guilt, shame, and adjustment in three cultures
TRANSCRIPT
Person. individ. Difl Vol. 8, NO. 3, pp. 357-364. 1987 Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0191-8869/87 $3.00 + 0.00 Copyright 0 1987 Pergamon Journals Ltd
GUILT, SHAME, AND ADJUSTMENT IN THREE CULTURES
RONALD C. JOHNSON,’ GEORGE P. DANKO,’ YAU-HUANG HUANG,’
JONG YOUNG PARK,’ STEVEN B. JOHNSON~ and CRAIG T. NAGOSHI~
‘Behavioral Biology Laboratory and Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822, U.S.A.,
*Department of Educational Psychology, Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, Computer Center, Hankuk University, Seoul, Republic of Korea,
4National Mandarin Center, Taiwan Normal University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China and ‘Institute for Behavior Genetics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, U.S.A.
(Received 13 June 1986)
Summary-While guilt and shame may form a second-order factor of ‘sensitivity of conscience’, they form relatively distinct first-order factors. A study of male and female subjects from the United States (Hawaii), the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) revealed a high degree of consistency across national groups in whether individual test items describing socially disapproved conduct loaded on guilt vs shame factors and also in the relative seriousness with which each of these lapses in conduct were viewed. In general, guilt was unrelated to neuroticism and negatively related to psychoticism while shame was positively related to neuroticism and negatively related to psychoticism. Cross-cultural similarities are substantial and call to question the belief that Asian and Occidental societies (at least the better educated segments of such groups) differ in the degree to which guilt vs shame are used as mechanisms for social control.
A dominant theme of abnormal and of clinical psychology is one which states that persons who are psychologically troubled are persons who tend to inhibit their emotive behaviors; in particular, those which others might regard as antisocial behaviors. Campbell, speaking to this point in his American Psychological Association presidential address, said “it certainly is my impression, after 40 years of reading psychology, that psychologists almost invariably side with self-gratification over traditional restraint” (Campbell, 1975, p. 1120). Mowrer (1961, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1972) took the position that this dominant view of psychologists was totally in error. He argued (1) that well-adjusted persons who are not criminal, psychotic, nor neurotic feel the most guilt over violations of social norms, (2) that neurotics are less well socialized and feel less guilt, and (3) that criminals and psychopaths are least well socialized and feel the least guilt. From this position it would follow that therapeutic efforts aimed at reducing the guilt felt by neurotic or psychologically troubled individuals would have the effect of making them more similar to psychopaths, not to ostensibly normal persons.
Mowrer, perhaps because of his own Calvinistic background (Mowrer, 1966), centered his discussion on guilt; from his point of view, normal persons were persons who felt considerable guilt following the commission of wrongful acts. In most of his writings he did not consider the possibility that persons varying in adjustment might vary more in resistance to temptation than in guilt following yielding, even though some of the empirical data he cited might be interpreted in this way. For example, Peterson (1967) compared 670 high school students with conduct problems (acting out, psychopathic behaviors), personality problems (neurotic behaviors), and with neither type of problem on scores on the socialization scale of Gough’s California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1960). He found conduct problems to be lowest in socialization scores, personality problems to be intermediate, and students with neither type of problem to be the most highly socialized. Whether being well socialized is associated with a lesser likelihood to commit antisocial acts, to feel more guilt after the commission of such acts, or both, cannot be ascertained from the Peterson data, even though Mowrer (1967) interpreted the data as supportive of his views regarding guilt.
