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How Iran Regime Cheated the WorldTehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up

its Nuclear Weapons Program

National Council of Resistance of IranUS Representative Office

June 2014

HOW IRAN REGIME CHEATED THE WORLD; Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program

Copyright © National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Office, 2014.

All rights reserved. No part of this monograph may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in articles or reviews.

First published in 2014 byNational Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Office 1747 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Suite 1125, Washington, DC 20006

ISBN-13: 978-0-9904327-0-8ISBN-10: 0-9904327-0-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

National Council of Resistance of Iran - U.S. Representative Office.

HOW IRAN REGIME CHEATED THE WORLD; Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Up its Nuclear Weapons Program

1. Iran-Military policy. 2. Nuclear weapons-Iran. 3. Iran-Foreign relations. 4. Security, International. 5. Rouhani, Hassan.

First Edition: June 2014

Printed in the United States of America

_____________________________________________________These materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran-U.S. Representative Office. Additional information is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

How Iran Regime Cheated the World

Tehran’s Systematic Efforts to Cover Upits Nuclear Weapons Program


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Demanding Iran to accept the Additional Protocol, indispensable to any viable nuclear accord. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Concealing aspects of the nuclear program through the use of conventional military sites, and barring access to the IAEA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Disclosure of the sites and Tehran’s refusal to provide further information to the IAEA. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

“Transparency”: Two examples of Tehran’s attitude toward IAEA inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Regime officials confess. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The latest status of the military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. . . . . 33

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Annex I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Annex II. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Table of Contents

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How Iran Cheated the World 7

Demanding Iran to Accept the Additional Protocol, Indispensable to Any Viable Nuclear Accord

One of the most fundamental challenges that goes to the heart of the dispute regarding the Iranian regime’s ambitious nuclear weapons program is for the

international community to ascertain with confidence that Tehran will not pursue a nuclear bomb. Such an assurance can only be obtained through specific steps taken by Tehran in response to the international community’s concerns.

This white paper discusses the Iranian regime’s lack of transparency when addressing the international community’s concerns about the true nature and the ultimate purpose of its nuclear program.

The analysis relies on credible intelligence and information obtained and collected by sources affiliated with the main Iranian opposition group, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (PMOI/MEK). Specifically, it looks at the information obtained by the organization’s network that has infiltrated the ruling regime, specifically over the past 12 years.

Despite Tehran’s insistence that it has adequately responded to all outstanding concerns raised by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an impartial study of Tehran’s tangible actions and corresponding attitude suggests a different account and casts serious doubts on Tehran’s claims of transparency.

Introduction

We halted the nuclear program?We were the ones who completed it!

Hassan Rouhani on Iranian State TV, May 2013””

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Concealing Aspects of The Nuclear Program Through The Use of Conventional Military Sites, And Barring Access to The IAEA

A discernible aspect of the Iranian nuclear program consists of a substantial number of sites, workshops, and labs utilized in the nuclear program that have

actually been set up in conventional military sites.

As part of Tehran’s overall strategy, this approach offers a number of advantages, including the following:

• These sites are cordoned off (a typical and reasonable measure for military locations);

• Military personnel and officials have the freedom and the rationale to visit these sites on a regular basis;

• Rejecting IAEA access to these sites may be perceived as defensible under the pretext of national security concerns.

BackgroundThe existence and extent of Tehran’s nuclear program was publicly revealed for the first time by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) at a press conference in August 2002 in Washington, DC. The disclosures focused on two locations: a uranium enrichment site located near the town of Natanz and a heavy water reactor located in the city of Arak (both in central Iran). This high-profile revelation, triggered IAEA inquiry, and eventual inspection of the sites for the first time in February 2003. These revelations were followed by another disclosure about a facility known as Kala-Electric in February 2003. In May of that year, the NCRI also revealed in Washington, DC, the existence of the Lavizan-Shian site that functioned as the command center of Tehran’s nuclear program. The IAEA inspected the site in June 2004, but by that time

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How Iran Cheated the World

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the Iranian regime had already razed the buildings, even hauling away soil as deep as 20 meters in the area. Subsequent to these disclosures and inspections, the IAEA and major European powers (France, Britain, and Germany also referred to as the EU-3) engaged Iranian officials in 2004 and 2005. As a result, Tehran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment. Iran’s current president Hassan Rouhani was Tehran’s lead negotiator at the time.

However, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office as the new president in mid-2005, Tehran effectively rescinded the agreement during the second half of 2005. Besides resuming enrichment at Natanz and installing centrifuges, the regime stepped up constructing additional sites for its nuclear activities.

It was critical for the regime that these sites remain out of view and inaccessible to the IAEA. The sites had the following characteristics:

• They were all eventually placed under the supervision of the command center for production of nuclear weapons known as the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (known by its Farsi acronym SPND), which is headed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi (a key figure in the nuclear program and a Defense Minister Deputy who directly reports to the Defense Minister);

• The sites were constructed in tunnels that could shield them from potential air strikes;

• They were built in conventional military locations that would offer an added layer of intelligence protection to conceal their existence; and

• The regime could stonewall IAEA requests for inspection by falling back on the limitations specified in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

The NCRI has identified and disclosed several of such sites as follows:

i. FordowIn a press conference in Paris on December 20, 2005, , NCRI’s Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Mohammad Mohaddessin made public the regime’s strategy for the construction of tunnels for its nuclear activities. He revealed for the first time the existence of Fordow facility as an underground complex under construction near the city of Qom.

Subsequently, on December 25, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama, French

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President Nicolas Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown acknowledged the existence of Fordow on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

On October 1, 2009, after Fordow had been built and was about to become operational, the NCRI disclosed further details during a press conference. Among other things, it revealed that:

The construction and progress of Fordow in Qom was directly supervised by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. A number of experts directly involved in executing the project were tied to the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (known as Mojdeh at the time), which was under the command of Fakhrizadeh. Additional information on a number of figures working directly with Fakhrizadeh during the construction of Fordow is provided in Annex 1.

