henry babcock veatch

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S w i m m i n g A g a i n s t t h e T id e i n C o n te m po ra ryPhi losophy . By Henry B. Veatch.Washington, D.C. : Catholic University ofAmerica Press, 1990.

I n the past several years a number of economists centered atGeorge Mason University have claimed to find an affinity be-tween Austrian economics and certain types of Continental phi-losophy. Their views have not gone uncontested: Murray Rothbardand Hans Hoppe have assailed the "hermeneuticists" with charac-teristic vigor. I fear I am no unbiased witness, as I have played aminor par t in t he controversy.

Henry Veatch, a distinguished Aristotelian philosopher, advancesin this excellent book a n interpretation of modern philosophy whichilluminates the controversy over hermeneutics. In addition, he pre-sents a carefully conceived defense of Aristotelian ethics. Economistsinterested in welfare economics will find Veatch's discussion of ethicsof substantial albeit indirect help to them. Often welfare economicsconceals utilitarian premises, and Veatch subjects this ethical systemto penetrating scrutiny. Although the book is a collection of separateessays, i t is remarkably unified.

Like his master Aristotle, Veatch proceeds by a dialecticalmethod. He means by th is a n analysis of the insights an d errors ofnon-Aristotelian philosophers in order to "remove the obstacles" towhat he deems the correct position (p. 6). I t soon transpires tha tthe rival philosophies contain much more error th an insight.

Since Descartes, modern philosophy has refused to use as its


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Descartes and his rationalist successors failed in their quest toprove the existence of the external world and discover its naturethrough the use of deduction. Their empiricist counterparts wereequally unable to show how one can gain knowledge of the real worldif one is restricted solely to ideas or sensations.

Philosophy faced an impasse. Immanuel Kant claimed to havefound a n escape that would end the stagnation of philosophy andpermit i t to progress a s a science. Veatch believes th at the transcen-dental turn, a s he calls Kant's proposal, was a disastrous mistake.Nevertheless, i t has dominated subsequent philosophy.

In brief, Kant thought th at we cannot know things a s they ar e inthemselves. Instead, the mind imposes a grid consisting of the cate-gories and the intuitions of space and time upon reality. Although wecannot know the real world, we can know appearances, since ourminds have created them.

Veatch finds in this turn to the subject the basis of relativism andirrationalism. Kan t thought t ha t everyone used the same categories.He claimed to derive them by a "transcendental deduction7'; f he wasright, people have no choice in their application of concepts to expe-rience.

Kant's successors made the categories changeable and relative.This more radical form of the transcendental turn has an unbreak-able hold on modern philosophy. Veatch uses the turn to explainQuine's philosophy and, more generally, contemporary philosophy ofscience. A "theory or hypothesis in science is accepted, ultimately, forscarcely any other reason than t ha t i t enables us to introduce a t leastsome sort of order and intelligibility into what otherwise would be asheer welter of experience" (p. 53) .

The culmination of the tur n lies in th e ut te r irrationalism of the


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155ook Reviews

Though Veatch's analysis i s impressive in its scope and unity, afew doubts-not I hasten to add, Cartesian ones -come to mind.First, one gets the impression from Veatch's discussion that Descartesarbitrarily rejected commonsense beliefs. But would not Descartesrespond that the skeptical issue he addressed is a genuine problem?How do we know that our experience gives us knowledge of the realworld? Veatch I think would reply that all at tempts to justify knowl-edge which start from doubt of commonsense have failed. Either wetake as given that we perceive real things or we wind up in skepti-cism. Ter t ium non d a tur .The effectiveness of thi s response depends on Veatch's suc-cess in showing that once skepticism is allowed in the door, itcannot be expelled. His criticism of Kant's transcendental t urn isespecially vital, since he sees t he t u rn as basic to contemporaryphilosophy.Veatch's evaluation of Kant, however, strikes me as disputable.He takes Kant to be saying, in effect: "We do not know reality: al l tha twe know are appearances." Veatch rightly takes th is view to lead torelativism and skepticism.But this interpretation of Kant depends crucially on the equationof reality with things-in-themselves. Since the phenomenal worldincludes everything governed by the categories, it might be arguedthat the phenomenal world just is the commonsense world. If so, Kantdid not then deny realism but affirmed it. I do not mean to endorsethis view of Kant: there is a great deal to be said for Veatch'sinterpretation. But if the realistic view of Kant is right, Veatch needsto show that Kant's deduction of the categories fails. Otherwise, hisindictment of the transcendental turn collapses.In "Is Quine a Metaphysician?", Veatch attempts to use one of


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Veatch also finds contemporary moral philosophy radically unsat-isfactory. He draws the customary distinction between teleologicaland deontological theories. The la tter fail utterly; the former requirerevision along Aristotelian lines.

