hegel's contested legacy

18
Hegel's Contested Legacy: Rethinking the Relation between Art History and Philosophy Jason Gaiger It is widely acknowledged that the ideas of the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel played a vital role in the formation of the modern discipline of art history and that his attempt to discern underlying structures of meaning in the historical development of art provided an important stimulus for figtires such as Alois Riegl, Heinrich Wölfflin, and Max Dvorak. However, it is equally widely ac- cepted that Hegel's own theory of art—including the highly problematic notion of a historically unfolding "world spirit" (Weltgeist)—is bound up with a set of metaphysical commit- ments that are no longer tenable today. To speak of Hegel's contested legacy is thus to invite the question whether there remains anything to contest in the work of a philosopher whose last public lectures on aesthetics were given in Berlin in 1829. As long ago as 1907 Benedetto Groce published a book with the title What Ls Living and What Ls Dead in Hegel's Philosophy.^ In the intervening century numerous efforts have been made to salvage isolated elements that can be put to use within an alternative theoretical framework. Nonetheless, it is scarcely controversial to claim that the challenge to construct a complete system of knowledge, in which the place of art is secured in advance by a "science of logic," no longer compels conviction.^ If speculative idealism has collapsed as a coher- ent philosophical project, it would seem that the Lectures on Aesthetics can be quarried for critical insights concerning particular artworks, and perhaps for more general claims concerning the changing cultural and historical functions of art, without having to engage with the substantive body of ideas through which these insights were generated. On this view, whatever recognition might be accorded to Hegel as one of the "founding fathers" of the discipline, his work belongs to art history's history rather than to its present concerns."^ This assessment of Hegel's significance—typified by Hans Belting's observation that a workable "aesthetics of content" must first be "severed from its dogmatic mooring in Hegel's 'system' "—remains dominant among art historians.^ By con- trast, there is an exceptionally vigorous debate taking place among philosophers, for whom the question of Hegel's con- temporary relevance has, if anything, gained in impetus over the last two decades. The guiding thread for understanding this new critical approach is to be found in Jürgen Haber- mas's assertion that Hegel was the first philosopher for whom modernity itself became a philosophical problem.^ Accord- ing to this interpretation, Hegel's relevance to us resides in his recognition that under the specific historical conditions of modernity, that is to say, after the rejection of all merely external claims to authority, be it in the form of religious doctrine or brute political power, reason must find a means of grounding its own claims to rationality without recourse to prior suppositions: the refusal to obey any external authority without examining its warrant or entitlement also extends to reason itself. For Habermas and other contemporary philos- ophers, Hegel's analysis of the sociality of spirit, or Geist, should be understood as an explanation of how we are both subject to the claims of reason and yet also responsible for instituting the norms and values through which reason be- comes active in our lives.^ It is not difficult to see that this reconstruction of Hegel's views also has profound consequences for his theory of art. Rather than reading the lectures on aesthetics as a colorful but improbable set of illustrations to the march of the world spirit, philosophers such as Martin Donougho, Dieter Hen- rich, Stephen Houlgate, and Terry Pinkard have focused on the underlying problem of art's status and function in rela- tion to other forms of knowledge and experience.'^ In the words of Robert Pippin, perhaps the leading exponent of this approach, Hegel is "the art theorist for whom the link be- tween modernity and an intensifying self-consciousness, both within art production and philosophically, about art itself, is the most important."** A reassessment of Hegel's aesthetics is particularly timely in light of the new critical editions of his work that have been published in Germany. As we shall see, access to the original auditors' transcripts of the lectures provides an insight into Hegel's philosophy that is strongly at variance with the version presented by his critics and offers us a fresh opportunity to reconsider his views. Before going into Hegel's philosophy, it is useful to look at the reasons for the comparative neglect of Hegel's aesthetics within the discipline of art history. Ernst Gombrich's critique of Hegel as the proponent of a mystifying theory of art that is immune to correction by empirical evidence still commands widespread assent, even though few contemporary art histo- rians accept Gombrich's conception of properly "scientific" knowledge or his contention that the appropriate model of inquiry is to be found in the writings of Karl Popper.^ Gom- brich's blanket identification of Hegel with a "metaphysical" tradition of thinking in which agency is attributed to hypos- tatized entities, whether it be the "spirit of a people" ( Volks- geist) or the "will to art" (Kunstwollen), and his condemnation of this tradition as a form of "mythmaking" that accords explanatory value to unitary principles are rooted in his conviction that "the habit of talking in terms of collectives, of 'mankind,' 'races,' or 'ages'. . .weakens resistance to totali- tarian habits of mind."'" This formulation is clearly indebted to Popper's analysis of the rise of totalitarianism and his denunciation of Hegel in The Open Society and Its Enemies.^ ^ However, it is also decisively shaped by Gombrich's experi- ence of exile and the need to work through the inheritance of the Vienna school of art history. Gombrich had already questioned the "facility of the correlation" between artworks and the "spirit of the age," as well as the "unreflecting as- sumption that one can make an inference from one to the other," in a review of an essay by Ernst Garger, which he

Upload: maria-phillips

Post on 16-Aug-2015

36 views

Category:

Documents


3 download

DESCRIPTION

Jason Gaiger

TRANSCRIPT

Hegel'sContestedLegacy:RethinkingtheRelationbetweenArtHistoryandPhilosophyJason GaigerItiswidelyacknowledgedthattheideasoftheGermanphilosopherGeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegelplayedavitalroleintheformationofthemoderndisciplineofarthistoryandthathisattempttodiscernunderlyingstructuresofmeaninginthehistoricaldevelopmentofartprovidedanimportantstimulusforfigtiressuchas AloisRiegl,HeinrichWlfflin,andMaxDvorak.However,itisequallywidelyac-ceptedthatHegel'sowntheoryofartincludingthehighlyproblematicnotionofahistoricallyunfolding"worldspirit"(Weltgeist)isboundupwithasetofmetaphysicalcommit-mentsthatarenolongertenabletoday.TospeakofHegel'scontestedlegacyis thustoinvitethequestionwhetherthereremainsanythingtocontestintheworkofaphilosopherwhoselastpubliclecturesonaestheticsweregiveninBerlinin1829.Aslongagoas1907BenedettoGrocepublishedabookwiththetitleWhat Ls LivingandWhat Ls DeadinHegel'sPhilosophy.^Intheintervening centurynumerouseffortshavebeenmadeto salvage isolatedelementsthat can be putto usewithin analternativetheoreticalframework.Nonetheless, it isscarcely controversialto claimthatthechallengetoconstructacompletesystemofknowledge,inwhichtheplaceofartissecuredinadvance by a "science of logic," no longercompelsconviction.^Ifspeculativeidealismhascollapsedasacoher-entphilosophicalproject,itwouldseemthattheLecturesonAestheticscanbequarriedforcriticalinsightsconcerningparticularartworks,andperhapsformoregeneralclaimsconcerningthechangingculturalandhistoricalfunctionsofart,withouthavingtoengagewiththesubstantivebodyofideasthroughwhichtheseinsightsweregenerated.Onthisview,whateverrecognitionmightbeaccordedtoHegelasoneofthe"foundingfathers"ofthediscipline,hisworkbelongstoarthistory'shistoryratherthantoitspresentconcerns."^ThisassessmentofHegel'ssignificancetypifiedbyHansBelting'sobservationthata workable"aestheticsofcontent"mustfirstbe"severedfromitsdogmaticmooringinHegel's'system'"remainsdominantamongarthistorians.^By con-trast,thereis anexceptionallyvigorousdebatetakingplaceamongphilosophers,forwhomthequestionofHegel'scon-temporaryrelevancehas, if anything,gainedinimpetusoverthelasttwodecades.Theguidingthreadforunderstandingthisnewcriticalapproachistobefoundin JrgenHaber-mas's assertionthat Hegel was the first philosopherforwhommodernityitselfbecameaphilosophicalproblem.^Accord-ingtothisinterpretation,Hegel'srelevancetousresidesinhisrecognitionthatunderthespecifichistoricalconditionsofmodernity,thatistosay,aftertherejectionofallmerelyexternalclaimstoauthority,beitintheformofreligiousdoctrineorbrutepoliticalpower,reasonmustfindameansof groundingits own claimsto rationality without recoursetopriorsuppositions:therefusaltoobeyany externalauthoritywithoutexaminingits warrantorentitlementalso extendstoreasonitself.ForHabermasandothercontemporaryphilos-ophers,Hegel'sanalysisofthesocialityofspirit,orGeist,shouldbeunderstoodas anexplanationofhow we arebothsubjecttotheclaimsofreasonandyetalsoresponsibleforinstitutingthenormsandvaluesthroughwhichreasonbe-comesactiveinourlives.^Itis notdifficulttoseethatthisreconstructionofHegel'sviewsalsohasprofoundconsequencesforhistheoryofart.Ratherthanreadingthelecturesonaestheticsasacolorfulbutimprobablesetofillustrationstothemarchoftheworldspirit,philosopherssuchasMartinDonougho,DieterHen-rich,StephenHoulgate,andTerryPinkardhavefocusedontheunderlyingproblemofart'sstatusandfunctioninrela-tiontootherformsofknowledgeandexperience.'^Inthewords of Robert Pippin, perhapstheleading exponentof thisapproach,Hegelis"thearttheoristforwhomthelinkbe-tweenmodernityandanintensifyingself-consciousness,bothwithinartproductionandphilosophically,aboutartitself,isthemostimportant."** A reassessmentofHegel'saestheticsisparticularlytimelyinlightofthenewcriticaleditionsofhisworkthathavebeenpublishedinGermany.As weshallsee,accesstotheoriginalauditors'transcriptsofthelecturesprovides aninsightintoHegel'sphilosophythatis stronglyatvariance withthe versionpresentedby his critics andoffersusafreshopportunitytoreconsiderhis views.Beforegoing into Hegel'sphilosophy,it is usefulto lookatthereasonsforthecomparativeneglectofHegel'saestheticswithinthedisciplineof arthistory. ErnstGombrich'scritiqueof Hegelas theproponentof a mystifyingtheory of artthat isimmunetocorrectionby empiricalevidencestillcommandswidespreadassent,eventhoughfewcontemporaryarthisto-riansacceptGombrich'sconceptionofproperly"scientific"knowledgeorhiscontentionthattheappropriatemodelofinquiryis tobefoundinthewritingsofKarlPopper.^Gom-brich'sblanketidentificationofHegelwitha"metaphysical"traditionofthinkinginwhichagencyis attributedtohypos-tatizedentities,whetheritbethe"spiritofapeople"( Volks-geist)orthe"will to art"(Kunstwollen),andhiscondemnationofthistraditionasaformof"mythmaking"thataccordsexplanatoryvaluetounitaryprinciplesarerootedinhisconvictionthat"thehabitof talking interms of collectives, of'mankind,''races,'or'ages'. . .weakensresistancetototali-tarianhabits ofmind."'"This formulationis clearlyindebtedtoPopper'sanalysisoftheriseoftotalitarianismandhisdenunciationofHegelinThe Open SocietyandIts Enemies.