and Pericles, who linked justice and iso-nomia to the rule of the , still did not envisage a conict between citizens and nobles but merely did emphasize the unity of the city against the menace of oligarchy and tyranny. At rst nobles like Pindar and Plato innovated the political and moral concept of aristocracy in order to pit the rule of the best against democracy or as Tucidides and Aristotle did later to distinguish good from bad oligarchies. For the conceptual history of aristocracy see Werner Conze and Christian Meier (1972). 16)In Aristotle a pure democracy is described as degenerated rule of the poor (1279b 5-10). His concept of politeia understood as the good form of democracy or also as free constitu-tion was shared by Isocrates (IV, 125; ep. VI, 11) and Demosthenes (I, 5; VI, 21; XV, 20).17)Wolfgang Schuller (1995), 316-23 and Alexander Demandt (1995), viii and ix. 18)For the strong elements of popular participation in Rome, see John North (1994). 19)Aelius Aristides (1981), XXVI, 60. See also Richard Klein (1981), 131f.20)CassiusDio(1961),LVI,43.4.andVI,23.5.SeealsoAlexanderDemandt(1995), 213. O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201181neitherAristidesnorDiowantedtorenouncethelegitimizingvaluethe concept of democracy still carried in the rst centuries of the Christian era. Te situation only changed during the European Middle Ages, when the predominanceofreligionoverallaspectsoflifemadethereferenceto democracy evidently useless. It was not until the thirteenth century that a few thinkers revived the concept notably, St. Tomas of Aquinas, Engel-bertofAdmont,MarsiliusofPaduaandNicoleOresmewhoencoun-tered it through their reception of Aristotle21 and started using it to describe the contemporary politics of the Italian cities.22 But even the rise of Prot-estantism and the diminishing authority of the Catholic Church (accom-panied by the rise of contract theory, which epitomized the new forms of rationalisminpolitics)couldnotimmediatelychangetheassociationof the concept of democracy with antiquity. Te concept of representation, especially, was for a long time considered to be incompatible with the idea of the ruling people. Hence Tomas Hobbes argues in favour of represen-tation and against democracy even though his argument that every man is born free and equal can be said to be democratic. Meanwhile, Rousseau insisted, vice-versa, on the sovereignty of the people against representation. Obviously they shared the unchanged idea that democracy means nothing else than the reign of the people over themselves for Hobbes a terrible imageandforRousseausomethingtoonicetobeactualized.23Further-more, since the Reformation and the Enlightenment the concept of democ-racy was sporadically used to identify some specic elements of the mixed constitutioninEngland(Blackstone,DeLolme,JohnAdams),ofthe republican constitutions of Switzerland and its cantons, of the Netherlands, 21)Te philosophical work of Aristotle was unknown in the West from the fth century all the way to the late twelfth century. 22)See Claire R. Sherman (1995), 240-52; Karl Ubl (2000), 134., R.W. Dyson (2003), 203-05 and 246-50. 23) prendre le terme dans la rigueur de lacception, il na jamais exist de vritable dmo-cratie, et il nen existera jamais [. . .] Sil y avait un peuple de dieux, il se gouvernerait dmo-cratiquement. Un gouvernement si parfait ne convient pas des hommes. Translation: In its most rigorous sense, there has never been a true democracy, such a thing will never exist [. . .] If a people of god existed, it would govern itself democratically. Such a perfect govern-mentisnotappropriateformankind.Jean-JacquesRousseau,Ducontratsocial,(1959-1969), III, 4.182O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201and also of some German cities.24 Nevertheless, the (Aristotelian) scepti-cism concerning the realization of a pure democracy still predominated until the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, also very Aristotelian was the fact that many thinkers restricted the concepts use to the description of the state and government system, as, for example, in the works of Johan-nes Althusius, John Henry Alsted, Tomas Hobbes, William Temple, John Locke, Samuel von Pufendorf, Christian Wol, Charles de Montesquieu, the Encyclopaedie (De Jaucourt), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Christoph Martin Wieland and August von Schlzer.Tishistoricalcontextexplainswhytheconceptofdemocracywould notstrikeachordduringtheFrenchRevolution.Duringitsrststage, republic was still the most widely used concept.25 In this sense, the works of the Abb Sieys are instrumental in proving that only the republic was assumed to be able to include a modern market economy as well as a rep-resentative government,26 whereas democracy was still associated with the direct rule of the people and the virt of citizens. A few years later, how-ever, there was a signicant increase in the number of positive statements concerning democracy uttered by the revolutionaries,27 but eventually the reign of the Jacobins only served to conrm scepticism towards democracy, discreditingtheconceptforanotherfewdecades,especiallyinEngland andinGermany.TisishowinKantsZumEwigenFrieden(1795)a complementofRousseausContratsocialinwhichanimportantdistinc-tion between the forma regiminis (republicanism and despotism) and the formaimperii(monarchy,aristocracy,anddemocracy)canbefound democracy remains associated with the absence of checks and balances as well as of representation and the rule of law.2824)SeeforexampleMartinLuthersaddressonFebruary7th1539(WAIV:4324),and Ren Louis dArgensons Considrations (1764), 8., 61f., 70., and 103. 25)TereforetheconceptofdmocratiedidnotplayanyroleduringtheFrenchdebate concerning the surage universel in 1790. See Robert R. Palmer (1953), 214. 26)Jean Roels (1969).27)See for instance Robespierres address on February 5th 1794 when he made no substan-tial distinction between democracy and republic. Charles Vellay (1908), 324.28)Before Sieys and Kant, the Federalists argued in favour of the republic and against the ancient idea of a democratic executive that might lead to despotism. In the United States, theconceptofdemocracyhadaratherpejorativeimageatleastuntiltheJacksonian Democracy, after 1828 despite the sympathies sporadically voiced by Tomas Jeerson. SeeGustavH.Blanke(1956),43..Supposedly,thereasonforthisisthatdemocracy O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201183Two complementary things had to happen before the concept of democ-racycouldstartitstriumphantadvance.Firstofthemwasthehistorical overcomingoftheantagonismbetweendemocracyandrepresentation and, second, the extension of the concept beyond the classication of state and government to the description of a particular form of society as well. Te Marquis dArgenson was possibly the author who prepared and antic-ipatedbothinnovationsinthemiddleoftheeighteenthcentury.Inhis Considrations sur le gouvernement (1764) he distinguished between a fausse and a lgitime democracy, the rst one being anarchic and revolutionary, the