Johnson, Ackerman, Frank, and Fionda (1968) compared individuals on their resistance to temptation and their guilt following yielding, as measured by their completions of projective stories. They found that when subjects, who varied in adjustment or in mental health, responded to
P.A ID 8,&E 351
358 RONALD C. JOHNKIN et al.
projective story stimuli involving moral dilemmas, they did not differ in the amount of guilt shown in their responses, but differed in amount of resistance to temptation; those who were more mentally healthy showed greater resistance. These results appear to be unsupportive of the majority view in psychology and, for that matter, are not greatly supportive of Mowrer, with his emphasis on the necessity for feeling guilt if one is to be well adjusted. The results raised a major question for the first author: If neurotics and more normal persons do not vary in guilt, why do clinicians almost universally believe that neurotics are excessively guilt-ridden? It seemed possible that the data might be wrong. The stimuli used by Johnson et al. were projective stories; resistance to temptation and guilt following yielding were measured from respondents’ story completions. Projective measures are time-consuming; Johnson et al. used only eight stories, yet participants often took nearly a full hour to complete these stories. This indicated a commendable degree of involvement on the part of respondents; nonetheless, there was a clear limitation on the number of socially disapproved behaviors that could be included as story themes. When one has only a few measures, one does not fritter away one of these on, say, a projective story with a theme having to do with cheating while playing a pinball machine (then common).
Each of eight stories used by Johnson et al. had to do with a major moral dilemma. Therefore, while the results of the Johnson et al. study indicated that persons varying in adjustment did not vary in projectively measured guilt regarding major violations, they did not bear on differences in reaction to other domains of norm violation or socially prohibited behavior. It seemed necessary to obtain data having to do with wider domains of behavior.
Johnson and Noel (1970) began to collect items that included trivial as well as major behaviors, that were both private (not observed by or known by others) and public (known to others), and that encompassed both violations of laws, customs, and mores, and violations of interpersonal confidence and trust. These were obtained by having undergraduates provide lists of behaviors that would make them feel guilt or shame, plus using or adapting some of the items developed by or used by Crissman (1942), Rettig and Pasamanick (1959, 1960, 1961) Ewe11 (1954), and Mosher (1966). Johnson and Noel’s final Dimensions of Conscience Questionnaire (DCQ) scale consisted of 121 items of socially disapproved or socially gauche behaviors ranging from trivial (e.g. spilling food at a buffet dinner) to major (e.g. committing murder) lapses in conduct. Kido and Miyasaki (1972) worked on this scale, rewording some of the statements and discarding six of the items.
The DCQ has been used by Winn (1973), Souza (1977) and Nagoshi (1980). Each item was rated by subjects in terms of how badly the subject would feel after committing the described act, with ratings varying from 1 (not at all bad) to 7 (as bad as I possibly could feel). Neuroticism was measured by the Eysenck Personality Inventory (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1968). All of these reports are of the responses of male and female subjects from a variety of racial/ethnic groups residing in Hawaii. The three sets of researches show comparable results. The reliability of the DCQ was very high. The relative degree of seriousness attributed to moral or social lapses was highly similar across sexes and racial/ethnic groups (r = f0.90). Factor analysis of DCQ items yielded more than two factors, but the first two were (by far) the most important ones. They consisted of items evoking (1) shame; embarrassment (basically, making a public fool of oneself), and (2) guilt; violations of interpersonal confidence and trust. Across sexes and ethnic groups, DCQ factor scores showed a highly significant, positive correlation of shame with neuroticism and essentially a zero-order correlation of guilt with neuroticism. A number of examples of these two kinds of items will be presented below. For now, here are several samples of each: Shame-Your home is very messy and you get unexpected guests; Spilling food at buffet dinner; Guilt-Allowing someone else to be blamed for something that you have done; Failing to help someone you know is in trouble when you could have been of help.
Clinicians generally have felt neurotics to be excessively guilt-ridden; they usually hear their clients express negative self-regard in reference to behaviors that are trivial in magnitude of violation of the social contract. Major violations-those that form the core of morality-probably are far less frequent in occurrence. This may be why Johnson et al. (1968) found no differences in guilt between persons varying in adjustment-all their measures had to do with major moral issues, not common and trivial, socially gauche behaviors. Thus, neurotics may be typified as easily shamed (embarrassed) but not guilt-ridden. The recent report of Edelmann and McCusker (1986) included data showing that ease of embarrassment is positively correlated with neuroticism.