In order to conceal its location in Qom, this site was built inside an IRGC military base. As such, requests for access or disclosure of the site’s activities, not to mention IAEA requests for inspection, could be stonewalled under the pretext of the military nature of the location. The site’s name (Fordow) was borrowed from the name of a village situated near Qom. By choosing “Fordow” to identify the site, the regime essentially sought to shield it so that in the event that information about it was revealed, intelligence agencies would focus on

Fordow Site; Imagery source: Digital Globe


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Fordow village, almost 80 km away, where they would find nothing of interest.

The Fordow site is situated 30 kilometers north of the city of Qom, south of a seasonal lake called Hoz-e Soltan and to the east of the Tehran-Qom Highway. Two deserted villages of Aminabad and Sadrabad are roughly 10 km from this site. The Fordow village, however, is on the other side of the city 50 km south of Qom; it has no geographical links to the nuclear site.

Once the existence of Fordow was disclosed, Tehran initially claimed that it had already reported the site to the IAEA. But the IAEA wrote in Article 30 of the annex to its November 2011 report: “In addition, although now declared and currently under safeguards, a number of facilities dedicated to uranium enrichment (the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom) were covertly built by Iran and only declared once the Agency was made aware of their existence by sources other than Iran. This, taken together with the past efforts by Iran to conceal activities involving nuclear material, creates more concern about the possible existence of undeclared nuclear facilities and material in Iran.”

ii. Javadinia-2 Site (Codenamed 311)In a Washington, DC press conference on September 9, 2010, the NCRI revealed another hitherto clandestine nuclear site, located in tunnels in

Above and opposite page:Javadinia-2 Site (Codenamed 311)Imagery source: Digital Globe/SPC

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Behjatabad in the Abyek Township of Qazvin Province. This covert nuclear site was codenamed “311” and known as Javadinia 2. It was being constructed at the time by the Defense Ministry in a top-secret operation. Located in the Javadinia Military Base, the site’s construction began at the same time as that of Fordow in early 2005. This site was also placed under the supervision of SPND headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

The day after its disclosure, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), attempted to deny the reports, saying: “There are numerous centers for providing radiation to the agriculture industry to be used in sterilization processes throughout Iran.”1

In fact, however, equipped with the experience of dealing with the IAEA after the Natanz revelations, Salehi was using the “radiation” argument so that if the IAEA demanded inspections, the regime would be in a better position to offer alternative justifications.

iii. Site 012 at military industries in Haft-e Tir of EsfahanThe “012” site is located in a military zone, which is related to the Haft-e Tir of Esfahan military industries. The NCRI disclosed this site in November 2013 at a press conference in Paris by NCRI’s Peace Committee Chair Mehdi Abrishamchi.This nuclear site is positioned inside a vast military zone and has been built in a tunnel inside a mountain.

The construction of this site, like Fordow and Javadinia, began in 2005.


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The 012 Site is located near the Esfahan-Shiraz Highway and is 10 km from the town of Mobarakeh. This site is surrounded by mountains on three sides and is to the south of the military region of Haft-e Tir and is only accessible through the Haft-e Tir Esfahan industrial complex.

These three sites have the following common attributes:

a. Their construction began in 2005 when Ahmadinejad annulled the agreement to suspend uranium enrichment;

b. All built inside mountains;c. All located in fortified military zones, not subject to the NPT;d. All run by the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research

(SPND), headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh; ande. Tunnels and other associated facilities all built by companies affiliated

with the Defense Ministry.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Haft-e Tir Site

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This satellite image taken on July 13, 2006 shows the Heavy Water Production Plant, made operational in August 2006, and the progress of a heavy water nuclear reactor on the top left. The facility in Arak could provide a parallel means for Iran to produce fissile material for a nuclear bomb, as it would be capable of producing enough plutonium for at least two

bombs a year.

Arak Heavy Water Site


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Disclosure of The Sites And Tehran’s Refusal to Provide Further Information to The IAEA

A cursory review of the developments around the disclosure of the regime’s nuclear sites, especially those whose existence and activities have been proven

to the international community, clearly shows that the regime did not voluntarily report any of these sites to the international community’s nuclear watchdog.

A partial list of over 100 disclosures of sites, projects and identities of experts related to the nuclear weapons program over the past three decades, especially in the past 12 years, is enclosed in Annex 2.

Some of the most important sites, which the regime attempted to conceal from the IAEA, are mentioned below. It is worth noting that even after the disclosure of these sites, Tehran worked diligently to refuse access to them and in some cases spent an exorbitant amount of energy to either destroy or to fundamentally alter these facilities.

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Uranium Enrichment in Natanz, August 12, 2006 IKONOS satellite image by GeoEye


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Natanz and Arak nuclear sitesThese two complexes are among the largest and most prominent investments made by Tehran in its nuclear program. As mentioned, their existence was revealed by the NCRI on August 14, 2002 in Washington, DC. The revelation was a devastating blow to Tehran’s plans and ultimately led to inspection by IAEA inspectors who verified their existence.

The Kala-Electric CompanyA site tied to this company in Ab-Ali was in fact a center for assembling and testing centrifuges. During subsequent IAEA inspection, traces of highly enriched uranium were discovered in the area. Officially, the company was registered as a watch manufacturing business.

The Lashkarabad site and its front companyThis site was revealed by the NCRI in June 2003 and was inspected by the IAEA in October 2003. Initially, the IAEA inspectors were deliberately taken to a different location evidently as a deceptive maneuver by Tehran. Ultimately, the regime had no choice but to acknowledge that the site was used for enrichment through laser technology.

Lavizan-ShianIn May 2003, the NCRI disclosed the Lavizan-Shian site in a Washington, DC press conference. The site was in fact the command center for the planning of weaponization aspects of the nuclear program in Iran. Worried about possible inspections by the IAEA and the disclosure of its principal nuclear weapons center, the regime moved out its personnel and equipment immediately after the site’s existence was disclosed, and in 2004, only after its soil had been removed to a depth of 20 meters, it agreed to grant access to the IAEA.