second its true version, being represented by elected deputies.29 Te amalgam between the concept of democracy and political representation became possible because dArgenson neglected the state and constitutional order and focussed on the social system. About one hundred years before Tocqueville30healreadywasconcernedwiththehistoricalprogrsdela dmocratie in France and also stressed the decisive role of the French mon-archyinrepressingEuropeanfeudalismandtheprivilegesofthenobles and in allowing the rise of civil society and social equality.31DArgensonsroyalistviewondemocracybecamepoliticallye cient soon after the French Revolution when Tomas Paines answer to Edmund Burkes Reections on the Revolution in France (1790) in Te Rights of Man (1791)begantodissolvetheideathatdemocracyandrepresentative governmentmustremainacontradictioinadjecto.32Inthissamevein, thedistinctionbetweentheformaregiminisandtheformaimperii,asit wasexpressedbyKant,shiftedtowardstheinterpretationthatrather thantherepublic,democracymightbetheforthcomingaimofhistory, whether in France (Constant, Guizot) or in Germany (Schlegel, Grres). becameidentiedwiththeterreuroftheJacobins.SeeWilliamCorbettsHistoryofthe American Jacobins Commonly Denominated Democrates (1796). 29)Ren Louis dArgenson (1764), 7f. A similar yet not so strict distinction can be found in the Deutsche Encyclopdie from 1783. 30)Te Considrations started circulating in France after the 1730s. See R.R. Palmer 1953: 205. 31)Ren Louis dArgenson (1764), 135.32)Cf.DolfSternberger(1980).TereforeFichtesandSchlegelsreceptionsofKants ZumEwigenFriedenfollowingCampesZweitemVersuchdeutscherSprachbereicherung (1792) insist on the compatibility between a representative democracy and a republic. See Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1965a), 160; (1965b), 431. and Friedrich Schlegel (1966), 12-17. Kant himself conrmed this view in his Metaphysik der Sitten (1797). 184O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201As this development occurred, Aristotles quantitative criterion the rule of one, a few or many and most notably the opposition between monar-chy and democracy receded into the background. Later in the nineteenth century (and particularly after the 1848 Revolution) the question was not longer if democracy was within the historic horizon, but simply what kind of democracy lied ahead in the future: free or despotic, liberal or socialist, monarchic or republican, elitist, grass-rooted or anarchic, or perhaps even a democratic dictatorship. All these options became available due to the fact that the concept of democracy had increasingly become a synonym for modern society and culture,33 and that democratic theories (Jeerson, Toc-queville,vonStein,Lincoln,Mill,Proudhon,34Marx,Mosca,Dewey) changedintonormative(ornormative-empirical)conceptstailoredto organize the social reality of democracy or to overcome it, as for Nietzsche, Sorel,andPareto.Startinginthenineteenthcentury,oneisalsoableto observehowdemocraticsystemsdevelopdistinctivelyineachcountry, region, and continent. While the Anglo-American brand stood out for its liberal aspects, France and other countries in Continental Europe remained more strongly connected to the republican tradition. If presidential democ-racyisdominanttodayinNorthandSouthAmerica(andinEastern Europemorerecently),inWesternEuropeparliamentarygovernments have been prevalent (despite some ill-fated hesitations and interruptions in Germany,Italy,Portugal,andSpain).Teepoch-deningsuccessof democracy as a constitutional and social order, and, additionally, as a polit-ical practice gave rise to a host of empirical and formal theories during the twentieth century (Weber, Schumpeter, Popper, Downs, Carl J. Friedrich, Dahl,Lipset).Atraitthesetheorieshaveincommonistheattemptto describe, analyze, and forecast democratic processes and politics. Te dom-inance of the formal-empirical paradigm in the social sciences succeeded in promotingtheopinionthatconceptsofdemocracyrestinguponnorms andidealslackingsystematicreferencetopoliticalrealityweregenerally 33)In this respect, the fundamental break between the concept of democracy and its ancient heritageoccurredduringthenineteenthcentury(Constant,Bluntschli).Sincethenthe identication of democracy with Protestant equality and Contract Teory (von Rotteck) have been reected in the use of the concept. 34)In Tocqueville and Proudhon it is also possible to nd the Kantian insight that modern democracy means most of all a peaceful handling of political and social conicts beyond the former Kriegergesellschaft.O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201185undermined by empirical denitions.35 Nevertheless, there are still eec-tivenormativeconceptsofdemocracy,emphasizing,forexample,justice (Rawls)oritsbondtohumanrights(Habermas).Neithershouldother lesserknownconceptionsofdemocracybeignored,suchasthosethat criticize the lack of peoples participation in contemporary liberal democ-racies(Barber,Bellah,Putnam)orthatunderscoreitsinevitabledecline due to the belief that democratic levelling is the conditio sine qua non of totalitarianism (Lefort, Arendt). Furthermore, it is possible to nd theories that combine aspects of normative and empirical conceptions36 as well as other rather empirical concepts that are used to formulate quasi-normative concepts that inform the construction of a new social and political world order, such as modernity, for example. It seems inevitable today that the empiricalrealityandvarietyofdemocraticinstitutionsandsocietiesis accompaniedbyrenewedcriticalnormativereectionsontheconcept given that not only the best form of democracy is an object of dispute but also its chances and risks in the context of globalization.2.Paradoxes, Aporias, and Contradictions of DemocracyIfwearetojudgeaccordingtothelargeamountofdierentsocialand political systems named democracies (among them the democratic peo-plesrepublicsofKorea,LaosandAlgeria,thedemocraticrepublicsof Congo and East Timor, the peoples republics of China and Bangladesh, the democratic socialist republic of Sri Lanka, and the Islamic republics of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan), there is no doubt no country in the world would call itself anti-democratic today. Since the twentieth century, the legitimizing value of democracy is such that any country will be quick to call itself democratic in the sense that the ruler allegedly draws his legiti-macy from the people, regardless of the existence of individual rights, free elections, and the political power is not under peoples control. Interest-ingly,thecountrieswiththelongestdemocratictraditionstheSwiss Confederation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America donotdrawattentiontotheirdemocraticinstitutionsandsocietyby meansoftheiro cialname,whereassocialistcountriesinparticular 35)Mostafa Rejai (1967), 31. 36)Giovanni Sartori (1992), Arno Waschkuhn (1998). 