Guilt, shame, and adjustment in three cultures 359
So far, this review of the literature has addressed the association of resistance to temptation and of reactions (guilt/shame) to lapses in behavior. The data lead to a number of cross-cultural psychological questions that will be discussed below. A major finding of the data reported above is that shame and guilt differ from each other, and also in their associations with adjustment; an unanswered question has to do with the degree to which this is true across cultures (especially across cultures believed to differ in their relative emphasis on guilt vs shame as mechanisms for social control).
When introduced into the literature, the distinction between shame and guilt centered on the belief that shame results from the existence of a real or imagined audience (or observers) of one’s misdeed, while guilt generally is defined as a feeling of negative self-regard associated with the real or imagined commission of an act, without any need for an audience. A more adequate distinction between shame and guilt was made by Lebra (1971) who argues that shame is evoked by status incongruity while guilt is evoked by failure to fulfil norms of role reciprocity. Lebra’s definition of shame would encompass Piers’ and Singer’s (1953) belief that shame is evoked by incompetence. It seems clear that Lebra’s distinction of shame and guilt is congruent with the first and second factors of the DCQ described above: (1) shame/embarrassment and (2) betrayal of interpersonal confidence or trust. It has often been claimed, beginning with Mead (1943) and later with Benedict (1946), that Asian groups are more concerned with shame (embarrassment, ‘losing face’, etc.) than persons of the American/Western culture. It seems reasonably well established that persons who feel more or less badly over socially maladroit behavior vary in adjustment, while the amount of negative self-regard having to do with less obvious moral issues concerning violations of interpersonal confidence and trust (role reciprocity; guilt) is not substantially associated with adjustment. From this one might expect a higher level of neuroticism among Asians than among persons from American/Western culture, particularly if one accepts the Mead/Benedict position.
The first cross-cultural question to be investigated is whether or not ethnic groups differ in the nature of items that evoke guilt vs shame. The second question has to do with assessing the relative seriousness of these two kinds of behavioral lapses across ethnic groups (i.e. is shameful behavior more serious to Asians than to persons growing up in the European-American cultural tradition, as would be expected from anthropological sources?). A third question concerns the association of shame/guilt with adjustment across cultures. The data presented below deal with these questions.
METHOD
Subjects. Data were obtained from college student subjects in Hawaii, Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Ns were as follows: Hawaii-males 39, females, 67; Korea-males 158, females 145; Taiwan-males 112, females 175. Both the Korean and Taiwanese subjects are racially homogeneous. The Hawaii subjects vary considerably in ethnicity, with the majority being of Japanese or of Caucasian ancestry, but since prior data (Souza, 1977; Nagoshi, 1980) show the correlations of the mean negative self-regard scores assigned to various behaviors to be in the 0.90s between sexes and ethnic groups in Hawaii and the factor structure of the DCQ to be almost identical across sexes and ethnic groups, it appeared to be appropriate to combine raciah’ethnic groups in the Hawaii sample.
Measures. The DCQ was constructed for the assessment of American subjects. Many of the behaviors that are at least conceivable to an American population almost never occur in any but highly criminal groups in Asia (e.g. items having to do with drug use). We selected 28 items from the DCQ based on these criteria: (1) they described behaviors that might occur in Korea and Taiwan, and (2) they loaded heavily on the shame (status incongruity) or guilt (violation of interpersonal confidence or trust) factors of the DCQ. We had intended to have 14 items in each group, but an undetected error on the part of the first author led to the construction of a scale that included 13 shame and 15 guilt items. These items were translated and cross-translated into Korean and Mandarin Chinese. The measure of adjustment consisted of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975) in English, Korean, and Mandarin Chinese versions.