Fordow covert enrichment siteDisclosed by the NCRI in December 2005, Fordow was ultimately acknowledged as a nuclear site in September 2009 by the leaders of the U.S., Britain and France. The regime was eventually compelled to declare the site’s existence to the IAEA.

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Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research (SPND)SPND is the command center for research on manufacturing a nuclear bomb, and is headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. This facility was exposed by the NCRI in July 2011. Its existence is acknowledged in the special annex to the IAEA report of November 2011.

When it comes to all of these sites, and dozens of other disclosures made with respect to the various aspects of the regime’s nuclear program, Tehran has failed to inform the IAEA voluntarily or in a transparent manner. In all these cases, access to IAEA inspectors has only been granted after the NCRI or other sources revealed their existence and subsequent to the IAEA and international pressure and threat of sanctions. The granting of access, however, was marred by unjustifiable delays. The regime wanted sufficient time to remove all incriminating evidence before it allowed in the inspectors.

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“Transparency”: Two Examples of Tehran’s Attitude Toward IAEA Inspections

i. Tehran’s claims about nuclear contamination at a “technical university”

One example of how the Iranian regime deliberately misled the IAEA was during the IAEA inspection of Imam Hossein University (IHU) in 2007.

The Imam Hossein University is affiliated with the IRGC. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the so-called “father” of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, along with Fereydoun Abbassi, one of the founders of the regime’s nuclear program who also headed the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) for some time, were among the professors teaching at Imam Hossein University and had been conducting nuclear research there for many years.

When the regime accompanied IAEA inspectors during a visit to the Imam Hossein University to show them the equipment used to produce a vacuum, it introduced it as a technical university in order to cover up its links with the IRGC, which would have alarmed the IAEA.

Article 35 of the February 2006 IAEA report reads: “As indicated by the DDG-SG

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Satellite imagery of imam HoSSein UniverSity in teHran wHere nUclear reSearcH and development iS pUrSUed by irgc

SoUrce: google eartH


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in his February 2006 statement to the Board, in January 2006, the Agency presented to Iran a list of high vacuum equipment purchased by the PHRC, and asked to see the equipment in situ, and to be permitted to take environmental samples from it. Some of the equipment on the Agency’s list was presented to the Agency at a technical university, and environmental samples were taken from it, the results of which are still pending. The Agency subsequently wrote to Iran requesting additional clarifications regarding the procurement efforts of the PHRC and the relationship between the PHRC and the technical university. During the Agency’s visit in mid-February 2006, Iran declined to discuss this matter further.”

According to information obtained and made public by the NCRI, the inspection of the non-existent “technical university” referenced in the clause above is in fact that of the IRGC Imam Hossein University.

The “Physics Research Centre” (PHRC) is in fact associated with the IRGC’s Lavizan-Shian site that operated under the supervision of the Ministry of Defense. This site was disclosed in 2003 by the NCRI and was subsequently razed by the regime. (It should also be mentioned that the above two names appear in multiple IAEA reports).

Khamenei at Imam Hossein University

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A credible report obtained by the NCRI and disclosed here for the first time reveals that:The IAEA inspectors were taken to the IRGC Imam Hossein University in January 2006. Mr. Rouhi, responsible for the university’s international relations, accompanied the IAEA inspectors. IRGC Brigadier General Fazaeli was the chair of the university at the time. Mr. Soleymani and Dr. Amin, two university officials, were tasked with coordinating the IAEA visit.

In order to mislead IAEA inspectors, the Faculty of Science at the Imam Hossein University was introduced to the IAEA inspectors as the technical university and it appears under this title in the IAEA’s reports. This is while the university’s Faculty of Science has a large section allocated to nuclear physics and is a military department managed by the regime’s military hierarchy.

After taking environmental samples from the equipment of Imam Hossein University, traces of highly enriched uranium were detected by IAEA inspectors. The IAEA’s August 2007 report reads in part:

“12. As indicated previously to the Board of Governors (GOV/2007/8, paras 16–17; GOV/2006/53, para. 24), analysis of environmental samples taken in January 2006 from equipment purchased by a former Head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and located at a technical university in Tehran showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium. The Agency has requested clarifications, permission to take samples from other equipment and materials procured by the PHRC and access to another former Head of the PHRC (GOV/2006/53, para. 25). These requests have not yet been acceded to by Iran.”

Later, the regime attributed the traces of the enriched uranium to a test conducted in a workshop of the AEOI located in Vanak Square in Tehran.The person identified as the former head of PHRC to whom the IAEA requested access is none other than Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. To this day, the Iranian regime has refused to allow interviews with Fakhrizadeh.It is amply clear that IAEA inspectors encountered traces of highly enriched uranium at the IRGC Imam Hossein University, but this discovery was swept under the carpet in reports produced by the regime. The file was ultimately closed in the context of modalities of the agreement reached between then-IAEA director Mohammed El Baradei and Ali Larijani, Tehran’s former chief nuclear negotiator and current Parliament Speaker.


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ii. NCRI’s disclosure of Lashkarabad site and Tehran’s attempts to deceive the IAEA

Similar to its centrifuge assembly and enrichment technology, Tehran first attempted to conceal its research program and advancement of laser isotopes from the IAEA. The laser program in Lashkarabad laser laboratory, located 40 km west of Tehran, was first disclosed by the NCRI in May 2003, in Washington, DC.

Subsequently, the IAEA requested to inspect the Lashkarabad site. Iran first denied having any laser enrichment program at this location. Then, before granting permission to IAEA to visit the site in August 2003, it moved the laser enrichment equipment from this site to the nuclear research center in Karaj for agricultural and medical purposes.

In August 2003, during the IAEA inspection of Lashkarabad, Iranian officials told inspectors that the laboratory worked on combining lasers and laser spectrum analysis. They reiterated that there were no nuclear materials involved in the laser tests and experiences.