^ ^However,itisalsodecisivelyshapedbyGombrich'sexperi-enceofexileandtheneedtoworkthroughtheinheritanceoftheViennaschoolofarthistory.Gombrichhadalreadyquestionedthe"facilityofthecorrelation"betweenartworksandthe"spiritoftheage,"aswellasthe"unreflectingas-sumptionthatonecanmakeaninferencefromonetotheother,"inareviewofanessaybyErnstGarger,whichheHEGEL' SCONTESTEDLEGACY179publishedin1937 whenhewas justtwenty-eightyearsold,'^ThecurrentresurgenceofinterestinthewritingsofRieglandotherViennaschoolarthistoriansaffordsavantagepointfromwhichtoquestionsomeofthesimplificationsofGombrich'saccount, andthe ways in whichGombrich'sideasintheirturnhavebeensimplified,whileacknowledgingtheentanglementof art andpolitics in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-centuryarthistory,I draw onrecent"nonmetaphysical"interpretationsof He-gel'sphilosophy^whoseadvocatesincludeAnglo-AmericananalyticphilosopherssuchasRobertBrandomandJohnMcDowellaswellasphilosophersworkingwithintheso-calledContinentaltraditioninordertosketchoutthelin-eamentsof analternativeand,I hope,moreproductiveread-ingofHegel'slecturesonaesthetics,"Farfromvitiatinghisposition,theidentificationofunresolvedandpotentiallyirresolvabletensionsbetween,forexample,theconceptofart andits historicalmanifestationsorbetweenart'ssensuousnatureanditsrationalcontentlendshisworkmuchofitscontemporaryinterestandhelpstosecureitsrelevancetoaperiodinwhichtraditionalframeworksandnarrativeshavelost theirhold. The most challenging, but also potentiallythemostrewardingfeattiresofHegel'saestheticsbecomeappar-entonlyif we addresshis claimsconcerningthedeephistor-icalnessof art,andwe shouldthereforeresistthetemptationtoadoptafragmentaryoratomisticapproachtobroaderquestionsofmeaning.Thisallowsmeto addresstherelationbetweenart historical andphilosophicalinquiry andto inves-tigatewhetherthe"fatefuldivision"inauguratedbyHegelresidesnot,asBeltingmaintains,intheseparationofthehistoricalstudyof art fromcontemporaryproblemsandcon-cernsbutintheseparationofarthistoryandphilosophy,whichonceworkedso closelytogether.ThedisputeoverthecorrectinterpretationofHegel'sideasthushasbroaderim-plicationsforarthistoriansworkingtoday,foritbearsnotonlyonthediscipline'stroubledrelationtoitspastbutalsoonitsrelationtoother,contiguousfieldsofknowledgethatresideonthefaultlinebetweenhistoricalandtheoreticalunderstanding.Conceptionsand MisconeeptionsofHegel'sPhilosophyCriticalresponsestoHegel'sphilosophyhavebeensharplypolarizedsincethedivisionintorightandleftHegeliansintheyearsimmediatelyfollowingthephilosopher'sdeathin1831,'* Thephilosopherwho was laudedfordiscoveringthe"rationalinthereal"throughhis investigationoftheorgani-zationofthePrussianstateandthedoctrinalclaimsofProt-estantism^whichcharacterizedhimasanunquestioningapologistofthestatusquowasalsoidentifiedasthemostactiteanalystofthe"contradictions"ofmodernsociety,whose dialecticalmethodandradical"sublation" (Aufhebung)ofChristianitypro'videdtheresourcesforarevolutionaryoverthrowofestablishedvalues,LudvgFeuerbachdeclaredthathehadsucceededinturningHegel'smethodofcriticalanalysisbackagainstspeculativeidealism,whileKarlMarxfamouslyinsistedthathehadplaceddialecticsonitsfeet,whereasHegelleftitstandingonitshead,'^Boththinkersemphasizedtheradicalhistoricismandimplicitsocialcri-tiquethat was containedwithintheapparentlystaticconfinesofHegel'ssystem.TheirinterpretationpicturedHegelasadynamicandpotentiallydestabilizingthinkerwhoseideascouldbedeployedagainst theforcesofreactionandconser-vatism.ThepowerfulinfluenceexertedbyHegel'sphilosophythroughoutthenineteenthandtwentiethcenturiesis due,atleastinpart,tothewayinwhichsubsequentmovementsincluding,besidesMarxism,existentialism,phenomenology,pragmatism,and,morerecently,deconstructionsoughttodefinethemselvesthroughoppositiontohiswork,therebysettingintrainacomplexprocessofrejectionandretrieval.AsKaterinaDeligiorgihasastutelyobserved,thereceptionhistoryofHegel'sthought"is shapednotonlybythosewhosawthemselvesaspreservinghisteachingsbutalsobythosewho criticisedthem,"' This also holdstrueforthedisciplineof arthistory, whichemergedinits modernforminGerman-speakingcountriesinthewakeofHegel'saesthetics.The"criticalhistoriansofart,"touseMichaelPodro'shelpfulterm,remaineddeeply indebtedto Hegel'sideas while atthesametimesubjectinghisapproachtofar-reachingcriti-cisms.^^ItisdiffictiltnowtoteaseapartthevariousstrandsthatlinkedtogetherHegelianism,Neo-Kantianism,andovertlyempiriciststances. Thechargesthatidealismhadcutitselfadriftfromthenaturalsciencesandthatitwasinade-quatelyresponsivetohistoricalfactswerecounteredbythematerialrichnessofHegel'sphilosophyanditssuccessinidentifyingmeaningfulpatternsof orderwithinanotherwiseoverwhelmingmass of data. In seeking to "go beyond"Hegel,thecriticalhistoriansofartdrewfreelyonawiderangeofintellectualresourceswiththeaimofextendingaswellascorrectinghisconceptionofartastheproductofahistori-callyspecificconstellationofideasandvaluesthatisnone-thelesssubjecttoitsown"immanent"processesofdevelop-ment.Oneofthereasons why Gombrich'snarrativeof theHege-lianoriginsofarthistoryhasprovedsoenduringisthatitimposesaretrospectivesenseoforderonadenselycom-pactedsetoftheoreticalandmethodologicaldebates.Thecentraltask of his essay "InSearchofCulturalHistory"firstdeliveredas a lecturein1967istoshowthatthedisciplineofarthistoryisconstructedonHegelianfoundationsthatcouldnolongerbeartheweightoftheedificetheywereintendedtocarry.'*Goinbrichidentifiesarosterofarthis-torians,includingJakobBtirckhardt,ErwinPanofsky,andJohanHuizinga,as wellasRiegl,Wlfflin,andDvorak,whorejectedtheidealistpremisesofHegel'smetaphysicsbutnonetheless continuedto operate with his theory of history. IfGombrichisrightthattheveryprojectofKulturgeschichte,orculturalhistory, "has beenbuilt, knowingly andunknowingly,onHegelianfoundationsthat have crumbled,"thereremainsatheoreticaldeficitattheheartofthedisciplinethatcanbemadegoodonlybyextirpatingthelastremnantsofHegel'sphilosophyandconstructingamorerobvistexplanatoryframework.''*ThemodelforthisistobefoundinPopper'sinterpretationofthe"logicofscientificdiscovery,"inwhichfalsificationthroughempiricale'videnceplaysakeyroleinestablishingthevalidityofscientificknowledge.Atthesametime,Gombrichplacesfaithinmorelocalizedstudiesinwhichattentionisfixedontheachievementsofindividualartistsratherthanbroadhistoricalperiods.""Itisunsurprising,then,thatGombrich'sargumentsare80BULLETI NJ UNE2011VOLUMEXCI I INUMBER2directedforthemostpartatHegel'sphilosophyofhistoryratherthanthelecturesonaesthetics.Heputsfoi-wardanumberof powerfulcriticismsof Hegel's"exegeticmethod,"focusinginparticularontheproblematicideaofaunified"spiritofthepeople"thatisrevealedinthereligiousviews,culturallife,andmoralcommitmentsof aparticularnationorsociety as wellas inits politicalconstitution,legalsystem,andcharacteristicmodesofthought.Therecognitionthatthesedifferentelementsareinterconnectedinmyriadwaysshouldnot,accordingtoGombrich,leadustomaketheunfoundedanddeeplymisleadingsuppositionthat"all as-pectsofaculturecanbetracedbacktoonekeycauseofwhichtheyaremanifestations."^'ThetvnHegelianpostu-latesofthe"spiritofthe age" and"thespiritof thepeople"restontheassumption"thateverythingmustbetreatednotonlyas connectedwitheverythingelse, butas a symptomofeverythingelse."^'^ Whatmakesthisassumption"metaphysi-cal"ratherthan"agenuinelyscientificsearchforcausalconnections"isits"aprioricharacter."^**DrawingonPop-per'slines of reasoning inThe Poverty of Historicism,Gombrichcontendsthatthedeficienciesoftheholisticapproachbe-comeobviousoncewe acknowledgethat"thereis noneces-sary connectionbetweenany one aspect of a group'sactivitiesandany other."^"* Thisinsightformsthe basis ofGombrich'slifelongattemptto identifyand slay the metaphysical"giants"that he believedhad emergedfromHegel'sphilosophy; "aes-thetictranscendentalism,""historicalcollectivism,""histori-caldeterminism,""metaphysicaloptimism,"and"dialecticalrelativism."^^Gombrichis primarily concernedwith the afterlifeof theseideasinthedisciplineofarthistory.However,giventheweightthatGombrichplacesontheconceptof"spirit,"it isworthpausingtoexaminethecomplexrolethatthistermplaysinHegel'sphilosophy.Hegel'sobsei-vationintheLec-turesonthe PhilosophyofWorld Historythat"spiritisessentiallyactive; it makes itself intothat whichit is in itself, into its owndeed, its own creation" can be recast in more acceptableformbytranslatingtheGermanwordGeist as "mind"ratherthanspirit.Onthis"nonmetaphysical"reading,Hegelissimplyreminding us that the social and cultural world is the productofhumandecisionmakingandthatourcharacterandiden-tity are formed,atleast inpart,throughtheinstitutionsthatwecreate.^''But whenhegoesonto say that"it is thesamewiththespiritof anation;itis aspecificspiritwhichmakesitselfintoanactualworldwhichnow existsobjectivelyin itsreligion,itsrituals,itscustoms,constitutionandpoliticallaws,"heseemstoposittheexistenceofanindependentforceorpowerthatexercisesagencyonasupraindividuallevel.Hegelfrequentlyspeaksof"reason"and"spirit"as iftheywereobjectiveforcesthataresomehow"realized"throughhumanactions.ThisprovidesthebasisforwhatHoulgateterms"theinfamousHegelianAbsolutewhichissupposedtobetheall-powerfulpuppetmastergoverninghistoryandusinghumanbeingsasthevehicleforitsschemes." Houlgatecontendsthatthis is "an absolutefiction"and,furthermore,"SuchanAbsolutedoesnotexistinHe-gel'sphilosophybutonlyinthemindsofhiscritics."^^ He-gel'sformulationofthemanifestationofreasoninnatureandhistory,orwhatheterms"theIdea,"describesnota"transcendentpower" but rather"the rationalitythatisinher-ent inthe worlditself;theworld'sownimmanentlogic."^*Analternativestrategy,pursuedbyPippin,istoconcedethatHegeldoesmakehighlyproblematicmetaphysicalclaims aboutthe nature and activity of "spirit." Whenit comestospecificproblemsconcerning,forexample,thenatureofmoralactionor the exercise of agency withinnorm-governedsocial institutions, though, he consistently furnishesan expla-nation"intermsinternaltothetopicatissue"ratherthanrelyingonhisconceptionofthe"unfoldingoftheAbso-lute."^^Followingthisinterpretation,Hegel'sview of"spirit"as an extrapersonalforcecan safely be set to one side since ithas no practicalbearing on the issues that really matter. I willreturntotheseissues, but forthemomentit is importanttonotethepowerfuldissentingvoicesincontemporaryHegelstudiesandthephilosophers,includingFrederickBeiser,SebastianGardner, and Rolf-PeterHorstmann, who argtie fortheindispensabilityofHegel'smetaphysicalcommitments.'**"Beiser,for one, contendsthatthe nonmetaphysicalinterpre-tationrepresentsanillegitimate"domestication"ofHegel'sideasandthat"the tendencytoreadthemetaphysical themesandissuesout ofGermanidealism"removespreciselythoseelementsthatare"challengingtoourownwaysofdoingphilosophy."""Whatgivesthesedebatestheirsenseofur-gencyis thenotionthatHegel'sanalysisofthe"sociality" ofthenorms,practices,andinstitutionswithinwhichrationalchoicesaremadeaffordsagenuinealternativetomethod-ologicalindividualismandthusoffersa"live" set of possibil-itiesforphilosophersworkingtoday.Atleastinitially,theselargertheoreticalquestionsdonotappearto haveany directbearingonGombrich'sanalysis ofthedeleteriousconsequencesofHegel'sideasforthedevel-opmentofarthistory.HisdiagnosisofthepersistenceofHegelianmodes of thinkingor what he terms"Hegelianismwithoutmetaphysics"restsontheunderstandingthatthecriticalhistoriansofart,whilerejectingHegel'saccountoftheoperationof reasoninhistory,continuedto assumethatthereis anunderlyingunitythatlinksallthemanifestationsof a culture; attempts to replacethe worldspirit with the "willto art"(Riegl), the "history of vision"(Wlfflin),orchanging"conditionsof production"(Marx)onlyreproducethesameproblems in a differentguise.'^'^ Once we relinquishthe Hege-lianmodelandexaminetheempiricalevidence,weareforcedtoacceptthateventhemosthomogeneoussocietiescontainconsiderableinternaldiversity,thatthespheresofscience, jurisprudence,andpoliticsoverlapanddivergeinunpredictableways, and that the various arts rarely develop intandemwithoneanother.^'''Havinglearnedfromthe mis-takes of our predecessors, we can place art history on a secureempiricalfootingandfinallylaytorestthespecterofitsHegelianpast.AssooftenwithGombrich,however,thecoherenceandpersuasivenessofthestoryhewantstotellisbeliedby theacknowledgmentofgreatercomplexity,whichispushedtothemarginsbut neverfullysuppressed.Althoughheappearstoputforwardarallyingcry fora"returntothefacts,"herecognizes that the facts cannot speak for themselves andthatwithoutsome"principleofrelevance,"thehistorianis con-frontedwithan"infinitearrayofdocumentsandmonu-ments."Indeed,"historycouldnot be writtenatall" withoutHEGELSCONTESTED LEGACY181a"preconceivedidea"thatenablesus to discernorderandmeaningratherthansimplyaccumulatingisolatedunits ofinformation.