Gripe Aviar: factores clave en la bioseguridad

de la EU

Prof. JM Sánchez-Vizcaíno

Complutense University

jmvizcaino@ucm.es

AGENDA FOR TODAY

• A review of the influeza virus characteristic

• The different scenarios of I.Virus’ Infection

• Mechanisms of spread

• Distribution of HPAI Subtypes

• Biosecurity for influenza virus

• A success clinical case control

Information, Biosecurity and Early detection

The best tools for Protection

EPIDEMIOLOGY

MAMMALS

(H 1-16; N 1-9)

Antigenic Ecology of the virus

* No interhuman transmission

Type Host

Type NA Host

H1 Human,Pigs N1, N2 Human,Pigs

H2 Human N2 Human,Pigs

H3 Human, pigs N2

H4 N4

H5 Human* N5

H6 N6

H7 N7

H8 N8

H9 Human * N9

H10-16

Human * Human *

Neuraminidase (9)

ARN segmented (8 SEGMENTED)

Proteín M2 (only in Tipy A)

Family Orthomyxoviridae

Influenzavirus: A, B y C

-M1 matrix protein

-PB1, PB2 y PA. (Proteínas internas)

NS1 y NS2 non strutural protein

Hemaglutinin (16)

FLUE VIRUS STRUCTURE

type 2,3

Receptor type

2,6

Shinya K, 2006 Nature

Van Riel; 2006 Science Express

Why I’ts difficult to transmit some serotypes between humans and birds?

• Human and aviary receptors are

different.

• The anatomical distribution in humans is

different

• Receptor 2,3 more predominant

in pulmonary (deep) cells.

• Receptor 2,6 more prevalent in

upper respiratory tract cells.

Pigs are even more resistant Bronchioles

Bronchial

Alveoli

Windpipe

Genetic Reorganization

SPREAD OF H5N1 FLUE VIRUS

INTENSIVE

ACTION MEDIA

TV

Journal

• Radio

Social media

Arrived to Europe on October 2005

WHAT HAPPENS WITH FLU VIRUS

GENETIC

REORGANIZATION

MUTATIONS (RNA)

PB1

HA

NA

PB1

HA

Aseatic flue

pandemic (1957)

Hong Kong Flue pandemic(1968)

Evolution of A(H2N2) y A(H3N2) on human

Human Virus

Birds Virus Virus avium

Virus A(H2N2) Virus A(H3N2)

Flue pandemics

1889-99 (H2) Siberia, Europe, America.

1899-1917 (H3N8?)

1918-1919 (H1N1) “Spanish flue” (20-50)

1957-58 (H2N2) “Asiatic flue” (2,5 – 5)

1968-69 (H3N2) “Hong Kong flue” (1 – 2)

1977-78 (H1N1) “Russian flue”

2009. New Flue H1N1. “American flue” (Swine Flue)

ALWAYS: H1, H2, H3

Time pattern.

Neuraminidase N1. Eurasian pig

Proteins MP: M1 y M2 Eurasian pig (H3N2)

Family Orthomyxoviridae

Influenzavirus: A, B y C

-PB1: Human Flue, -PB2: Avian Flue -PA: Avian Flue

NS: Strain H3N2 USA pig

Hemaglutinine H1. USA pig

Homology of 95%

• Africa: H5N1, 1777 notifications (peaking in 2015)

• Americas: USA, Canada: H5N2, 281 notifications (peaking in 2015); Mexico, 144 notifications: H7N3 (2012-16)

• Asia:

• o H5N1, 1893 notifications (steady evolution 2012-16)

• o H5N8, 713 notifications (appears in 2014, huge peak in 2015, then down again in 2016)

• o H5N2, 638 notifications (peaking in 2015)

• o H7N9, 620 notifications (appears in 2013, peaks in 2014, then down again in 2015 and 2016)

• o H5N6, 305 notifications (appears in 2013, peaks in 2015 and 2016)

•

• Europe:

• H5N8, 1629 notifications (huge peak in 2016 and continues rising in 2017, by far the subtype with the highest number of notifications, >500)

• Many other subtypes have circulated with lower number of notifications (<15). Only H5N2, H5N1 and H5N9 reached >20 notifications in 2015

The main subtypes of HPAI vary from one continent to another:

Distribution by year and country of HPAI subtypes (except H5N8)

AI in Europe

S. Alberti

• FARMS (TURKEYS, BROILERS) & AI OUTBREAKS CONCENTRATION

AI in Italy

S. Alberti

NUMBER OF NOTIFICATION BY SPECIES

SPANISH SCENARIO

OUTDOOR : aprox - 4%

INDOOR: aprox 95%

IMPORTANCE WETLANDS. BIODIVERSITY HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE

Invernada

Reproducción

Rutas migratorias: www.oie.int Registro anillamientos: OEM, 1954- 2004. Georeferenciación: ArcGIS 9.1

RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SPAIN

Escenario atlántico

Escenario mediterraneo

•The Atlatic Scenario: • More wetland. • More numbers of wild bird. • Low temperature • More outbreak

THE MAIN RISK FOR SPAIN THE ATLATIC SCENARIO

Main wetlands in Spain where newcomers contact residents

Domestic density which can come in contact with wild birds

OUTDOOR CENSUS /kM2

0,16- 2,4

2,4 - 12,3

12,3 - 775,7

&, WETLANDS

POTENTIAL DOMESTIC WILD LIVE CONTACT

Recurvirostra avosetta

Vanellus vanellus

Anas clypeata

Calidris minuta

Charadrius alexandrinus

Aythya fuligula

Himantopus himantopus

Larus fuscus Larus ridibundus

Podiceps cristatus Podiceps nigricollis

Tachybaptus ruficollis

Tringa totanus

Anas platyrhynchos

Anas clypeata

Fulica atra

Anser anser

Anas crecca

Calidris alpina

Phalacrocorax carbo

Netta rufina

Aythya ferina

Limosa limosa

Phoenicopterus ruber

Anas strepera

Anas acuta

Anas penelope

Numenius arquata

Larus cachinnans

30 species Probability of exposure to the virus:

Pluvialis squatarola

Subtipo Medio Tº Actividad Supervivenci

a

(Días)

H3N6 Lago 0 Conserva

infectividad

30

H3N6 Lago 22 “ 4

H5N2 Heces 4 “ 35

H5N2 Heces 25 “ 2

H7N2 Heces 4 “ 23

Scientific Report 7 EFSA

En Patogénesis in wild birds

y en Environmental stability

of Asian lineage H5N1HPVirus

TEMPERATURE AND VIRUS INACTIVATION

y = 36,902e-0,0989x

R2 = 0,961

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0 10 20 30

Días del H5N1

Ajuste teorico

Exponencial (Díasdel H5N1)

ASIAT SCENARIO

EUROPEAN SCENARIO

AFRICAN SCENARIO

BIOSECURITY AND SCENARIOS

BIOSECURITY AND A. FLUE

BIOSECURITY DEFICIENCY

Biosecurity and Early detection The best tools for

Protection

DIFUSIÓN ENTRE GRANJAS

SPREAD BETWEEN FARMS

3 Km

10 Km

RISKS FACTORS RELATED WITH FARMS

• Location of the Farm • Farms Multiage • Change of Males • Incubator Material • Removal of dead animals

Others risk related with location

Proximity to: other poultry farms. other animal farms. roads where there is bird traffic. water reservoirs or streams that

attract migratory birds

BIOSECURITY MEASURES

In commercial farms, control measures against wild animals and migratory birds need to be strengthened:

Fence of the farm

Aviary fabrics

Closed doors

Avoiding water around farms

Prevent birds nesting in the farm environment

Control people movements, trailers

Cleaning and disinfection of equipment and installations

Hygienic individual protection: boots, mono ...

Disposal of hygienic bodies

• Install wire mesh

• Avoid free access to water and feed

OTHER BIOSECURITY MEASURES

First case in Spain in domestic animals

2009 First case in a farm in Europe

H7N7 Europe 2003: Nederlands, Italy

• At that time of 2009 only was detected an outbreak in wild bird in Germany: H5N1

Background

A H7N7 CASE. Early detection Good Control

POULTRY FARM

AGRICULTURAL LAND

WETLAND

Porrón común Aythya ferina

Focha común Fulica atra

•Both species have been affected by H5N1 AP in Europe •The common hawk is so susceptible which is considered sentinel species

The Anatidae of the Almoguera Wetland

y = 36,902e-0,0989x

R2 = 0,961

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0 10 20 30

Días del H5N1

Ajuste teorico

Exponencial (Díasdel H5N1)

16ºC

Almoguera

Farms around

Almoguera

Affected farm Sucursal de la Granja afectada

Other two eggs farms affected in town

Piscifactory Almoguera Wetland

CULLED ANIMALS

y = 36,902e-0,0989x

R2 = 0,961

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0 10 20 30

Días del H5N1

Ajuste teorico

Exponencial (Díasdel H5N1)

16ºC

Affected farm

Asociate farm affected

Two more affected in town

Piscifactoria Almoguera wetland

8Km

THE NO SPREAD

Acknowledgements

FLUE

UCM -

CISA

TEAM

MUCHAS GRACIAS AMIGOS

THANKS A LOT MY FRIENDS

jmvizcaino@ucm.es www.sanidadanimal.info