Finally, in October 2003, Iran acknowledged that in breach of safeguards agreements it has used a small amount of nuclear material and has attempted to advance a laser enrichment program in Lashkarabad.2

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lavizan-SHian Site, iran—aUgUSt 11, 2003 image: digitalglobe/iSiS

lavizan-SHian, iran—marcH 22, 2004image: digitalglobe/iSiS

lavizan-SHian, iran, october 2013image: google eartH

Satellite images of Iran’s Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center in northern Tehran. The top image was taken three months after the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed that the regime allegedly conducted secret biological weapons work at the complex. Following that revelation, the regime razed the buildings to the ground and the ground was scraped, as seen in the second image before the IAEA was allowed to inspect the site in June 2004. The regime then began planting grass and trees over the area. This activity appears to support the theory that Iran sought to remove all traces of nuclear material that it had been

utilizing in its secret nuclear program at the site.

Lavi

zan-

Shia

n Site


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Regime Officials Confess

The most senior officials of the regime have repeatedly claimed that all information concerning their nuclear program has been provided to the IAEA

and that the nuclear file should at last be closed. On the other hand, the very same authorities have admitted to and even boasted of their efforts to deceive the IAEA or hide certain aspects of their nuclear project.

i. Disclosure of the violation of regime obligations to the EU-3 and the IAEA

In order to implement its agreements with the three European powers (France, UK, Germany), Iran provided a 1075-page report in November 2003 as a full explanation of its nuclear activities in past years to the IAEA (including some of the heretofore covert activities). But in this report, specific cases that would point to the regime’s attempts to obtain nuclear weapons or related technologies were left unexplained.

These cases were subsequently disclosed to the Agency and it became clear to the IAEA and the EU-3 once again that the regime had simply lied to them, while breaching its obligations and commitments since the very beginning.

For example, on December 20, 2003, Libya issued an official statement declaring its intentions to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and all equipment and materials that could lead to nuclear weapons. As a result of this development, a number of the regime’s lies and deceptive activities were disclosed. In February 2012, the Research Center of Iranian Majlis (Parliament) published an internal report entitled “With the Ninth Parliament’s Members – Working process of the nuclear activities and Parliament’s role in their development.”

With respect to the Libyan decision to renounce its nuclear activities and revelations made regarding the Iranian regime’s deception, the report said:

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“With Libya’s move toward capitulation, this country alleged secret ties of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s network to the Islamic Republic of Iran and Libya .... Libya’s nuclear technology supply network in its statement to the IAEA’s inspectors claimed Iran was smuggling P1 and P2 centrifuges.”3

ii. Hassan Rouhani’s remarks:In his memoirs entitled, “National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy,” published in 2011, the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani wrote (p. 236): “Taher (the alias of the person whom the regime identified to the IAEA as smuggler and seller of P1) was arrested in Malaysia and confessed that in the 1990s, he had provided P2 blueprints to Iran in Dubai for three million dollars. The AEOI did not confirm the story initially and when pressed by the IAEA stated that P2 blueprints and drawings were delivered to Iran with P1 centrifuges without the request of the AEOI and no additional money was given for P2 blueprints. The IAEA officials said that it was impossible that Iran could have purchased P1 centrifuges and that the sellers had given Iran P2 blueprints and diagrams for free. Finally AEOI acknowledged that in 1995, it had acted to purchase those blueprints.”

The secrecy of the AEOI in this regard and subsequent contradictory reports on this issue were identified as a serious breach of the regime’s obligations to the EU-3.

The results of the IAEA sampling from Kala Electric indicated that traces of 36% enriched uranium were found and that it was the result of waste reprocessing of a reactor, which indicated that the regime was concealing important elements about this case.

Rouhani’s memoirs, (p. 213): “One of the things that caused trouble for us was the traces of 36 percent enriched uranium found in one of the rooms of Kala Electric. In the following months, issues regarding higher enrichment levels of uranium (e.g. 80%) were resolved, but this case remained unresolved. They (IAEA) maintained that the contamination type indicated that it was related to the waste of a reactor and given its characteristics, it probably belonged to one of the former Soviet Union countries.”

He adds (p. 235): “The issue of contamination and particularly the traces of 36 percent enriched uranium, which was different from other types of contamination, had created another dilemma. According to the IAEA, this type

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of contamination was caused through waste reprocessing. Therefore, the IAEA added the allegation of the Iran’s relationship with the former Soviet Union to the file… They said that Pakistan can be a source for the other contamination, but the traces of 36 percent enriched uranium were the result of reprocessing that related to one of the former Soviet Union countries. El-Baradei told me that our experts think the AEOI may have imported enriched uranium from one of the former Soviet Union countries.”

The regime converted some UF4 into metallic uranium but told the IAEA that this amount had gone missing. When the IAEA investigated, it turned out that the regime had misled the IAEA.

According to Hassan Rouhani’s memoirs (p. 231): “During the transformation negotiation (UCF), the issue of missing some UF4 and its conversion to metallic uranium, was a topic of discussion for the Agency. Despite the previous denial by the AEOI, in its October 2003 statement it accepted and included it on the list the activities of the 1990s. The Agency was sensitive about metallic uranium because it could be also used for the shell of the bomb.”

Another example of Tehran’s deception related to plutonium. In pages 231 and 232 of his memoirs, Rouhani wrote: “The next issue was plutonium. The IAEA said Iran had reprocessed nearly 7 kg of UO2 using hot cell and subsequently it had also performed plutonium separation.

After the October’s statement, IAEA conducted some inspections and pointed to the contradictions between Iran’s statements and its own findings that in a way questioned the statement. ... Another issue that became controversial was polonium that was not declared in the statement.”

The claim that UF6 had leaked from related cylinders discredited the AEOI and ultimately the AEOI was forced to declare that this amount of materials had been used and injected into centrifuges. Later, in sampling of Kala Electric and in the inspection of materials, it became clear that the injection had indeed taken place.1

Rouhani, the Supreme National Security Council Secretary and chief nuclear negotiator at the time, addressed the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council in 2005: “Most of the activities that we had not reported to the IAEA had already been reported to the IAEA by other countries that had worked with us and that were involved in those activities, such as China. We had certain projects with


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China in the past that, according to the regulations, we had to report to the IAEA and had not done so. The Chinese, on the other hand, told us that they had reported all of those activities to the IAEA. In addition, we had purchased some equipment from the Russians...”