^''Thetask of the arthistorian is notmerely todescribe the empirical diversity of artworks but to analyze theunderlyingvisualandconceptualschematathroughwhichartists at differenthistoricalperiodshaverepresented theworld.Contraryto what we mightexpect, in thesepassagesandelsewhere in his work, Gombrichrelies on what is, per-haps, thekey insighton whichHegel'sphilosophyis based:therealizationthatthemindplays anindispensablerole inthe structuring of experienceandthat we thereforeneed tochallengeall claims to "immediacy.""''' Gombrich'srichly in-formativeandwide-ranginginvestigationsintotopics as di-verse as thepsychology of pictorialrepresentationand theinterplay of traditionandinnovationin historicallearningprocesses rest on the contentionthat thereis noperceptionwithoutconception:seeingand knowingare inextricablyboundup with each otherin visualexperience."'TheHegelianprovenance of theseideas^whichreceivedtheirclassicformulationin Hegel'scritiqueof "sensecer-tainty" in the opening section of the Phenomenology of Spiritisobscuredby Gombrich'suncriticalacceptanceof the consis-tentlyright-Hegelianinterpretativeapproachhe found atwork in art history.'^ Starting out fromthe mantra "one doesnotarguewiththe Absolute,"he maintainsthatHegel'sentirephilosophyshouldbeunderstoodas "anexten-sion . . . of theChristianinterpretationof providentialhis-tory."*** This interpretationdepends on a strongly metaphys-icalreading of therelationbetweenHegel'sScienceof Logicandhispracticalphilosophy,whichsupposedly"repeats itsessential and inevitable dialectical steps as an ascentthroughthelogicalcategories."^^GombrichassumesthatHegelworkedout his views in advancein accordancewith theexigencies of his system and then simply "applied" the resultsto the various domains of art, science, morality, and so forth.HeconcedesthatHegel"displayedmuchskilland evenpoeticgiftin presentingthedevelopmentof thearts as alogical process accompanying and reflecting the imfolding ofthe spirit.""' However, it is only whenthe"clappering of hisconceptual mill falls silent" that his "genuine love of art" cancome to thefore.*"Theunderlyingassumptionhereis thatphilosophical reflectiondistorts or obscures ourpurportedlymorenaturalresponses to artandthatHegel'sattempt tograsp the interrelationbetweendifferentdomains of experi-ence is drivenby a spurioussearch for unity, in which heimposes the orderhe claims to discover.Gombrich'scriticisms of Hegelaredeeplyentangled inrecentGermanhistoryandhis dualassimilationandrejec-tion of themethods of theViennaschool of arthistory inwhichhe was trained,but which in the work of figures suchas JosefStrzygowskiandHansSedlmayrhadbeentaintedwithracismandright-wingideology.*^ForGombrich, notonly Hegel'sideasbutalsothose of Rieglare to beviewedthroughthelens of theirsubsequentadoptionandreinter-pretation by art historians who gave their support to NationalSocialism, His willingnessto evaluate earlier thinkers onthebasis of their inheritance in art history is made explicit in Artand Illusion, where he grounds his assertionthat "[t]he'will-to-form,'theKunstwollen,becomes a ghost in themachine,drivingthewheels of artisticdevelopmentaccording to 'in-exorablelaws,' " not throughstudy of Riegl'swritings butthroughreferenceto Sedlmayr'srevisionaryaccount of the"quintessence" of Riegl's teaching.'*'' Gombrich finds there insummaryformthedoctrines he spent a lifetimeopposing,includingthe statementthat"spiritualcollectives"possessindependentrealityandthatthereis sucha thingasthe"meaningfulself-movementof theSpiritwhichresults ingenuinehistoricaltotalitiesof events."'*'* In a review of aFestschriftpublishedfor Sedlmayr in 1964,Gombrichpre-sented a forcefulcritique of themethod of "structuralanal-ysis," contendingthat"failure to speakoutagainsttheene-mies of reasonhascausedenoughdisastersto justifythisbreachof Academic etiquette.'"**Togetherwithcolleaguessuch as OttoPachtandGuidoKaschnitz von Weinberg, Sedlmayr had sought to turnRiegl'sideasintoarigorous"scienceof art history"thatwoulddisclose the structural principles underlying the formalorga-nization of individual works of art as well as largerprocessesofhistoricalchange.Theambiguitiesattendanton Riegl'snotion of Kunstwollen were to be replaced by the more neutralanalysis of "structure,"butSedlmayralsodeclaredthatthiselusive concept shouldbe understood in terms of"objectivespirit," withits strongHegelianresonance,andthat it pos-sessedthecharacterof a "supra-individualwill" withits ownrealityand"power[Kraft]."*^ Already in 1936, in a criticalreview ofKunstxuissenschaftlicheForschungen, a journaleditedby SedlmayrandPachtas a vehiclefordisseminatingtheirideas, Meyer Schapiro hadobserved:Theauthorstendto isolateformsfromthe historicalconditions of their development, to propel them by myth-ical,racial-psychologicalconstants,or to givethem anindependent, self-evolving career. Entities like race, spirit,will, and idea are substituted in an animistic manner for areal analysis of historicalfactors.*^Theconceptof aVolksgeist hadbeenintroducedby JohannGottfriedHerderin theeighteenthcentury as a means ofcombatingthecomplacentassumptionsof classicistaesthet-ics. His emphasis onthe distinctive character of a people, asmanifestedin its artandsocialstructures,wasintended togive due weight to cultural diversity by showing that there isnosinglenormativestandardthatcan be used to evaluateothercultures,whichare guidedby theirownidealsandvalues.'*" Subsequent history has shown, however, that roman-tic notions of "organic community," includingtheconstrualof a specificnationalcharacter,readilylendthemselves toideologicalexploitation.Detachedfromtheiroriginalcon-text and combined with ideas of historical progress, conceptssuchasVolk andGeistwereusedto endorseaggressivelyexpansionist enterprises and to give pseudoscientificsupportto the belief in cultural superiority that Herder had sought toundermine. In the writings of Sedlmayr andothermembersofthesecondViennaschool of arthistory, the project ofGeistesgeschichte(culturalhistory)was allied to stronglyreac-tionary tendencies that were explicitly anti-Semitic and racist.It wouldthus appearthat Gombrich's view of thedangersof appealing to "unitary principles" was borne out by events.Nonetheless, we needto be wary of retrospectivegeneraliza-tionsandof placingtoomuchweight on theproblematic2 8 2 A R T B U L L E T I N J U N E 2 0 1 1 V O L U M E X C I I I N U M B E R2conceptof"infltience."Itisnoteworthy,forexample,thatPachtcontinuedtodefendastructuralinterpretationofRiegl'sideaslongafterhisexiletoE nglandasaJ ewishrefugeein1937, andthatRieglhimselftinlikehis contem-poraryStrzygowskishowedlittlesusceptibilityto nodons ofracialpurity or pan-Germannationalism.**^ I n an article pub-lishedintheBurlington Magazinein1 963, PachtchallengedGombrich'sstippositionthatarthistorycoulddispensewiththeconsiderationof broaderhistoricalstructures while at thesametimepresentingamorenuancedrenditionofRiegl'sapproachthat emphasizedthe empiricalbasis of hiswork andtheextenttowhichhisideasarosefromtheclosestudyofobjectsinhis capacityas amuseumcurator.^"PachtacceptsthattheconceptofKunstiuollenhasextrapersonalconnota-tions, but he contendsthat it provides an answer to a genuineprobleminsofarasitallowstheanalysisof"deeper-lyingchanges" thatcannotbe explainedonthe levelofindividualvolition.Gombrich'sfamousobservation,"Therereallyis nosuchthingas Art. Thereareonlyartists," has its correlateinC roce'scontentionthat"thereis, stricdy speaking,no historyofart,onlyindividualardsts."For Pacht,theupshotofsuchradicalindi'vidualismis thateverythingbecomesamatterofsubjectivedecision,an"arcanumofptireart," inwhich"theartisticgeniusintervenesas adeusexmachina."^^^M orerecentstudies, suchas thoseby J asE isnerand C hris-topherS.Wood,havestressedthetensionbetweenRiegl'sdetailedvisualexaminationofindividualobjectsandhis at-tempttosolve"muchlargerproblemsabouttheculturalmeaningof art itself."''^Therehabilitationof Riegl'sreputa-tionintheE nglish-speakingworldhasmtichtodowithrecognitionthatthequestionofhowwemovefromthescrutinyofindividualartworkstobroaderargumentsandgeneralizadons,orwhatE isnerterms"the big picture," can-notbecircumvented.*'Pcht'sassessmentofRiegl'ssignifi-cance,andhisdefen.seofwhathetermsa"hybridtypeofenquiry,"isthusclosertocontemporaryapproachesthanGombrich'shighlypartisancritique.^*Ratherthanidentify-ingasinglelineagethatleadsfromHegeltoSedlmayr,arthistorianshavebeguntoproduceamoredifferentiatedac-countthatis attentiveto internalcontroversiesanddisputes.Atthesametime,however,thereturntoRieglhasrevealedthattherearesubstantialmethodologicalproblemsthatstillremainunresolved.E isner'sobservationthat "our generaliza-tionsine'vitablyleapbeyondwhatisstrictlyprovableby thepreciseanalysis of somethingso particular as a specificobjectorsetofobjects"raises,onceagain,theproblemofinduc-tion,whichso troubledPopper.''"''Drawing onthe insights ofDavidHumeandotherempiricistphilosophers.Popperar-guedthatuniversalaffirmativepropositionscannotbein-ferredfromanaccumulationof facts,nomatterhow consis-tenttheevidencemayappear,forwecannotruleoutthepossibilitythatacounterinstancemightarise.''*' Popper's so-lutiontotheproblemrestsontheprincipleoffalsification,accordingtowhichonlyhypothesesthatarefalsifiablebyexperiencecountasscientific.Sinceknowledgearisesnotfromtheconfirmationofahypothesisbutfromthecorrec-tionoferror,theprincipleof falsificationaffordsavianega-tivathatcanbeusedtoassessthestatusofanyclaimtoknowledgeordulyscientificmethodology.Thelimitsofthisprincipleatleastinitsapplicationoutsidethedomainof thenaturalsciencescanbe seenbyconsideringPopper'sstricturesonwhatcotmtsaslegitimatesocialandpoliticaltheory.Herejectsas nonscientificeffortsto understandsocialchangethroughthe beha'vior and actionofcollectives,onthebasisthatsocialphenomenamustbegraspedintermsofindi'vidualchoicesanddecisions,sincethesealone are susceptibleto causalexplanation,prediction,andtestingand,hence,to"falsification."N ot onlydoesherule out holistic formsof "understanding"(Verstehen),he alsodiscountsthe existence of meaningftilmethodologicaldiffer-encesbetweenthesocialandnaturalsciences.Despitehiscriticismsofthespecificdoctrinesoflogicalpositivismandhisresistancetotheuseoftheterm.Poppercanstillbecharacterizedas a "positivist" insofaras he remainedcommit-tedto thethreebasictenetsidentifiedby G. H. vonWright:thefundamentalunityofscience,theestablishmentoftheexactsciencesas a modelforthe others, and adherenceto arestrictivelynomological,orlaw-based,theoryofexplana-tion.*^E quallycontentiously.Popperholdsthatanypresen-tationoftheconditionsforgoodgovernmentispotentiallyopentocorruptionandmisuse,andthatphilosopherssuchas Plato andHegeldirectlycontributedto theemergenceoftotalitarianismby attemptingtoprovideapositivetheoryofwhatconstitutesa justsociety.Here,too.Popperproposestheadoptionofavia negativa:theonlylegitimatecriterionfordemocracyistheabilitytoremoveanunwantedgovern-ment.Whileit is now widely acceptedthatthisis anecessaryconditionforagenuinelydemocraticsociety,fewwouldagreethat it is a stifficientconditionor that we shotildforsakeanyendeavortoarticulateasubstantiveformulationof con-stituentelements suchas justice, representativepower, or theruleof law.SincemanyofthecontemporarymisconceptionsaboutHegel'sphilosophyderivefromPopper,itisimportanttorecognizethetendentiousanddeeplymisleadingcharacterofhisapproach.I nadevastatinganalysisofthechapterdevotedto Hegel inT heOpen Society and Its Enemies, Walter A.Kaufmannhas shownthe extentto whichPopperallowed hispoliticalconvictionstooverridehismethodologicalscru-ples.