186O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201seldom renounce or have renounced such a reference. While the use of the concepts of republic and monarchy in order to dene a state and a political system demand the visibility of political institutions that have traditionally been associated with them, the employment of the term democracy appar-ently is not bound to such strictures. Whereas the rst two concepts must be supported by hard evidence, the concept of democracy remains amor-phous; whereas it is not so hard to identify a constitution as a republic or monarchy, a erce and protracted struggle has evolved around the question ofwhichcountriesareentitledtocallthemselvesdemocracies.Priorto 1990, this issue was disputed between liberal and socialist regimes, nowa-daysthesameseemstobehappeningbetweentheso-calledWestern democracies(withtheiroshootsinLatinAmerica,India,Japan,and Eastern Europe) and political systems from other parts of the world, espe-cially in the Middle East and Asia.In view of the above, this brief analysis might raise the suspicion that the abuse of the concept by dictators, parties, and ideologists is a danger. How-ever, the conceptual history of democracy shows that dierent interpreta-tions are inherent to the concept itself. Tis goes beyond the general thesis that all political concepts are liable to continuous change in terms of mean-ing since they reect the mutating values and norms of a society. Not only does democracy t the general insight that (political) concepts are always collections of a plurality of meanings,37 that is, formed by historical reality whichmakesitimpossibletodemarcatetheboundariesbetweensyn-chronic and diachronic time, but it also contains many and contradictory meanings, dimensions and associations, all of which invite us to adapt its semantics to dierent historical entities. Below one nds a list of ve of the most important paradoxes and aporias38 of democracy, which are not dis-cussed at length in this article:(1)Democracy is obviously against the natural idea that the few above should rule over the many below.39 In this respect, the sovereignty of the people remains simply a metaphor for democracy as a special form of order, 37)Reinhart Koselleck (1978), 29.38)A good overview concerning the huge list of relevant aporias and paradoxes pertaining the concept of democracy can be found in Paul B. Clarke and Joe Foweraker: (2001), or also in Robert Dahl et al. (2003). 39)Jean-Antoine Laponce (1991). O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201187althoughcompleteidentitybetweenrulersandsubjectsisimpossibleto achieve. Withrepresentativegovernment,elections,andthedismissalof rulers,theconceptofdemocracyissupposedlyconvertedintopolitical practice but the contradiction between democracy and representation ulti-mately remains unsolved.40 Tus modern democratic theories try to distin-guish between the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of democracy.41 Whileeverygovernmentsystemguaranteesthenecessaryhierarchyand verticality in order to avoid anarchy, only democracy provides horizontal elements of control such as checks and balances, opposition, institutional-izedconicts,andpluralism.Tedierence,however,betweenpower coming from above and legitimacy coming from below as underlined by thinkerssuchasAlexisdeTocqueville,GuglielmoFerrero,42andMax Webers is not specically democratic.(2)With respect to the democratic decision-making processes, there is ageneralcompetitionbetweentheprinciplesofqualityandquantity. Although some new models of radical democracy (Barber, Lummis) deny this antagonism and strive to widen the scope of democracy as well as the intensity of participatory moments, the problem seems to be determining how to achieve good or at least acceptable political choices. Te vote of the majority might be seen as an indicator of the quality of a decision (or of a politician) but what will happen, however, if the majority is wrong about decisiveorfundamentalquestions?43Henceoneofthemostimportant tasks of democratic theory will always be locating the boundaries for dem-ocraticdecision-making.Shoulditbeboundbytheconstitutionorby human rights or religion? Radical theorists like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Hans Kelsen stressed that any kind of border will necessarily violate democ-racy itself. Tis also led into a new paradox. While Rousseau claimed that a divine legislator was necessary to educate the people in order to conciliate quantityandquality(orthevolontgnraleandthevolontdetous)in democratic decisions, Kelsen declared that voting for anti-democratic par-tiesanddemagoguesinordertopreventthemajorityfromdestroying democracies is actually an act of betrayal.44 Terefore, if democracy is to be 40)Danielo Zolo (1998) and Guiseppe Duso (2006). 41)Giovanni Sartori (1992), 137f.42)See Alexis de Toqueville (1954), 333 and Guglielmo Ferrero (1944), 481. 43)Bernd Guggenberger and Claus Oe (1984). 44)Hans Kelsen (2006), 237. Te paradox is also known as the Toleranzproblem of democ-racy. Manfred Httich (1965). 188O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201protected against its own dangers we must eventually accept some bound-aries and values located beyond democracy even if we agree that democ-racy and human rights might come from the same source (Habermas).45 As long as a contradiction in practice is possible the appeal to anti-democratic measures always remains a plausible option for democracy.46(3)Democracyrestsupontwofundamentalprinciplesthatareoften following colliding trajectories: liberty and equality.47 When Goethe said: Legislatorsandrevolutionarieswhopromiseequalityandlibertyatthe same time are either psychopaths or mountebanks, he was indicating that absolute equality could only be achieved by repression since a free society will necessarily display dierences and inequalities. On the other hand, the classical controversy between Left and Right can persuasively be described asadebateconcerningthepossibleextentofequality,althoughneither camp needs to challenge democracy itself given that they show respect for the principle of freedom.48 Hence the struggle between democratic parties all over the world is usually a quest for the right balance between liberty andequality.Inthisrespect,theliberalidealcombiningsocialhierarchy andpoliticalequality(Rawls)isonepossibleorientationamongmany. Moreover, in addition to the problem that some will become more equal than others, there is the question of what kind of freedom is preferred: an undened negative one, giving us the opportunity to start our own pursuit of happiness, or a dened positive one securing our participation in mak-ing the laws we have to obey. Te former type is supported by liberals like Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin, the latter by democrats such as Ben-jaminBarberandJean-JacquesRousseau.Andthereareotherthinkers, like Kant and Habermas, that attempted to combine both aspects. In sum, reection upon liberty and equality and the tension between them is one of the perennial subjects of democratic theory.45)Tis aporia persists in one of Habermas earlier contributions (1973), 316, in which he a rms that the Verfassungswirklichkeit des brgerlichen Rechtsstaates was seit je her in Widerspruch zur Idee der Demokratie. An advanced discussion about the possible anton-ymy between democracy and the constitutional state can be found in Werner Kgi (1973). 