hegel - the critical journal of philosophy

8/8/2019 Hegel - The Critical Journal of Philosophy

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Hegel and Schelling 1801

The Critical Journal of PhilosophyIntroduction on The Essence of Philosophical Criticism Generally, and itsRelationship to the Present State of Philosophy in Particular

First Published: Kritisches Journal der Philosophie , 1, no. 1 (1802) iii-xxiv;Translated: by H S Harris.

IN WHATEVER DOMAIN OF ART or [speculative] science it is employed, criticism requires astandard which is just as independent of the person who makes the judgment as it is of the thing thatis judged a standard derived neither from the singular [ i.e. the immediate occasion for critical

judgment] nor from the specific character of the [judging] subject, but from the eternal andunchangeable model [ Urbild ] of what really is [ die Sache selbst ]. Just as the idea of fine art is notfirst created or discovered by art criticism, but is purely and simply presupposed by it, so too in

philosophical criticism the Idea of philosophy is itself the precondition and presupposition withoutwhich it would only be able to set one subjective view against another for ever and ever, and never set the Absolute against the conditioned.

What distinguishes philosophical criticism from art criticism is not the judgment of the capacity for objectivity that is expressed in a [philosophical] work, but rather just the object [of criticism]; [inother words] the Idea itself that is basic to the criticism, and which cannot be anything other thanthe Idea of philosophy itself. As far as the capacity for objectivity is concerned, philosophicalcriticism involves the same claims to universal validity that art criticism does. So anyone whowants to deny objectivity of judgment in philosophy in spite of that, must claim not merely the

possibility of distinct forms of one and the same Idea, but the possibility of essentially distinct yetequally true philosophies a view of the matter [ Vorstellung ] which properly deserves noconsideration, for all its immense comfortableness. The fact that philosophy is but one, and canonly be one, rests on the fact that Reason is but one; and just as there cannot be distinct Reasons, sotoo a wall cannot be set up between Reason and its self-cognition, through which its self-cognitioncould become essentially distinguishable from its appearance. For Reason absolutely considered,and Reason when it becomes object for itself in its self-cognition (and hence philosophy) is again

just one and the same thing, and therefore completely equal.

The ground of a distinction within philosophy itself cannot lie in its essence, which is strictly one,

any more than it can be based on the inequality of the capacity to shape [ gestalten ] the Idea of philosophy objectively. For the fact is that in the philosophical perspective the Idea itself is all thatcounts, while the capacity to set it forth that comes additionally with its possession, makes onlyanother side of philosophy, and one that is not peculiar to it. Therefore, once philosophy is definedas a cognition of the Absolute) the possibility of infinitely many distinct reflections, such that eachhas an equal right to maintain itself against the others, each of them being essentially distinct fromthe others, could only result from thinking of the Absolute (whether as God or in some other aspectas Nature) as fixed in immovable and absolute opposition to cognition as subjective.

But even upon this view the distinction would have to suspend and ameliorate itself. For sincecognition is here represented as something formal, it is thought of as completely passive in itsrelationship to the object; and it is required of the subject that is to be capable of this reception of the divinity, or of the purely objective intuition of nature, that it should close itself quite generallyagainst every other relationship to any limiting factor at all, and restrain itself from any activity of its own, since that would upset the purity of the reception. Through this passivity of intake, and the


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equality of the object [in all such pure intuitions] what is represented as result, would have to be justthe cognition of the Absolute, and a philosophy that sprang from this root must again be simplyunique and in every respect the same.

It is because the truth of Reason is but one, like beauty, that criticism as objective judgment is possible in principle, and it follows evidently that it only makes sense for those who have the Ideaof the one identical philosophy present to their minds; and by the same token it can only beconcerned with those works in which this Idea is expressed more or less clearly for cognition. Theeffort of criticism is entirely wasted on the people and the works that are deprived of the Idea. In theabsence of the Idea criticism gets into the gravest difficulty, for if all criticism is subsumption under the Idea, then all criticism must necessarily cease where the Idea is lacking, and it can have no other direct relationship [to that with which it is concerned] than that of repudiation. But in thisrepudiation it ruptures altogether every connection between that wherein the Idea of philosophy islacking, and that in whose service criticism exists. Since reciprocal recognition is in this waysuspended, what appears is only two subjectivities in opposition; things that have nothing incommon with one another come on stage with equal right for that very reason; and in declaring thatwhat is before it to be judged is anything else one likes, which is tantamount to declaring it to be