Tab
le
I. G
uilt
a
nd
sh
am
e
sca
le
item
s
Item
Fac
tor
loa
din
gs
Me
an
‘s
erio
usn
ess
’ sc
ore
s H
aw
ail
Ko
rea
Ta
iwa
n
G
S G
S
G
S H
aw
aii
Ko
reZi
T
niw
xn
I. A
no
nym
ou
sly
info
rmin
g
au
tho
ritie
s o
n
a
frie
nd
w
ho
is
in
volv
ed
in
a
n
ille
ga
l a
ctiv
ity.
(G)
2.
Stro
ng
ly
de
fen
din
g
an
id
ea
o
r p
oin
t o
f vi
ew
in
a
d
isc
uss
ion
o
nly
to
le
arn
la
ter
tha
t it
wa
s in
co
rre
ct.
(S)
3.
Yo
ur
ho
me
is
ve
ry
me
ssy
an
d
you
g
et
un
exp
ec
ted
g
ue
sts.
(S
)
4.
Bein
g
ha
bitu
ally
c
ross
o
r d
isa
gre
ea
ble
to
m
em
be
rs
of
one
’s
ow
n
fam
ily.
(G)
5.
Ina
dve
rte
ntly
re
vea
ling
so
me
thin
g
ab
ou
t a
p
ers
on
th
at
the
p
ers
on
h
as
told
yo
u
co
nfid
en
tially
. (G
)
6.
Alw
ays
a
gre
ein
g
with
yo
ur
bo
ss
be
ca
use
yo
u
ne
ed
th
e
job
. (G
)
7.
Ha
vin
g
pe
op
le
in
a
bu
s st
are
a
t yo
u
wh
ile
a f
rien
d
of
the
o
pp
osi
te
sex
sho
ws
to”
mu
ch
a
ffec
tion
tow
ard
yo
u.
(S)
8.
Suc
ce
ssfu
lly
ste
alin
g
som
eth
ing
fr
om
a
st
ore
w
itho
ut
an
yon
e
find
ing
o
ut.
(G)
9.
Fin
din
g
tha
t yo
ur
clo
the
s h
ave
b
ec
om
e
dis
arr
an
ge
d.
exp
osi
ng
p
art
o
f yo
u
tha
t u
sua
lly
is
co
vere
d.
(S)
10.
Rea
lizin
g
you
’ve
b
ein
g
exp
loiti
ve
an
d
co
nce
rne
d
ch
iefly
w
ith
you
r o
wn
ne
ed
s in
a
lo
ve
rela
tion
ship
. (G
)
I I
Allo
win
g
som
eo
ne
els
e
to
be
b
lam
ed
fo
r so
me
thin
g
tha
t yo
u
ha
ve
do
ne
. (G
)
12.
Bein
g
un
inte
ntio
na
lly
rud
e
to
som
eo
ne
tha
t yo
u
do
n’t
kno
w,
late
r re
aliz
ing
h
ow
h
urt
th
e
pe
rso
n
wa
s.
(G)
13.
Giv
ing
a
ta
lk
on
a
to
pic
th
at
you
’re
su
pp
ose
d
to
kno
w.
an
d
ha
vin
g
pe
rso
ns
in
you
r a
ud
ien
ce
d
em
on
stra
te
tha
t yo
u
are
fa
ctu
ally
w
ron
g.
(S)
14.
Ma
kin
g
a
sce
ne
at
the
c
orn
er
of
a
bu
sy
bu
sin
ess
d
istr
ict.
(S)
15.
Rep
ea
ting
g
oss
ip
wh
ich
yo
u
kno
w
to
be
d
am
ag
ing
to
a
p
ers
on
’s
rep
uta
tion
w
hile
a
ssu
red
th
at
the
p
ers
on
is
un
aw
are
o
f yo
ur
invo
lve
me
nt.
(G)
16.
Un
witt
ing
ly
ma
kin
g
a
rem
ark
d
isp
ara
gin
g
to
a
min
orit
y g
rou
p
in
fro
nt
of
a
me
mb
er
of
tha
t g
rou
p.
(S)
17.