46)For this see also Derridas gure ofla dmocratie venir. Jacques Derrida (2002), 112-157. 47)See the famous rst chapter of Tocquevilles Democracy in America Vol. 2, book 2 Why Democratic Nations Show a More Ardent and Enduring Love of Equality than of Liberty. A meditation on the topic is oered in Ralf Dahrendorf (1963). 48)Norberto Bobbio (1994). O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201189(4)Modern democracy also marks a new epoch in terms of the com-plexrelationshipbetweenindividualsandthecollective.Whileinthe ancientworldprivateconcernswerestrictlysubordinatedtothepublic interest,49capableevenofturningslaveryintoamoralimperative,50the modern age has set itself apart by the protection of individual rights and of the pluralism of opinions, aims, and ambitions. Nevertheless, even mod-erndemocraciesrequiresomedegreeofpublicspiritednessandsocial homogeneity in order to conserve political unity and represent something more than just a crowd of people. Te question of how to bind democratic individualstogetherisanotherproblemforwhichseveraltentativesolu-tionshavebeenoered.Teoryaswellashistoryhavewitnessedseveral suchattemptsunderseveral(partiallyantagonistic)conceptssuchasthe state and the nation, race and ethnicity, religious and cultural traditions, rationality,ethicalcategorieslikejustice,toleranceorsolidarity,thecivil society,communication,and,lastbutnotleast,economicalsuccessand consumerneeds.Furthermore,somedegreeofsocialhomogeneityalso seems to be a necessary precondition for the functionality of democratic techniques and for the peaceful coexistence of majorities and minorities.51 However, there is always a danger that in striving to forge political unity and to solve essential social and political conicts, the exact opposite might be achieved through the elimination of a sense of indeniteness and divi-sion that is inherent to democracy.52 Terefore, striking a balance between private and public interests, individual and collective claims represents a constant challenge for democratic theory.49)Although some ancient authors also made important ethical innovations strengthening the individuals position (sophists like Antiphon and Alcidamas, for example, emphasized equality, Socrates and Aristotle considered the prospect of an apolitical way of life, and the philosophical schools of Cynicism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism called for a kind of world citizenship), one should not forget that the concept of the individual only becomes identi-able with a singular human life after the rst civil revolutions. Hence in Antiquity there is neither a theoretical nor a practical separation between the individual and his community comparable with modern individualism (Vittorio Hsle (1997), 36.). For the ancients it wasdi culttobelievethattheaimsandpurposesofonesinglemancouldbedeemed higher than the public need. 50)Alexander Demandt (1993), 51. 51)Herrmann Heller (1971). 52)Claude Lefort (1990). 190O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201(5)Te dislocation of the concept of democracy from a form of govern-ment to a form of society also leads to understanding of the heterogeneity of democratic institutions as a result of moral, social, and cultural dissimi-larities. As indicated by Montesquieu and Tocqueville, the particular men-talities,habits,andintellectualmannersofnationsendowallsocialand political systems with a character of their own. Tus there are two reasons why democracy has become such a ubiquitous concept: it is able to explain whatdemocraticsocietieshaveincommonaswellaswhatdistinguish them from each other. Tis leaves democratic theory with the task of pro-vidingcogentcriteriatodeterminewhatisstill,notyet,ornolonger,a democracy. But even in this respect there can be only provisional answers, once again, as a result of the special dynamics of democracy. In particular, the history of democracy can also be interpreted as a permanent movement of inclusion that progressively incorporated once marginal individuals and groups: slaves, the poor people, women, and so forth. Yet there have always been those willing to criticize the alleged overreach of democratic equality. Tis continues in the present as discussions on the extension of democracy to other social groups (children, foreigners, and next generations)53 prog-ress.Tuswhenevaluatingothersocietiesonemustkeepinmindthat democracy is a process that might evolve dierently or that might incorpo-rate key aspects that are not necessarily familiar to certain societies. Ulti-mately,however,wemusteventuallybeabletosaywhetherornotthe application of the concept is justied.Te tensions between liberty and equality, individualism and collectiv-ism, participation and leadership will persist as problems each democratic theory and system will have to deal with, even if they cannot ultimately be solved.54 Given the diversity of societies and cultures, this also means that solutionscanhardlybeuniversal.Tisapproachalsosuggeststhatthe empirical variety of democratic political formations demands the acknowl-edgementthatdeningwhatademocracyisisanormativedecision reecting dierent tentative solutions to the paradoxes of democracy. Te types of policies that are eventually pursued are inevitably a consequence of this previous normative decision.53)See for instance Bobbio (1988) and Dryzek (2000). 54)J. Roland Pennock (1979). O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-2011913.Conceptual History and Conceptual PoliticsTenumerouscontradictions,paradoxes,andaporiaspropertodemoc-racy mean that the concept is rarely used in isolation, it is often qualied by special adjectives that attribute a descriptive or normative meaning by increasing dierentiation and restricting conceptual stretching.55 Examples of such adjectives used to qualify the concept of democracy are authori-tarian,neopatrimonial,military-dominated,parliamentary,presi-dential, federal, guarded, electoral, protected, illiberal, restrictive, tutelary, one-party, and elitist; or also Western, modern, plebi-scitarian, representative, pluralistic, socialistic, liberal, and delib-erative.56 In this respect, it is important to understand that the usage of the noun reveals the intention to ensure that the referred state, society, or system is in fact a democracy, since it displays at least one of its many prox-ieselections,referenda,aconstitution,parties,civilrights,amarket economy or also the pluralism of opinions and lifestyles. Meanwhile, the adjectiveservesthepurposeofemphasizingeithertherejectionorthe adoption of certain democratic practices. Tis is also why descriptive and normativeperspectivesinterfereinthisconceptualconstruction.For example,amilitary-dominated,authoritarian,orparliamentary democracy just means that in fact dierent actors play powerful roles the military, the (elected) political leader or the parliament. Most importantly, the adoption of these adjectives normatively indicates whether the described subject is more democratic or less so. For example, the adjectives authori-tarian,,neopatrimonial,military-dominated,guarded,protected, illiberal, restrictive, tutelary, one-party, or defect are always detri-mental to the quality of democracy whereas the concept of a parliamentary, presidential, federal, or electoral democracy rather conrms the fact we aredealingwithtruedemocracies,albeitadmittingdierentsubtypes.57 Hence in all of these cases the concept of democracy itself remains a positive norm whose devaluation demands an adjective. Consequently, it is hardly 55)David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997). 