Veatch approaches ethics with a fundamental assumption. Noethical judgments ar e self-evident. Claims that people have rights orobligations require justification: they cannot be simply taken asobvious. I wonder whether this is correct. Are there no particularjudgments, e.g., "Torturing small children for fun is wrong" that aremore clearly true than the premises of any theory supposed to justifythem? Veatch is no doubt right that the judgment just given is notself-evident, if by that he means th at no logical contradiction resultsfrom the statement's negation.c But self-evidence in this sense, and "obvious" t ru th , a re two quitedifferent things. Veatch moves too quickly from one to the other. If/ we can take our ordinary commonsense judgments to be true inepistemology, why may we not do the same in ethics?But even if Veatch has insufficiently justified the need for justi-fication, he raises penetrating objections to the particular theories hediscusses. Utilitarianism fails because of a flaw in it s sta rt ing point.Its advocates tell us to maximize happiness, understanding happi-ness a s the satisfaction of desire. But why is i t good to satisfy desire?Unless a utilitarian can first establish this, he cannot arrive at anethic. Appeal to the Principle of Universalizability avails nothing. Ifsomeone argues "I want to satisfy my desire; but if i t is good to satisfymy desire, it is good to satisfy anyone else's," he has begged thequestion. Is i t good to satisfy desire?

Deontological theories fare no better. "[Tlhere is no basis what-ever for the rights claims that are th e very basis and start ing pointof modern teleological ethics" (p. 111).Kant's categorical imperativelends no help, because it is a purely formal principle. Gewirth's


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Book Rev iews 157

them because they are good. They are not good because they aredesired.Now the question of course becomes: how are obligatory ends

established? Veatch once more returns to Aristotle. Human beingshave a nature, and what perfects that nature is a n obligatory end.Once one obtains, "I ought to perfect my nature," the Principle ofUniversalizability does the rest. Everyone ought to perfect his or hernature. Thus ethics has been established on a rational basis.

Veatch's relentlessly pressed case arouses both admiration anddoubt. As with epistemology, the form of his argument is this: ap-proaches A , B,- etc. will not work. If, then, we want an objectiveethics we must proceed in the way Veatch specifies.

I But to argue that unless one adopts his view, one will end up onan unwanted position begs the question. If one accepts Veatch'scontention that ethical judgments are not self-evident, why take forgranted that an objective ethics can be derived?Veatch might deny that he has argued solely by elimination ofalternatives. On the contrary, he has argued directly for the truth ofhis view. But the system of natural ends he favors depends on acontroversial principle: a human being ought to fulfill his naturalend. Though I cannot now argue the point, I think the principlerequires more defense than Veatch gives it here or in his earlierbooks.

Veatch also is open to objection for not being Aristotelian enough.Why does he combine his natural-end ethics with th e Principle ofUniversalizability, a Kantian device? It is not obvious that a moralsystem must use this principle, nor is it a truth of logic. Veatchrecognizes that some libertarians have challenged the principle, buthe discusses only those who abandon morality altogether along with


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correctly decides that obtaining a job a s a bouncer a t the W. D. RossBar will be a major step forward. Does this prevent others fromcompeting for t he job?

He makes one or two other dubious claims about moral theory. Heargues that amoralism is self-referentially inconsistent if the amor-alist tries to give reasons for his refusal to pay attention to morality.If the amoralist says he ignores morality because there is no suchthing, is he not claiming justification for his conduct (p. 189)?

He is indeed, but he need not claim moral justification. To assumethat justification must be moral begs the question. The amoralist canview h is ignoring morality as analogous to the denial unicorns exist.He is an amoralist, not a n arationalist.

Also, Veatch's account of Philippa Foot is inaccurate. She claimsthat certain terms, e.g., "courageous" or "rude," can be applied onlyin particular circumstances. Avoiding the cracks in the sidewalkwhile walking could not be courageous, if this is all there is to thestory. Veatch agrees with he r but thinks he r argument rests on "merelinguistic rules" instead of a genuine connection with reality (p. 147).This imputes to her a conventionalist view of language she takespains to argue against. Also, he wrongly supposes that she acceptsuniversalizability.

As will be apparent, I do not invariably agree with ProfessorVeatch. But he is sometimes profound, usually first -rate, and alwaysprovocative.

David GordonLudwig von Mises Inst itute

henry babcock veatch

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