hazlitt, ruskin, and nineteenth-century art criticism

Hazlitt, Ruskin, and Nineteenth-Century Art CriticismAuthor(s): William C. WrightSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Summer, 1974), pp. 509-523Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/429366 .

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WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

Hazlitt, Ruskin, and Nineteenth-

Century Art Criticism

ALTHOUGH WILLIAM HAZLITT'S position as one of the leading literary and drama critics of the early nineteenth century has long been recognized, his work as a critic of the fine arts has attracted relatively little scholarly attention.l To at least one com- mentator on nineteenth-century art criticism, this oversight is justified. In The Last Romantics Graham Hough views the general level of art criticism after Reynolds and before Ruskin and finds, "After him [Rey- nolds] there is no one. Hazlitt's art criticisms are genial and sympathetic, but generate more warmth than light; painting was to him a region of happy day-dreams, and his writing about it is an attempt to recreate this 'sober certainty of waking bliss.' "2 Other assessments, however, suggest a more positive value to Hazlitt's contribution to the field of art criticism than that allowed by Hough, but differ on the precise nature of this contribution. Thus several recent studies follow up the argument of Stanley P. Chase's 1924 PMLA study of Hazlitt as a critic of art and focus on the relationship of Hazlitt to Reynolds and the Academy.3 A very recent study, J. D. O'Hara, "Hazlitt and Romantic Criticism of the Fine Arts," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 27 (Fall 1969): 73-86, sees Hazlitt as break- ing with neoclassic terminology and prepar- ing the way for the introduction of new views of art; but in general, Hazlitt is

WILLIAM CULVER WRIGHT is associate professor of English at the University of Houston.

seldom granted a title higher than that of a popularizer of current ideas about art, and only vaguely is it hinted that he might have influenced Victorian attitudes toward art and specifically those of Ruskin.4

The relationship of Hazlitt's views of the fine arts to those held by Ruskin early in his career is the specific concern of this study. The charge of dilettantism which underlies Hough's estimate of Hazlitt as an art critic may be said to be symptomatic of a general attitude taken by Ruskin scholars. Aside from connoisseurs and dilettantes whose contributions are negligible, they see no one bridging the gap between Reynolds and Ruskin, primarily because Ruskin's total contribution to the field of art criticism is so immense that it towers above any other nineteenth-century criticism of the visual arts. Yet even in acknowledging Ruskin's very significant contribution, Ruskin scholars generally agree that Ruskin in writing volume one of Modern Painters drew upon ideas and attitudes already current in early nineteenth-century criticism. Henry Ladd in The Victorian Morality of Art even goes so far as to credit Hazlitt with popularizing many of these attitudes and to regard some aspects of Hazlitt's criticism as significant and relevant to Ruskin's criticism, but he deems it highly unlikely that Ruskin actually knew Hazlitt's work.5 In fact, Ruskin's preface to the second edition of volume one of Modern Painters (1844), in which Ruskin attempted to clarify the general purpose of his art criticism, contains certain ideas and



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views already expressed by Hazlitt and as such indicates that it is quite possible that Ruskin was more indebted to Hazlitt at this early point in his career than has been generally acknowledged.

Specifically, this study has a three-fold purpose: (1) By an examination of Hazlitt's and Ruskin's respective reactions to Rey- nolds and the Academy, to demonstrate that both thought their views on art to be unorthodox a break with current attitudes; (2) to show that Hazlitt had expressed many of the ideas used by Ruskin in 1843-44; and (3) to suggest that there is good reason to believe that Ruskin did indeed know many of Hazlitt's writings on fine art.

Hazlitt was acknowledged as an art critic of some stature in his own lifetime. From 1814 till his death in 1830 Hazlitt wrote numerous articles on art for such publica- tions as the Morning Chronicle, the Cham- pion, the Examiner, the Edinburgh Re- view, and the London Magazine. In addition, he published three books dealing almost exclusively with the subject of art- Sketches of the Principal Picture-Galleries in England (1824), Notes on a Journey through France and Italy (1826), and Con- versations of Northcote (1830). Actually by 1816 Hazlitt had achieved enough stature as an art critic to be commissioned by Macvey Napier, editor of the Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, to write an article entitled "Fine Arts." This article, a restatement of many of the ideas presented earlier in the Morning Chronicle and Champion, after appearing in the Supple- ment from 1816 to 1823, was incorporated into the Britannica itself in 1824 and re- mained the basic article on the fine arts till 1842-the year before Ruskin published the first volume of Modern Painters.

The fact that Hazlitt wrote the Britan- nica article should not mislead one to think that Hazlitt was writing "Establishment" or Academy views on art. On the contrary, both Hazlitt and his editor saw his work as essentially dissenting from current attitudes on art. In a letter to Macvey Napier, dated April 2, 1816, Hazlitt attempted to explain the attitude he had taken in the Britannica

WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

article. Evidently, Napier had complained about the extreme position. The letter reads in part:

I dare say that your objections to several of the observations are well-founded. I confess that I am apt to be parodoxical in stating an extreme opinion when I think the prevailing one not quite correct. I believe however this way of writing answers with most readers better than the logical. I tried for some years to express the truth & nothing but the truth, till I found it would not clo. The opinions themselves I believe to be true, but like all abstract principles, they require de- ductions, which it is often best to leave the public to find out.6

The "prevailing" opinion which Hazlitt saw as "not quite correct" in his Britannica article was the same which Ruskin attacked over twenty-five years later-Sir Joshua Reynolds's theory of art as expressed in the Discourses and Idler papers and as followed by his disciples in the Academy. Ruskin was primarily concerned with Turner, but in order to defend the latter's work, he felt obliged to discredit the teachings of Rey- nolds and the practitioners of the grand style. Hence, throughout the critical writings of both Hazlitt and Ruskin is the spirit of reform and of dissent from the critical values of Reynolds and the Academy. Ac- tually both men were probably more indebted to Reynolds than either cared to admit, but inasmuch as both felt the need to use Reynolds as a scapegoat, their disa- greements with certain aspects of Rey- nolds's theory provide a convenient frame upon which to examine their respective views on art.

Hazlitt's most extended discussion of Reynolds came in a series of essays printed under the general title "Sir Joshua Rey- nolds' Discourses" appearing in the Cham- pion late in 1814 and early in 1815. The basic ideas expressed in these papers he was later to reproduce, slightly condensed in the Britannica article. Focusing his attention on the major points made by Reynolds in the first six Discourses, Hazlitt listed six major points, "either wrong in themselves, or lia- ble to misconception and abuse":7

1. That genius or invention consists chiefly in borrowing the ideas of others, or in using other men's minds.



Hazlitt, Ruskin, and Nineteenth-Century Art Criticism

2. That the great style in painting depends on leaving out the details of particular objects.

3. That the essence of portrait consists in giving the general character, rather than the individual likeness.

4. That the essence of history consists in ab- stracting from individuality of character as much as possible.

5. That beauty or ideal perfection consists in a central form.

6. That to imitate nature is a very inferior object in art.

That these six points probably do not rep- resent accurately Sir Joshua's views has been pointed out by several critics.8 But evidently what Hazlitt attacked was the misuse or "misconception" of Reynolds's theory by the practitioners of the Academy. The prevailing view still seemed to emphasize that art must imitate nature, not the common particular appearances of nature, but rather the general ideal forms of nature-nature as man might wish it to be. The painter was to look at nature, determine the "will and intention of the Crea- tor" as presented in the external forms of nature and present only this ideal or central form in his work. Inasmuch as the ancients had already shown the ideal form of nature, to copy them was to copy nature. They provided the criteria to judge all art, whether it be landscape, historical, or portrait painting.

