guerrilla warfare || the reality of guerrilla warfare

The Reality of Guerrilla WarfareAuthor(s): Davis M'gabeSource: Africa Today, Vol. 19, No. 1, Guerrilla Warfare (Winter, 1972), pp. 20-25Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185211 .

Accessed: 16/06/2014 03:09

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.36 on Mon, 16 Jun 2014 03:09:54 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=iupress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185211?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


The Reality of Guerrilla Warfare

Davis M'gabe

A number of American scholars urge that Africa must come to terms with the white leadership of Southern Africa or else be ruined by itW In history and the social sciences these academicians, pessimists like those who advocate military regimes as the best agent for modernization, theorize that guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa will never succeed. In "The Frustration of Insurgency: the Rhodesian Example in the Sixties"2 and elsewhere, J. Bowyer Bell argues that guerrilla warfare will not succeed in Africa because of (1) tribalism; (2) tactical errors and (3) superiority and cohesiveness of the white community. A close look at the facts, however, will show how such unnecessarily negative scholarship fosters defeatism instead of serving a constructive, humanity-enhancing purpose.

In the case of Zimbabwe, Bell accurately states that ZANU and ZAPU expended their energy fighting each other and in the process "alienated much of the African population." He then comes to a conclusion which is not, however, borne out by the data he has given, i.e. that among Africans this alienation "created grave doubts if the cause was in effect valid." The implication is that Africans could not differentiate between the cause and the politics of the the cause. But Bell's main point is that the fighting was tribally inspired and that tribalism "being the graveyard of Africa" could not be corrected. Let us look at the facts.

ZAPU was led by Ndebele-speaking Joshua Nkomo, but his lieutenants (James Chikerema, William Musarurwa and William Mukarati) who organized violence in Salisbury in late 1963 were Shona- speaking. The violence was against Shona-speaking Leopold Takawira, Robert Mugabe and others of ZANU. In another instance,

1. See for example William A. Hance, "The Case for and Against United States Disengagement from South Africa," in Hance (ed.), Southern Africa and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 105-160; and Edwin Munger, Afrikaner and African Nationalism: South African Parallels and Parameters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

2. Military Affairs, Vo. XXXV, No. 1, February 1971, pp. 1-5.

Davis M'gabe, a former Salisbury journalist and a contributor to the Monthly Review and Africa Report, is an instructor in political science at SICC, City University of New York.

20



Davis M'gabe

an almost exclusively Ndebele speaking youth attacked ZANU treasurer, Enos Nkala, who is himself Ndebele-speaking. This shows that the intra-party fighting was Shona and Ndebele against Shona and Ndebele and had very little to do with the colonial term, "tribalism."

Tribalism in post-colonial times, in Rhodesia at least, is something different from the anthropological term. There is some historical ethnicity and there are some linguistic (dialectical) divisions; but the essential divisions today are geo-economic, religious and educational. What part of the country does a man come from in terms of settler reorganization of the land? Does he come from the industrial hubs (and their environs) of the north and the west where the industrial culture of the European prevails? Does he come from the farming areas of the scenic east where contact with whites has been mostly through the missionary who wanted to transform the African into a black-white man? Does he come from the farming south where the missionary desired converts who were efficient "hewers of wood and drawers of water?" It is these religious, educational, economic and geographic divisions which separate the people of Rhodesia, and these divisions are essentially colonial and not the "tribalism" that foreign writers like to invoke.

There is a clan of Ndebele people in the Western region who originally came from South Africa and who are culturally associated with the Zulus of the Natal coast. Their participation in the politics of Zimbabwe became minimal after the abolition of the Ndebele monarchy at the turn of the century. Prime Minister Ian Smith and some writers seem intent upon trying to create an Ndebele myth.3 Besides the Ndebeles there are at least six Shona ethnic groups, in- cluding one Ndebele-speaking Shona community in the West called the vaKalanga (spelled with an "1" to differentiate it from a much larger group in the Southern region called the vaKaranga). These six groups vied for power on a regional basis. A look at Zimbabwe politics in terms of regional interests provides a better understanding of things. Regional interests constitute a universal phenomenon of politics. But writers often refuse to look at African politics in these terms because it would make Zimbabwean politics normal and universal, and not pathological and exotic.

I would like to suggest that a closer look at Zimbabwean politics will show that the nationalist movement started with leaders from the Northern region (Chikerema, Nyandoro and Mushonga) in control, with a figurehead president, Nkomo, and his financial secretary, Jason Moyo, both from the Western region. The formation of the

3. The Smith government's statement banning ZANU and PCC (ex ZAPU) on Auqust 26, 1964 dwelt at length on tribalism (the "Ndebele question") as the source of intra-party fighting. See also L. H. Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1963).

