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    GRAVE SECRECY

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    Please note that each shell company named in this

    report is a reerence to that particular company reg-

    istered in t he named jur isdiction only. For the avoid-

    ance o any doubt, Global Witness does not reer to or

    iner any link to other companies in other jurisdictions

    which may have the same or similar names. Any such

    similarities in the names o companies registered in

    other countries are entirely coincidental.

    This report contains some quotations rom press arti-

    cles, documents and sources that have been translat-

    ed into English rom the Russian or other languages.

    These are clearly indicated in the reerences.

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    CONTENTSExECuTiVE SummARY

    RECOmmENDATiONS FOR POLiCY CHANGE

    iNTRODuCTiON

    CHAPTER 1: ASiAuNiVERSALBANk:COOkiNG THE BOOkS?

    CHAPTER 2: THE uSE OF SHELL COmPANiESFOR SuSPiCiOuS TRANSACTiONS

    CHAPTER 3: THE kYRGYz ECONOmY:iN THE HANDS OF A FEw mEN

    CHAPTER 4: HOw AuB GAiNED ACCESSTO THE GLOBAL FiNANCiAL SYSTEm

    CONCLuSiON

    REFERENCES

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    It is so easy to set up a company with hidden ownership in

    Britain that even a dead man can do it. Global Witnesss

    new investigative report Grave Secrecy shows the poten-

    tial or companies in the UK, New Zealand and elsewhere

    to be used as cover to launder the proceeds o corruption,

    tax evasion and other crimes.

    It is based on an investigation into a Central Asian bank

    at the centre o major money laundering allegations, but

    the ndings are much broader, highlighting the shocking

    inadequacy o how some o the worlds major economies

    monitor the registration o companies.

    Kyrgyzstans largest bank, AsiaUniversalBank (AUB), was

    nationalised and ound by the authorities to be insol-

    vent ater a revolution overthrew the regime o President

    Bakiyev in April 2010. The new Kyrgyz authorities allege

    that AUB was engaged in large-scale money laundering

    and an independent audit by a multinational rm sup-

    ports these claims. However, the banks ormer manage-

    ment deny the allegations and claim that the new regime

    illegally expropriated AUB because it was a successul

    business and that their indictments by the new authori-

    ties are politically motivated.

    To get beyond these contradictory claims, Global Witness

    investigated dozens o companies that held accounts at

    AUB, many registered in the UK, and ound signicant

    indicators that suggest money laundering: hundreds o

    millions o dollars seemed to be moving through their

    accounts while they were not engaged in any real busi-

    ness activity.

    In the most egregious example, the shareholder o one

    UK company was a Russian man who had actually died

    some years beore the company was registered. His iden-

    tity had been used to hide the real owner o a company

    that appeared to have US$700 million owing throughits account at AUB while doing no business in the UK and

    ailing to le accounts with the UK corporate registry as

    required. It is scandalous t hat lax oversight and enorce-

    ment over company registration in the UK allows such

    behaviour to prosper.

    Many o the companies in this report, even i incorpo-

    rated onshore, eature shareholders and directors rom

    oshore jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands

    and the Seychelles. But these are not the companies true

    owners. They are employees o corporate service provid-

    ers who are paid, quite legally, to pimp their identity asnominee shareholders and directors, in eect hiding the

    identity o their customers: the real owners o the com-

    pany. Technically, police and tax authorities can request

    company ownership inormation, but i it is cross-border

    the legal processes are cumbersome and the investiga-

    tors have to know what they are looking or a Catch-22

    system that does nothing to prevent money laundering

    and other criminal misuse o these companies in the rst

    place.

    The corporate service providers who set up these com-

    panies and act as nominees are already required by the

    anti-money laundering laws to identiy who they are act-

    ing or and to report any suspicions to the authorities.

    But the UK, like many countries, currently does little to

    enorce this existing standard; it is time it did so.

    Global Witness believes a urther dramatic change

    is required: the identities o the real, beneicial

    owners o all companies should be publicly availa-

    ble in the country they are incorporated, and nomi-

    nee directors and shareholders should be held liable

    or their clients actions. The EU has the opportuni-

    ty to take the lead on this over the next 18 months as

    it updates its anti-money laundering laws.

    This matters because shell companies entities that are

    little more than just a name on a piece o paper are key

    to the outow o corrupt money that keeps poor countries

    poor. Those who loot state unds through corruption or

    deprive their state o revenues through tax evasion need

    more than a bank: they need to hide their identity behind

    a corporate ront. Countries such as the UK might have a

    company registry and consider themselves onshore, but

    as long as they only collect shareholder inormation, they

    are eectively permitting hidden company ownership

    which means they are as oshore as any palm-ringed

    island and will continue to acilitate corruption, tax eva-

    sion and other crimes. This needs to change.