It was Reynolds's insistence upon the imitation of the ancients as the foundation of genius and invention that formed the sub- stance of Hazlitt's "On Genius and Originality." 9 The essay shows that Haz- litt, on occasion, could be as patronizing, sarcastic, and dogmatic as Ruskin. He demonstrates that Reynolds contradicts himself by quoting various passages from the Dis- courses, some out of context. Thus Rey- nolds insists upon imitation of the Ancients but praises Michelangelo for not relying on foreign models. Further, Reynolds is incon- sistent in his definition of genius. Indeed Hazlitt sees Reynolds as denying the existence of natural genius and then averring that "the degrees of excellence which pro- claims genius is different in different times and places" in confutation of his previous statement.'0 The very practice of the An-

cients in imitating nature-and not their predecessors-indicates to Hazlitt the invalidity of Reynolds's theory. Hazlitt is perhaps kindest to Reynolds when he states that Reynolds feared "premature preten- sions" to genius and, as a consequence, lack of industry on the part of young painters. Therefore Reynolds went to the extremity of insisting upon laborious exercise as a substitute for natural genius."l

Hazlitt's own definition of genius and originality does differ from Reynolds's more extreme statements and anticipates Rus- kin's general position in the preface to the second edition of Modern Painters, volume I.

But however a man may come by the faculty which we call genius, whether it is the effect of habit and circumstances, or the gift of nature, yet there can be no doubt that what is meant by the term, is a power of original observation and invention. To take it otherwise, is a solecism in language, and a misnomer in art. A work demonstrates genius exactly as it contains what is to be found no where else, or in proportion to what we add to the ideas of others from our own store, and not to what we receive from them. It may contain also what is to be found in other works, but it is not that which stamps it with the character of genius.u

Though Hazlitt here emphasizes "original observation and invention" as the mark of genius, he by no means would discard or consider useless the works of past masters. In fact, throughout the essay he assesses the particular qualities manifested in the works of antiquity. Thus, he sees the genius of Michelangelo resting in grandeur of form, that of Raphael in expression, and that of Titian in internal force and proportion.

Hazlitt expressed this same idea more clearly in another essay, "On Genius and Common Sense." He says here that the highest prerogative of a human being is to find and express any one truth in nature. The mark of a man of genius is his ability to do this. But capacities of artists differ: "One displays her [Nature's] force, another her refinement.... Each does that for which he is best fitted by his particular genius, that is to say, by some quality of the mind in which the quality of the object sinks deepest, ... is perceived to its utmost ex-

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tent, and where again it forces its way out from the fulness with which it has taken possession of the mind of the student." 13

To Hazlitt, the genius of the past masters of art lay not in imitating other painters but in the immediate perception and imitation of nature. Furthermore, had these men been compelled to compose by the rules laid down by Reynolds and the Academy their chances of demonstrating their genius to the world would probably have been considerably diminished. In short-imitation of the works of antiquity and following academic rules tend to inhibit genius:

A theory, then, by which these great artists could have been lost to themselves and to the art, and which explains away the two chief supports and sources of all art, nature and genius, into an un- intelligible jargon of words, cannot be intrinsi- cally true. The principles thus laid down may be very proper to conduct the machinery of a royal academy, or to precede the distribution of prizes to the students, or to be the topics of as- sent and congratulation among the members themselves at their annual exhibition dinner: but they are so far from being calculated to foster genius or to direct its course, that they can only blight or mislead it, whenever it exists, and "lose more men of talents to this nation", by the dis- semination of false principles, than have been already lost to it by the want of any.'4

Hazlitt's views on genius, originality, and related problems of the use of the ancients and the function of the academy may be summarized as follows. The painter who possesses genius must rely primarily on his abilities of original observation of particular nature and invention to produce original works. Invention, as Hazlitt uses the term, means discovery. He may add to the works of the ancients but not slavishly imitate them, for each artist displays a perception of a unique aspect of nature and an ability to express that view. Current critical canons, however, tend to inhibit the expression of genius by denying the chief supports of art-nature and genius-and by judging the merits of art only by examples of the past.

Turner's genius and originality were, of course, two important concerns of Ruskin's first volume of Modern Painters, but the caustic comments of a reviewer, who saw Ruskin as admitting "the fact against which

WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

he mainly argues-namely, the superiority of these time-honored productions," gave Ruskin an opportunity (in the preface to the second edition) to state succinctly his views on the use and value of the works of the past.'5 Like Hazlitt, Ruskin would not hold the works of the great painters of the past to be useless, nor would he advocate a close imitation of them as advisable. Imper- fections existed in even the best paintings of the past and study could conceivably im- prove these productions. But whereas Haz- litt emphasized the excellences of the works of individual artists, Ruskin saw art as the expression of various nations and generations. He comments "that every nation, perhaps every generation, has in all probability some peculiar gift, some particular character of mind, enabling it to do something different from, or something in some sort better than, what has been before done; and that therefore, unless art be a trick or a manufacture of which the secrets are lost, the greatest minds of existing nations if exerted with the same industry, passion, and honest aim as those of past time, have a chance in their particular walk of doing something as great, or, taking the advantage of former example into account, even greater and better." 16

Ruskin's idea that art is a reflection of the moral temper of a people and an age- a concept that he developed more fully in The Stones of Venice-is touched upon here in the preface. Though Hazlitt never reached Ruskin's fully developed conclusions concerning the morality of art, he was interested in the influence of climate on artistic expression and viewed the art of the past both as the result of a particular talent and as the reflection of the spirit of an age. So in the "Fine Arts" article, Hazlitt main- tained that "In the portraits of Titian, as might be expected, the Italian character always predominates; there is a look of pierc- ing sagacity, of commanding intellect, of acute sensibility, which would be vain to seek for in any other portraits. The daring spirit and irritable passions of the age and country, are distinctly stamped upon their countenances, and can be as little mistaken as the costume which they wear." 17




Hazlitt and Ruskin are in accord on the proper use of the masters in the development of genius. As Hazlitt would demand that a work demonstrates genius only in its uniqueness or in proportion to what it adds to the ideas of others, thus emphasizing the intellectual aspects of a painting, so Ruskin saw the powerful intellect, not the imitation of the ancients, as determining the value of art. He holds that "If a mind were to arise of such power as to be capable of equalling or excelling some of the greater works of past ages, the productions of such a mind would, in all probability, be totally different in manner and matter from all former productions; for the more powerful the intellect, the less will its works resemble those of other men, whether predecessors or contemporaries." 18 Ruskin does not attempt to disguise the identity of the posses- sor of this powerful intellect-J.M.W. Turner. What he recognized was that by current critical standards, largely derived from Reynolds and the Academy, Turner's genius would be ignored. Consequently, Ruskin called for the establishment of a new critical canon based primarily upon fidelity to nature.