Un
co
nsc
iou
sly
reso
rtin
g
to
ea
ting
w
ith
you
r fin
ge
rs
at
a
rath
er
form
al
rest
au
ran
t a
s th
e
rest
o
f th
e
din
ers
sta
re.
(S)
18.
Sec
retly
m
aki
ng
h
ug
e
pro
fits
at
the
e
xpe
nse
o
f o
the
rs.
(G)
19.
Yo
u,
as
a
ma
na
ge
r,
reta
in
wo
rkin
g
co
nd
itio
ns
for
you
r w
ork
ers
kn
ow
n
to
be
d
etr
ime
nta
l to
th
eir
he
alth
. (G
)
20.
Ge
ttin
g
so
bo
red
lis
ten
ing
IO
so
me
one
ta
lk
tha
t yo
u
tell
the
p
ers
on
to
sh
ut
up
. (S
) 21
. St
um
blin
g
an
d
stu
tte
ring
in
a
n
ora
l c
lass
p
rese
nta
tion
, h
avi
ng
th
e
inst
ruc
tor
op
en
ly
use
yo
urs
a
s a
n
exa
mp
le
of
a
po
or
pre
sen
tatio
n.
(S)
22.
Faili
ng
to
h
elp
so
me
one
yo
u
kno
w
wh
o
is
in
tro
ub
le
wh
en
yo
u
co
uld
h
ave
b
ee
n
of
he
lp.
(G)
23.
Up
on
m
aki
ng
n
ew
a
cq
ua
inta
nc
es
at
a
pa
rty,
yo
u
tell
a
risq
ue
o
r d
irty
joke
a
nd
m
an
y a
re
offe
nd
ed
b
y it.
(S
)
24.
Ch
ea
ting
in
a
n
exa
m
an
d
not
ge
ttin
g
ca
ug
ht.
(G)
25.
Fin
din
g
out
o
ne’s
p
are
nts
a
re
in
fina
nc
ial
ne
ed
ju
st
afte
r o
ne
ha
s sp
en
t a
lo
t o
f m
on
ey
un
wis
ely
, se
lfish
ly
or
un
ne
ce
ssa
rily,
le
avi
ng
o
ne
in
no
p
osi
tion
to
he
lp.
(G)
26.
Suc
ce
ssfu
lly
ste
alin
g
som
eth
ing
fr
om
a
fr
ien
d
with
ou
t h
er
eve
r d
isc
ove
ring
yo
u
are
th
e
thie
f. (G
)
27.
Go
ing
to
a
p
art
y in
c
asu
al
clo
the
s a
nd
fin
din
g
tha
t e
very
one
is
d
ress
ed
u
p.
(S)
_ ̂
- ^
^ ̂
0.48
0.59
0.46
0.53
0.54
0.58
0.57
0.60
0.49
0.67
0.67
0.54
0.72
0.55
0.49
0.71
0.24
0.
10
0.25
4.
95
5.05
5.
28
0.59
0.
5 I
0.44
4.
24
3.97
5.
09
0.57
0.
60
0.61
3.
86
3.21
4.
29
0.38
0.
28
4.78
3.
54
5.14
0.
35
0.50
5.
74
5.01
5.
04
0.59
0.
43
4.25
5.
08
4.9
I
0.43
0.
26
0.36
3.
64
3.55
0.55
0.
59
5.07
4.
50
0.61
0.
49
0.59
5.
00
5.09
0.
60
0.57
5.
39
4.95
0.63
0.
59
6.00
5.
14
0.56
0.
47
5.70
4.
74
4.14
5.17
6.69
z
5.38
2
6.18
6
6.08
0
0.68
n
.59
0.50
0.
33
0.56
0.4
I
0.62
5.
37
4.72
0.56
4.
46
4.16
0.63
4.
95
5.1X
0.53
5.
44
4.37
5.44
2
5.23
z!
5.00
B
5.30
9
0.54
0.
62
0.58
4.
55
3.28
0.64
0.
69
5.10
5.
13
0.58
0.
72
6.18
5.