^* Heputsforwardthreeprincipalcharges.First,ratherthanreadingtheoriginaltexts.PopperreliedonthebookHegel Selections editedby J acobL oewenbergand published byScribner's in1929; besides seeming to be unaware of passagesand,indeed,entireworks,thatare notincludedby L oewen-berg, he pays no attentionto the originalcontextfromwhichtheisolatedsectionsaretaken,evenwherethisdecisivelychangestheirmeaning.Second,hedeploysthemethodofcompositequotation,stringingtogethersentencesandphrasesfromdifferentcontextsandevendifferentworks, toattributeviews toHegelthatarequiteat variancewiththoseheactuallyheldorthatmisleadinsofarasPopperomitsHegel'sown caveatsandqualifications.''''Third,herelies onaconceptof"influence"thatderivesfromthelogicallyfalla-ciousprinciplepost hoc ergopropterhoc(A occurred,thenBoccurred,therefore,AcausedB ).I nclaimingthatHegelrepresents"themissinglink"betweenPlatoandfascism,henotonlyignoresHegel'sdefenseofthemodernconstitu-tionalstateinhis Philosophyof Right,healsofailstoexaminewhetherofficialNaziideologyactuallymadeuseofHegel'scomplexanddemandingphilosophicalwritings.KatifmannHEGEL' SCONTESTEDLEGACY183pointsoutthat"HegelisrarelycitedinNaziliterature,and,whenheis referredto, it is usually by way of disapproval.TheNazi'sofficial'philosopher,'[Alfred]Rosenberg,inDer My-thos des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts,mentions,anddenounces,Hegeltwice."''" Kaufmann'sargumentsaresupportedby de-tailedhistoricalstudiesbyShlomoAvineri,FranzGrgoire,HenningOttmann,andothers who have soughtto exposeasa"myth"thenotionthatHegelwasanapologistofthePrtissianstate and a totalitariantheorist.^'This is not to deny,of course, thatHegel'sideas, likethoseof othermajorthink-ers,havebeensubjectedtoideologicaldistortion.Manyofthekeyelementsofhisphilosophyincludinghisconcep-tionof historicalprogress, the role of the nation-state, andhisemphasis onthe unity of ethicallife(Sittlichkeit)are opentobothinterpretationandmisinterpretation,andtheyhavebeentakenupbyprotagonistsfrombothwingsofthepolit-icalspectrum,sometimesindisastrousways.TheproblemwithPopper'saccountisnotthatitisunremittinglycriticalbutthatitsharesthesameflatteningoutandreductiveisolationofcertainaspectsattheexpenseofothersthatcharacterizetheworstaspectsofthisreception.Gombrich'sdeclarationinArtandIllusion thathewould"beproudifProfessorPopper'sinfluenceweretobefelteverywherein this book" now represents a majorimpedimenttotheacceptanceofhisideas.''^Hiscommitmenttoaprop-erly"scientific"modelofarthistoryundoubtedlyhadbene-ficial effects,allowinghimtobreakwiththeearly-twentieth-centurypreoccupationwithquestionsofstyleandtobuildcloselinksv^ithcurrentresearchinthenaturalsciences,including,aboveall,thepsychologyofperception.Hisdem-onstrationofthecomplexinterrelationofconceptualandperceptualelementsinthemakingandappreciationofartstillformsanindispensablestartingpointforcurrentre-searchinthephilosophyofdepiction.'^'''Moreover,asI havealready observed, his actualpractice as an art historian was farmoresophisticatedthanhisofficialpronouncementswouldseemtoindicate. JamesElkins'scontentionthatGombrich'sworkis notconnectedtocontemporaryarthistoryputfor-wardinanessaypublishedin2002,ayearafterGombrich'sdeathalreadyseemsdatedinlightoftherenewedinterestin"visuality"andtheoriesoftheimage,orwhatinGermanyistermedBildwissenschaft.^'^Gombrich'sinsistencethatarthistorymustbeanswerabletoPopper'sanalysisofthe"logicof scientificenquiry" was intendedto securethemethodolog-icalrigorthathebelievedwaslackinginthe"mythmaking"and"simulacrumof explanation"providedby HegelandtheViennaschool.However,theresultingtraductionofarichandvariedtraditionofthoughtcreatedahighlydistortedpictureofarthistory'shistory,leavingatheoreticalvacuumthathadtobefilledbyothermeans,anditalsoreliedonaconceptionofarthistoricalresearchthatwasinadequatelyresponsivetothedistinctiveformsofinquiryappropriatetothehumanandsocialsciences.ThedeleteriousconsequencesforGombrich'sowntheoryofartcanbebroughtoutby consideringhis responsetotheworkofMichaelBaxandall,whosebookPainting and Experi-ence inFifteenth-CenturyItalybeginswiththestatement,"Afifteenth-centurypaintingisthedepositofasocialrelation-ship."'''^Inanarticleonthecriticalreceptionoftheconceptofthe"periodeye," AllenLangdaleobservesthatBaxandall'sundertakingto developa moresociallyresponsivearthistory"worriedGombrichandotherscholarsforwhomthePeriodEyeinvokedtheZeitgeistandallitsominousassociations."''''AccordingtoLangdale,thereasonsforthiscanbetracedbacktoafundamentaldifferenceinapproachthatis allthemoremarkedbecauseoftheapparentcontinuitywithGom-brich'sinterpretationofthe"beholder'sshare."WhereasGombrichtreats"artisticprodtictionasapracticesealedofffromothersocialactivities," isolatingthestudy ofpsycholog-ical processes fromotherfactors,Baxandall"integratespaint-ingbyembeddingitinamuchgreaternumberofandbroaderrangeof socialpractices, activities removedfromtheworldofvisualart,thoughnotremovedfromtheworldofvisuality."Asaresult,Baxandall"hadtoconfrontthelaby-rinthof problemshis projectgenerated;theindividual versusthecollective,theinnateversustheconditioned,andsoon."''*^Langdaleoverstatesthecontrast,buthisdiscussionusefullyrevealsthedifficultiesattendantonGombrich'sat-temptsimplytoexcisefromarthistorythehistorical"collec-tivism"and"determinism"thatheidentifiedwithHegel'sphilosophy.Unlessthe field of inquiry is artificiallynarrowedtoexcludearicher,moresocialaccountofartisticactivity,theseHegelianthemesarelikelytoreemerge,notas"meta-physicalerrors"butasgenuineproblemsthatasociallyem-beddedhistoryofartneedstoaddress.SimilarissuesareatstakeinthehostilereceptionaccordedtoSvetlanaAlpers'sThe Art of Describing,whichwas portrayedby theadherentsofa morenarrowly "iconological" interpretationof seventeenth-centuryDutchpaintingasaregressionintoHegelianism,characterizedby"holism"and"thehabitofthinkingincol-lectiveterms."''**Inhislecture"HegelandArtHistory,"deliveredin1977,Gombrichoffersamoresympatheticversionofthedisci-pline'sdebttoHegel,evenportrayinghimselfas a"run-awayHegelian"inanoteaddedtotheEnglishtranslation.''^Al-thoughhe refersto Hegel's Lectures on Aesthetics d& the"found-ing documentofthemodernstudy of art," hemaintainsthatifarthistoryisto"freeitselfofHegel'sauthority,"itisnecessarytoworkoffthisinheritancebysubjectingittocriticalexamination.TheinfluenceofPopperis nothardtodiscerninhiscontentionthat"[t]hegenuinescientistdoesnotseektoconfirmhishypothesishelooksprimarilyforcounter-examples.Atheorythatdoesnotencounteranyresistance,doesnothaveanyscientificcontent.ThedangerofHegel'sinheritanceliespreciselyintheseductiveeaseofitsapplication."Gombrich'sreminderthatweshouldbewaryofthetin-questioning deploymentof any thinker'sideas contributesanimportantcorrectivetotherelianceonHegelianformsof"explanation"by somemembersof the Viennaschool.It canbeargued,however,thatGombrich'sowntreatmentofHe-gel,likethatofPopper,substitutesonehighlysimplifiedreadingforanotherandthathisreadydismissalofanentiretraditionofthinkingpossessesthesame"seductiveease"astheviewsherejects.Thefatallack oftractioninGombrich'sanalysis ofHegel'slegacycanbebrotightintoreliefbycomparinghisconcep-tionwiththemorecomplexviewofHegeldevelopedinGontinentalEuropeintheperiodbeforeandafterWorldWarII.AlthoughmydiscussionfocusesonGermany,itis184B U L L E T I NJ U N E2 0 1 1V O L U M EX C I I IN U M B E R2importanttorealizethattherewasanequallystrongcriticalengagementinFrance.Thepublicationin1929ofJeanWahl' sLemalheurdelaconscience danslaphilosophiede Hegelmarksthebeginningofadistinctiveinterpretativetraditioninwhichthefigureofthe"unhappyconsciousness"was ac-cordeda key roleinunderstandingHegel'stheoryofmoder-nityafigurethathasrecentlyre,surfacedinT.J.Clark'sFarewellto an Idea.^^AlexandreKojve'scelebratedseminarsonHegel'sPhenomenologyof Spirit,heldinParisinthe1930s,wereattendedbymanyoftheleadingfiguresinFrenchthought,includingRaymondAron,GeorgesBataille,AndrBreton, JacquesLacan, andMauriceMerleau-Ponty.Forcon-temporaryarthistorians,thecentralpointofreferenceisundoubtedlytheworkof JudithButler,whoseresearchintothecontroversiessurroundingtheHegelian"subjectofde-sire" in twentieth-centuryFrenchthoughtlaid thefoundationforherinvestigationof "performativity"andtheconstructionofsocialidentity.'^Atthesametime,manyofHegel'sideasalsomadetheirwayintoarttheorythroughmoresubterra-neanroutes, suchas theclose engagementwiththephenom-enologicaltraditionbyartistsandcriticsinthe1960swhoexploredtherelevanceoftheconceptof"embodiment"andthedialecticsof"subject-objectrelations"torecentdevelop-mentsinpaintingandsculpture.InGermany calls fora "return"toHegel were moreexplic-itlypoliticalinorientation.Motivatedby theneedtoofferaviable alternativeto the cnidereflectionistaccountof artthatwaspromotedbyorthodoxMarxism,oratleasttheversionthatwasdominantinEastern-bloccountries,proponentsofWesternMarxism,incltiding TheodorAdorno, WalterBenja-min,MaxHorkheimer,andHerbertMarcuse,soughttore-coverthecriticalimpetusofdialecticalthinking.Thisrecog-nizablyleft-HegelianapproachplacedgreatemphasisonkeyHegelianconceptssuchas "mediation,""contradiction,"and"determinatenegation"while,atthesametime,rejectingHegel'sefforttoreconcileconflictingtendencieswithintherealmofthought.Adorno,forexample,explicitlycontraststhe"unreflectedcopytheory"tipheldbythosewho"admin-isterthedialecticinitsmaterialistversion"withthe"criticalferment"containedinHegel's philosophy.'^Definingdialec-ticsas"theunswervingefforttoconjoinreason'scriticalconsciousnessof itselfandthecriticalexperienceof objects,"hecontendsthatthesuperiorityofHegel'sdialecticalmethodlies inits abilityto preserve"thedistinctmomentsofthesubjectiveandtheobjectivewhilegraspingthemasme-diatedtogether."'* Adorno'stargethereis notmerelyortho-doxMarxism,withitsrigidlydeterministicframingoftherelationbetweenmindand world, butalso Popper'spositivist"logicofscience,"forwhich"objectivetruthiswhatisleftoverwhentheso-calledsubjectivefactorshavebeenre-moved."'''Hegel'scoreinsightadumbratedinGombrich'sacknowledgmentofthecrucialroleofcognitioninvisual(andother)experienceisthatwehavenoaccesstotheworldundescribedexceptthroughspecificframesofrefer-ence,andthatwethereforeneedtoreflectcriticallyonthesubjectivedimensionof evenpurportedlyneutralknowledgeclaims.Thereceptionof criticaltheory withinthedisciplineofarthistorycreatedamomentinwhichitwaspossibletounder-take a revisedassessmentof Hegel'slegacy. Therecuperationof spectilative anddialecticalthinking by a later generationofarthistorianswhohadreadandbeendeeplyinfluencedbythe workof thinkerssuchas BenjaminandAdornoprovidedampleresourcestochallengethetheistic,quietist,andpan-logicistinterpretationofHegel'sphilosophythatGombrichhaddoneso muchtoestablish. Justsix years afterGombrichgavehislecture"InSearchofCulturalHistory,"Clarkob-servedinImage ofthe Peoplethatworksofartneversimply"reflect"ideologiesorsocialstructuresandissueda call fora"historyofmediations"thattakesintoaccounttheintricateprocessesofconversionandrelationthatlinkspecificformsofrepresentationtoconcretesocialcircumstances."*Clark'sinsistencethat"[i]narthistory. . .it is precisely theHegelianlegacy that we needto appropriate:to use, criticize,reformu-late" openedtheway fora renewedengagementwithdialec-ticalthinking."However,despitetheinstitutionalconsolida-tionofthesocialhistoryofartandtheestablishmentoftheso-callednew art history, Clark's attemptto "disinter"Hegel'sphilosophywas, forthemostpart,unsuccessful.Carefulhis-toricalstudies,suchasthosebyMargaretIversen,HubertLocher,andMichaelPodro,havegreatlyenrichedourun-derstandingofthenineteenth-centuryoriginsofthedisci-plinebuttheydonotseemtohavedisplacedtheorthodoxpictureofHegel,whichisstilldisseminatedinarthistorytextbooksandisregularlysetupasaneasytargetforcriti-cism.Podro'swork,inparticular,showedthatitwaspossibletocombinea critical andintellectuallyprobing approachtothephilosophicalunderpinningsofarthistorywithsensitivitytothedistinctiveinterestsandconcernsofanearliertraditionofthought.It is allthemorestriking,then,thattheoreticallysophisticatedarthistorianssuchasMichaelAnnHollyandKeithMoxey, whohaveinitiatedanimportantsetofdebatesontheappropriatemethodsandconceptualframeworksforthestudyofvisualculture,continuetodescribeHegelintermsvirtuallyindistinguishablefromthoseemployedbyGombrichover forty years ago.'^ InherbookPanofsky and theFoundationsof Art History,HollycontendsthatHegel"postu-latedan'InfiniteSpirit'or'Idea'behindhistorythatworksitselfoutdialecticallythroughtimebymanipulatinghumanactors caught in its path."