nothing at all, since philosophy is all that it aims to be criticism transposes itself into a subjectivesituation and its verdict appears as a one-sided decision by violence. Since its activity ought to beobjective, this situation directly contradicts its essence; its judgment is an appeal to the Idea of

philosophy but since this Idea is not recognized by the adverse party, it is only a foreign court of judgment for him. There is no immediate escape from this relationship of criticism, which cutsunphilosophy off from philosophy criticism must stand on the one side and have unphilosophy onthe opposite side. Since unphilosophy takes up a negative attitude to philosophy, and hence therecan be no question of discussing it as philosophy, there is nothing to be done but recount how thisnegative side expresses itself and confesses its non-being (which in as much as it has a phenomenalaspect is called platitude), and since what is nothing to begin with, must unfailingly appear ever mote clearly a; nothing in its development, until it can be recognized [ erkannt ] as such by virtually

everyone, through this completely executed construction [of evident nullity] from the primal nullity.Criticism is reconciled once more with the incapacity [of the cultured public] which could seenothing in the original verdict [of the philosophical critic] but self-satisfied personal bias andcaprice.

On the other hand, where the Idea of philosophy is actually present, there it is the concern of criticism to interpret the way and the degree in which it emerges free and clear, and the range withinwhich it has been elaborated into a scientific system of philosophy.

As for this last point, if the pure Idea of philosophy is expressed with spirit, but naively and withoutscientific range if it does not arrive at the objectivity of a systematic consciousness -we must stillgreet it with joy and delight; it is the mark of a beautiful soul, whose inertia guards it against falling

into the original sin of thinking, but which also lacks the courage to hurl itself into that sin and tofollow the path of its guilt, till the guilt is dissolved and so it has not arrived at the intuition of itself in an objective whole of science. The empty form of such spirits, however those who aim togive the heart and essence of philosophy in short formulas without [living] spirit this form has noscientific significance, and has no other interest either.

But when the Idea of philosophy becomes more scientific it must be carefully distinguished fromthe individuality which will express its character without harm to the identity of the Idea of

philosophy or to the purely objective exposition of it the subjectivity or limitedness, that getsmingled in the exposition of the Idea of philosophy. Criticism has to apply itself especially to theway that philosophy looks when masked by this subjectivity it must tear the mask off.

When it is shown to be the case that the Idea of philosophy is actually before the mind, thencriticism can cleave to the requirement and to the need that is expressed, to the objective factor inwhich the need seeks its satisfaction, and can lay aside the limitedness of the shape through its own


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genuine tendency toward perfect objectivity.

But in this connection two cases are possible. In the first case consciousness has not properlydeveloped beyond subjectivity.

Idea of philosophy has not risen to the clarity of free intuition, but stays hidden in a dark background, partly, perhaps, because some forms in which it finds itself largely expressed, forms

which possess great authority, still hinder the breakthrough to pure formlessness, or to be thehighest form (which is the same thing). Even when criticism cannot allow the work and the deed to be valid as a shape of the idea, it will not ignore the striving [toward that]; the genuinely scientificconcern here is to peel off the shell that keeps the inner aspiration from seeing daylight; it isimportant to be aware of the manifoldness of the reflections of the spirit, each of which must haveits place in philosophy, as well as being aware of their subordinate status and their defects.

In the second case it is evident that the Idea of philosophy has been more clearly cognized, but thatsubjectivity has striven to ward off philosophy in so far as this is necessary for its own preservation:

Here what matters is not to set the Idea of philosophy off in relief, but to uncover the nooks andcrannies that subjectivity makes use of in order to escape from philosophy, and to make the

weakness, for which any limitation offers a secure foothold, visible both on its own account [fr sich] and with respect to the Idea of philosophy qua associated with a subjectivity; for the trueenergy [i.e., actualization] of the Idea is incompatible with subjectivity.

But there is still another way of proceeding upon which criticism must especially fasten; the onethat gives itself out to be in possession of philosophy, which uses the forms and vocabulary inwhich great philosophical systems are expressed, goes in for lengthy debates, but is at bottom onlyan empty fog of words without inner content. This sort of chatter, though lacking the Idea of

philosophy, gains for itself a kind of authority through its very prolixity and arrogance. Partly this is because it seems almost incredible that such a big shell should be without a kernel, and partly because the emptiness is in its way universally understandable. Since there is nothing moresickening than this transformation of the seriousness of philosophy into platitude, criticism mustsummon up all its forces to ward off this disaster.