56)David Collier & Steven Levitsky (1997) and Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48. See also Giovanni Sartori (1970); David Collier and James E. Mahon (1993); David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997).57)While the studies of Juan Linz (1978) and (1994) suggest that a presidential democracy can more easily deteriorate into an authoritarian regime than a parliamentary one, this does not mean that the adjective presidential has an anti-democratic connotation. 192O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201surprisingthatthesemanticusetheadjectivedemocraticservestolegiti-mize states, societies, institutions, national and international organizations or to support techniques, actions, value propositions, or even human traits.But what about the other adjectives mentioned above? Are they also the product of a conict between a descriptive and a normative perspective? Indeed they are. Tis becomes evident if the ve aporias or contradictions of the concept of democracy are considered: popular sovereignty vs. repre-sentation, quality vs. quantity, liberty vs. equality, individual vs. collective, and,nally,thesynchronicitybetweensimilaritiesanddissimilarities.In order to demonstrate this argument, I shall point out that all those adjec-tivesthatcannotbeimmediatelyorunequivocallyassociatedwiththe decreaseorincreaseinthequalityofdemocracycanberearrangedas antagonistic subtypes of democracy that stress only one side of a paradox (or perhaps of several paradoxes). According to this criterion, the following pairs of concepts dealing with the issues of government, decision-making, ideology, economy, time, and space seem to be relevant: direct (or radical) vs. representative democracy elitist vs. deliberative58 (or participatory) democracy liberal vs. republican democracy pluralistic (or market) vs. social democracy ancient vs. modern democracy Western vs. non-Western democracy59All of these conceptual constructions might include an empirical descrip-tionofexistingdemocracies.However,theyalwaysincludeanormative perspective as well. Tis occurs both at a theoretical level (in that a particu-lar dimension of democracy is valued positively or negatively in each case) and at a practical level (through the observation of democratic institutions and habits that reect a normatively constituted political culture). Tere-fore direct or republican democracy emphasize the ancient heritage against modern forms of representative or liberal democracy, whereas deliberative, republican,socialoralsotheknownformsofnon-Westerndemocracy 58)For the concept of deliberative democracy, see Joshua Cohen (1989); Jon Elster (1998); and Robert Talisse (2005). 59)Of course, this list is incomplete and could be enhanced with oppositions like consensus vs. majoritarian democracy or also consociational vs. competitive democracy. O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201193stress the collective against the more individualistic concepts of elitist, lib-eral,pluralisticandWesterndemocracy.Liberalandelitistdemocracy underlinefreedomagainstequality,therepublicananddeliberativesub-type vice versa; and while ancient and modern democracy are associated with opposing notions of freedom, pluralistic and social democracy sug-gest a dierent concept of equality. Finally elitist, representative, and lib-eraldemocracystandforthequalityofdemocraticdecision-making, whereasdeliberative,direct,andrepublicandemocracyemphasizethe quantity of people participating.In this respect the evident cross relations between the dierent opposi-tions of conceptual constructions show at least two things: rst, that one adjective is hardly enough in order to produce an in-depth characterization ofademocraticsystem,and,second,thatdierentdemocraticsystems have both similarities and dissimilarities (aporia no. 5) whereby the crucial question is whether these dissimilarities include not only dierent norma-tivedecisionsconcerningtheaporiasinherenttodemocracybutalso choicespertainingtoaspectsthatdiminishdemocracy.Forexample, ancientdemocracywhichincludedslaveryanddidnottakeindividual rights into account today would hardly be deemed as a sound democracy. Likewisethiscanapplytotheadjectivesusedtodescribethedeclineof radical forms of democracy into a tyranny of the majority, of social democ-racy into socialism, or the serious lack of democratic legitimacy in liberal, elitist or representative systems. However, the most di cult problem is of course how to treat concepts of democracy in view of the existence of dif-ferent societies and cultures. From a Western point of view, the proximity between existing Asian or Islamic democracies and authoritarian or totali-tarian regimes60 might seem quite obvious. Yet, we must not forget that the fact that Western civilization has dominated our view of global democracy means nothing else but the long-term result of normative decisions, values, habits, and practices. So although the appreciation of non-Western democ-racies might be almost impossible for Westerners, we must keep in mind thatweareneversimplydescribingbutalwaysevaluatinginaccordance with our norms. Tese evaluations prove that the interaction between the empirical and the normative perspective relative to the concept of democ-racy becomes even more accentuated in spatial comparisons.60)For this dierence, see Juan Linz (2000). 