Reynolds too had insisted upon nature as the basis of art, but both Hazlitt and Rus- kin disagreed with Reynolds's concept of generalized nature, or central forms, and the grand style. Both saw Reynolds as ignoring particular nature in his quest for the ideal form and accused him of seeing in nature what he wanted to see; yet each in attacking the ideal form saw the dangers of the other extreme-over-fidelity to detail- and sought a via media, a means to reconcile the representation of diverse and specific forms of nature with the attainment of a higher truth.

To refute Reynolds's concept of generalized nature or central forms, Hazlitt pro- pounded the idea that the ideal is actually the extreme rather than the mean. In the Britannica article Hazlitt comments that "Sir Joshua Reynolds constantly refers to Raphael as the highest example in modern times (at least with one exception) of the grand or ideal style; and yet he makes the essence of that style to consist in the em-

bodying of an abstract or general idea, formed in the mind of the artist by rejecting the peculiarities of individuals, and retaining only what is common to the species." But the style of Raphael is inconsist- ent with this definition, Hazlitt argues, for such paintings as the Miracle of the Con- version and the Assembly of Saints are no more than a "collection of divine portraits, in natural and expressive attitudes, full of the loftiest thought and feeling, and as varied as they are fine... where one spirit,- that of truth,-pervades every part, brings down Heaven to Earth, mingles Cardinals and Popes with Angels and Apostles,-and yet blends and harmonizes the whole by the true touches and intense feeling of what is beautiful and grand in nature." 19 It is Ra- phael's reliance on the power of nature, which is equated by Hazlitt with reality, that produced these masterpieces.

Michelangelo's paintings, despite flaws, provided Hazlitt with good examples of what he called extreme forms: "His forms, however, are not middle but extreme forms, massy, gigantic, supernatural. They convey the idea of the greatest size and strength in the figure and in all the parts of the figure. Every muscle is swollen and turgid. This tendency to exaggeration would have been avoided, if Michael Angelo had recurred more constantly to nature, and had pro- ceeded less on a scientific knowledge of the structure of the human body; for science gives only the positive form of the different parts, which the imagination may after- wards magnify, as it pleases, but it is nature alone which combines them with perfect truth and delicacy, in all the varieties of motion and expression." 20 In another essay on Reynolds, entitled "On Certain Incon- sistencies in Sir Joshua Reynolds' Dis- courses," Hazlitt asserted more explicity that "Ideal Expression is not neutral expression, but extreme expression." 21 It is not an ab- stracting of a general principle from nature, but an intensification of impression on the part of the painter which in turn produces an immediate response by the viewer.

Although Ruskin in 1843 emphasized perception more than imagination as the molding force through which intensifica-

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tion is achieved, he would tend to agree with Hazlitt on the concept of the ideal resting on an extreme rather than on a mean, and on the invalidity of Reynolds's concept of generalized nature. Hazlitt had seen Reynolds's quest for the ideal or neutral form leading to a shortsightedness. He commented that "It is no wonder that Sir Joshua, when he first saw Raphael's pictures in the Vatican, was at a loss to discover any great excellence in them, if he was looking out for his theory of the ideal, of neutral character and middle forms." 22 Ruskin almost paraphrases Hazlitt's remarks in criticizing Reynolds for the same failing, in respect to Reynolds's discussion of a Titian foreground: "But Sir Joshua is as inaccurate in fact, as false in principle. He himself furnishes a most singular instance of the very error of which he accuses Vaseni,-of 'seeing what he expects; or, rather, in the present case, not seeing what he does not expect.' " 23 Like Hazlitt, Rus- kin pointed to Raphael's cartoons as further "proof" of Reynolds's faulty theory in practice.24

Hazlitt's insistence upon the imitation of particular nature, as opposed to generalized nature, is restated in such a fashion by Rus- kin that it appears to be virtually a scientific maxim. Hazlitt, more concerned with portrait and historical painting than with landscape, spoke of his own concept of historical painting in the following fashion:

It consists, then, in seizing the predominant form or expression, and preserving it with truth through every part. It is representing the individual under one consistent, probable, and strik- ing view; or shewing the different features, mus- cles, in one action, and modified by one principle. A face thus painted, is historical;-that is, it carries its own internal evidence of truth and nature with it; and the number of individual peculiarities, as long as they are true to nature, cannot lessen, but must add to the general strength of the impression.25

Ruskin voiced the same idea in terms of the art of the landscape painter:

Every herb and flower of the field has its specific, distinct, and perfect beauty; it has its peculiar habitations, expression and function. The highest art is that which seizes this specific character, which develops and illustrates it, which assigns to it its proper position in the landscape, and which,

WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

by means of it, enhances and enforces the great impression which the picture is intended to convey.26

The implication of Reynolds's "grand style"-that the painter avoids the details or particulars and seizes the general idea or character-Hazlitt and Ruskin both thought undermined art. "Greatness," to Hazlitt, consisted "in giving the larger masses and proportions with truth," but this did not preclude supplying the particulars as well. In fact, the omission of details, far from being a "grand style" was the "gross" style. The other extreme, giving nothing but details, Hazlitt labeled the "finical" style. But as nature contained "both large and small parts,-both masses and details," so too great works of art united "both kinds of excellence, of strength with delicacy, as far as the limits of human capacity and the shortness of human life would permit." 27

Reynolds's grand style was, to Ruskin, an anathema, the cause of the "sad state of landscape painting." "The sense of artifi- cialness, the absence of all appearances of reality, the clumsiness of combination by which the meddling of man is made evi- dent, and the feebleness of his hand branded on the organization of his mon- strous creature, are advanced as a proof of inventive power, as an evidence of ab- stracted conception; nay, the violation of specific form, the utter abandonment of all organic and individual character of object ... is constantly held up by the unthinking critic as the foundation of the grand or historical style, and the first attainment of a pure ideal." It was virtually blasphemy for the painter to consider himself an arbiter of nature-to anticipate the divine will as Reynolds would have him do-when to Ruskin the painter was merely a disciple. Ruskin's own grand style emphasized the artist's acute perception and accurate representation of the specifics of an object:

Now there is but one grand style, in the treatment of all subjects whatsoever, and that style is based on the perfect knowledge, and consists in the simple unencumbered rendering of the specific characters of the given object, be it man, beast, or flower. Every change, caricature, or abandonment of such specific character is as de- structive of grandeur as it is of truth, of beauty as of propriety.28