These distinct forms [of philosophy and unphilosophy] are in general more or less dominant in theGerman philosophy of the present time to which this Critical Journal is addressed. But they [theforms] have the further peculiarity that every philosophical enterprise takes on the aspect of ascience and the dimensions of a system, or at the very least takes its stand as the absolute principleof philosophy as a whole. Through the work of Kant, and still more through that of Fichte, the Ideaof a science, and particularly of philosophy as a science, has been established. Philosophizing

piecemeal [ das einzelne Philosophieren ] has lost all credit, and the possibility of counting for something as a philosopher through a variety of philosophical thoughts upon this or that topic,

published perhaps in scholastic treatises, no longer exists. As a result a multitude of systems and principles is arising which gives that part of the public which does philosophy a certain outwardsimilarity to the state of philosophy in Greece, where every prominent philosophical mindelaborated the Idea of philosophy in his own individual way. At the same time philosophicalfreedom emancipation from authority and independence of thought seems to have reached sucha pitch with us, that it would be considered disgraceful to call oneself a philosopher after the fashionof a school that already exists; opinion has it that thinking for oneself can only proclaim its presencethrough originality the invention of a system that is entirely novel and ones own.

When the inner life of philosophy comes to birth in an outward shape, it necessarily endows thatshape with something of the form of its own peculiar organization; by so much is the original aspectof genius distinct from the particularity which takes itself for, and gives itself out to be, originality.

For this particularity, upon closer examination, really keeps firmly to the common highway of culture, and can never boast of having arrived at the pure Idea of philosophy by leaving it; for if ithad grasped this Idea, it would know [ erkennen ] it again in other philosophical systems, and ipso


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facto it would then be unable to label itself with the name of a personal philosophy, even though itmust of course, preserve its own living form. What the particular originality has created of its ownupon that highway, is a particular form of reflection, seized upon from some singular, and hencesubordinate, standpoint. This is easy enough to do in an era that has cultivated the understanding inso many aspects, and has, in particular, fashioned it into philosophy in so many ways. Anassemblage of such original tendencies, and of the manifold efforts after a form and system of ones

own, offers us the spectacle of the tortures of the damned, rather than that of the free upsurge of themost various living shapes in the philosophical gardens of Greece. Either they are for ever bound totheir own limited position; or they must seize on one position after another, marvelling unstintedlyat them all, and casting one after the other away.

As for the labour of enlarging a particularity of this kind into a system, and setting it forth as thewhole, this is a hard labour in good sooth, and the particular originality must surely come to grief over it, for how could what is limited be capable of extending itself into a whole, without ipso factoflying to pieces itself? The very quest for a particular principle is already committed to the goal of

possessing something of ones own, something that satisfies ones self alone, and renounces any pretension to the objectivity of knowledge or to its totality. And yet the whole is, more or less,

present in objective form, at least as raw material, as a mass of knowledge; it is hard to do itviolence and to follow the thread right through it consistently with ones own peculiar concept; butat the same time, given that it [the whole] is indeed there, one is never permitted to stage itapprovingly without coherence [with ones principle]; the cleverest way, it seems, is not to bother oneself on that account, and to set up ones own peculiar principle as the only thing that matters,leaving the rest of knowledge to bother itself about its coherence with the principle. It seems, of course, that this is a lower task altogether; to give to the basic principle its objective scientificrange. But if, on the one hand, this range is not to be lacking, and on the other hand, one wants tospare oneself the effort of bringing the manifold array of knowledge into coherence with itself andwith the limitedness of the principle, the way of proceeding that unites both of these requirements isthat of provisional philosophizing, i.e., that which sums up what is present not in terms of the

needs of a system of knowledge, but on the following ground: that it seems that what is present canhave its use then too to exercise our heads, for why else should it be there?