67
0.25
0.
35
4.85
5.
27
a 4.
03
5.92
5.79
4.07
0.57
0.
49
0.64
5.
66
5.55
5.
72
0.44
0
5x
5.93
4.
82
5.10
0.
5 I
0.39
0.
46
5.03
5.
01
5.75
0.63
0.
59
4.46
3.
91
4.51
0.56
0.
43
5.66
5.
22
6.46
0.
62
0.64
6.
15
5.78
5.
60
0.79
0.
68
0.65
4.
83
3.68
4.
98
0.71
0.
64
0.68
4.
76
4.00
4.
49
28.
Splll
mg
a
p
late
to
ll o
t to
ad
a
t a
b
utt&
d
mn
er.
(S
)
Guilt, shame, and adjustment in three cultures 361
Table 2. Reliabilities of the scales
Scale
Guilt Shame Neuroticism Psychoticism Extraversion Lie
Country __.
Hawaii Korea Taiwan
0.87 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.77 0.81 0.86 0.82 0.84 0.48 0.57 0.55 0.85 0.80 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.68
RESULTS
The DCQ scale contained items that had previously loaded on a guilt factor or else on one involving shame. The DCQ, in full, loaded on other factors, although those factors we describe as guilt and shame were the major ones. These other factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.00 involved (a) ‘sneakiness’; e.g. you’re given too much change when paying a bill and keep it, (b) ‘not meeting parental expectations’, and (c) sexual behavior (for females but not males). Some of the items in the present 2%item scale loaded above 0.40 on one or the other of these factors, as well as on guilt or shame; however, these other factors were not directly relevant to our present concerns. Therefore, the 28 items were forced to a two-factor, varimax solution. Table 1 shows: the items, and whether they loaded on guilt (G) or shame (S) in the prior analyses (Souza, 1977; Nagoshi, 1980); the present factor loadings on guilt or shame within each national group; and the mean ‘seriousness’ ratings across the three national groups. (Analyses also were done separately across sexes, and across sexes x national groups, but are not shown since the findings were highly consonant with those that are presented herein and would require a good deal of space for presentation.)
Of the 28 items, the agreement between groups on which dimension-guilt or shame-individual items loaded is: Hawaii and Korea, 23 of 28; Hawaii and Taiwan 25 of 28; Korea and Taiwan, 26 of 28. The coefficient alpha reliabilities (Cronbach, 1951) of the different scales are shown in Table 2. Congruence coefficients (Tucker, 1951) also were calculated, comparing the factor structures of the guilt and the shame scales for each of the three possible pairs of national groups. The coefficients ranged from 0.92 to 0.96.
The correlations between the degree of rated seriousness of the 28 individual items are: Hawaii vs Korea, 0.64, P c 0.001; Hawaii vs Taiwan, 0.70, P < 0.001; Korea vs Taiwan, 0.59, P < 0.001;
Table 3. Means* and standard deviations on guilt, shame, and EPQ scales
Guilt Shame Neuroticism Psychoticism Extraversion Lie Males K 0 K 0 K 0 R 0 P C7 R 0
Hawaii Korea Taiwan
5.16 0.93 4.38 0.95 IO.51 5.30 3.28 2.66 13.67 5.25 6.20 3.87 4.83 0.81 4.07 0.92 13.71 4.82 5.06 2.86 II.44 4.55 8.14 3.86 5.26 0.76 4.58 0.87 II.91 5.31 4.95 2.53 12.84 4.47 8.96 3.22
Hawaii Korea Taiwan
All subjects Hawaii Korea Taiwan
All subjects Males Females
5.47 0.79 4.96 0.92 14.12 4.8 I 2.90 I .92 12.95 4.52 6.22 3.62 5.11 0.76 4.55 0.81 14.69 4.29 4.63 2.34 II.08 4.42 8.32 3.78 5.55 0.70 5.17 0.75 13.78 4.72 3.87 2.23 II.67 4.27 9.55 3.41
5.35 0.85 4.75 0.97 12.79 5.27 3.03 2.22 13.22 4.79 6.22 3.70 4.96 0.80 4.30 0.90 14.18 4.59 4.85 2.64 II.27 4.48 8.23 3.82 5.44 0.73 4.94 0.85 13.05 5.04 4.29 2.41 12.12 4.38 9.32 3.35
5.03 0.83 4.29 0.93 12.65 5.18 4.79 2.79 12.23 4.67 8.19 3.73 5.37 0.76 4.90 0.85 14.18 4.59 3.98 2.30 II.67 4.41 8.52 3.77
*Scores were obtained using the British Scoring Key.