In the same speech, Rouhani said: “We had not accepted suspension in the areas where we had technical problems. We only agreed to suspend activities in those areas where we did not have technical problems... We completed the Esfahan project, which is the UCF where yellowcake was converted into UF4 and UF6 during the period of suspension.”

He added: “The issue of lasers was also an important topic concerning equipment that we had purchased from Russia and China and had not reported to the IAEA.”

When asked by a member of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council “Do you mean that we lied about” P2 diagrams, Hassan Rouhani said: “... In some cases we may not have disclosed information in a timely manner.”

Elsewhere, he also went on the record to say: “One of the members indicated here that all this should have been done in secret. This was the intention; these activities were never intended to be carried out in the open. But at any rate, spies exposed it. We did not want to declare all this... We had concealed some aspects and thought no one was aware of them. But the things we had hidden were unfortunately published in masters and PhD dissertations and in research papers.”

In a television interview on May 27, 2013, Rouhani said: “Do you know when UCF was opened? It is good to read history. We had Tehran negotiations in September 2003. The first stage of UCF was opened in March 2004 and the next stage opened in the fall of 2004 and was completed in March 2005. Heavy

iSfaHan UraniUm converSion facilitySoUrce: digital globe

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water was also produced in the summer of 2004. Yellowcake was produced in the winter of 2004 and the number of centrifuges reached 3000 in the winter of 2004… We completed nuclear technology… Completion in a way that we created the opportunity that Esfahan UCF was completed, and UF4 and UF6 were produced.”

iii. Fereydoon Abbasi’s remarks: In an interview with Iranian daily Mashreq on March 18, 2013, Fereydoon Abbasi, former head of the AEOI and a key figure in the nuclear program

over the past 20 years, said: “When we wanted to move the main reservoir tank of Arak reactor, we had hidden it so they could not know which workshop it was. Because they could threaten to sabotage the workshop … We hid this reservoir for a few years so that the company could perform its

work. Of course, they went after it persistently. Even when we wanted to move the tanker, we had information that they may strike it with Stinger missiles ... As long as sanctions against us exist, we will not inform where we import the equipment from or what their specifications and intended uses are.”

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fereydoUn abbaSi


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June 2014


The Latest Status of The Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program

Considering that the amount and types of nuclear fuel are critical for building a nuclear bomb, a specific organization was created by Tehran to undertake the

task of weaponization.

This organization that represents the most secret aspect of the Iranian nuclear weapons program is in fact the heart and the headquarters of the manufacturing of a nuclear bomb.

The organization has undergone many changes over the years, specifically its structure, name and location. It has nevertheless preserved its organizational integrity and has even undergone an expansion in recent years.

The regime has never declared the existence of this organization directly to the IAEA. The Agency became aware of its existence, functions, activities, and even its experts and key personnel, through various information channels.

The key person associated with this organization is Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. The regime had intended to keep the identity of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh completely secret. But his identity was revealed in November 2003 at a press conference in Paris by the National Council of Resistance of Iran. Until recently no picture of Fakhrizadeh had been publicly available. Below is one of his pictures:

About Mohsen FakhrizadehMohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi heads the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (SPND).

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He was previously the head of the “Institute of Applied Physics,” (IAP) which was based at the Lavizan-Shian site. Later, he was appointed as the head of the organization tasked with designing and researching the manufacture of the atomic bomb and is now the head of the “Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research” (SPND).

Biographical InformationFather’s name: HassanDate of Birth: 1958City of Birth: QomMarital status: Married with three childrenEducation: Ph.D. in Nuclear EngineeringAlias in regime: Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi uses the pseudonym, Dr. Hassan Mohseni in letters and administrative correspondence.

Professional background:Mohsen Fakhrizadeh joined the IRGC when it was created shortly after the 1979 revolution. He later began work at the IRGC’s Research Center.

In 1992, he became a faculty member of the Physics Department of Imam Hossein University, which is affiliated with the IRGC, a position he has held since . He teaches at the university once a week.

Working with the Ministry of Defense in the field of nuclear research

Fakhrizadeh started his work with the Ministry of Defense in nuclear research prior to 1992 and is one of the senior experts of the Ministry of Defense in the nuclear field. He currently continues to have oversight responsibilities for the regime’s nuclear activities at the Ministry of Defense.

Current position and statusAs an IRGC Brigadier General, Fakhrizadeh is in charge of the ‘SPND’ organization and as a deputy defense minister, he reports directly to the Defense Minister.

June 2014


UN sanctions list - IAEA’s longstanding request to interview Fakhrizadeh

Fakhrizadeh’s name was included in the UN sanctions list in UN Security Council resolution 1747, adopted on March 24, 2007. He was identified as a member of the Ministry of Defense and Logistics involved in the nuclear program.

According to the UN resolution, “The IAEA has asked to interview him about the activities of the PHRC over the period he was head but Iran has refused.” In fact, Tehran continues to strongly refuse to heed the IAEA’s demands.

Latest information on SPNDPerhaps one of the most important indicators that would show Tehran’s serious intentions in stopping its nuclear weapons program would be to reveal its bomb-manufacturing entity known as SPND, and to provide IAEA access to the experts, centers, archives and documents related to this organ. In order to prove its good faith, the least Tehran can do is to dismantle this organization or at least significantly and verifiably curb its activities.

However, the latest information obtained by the NCRI about SPND and its activities tells a completely different story.

Based on information obtained from its sources in Iran’s Ministry of Defense, the IRGC and the Malek Ashtar University (an IRGC-affiliated university), the NCRI revealed in October 2013 that in order to deceive the international community, in late 2013, Tehran had planned and began to implement a project to relocate SPND to a new top-secret location.

original location of Spnd in mojdeH ave; Since September 2013, teHran HaS been gradUally moving Spnd to a new location.