21



National Democratic Party (NDP) after the ban of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1959, broadened the leadership of the movement. During the period of the NDP's existence (January 1960- November 1961) the Southerners (Michael Mawema and Leopold Takawira) and Easterners (Morton Malianga and Ndabaningi Sithole) were brought into executive positions of power. Because of detention the Northern leadership was in decline during the legal life of ZAPU (January 1962-September 1962), but subsequently, after the release of Chikerema and Nyandoro from detention, there was a fight for power which led to a restoration of the original Western-Northern coalition, this time with the Western leadership (Nkomo) in full control. The Southern and Eastern leadership (Mawema, Malianga, etc.) was edged out and ultimately regrouped within ZANU. In 1970, the Western-Northern coalition fell apart leading to the creation of a Northern party, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI). This left ZAPU (as of 1971) exclusively Western. One hopes that having assessed each other's strength, however, these groups will create a viable coalition that will address itself to the national problem of liberation.

This is regional politics and has very little to do with Professor Bell's Shona "passive majority" and Ndebele "martial minority." Zimbabwe was following the tradition of Europe, and herein perhaps lies the tragedy of African politics. An analysis of Angolan, Mozam- bican and South African politics will show the same lines of cleavage in the nationalist movements, cleavages which are determined by regional interests which are themselves economic and religious as well as geographic, and cleavages dominated by urban versus rural economics. These are lines cut by colonialism in the last one hundred to three hundred years and not by the politics of pre-European Africa. Is this blaming everything on colonialism? Yes! Why not? It has been the most effective single social determinant of societies in the Third World although Western scholars have generally been reluctant to deal with it as such in African terms.

Culture and Tactics

A second factor in the failure of guerrilla movements is generally pointed out as a "tactical error" of resorting to harassment and sabotage of the settler communities instead of organizing to kill. This is correct. It was clearly the error of Zimbabwean leaders. James Chikerema writes: "The objective of this army ... was not to wage guerrilla warfare but to carry out acts of sabotage which were con- sidered relevant to bring forth fear and despondency to the settlers of Rhodesia in order to influence the British government and foreign settlers to accede to the popular revolutionary demands of the people." (ZAPU document, March 1970). Bell correctly points out that the only

22



Davis M'gabe

exception was perhaps in Angola where nationalists reacted to the Luanda massacres of February 1961 with organized war. The question that is not asked is why. Why would people who have been brutally oppressed for three hundred years have qualms about organizing to kill their oppressors? I would like to suggest that there are two reasons besides the usual answer that highly organized oppression discourages reaction.

First, for five hundred years and more before the whites came to Zimbabwe, the African people were a political entity which had certain cultural givens. One of them was a belief primarily in defensive war. A virtue in Shona culture. (if not acknowledged as such by some Western scholars) was the Shona people's ability and wisdom to build skillful and intricate fortifications and caves from which they could frustrate their enemies for years if need be. The Shona people developed this art in the perfection of the 400 to 500 stone stockades (Dzimbabwe) that give the country the name by which it is known to Africans. Shona civilization glorified not in the tactics of mass annihilation, the cannon, the bomb, dynamite, rockets, et. al. but in defense of the national empire of clans. This is indeed the wrong tactic to use against planes, bombs and dynamite. But the African has had little chance to work out an alternative since that first conquest. The missionary has taken advantage of this peaceable cultural trait to help produce a politically dysfunctional African personality in colonial Southern Africa. Colonial socialization has produced a personality that is often ineffectual in matters of national interests. One could suggest, for example, that Nkomo is still a Methodist preacher. Perhaps that is why socialist writers say that an effective freedom fighter must first be exorcised of his colonialism before he can claim leadership in a guerrilla movement.

The Myth of White Supremacy

The third reason for failure of liberation movements is tied up with what some writers have called the "togetherness" of the white bloc which denies a "protected supply" route or source of arms for the guerrillas. The truth about southern Africa is that physically there is not one country which can offer liberation movements a "protected supply" of arms. It is true that contiguous Zambia, Tanzania and Zaire (Congo) have, at grave risk to their national security, allowed guerrilla camps in their countries. But what is not usually apparent is that the supply of arms they can allow is limited, not necessarily by themselves, but by the metropolitan countries with whom they have military agreements. Even a guerrilla war must ultimately reach an offensive level when guerrillas will shell towns and shoot down planes

23



attacking them. That suggests Czech tanks and anti-aircraft guns rolling down Zambian roads, or Soviet ships unloading such weapons at Matadi. With all the goodwill of Kenneth Kaunda and Joseph Mobutu, these countries know this would not be possible. They know that if they did allow that kind of escalation their countries would get the kind of treatment that North Vietnam is get- ting, not only from South Africa but from the United Kingdom and from the United States as well. The main interest of the western intelligence community in Southern Africa is to guarantee that this war be limited by the kind of weaponry that shall be allowed to reach the Zambezi valley or the Angolan border!4 Kaunda, Mobutu, and Julius Nyerere have tried to play the game as carefully as possible without jeopardizing their national security beyond certain limits, but they are aware of the limits of the war as much as the scholars who write about it should be.