Both Hazlitt and Ruskin either antici- pated or answered critics who saw their emphasis on the particular as leading to a pro- liferation of details to the exclusion of the general impression. Anticipating the ques- tion "Would you then have an artist finish like Denner?" Hazlitt answers that Denner is an example of finishing to be "shunned because he did nothing but finish; because he finished ill, and because he finished to excess;-for in all things there is a certain proportion of means to ends." Denner's emphasis upon minutiae, his tendency to re- flect man as he might be seen through a magnifying glass rather than as he actually appears, blinded him to nature, for Denner violated what Hazlitt considers to be the "business" of painting-"to express objects as they appear naturally, not as they may be made to appear artificially." Titian, hlowever, offered the best example of proper attention to subordination of details to general effect. His finishing is "engrafted on the most profound knowledge of effect, and attention to the character of what he repre- sents. His pictures have the exact look of nature, the very tone and texture of flesh. The endless variety of his tints is blended into the greatest simplicity. There is a proper degree both of solidity and transpar- ency. All the parts hang together: every stroke tells, and adds to the effect of the rest." 29

Ruskin's insistence upon the "right statement of generic difference," even of the details of granite and slate, had opened him to the criticism that such attention to detail would lead to "Denner-like portraiture" of landscape. His argument follows Ha- zlitt's in many respects. "It is not," Ruskin reasons, "detail sought for its own sake,- not the calculable bricks of the Dutch house-painters, nor the numbered hairs and mapped wrinkles of Denner, which consti- tute great art,-they are the lowest and most contemptible art; but it is detail referred to a great end,-sought for the sake of the inestimable beauty which exists in the slightest and least of God's works, and treated in a manly, broad, and impressive manner." Titian's painting of flowers in the foreground of his Bacchus and Ariadne is

the best example of Ruskin's concept of the particular: "While every stamen of the rose is given, because this was necessary to mark the flower, and while the curves and large characters of the leaves are rendered with exquisite fidelity, there is no vestige of particular texture, or moss, bloom, moisture, or any other accident-no dew-drops, nor flies, nor trickeries of any kind; nothing beyond the simple forms and hues of the flowers,-even those hues themselves being simplified and broadly rendered." Though Titian perhaps had given too intense a blue to the varieties of aquilegia-to Ruskin's eye they are actually grayish-Ruskin argues that Titian did not intend to give "the particular color of individual blossoms," but rather seize the "type of all," and give "it with the utmost purity and simplicity of which color is capable." 30

The basic problem that Hazlitt and Rus- kin had to solve was how a painter, in re- producing with fidelity each detail of an object, was to avoid a pedestrian realism akin to the hack illustrations of the "topog- raphers." Rejecting Reynolds's ideas concerning central forms and the ideal, both Hazlitt and Ruskin developed alternative concepts of the ideal, which in several respects were quite similar, and offered a means, totally different from Reynolds's an- ticipation of the "Divine Will," by which the painter might achieve this ideal.

Two recent articles on specific aspects of Hazlitt's and Reynolds's art criticism, though intended primarily to illuminate some essential differences between neoclassic and romantic theories of art, offer views that suggest several possible resemblances between Hazlitt's and Ruskin's theories of art.31 In "Hazlitt, Reynolds, and the Ideal," Leonard M. Trawick acknowledges that no ideal pre-exists for Hazlitt in the external world beyond the multitude of specific con- crete phenomena, and sees the basic difference between Hazlitt and Reynolds resting in the orientation of their thought. Unlike Reynolds, who tended to emphasize the typical character of an external object, Hazlitt stressed the individual and internal character of an object. Trawick cites Hazlitt's re- mark, "There is another mightier world,

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that which exists only in conception and in power, the universe of thought and sentiment, that surrounds and is raised above the ordinary world of reality, as the empyrean surrounds this nether globe: ... this is the ideal in art, in poetry, and in painting." 32 To Trawick, Hazlitt's emphasis upon conception, the "universe of thought and sentiment" makes him a part of the "Co- pernican revolution"- a term defined by Trawick to mean a shift in emphasis from object to subject in art criticism. The forms of nature surrounded by this world of thought and sentiment could not be static. Rather they emerged organically from internal germs: "All the varieties of nature in the infinite number of its qualities, combina- tions, characters, expressions, incidents, etc. rise from distinct points or centres and must move in distinct directions, as the forms of different species are to be referred to a separate standard. It is the object of art to bring them out in all their force, clear- ness, and precision, and not to blend them into a vague, vapid, nondescript ideal conception, which pretends to unite, but in reality destroys." 33 It follows from Hazlitt's view of organic nature that the ideal lay not in a preconceived abstract representation but in the "extreme of any line of development that reveals the essence of nature." Trawic concludes that Hazlitt found "a new unity in the power of the individual to impose a valid order on nature's infinite manifestations." 34

Trawick does not discuss the nature of this "power," or the means by which the individual might penetrate this world of thought and sentiment which surrounds the forms of nature. Nor does he attempt to link Hazlitt's concepts with Ruskin's; yet certain similarities do exist. The most obvious relationship is that Hazlitt and Rus- kin shared the romantic concept that nature is organic. That Ruskin attached a good deal of importance to this idea is evi- dent in Praeteritai where he recounts his experience in sketching an aspen tree:

Languidly, but not idly, I began to draw it; and as I drew, the languor passed away: the beautiful lines insisted on being traced,-without weariness. More and more beautiful they became,

WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

as each rose out of the rest, and took its place in the air. With wonder increasing every instant, I saw that they "composed" themselves, by finer laws than any known of men. At least, the tree was there, and everything that I had thought before about trees, nowhere....

The woods, which I had only looked on as wilderness, fulfilled I then saw, in their beauty, the same laws which guided the clouds, divided the light, and balanced the wave. "He hath made everything beautiful, in his time," became for me thenceforward the interpretation of the bond between the human mind and all visible things; and I returned along the wood-road feeling that it had led me far;-Farther than ever fancy had reached or theodolite measured.36

This "discovery," related with all the fervor of a person undergoing a religious conver- sion, was made several years before the writing of Modern Painters and helps to account for Ruskin's self-righteousness in de- fending his theory and dogmatism in preach- ing the doctrine of truth to nature in the initial volume. He had apprehended in the diversity of nature its organic character. The aspen tree, like the lowly Norwood ivy, was composed by a higher law; it possessed beauty in each part and in relation to the whole. The woods, with its multitudes and varieties of trees, fulfilled a divine truth. The painter, as Ruskin had stated in his preface, could not be an arbiter of such a truth, he could not anticipate a divine will, but rather he stood as a disciple in rendering with fidelity this truth in nature.

At face value, Ruskin's statements would seem to indicate a faithful representation of the organic aspects of nature to be the business of painting and the ideal in art nothing more than a photographic representation. He did not, of course, hold such a view, but as Henry Ladd and others have pointed out, Ruskin's art criticism possessed organic qualities too; it grew out of the initial volume, attaining the stature of a full body of criticism only much later. For instance, in the first volume Ruskin speaks at great length of truth in nature and painting, but he does not adequately define the ideal in art, nor reconcile the ideal with nature. But by the time he does deal with these matters, he comes to conclusions, concerning the ideal and the naturalist ideal, quite similar to Hazlitt's.