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Spnd’S new location SoUrce: google eartH

According to this information, various aspects of the regime’s weapons manufacturing project were quickly expanded in 2012 and 2013. The NCRI has been able to identify about 100 experts and scientists who are involved in this project.

SPND was consolidated in February 2011 in order to expedite the acquisition of nuclear weapons.,. It became an independent organization in the Ministry of Defense and was placed under the supervision of Fakhrizadeh. It is worth noting that the Minister of Defense, his second-in-command and his deputy are all IRGC officers.

Relocation of SPNDUntil early September 2013, SPND was located at:

Tehran- Lavizan- Mojdeh Avenue- across Koye Nobonyad associated to SPND.

However, since September 2013, the process of moving it secretly to the following address was initiated:

Tehran- Pasdaran Ave- Nobonyad Square- Hossein Langari Avenue (Aghdassieh)- Lak Avenue opposite of the Chamran Hospital. The Chamran Hospital is associated with the Defense Ministry.

June 2014


Spnd’S new location iS 1.5 kilometerS aerial diStance, and 3 kilometerS by road from tHe old location


The new site has the following characteristics:• It is located in a secure area, under full surveillance.• It is located in between several centers and offices affiliated to the Defense

Ministry, including the Defense Ministry itself, Alghadir Industries that is part of Defense iIndustries (Farsi acronym SASAD), the Union of IRGC, the sports organization of the Defense Ministry, two residential quarters affiliated to the Defense Ministry, and Chamran Hospital.

SPND’s new location was classified as top-secret, and the regime is making every effort to keep both the relocation and the new site completely out of view.

Reason for the relocation, measures to prevent its revelation or responding to possible IAEA inspectionsSPND’s last location was exposed by the NCRI. Concerned about the obligation to concede these locations and provide access to the IAEA to ascertain the nature of its nuclear activities, the regime once again relocated this site.

In order to deceive the international community and mislead inspectors, all organs related to nuclear engineering will be transferred to the new location and to this day many have already relocated.


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However, in order to prevent any relocation plans from being revealed, a number of the sections whose work and investigations were of dual nature, and/or whose activities were conducted under the Malek Ashtar University umbrella, would keep their offices in their previous location and would not be relocated. In order to fully occupy the previous site and to portray a sense of normalcy, parts of Malek Ashtar University’s logistical activities were transferred to the former site of SPND. The objective was to avoid closing the center, and in the event of inspections, to claim that the site has always had the current formation and reports stating otherwise are bogus.

A brief background on SPND and its functionSPND began operating as the Physics Research Center (PHRC) and subsequently changed its name to AMAD. The venue and the site of this organ were located at Lavizan-Shian in Tehran.

Its existence was revealed in May 2003 by the NCRI. Anxious about possible IAEA inspections, Tehran quickly decided to relocate this site and dispersed it to various locations, thus initiating a major change. Ultimately when in 2004 the IAEA inspectors got access to Shian, they faced strange scenery where even the soil was removed in order to prevent anything from being discovered by the IAEA. The head of the Physics Research Center was Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. The person in charge of the Iranian nuclear dossier at the time was Hassan Rouhani.

Subsequent to several reorganizations, the regime consolidated the various parts and named it SPND in February 2011. The Iranian regime acknowledged the existence of SPND in July 2011, after the NCRI revelation, and the IAEA confirmed it in November of that year.

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June 2014


OrganizatiOnal chart Of the Organ in charge Of manufacturing nuclear bOmb Sazman-e PazhouheSh-haye novin-e Defa’ei (SPnD)

exPertiSe: laSer

area Of wOrk: laSer

reSearch

exPertiSe:electrOnicS

area Of reSearch:manufacturing

interiOr PartS Of

the warheaD

exPertiSe: metallurgy

area Of reSearch:PrODuctiOn Of the bODy

Of the warheaD, miSSile

anD Other metallurgical

PartS

exPertiSe: chemical material

area Of reSearch: tO

PrePare miSSile fuel anD

Other chemical material

exPertiSe:mechanicS

area Of wOrk: ShaPing

warheaD anD bODy

exPertiSe: high

exPlOSiveS material

area Of wOrk: DetOnatOrS

fOr nuclear weaPOnS

exPertiSe: nuclear

PhySicS

area Of reSearch:wOrk On enricheD

uranium

reSearch center fOr laSer anD PhOtOnic

ghOlamali maSSah

center fOr PrePareDneSS anD aDvanceD mODern technOlOgy,

PSeuDOnym: fakahr mOqaDam

mOhSen fOrOughzaDeh mOghaDam

center fOr reSearch anD DeSign Of new aerOSPace

technOlOgy

aref bali laShak

center fOr reSearch anD technOlOgy fOr aDvanceD

material-metallurgy

SeyeD mehDi abbaSi

center fOr reSearch anD technOlOgy fOr aDvanceD

material-chemiStry grOuP, PSeuDOnym: karimi grOuP

akbar mOtalebizaDeh

center fOr reSearch fOr exPlOSiOn anD imPact,

PSeuDOnym, metfaz

JavaD al-yaSSin

center fOr inDuStrial PrODuctiOn anD reSearch

ali mehDiPOur Omrani

DefenSe miniSter

irgc brigaDier general hOSSein Dehghan

DirectOr Of OrganizatiOn Of DefenSive innOvatiOn anD

reSearch (SPnD) irgc brigaDier general mOhSen

fakhrizaDeh mahabaDi

DePuty DefenSe miniSter

irgc brigaDier general amir hatami


June 2014

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Satellite imagery of Kala Electric, in Tehran—A primary centrifuge research and development, and manufacturing site—disguised as a watch making factory until disclosed by the NCRI on February 20, 2003. The facility was located at Km 2.5 Ab-Ali Highway, “next to Chemi Daroo Company.” Before that, Iran had fed nuclear material into centrifuge machines at this test facility. This satellite image taken in January, 2005 shows the centrifuge research and development facility next to a building with the words “Chemi Daroo” written in Farsi on the roof, which confirms the location as described by

the NCRI.