**" Iversen rightly observes thatHolly"seemstohavereadHegelthroughthelensofhostilecriticswhotendtocaricaturehisphilosophy"withoutstoppingtoask"why anyoneshouldholdsucha bizarreview" orwhetherwemightstillhavesomethingtolearnfromHegel's"mind-formulated"accountofthesocialworld.*"Inhis1998essay"ArtHistory'sHegelianUnconscious,"MoxeyalsorehearsesthestandardcriticismsofHegel,reproducingmanyofGom-brich'sargumentsverbatim,butheembedstheminapost-structuralistperceptionoftruthassomething"constructed"ratherthan"found."Despitehisassertionthatthehistoriog-raphyofartremainsessentiallyHegelianandthatarthisto-riansneedtosustaintheirresistancetotheworkingofthedi,scipline's"Hegelianunconscious,"MoxeyrefersdirectlynottoanyofHegel'sownwritingsbutonlytotextsbyGombrichandotherarthistorians.**^BeforedelvingfurtherintothequestionofwhyGom-brich'simageofHegelstillretainsitshold,I wanttoinvesti-gatewhetherthisaccountcorrespondstotheviewsthatHe-gelactuallyputforwardinhislecturesonaesthetics.HEGEL' SCONTESTEDLEGACY1851FranzTheodorKugler,Hegelwhrendeiner Vorlesung,1828,lithographonpaper,7y8 X 9% in.(19.5X24.7 cm).Kupferstich-kabinett,Staatliche-museenzuBerlin,462-103(artworkinthepublicdomain;photographprovidedby BPK, Berlin)Examinationof the original sources will enable me toidentifysomeofthecoreinterpretativeissuesatstakeincurrentreassessmentsofHegel'sphilosophyandtoshowthatthesebearonproblemsthatareof directconcernto arthistoriansworkingtoday.NormatvityandtheExchangeofReasonsAnyreconsiderationofHegel'sviews onartmustbeginwiththediscoveryandongoingpublicationoftheoriginalaudi-tors'transcriptsofhislecturesonaesthetics.AsAnnemarieGethmann-Siefert,HelmutSchneider,andothershaveshown,closeinvestigationofthesetextscastsdoubtonthereliabilityoftheposthumouseditiononwhichmostoftheextantliteratureis basedand,further,itdecisivelymodifiesourunderstandingofkey elementsofHegel'sphilosophy.**''HegelfirstlecturedonaestheticsinHeidelbergin1818,thoughatthis stagehestilltreatedartandreligiontogether.AfterhismovetoBerlinhededicatedfourseparatelecturecoursestoaesthetics,in1820-21,1823,1826,and1828-29.Auditors'notebooksortranscripts(Nachschriften)surviveforallofthese,insomecasesinmtiltipleversions,andpublica-tionhas proceededapacesince1995.*'*Notetakingseemstohave beenahighlydevelopedskillthatwas prizedby univer-sitystudents;notonlyweretranscriptscirculatedamongthosewhocouldnotbepresent,butalsoinsomecasestheywerepreservedinexpensivebindingsandplacedforsafe-keepinginprivatelibraries. Thesurvivaloftranscriptsofthesamelectureseriesbydifferenthands,andoftranscriptsoflecturesonothertopicsforwhichHegel'sownnotebooksremain,allowsacheckontheiraccuracy.Thepublishededitionsofthetranscriptsclearlymarkthepresenceoflacu-naeanddeployasystemofbracketstoshow whereinterpo-lationshavebeenmade.Althoughthetranscriptsvaryinquality,theygivearemarkablyvividpictureofHegel'sprac-ticeas alecturer,whichcanbeplacedalongsidethefamouslithographby FranzKugler,basedonhis owndrawing"fromlife[nach der Natur]" of1828 andreproducedin his Handbuchder Geschichteder Malerei of1837(Fig.1).**"Hegel did not publishany of his lectures in his lifetime;theversionsthatappearedintheWerkeedition,or"completeworks," organizedby "anassociationof friendsof theimmor-talized[philosopher]"between1832and1845, wererecon-structedfromhisnotesandfromthoseofhisstudentsandwere stibjectto varying degreesof editorialintervention.Theworkthatmost ofus know as theLectures on Aesthetics wasputtogetherbyhisstudentHeinrichGustavHotho,whohadknownHegelsince1822andattendedmanyofhislecturecourses.^^AfterHegel'sdeathhetookoverhislecturesonaestheticsatBerlinUniversity,andin1832hewasofferedapostinthepaintingsectionof thenewly built AltesMuseum.AninsightintoHotho'sviews, oratleasttheviews by whichhewishedtobeidentified,isfurnishedbyhisapplicationletterforthisposition,addressedtotheministerofculture,Karl von Altenstein;"as thehighestgoalof scienceI havesetmyselfthetaskoftreatingaestheticsonlyintheclosestcon-nectionwitharthistorysothata justificationandguaranteeof universalaestheticprinciplescanbe providedthroughthehistoricaldevelopmentofthearts."*^Thetensionbetweenhistoricalandsystematicapproachesto art was farfromresolvedatthistime. As James J.Sheehanhasshown,itplayedanimportantroleinthedesign,build-ing,andorganizationoftheAltesMuseumandledtoanacrimonioussplit betweenAlois Hirt, who had first calledfortheestablishmentofapublicartmuseuminBerlin,andothersonthecommittee,includingWilhelmvonHtimboldt,Carl-FriedrichRumohr,KarlFriedrichSchinkel,andGustavWaagen,whoarguedthattheselectionanddisplayofworksshouldbebasedonaestheticratherthanhistoricalconsider-185BULLETI NJ UNE2011VOLUMEXCIIINUMBER2ations.Intheenda compromisewas reached:thecollectionofantiquitieswas arrangedthematicallyonthefirstfloor,inaccordancewith Schinkel'sinsistencethat thepurposeofthemuseumwas toteachpeopleaboutbeauty,notthehistoryofart,whilethepaintingsonthesecondfloorwereplacedinbroadlychronologicalorder.^*Itis inthecontextofthe.sedebatesthatHothobeganthetaskofeditingHegel'slecturesforpublication.Ittookhimnearly fouryears to preparethe first volumeof theLectures onAesthetics,whichfinallyappearedin1835,followedbytwofurthervolumesin1837 and1838. Theresultof hiseditoriallaborsrunstonearlysixteenhundredpagesinthemodernGermaneditionandis incomparablylargerinscalethananyofthesurvivingtranscriptsandlecturenotes.A measureofcomparisonis givenbytheprintedversionofHotho'stran-scriptofthe1823lectureseries,whichis justoverthreehundredpageslongandis freeofthenumerousrepetitionsandtheforcedtransitionsbetweenthevariouspartsthatmakethepublishededitionsounwieldy.HothowasabletoconsultHegel'snotebooks,whicharenowlost,aswellasseveralotherstudenttranscriptsalongsidehisown.*^^ None-theless,questionsabouttheauthenticityofhiseditionwereraisedasearlyas1931byGeorgLasson,whopointedtodiscrepanciesbetweenthepublishedtextandtheavailablesources,noting,forexample,thattheclaimthatartis"thesensibleappearanceoftheidea[dassinnliche ScheinenderIdee]," onwhichso muchweight has beenplaced,is notto befoundin any of the extanttranscripts.'"' These questions havebeengivenrenewedprominencebytheresearchofGeth-mann-Siefert,theleadingfigurebehindthepublicationofthetranscriptsandthefiercestcriticofHotho'seditorialpractice,whichshe judges"unreliabletoahighdegree."''*Gethmann-Siefertmaintainsthat"Hegel'soriginalconcep-tionisonlytobefoundinthelecturetranscripts"andthat"thebasisforcontemporarydiscussionofHegel'saestheticsshouldnolongerbethetextpublishedby Hotho, butratherthesources fortheBerlinlectures."''^ Herassertionshavenotgone unchallenged,andHothocontinues to have hisdefend-ersonbothstylisticandsubstantialgrounds.* However,it isnow generallyacceptedthat whiltHotho'seditionremainsavaluablehistoricaldocument,notleastbecauseitwasthroughthistextthatHegel'sideasweremadeavailabletolaterreaders,thepublishedtranscriptsmustbeconsultedasanindispensable.supplementandcorrective.Farfrombeinganobscureproblem,ofinterestonlytocommittedHegelscholars,thestatusofthetextualsourcesforthelectures is a matterof centralimportance, formany oftheargumentsputforwardby bothsupportersandcriticsofhis work arebasedontheheavily editedreconstructionsthatwerepublishedby his followersafterhis deathinanattempttosecurethedominanceoftheHegelianschool.Thenewcriticaleditionsofhislecturesontopicssuchasnaturalphilosophy,religion,andworldhistory,whichmakethein-dividuallecturecoursesavailableforthefirsttime,differmarkedlyfromtheWerke edition,inwhichthelectureswerepresentedas a definitiveexpositionof Hegel's views. Peter C.Hodgson'sobservationsconcerningthelecturesonthephi-losophyofreligionbearclosecomparisonwithGethmann-Siefert'sanalysisofthelecturesonaesthetics:TheWerkeeditionpresentedhislecturesonthevarioustopicsofphilosophyaspartofacompleted,consistent,unitarysystem,but we now knowthatHegellecturedwithaninnovativespirit,unwillingeversimplytorepeatwhathesaidbefore.. . . Far fromimposinganabstract,apriorischemaonthehistory ofreligions,Hegelapproachesthistopicasanexperimentalfieldinwhichavarietyofinter-pretativestrategiesmustbetriedout.'''*Gethmann-SiefertcontendsthatwhenHothobeganeditingHegel'slecturesonaestheticshesoughttocounterthechal-lengeposedbytherivalsystemsof"speculativeaesthetics"thathadbeendevelopedby KarlSolgerandFriedrichSchel-ling,andthathewasthereforeinducedtoreconstructwhathedescribedasmere"sketchesandobservations"intoatightlyorganizedandstructuredwhole.Insodoing,heturnedthelecturesintoa"closedpartofaself-containedconceptualsystem"andobscuredthetentativeandexplor-atorymannerinwhichHegelpresentedhisideas.^*Geth-mann-SiefertalsoattributestoHothothenormativeassess-mentsofindividualartworksfromthestandpointofthesystem,whichseemsoatvariancewithHegel'srecognitionthattheappropriatetermsofevaluationareinternal totheaims ofdifferentculturalpractices.Herprincipalcriticismisthatthroughhis editorialreworkingsHothotransformedtheopen-endedanddiscursivecharacterofHegel'saestheticsintoarigidandunyieldingexpositionoftheplaceofart,whosevery"completion"runscontrarytothespiritofthelectures.Theposthumouspublicationofanywriter'sworkislikelytoprovecontroversial,andHothowasclearlyawarethathiseditionoftheLectureson Aesthetics wasexposedtopotentialobjections.Intheprefacetothefirstvolumeheeloquentlyarticulatesthedifficultieshehadtoovercomeandthefrag-mentarystateofthematerialshehadbeforehim.Heob-servesthathistaskwasnottoeditafinishedmanuscriptforpublicationbutrather"tofusethemostdiverseandfre-quentlycontradictorymaterials,wherepossible,intoaroundedwhole, whilst exercisingthegreatestcircumspectionandwarinessatmakingimprovements."^Helikenshimselfto"a faithfulrestorerofoldpaintings. . . whoallowshimselftomakeonlythoseadditionsthatarenecessarytopreservewhat remains of theoriginal."^' By combining what hesaw asthebestelementsofeachofthevariouslecturecoursesandaddingtheinterconnectionsneededto bringtheminto"har-mony[Einklang]" withoneanother,hesoughttopresentHegel's workinthebestpossiblelight. Yet justas practicesofrestorationhave changedoverthelast onehundredand fiftyyears,sohavemodemconceptionsofscholarship.Wenowprefertohaveaccesstotheoriginalsources,nomatterhowincompleteorcontradictorytheymaybe.WhileHothoun-derstandsthatHegelsoughtto extendhis accountof artandto improveits expositionineachnew lectureseries, heneverentertainsthepossibilitythathemighthave alteredhis views.ItisnowverydifficulttopriseapartwhatbelongstoHegelandwhattoHotho,andwithoutaccesstoHegel'spapers wecannotreachadefinitiveconclusionconcerningtheextentofHotho'sinterventions.UnlikeHotho'sedition,whichgivestheappearanceofafinishedtextthathadbeenmadereadyfortheprinter,theHEGEL' SCONTESTEDLEGACY187transcriptsreturnthereadertothelecttirehall.'WhereasHothofusedHegel'sargumentsandideasintoasinglesys-tematicwork,thetranscriptsenableus to examinethediffer-encesbetweenthevariouslecturecourses,eachofwhichisseparatedby sometwo orthreeyears. Therewefindsubstan-tial structuralchangessuchas themovefroma bipartitetoatripartitedivisioninthefinalseries(achangeadoptedbyHothoforhis posthumousedition)aswell as markedshiftsinemphasis, particularlyconcerningtherelationbetweenartandreligion.Gethmann-SieferthasurgedthatweviewHe-gel'saestheticsasa"workinprogress,"subjecttocontinualexaminationandreassessmentoverthedifferentlecturese-ries,forfarfromconstructingarigidsystem,Hegeltreatedaestheticsasa"fieldofphilosophicalexperimentation"inwhichtheheuristicpotentialofhistheorycouldbetestedagainstspecificexamples.''