Henry Ladd's analysis of Ruskin's concept of the ideal and the reconciliation of the ideal with natural fact suggests certain areas of agreement.36 To Ruskin, nature was diverse and organic, but amid this diversity existed an animating principle that somehow linked all objects and pointed to a divine origin. Ruskin's firm religious convictions, at least early in his career, led him to see this unity in diversity as a sign of God's hand in creating all things. This principle may be designated as the "characteristic Truth" of nature. The artist's purpose was two-fold: "To induce in the spectator's mind the faithful conception of any natural object whatsoever," and "To guide the spectator's mind to objects most worthy of contemplation and to inform him of thoughts and feelings with which these were regarded by the artist himself." The first purpose could be attained by a painter if his perception were sharp enough and his talents worthy of the task. But the second purpose could only be attained by an artist of high intellect and fine sensibilities, for it involved both selectivity and arrangement, and the conveyance of thoughts and feelings associated by the painter with the object, which in turn would evoke a response by the viewer.

Ladd points out the similarity of Haz- litt's thought to Ruskin's on this score and even suggests that Hazlitt is far more con- vincing in his explanation.37 Just as Ruskin had emphasized "seeing" as a prerequisite for the attainment of a characteristic truth, so also did Hazlitt. Both too would insist upon art either adding to ideas of the past or presenting an interpretation of something "before unknown." Hazlitt recognized that human perception differs with the individual. One person does not neces- sarily see an object as another would. Haz- litt comments, "Nature presents an endless variety of aspects, of which the mind seldom takes in more than a part or than one view at a time, and it is in seizing on this exposed variety, in giving some one of these new but easily recognized features in its characteristic essence, and according to the peculiar bent and force of the artist's genius, that true originality consists." 38 "Charac-

teristic essence" is the force which clearly defines each form of nature and which can be gained only by intensification of vision. It is quite similar to Ruskin's concept of characteristic truth, but differs in a significant aspect. Ruskin's characteristic truth betokened a finer law that indicated the work of the Creator and reinforced his own orthodox religious convictions. Hazlitt came from far too unorthodox a religious background to find "God in Nature." Rather, when he used the term divine, he was speaking of what we imagine of the gods, "pleasure without pain, power without effort." 39

Although Ruskin at first stressed perception as the prime quality in arriving at characteristic truth or the ideal, later he came to regard the imagination as the force through which arrangement and selectivity of nature's features could be attained. Rus- kin had regarded the "penetrative imagination" as a means of perceiving characteristic truth, but the shaping force of the mate- rials of nature which was instrumental in emphasizing some forms, in neglecting others, and in arranging all, he called the "contemplative imagination." Ladd sees the operation of this activity of the imagination as consisting in "depriving subjects of mate- rial and bodily shape, developing only those qualities which are chosen for such a particular purpose, and forging those qualities into abstract groups or forms." The process is necessary because of the indefi- niteness of human conceptions. People re- member enough of an object to permit rec- ognition, but tend to forget details. "The imagination, aided by the associative fancy, takes advantage of this indefinition and proceeds to abstract certain qualities above others for a certain purpose which is deter- mined by the form in which the mind has chosen to regard the remembered or seen object." Several causes may determine the form: "the particular regard for the object arising from the artist's sensibilities, . .. for- gotten associations or... his [the artist's] penetrative intuition of truth." 40

How closely Ruskin's treatment of the operation of the imagination in attaining the ideal resembles Hazlitt's is acknowl-

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WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

edged by Ladd who quotes Hazlitt's definition of the ideal as "the enhancing and expanding an idea from the satisfaction we take in it or it is taking away whatever divides, and adding whatever increases our sympathy with pleasure and power, 'till our content is absolute! or at its height." Ladd points out that Hazlitt's ideal is not different from what is seen, nor "is it what a thing ought to be," nor the neutralization of its character, but "the highest point of purity and perfection to which we can carry the idea of an object or quality ... by re- moving what is irrelevant and supplying what was defective," to make "it more itself than it was before." 41

Basic to both Hazlitt's and Ruskin's art criticism is the power of the painter to achieve intensity, but the terminology Haz- litt chose to describe this quality-expression or gusto-belonged essentially to the conventional language of art criticism which he redefined to conform to his theory. Ruskin, on the other hand, studiously avoided traditional terms that would link his theory to neoclassical theories and in- vented a complex language, comprised of such phrases as the "penetrative imagination," "contemplative imagination," and '"vital truth," which apparently spoke of an entirely new development in art criticism. Yet despite the high sounding terms and the confusing complexity of his theory, Ruskin was employing the same sort of methodology as Hazlitt.

Expression or gusto has been acknowledged to be the touchstone of Hazlitt's criticism, but because Hazlitt used the term rather indiscriminately to describe a number of qualities, there has been a good deal of speculation as to its precise meaning.42 However, an article by Eugene C. Elliott, "Reynolds and Hazlitt," attempts to fix as accurately as possible Hazlitt's definition of expression and to show how his use of the term differs markedly from Reynolds's.43 El- liott cites two key passages from Hazlitt's works, one from the "Catalogue Raisonne of the British Institution," the other from "On the Portrait of An English Lady." In the former Hazlitt held that gusto or expression was "the conveying to the eye

the impressions of the soul, or the other senses connected with the sense of sight, such as: the different passions visible in the countenance, the romantic interest connected with the scenes of nature, the character and feelings associated with different objects." 44 In the latter Hazlitt voiced the notion that expression gave interest and sig- nification to forms and was the basis of judging their imitation-the greater the sympathy of the artist, the closer will be the affinity between the imitation and the thing imitated. Finally, therefore, expression is the test and measure of genius.45

Elliott points out that Reynolds's use of the term most frequently meant merely the external representation of the passions, or possibly attitude and decorum in a portrait, and concludes that, "To Hazlitt, expression was no longer the characteristic mark of the subject distributed throughout the picture. It had become the effect of a powerful sympathy enabling the artist to enter into his object, to penetrate to its nature. Great art, then was not the exact imitation of visual appearance. A true portrait demanded a comprehension of the whole, that is, of a varied mass of physical appearances through which the subject might pass, which could only be known through the activity of a moral sense-sympathy; and the picture finally responded to a preconceived judgment-an ideal image of the object in the mind of the artist." If the univer- sal lay in the individual, so too expression rested in each object, not in the entire picture.46

Expression, then, according to Elliott, concerned both the creative act and the sympathetic response of both painter and viewer. It involved the power of the artist to penetrate into the characteristic essence of the forms of nature and to respond through the activity of a moral sense-sympathy so as to capture this internal quality. The effect of the penetrative power and the sympathetic response of the artist in the painting, in turn, evoked the desired response on the part of the viewer.