Kala Electric Site

June 2014


Conclusion

Need for unfettered and unconditional IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear program (going beyond the Additional

Protocol)

The information provided in this white paper, represents only a portion of the regime’s attempts to conceal its nuclear program and to proceed with its attempts

to acquire nuclear weapons. Providing misleading information and resorting to what can only be described as deceptive tactics appear to be the regime’s modus operandi over the past decade in dealing with the international community. Every time Tehran has claimed that it has fully provided all the relevant information to the IAEA, a new revelation has disproved its claims. The regime has continually surprised the world with progress in its undeclared aspects of the nuclear program; progress that has been discovered by other parties, not made public by the regime itself.

With such a track record, trusting the Iranian regime regarding its nuclear program would be a major mistake.

If Tehran’s counterparts in the negotiations are genuinely interested in preventing it from obtaining nuclear weapons, they must insist on the implementation of a series of measures that should be included in a potential comprehensive agreement. They are as follows:

i- The Iranian Parliament must ratify the Additional Protocol; the Supreme Leader must endorse it and it must be immediately implemented. This implementation should include:

• Free and unhindered access to, and unannounced, snap inspections of, all sites, declared or undeclared, including nuclear sites or sites that are suspected

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to carry out nuclear activities. This would include immediate inspection of all nuclear sites and ballistic missile sites, including those that have been disclosed previously but have not been inspected. These sites include, the headquarters of SPND and Parchin, Ma’adan Sharq, Javadinia 2, and site 012 in Mobarakeh near the city of Esfahan).

• Free and unrestricted interviews and access to all nuclear experts or officials who are, or have been, directly or indirectly involved in the nuclear program.

ii- Implementation of restrictive measures including but not limited to:

• Complete closure of the Arak heavy water facility;• Full implementation of UN Security Council resolutions regarding the regime’s

nuclear program;• Stopping all enrichment-related activities; and • Stopping the entire ballistic missile program.

Interestingly, on May 11, 2014, while visiting the IRGC’s Air Force Command Center, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called on the IRGC to mass produce missiles. He said that expectations for the regime to limit its missile program were “stupid and idiotic.”

iii- Provisions for tough punishments and specific sanctions in the event of breaches or violations by the regime or revelations of any concealment or delay in declaring information to the IAEAThe experience over the past decade has made it abundantly clear that the only way to force Tehran to comply is through adopting a firm stance. Tehran is more likely to comply if there is meaningful and concrete punishment for its violations.

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June 2014


Endnotes

1 Asr Iran, state-run newspaper, September 10, 2009.2 IAEA report of November 10, 2003 writes in this regard:

C.3.2. Laser enrichmentAs reported in paragraph 41 of GOV/2003/63, Iran allowed the IAEA in August 2003 to visit a laboratory in Lashkarabad that Iran had announced previously it was related to laser fusion research and laser spectroscopy, but its purpose has changed, and became research and production of copper vapor laser. In a letter of August 19, 2003 to the Agency, Iran stated it had a major program of research and production of laser, but currently does not have a laser isotope separation program.40. During the inspectors visit to Iran between October 27 to November 1, 2003, Iran provided additional information about Lashkarabad and acknowledged that a pilot plant for laser enrichment has been created there in 2000. The project to build facilities included several contracts that not only included providing the information that was mentioned in the letter of October 21 of Iran, but also included ordering more equipment. Iran also stated that experiences of Laser uranium enrichment between October 2002 and January 2003, using natural uranium metal that were not declared before and were imported from one of the suppliers, were performed. According to Iranian officials, all equipment were disabled in May 2003 and moved to Karaj for storage together with the uranium metal. Equipment and materials were shown to the inspectors on October 28, 2003.

3 Internal report by the Research Center of Iranian Majlis (Parliament) “With the Ninth Parliament’s Members – Working process of the nuclear activities and Parliament’s role in its development,” February 2012, page 12. 4 Rouhani’s memoirs, p. 238.


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Annex IIdentities and backgrounds of two key officials involved in Fordow site under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh

Morteza Behzad: He is an engineer, and a veteran IRGC member. He is an expert in centrifuge production and testing. He is on loan from the Ministry of Defense to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and is the liaison of the Defense Industries Organization with the AEOI. Communications regarding the Defense Ministry’s secret nuclear activities, including ordering the manufacturing of sensitive parts and centrifuges were made through him to the AEOI. From 2007 he was transferred to the Fordow site to test and launch the centrifuges. In March 2008, his name was included in the UN Security Council resolution 1803 for being “involved in making centrifuge components.”

Hossein Zilouie: A SPND (formerly known as Mojdeh) expert currently working in Fordow under Parviz Kattani, one of the managers of the Mojdeh site. He studied solid-state physics in Science & Industries University and is an expert in measuring radioactive rays.

June 2014


Annex IISince 1991 the Iranian resistance has exposed some 100 secret

nuclear projects of the Iranian regime.

Some of the more notable nuclear revelations include:

1. Revealing the regime’s preliminary nuclear facilities in Mo’alm Kalaye (1991);2. Revealing the attempt to purchase nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan (1992);3. Continuous revelation of hiring Chinese, Russian and N. Korean experts and the

regime’s teams travelling to these countries over the years on dozens of occasions;4. Revealing the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz, being the largest and most

expansive of the regime’s investment on its nuclear weapons program. The site was exposed on August 14, 2002 in Washington, DC, and disrupted Tehran’s nuclear calculations and led IAEA inspections that confirmed the revelation;

5. Revealing the heavy water project in Arak (August 14, 2002) in a press conference in Washington, DC;

6. Revealing the most important companies involved in producing and importing equipment and necessary material for nuclear projects (February 2003 and August-September 2013), including Kala Electric in Aab-Ali that was registered as a watch-making factory. However, this was actually a center for centrifuge assembly and testing, and in an IAEA inspection, traces of highly enriched uranium was found at this site;

7. Revealing the Lavizan-Shian Center (May 2003). This was a very sensitive nuclear site for the regime and the mullahs immediately destroyed it and even removed the soil;

8. Revealing the Lashkarabad site and its front company (May 2003). This site was inspected by the IAEA (October 2003), and the regime deceived the inspectors by taking them to another location;.

