Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000

SandiaNationalLaboratoriesGridModernizationProgramArea

CharlesHanleyDecember,2016

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Sandia’sGridModernizationVision

Aworldofinterdependent andvariabledistributedsystemsthatareoptimized atmultiple scales– including transmission– tomaximizelocalresourcesinprovidingsecure,resilient,andcleanenergytoallusersatalltimes.

Ourcapabilitiessupport thisvision:- DERandrenewableenergyintegration- Powerelectronicsandcontrols- Secureandscalablemicrogrids- Advancedgridanalytics/complexsystems- Infrastructureinterdependencies- Cyberandphysicalsecurity- Embeddedsensors, information

processing,andsecuremanufacturing- Energystoragesystems

Picturecourtesyof:SmartGrid2030

Sandia’sGridModernizationProgramStructure

GridModernizationandMilitary

EnergySystems(CharlesHanley)

EnergyStorageandPowerElectronics(Babu

Chalamala)

DistributedSystemsandRenewableIntegration

(AbrahamEllis)

TransmissionOperations,Planning, andControls (RossGuttromson)

Civilian Cyber(Silpan Patel)

DefenseEnergy(AlanNanco)

Sandia’sEnergyStorageResearchCrosscutsSeveralTechnologyAreas

WiderangingR&Dcoveringenergystoragetechnologieswithapplicationsinthegrid,transportation,andstationarystorage

ImprovingGridResilienceinPlanningandOperations

• Sandiadevelopedaframeworkforrigorousquantificationofenergysystemresilience

• Thisframeworkenablesdecisionmakingtoobtaindemonstrableresilienceimprovements

• PJMPartnership:AppliedtoGMDasathreatweconsider

– MultiplescenariosforworstcaseGMDintensityanduncertaintyintheorientationoftheGMD

– Formulateanoptimizationproblemwhereminimizingconsequencesofoneormultipletypes istheobjective

– Thisresultsinanon-linearprogram(operations)oramixed-integernon-linearprogram(planning)

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Prob

abili

ty o

f Con

sequ

ence

s [$

] Giv

en T

hrea

t X

Consequences [$]

Reduced Expected Financial Consequence

Reduced Risk

Baseline System Resilience

Resilience of System after Improvements Improvements

must cost significantly less

than E-E’

E’(C) E(C)

DEROptimalControl

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3 kW PV Inverter

20 kW Battery

Plug In Electric Vehicle

Single Customer

200 W Micro-

inverter

Market Engine

Communication System (Advanced Grid Function Dispatch and

Monitoring)

Forecasting(Solar, Wind,

Load)Real-Time Optimization

Virtual Power Plant

Payment for services

MarketsTransmission Energy Market via ISO/RTO/

TSO Balancing Authority

Geographical Information

Distribution Energy Market

200 W Micro-

inverter

200 W Micro-

inverter

200 W Micro-

inverter

200 W Micro-

inverter

200 W Micro-

inverter

200 W Micro-

inverter

200 W Micro-

inverter = 200Micro-inverters

IEC 61850-90-7 over SEP 2.0, OpenADR, via TCP/IP, Wi-Fi, Zigbee

115 kV 12.47 kV 120/240 V

Transmission System

20 kW Battery

Gateway Gateway

Security Engine

bids commitments

commitments expected power/load for multiple time horizons

DER status, information on additional DER connections

3 MW Wind

Turbine

1 MW Diesel Genset

Medium Voltage Distribution System Low Voltage Distribution System

advanced DER commands

Removal of DER from VPP due to cyber compromise, natural disasters, communication failures, etc.

IEC 61850-90-7 IEC 61850-90-7Communication Losses/Failures

Web-based Meteorological

Information

Backend High Performance Computing

Single CustomerSingle Customer

Wireless

Database of recent threats/

vulnerabilities

• Thisiswherewearegoing…

Keyquestion:Howdoweensurereliability,securityandoptimality?