*Thisclaimisparticularlysignifi-cantinlightofGombrich'sinsistencethatHegel'stheoriesareimmuneto correctionby empiricalevidenceandthatheshapedtheavailablehistoricalmaterialtofitthe"logicalnecessity"ofanaprioriconceptualstructure.IfGethmann-Siefertisright,Hegelwas justasinterestedinthewayinwhichtheclosestudyoftheartofdifferentperiodsandplacescouldconfoundorproblematizehis assumptionsas intheway itcouldbeusedtoconfirmthem.A closereadingofthetranscriptsalsopermitsustochal-lengeasecond,pervasivemisunderstandingthathasservedas an obstacleto grasping Hegel's views: the belief that he wascommittedto anaestheticallyconservativeformof classicism.Onthisinterpretation,althoughHegelpurportedtoinvesti-gateartfroma "higher"philosophicalstandpoint,hesharedmany of theprejudicesof Johann JoachimWinckelmannandothereighteenth-century"Hellenophiles." Inparticular,he isaccusedofidentifyingtheartofancientGreeceasanidealagainstwhichtomeasuretheartisticachievementsofallothercultures:notonly whatheterms"symbolicart,"thatisto say, theartof early Easterncivilizations andancientEgypt,butalso whatheterms"modern"or"romanticart,"thatis tosay, allzrtafterthe highpoint of "classical art" infifth-centuryAthens, is regardedas in some sensedefectiveorinadequate.Hegel'sfamousobservationthattheconceptofartreaches"perfection[ Vollendung] " in ancient Greek sculpture andthat"[n]othingcanbeorbecomemorebeautiful"isalsotobefotindin the lecture transcripts. However, he qualifiestheseremarksbycharacterizingtheclassicalidealas"cold,foritself, andself-contained"in contrastto romanticart, which isaddressednotto the"ideal" butto theneedsof otherhumanbeings.Hethengoesontoproposethattheunityofformandcontentachievedinthegreatestexamplesofclassicalsculpturewaspossibleonlyinthecontextofalimited,andessentially premodern,understandingof subjectivityandthatwhatenablesthisbriefrealizationof"adequacy"is theunde-velopedcharacterofthecontentthatis represented.'"^TheGreekidealofbeautycannotsurvivethetransition,ontheonehand,tothegreater"inwardness" and"self-reflection"ofChristianity,and,ontheother,tothemerelyformaloruniversalconceptoftheselfthatis operativeintheabstractsystemofrightsandtheinstitutionof privatepropertythat isinstantiatedinmodernlegalcodes.ProperlylocatedwithinHegel'smoreinvolvedaccountoftherelationbetweenchangingconceptionsofsubjectivityandtheir"realization"or"expression"inoutwardform,the"perfection"ofclassicalartturnsouttobetransientandunsustainableratherthanyielding a timeless norm.His anal-ysis ofthe"dissolution[AuflsungY'or"destruction [Zertrm-merung]" oftheclassicalidealpreparesthegroundforapluralistoutlookin whicharthas nogivennatureoressencebutis simplythesumtotalofwhathasbeentreated asart.""Martin Donougho, who has providedthebest examinationofHegel'saestheticsinthese"presuppositionless"terms,con-cedesthat"justhowfarwecantakethisradical,non-e.ssen-tialisthistoricisingismoot,"butheinsiststhat"theclassical'norm,'inbothformandcontent,isnottobetakenasnormativeforHegel: the'Ideal'is nothis ideal."'"^ Hegelhascomparativelylitdetosayaboutclassicalartinthelectures;heis primarily interestedin what is not classical, thatis to say,thebreakdownanddiscontintiitiesofformandcontentthatcharacterizebothsymbolicandromanticart.AsPippinhaspointedout,Hegel'shistoricaltreatmentofartleadshimto"amostparadoxicalconclusion":muchofwhatweconsiderpost-classicalart(whatHegelterms"romantic"art)istreatedasartintheprocessof"transcendingitselfas art, somehow"againstitselfas art,asmuchamanifestationofthe"limitations"andincreas-inglydissatisfied"life"ofthepracticeoftheprodtictionandappreciationofartasitis partofacontinuoustradi-tion.(Theevendeeperparadoxis thatromanticartis allofthis"asart").^'^Hegel'sclaimsthatthetransitiontoromanticartisbroughtaboutbythe"progressionofartbeyonditselfandthatthecontentthatistobeexpressed"demandsmorethantherepresentationalformoftheartworkcanachieve"introduceatensionorconflictwithintheveryconceptofart,forheinsiststhatwhatis lackinginclassicalartis somethingthatislackinginartitself.'"'*Thislineofinterpretation,inwhichHegel's judgmentof the"inadequacy" and"incompletion"ofromanticarttellsussomethingabouttheproblematicchar-acterofartinmoderncivilsocietyandthespecificchal-lenges anddifficultiesto whichit is exposedallowshis ideasto be relateddirectiy to pressing contemporary concerns. Notjustthepracticeofartbutalsoitsrelationtootherformsofhumanagencyturnouttoberadicallyunstable.Moreneedstobesaid,ofcourse,aboutHegel'saccountoftherelationbetweenartandphilosophy,andhismuchmisunderstoodthesisofthe"endofart."Nonetheless,itshouldalreadybeclearthatthelecturesonaestheticsdonotpresentatrium-phant,Whiggishformulationoftheinevitable"progress"ofart,guidedfromonhighby thecategoriesofHegel'sScienceof Logic,asGombrichandotherswouldhaveusbelieve.What,then,is thecorrectwaytocharacterizetherelationbetweenartandphilosophyas itis presentedinthelecturesonaesthetics?AndhowdoesthisinformHegel'sdistinctiveperceptionofmodernity?Thecoreofhispositionresidesinthepropositionthatartoccupiesauniquepositionbetweenabstractconceptualthoughtandsensuousimtnediacy, partic-ipatinginbothbutfunctioningasa"middleterm[Mittel-glied] " thatbringscognitionandsensibilitytogetherwithoutgiving priorityto either.'"''His contentionthatart containsa"truthcontent[Wahrheitsgehalt]"affordsa meansofacknowl-A R TB U L L E T I NJ U N E2 0 1 1V O L U M EX C I I IN U M B E R2edgingthatartworkspossessbothcognitiveandexpressivevalue.However,thisformulationispotentiallymisleadinginsofarasitsuggestsamerelyexternalconnectionbetweenartistic"form"andconceptual"content."Alreadyinthe1820-21lectureseries,hestatedthat"itisnecessarytoridourselvesoftheideathattheconcept,thecontentofanartworkis somethingalreadythought,as ifit alreadyexistedinaprosaicform.. . .Arthasthepurposeofbringinganot-yet-consciousconcepttoconsciousne.ss.""^*'Hegelper-ceivesthatboththemakingandappreciationofartareirreducibletoother' formsof experienceandthatit is there-forewrongtoconceiveanartworksimplyasa"vehicle"fortransmittingthotightsandideasforwhichitsuppliestheappropriateexternalshapeorcladding.AsPippinobserves,artforHegelis "anachievedformofself-knowledge;knowl-edgewewouldnot,couldnothave,exceptforthisrealiza-tion.-107But how is this sophisticatedandnondeterministicconcep-tionoftherelationbetweencognitionandsensibilitytobereconciledwithHegel'sassertionthatart,religion,andphi-losophy sharethe same "content" eventhoughtheyarticulateit in differentways? This idea, whichHegel first elaboratedint heEncyclopediaofthePhilosophicalSciences in1817,survivesthroughoutthevariouslectureseriesonaesthetics.'"^Hispractical philosophy, or "philosophy of spirit," is based onthenotionthatart,religion,andphilosophyintheir"highestvocation"areallconcernedwithbringingtoreflectivecon-sciousnesstheconditionsfortheexerciseoffreedomthatunderpinrationalagency.Althoughhemaintainsthattheformsof"absolutespirit"differonlyinthe"mode"inwhichthis deepertruthis revealed,thecontentthateachis capableofexpressingturnsouttobeprogressivelymoresubstantialandarticulate.Therecognitionthatwe areself-determiningbeingswhoseethicalexistenceisconstitutedthroughstruc-turesofself-relationthataresustainedintheconcreteprac-ticesandinstitutionsthatmakeupthesocialworldisonlyfullyrealizedinthemodemage.ThereisthusaprofoundambivalenceunderlyingHegel'scharacterizationoftherela-tionbetweenartandphilosophy.Ontheonehand,heidentifiesartasauniqueandirreplaceablehumanactivitythatcannotbereducedtootherformsofknowledgeandexperience.Ontheotherhand,hetreatsthesphereof art asa priorandsubordinatestageinthedevelopmentofhuman-ity's"being-for-selfwhoseirremediable"defect"or"limita-tion"lies inits inseparabilityfromsensuousintuition.Philos-ophyhasthetaskofunifyingandrenderingfullyintelligibletomodemreflectivethoughtinsightsthatareexpressedinchoatelyintheformofsensuousimageryandsymbolism.Theclaimthatartandreligionhavebeen"superseded[aufgehoben]"byphilosophy,inthedouble.senseof"pre-served"and"overcome,"representsoneofthemostprob-lematicaspects ofHegel'saestheticsandleadsdirectlytohisnotoriouspronouncementsconcerningtheendofart.AsGethmann-Siefertreadilyacknowledges,thelecturetran-scriptsrevealthatthisargumentoriginateswithHegel,notHotho,as somereadershadhoped,andthatheheldfasttohis positionthroughall fourseries, includingthe final onein1828-29.'"''Ratherthanbacktracking,heseemstohaverel-ishedtheprovocationofhisremarks,whichleftthecom-poser Felix Mendelssohnwondering how^with JohannWolf-gangvonGoetheandBertelThorvaldsenstillaliveandLudwig vanBeethovenonlyrecentlydeceasedHegelcoulddeclarethatGermanartwas"deadasadoornail[mause-lot]."''"MostscholarsnowagreethatHegel'sthesisconcernsnotthe "death" of art but only its "end" or "pastness," andthat hisanalysisoftheprofotmdhistoricalandculturaltransforma-tionsthataccompanythetransitiontomodernityisfvillycompatiblewithawarenessofart'scontinuingprodtictionandvitality."'Whathadchanged,accordingtoHegel,is themeaningthatindividtialworksofartcanhave forus. Hereishispresentationofthethesisinthe1820-21lectureseries;Ourrelationtoartnolongerhasthehighsolemnityandsignificancethatitpossessedinearlierperiods.. . .Asaresultofoureducationandculture[Bildung], weinhabitanintellectualworldratherthanaworldofsensuousapprehension.Therepresentationof ideasthrotighformsismoreessential,morenecessary,forthosepeoplesforwhomtheuniversalhasnotyetdisintegratedintopartic-ulars, forwhomthelifeof themindhas not yetdevelopedto this point, whereas forus thespiritof theuniversal,thegenus,canonlybeidentifiedthroughparticulars."^Indrawingadistinctionbetweenpremodemandmodernformsof consciousness,Hegelexposedhimselftothechargeofculturalgeneralizationandessentialism,as well as ofmak-inganimplicitappealtoanarrativeofhistoricalprogress.However,thedeclarationthatartis tinableto fulfillthesamesymbolicandunifyingrolethatit didinthepastis primarilyintendedasacritiqueoftheRomanticbeliefthatitwaspossibletorestorethesenseof unity andwholenessthathadbeendestroyedby the"ageofreason."HistargethereistheworkofNovalisandotherleadingfiguresofearlyGermanRomanticism, as well as artistic groups suchas theNazarenes,whoofferedanidealizedevocationofmedievalChristianity.Hegel'srejectionofthisattitudefollowsdirectlyfromhisidentificationofa closeinternalrelationbetweenmodernityandtheself-groundingcharacteroftheoreticalandpracticalreason;criticalreflectiononnormativeprinciplesandtheexchangeof reasonstakeprecedenceover sensuousimmedi-acy,whichcannotstirvivethedisintegrationoftraditionalworldviews.Toputitcrudely,if we wanttoresolvecomplexsocialproblemssuchasthefairdistributionofgoods,therelationbetweenrightsandresponsibilities,ortheimposi-tion of legitimate constraints onhumanfreedom,we now relyonthedeliberativemodelofreasonenshrinedinmodernjudicialandparliamentarysystems.AlthoughtheRomanticsheldontothedreamthatartcouldsatisfytheunifyingfunc-tiononceaccomplishedbyreligion,Hegeloffersahard-headedviewofitslimitedroleinmodernnation-states.Hisobservationsarenotuncoloredbyasenseofloss,butheinsiststhatotirstancetowardartischaracterizedby"reflec-tion" ratherthanveneration; we "value art andrespect it," butwe"nolongerseeitas somethingfinal.""'ItisaremarkablefeatureofHegel'saestheticsthathisdeclarationof the "end" of art took place at the very historicalmomentwhenthemodemconceptofartwasgainingwide-spreadrecognitionthroughthedevelopmentofpublicinsti-tutionssuchas artmuseums,lendinglibraries,andsubscrip-HEGELSCONTESTED LEGACY189tionconcerts."