9. Revealing in November 2003, the special role of the IRGC in the nuclear projects clearly showed the military goals and aspects of this project;

10. In April 2004, the NCRI revealed that Tehran had dedicated 400 nuclear experts to military industries;

11. Exposing the new Center for Readiness and New Defense Technology (Lavizan 2) in April 2004. The equipment from razed Lavizan site was moved to this site, but the site was kept off limits;


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12. In September 2004, NCRI revealed the allotment of $16bn to nuclear technology, purchase and smuggling of Deuterium from Russia, as well as details on the AEOI’s companies;

13. Revealing the Hemmat Missile Industries site in relation to producing nuclear-chemical warheads (December 2004);

14. Revealing a project in February 2005 aimed at producing plutonium-210 and beryllium to build nuclear bomb fuses;

15. Revealing the secret nuclear center in the Parchin tunnel (March 2005). This site focused on laser enrichment;

16. Revealing the production and importing graphite necessary for nuclear bomb production (May 2005);

17. Revealing the import and production of Maraging steel to build the bomb fuselage and using it in centrifuge systems (July 2005);

18. Revealing the production of 4,000 ready-to-install centrifuges (August 2005);19. Revealing in a press conference in Washington, DC, in August 2005, the meeting

between Abdul Qadeer Khan, and commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in 1986 and 1987 in Tehran;

20. Revealing in Brussels the regime’s plans to smuggle tritium from South Korea to increase nuclear explosion power (September 2005);

21. Revealing, in a Washington, DC, press conference, the regime’s tunnel construction in its military centers to keep secret the material and equipment (September 2005);

22. In a Washington, DC, press conference in November 2005, NCRI revealed that Iran was building nuclear capable missiles in underground secret tunnels;

23. Revealing the construction of an underground site near Qom (Fordow) in December 2005;

24. Revealing importing of industrial press machines to shape enriched uranium in a bomb (January 2006);

25. Revealing the production of P2 centrifuges (August 2006);26. Revealing in Washington, DC, the reactivation of laser enrichment projects

(September 2006);27. Revealing the specifications of 7 nuclear front companies related to the nuclear

fuel cycle (February 2007);

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28. Revealing a secret tunnel being constructed by the Ministry of Defense south of the Natanz site (September 2007);

29. Revealing the location of nuclear warhead construction in Khojeir and the nuclear weapon command center in Mojdeh (February 2008);

30. Revealing Beheshti University as a nuclear research center related to commanding weapons production in Mojdeh (March 2008);

31. Revealing Center of Explosion and Impact Technology (METFAZ) and changes in the nuclear command center (September 2009);

32. Revealing further details about the Fordow site (October 2009); .33. On September 9, 2010, the NCRI made the revelation in Washington, D.C., about

a covert nuclear site located in tunnels in Behjatabad in the Abyek Township of Qazvin Province. This covert nuclear site was codenamed “311” and is known as Javadinia 2;

34. On April 7, 2011, the NCRI revealed in Washington, DC, the covert site located 10 km into the Karaj-Qazvin highway, near Tehran, named TABA which was involved in production of centrifuge parts for tens of thousands of centrifuges. Tehran conceded the existence of this site the next day;

35. Revealing in Washington, DC, in July 2011, the Defensive Innovation and Research Organization (SPND) nuclear bomb command center chaired by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh;

36. Revealing 100 names of nuclear engineering experts active in various bomb making sections (January 2012);

37. Revealing in Washington, DC, further details of SPND operations, its involvement in the Fordow site, and the list of experts associated with this center (April 2012);

38. Revealing the top-secret Maadan Sharq nuclear site in Tehran’s Damavand district. (July 2013);

39. Revealing the relocation of Defensive Innovation and Research Organization (SPND) nuclear bomb command center (October 2013); and

40. Revealing the “012” secret site in Isfahan’s Mobarakeh linked to SPND (November 2013).

About NCRI-US

The National Council of Resistance of Iran-US representative office (NCRI-US) is registered as a non-profit entity in Washington, DC. The NCRI acts as the parliament-

in-exile with some 500 members (half of them women), including representatives of ethnic and religious minorities such as the Kurds, Baluchis, Armenians, Jews and Zoroastrians. Founded in 1981 in Tehran, NCRI aims to establish a democratic and non-nuclear republic in Iran, based on the separation of religion and state.Maryam Rajavi is the President-elect of the NCRI for the transitional period. Her mandate is to oversee the peaceful transfer of power to the people following the regime’s overthrow.In a 2006 meeting at the Council of Europe, Mrs. Rajavi introduced her Ten-Point Plan on the movement’s vision for the future Iran; a summary follows:1. Ballot box is the only criterion for legitimacy; a republic based on universal suffrage.2. A pluralist system, freedom of parties and assembly. We respect all individual freedoms. We underscore complete freedom of expression and of the media and unconditional access by all to the Internet.3. Abolition of death penalty.4. Separation of Religion and State; Abolition of discrimination against the followers of any religion and denomination.5. Complete gender equality in political, social and economic arenas; equal participation of women in political leadership. Any form of discrimination against women will be abolished; the right to freely choose their clothing, free in marriage, divorce, education and employment.6. Rule of law and justice; a modern judicial system based on the principles of presumption of innocence, the right to defense, effective judicial protection and the right to be tried in a public court; total independence of judges. The mullahs’ Sharia law will be abolished.7. Commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and international covenant and conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture, and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.8. Recognition of private property, private investment and the market economy. All the Iranian people must enjoy equal opportunity in employment and in business ventures.9. Foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence, international and regional peace and cooperation, and respect for the UN Charter.10. A non-nuclear Iran, free of weapons of mass destruction.


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