In a hypothetical situation, Hazlitt's theory appears to work in this fashion. Given Hazlitt's concept of nature as a pluralistic

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reality-diverse, organic, permeated by a characteristic essence, the empyrean of ideas-the painter, through "gusto"-the intensity of perception which projects self into the world of ideas-identifies with one aspect of nature's characteristic essence, seeing it more clearly than ever before. The idea of the object, in turn, through associa- tion with the painter's preconceived idea of the object and the operation of the moral sense of sympathy, is the occasion of a response or receptiveness by which the artist selects from and arranges the many forms of nature so that the characteristic essence which he has apprehended is stressed. This associative response Hazlitt also calls "gusto." Finally, the painting itself, because of the accentuation of some parts, the ne- glect of others-occasioned by the use of "gusto" as the responsive or shaping force of nature's diversity-evokes a response in the viewer as he apprehends one truth more clearly than ever before.

Ruskin never uses the term gusto, but the operation of the feelings and perceptions of the artist in the creative act to produce the naturalist ideal is very much like the function of Hazlitt's gusto or expression. The "penetrative imagination" or the ability to perceive "vital truth" corresponds loosely to Hazlitt's characteristic essence in that both imply the existence of a higher truth permeating the forms of nature.

Of course, differences are readily appar- ent as well. Ruskin's "characteristic" truth amid the diversity of nature is paradoxical, for while admitting a pluralistic concept of reality, it still looks to a constant: a unity in diversity directly attributed to God. The associative base of Ruskin's theory is much more expansive and complex than Hazlitt's. There is not one moral sense employed but rather the response to beauty of one's total moral being. This response, theoria; is distinguished from aesthesia or the mere sen- suous pleasure one takes in art according to Ruskin's scheme. Ruskin's concept of the "naturalist ideal," natural because it is true to nature and ideal because of its arrangement of parts, stresses the unity in diversity, while Hazlitt, in demanding truth to na-

ture, saw the ideal resting in the beauty of each particular and thus in the whole.

Perhaps of greatest importance is the difference in tone. Ruskin approached his work as a preacher turning to the chore of biblical exegesis. There is a sermonizing quality about his art criticism, an evangeli- cal fervor that pervades much of his early writings. He is, in effect, calling for a reun- ion of man with God-in-nature and thus reinforcing scriptural truths that had been questioned. Hazlitt came to his work with the same fervor that prompted him to defend Napoleon publicly during the Napo- leonic wars. A born iconoclast and an ap- parent skeptic in matters of faith, Hazlitt delighted in tearing down old systems, but in replacing the old with a new, he did not attempt to infuse a religious aura into his work or offer a theory of art implicitly sanc- tioning biblical truth. No doubt, in the minds of his reading public, Hazlitt re- mained much as Keats had characterized him-a "good damner." 47

Evidently, because Ruskin seldom speaks of Hazlitt's work, Henry Ladd implies that it is doubtful that Ruskin actually knew Hazlitt's writings on art. Yet it seems im- probable in light of the availability of Ha- zlitt's work that Ruskin could be totally ignorant of a body of art criticism published almost in direct competition with his Modern Painters. Still current were the Bri- tannica article on the "Fine Arts," a rework- ing of Hazlitt's early Champion papers, and the Conversations of Northcote (1830). In addition to these works on art, Hazlitt's son made available several other articles on painters and painting which were reprinted along with some miscellaneous essays in Lit- erary Remains (1836), and edited selected essays on the same subjects published under the title Criticism on Art. The latter work appeared in two volumes, the first late in 1843, the second in the spring of 1844, shortly after the second edition of Ruskin's first volume of Modern Painters.48 Besides selected essays on art, the edition reprinted the Britannica articles, "Notes on a Jour- ney through France and Italy," and "Sketches of the Principal Picture-Galleries in England." In fact, the latter, published

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WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

first in book form in 1824 and reprinted in 1843 as part of Criticism on Art, contained descriptions of several collections in the Dulwich and of paintings to be found in the National-important to Ruskin; for these paintings very probably constituted the ex- tent of Ruskin's knowledge of paintings and certainly provided him with all examples necessary to support his contentions about painting in 1843.49

In Modern Painters I Ruskin does draw upon Hazlitt's Sketches, evidently from the 1824 edition,50 but he uses the work much as both he and Hazlitt had used Reynolds's Discourses; that is, he conveniently disre- gards the nature and object of the work, in this case choosing apparently to consider it a serious treatise on art rather than a popu- lar, almost enthusiastic account of English art collections, and selects only those parts for comment which he dislikes, ignoring the rest. Hazlitt had made his intentions quite clear in the Advertisement to the Sketches. "It is," he says, "the object of the following little work to give an account of the principal Picture-Galleries in this country, and to describe the feelings which they naturally excite in the mind of a lover of art." 51 This "little work" is but a trifle, containing little theorizing but a good deal of enthusiastic responses to individual paintings. Its intent is to popularize-to create an interest in art by describing the paintings and the author's emotions upon viewing them. Hazlitt almost always has something good to say about a painting and his critical comments are infused with a good-natured zest, a quality not frequently found in Hazlitt's other criticism. But enthusiasm to Ruskin embod- ied the uncritical attitude which he sought to destroy, and consequently he took Haz- litt to task for several of his apparently superficial estimates of paintings.

Hazlitt's terminology, in particular, offended Ruskin. On one occasion, Ruskin picks up Hazlitt's use of the adjective "pulpy" and ridicules Hazlitt for using it, especially because it describes a work by Rubens, whose paintings Ruskin generally disparaged. But Hazlitt's subsequent treatment of Titian and "gusto," which follows the remarks on Rubens, Ruskin does not

mention at all, perhaps because he shared Hazlitt's admiration for that painter.52 A Cuyp landscape, Cattle and Figures Near a River with Mountains, had drawn an enthusiastic response from Hazlitt in the Sketches. Ruskin, intent on informing his readers of truth in landscape, uses Hazlitt's remarks as a convenient straw man. He comments, "Again, look at the large Cuyp in the Dulwich Gallery, which Mr. Hazlitt considers the 'finest in the world,' and of which he very complimentarily says, 'the tender green of the valleys, the gleaming lake, the purple light of the hills, have an effect like the down on an unripe nectarine,'" and then attacks both the terms of criticism and Hazlitt's aesthetic judgment, sarcastically pointing out that the sky is indeed like an unripe nectarine, but very much unlike a sky.53 Hazlitt actually did not say that the Cuyp was the finest painting in the world but the finest Cuyp in the world. The distortion of Hazlitt's rather in- nocent comment fits Ruskin's purpose more than the actual quote.54 Hazlitt's remarks on Cuyp, in context, are actually quite relevant, for he is talking about the illusion created by the painting or the emotive response of the viewer. But when applied to Ruskin's subject, fidelity to nature, they appear ridiculous.