*We havealreadyseenthattheconflictbetween "aesthetic" and "historical" standpoints played a rolein the design and organization of the Altes Museum in Berlinand that these tensions informednot only Hegel's lectures onaestheticsbut alsoHotho'sapproachto editingthem forpublication. Althoughthe Altes Mtiseum didnot openuntil1830, a year afterHegel's final lecture courseonaesthetics,the fact that Hegel delivered his lectures at Berlin University,just a short walk fromthe site wherethemuseum was beingbuilt, has led some critics to identify the two projects with oneanother and to charge that Hegel should be heldresponsibleforthe"museumification"of art. Sheehanobserves thattheideathatmuseumsshouldfeature"visiblehistories of art"drew sustenancefromHegel'sphilosophy while at thesametimecreating"newpossibilities of artisticidentityandnewcriteria for aesthetic judgment," insofaras artworks began tobe created with the museum in mindas their ultimate desti-nation.""'Oneway of addressingthisissue, adoptedin dif-ferentpermutationsby Hans Belting, StephenMelville,andBeat Wyss, is to contendthatHegel"constitutes"artas his-torical by considering it fromthe standpoint of thepresent.Melville, forexample, holdsthat:what wenow callthehistory of a r t . . .inits specificvisi-bilitybecomespossibleonly at a certainmomentwithinthe Westerntradition, andthis momentis firmly mooredto the name of Hegel, whose claim that art has come to anendhasbecome,thatis, merelyhistoricalengendersbothan objectand a questionabout our access to it."Melville'ssophisticatedpresentationof theproblemallowshim to showthatthevery identificationof artas a discretesphere of htiman activity "is thus bound up with the notion ofits end; its achievementis inseparablefromits pastnessartcomes to presenceand explicitness precisely as historical, asalreadyovercome."' "ToreadHegeltoday,therefore, is toconfrontthequestion of art'shistoricalnessandtheway inwhichthis is implicated in the writing of arthistory.InhisbookTheEndof theHistoryof Art'? Beltingacknowl-edgesthatHegel'sideasconcerningthe "pastness" of artcannot be ftillyunderstoodotiLside of his"system,"but hegoes onto suggestthathis views are"symptomaticof a newunderstanding of artitselfcharacteristic of hisepoch";fur-ther,"Onthe basis of thisunderstandingrests the entireprojectof the historicalstudyof art as a scholarlydisci-pline.""Hegel'sconceptionof the"emancipation" of artfromits earlierreligiousand historicalfunctionsenabledcritical reflectionon art to gain "a new dimension." However,Belting contendsthat by "offeringarthistory as contempla-tion of pastmodes of humanexpression,modeswhich nolonger , , . suggest a model forthe futureof art itself," Hegelinitiated a "fatefuldivision" between the historical study of artand the concerns of contemporary artists and critics, therebyopeningup a rupturethatwe are stillstrugglingto over-come."" Rather than accepting the de facto split between artcriticism and empirical art scholarship, we need to recognizethat"[t]hequestionof what art hasbeenin history,andwhether it at allresemblesthishistoricalentity in ourowntime, hinges on our tmderstanding of modern art."'^" Beltinginsists that he is seeking not to restore a "lost notion of unity"but to displace a false unity that obscures "the genuine diver-sity of artas manifestedin its ever changingroles anddefi-nitionsin history,"'^'AlthoughBeltingpresentshis argu-mentas a straightforwardcritiqueof Hegel, the terms inwhich he couches his analysis suggest that he is more plausi-blyunderstoodas usingHegelto thinkagainstHegel, astrategy that has frequently been adopted by left-Hegelians asameans of recoveringthe "criticalimpulse" of dialecticalthinking. Hegel's reflectionsonthe diversity of artistic prac-tice, andthe difficultyof subsuming this diversity underanysingle definitionor description, provide a means of elucidat-ing the insufficientlyhistorical character of the concepts andcategoriesthatareavailable to us. On theinterpretation Ihave defendedhere^which is closer to Arthur Danto's con-trasting assessment of therelevance of Hegel'saesthetics torecentandcontemporaryartpracticeHegel'sclaimscon-cerning the "end of art" do not mark an absolute break withthe past; rather, they are intended to broaden the question ofwhat art means for us today and its constitutionas anauton-omous field of humanactivity, making it more forceful,chal-lenging, anddifficultto answer.'^^A greatlysimplifiedandmuchcruderunderstanding ofHegel'spositionis to be foundin Wyss's widelyreadbookHegel'sArtHistoryandtheGritiqueofModernity. ^'^^Wyss'spre-sentation is organized around the conceit that the lectures onaesthetics canbereconstructedas a vast imaginarymuseumof art in which Hegel guides us throughthe variotis stages ofart'shistoricaldevelopment.Weare askedto picture thephilosopher as he walks through the rooms of a building thathousesthe entirehistoryof ctilture: wefollowhimashepasses in succession through the differentstages of the worldspiritmorning,noon, and eveningthat correspondto histreatment of symbolic, classical, andromantic art. As the daydraws to a close,Hegelleaveshismuseum,contentin theawarenessthathe "hadcondensedthe entirepathof theworld spirit frommorning to evening in one overview." Wysscontendsthat:[Hegel's] art history is museum-like,sincethepresent iscutoff fromthe past.Onlywhathas the auraof thehistoricaland what has beenpassedby the socialconsen-sus is admitted. . . . Thereis no roomfortheunexpectedorthe yet imagined in this conceptof art.'^*Wyss's adoption of themuseum as a guidingmetaphor forunderstanding Hegel's aesthetics creates the very rigidity andossificationthat it is designed to criticize. Far fromconfiningart within the walls of the museum, the lectures onaestheticsrequire that art be understood as a social practicea practicethat stands in an inherently dynamic and unstable relation tootherpracticesand institutions.WhatSheehanterms the"museumage" postdates Hegel's philosophy, but the role ofthemuseumin shapingthe modernunderstandingof artmustbe takenintoaccountby any theorythatseeks tovouchsafe a genuinely historicalnarrative of art's relation tothewidersocialworld,'^^Thedevelopment of themodernart museum is a consequence rather than a presupposition ofthe profoundhistoricalshiftthatHegelis trying to explain.Therealissue at stake in thesedebates, or so I wish toargue, is not the relationbetween art history andcontempo-190B U L L E T I NJ U N E2 0 1 1V O L U M EX C I I IN U M B E R2raryartpractice,whichis,inanycase,moreopenanddy-namicthaneitherBelting or Wyss seems willing to admit,buttherelationbetweenarthistoryandphilosophy.WhatMel-villeterms"thenameofHegel"hascometostandforaspecificimageofphilosophyinwhichthepursuitofabstractgeneralizationsis allowedtorideroughshodovertheempir-icalevidence.ItisnotnecessarytoattributeastrongcausalroletoGombrich'sparticularconstrualoftherelationbe-tweenarthistoryandphilosophytorecognizethathischar-acterizationofHegel'saestheticsastheproductofatotaliz-ing metaphysicsthat is no longeranswerableto the world wasinfluentialataformativestageinthediscipline'sdevelof)-ment.Gombrich'santimetaphysicalrhetoric,hisappealtocommonsense,hisdistrustofabstractuniversals,andhisinsistencethat we have to choosebetweenthe methods ofthenaturalsciences andrelianceonphilosophy all signal a breakwiththeGermanidealistheritageofarthistory.FewwouldnowalignthemselveswithGombrich'schosenalternatives,buthisreductiveexplanationofHegel'slegacycontinuestoserve as a barrierto theintensivereengagementwithhis workthathasbeensuchamarkedfeatureofcontemporaryde-bates inepistemology, politicaltheory, ethics, andphilosoph-icalaesthetics.OneofthethingsIhavesoughttoshowhereisthatarthistoryisillservedbythetendencytotreatphilosophicalargtimentsasinertmaterialthatcanbeusedforitsownpurposesratherthanas anoccasiontothinkphilosophicallyabouttheunderlyingproblemsandissuesatstake.Unlessconceptsandideasthatarederivedfromphilosophyaresubjecttocriticalexaminationtheyarelikelytohardenintoimmutablegivens.Theresultinglossof"resistance,"whichGombrichrightlyidentifiedas essentialtogenuineresearch,leads to the establishmentof fixed ratherthanrelative values,whichcanthenbecissimilatedordismissedas needdictates.Fromthisperspective,thedifferencebetweenGombrich'scondemnationof Hegelandtheuncriticaladoptionof Hege-lianmotifswithintheViennaschoolstartstonarrow,insofaras bothprovideamerely externaltreatmentofphilosophicalpositions andideas. I have defendedthe view that arthistory'sconcoursewithphilosophymustitselfbephilosophical,pro-ceedingthroughtheaskingofquestionsratherthantheuncriticaldeploymentofresourcesthatareserviceableforthetaskathand.'^^Iwouldlike,therefore,toconcludebyaskingwhetherthenonmetaphysicalreadingofHegelpre-sentedhereoffersalegitimateinterpretativeframeworkforunderstandinghis ideas or whether, as Beiser andothers haveproposed,it is actually a projectionontohis workof ourowninterestsandvalues.EventhosewhoaresympathetictowhatBeisertermsthe"puzzlingHegelrenaissance"concedethattherevivalofinterestinGermanidealismis closelytiedtothedominanceofnaturalismandthatitis driven,atleastinpart,by adesiretomakegoodnaturalism'sperceivedlimitations.Inparticu-lar,philosopherssuchasBrandomandPippinhavebeendrawntoHegel'sworkbytheinsightthatnattiralismisun-abletoaccountforthedistinctivelyhumanactivitiesofexer-cising judgmentandemployingnormativeconcepts.Hegel'saccountofreason,agency,andmutualrecognition,whichonceseemedhopelesslyoutmoded,hasbeenshowntocon-tainarichsetofconceptualresourcesthatcanbeusedtoelucidatetheproceduresthroughwhichnormsareacknowl-edgedaspossessingauthorityoverusandthereforeastheoutcomeofrationalreflectionandchoice.AsBeiserpointsout,thispointofviewinvolvesdownplayingthereligiousdimensionof Hegel'sthoughtas well as the overtly metaphys-icalambitionsofhisphilosophyofnature.Hedescribesthenonmetaphysicalreadings as "acts of enormousinterpretativecharity"andclaimsthattheycanonlybesustainedbyignor-ing"themostdiffictiltandtroublingaspectofhisphiloso-phy." AccordingtoBeiser,Hegelscholarshipis facedwithanunavoidabledilemma;Ifourscholarshipishistoricallyaccurate,weconfrontaHegelwithprofotindmetaphysicalconcernsalientothespiritofcontemporaryphilosophicalculture,whichmis-trusts metaphysics. But if we continueto interpretHegel inanonmetaphysicalmanner,wehavetoacceptthatourinterpretationis more a constructionof ourcontemporaryintereststhantherealhistoricalschool.'^^Thetwohornsofthedilemmaare"anachronism"(interpre-tationintermsofourcontemporaryinterestsandconcerns)and"antiquarianism"(amerelyhistoricalinterestthatctitsoffthepast fromthepresent). To acceptthat we mustdecidebetweenthesetwo alternativesas astricteither/ormeanstoperpettiatetheinvidiotisdistinctionbetweendoingphiloso-phyandstudyingthehistoryofphilosophy.Theadoptionofastrictlyantiquarianstandpointisolatesphilosophicaltextsfromcontemporarydebates, therebybarringaccess topoten-tiallyvaluableresourcesthatmightshedlightonissuesthatmatterdirectlytous. Similarly,aconcernwiththehistoricalcorrectnessofourinterpretationsofpastphilosophers,in-formedby a close analysis of theprimary sources, provides animportantcorrectivetoanachronismandthedangersofmisinterpretationthatthisentails.Itisonlybysustainingbothapproachesthatwecanensurethattheuseofphilo-sophicalargumentsencountersadequateresistance.ThequestionwhetherthenonmetaphysicalinterpretationofHe-gel'sphilosophyislegitimatecanthusbeansweredintheaffirmative,foritplaceshisideaswithintherealmofargu-mentandcontestation,wheretheycanbehandledcriticallyratherthantreatedas"inertmaterial."RecentworkinphilosophyhassucceededinbringingHe-gel's ideas into conversationwith the secular anddeflationarypositionsthatcharacterizeourown,postmetaphysicalage.However, it is importantto recognizethat Hegel'sphilosophycannotbemadesimplytosheditstranscendentalandmeta-physical dimensions. Those aspects that have beenbroughttotheforebyphilosopherssuchasBrandomandPippin,whooffera stricdy"horizontal"interpretationofhiscontributiontodebatesonnormativeauthorityandself-legislationorwhatPinkardtermsthe"infiniteactivityofgivingandaskingforreasons"areclosely entwined with deepercommitmentsconcerningthehistoricaltruthofChristianityandthe"im-manentlogic" thatHegelbelievedhecoulddiscoverinboththenaturalandthesocialworld.'