• Sandiaworkingonsolutions…VirtualPowerPlant

• DispatchResources• OfAnyKind• ForAnyPurpose

AnalysisofHighPen.DER(PV)onDistributionCircuits• AssessimpactsandmitigationofDERon

distributionsystems,mainlyPVandstorage• Developadvancedanalysistechniques,simulation

tools,solarvariabilitydata• DGscreeningandinterconnectionprocedures

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Interconnectionscreening&Interconnectionprocedures

AdvancedInverterR&DaddressingsystemreliabilityissuesandincreasingREpenetration

RELIABILITY:Ø VandFsupport (autonomous andclosed-loop)Ø Tolerancetogriddisturbances(V/FTR)Ø Advancedprotection (e.g.,fasttriptoaddressTrOV)Ø SCADAintegrationandinteroperabilityØ CSI4projecttodeterminedefaultandoptimalAIsettingsRENEWABLEINTEGRATION:

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Volt/Var Function

Partners:CPUC

SandiaDevelopingSecure,ResilientMicrogrids

• Sandia’smicrogridresearchspansadvancedconceptsthroughapplications:– Controlsandoptimization theory– Resiliencetheory– Cybersecurity– MissionAssurance

• SmartPowerInfrastructureDemonstrationforEnergyReliabilityandSecurity(SPIDERS)

• HobokenandNJTransit• Remotesites:Alaska,Caribbean,

ForwardOperatingBases• AdditionalDODandinternational

microgridwork.

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Designleadon3SPIDERSmicrogridsforDOD

InthewakeofHurricaneSandy, ledthedesignofresilientmicrogridsforNJTransitandCityofHoboken

AdvancedMicrogridConceptualandOperationalDesigns

Military Conceptual Designs/Assessments

<1 MW Microgrid Operations

Large Scale Microgrid Operations

Community Microgrid Designs

• Creech AFB – FY12 DoD• Soto Cano – FY12 DoD• West Point FY12, DoD/DOE OE• Osan AFB, FY 12, DoD• Philadelphia Navy Yard – FY11,

DOE OE/PIDC• Camp Smith – FY10, DOE FEMP• Indian Head NWC – FY09, DOE

OE/DoD• Ft. Sill – FY08, Sandia LDRD• Ft. Bliss – FY10, DOE FEMP• Ft. Carson – FY10, DOE FEMP• Ft. Devens (99th ANG) – FY09, DOE

OE/DoD• Ft. Belvoir – FY09 DOE OE/FEMP• Cannon AFB – FY11, DOE OE/DoD• Vandenberg AFB – FY11, DOE

FEMP• Kirtland AFB – FY10, DOE OE/DoD• Maxwell AFB – FY09, DoD/DOE• Bagram – FY13, DOD• Kuwait – FY15, DoD• 29 Palms – FY14, DoD/ESTCP

• Maxwell AFB – FY11 -14, DoD

• Ft. Sill – FY10, DoD• Ft. Bliss – FY12-13,

DoD/ESTCP

• SPIDERS JCTD – FY11-15, DOE/DoD/CERL

• Camp Smith• Ft. Carson• Hickam AFB

• Ft. Belvoir FY15 DoD

• Northampton, MA• NJ Transit• Hoboken, NJ• Lihue, Kauai• New Orleans, LA• Alaskan Villages

Community

Military

MicrogridDesignToolParetoOptimalityUsingGeneticAlgorithms

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Topology

Performance

EventDriven

Simulation

MonteCarlo

Analysis

Eachdotisadifferentmicrogrid layout

SandiaAdvancedMicrogridEngineering/DeploymentTraining

§ AdvancedMicrogridConceptualDesignCourse§ 250pagecoursebook followsESDMprocess

§ Background info,vugraphs,informationonadvanced microgridconceptsanddesignprocess

§ 50pageworkbook§ Exampleproblemworksheets and fullmicrogrid

designandanalysisprocessexample§ Designed in2013for stakeholders,engineers§ 2-dayor3-dayclass,taught4timestodate

§ AdvancedMicrogridModelingandAnalysisCourse§ Currentlyunderdevelopment forDOE§ Designed fortechnicalaudience§ Providemodeling tools andinstructiononusefor

advancedmicrogrid designand optimization§ Likelyaweeklongorweb–basedtrainingclass

CybersecurityandPowerSystems:SCEPTREToolSet

• AdvancedhybridmodelingandsimulationofICSforsimulated,emulated,hardware-in-the-loopintegrationofdevices,networking/communications,andphysicalsystemslikemicrogrids

– Emulation:routersoftware,Modbus/DNP3/IEC61850traffic,HMIs

– Simulation:power,gaspipelines,watersystems

– Hardware-in-the-loop:electricalrelays,RTUs,PLCs,Lab-Voltsystem

Integratedapproach• IntegratedCyber-PhysicalImpactAnalysis(ICIPIA)framework

DistributedLabsAllowUstoIntegrateRealWorldSolutions

PartnershipsareKeytoOurStrategy

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ThankYou

CharlesHanleySr.Manager,GridModernizationandMilitaryEnergySystems505-844-4435cjhanle@sandia.gov

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