Some twenty years after the appearance of Modern Painters I, Ruskin had occasion to refer to the Sketches again, this time to Hazlitt's critical opinion of Rembrandt's A Woman Taken in Adultery. Again Ruskin tends to distort Hazlitt. He says in The Cestus of Aglaia, "And without denying the pleasantness of the mode of progression which Mr. Hazlitt, perhaps too enthusiasti- cally, describes as attainable in a background of Rembrandt's-'you stagger from one abyss of obscurity to another'-I cannot feel it an entirely glorious specialty to be distinguished, as Rembrandt was, from other great painters, chiefly by the liveliness of his darkness, and the dulness of his light. Glorious, or inglorious, the specialty itself is easily and accurately definable. It is the aim of the best painters to paint the noblest things they can see by sunlight. It was the aim of Rembrandt to paint the foulest

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things he could see-by rushlight." 55 Rus- kin criticizes Rembrandt's arrangement, color, and "focus on the dissection of a car- case rather than the assumption of a spirit." In contrast he praises Titian and Veronese, especially Titian's Assumption. Ruskin dis- torts Hazlitt's view of Rembrandt by quoting only his remarks about coloring, but Hazlitt actually is critical of Rembrandt's Woman because of its lack of "gusto." A line from Paradise Lost (8:539) epitomizes Hazlitt's position: "of outward show/Elabo- rate, of inward less exact." What is more, Hazlitt follows with praise for Titian, Ve- ronese, and Tintoretto, all of whom Ruskin regarded highly, and distinguishes their work from Rubens's and Rembrandt's primarily because of their internal light or gusto.56

There was little cause for Ruskin to respect Hazlitt as a man and this personal distaste may have occasioned his rather shoddy treatment of his art criticism. Haz- litt's Bonapartist loyality, his republican- ism, and his religious unorthodoxy must have appalled Ruskin. In addition, Hazlitt never came to admire Turner's late style and was rather caustic in his early reviews of Turner's paintings. On Turner's landscape Apullia in Search of Appullus, Ha- zlitt remarked that the composition was a parody of Egremont's Jacob and Laban, the arrangement a borrowing from Claude, and consequently, "all the taste and all the imagination being borrowed, his powers of eye, hand, and memory, are equal to any thing.... The figures in the present picture are execrable. Claude's are flimsy enough; but these are impudent and obtrusive vul- garity. The utter want of a capacity to draw a distinct outline with the force, the depth, the fulness, and precision of this artist's eye for colour, is truly astonishing. There is only one part of the colouring which did not please us: it is the blue of the water nearest to the foreground, immediately after the dark brown shadow of the trees." 57 Such impious remarks were not calculated to endear Ruskin to Hazlitt.

Likewise, W. Carew Hazlitt, the essayist's grandson, reveals in his Four Generations of a Literary Family a latent hostility toward

Ruskin. Both Carew and his father had published portions of Hazlitt's art criticism as parts of projected complete works,58 quite possibly in competition with Ruskin's works. In addition, Carew had sought some information concerning Venetian culture from Ruskin for his own history of Venice. Ruskin, however, never acknowledged his letter of inquiry. It is in a malicious spirit, perhaps occasioned by this slight, that Carew relates the following anecdote: "'He [Turner] sent his picture of a ship in a snowstorm to Ruskin for the opinion of that great expert. Ruskin, on looking at it, confessed that the snow had much the look of soapsuds; but he added this graceful sav- ing clause, that he believed the painter to be so true to Nature, that he doubted not that the scene was a faithful representation of what he had seen." 59 Quite possibly too, Carew was paying back Ruskin, in kind, for his caustic comments on Hazlitt's "nectarine sky" in Modern Painters 1.

Ruskin did know Hazlitt's Conversations of James Northcote and while he may have been disposed to find the criticism the best "founded on the principles of Sir Joshua's school," he was not favorably inclined toward Hazlitt. Northcote had done several portraits for the Ruskins and was a personal friend of the elder Ruskin. According to a letter written by Northcote to John James Ruskin, Northcote felt that Hazlitt had said more than was necessary in the Conversations merely to hurt people, but the painter was delighted that the book was well-received. Evidently Ruskin himself was offended by some of the passages, for many years later he intended to edit the Conver- sations, retaining only those which he thought Northcote would have liked pre- served, probably deleting all that might ir- ritate Victorian sensibilities, and adding some of his own earlier conversations with the painter.60 Ruskin certainly had available in the Conversations a good many of Hazlitt's views on art, if he bothered to sift the author's ideas from Northcote's in the staged dialogues.

But Ruskin apparently was not given to a careful appraisal of works which he considered to be inferior, nor was he careful to

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acknowledge sources for his own ideas. His practice, at least in the case of Reynolds and Hazlitt, was to set up those artistic canons which he believed to be fallacious, to argue in such an assertive, righteous manner so as to demolish these views, and then to preach his own gospel. Those critical views with which he agreed he seldom acknowledged as having been advanced pre- viously, preferring instead to pass them off as part of a "new" system of art criticism.

This practice did not go undetected in his own lifetime. His obvious indebtedness to Carlyle and the possible influence of Pugin in the first edition of Modern Paint- ers II and his subsequent failure to acknowledge his borrowing had given rise to the charge of plagiarism. Ruskin answered this criticism by appending an essay on plagiarism to the second edition of Modern Painters 111.61 In the case of Carlyle, he freely acknowledged his indebtedness but excused the absence of citation on the grounds that his and Carlyle's ideas were so inextricably interwoven that they were too difficult to separate. But Pugin's influence Ruskin vehemently denied. Graham Hough suggests, however, that there is good reason to believe otherwise. He says, "Quite early in Ruskin's career it was suggested that he learnt from Pugin; and indeed it is difficult to believe that his studies of Gothic archi- tecture could have failed to feel Pugin's influence. However, Ruskin always denied it, explicitly in Appendix III to the third volume of Modern Painters. The rancour of the attack on Pugin in Romanist Modern Art might lead one to suppose that he pro- tests too much, and he seems to have dis- played embarrassment over the business on other occasions. The recently published ma- terial on Ruskin's private life has shown him as a pathological liar when his self- esteem was concerned, and it may well be that Pugin's influence was greater than he cared to admit." 62 It was, of course, Pugin's Roman Catholicism that most disturbed Ruskin. But a very similar prejudice could also have prompted Ruskin to avoid men- tioning the art criticism of Hazlitt, whose republican political views and religious unorthodoxy he must have abhorred.

Perhaps, too, Ruskin considered Hazlitt's

WILLIAM C. WRIGHT

art criticism as belonging to the public do- main. Hazlitt's essays frequently appeared unsigned. Probably the most important account of his critical views, the Britannica article on the fine arts, was current for six- teen years prior to the publication of Mod- ern Painters I, yet bore only the initial "z" to indicate Hazlitt's authorship. That a ris- ing middle-class family such as Ruskin's could have purchased the encyclopedia is quite possible. Then too, if Ruskin were familiar with the article bearing only an initial as a signature, he may well have thought it superfluous to acknowledge a specific borrowing. Ruskin's unreliability in matters of acknowledgment, taken into account with the availability of Hazlitt's work and the general resemblance the critical theories suggest, make it rather difficult to accept Ladd's opinion that Hazlitt's works were virtually unknown to Ruskin. What- ever the case, the circumstantial evidence suggests a much closer relationship than Ruskin admitted.