Scales Guilt
Table 4. F values of national and sex differences
Shame Neuroticism Psychoticism Extraversion Lie
Nation Sex
24.56” 33.36.’ 1.62** 18.68” 8.93** 29.03’. 22.18” 67.97*’ 21.78** 13.06.’ 4.56* I .36
l = p < 0.05; ** = P < 0.001
362 RONALD C. JOHNXJN cl al.
male vs female, 0.92, P < 0.001. The means and the standard deviations of subjects’ responses to the guilt, shame, and EPQ scales are shown in Table 3.
Analyses of variance were performed to assess the main effects of national group and sex, and the nation x sex interactions. The F values for nation and sex for each of the measures are shown in Table 4. There were no significant nation by sex interactions. The correlations between measures are shown in Table 5.
DISCUSSION
Table 1 shows very high agreement across cultures in whether items load chiefly on the guilt or the shame dimensions of conscience. Groups also show substantial agreement on the factor loadings and on the rated seriousness of individual items. The coefficient alpha reliabilities (Table 2) of the guilt and shame scales are quite high across all groups; EPQ reliabilities tend to be lower, but are still adequate.
All of the present subjects are college students and it is probable that the Korean and Taiwan Chinese students are more westernized than would be a broader sample of Korean or Taiwanese subjects. Within this segment of the nations tested, there is a very substantial degree of cross-cultural similarity. The relative magnitudes of the loadings of items on the guilt vs the shame factors are highly congruent across cultures, as are the mean seriousness scores assigned to individual items. Further (as discussed below), the correlations of guilt and shame with neuroticism and psychoticism generally are consistent across groups.
Table 5. Correlations between measures
Shame Neuroticism Psychoticism Extraversion Lie
Guilt Total M (309)
F (3871 Hawaii M‘(39j
F (67) Korea M(l58)
F(145) Taiwan M(lI2)
F(l75)
Shame TOIA M
F Hawaii M
F Korea M
F Tawan M
F
Neuroticism Total M
F Hawaii M
F Korea M
F Taiwan M
F
0.49” 0.45”’ 0.73”’ 0.47*** 0.39*** 0.31 l ** 0.43’11 0.46***
-0.02 -0.20” -0.03 -0 21.1’
0.34’ - 0.00 -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 -0.22”
0.05 -0.14’ 0.04 -0.21’
- 0.06 -0.17’
0.22** 0.17*** 0.3 I l 0.23* 0.28*** 0.25** 0.27* 0.18**
-0.12’ -0.07 -0.03 -0.18*** -0.12** 0.08 -0.11 -0.25 -0.12 -0.09 -0.13 -0.30** -0.05 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12 -0.17’ -0.04 -0.23** -0.10 -0.11 -0.16’ -0 lb’ 0.00
0.21*** o.l8’** 0.15 0.13 0.23” 0.18’ 0.13 0.19”
Psvchoticism T&l M
F Hawaii M
F Korea M
F Taiwan M
F
Extraversmn Total M
F Hawaii M
F Korea M
F Taiwan M
F
0.04 0.08
0.1 I* 0.18** -0.08 -0.07
0.1 I 0.25* 0.05 0.17. 0.04 0.13’
- 0.05 -0.03 0 I3 0.18”
-0.30” -0.26***
0.09 - 0.24’ -0.29*** -0.16’ -0.32”’ -0.35***
-0.33’8 -0.21*** -0.33* -0.28* -0.43”’ -0.20** -0.30*** -0.18”
0.04 -0.21” -0.08* -0.16** -0.32’ -0.20 -0.16 -0.16
0.00 -0.32*** 0.05 -0.23** 0.10 -0.19’ 0.02 -0.23**
-0.14” -0.08* -0.50”
0. I3 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02
0.1 I
l p < 0.05; **P < 0.01; l **P < 0.001.