194O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201But what does all of this mean for the conceptual history of democracy? Hitherto we have been discussing how dierent conceptual constructions arenotonlydescriptionsorattemptstograspthenormativedecisions made by democratic societies but are also normative decisions themselves that serve to strengthen the functionality, e cacy, or simply the legitimacy ofademocraticsystem,ortostresseitherhomogeneityorplurality,the position of individuals or of the collective, the role of cultural identity and so on. Tus the role conceptual history plays in this whole game is rst and foremosttorevealtheconceptualpoliticsofdemocracy.Tisbringsus back to the initial question of whether conceptual history might help us to arrive at a normative perception of democracy. It is now possible to answer thatthisisindeedtheonlypossibleperceptionsincethecontradictions andaporiasinherenttotheconceptofdemocracyrequirechoosingone kindofdemocracyoverother.61Conceptualhistoryalsoshowsthatitis nottheconceptofdemocracyitselfthatisessentiallycontested.Rather contention is an essential feature of the democratic moment and is what allows the use of the concept to subsume quite dierent historical realities under its semantic eld.An additional question that arises is whether conceptual history simply unveilstheissuesandcategoriesthatinformnormativeperspectivesof democracy or whether it is also a form of conceptual politics. As Reinhard Mehring argued, noting some surprising methodological analogies between Reinhart Koselleck and Carl Schmitt, in the writing of a history of (politi-cal) ideas there seems to be a kind of blending of Begrissoziologie, Begris-geschichte, and Begrispolitik into each other.62 Although conceptual history should try to reveal the strategies of conceptual politics, the potential of concepts to exert political power, and also the polemic purposes of seman-ticuses,italmostgoeswithoutsayingthatconceptualhistorymayalso 61)Here I have in mind Max Webers statement that there is no truly objective scientic analysis of cultural life or [. . .] social phenomena but only knowledge depending on indi-vidual realities or precisely on normative ideas. See Max Weber (1991), 49 and 61f. So an objective point of view turns out to be possibly by separating facts and norms (like Weber assumed) it matters little if social phenomena which might be called or even treated as facts are merely a result of our interpretation (Peirce), of our realization-leading interest (Habermas) or of social communication (Niklas Luhmann) in any case, we must decide rst what democracy should mean. And by all means this sort of denition is part of a normative process which I call conceptual politics. 62)Reinhard Mehring (2006). O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201195include a claim for the normative prevalence of particular conceptions perhapsalreadybydecidingwhichconceptmightbeworthanalyzing. Most importantly however, it must not be forgotten that the analysis con-ducted according to the methods of conceptual history require the use of conceptsperse,almostallofwhichmightbepolitical,63whichmeans thattheseconceptsmightbecomechargedinanormative-politicalway which means that they contain the potential for polemics.64 After all, con-cepts not only have a history but they also make history as leading con-ceptsofthehistoricalmovementandbyformulatingprerequisitesof possible futures.65 In other words, it may be possible to make a clear dis-tinctionbetweentheanalyticandthenormativeapplicationofconcepts yet it is impossible to act only as an observer of history and of changing semanticuses.66Eventhefundamentalcritiqueofnormativeconcepts includes an absolute normative approach. As discussed above, this dynam-icsismorethanevidentwhenitcomestodemocracy.Inthissense,the concept captures much more than one of the four fundamental criteria of the Lexikon der Geschichtlichen Grundbegrie,67 which describes the seman-tics of modernity in toto democratization. It also signies that the con-ceptual history of democracy, which requires the consideration of the most diverse spatial and temporal perspectives in order to become intelligible, cannotreleaseitselffrommoderndemocracysclaimtobetheexclusive form and method capable of generating legitimacy. Terefore the concep-tual history of democracy is also part of democratic history.4.ConclusionIn his posthumously published book, Begrisgeschichte. Studien zur Seman-tikundPragmatikderpolitischenundsozialenSprache(2006),Koselleck emphasized that the historian does research on concepts, in which social 63)Horst Gnther (1978), 102. 64)See Reinhart Koselleck (1967), 87.; (1972), XXf.; (1979). 65)Reinhart Koselleck (1972), XVII, (2000), 327.66)See Reinhard Mehring (2006), 41. Hence the authors aim is also to extract a practical proposition from Kosellecks studies focussing on a subversive critique of modernity whose semantics and concepts are analyzed only with supercial objectivity (2006), 46. 67)According to Koselleck, the other three criteria are temporalization (Verzeitigung), polit-icization and ideologization of all modern concepts. See Reinhart Koselleck (1972), 46.196O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201andpoliticalprocessesarerecordedpersistingoverthecourseofgenera-tions and even centuries .68 Hence conceptual historians research the his-torical transformations of perceptions and receptions of semantics in order tounderstandtheveritablemeaningofconceptsandtomakesuretheir usage remains critical and historically informed.In the specic case of democracy, it is even more important to analyze semantic change because the concepts inherent contradictions and aporias requireaspecialtypeofconceptualhistory.Paradoxically,thefactthat democracyisnecessarilyanunnishedjourney(JohnDunn)iswhat mightbethebestguaranteethattheconceptmaintainsitshegemonic status within political semantics. Te fact that the concept of democracy isstillinuseinscienticdiscourseaswellasineverydaylanguageisfar from being an exception in the history of language.69 Rather, the under-determination of the concept seems to be the most important reason for its success.Teeternalquestionconcerningthebestpoliticalconstitution seemstohavebeentranslatedintothequestionaboutthebestkindof democracy. Terefore the symbiosis between social history and history oflinguisticmeaning70obviouslysuggeststhatthecurrentdebatecon-cerning a possible post-democracy (Guhenno, Rancire, Crouch, Jrke) will be futile.However, conceptual history also proves that democracy is not simply a label that could be used in order to legitimize any political or social system. Althoughwecannotescapeconceptualpolitics,becauseitisembedded into the structure of concepts, democracy is much more than a strategy of persuasionusedtoadvancepoliticalagendas.Whatconceptualhistory shows is the framework of the concept democracy in which dierent nor-mative decisions are available and also become necessary reference points in the search for the best interpretation of democracy. Nevertheless, it is impossible to escape the problem that the contest over the best interpreta-tion of the concept must always establish the boundaries that cannot be crossed. Tis search for the best interpretation of democracy is ultimately a form of conceptual politics. It is less the lack of standards than the con-tradictions and aporias inherent to the concept that prevent us from for-mulating a valid single idea of democracy. Instead, we must always keep in 68)Reinhart Koselleck (2006), 365. 69)Hubertus Buchstein (2006), 48. 70)Karlheinz Stierle (1978), 184. O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201197mindthatthemanysidesofdemocracyrendereachdenitionofwhat should democracy mean today71 merely a preliminary, political decision.5.Bibliographical ReferencesArgenson, Ren Louis de. 1764. Considrations sur le gouvernement de la France. Amsterdam.Aristides, P. Aelius. 1981. Te Complete Works, 2 Vol. Leiden: Brill.Aristotle. 