    The report also shows how:

    The Kyrgyz economy ell into the hands o just a ew

    men, with up to US$64 million in state unds, including

    pension unds, potentially missing rom AUB. Maxim

    Bakiyev, the son o the ormer Kyrgyz president, was

    riends with AUBs chairman, and is suspected by the

    Kyrgyz authorities o being involved. Meanwhile, Maxim

    has claimed asylum in the UK, saying that is being made

    a scapegoat by the new authorities in Kyrgyzstan.

    The billions o dollars in suspicious transactions that

    apparently moved through AUB could not have beentranserred without the help o AUBs relationships

    with banks abroad called correspondent relationships.

    Though Swiss bank UBS was sufciently concerned about

    ExECuTiVE SummARY

    ExECuTiVE SummARY

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    AUB to close its correspondent account, others kept their

    doors open. The largest amounts o money rom AUB

    went through Citibank in New York, the UKs Standard

    Chartered and Austrias Raieisen Bank. Global Witness

    has asked these banks what anti-money laundering

    checks they did on AUB; Citibank didnt reply, the others

    couldnt comment due to client condentiality.

    AUBs international reputation was helped by the pres-

    ence o three ormer US Senators, including ormer presi-dential candidate Bob Dole, on its board.

    Global Witness believes that the identities o the

    real owners o all companies should be publicly

    available in the country where they are incorpo-

    rated.

    Countries who do not do this, such as the United

    Kingdom and the USA, will continue to acilitate

    corruption and remain just as much a part othe oshore system as any palm-ringed island.

    April 2010, Protestors try to storm the Kyrgyz White House, but what was happening to the money in Kyrgyzstans largest bank?Photo: Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP/Getty Images

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    Specic recommendations relating to this case:

    Clearly, there is a lot that the new Kyrgyz government

    can be doing to continue to address the AUB case and

    the potential loss o state unds. But given the allega-

    tions that money has been laundered, including to oth-

    er jurisdictions, Global Witness also makes the ollowing

    recommendations:

    An immediate investigation should be launched in

    countries where the companies named in this report are

    registered into their ultimate benecial owners, the ori-

    gin o any money ound in accounts, and the role o the

    company service providers who set them up and ronted

    or them.

    There should be an urgent review in the UK o Maxim

    Bakiyevs asylum case, including investigations into the

    allegations made in this report. I there is enough evi-

    dence o wrong-doing, he should be tried in a British

    court.

    The authorities in the UK should more actively investi-

    gate and prosecute potential breaches o the Companies

    Act by nominee directors named in this report who:

    ailed to le accounts;

    signed dormant accounts while their companies

    saw huge amounts o money pass through their bank

    accounts.

    The authorities in Latvia should investigate the US$30

    million payment apparently received by a DoveparkLimited account at Aizkraukles Bank.

    The authorities in Switzerland should investigate

    the possibility o laundering relating to the Kyrgyz

    Development Fund at Verwaltungs und Privat Bank, ol-

    lowing the concerns raised by PwCs audit o the Fund.

    Banks that possessed correspondent relations with

    AUB should assist the Kyrgyz authorities in trying to

    trace possibly laundered or stolen money.

    The authorities in the US, UK and Austria, in theirrole as regulators o the correspondent banks through

    which the largest portion o AUBs unds are alleged to

    have passed, should investigate whether money alleged-

    ly stolen rom the Kyrgyz state went through their banks,

    and i necessary (and possible) should use their money

    laundering laws to prosecute the Kyrgyz ofcials respon-

    sible. They should also investigate whether the corre-

    spondent banks that did business with AUB did sui-

    cient due diligence checks on AUB, including on its links

    to politically exposed persons, and penalise banks that

    have ailed in these responsibilities.

    1. New rules on benecial ownership

    The EU should adopt a benecial ownership registries

    standard as part o its review o the Third Anti-Money

    Laundering Directive during 2012-2013, which includes

    the ollowing elements:

    Companies should be required to submit the name

    and address o their benecial owner(s) to a national

    registry which should make the inormation public.

    The ees charged on incorporation should be increased

    to cover the extra costs o collecting this inormation.

    National corporate registries should carry out due dil-

    igence, on a risk based approach, to veriy that the ben-

    ecial ownership inormation provided to them is cor-

    rect. This need not be that onerous: company service

    providers are already required by the global anti-mon-

    ey laundering standards to do exactly this. The ees

    charged on incorporation could be increased in coun-

    tries where they are currently low to cover the extra

    costs this would entail.

    The use o nominees to record the ownership o shares

    should be permitted, but only i the name o the bene-

    cial owner is also recorded and in the public domain.

    Those holding company oicer positions (i.e. secre-

    tary, shareholder or director) who act in accordance

    with the instructions o a third party should be obliged

    to disclose this act and place a copy o their instruc-

    tions on the public record and disclose who they are

    acting on behal o.