1 Of the considerable body of Hazlitt scholarship, only one chapter of Elisabeth Schneider's The Aes- thetics of William Hazlitt (Philadelphia, 1933) and several articles deal specifically with Hazlitt's views on painting and sculpture. See also Schneider's review of Hazlitt scholarship in The English Romantic Poets and Essayists: A Review of Research and Criti- cism, eds. Carolyn W. Houtchens and Laurence H. Houtchens (New York, 1966). Only a few articles have appeared since then.

2 Graham Hough, The Last Romantics (New York, 1961), p. 2.

3Stanley P. Chase, "Hazlitt as a Critic of Art," PMLA 39 (1924): 179-202. See also Leonard M. Tra- wick, III, "Hazlitt, Reynolds, and the Ideal," Studies in Romanticism 4 (Summer 1965): 240-47, and Eu- gene C. Elliott, "Reynolds and Hazlitt," JAAC 21 (1962): 73-79.

' Henry Ladd, The Victorian Morality of Art (New York, 1932), pp. 43-44, 51, 79-80, 215; Samuel Chew, "The Nineteenth Century and After," A Literary History of England, ed. A. C. Baugh (New York, 1948), p. 1187, comments that Hazlitt's "emphasis upon the literary content of painting antici- pated the typical Victorian approach to art, and in his rapturous descriptions of masterpieces as well as his insistence upon the moral and intellectual aspects of the arts he was a precursor of Ruskin."

6 Ladd, p. 80. 'Quoted in P. P. Howe, The Life of William

Hazlitt (London, 1947), p. 198. 7 William Hazlitt, The Complete Works of William




Hazlitt, ed. P. P. Howe, 21 vols. (London, 1930-34), 18: 63. All subsequent references to Hazlitt's writings are to this edition hereafter cited as Works.

8Chase points out that Hazlitt's discussion of Reynolds is based almost entirely upon the early lectures in the Discourses and concludes that Hazlitt probably had not read the later ones. Schneider argues that it is quite possible that Hazlitt had read all of the Discourses, but as in the case of Hazlitt's criticism of Malthus and of Locke, Hazlitt chose to concentrate "his attack upon the parts which he most disliked ignoring the rest even though he was familiar with it." The Aesthetics of William Hazlitt, p. 51. See also pp. 49-53 for Schneider's summary of Reynolds's basic position in the Discourses.

9"On Genius and Originality," Works 18: 64-70. 10 Ibid., p. 69. 11 Ibid., p. 70. 12 Ibid., p. 64. 13 "On Genius and Common Sense," p. 46. "4"On Genius and Originality," p. 68. '6John Ruskin, The Works of John Ruskin, eds.

E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London, 1903-1912), 3: 13.

loRuskin, Works 3: 13-14. 17 Works 18: 119. 18 Ruskin, Works 3: 14. 19 Works 18: 114. 20 Works 18: 115. 21 "On Certain Inconsistencies in Sir Joshua Rey-

nolds' Discourses," Works 8: 141. See also William P. Albrecht, Hazlitt and the Creative Imagination (Lawrence, 1965), pp. 80-81.

22 "On the Ideal," Works 18: 81. Also, "Fine Arts," p. 114.

2SRuskin, Works 3: 29. 24 Ruskin, Works 3: 29; Hazlitt, "Fine Arts," p.

114. 25 "On the Imitation of Nature," Works 18: 75. 28 Ruskin, Works 3: 33. 27 "On the Imitation of Nature," Works 18: 71. 28 Ruskin, Works 3: 24-25. 29 "On the Imitation of Nature," p. 72. 30 Ruskin, Works 3: 32. 31 Leonard M. Trawick, III, "Hazlitt, Reynolds,

and the Ideal," Studies in Romanticism 4 (Summer 1965): 240-47, and Eugene C. Elliott, "Reynolds and Hazlitt," JAAC 21 (1962): 73-79.

32 "On the Works of Hogarth," Works 6: 146. 33 "On Certain Inconsistencies...," Works 8: 144. 34 Trawick, p. 247. 35 Ruskin, Works 35: 314. 36 See Ladd, pp. 75-82, for a discussion of Ruskin's

views on representation and the attainment of characteristic truth.

37 Ladd, pp. 79-80. 38 Ladd, p. 80. Ladd quotes Hazlitt, "On Original-

ity," Works 20: 299. 39 "The Ideal," Works 20: 302.

40 Ladd, pp. 213-15. 41 Ladd, p. 384, quotes Hazlitt, "The Ideal," 20:

303. 42 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp (New

York, 1953), pp. 134-35, comments that Hazlitt's "'gusto' involves a flash of intensity in both the artist's conception and effect," quotes Hazlitt on Milton, and sees "gusto" as deriving from the "Longinian emphasis on critical responsiveness and 'enthrallment.'" Schneider, The Aesthetics of Wil- liam Hazlitt, p. 58, sees a relationship between Diderot's verve and Hazlitt's gusto in that both terms seem to mean intensity, but admits that Haz- litt defined the term in two different ways, once by a passing phrase-"gusto or expression," once as "power or passion defining any object."

43Eugene C. Elliott, "Reynolds and Hazlitt," JAAC 31(1962): 73-79.

44 "Catalogue Raisonne of the British Institution," Works 18: 109.

4""On the Portrait of An English Lady," Works 12: 285 f.

46 Elliott, p. 77. 47 The Keats Circle: Letters and Papers 1816-1878,

ed. Hyder E. Rollins, 2 vols. (New York, 1948), 1: 252. 48 The Advertisement to the first volume of Criti-

cism on Art (London, 1843) announced that the second volume would appear in the spring of 1844. The first edition of Modern Painters I appeared in May, 1843, the second on March 30,1844.

48Ruskin, Works 3: 6. The National Gallery was not in existence at the time Hazlitt wrote the Sketches, but paintings he describes in detail later became a part of the National collection. See Haz- litt's Advertisement to the Sketches in Works 10: 3.

60 Ruskin, Works 3: 350 n. Cook and Wedderburn cite Criticism on Art (1843) as the source for Ruskin's remarks, but that work actually appeared after the first edition of Modern Painters was published.

61 Hazlitt, Works 10: 2. 62 Hazlitt, Works 10: 72-74. 53 Ruskin, Works 3: 350. 54 Hazlitt, Works 10: 19. 55 Ruskin, Works 19: 109. se Hazlitt, Works 10: 13-14. 57 "British Institution," Works 18: 14. See also

Hazlitt's opinion of Turner's Dido and Aeneas in Works 18: 19.

59Hazlitt's son published twelve volumes of his father's work from 1838 to 1851, the art criticism appearing in 1843-44; W. Carew Hazlitt's collected edition appeared from 1869-86, the volume of art criticism coming out in 1873.

69W. Carew Hazlitt, Four Generations of a Liter- ary Family, 2 vols. (London, 1897), 1: 255.

60 Ruskin, Works 35: 214-15, and editorial note. 61 Ruskin, Works 5: 427-30 and 429 n. 62 Hough, p. 90.

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hazlitt, ruskin, and nineteenth-century art criticism

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