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GV280Politics in Action

Revision lecture

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1. & 2. Definitions and models

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The exercise of power by parties, individuals

and groups, at the time when they are

collectively in control of the state, over matters

which are directly connected with the governing

of the state.

Public policy – working definition

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Democratic model of public policy

Party A policies

ELECTION Party A WinsParty A policy

=public policy

Party B policies

PARTY POLICY ELECTION PUBLIC POLICY

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Pluralist model of public policy

Pre-electionparty policy

Think tanks

Public opinion

Interest groups

Lobbyists

Post electiongovernment policy Public policy

Civil servants

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• 1. The electorate

• 2. Politicians

• 3. Unelected officials

• 4. Elites

• 5. Interest groups

• 6. Big corporations

• 7. Think tanks

POSSIBLE ACTORS IN THE POLICY PROCESS

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Pluralism& Rational choice

• Pluralist model: multiple actors are involved in bargaining over and setting public policy

• Rational choice model: actors seek to maximize the benefits they receive

• Not mutually exclusive

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3. Essence of decision

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Explaining policy makingIn searching for an explanation, one typically puts himself in the place of the nation, or national government, confronting a problem of foreign affairs, and tries to figure out why he might have chosen the action in question. … [We assume] government behaviour can be most satisfactorily understood by analogy with the purposive acts of individuals. In many cases this is a fruitful assumption. Treating national governments as if they were centrally coordinated, purposive individuals provides a useful shorthand for understanding problems of policy. But this simplification – like all simplifications – obscures as well as reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of bureaucracy: the ‘maker’ of government policy is not one calculating decisionmaker but is rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors. (Allison, p. 3)

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Model 1: The Rational Actor

• Possible rational explanations for Khrushchev’s actions

• i. Bargaining chip in negotiations over US missiles

• ii. Diversion/trap• iii. Defence of Cuba• iv. Cold War Politics• v. Missile power - a shortcut in the arms race

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Model 2: Organizational Process

A government consists of a conglomerate of semi-feudal, loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. … Governments perceive problems through organizational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organizations process information; governments act as these organizations enact routines. Governmental behaviour can therefore be understood … less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour. (Allison, p. 67)

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• 1.THE CUBAN PROBLEM

• 2. THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM

• 3. THE BERLIN PROBLEM

• 4. THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM

Model 3: Bureaucratic Politics

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4. The players: politicians, civil servants and interest groups

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Pluralist model of public policy

Pre-electionparty policy

Think tanks

Public opinion

Interest groups

Lobbyists

Post electiongovernment policy Public policy

Civil servants

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Pluralist model of public policy

Interest groups

Post electiongovernment policy Public policy

Civil servants

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Traditional model of executive power

Prime minister (directs overall policy)

Cabinet (directs individual departmental policy)

Civil service (implements policy)

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The Core Executive(Taken from Peter Dorey, Policy Making in Britain, Figure 3.1, p. 50)

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Interest groups and policy networks

Based on resource exchange Dependencies between actors Degree of dependence of each actor can

vary with circumstances

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Policy communities & issue networksD. Marsh and R A W Rhodes, ‘Policy networks in British politics’, in Marsh and Rhodes (eds), Policy Networks in

British Government (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992

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5. Policy and ideology

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6. Policy and public opinion

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Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol

3 November 1774

“Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”

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Thermostatic model of opinion-policy relationship IV:Government policy on issue X overlaid on public opinion at t1

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Thermostatic model of opinion-policy relationship V:Government policy on issue X overlaid on public opinion at t2

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Thermostatic model of opinion-policy relationship VI:Government policy on issue X overlaid on public opinion at t3

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Thermostatic model of opinion-policy relationship VII:Optimal government policy with normal distribution of public

opinion

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Thermostatic model of opinion-policy relationship IX:Government policy realigned to reflect new distribution of

public opinion

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7. The media and the agenda

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John Kingdon,Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies

PROBLEMS

POLICIES

POLITICS

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Example: 1945 implementation of the Welfare State

PROBLEM: the poverty of the 30s depression

POLICY: Beveridge’s welfare state proposals

POLITICS: Labour’s landslide victory in the 1945 general election

Policy window

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8. Policy and finance

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Treasury objectives

Provide funds for all government activities Limit expenditure to acceptable limits

Maintain control over departmental budgets Input into departments’ policy decisions

Keep expenditure within the bounds of the possible

Avoid excessive taxation (but also maintain necessary levels of taxation)

Maintain funding balance between departments

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Departmental objectives

Fulfil service commitments Achieve targets set by minister/cabinet/PM Show it is vigorously pursuing policies

More spending = more effectiveness Maintain (or increase) funding levels as far as

possible Compete with other departments

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Common interests

Maintain government’s reputation for competence Deliver effective services

Maintain government’s reputation for financial responsibility Keep costs within reasonable bounds Keep taxes as low as possible

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Causes of tension

Departments believe Treasury sees everything in terms of money

Treasury believes departments don’t understand financial constraints

Departments believe other departments are over-funded

Overspending and underspending

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9. Policy and ethics

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John Stuart Mill’s harm principle

“The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control. … The principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.” - J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays ed. John Gray (Oxford: OUP, 1991), pp. 13-14

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10. The international dimension

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11. Policy and party competition

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Duverger’s law

The simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system

Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (London: Methuen, 1954), p. 217

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Series1

Left-right policy spectrum

LEFTe.g.RedistributionState intervention

RIGHTe.g.

Private property rightsLimited government

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Series1

Normal distributionof public policy preferences

LEFT RIGHT

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Series1

Position of the median voter

LEFT median voter RIGHT

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Series1

Positions of main political parties(notional)

LEFT median voter RIGHT

Lab LibDem Con

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Series1

Positions of main political parties(1980s)

LEFT median voter RIGHT

Lab LibDem Con

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Series1

Positions of main political parties(1997-2000s)

LEFT median voter RIGHT

LibDem Lab Con

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Series1

Positions of main political parties(now?)

LEFT median voter RIGHT

Lab LibDem Con

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11. Inside the think tank

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• Long history – Fabians blazed the trail• ‘Traditional’ vs ‘advocacy’• Fill gap left by ideology …• … but were themselves influential in establishing ideologies• Helped Thatcherism to get established …• … and helped create New Labour• Evidence of direct impact on policy is thin …• … but they often set the tone for party policy …• … and ex-think tank personnel roam the corridors of power

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12 Westminster and Whitehall: the legislature and the executive

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• Executive – initiates legislation• Legislature – scrutinizes legislation (and the actions of

ministers)– Legislative debate– Parliamentary questions– Select Committees

• Civil service-ministerial relations: who is top?– Haldane report (1918) established relationship of

interdependency and cooperation between civil servants and ministers

– But this has eroded recently (more ideological/on message ministers, more special advisers)

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13. Implementing public policy

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The policy process (I)

Agenda setting/problem identification

Policy formulation/approval (e.g.

legislation)Implementation

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The policy process (II)

Agenda setting/problem identification

Policy formulation/approval (e.g.

legislation)

Implementation