1994. Politik. Reinbek: Rohwolt.Barber,Benjamin.1994.StarkeDemokratie.berdie TeilhabeamPolitischen.Hamburg: Rotbuch.Berlin, Isaiah. 2006. Freiheit. Vier Versuche. Frankfurt: Fischer.Blanke,GustavH.1956.DeramerikanischeDemokratiebegriinwortgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung. In Jahrbuch fr Amerikastudien 1: 41-52.Bleicken, Jochen. 1995. Die athenische Demokratie. Paderborn: Schningh.Bobbio, Norberto. 1988. Die Zukunft der Demokratie. Berlin: Rotbuch..1994.RechtsundLinks.GrndeundBedeutungeneinerpolitischenUnterscheidung. Berlin: Wagenbach.Brunner, Otto, Werner Conze, and Reinhart Koselleck, ed. 1972. Geschichtliche Grundbe-grie. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Vol. 1. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.Buchstein, Hubertus. 2006. Demokratie. In Politische Teorie. 22 umkmpfte Begrie zur Einfhrung, edited by G. Ghler, M. Iser, and I. Kerner. Wiesbaden: VS.Campe, Joachim Heinrich. 1792. Zweiter Versuch deutscher Sprachbereicherung. Braunschweig.Clarke, Paul B. and Joe Foweraker, ed. 2001. Encyclopedia of Democratic Tought. London/New York: Routledge.Cohen,Joshua.1989.DeliberativeDemocracyandDemocraticLegitimacy.InTe Good Polity. Normative Analysis of the State, edited by A. Hamlin and P. Pettit. Oxford: Blackwell.Collier, David and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with Adjectives. Conceptual Inno-vation in Comparative Research. World Politics 49: 430-451.Collier,DavidandJamesE.Mahon.1993.ConceptualStretchingRevisited.Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis. American Political Science Review 87: 845-855.Conze, Werner, Reinhart Koselleck, Hans Maier, Christian Meier, and Hans-Leo Reimann. 1972. Demokratie. In Geschichtliche Grundbegrie, Vol. 1, edited by O. Brunner, W. Conze, and R. Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.Conze, Werner and Meier, Christian. 1972. Adel, Aristokratie. In Geschichtliche Grund-begrie,Vol.1,editedbyO.Brunner,W.Conze,andR.Kosellek.Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta.Crouch, Colin. 2004. Post-Democracy. Temes for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity.71)David Held (1987), 283-288. 198O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201Cunningham,Frank.2002.TeoriesofDemocracy.ACriticalIntroduction.London: Routledge.Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy. Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.Dahl, Robert A., Ian Shapiro, and Jos A. Cheibub, ed. 2003. Te Democracy Sourcebook. New York: MIT Press.Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1963. Gesellschaft und Freiheit. Zur soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwart. Mnchen: Piper.Demandt, Alexander. 1993. Der Idealstaat. Die politischen Teorien der Antike. Kln: Bhlau..1995. Antike Staatsformen. Berlin: Akademie.Demosthenes. 2002. Politische Reden. Stuttgart: Reclam.Derrida, Jacques. 2002. Politik der Freundschaft. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Dio, Cassius. 1961. Dios Roman History in Nine Volumes. Cambridge/London: Macmillan.Dryzek,John.2000.DeliberativeDemocracyandBeyond.Liberals,Critics,Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Dunn,John,ed.1992.Democracy.TeUnnishedJourney.Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press.Duso,Guiseppe.2006.DiemodernepolitischeReprsentation.EntstehungundKrisedes Begris. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.Dyson, R. W. 2003. Normative Teories of Society and Government in Five Medieval Tink-ers. St. Augustine, John of Salisbury, Giles of Rome, St. Tomas Aquinas, Marsilius of Padua. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen.Elster, Jon, ed. 1998. Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Ferrero, Guglielmo. 1944. Macht. Bern: Francke.Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. 1965a. Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissen-schaftslehre (1796). In Smtliche Werke, Vol. 3. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1-385..1965b. Rezension von Kant Zum ewigen Frieden (1796). In Smtliche Werke, Vol. 8. Berlin: de Gruyter.Finlay, Moses I. 1980. Antike und moderne Demokratie. Stuttgart: Reclam.Forst, Rainer. 2003. Toleranz im Konikt. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Gallie,WalterB.1955.EssentiallyContestedConcepts.ProceedingsoftheAristotelian Society 56: 167-198.Grres, Joseph von. 1928. Das rothe Blatt. In Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 1. Kln..1928. Der allgemeine Frieden, ein Ideal. In Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 1. Kln.Gschnitzer, Fritz. 1995. Von der Fremdartigkeit griechischer Demokratie. In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, edited by K. Kinzl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.Guggenberger, Bernd and Claus Oe. 1984. An den Grenzen der Mehrheitsdemokratie. Poli-tik und Soziologie der Mehrheitsregel. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.Guhenno, Jean-Marie. 1994. Das Ende der Demokratie. Mnchen: Artemis & Winkler.Gnther, Horst. 1978. Auf der Suche nach der Teorie der Begrisgeschichte. In Histori-sche Semantik und Begrisgeschichte, edited by R. Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.Habermas, Jrgen. 1968. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201199.1973. Politische Beteiligung Ein Wert an sich? In Grundprobleme der Demokra-tie, edited by U Matz. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.Httich, Manfred. 1965. Das Toleranzproblem in der Demokratie. Civitas 4: 15-40.Held, David. 1987. Models of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Heller,Hermann.1971.PolitischeDemokratieundsozialeHomogenitt(1928).In Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. 2. Leiden: Sijtho.Hsle,Vittorio.1997.MoralundPolitik.GrundlageneinerpolitischenEthikfrdas21. Jahrhundert. Mnchen: Beck.Isocrates. 2003. Opera omnia, 3 Vol. Mnchen/Leipzig: Saur.Jrke, Dirk. 2005. Auf dem Weg in die Postdemokratie. Leviathan 33(4): 482-491.Kgi, Werner. 1973. Rechtsstaat und Demokratie. Antinomie und Synthese. In Grundpro-bleme der Demokratie, edited by U. Matz. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.Kant, Immanuel. 2002. Werkausgabe, 12 Vol. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Kelsen, Hans. 2006. Verteidigung der Demokratie (1932). In Verteidigung der Demokratie. Abhandlungen zur Demokratietheorie, edited by H. Kelsen. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.Kinzl,KonradH.1995.Athens.Between TyrannyandDemocracy.InGreeceandthe Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, edited by K. Kinzl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.Kinzl, Konrad H., ed. 1995. Demokratia. Der Weg der Demokratie bei den Griechen. Darm-stadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.Klein, Richard. 1981. Die Romrede des Aelius Aristides. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-gesellschaft.Koselleck,Reinhart.1967.RichtlinienfrdasLexikonpolitisch-sozialerBegrieder Neuzeit. Archiv fr Begrisgeschichte 11: 81-99..1972.Einleitung.In:GeschichtlicheGrundbegrie,editedbyO.Brunner,W. Conze, and R. Kosellek. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta..1978.BegrisgeschichteundSozialgeschichte.InHistorischeSemantikund Begrisgeschichte, edited by R. Koselleck. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 19-36..1979. Zur historisch-politischen Semantik asymmetrischer Gegenbegrie. In Ver-gangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten, edited by R. Koselleck. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp..2000. Moderne Sozialgeschichte und historische Zeiten. In Zeitgeschichten. Studien zur Historik, edited by R. Koselleck. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp..2006.Begrisgeschichten.StudienzurSemantikundPragmatikderpolitischenund sozialen Sprache. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Laponce, Jean-Antoine. 1991. Democracy and Verticality. Are Tere Biophysical Obsta-clestoDemocraticTought?InHierarchyandDemocracy,editedbyA.Somitand R. Wildenmann. Baden Baden: Nomos.Lefort. Claude. 1990. Die Frage der Demokratie. In Autonome Gesellschaft und libertre Demokratie, edited by U. Rdel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.Linz, Juan. 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy. Does It Make a Dierence? In Te Failure of Presidential Democracy, edited by J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore/London: John Hopkins University Press.200O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201.2000. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. Boulder: Rienner.Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1978. Te Breakdown of Democratic Regimes. Baltimore/Lon-don: John Hopkins University Press.Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some Social Prerequisites of Democracy. Economic Devel-opment and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53(1): 69-105.Lbbe, Hermann. 1965. Skularisierung. Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begris. Freiburg/Mnchen: Alber.Luhmann, Niklas. 2002. Die Religion der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt. Suhrkamp.Lukes, Steven. 1974. Relativism. Cognitive and Moral. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soci-ety Suppl. 48: 165-189.Lummis, Douglas. 1996. Radical Democracy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Luther, Martin. 1916. Tischreden. D. Martin Luthers Werke (WA), Vol. 4. Weimar: Bhlau.Martin,Jochen.1995.VonKleistheneszuEphialtes.ZurEntstehungderathenischen Demokratie. In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, edited by K. Kinzl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.Mehring,Reinhard.2006.Begrissoziologie,Begrisgeschichte,Begrispolitik.Zur FormderIdeengeschichtsschreibungnachCarlSchmittundReinhartKoselleck.In Politische Ideengeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Konzepte und Kritik, edited by H. Bluhm and J. Gebhardt. Baden-Baden: Nomos.Meier,Christian.1983.DieEntstehungdesPolitischenbeidenGriechen.Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.North, John. 1994. Democracy in Rome. History Today 44(3): 38-43.Ober, Josiah and Charles Hendrick, ed. 1996. Demokratia. A Conversation on Democracies. Ancient and Modern. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Oliver, James H. 1953. Te Ruling Power. A Study of the Roman Empire in the Second Cen-tury Trough the Roman Oration of Aelius Aristides. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.Palmer, Robert R. 1953. Notes on the Use of the Word Democracy 1789-1799. Political Science Quarterly 68: 203-226.Palonen, Kari. 2002. Te History of Concepts as a Style of Political Teorizing: Quentin Skinners and Reinhart Kosellecks Subversion of Normative Political Teory. European Journal of Political Teory 1(1): 91-106..2005. Max Weber als Begrispolitiker. Etica & Politica/Ethics & Politics 2 (http://www.units.it/etica/ 2005_2/PALONEN.htm).Pennock,J.Roland.1979.DemocraticPoliticalTeory.Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press.Popper, Karl. 1992. Die oene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde, 2 Vol. Tbingen: Mohr Siebeck.Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. 1861. La guerre et la paix. Recherches sur le principe et la constitu-tion du droit des gens. Brussels: Lacroix.Raaaub, Kurt A. 1995. Einleitung und Bilanz. Kleisthenes, Ephialtes und die Begrn-dung der Demokratie. In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, edited by K. Kinzl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.Rancire, Jacques. 1997. Demokratie und Postdemokratie. In Politik der Wahrheit, edited by R. Riha. Wien: Turia + Kant.O. Hidalgo / Contributions to the History of Concepts 4 (2008) 176-201201Rejai, Mostafa. 1967. Democracy. Te Contemporary Teories. New York: Atherton.Roels, Jean. 1969. Le concept de reprsentation politique au dix-huitime sicle franais. Paris: Louvain.Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1959-1969. uvres compltes, 4 Vol. Paris: Gallimard.Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. American Poli-tical Science Review 64: 1033-1055..1992. Demokratietheorie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.Schlegel, Friedrich. 1966. Versuch ber den Begri des Republikanismus, veranlasst durch dieKantischeSchriftzumewigenFrieden(1796).InKritischeFriedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, Vol. 7. Mnchen: Schningh.Schmidt, Manfred. 1995. Demokratietheorien. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.Schuller,Wolfgang.1995.ZurEntstehungdergriechischenDemokratieauerhalb Athens. In Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory, edited by K. Kinzl. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter.Sherman, Claire R. 1995. Imaging Aristotle. Verbal and Visual Representation in 14th Cen-tury France. Berkeley: University of California Press.Stahl, Michael. 1987. Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archaischen Athen. Stuttgart: Steiner.Sternberger, Dolf. 1980. Herrschaft und Vereinbarung. In Schriften III. Frankfurt: Insel.Stierle, Karlheinz. 1978. Historische Semantik und die Geschichtlichkeit der Bedeutung. InHistorischeSemantikundBegrisgeschichte,editedbyR.Koselleck.Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta.Talisse, Robert B. 2005. Democracy after Liberalism. Pragmatism and Deliberative Politics. New York: Routledge.Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1954. Erinnerungen. Stuttgart: Kochler..1987. ber die Demokratie in Amerika, 2 Vol. Zrich: Manesse.Ubl, Karl. 2000. Engelbert von Admont. Ein Gelehrter im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus und christlicher berlieferung. Wien/Mnchen: Oldenbourg.Vellay, Charles. 1908. Discours et rapports de Robespierre. Paris: Charpentier et Fasquelle.Waschkuhn,Arno.1998.Demokratietheorien.Politiktheoretischeundideengeschichtliche Grundzge. Mnchen/Wien: Oldenbourg.Weber, Max. 1991. Die Objektivitt sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkennt-nis. In Schriften zur Wissenschaftslehre. Stuttgart: Reclam.Zolo,Danielo.1998.DiedemokratischeFrstenherrschaft.FreinerealistischeTeorieder Politik. Gttingen: Steidl.