In this respect the Critical Philosophy has performed an exceptionally important service. To wit, ithas been proved therein to express the matter in its own words that the concepts of theUnderstanding only have their application in experience, that Reason as cognitive through itstheoretical Ideas only involves itself in contradictions, and that its object must be given toknowledge generally by sensibility. All this is useful for getting us to renounce Reason in[philosophic] science, and give ourselves over to the most crass empiricism. The crudest conceptsdragged into experience, and an intuition polluted by the rudest offspring of a spiritless reflection,have been given out as inner and outer experience and actual facts of consciousness.Everything has been tumbled together under this heading upon an assurance received fromanywhere, that it does occur in consciousness; and all this comes to pass by appeal to the CriticalPhilosophy, which has proved that experience and perception are necessary for cognition, andwhich allows Reason no constitutive relationship to knowledge, but only a regulative one. Apartfrom the fact that unphilosophy and anti-science [ Unwissenschaftlichkeit ], which philosophy usedto regard with easy contempt, have taken on a philosophical form for their justification, the CriticalPhilosophy has in this way brought about even greater benefits; to wit, it has reconciled healthycommon sense, and every limited consciousness, with philosophy along with their finest blooms,which are at times called the highest moral interests of humanity.

But if subjectivity, without regard for the further difficulty which it faces in setting itself forth as asystem, because the Critical Philosophy has now made at least one great range of finite formssuspect or unusable, if it is afflicted with insight into its limitedness, and by a kind of badconscience, and is ashamed to set itself up as absolute, how can it be preserved and made valid inspite of its own better knowledge and the Idea of Philosophy that floats before its mind? In the first


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place, we must start with a form that is recognized as finite. It must represent nothing but what is, toall appearances, an arbitrary starting point, worth nothing indeed upon its own account, but it has to

be granted for the moment because its utility will become evident soon enough. It is granted for thetime being, on request, in a provisory, problematic hypothetical way, without any special

pretensions; it will soon legitimate itself later on. If we once arrive at what is true having startedfrom it, our gratitude for the sign post will recognize [ erkennen ] that arbitrary starting point as a

necessary one, and see that it has been verified. However the true needs no leading reins to guide usto it; but must bear within itself the power to step forth on its own account; and the limited [starting

point] is itself recognized here for just what it is, that is to say it does not have the stuff of its ownsubsistence in it, but is understood to be only something hypothetical and problematic, even thoughin the end it is due to be verified as a veritably true [being]. It is evident therefore that the salvationof finitude was the principal concern. But what is not supposed to be hypothetical later on, cannot

be hypothetical in the beginning I either; or else what is hypothetical at the beginning cannot become categorical later on. It might, of course, come forward as absolute straight away, but since itis, quite rightly, too timid for that, we need a roundabout way to sneak the Absolute in.

Making out that a finite starting point of this kind is a hypothesis for the time being only introduces

one more deception. For the starter comes on stage pretending to have no pretensions: whether hecomes forward modestly as a hypothetical [being] or right away as self-certain, both starts lead tothe same result: that the finite is preserved as what it is in its separateness, and the Absolute remainsan Idea, a Beyond in other words, it is afflicted with a finitude.

The certain starting point, which is taken up in its immediate consciousness in order that it may becertain, seems through its immediate certainty to make up for what it lacks by reason of its finitude;and pure self-consciousness is just such a certainty since, qua starting point, it is posited as a pure[consciousness] in immediate opposition to the empirical [consciousness]. In and for itself theconcern of philosophy cannot be with finite certainties of this kind. A philosophy which, in order toanchor itself to a certainty, begins from the most universally valid statements or activities ready athand for every human understanding, is either doing something superfluous, since it must stilltranscend this limitation, and suspend it, in order to be philosophy at all (and ordinary commonsense, which must thereby be led astray will take good note when its sphere is abandoned, and onewants to lead it into self-transcendence); or else, if this finite certainty is not to be suspended assuch, but is to abide and subsist as something fixed, then it must, of course, recognize its finitude,and require infinity. However, the infinite then comes on the scene precisely and only as arequirement, as something thought of, only as an Idea. For although it is the necessary andcomprehensive, all-inclusive, Idea of Reason, it is still, ipso facto, one-sided, since the Idea itself and that which thinks it [or: that which it thinks] (or whatever else the determinate was from whichthe start was made) are posited separately. In this type of salvation for the limited the Absolute isexalted into the supreme Idea, but not at the same time into the unique being, so that the antithesis[of thought and being] remains dominant and absolute throughout the whole system of philosophy,since this is the point from which the science of philosophy first begins: To a certain extent thesesalvation programmes are what typifies our own recent philosophical culture: and almost everythingthat has been accepted as philosophy in our day falls within the scope of this concept. Even thehighest manifestation of philosophy of the last generation has not overcome the fixed polarity of inner and outer, of here [in the sensible world] and yonder [in the noumenal one]. It allows twoopposed philosophies to stand: one in which we can only approach towards the knowledge of theAbsolute, and another which is within the Absolute itself though this latter is, to be sure, onlyestablished under the tide of faith. In this way the antithesis of dualism is given its most abstractexpression and so philosophy is not led forth from the sphere of our reflective culture[ Reflexionskultur ]. As a result the most abstract form of the antithesis is of the greatest importance;

and from this most acute extreme, the transition to genuine philosophy is all the easier. For the veryidea of the Absolute that is set up itself rejects the antithesis, because the antithesis carries with itthe form of an Idea, of an Ought, of an infinite requirement. We must not overlook how much the