^Moreover,itwasthemetaphysicaldimensionofHegel'sphilosophythatarguablyhadthegreatestimpactonlaterthinkers.Nonetheless,IhopethatI have shownthat his work is susceptibleto a varietyofinterpretationsandthat we needtoresisttheredticdonofHEGEL'SCONTESTED LEGACY191his philosophy to a fixed set of receivedideas. Hegel'sclaimthatthe study of art shouldconcernitself with all aspects ofa cultureratherthantreating artworks in isolationretains itsrelevance and requires that we engage constructively with thedistinctivelysocialformof mindednessthat he termedGeist.Thenonmetaphysicalinterpretationof Hegel'saesthetics isopentochallenge,buttherecognitionthatmanyof hisproblems are also our problems should allow us to address hiswork in a spirit of openintellectualinquiry.JasonGaiger is universitylecturer incontemporary art history andtheoryand a fellowof St.EdmundHallat theuniversityof Oxford.HisbooksincludeAestheticsandPainting(Gontinuum,2008)and,as co-editor.Art inTheory:1648-1815(Blackwell,2000)andArt inTheory:1815-1900(Blackwell,1998) [TheRuskinSchoolof DrawingandFineArt,UniversityofOxford,74HighStreet, Oxford, 0X14BG,U.K.,[email protected]].NotesI wouldliketothankLisaFlornianandCordulaGrewe, whosein'vitationtocontribtite to the panelthey chaired, "Art and Art History afterHegel," at theAnnualGonferenceoftheGollegeArtAssociationinLosAngelesin2008providedtheinitialimpetus forwritingthis paper.It has beenmuchrevisedinresponsetoinvaluablecommentsandsuggestionsfromthose whoheardlaterversions,I wouldlike torecordpartictilarthanksto WolfgangBruckle,KaterinaDeligiorgi, ,\ndyHamilton,StephenMelville, andPatil Smith, I amalso indebtedto the comments of two anonymotis referees forThe Art Bulletinand to the exchange of ideas with its editor-in-chief,Karen Lang, Work on thispaper was enabledby the award of a Leverhulme TrustResearchFellowship,Unless otherwiseindicated,translationsaremine,1.See Benedetto Croce,Cid che vivo e cid che mortonetla filosofa di He-gel: Studiocritico(Bari: Laterza,1907), Thedistinctionbetweenwhat is"living" andwhatis "dead"ina systemofthoughtis Hegel'sownandgoesbacktohis earliestreflectionsonChristianityandGreekethicallife.See, inpartictilar,Georg WilhelmFriedrichHegel,"ThePositivityoftheGhristianReligion"(1795-96),inEarlyTheologicalWritings,trans, T,M, Knox(Philadelphia:Universityof Penn,sylvaniaPress,1971), 67-179,2.HegeldescribedhisScienceof Logic,whichwas publishedintwo vol-umes in1812 and1816, as "the systemof purereason, , , therealmof purethotjght,"addingthatits contentcotildbeconceivedas "theexpositionof Godas heis inhis eternalessencebeforethecreationof nature,"Hegel,Scienceof Logic,trans. A, V, Miller(AtlanticHigh-lands, N,J,: HumanitiesPress,1989), 50, FortheGermantext, see He-gel,Winenschaftder Logik, vol,1 (Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1986), 44,3.Theidentificationof Hegelas the"fatherof art history" was made byFrnstGombrichin"HegelunddieKtinstgeschichte,"Neue Rundschau,88(1977): 202-19, at202, Thistext, whichwas originallydeliveredasalecturein1977 whenGombrichwas awardedtheHegelPrizeoftheGity of Stuttgart,is translated(by Gombrich)ina revised versionas" 'TheFatherof ArtHistory': A ReadingoftheIj^ctureson Aesthetics ofG, W, F, Hegel(1770-1831)," inTributes:Interpretersof Our CulturalTradition (Oxford: Phaidon,1984), 51-69,4.Hans Belting,The End of the Historyof Art? trans, Christopher S, Wood(Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1987), 9-10, originally pub-lishedasDas Ende der Kunstgeschichte? (Mtmich: Deutscher Kunstver-lag,1983),5.See JrgenHabermas,ThePhilosophical Discourseof Modernity,trans,FrederickLawrence(Cambridge,Mass,: MIT Press,1995), 43, origi-nally published as Der Philosophische Diskursder Moderne (Frankfurt:Snhrkamp,1985), Habermascontendsthat"Hegelwas the first phi-losophertodevelop a clearconceptofmodernity.We havetogobacktohimif we wanttounderstandtheinternalrelationshipbe-tweenmodernityandlationality,, , ,"(4), "Modernitycanandwillnolongerborrowthecriteriaby whichittakes its orientationfromthemodels suppliedby anotherepoch;it hasto createits normativityoutof itseir(7),6.Fora disctissionof theKantianorigins ofthis problem,see TerryPinkard,GermanPhilosophy,1760-1860:The legacy of CermanIdealism(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2002), 67, InPinkard's for-mtilation,the central question is: "How can we bebound by laws wemake?" See, too, StephenHotilgate's account ofHegel's commitmentto"prestippositionless thinking" inAnIntroductionto Hegel:Freedom,Truth and Historf,2nded,(Cambridge, Mass,: Blackwell, 2005), 26-47,7.Representative texts include MartinDonougho, "Art andHistory: He-gelontheEnd, theBeginning andthe Ftiture of Art,"inHegelandthe Arts, ed, StephenHoulgate(Fvanston, 111,: Northwestern LIniversityPress,2007), 179-215;Dieter Henrich,Fixpunkte:Abhandlungen undEssays zurTheorieder Kunst (Frankfurt: Stihrkamp, 2003); StephenHoulgate,"Hegel andthe Art of Painting,"inHegeland Aesthetics,ed,WilliamMaker(Albany, N,Y,: SUNY Press, 2000), 61-82;and TerryPinkard,"Symbolical, Classical, andRomantic Art," inHotilgate,Hegelandthe Arts, ,3-28,8.RobertPippin, "What Was Abstract Art?(FromthePoint of View ofHegel),"Critual Inquiry 1(2002): 1-24,at1, See, too, idem.Idealismas Modernism:Hegelian Variations(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1989); andModernismas a Philosophical Problem,2nded,(Cam-bridge, Mass,: Blackwell,1999), Fora criticaldisctissionofHoulgate'sandPippin'scontrastingviews onHegelandabstractart,see JasonGaiger,"Catchingtip withHistory: HegelandAbstractPainting," inHegel:Netv Directions,ed,KaterinaDeligiorgi(Chesham,U,K,: Acti-men,2006),1,59-76,9.Gombrichreadilyacknowledgedhis indebtednesstoKarlPopper, es-peciallyhisLogik der Eorschung,whichwas publishedin Viennain1935andtranslatedintoEnglishasThe Logicof Scientific Discovery in1959,Fora criticalaccountof Gombrich'srelianceonPopper,see AndrewHemmingway,"E, H, Gombrichin1968: MethodologicalIndividual-ism andtheContradictionsof Consei-vatism,"Human Affairs 19(2009):297-303, Thisspecialissue onGombrichcontainsantimberof valuablepapers,10.Ernst Gombrich, Art and Illusion: AStudy in the Psychologyof PictorialRefiresentation,5thed,(London:Phaidon,1977),16-17,11.Karl Popper,The OpenSocietyand Its Enemies,2 vols,(London:Rout-ledge,1945),12.ErnstGombrich'sreview of ErnstGarger's"Wertproblemetmdmittel-alterlicherKunst" is reprintedinatranslationby MichaelPodroun-derthetitle"AchievementinMediaeval Art," inGombrich, Medita-tions on a HobbyHorse (London:Phaidon,1963), 70-77, at75, For adiscussion,see JanBakos, "Gombrich'sStrtiggleagainstMetaphysics,"HumanAffairs 19 (2009): 239-50, at 239,13.See Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit:Reasoning,Representing,andDiscursiveCommitment(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press,1994); idem.Talesof the MightyDead:Historical Essayson the Metaphysicsof Intentionality (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 2000);andJohnMcDowell, Mind andWorld(Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard Uni-versity Press, 1994), which heprovocatively describes as "a prolegome-nonto a reading of[Hegel's]Phenomenology,"xi,14.An excellent ovei"view ofthe reception history ofHegel's philosophyis provided by Robert SternandNicholas Walker, "Hegelianism," inRoutkdge Encyclopaediaof Philosophy(London: Rotuledge, 2000); themost detailedstudyremains JohnEdwardToews,Hegelianism:The Pathtoward Dialectical Humanism,1805-1841(Cambridge:CambridgeUni-versity Press,1980),15.For Feuerbach'sresponsetoHegel, see Toews,Hegelianism,327-55,Marx'sremarkaboutdialecticsis containedintheaftei-wordtothesecondeditionoDasKapital:Kritik der politischenkonomie (Hamburg,1873), trans, Samtiel Moore andEdward Aveling inCapital:ACriticalAnalysis of CapitalistProduction(Moscow: Foreign Langtiages Publish-ingHouse, 1961),16.Katerina Deligiorgi, "OnReading Hegel Today," inHegel:New Direc-tions, 2.17.Michael Podro,The CriticalHistoriansof Art(New Haven: Yale Univer-sity Press, 1982),18.Ernst Gombrich, "InSearch of Cultural History" (1967), reprinted inIdeas and Idols:EssaysonValuesin Historyand in Art (Oxford: Phaidon,1979), 24-59,19.Ibid,, 28.20.GombrichreferstoPopper'sworkinboth"InSearchof Ctilttiral His-tory," 54, and"HegelunddieKunstgeschichte,"211, His mostexplicitattemptto applyPopper's"logic of sittiations" is tobefoundin 'TheSense of Order: A.Study inthe Psychologyof Decorative Art(Oxford:Phai-don,1979),21.Gombrich,"InSearchof CulttiralHistory," 46,22.Ibid,,46-47,23.Ernst Gombrich, "Style," inInternational Encyclopediaof the SocialSci-ences,vol,15 (New York: Macmillan Free Press, 1968), 352-61,at 357,24.Ibid,, 358, InArt and Illtision, 17, Gombrich cites thefollowing pas-sage fromPopper'sThe Povertyof Historicism(London: Routledge,192BULLETINJUNE2011VOLUMEXCIIINUMBER21957)andnotesthathe"cannotimprove"his words:"Ihavenottheslightestsympathywiththese'spirits';neitherwiththeiridealisticpro-totypenorwiththeirdialecticalormaterialistincarnations,andI aminfullsympathywiththosewhotreatthemwithcontempt."25.Gombrich,"HegelunddieKunstgeschichte,"203ff,,trans,idem,"'TheFatherof ArtHistory,'" 52-55.26.Hegel,quotedinHoulgate,AnIntroduction to Hegel,21. IhaveusedHoulgate'stranslationinpreferencetoG. W. F.Hegel,Lectures onthePhilosophyof World History:Introduction;Reasonin History,trans.H, B.Nisbet(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975), 58. FortheGermantext,seeHegel,Werke,ed,EvaMoldenhauerandKarlMarkusMichel,20 vols.(Frankfurt:Suhrkamp,1969-71),vol.12, 99.27.Houlgate,AnIntroductionto Hegel,24.28.Ibid,, 25,29.RobertPippin,Hegel's PracticalPhilosophy: RationalAgencyas EthicalLife(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),10.30.See,forexample,FrederickBeiser,"DarkDays: AnglophoneScholar-shipsincethe1960s,"70-90,andSebastianGardner,"TheLimitsofNaturalismandtheMetaphysicsofGermanIdealism,"14-49,bothinGerman Idealism:Contemporary Perspectives,ed.EspenHammer(Lon-don:Routledge,2007);andRolf-PeterHorstmann,"Subject,Sub-stanceandInfinity:A CaseSttidyoftheRoleofLogicinHegel's Sys-tem,"inDeligiorgi, Hegel:New Directions,69-84.31.Beiser,"DarkDays,"70-71.SeeGardner'scontentionin"TheLimitsofNaturalism"(44)that"theconsiderationswhichcanbeargtiedtogiveidealismdefinitephilosophicaladvantagesovernaturalismareatthesametimeconsiderationswhichsupportitsmetaphysicalratherthandeflationaryinterpretation."32.DavidSummersobservesthat" 'Hegelwithoutmetaphysics'turnedouttobeHegelwithsomekindofpsychologyorWeltanschauungormentalitiesorculturaldevelopmentsof'vision,'" Headds,"ForGom-brichthisimprovementuponHegelis adistinctionwithotUadiffer-ence,"Summers,"E. H,GombrichandtheTraditionofHegel,"inACompanionto Art Themy,ed.PaulSmithandCarolynWilde(Cam-bridge,Mass.: Blackwell,2002),139-49,at144.33.SeveralyearsearlierMeyerSchapirohadpresentedapowerfulcri-tiqueofholistic("organic")conceptsofstyleinwhichhedecisivelyunderminedtheclaimthat"eachstyleis peculiartoa periodofa cul-ttireandthat,inagivencultureorepochofctilture,thereisonlyonestyleoralimitedrangeofstyles." Schapirodrewattentiontotheconcurrenceofdifferentstylesduringthesamehistoricalperiodandthedifficultyofidentifyingstylisticaffinitiesbetweenworksproducedindifferentmedia.Schapiro,"Style"(1953),reprintedinTheoryandPhilosophy of Art: Style,Artist and Society(New York:GeorgeBraziller,1994),51-102,at53. Foranilluminatingstudyofstylisticpluralism,seeWolfgangBrckte,"Postmoderneum1600:HaarlemerStilzitateunddieStandortbestimmungderKunstnachVasari,"in.Stil als Bedeu-tunginder nordalpinenRenaissance:WiederentdeckungeinermethodischenNachbarschafl,ed.StephanHoppe,MatthiasMller,andNorbertNuss-baum(Regensburg:SchnellundSteiner,2008),212-37.34.Gombrich,"InSearchofCulturalHistory,"41-42.35.ReservationsconcerningGombrich'sreadingofHegelarealsotobefoundin JamesElkins,"ArtHistorywithoutTheory,"Critical Inquiry14,no.2(Winter1988):354-78.However,whereasElkins(359)con-tendsthatGombrichseekstoreplaceHegelianismwithanuntheo-rized,andnntheorizable,empiricism,andthat"anempiricalcritiqueof'Hegelianism'resultsinnothingotherthanits continuedaccep-tanceandtise,"I arguethatGombrichismoreindebtedtoHegel'sideasthanherealizes.Elkins'scritiqueis exposedtoGombrich'sun-doubtedlycorrectriposte:"Idonotadvocate'ArtHistorywithoutTheory,'butthesearchforbettertheories."Gombrich,"ResponsetoJamesElkins,"Critical Inquiry 14, no.4(Summer1988): 892.36.Foradetaileddiscussionoftheseissues,see JasonGaiger,Aestheticsand Painting (London:Continuum,2008),38-62,37.SeeG. W,F.Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (1807),trans.A, V,Miller(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),58-66;fortheGermantext,seeHegel,Phanomenologiedes Geistes(Hamburg:FelixMeiner,1988),69-78,Hegelmaintainsthattheideaofpureapprehensionwithoutcomprehensioncannotwithstandcriticalscrutinysinceeventhemostminimalidentificationofqtialitativedifferencesinvolvesamediatingcapacityfordiscriminationandunification.Foranilltmiinatinganaly-sis ofHegel'sviews, seeRobertPippin,Hegel's Idealism:The Satisfactionsof Self-Consciousness(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989),116-25.38.Gombrich,"InSearchofCulturalHistory,"29, 33,39.Ibid.,28-29,40.Ibid.,33.41.Gombrich,"HegelunddieKunstgeschichte,"209. Gombrich'sobser-vationthat"it wotildbeworthcollectingthesepassagesin