These limits are set by what Bell calls the "vast, integrated Southern Africa laager," and its "arrogant confidence." What some writers decline to add, however, is that the laager includes the sup- pliers of skills and materials; France, Britain, and the United States who supply licenses for the manufacture of tanks, helicopters, fighter bombers and missiles or who supply the actual material and skills; and West Germany who often supplies the personnel. The economist who supplies the rationale for the economic community of interests and the social scientist who supplies the analysis and basis for action form part of the laager. This is a laager of all white people who do not see the inhumanity of racism in Southern Africa.

The African people and the guerrillas on the fringe constitute the one element which is often left out of the analysis. In his article on Rhodesia, Bell comes to the conclusion, without hard data, that the African people have stopped supporting the liberation movement because of the efficient suppression and ruthlessness of the settler regimes. I have tried to show elsewhere that a rather misguided but much more experienced settler politican of Rhodesia, Roy Welensky, came to a different conclusion5 From the many court cases, he concluded that African villagers were wittingly and actively supporting guerrillas for long periods before they were trapped by informers. There is no data that I know of to prove the contrary. As for the guerrilla himself and the question of more recruitment, one can write with more confidence. As a young man in Rhodesia I never read

4. The Zambian government's 1966 expulsion of seventeen Britishers serving in the Zam- bian police because of their collusion with Smith-Vorster-U.K.-U.S. intelligence operations represented only the top of the iceberg. The Zambian treason trial of 1968 uncovered a bit more of it. Anyone who followed the course of such events realized how involved western powers were in pressuring the Zambian, Congolese and Tanzanian governments to limit their support for guerrilla movements.

5. In a forthcoming study entitled Rebuilding Dzimbabwe.

24



Davis M'gabe

much nor took much interest in guerrilla warfare in South America or Southeast Asia; but the day I read about an African called Holden Roberto leading Africans against Portuguese soldiers and settlers I was enthralled. To me he was an angel of mercy. I scarcely believed then in his reality. I lived long enough to see Roberto and work with him and even disagree with him. There are thousands of young men of similar experience. And they will search for their heroes; whether the picture is true or not is immaterial. In a world of such oppression, as in Southern Africa, there must be a ray of hope for a young man. The guerrilla line was three thousand miles away ten years ago. It is only two hundred miles away now and in some cases the guerrilla is at home. More young men will join because oppression by settler regimes escalates with each generation. Every black man in Zimbabwe, in- cluding Ian Smith's informers, supports the liberation movement. If writers assume that because people support the movement they must run into the mouth of the cannon, they are wrong. The people are waiting for a guerrilla son who can show them how and why to use the gun correctly. When such a guerrilla can live safely at home with his uncles and cousins as a unit of operation, the settlers will "scuttle" out of the farms of Zimbabwe. A wise people does not court destruction, but prepares for a day when a measure of destruction may be inevitable. The people of Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique are learning and preparing for that day. We are not particularly worried about which country will fall first. If Mozambique falls, Ian Smith knows he must pack. If Zimbabwe falls, Caetano knows he must get his people out of Angola and Mozambique and Vorster knows he is next. We are very much aware that there may be no victories - South America has taught us that. We are also aware that the second generation of guerrillas makes fewer mistakes than the first - South Vietnam and Ireland teach us that. These are the realities of guerrilla warfare. Victory or no victory, the war will go on.

Some writers forget that the guerrilla road is a one-way road. Once a young man leaves Rhodesia, under false pretenses or otherwise, there is no way back without the gun. Life under colonialism, to one who has escaped, is a prison worse than the death chamber; for freedom, consciously chosen, there is no substitute. Even those who have escaped colonialism and found refuge in professional careers in exile understand the nature of colonialism and confront it constantly in their consciousness. Their lives will remain unfulfilled until they return to a free Zimbabwe, Angola, or Mozambique.

Therefore, the guerrilla will be active until the settler dic- tatorships fall. Success will depend on the skills of the guerrilla and his ability to communicate those skills and his message to the village.

25



guerrilla warfare || the reality of guerrilla warfare

Documents