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study of philosophy has profited from the manifold elaboration that antithesis in general hasundergone the antithesis which every philosophy aims to overcome because a later philosophywas directed against the form of the antithesis that was dominant in an earlier one, and overcame it,even though the later philosophy fell back again, all unwittingly, into another form of antithesis; butat the same time we must also not overlook the variety of forms that the antithesis can assume.

On the other hand, there is a prevalent manner of proceeding that has only unprofitable aspects: towit, that which is at pains to make philosophical ideas popular, or more precisely, common, as soonas they appear on stage. Philosophy is, by its very nature, something esoteric, neither made for thevulgar as it stands [ fr sich ] , nor capable of being got up to suit the vulgar taste; it only is

philosophy in virtue of being directly opposed to the understanding and hence even more opposedto healthy common sense, under which label we understand the limitedness in space and time of arace of men; in its relationship to common sense the world of philosophy is in and for itself aninverted world .21 When Alexander, having heard that his teacher was publishing written essays onhis philosophy, wrote to him from the heart of Asia that he ought not to have vulgarized the

philosophizing they had done together, Aristotle defended himself by saying that his philosophywas published and yet also not published. In the same way philosophy [now] must certainly admit

[erkennen ] the possibility that the people can rise to it, but it must not lower itself to the people. Butin these times of freedom and equality, in which such a large educated public has been formed, thatwill not allow anything to be shut away from it, but considers itself good for anything or everything good enough for it in these times even the highest beauty and the greatest good havenot been able to escape the fate of being mishandled by the common mob which cannot rise to whatit sees floating above it, until it has been made common enough to be fit for their possessing; so thatvulgarization has forced its way into being recognized as a meritorious kind of labour. There is noaspect of the higher striving of the human spirit that has not experienced this fate. An Idea, in art or in philosophy, needs only to be glimpsed in order for the processing to start by which it is properlystirred up into material for the pulpit, for text books, and for the household use of the newspaper

public. Leibniz partly undertook these labours for his philosophy himself, in his Theodicy; his

philosophy did not thereby gain a general entree, but he made a great name for himself. Nowadays,there is a ready supply of people trained for the job. With isolated concepts, it happensautomatically; all that is necessary is to attach the concept-name to what has long been familiar ineveryday [ burgerlich ] life. In its origin and its realized essence [ an und fr sich ] the Enlightenmentalready expresses the vulgarity of the understanding and the vanity of its exaltation above Reason,and there was no need to change the meaning of the concepts [ Verstand and Vernunft ] in order tomake them attractive and easy to grasp; but one can readily grant that the word Ideal carriesnowadays the general meaning of that which has no truth in it, or the word humanity of thatwhich is utterly dull. he seemingly opposite case which is, however, just the same as this one at

bottom occurs where the matter is popular already, and where popular clichs (everyday ideas),which do not go even one step beyond the sphere of common concepts, have to be given the

outward look of philosophy by philosophical and methodical processing. just as in the first case theassumption is made, that what is philosophical can still be popular at the same time, so in thesecond [there is the assumption] that what is popular by nature, can in some way or other become

philosophic. Thus the compatibility of platitude and philosophy [is taken for granted] in both cases.

In a general way we can relate this variety of [philosophic] efforts to the spirit of unrest andinstability that is everywhere astir. This spirit is the mark of our time. After long centuries of thetoughest obstinacy, for which the casting off of an old form involved the most fearful convulsions,it has finally brought the German spirit to the point of tying even philosophical systems into theconcept of the ever changing and the ever new; although we must not mistake this passion for change and novelty for the indifference of play which, in its extreme insouciance, is at the same

time the most exalted and only true seriousness [ Ernst ]. For the restless impulse of our time goes towork with the extreme earnestness [ Ernsthaftigkeit ] of limitedness [as distinct from the only trueseriousness]. Yet fate has of necessity given it a dim feeling of mistrust and a secret despair which


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very soon reveals itself because the earnest limitedness is without living seriousness, so that on thewhole it cannot stake [ setzen ] much upon its concerns. Hence also it cannot achieve any great works

or [only] highly ephemeral ones.