Guilt, shame, and adjustment in three cultures 363
There are differences as well as similarities across the three national/cultural groups. As shown
in Tables 3 and 4, mean scores vary across national groups and across sexes. Koreans are lowest and Taiwanese highest on both the guilt and the shame measures (the anthropological literature would suggest that both Koreans and Taiwanese should be high in shame and low in guilt, with the reverse true for the Hawaiian subjects). Females are a good deal higher on both guilt and shame: Koreans (with the lowest scores on both guilt and shame) have the highest neuroticism and psychoticism scores; Chinese in Taiwan (with the highest guilt and shame scores) are intermediate in neuroticism and psychoticism scores; Hawaii subjects (intermediate in guilt and shame) have the lowest neuroticism and psychoticism scores. Differences between national means apparently have other bases than those having to do with the kinds of correlations shown in Table 5, since those differences found within cultures cannot be invoked to account for differences between cultures. For example, shame is related to neuroticism while guilt is not, and both shame and guilt are negatively related to psychoticism within cultures. The same is not true, across cultures, when contrasting mean scores, as was done above. It should be noted that the national means do not differ greatly, and none indicate pathology; all are within a basically normal range (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975, pp. 71-74).
The correlations in Table 5 concern the associations of guilt and shame with personal adjustment. Guilt and shame scores are substantially correlated with one another, but differ substantially in their association with adjustment. All prior research with the DCQ has been conducted with American subjects (both Hawaii and mainland samples) and has shown shame but not guilt to be associated with neuroticism. The present data differ from previous data sets in showing that a significant correlation exists between guilt and neuroticism for mule subjects from Hawaii. Nevertheless, this is the only exception, and the other data show near-zero correlations between guilt and neuroticism; thus our data certainly are more confirmatory than not of previous reports in showing guilt to be unassociated with neuroticism, once guilt and shame are distinguished from one another.
No prior research has been conducted assessing the association of psychoticism with guilt and shame as independent factors. The differences in directionality of the correlations of guilt and shame with psychoticism vs neuroticism is an additional confirmation of the independence of these factors (even though correlated with one another) and also the independence of neuroticism and psychoticism. Eysenck and Eysenck (1976) also report a high negative correlation between psychoticism and guilt-guilt measured quite differently than measured herein-for both males and females (the positive correlation for female guilt in Eysenck and Eysenck on p. 111 is reported incorrectly, per Personal Communication with H. Eysenck, 3 January 1986). Eysenck and Eysenck (1976, pp. 12Off; 1986) report a strong association of psychoticism with criminality. Therefore, it is not surprising (and would be expected both from the neo-Freudian/‘Mental Hygienist’ and the Mowrerian point of view) that persons scoring lower on both guilt and shame measures tend to score higher on the psychoticism scale.
There is a high degree of similarity between groups on whether individual items load on the guilt or the shame factors, on the degree to which they load, and on the relative seriousness of the behavioral lapses described. The pattern of correlations of guilt and of shame with neuroticism and psychoticism are closely comparable across groups. The supposedly greater emphasis of Asians on shame and of Occidentals on guilt as primary mechanisms of social control does not seem apparent in the present data set. The present research, like prior research using the DCQ, indicates that neurotics generally are not excessively guilt-ridden, but instead are easily shamed or embarrassed. They are more concerned with regard to behaviors that produce status incongruity, but not with regard to behaviors involving failure to fulfil norms of role reciprocity.
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