Moreover, if we wish, we can also regard this present unrest as a process of fermentation throughwhich the spirit strains upwards toward a new life out of the putrefaction of the deceased culture,and springs forth again in a rejuvenated shape from under the ashes of the old. To be exact it wasagainst the Cartesian philosophy and the universal culture that it expresses that philosophy likeevery other side of living nature had to seek a means of salvation. The Cartesian philosophyexpounded [in a philosophical form] the universally comprehensive dualism in the culture of therecent history of our north-westerly world a dualism of which both the quiet transformation of the

public life of men after the decline of all ancient life, and the noisy political and religiousrevolutions are equally just different-coloured outward manifestations. What philosophy has donefor its salvation has been greeted with fury where it was pure and openly expressed; where it wasmore covert and more mixed up [with empirical considerations], the understanding has mastered itmore easily and turned it round again into the earlier dualistic pattern [ Wesen ]. AU the scienceshave been founded upon this death, and the time itself has completely killed whatever was still

scientific in them, and hence at least subjectively alive. So that if it were not immediately the spiritof philosophy itself which feels the strength of its growing wings all the more when it is submergedand crushed together in this broad sea, the very tedium of the sciences would make the whole flat

plain unbearable this edifice built by an understanding abandoned by Reason which at its worst(under the borrowed title either of rational enlightenment, or of moral reason) has even ruinedtheology in the end. This tedium was bound to at least arouse a yearning of the [dead] riches for aspark of fire, for a concentration of living intuition, and, once the cognition of the dead had gone onlong enough, for that cognition of the living which is only possible through Reason.

Belief in the possibility of such an actual cognition, and not just in the negative wandering along or the perennial springing up of new forms, is absolutely necessary if the effect to be expected from a

critique of them is to be a true one, i.e., not a merely negative destruction of these limited forms, butone that results in a preparation of the way for the arrival of true philosophy. But in any case, evenif it can only produce the former [merely negative] effect, it is quite proper that the pretensions of limited forms and the enjoyment of their ephemeral existence should be soured and cut short; andhe who can, may well regard [philosophical] criticism as nothing but the ever-turning wheel,dragging down again every instant the shape that the surge had thrown up. It may be that restingself-assured on the broad base of healthy common sense, he simply delights in this objectivespectacle of appearance and disappearance, and takes comfort and confirmation from it all the morefor his own banishment from philosophy, because by induction a priori he regards the philosophyupon which the limited comes to grief as just another limited form. Or again, it may be that hemarvels over the coming and going of the forms in their fountain with profound sympathy and

interest, grasping it with much effort, and then watches their disappearance with a wise eye, and letshimself drift giddily.

When criticism itself wants to maintain a one-sided point of view as valid against others that arelikewise one-sided, it becomes partisan polemic. But even the true philosophy cannot protect itself from the outward look of polemic against unphilosophy. For, since it has nothing positive incommon with the latter, and cannot engage with it in a [positive] critique of the common ground,only the negative activity of criticism is left together with the construction of the inevitablysingular manifestation of unphilosophy. Moreover, since this appearance follows no rule and takeson a different shape again in every individual, the construction of unphilosophy is the constructionof the individual in which its manifestation has occurred. Now if one group has another group

facing it in opposition, each of them is called a Party; but when one of them no longer even seemsto amount to anything, then the other ceases to be a party likewise. Hence, on the one hand, eachside must find it unbearable to appear merely as a party, and must not spare itself the spontaneouslyappearing and disappearing semblance [of partisanship] which it acquires in the struggle, but must


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enter into the battle, which [even though it creates the semblance of partisanship] is at the sametime, the emerging manifestation of the nullity of the opposed group. On the other hand, if a groupwants to save itself from the danger of the battle, and from the manifestation of its own inwardnullity, then in virtue of its declaration that the other side is only a party, it has recognized theopposition as something [real], and has renounced for its own part the universal validity in respectto which, what is actually [for the moment] a party, must not be a party but rather nothing at all. In

so doing it has confessed itself to be a party, i.e. to be null and void for the true philosophy.

hegel - the critical journal of philosophy

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