    Company directors, whether nominee or not, should

    be held personally liable or intentional ailure to le

    accounts, supplying alse inormation, and or any

    actions taken by the company.

    Those EU members with oshore connections should

    use their inluence to extend this standard to those

    jurisdictions.

    RECOmmENDATiONS

    RECOmmENDATiONS

    FOR POLiCY CHANGE

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    FATF should adopt this same standard as its level o

    compliance or Recommendation 24 at the earliest pos-

    sible opportunity.

    At the very least, the EU should adopt a standard o

    publicly available shareholder registries in each o its

    member states, and its members should put pressure on

    those oshore jurisdictions with which they have rela-

    tionships to do the same.

    2. Better regulation o trust and company service

    providers

    Countries that do not regulate trust and company serv-

    ice providers under their anti-money laundering laws

    should do so, with criminal penalties or the worst ail-

    ures. FATF should penalise those countries that have

    ailed to do this.

    Those countries that already regulate trust and compa-ny service providers under their anti-money laundering

    laws should make signicantly greater eorts to ensure

    that these standards are enorced.

    Countries should actively enorce their company laws

    requiring accurate ling o accounts, and hold nominee

    directors to a standard o responsibility which does not

    permit them to claim ignorance o the activities o the

    company they purport to direct.

    3. More eective FATF evaluation process

    FATF should develop a new methodology or assessing

    compliance or use i n its mutual evaluations. It needs

    to ocus on assessing whether laws and regulations are

    being enorced, not just whether they are on the books. It

    should also put signicantly more pressure on countries

    that are not in compliance with its standards, either on

    paper or in practice.

    Who bears legal responsibility or a UK company

    with oshore nominee directors?

    Nominee directors o UK companies who are situated o-shore oten claim that they do not bear responsibility or

    the companies that they represent because they are nom-

    inees only and have little knowledge o the companys

    activities and no access to its bank accounts. However,

    the reality is that legally a nominee director has the same

    duties to the company as any other real director and is

    liable in exactly the same way.

    An oshore nominee director or a UK registered com-

    pany will thereore be liable or breaches o the UK

    Companies Act 2006 such as ailure to keep adequate

    accounting records and reports, or or wrongully signingdormant accounts. Ignorance is unlikely to be a deence

    in these circumstances as it is not enough or a nominee

    director to say that s/he did not have adequate inorma-

    tion about the companys inancial activity when s/he

    signed the accounts. A nominee director has the same

    duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence in

    order to ull their legal responsibility as a director.

    Sometimes the nominee directors may have signed an

    agreement with their client the companys real owner

    which purports to specically exclude them rom any

    directorial liabilities. However, such attempts to exclude

    a nominee director rom any responsibility or breach-

    es o the Companies Act in relation to the company s/he

    directs will not absolve the nominee rom statutory lia-

    bility and may have no legal eect.

    In practice, there are very ew consequences or nomi-

    nee directors that breach their duties because these pro-

    visions o this Act are not eectively enorced, either or

    real directors or nominees. Until they are, lax enorce-

    ment o UK company law will continue to be exploited

    by those looking to hide their ownership and conceal the

    true activities o their UK companies.

    The UKs overseas territories and hidden company

    ownership

    Quite a ew secrecy jurisdictions are overseas territo-

    ries o the UK, such as the British Virgin Islands, the

    Cayman Islands and Anguilla. As seen in this report,

    because o these jurisdictions strict secrecy laws, com-

    panies and company ofcers are oten located there, pro-

    viding convenient cover or those who want to hide their

    identity behind corporate structures. The company reg-

    istry o the British Virgin Islands, or example, does not

    give any inormation regarding a companys directors or

    shareholders.

    Global Witness is oten told by British civil servants that

    the UK has devolved commercial matters to the territo-

    ries and has limited inuence over them. However, there

    are indications that this is an over-simplication:

    1) The UK took over control o the Turks and Caicos, ater

    extensive problems with corruption there. 2) A recent

    report into the UKs implementation o the OECD anti-

    bribery convention says that: the UK can and has extend-

    ed international treaties to OTs [overseas territories] andenacted legislation in these territories over their objec-

    tion. As recently as 2000, the UK exercised these powers

    to enact legislation in the OTs to ensure their compliance

    with international human rights conventions [] the UK

    acknowledged that rom a constitutional perspective

    the UK has unlimited power to legislate or the OTs. 418

    Given this, the UK should do more to ensure that its over-

    seas territories are not used by criminals to hide their

    identities behind companies. At the very least, the U K

    should orce all overseas territories to have what the UK

    currently has an open shareholder registry that lists thelegal owners o registered companies and ensure that

    all laws governing companies registered in the territories

    are being enorced.

    RECOmmENDATiONS

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    This is a story that shows the potential or UK-registered

    companies to be used as money laundering ronts to

    move billions o dollars o dirty money, with devastating

    impacts or the countries where the money comes rom.

    In the rst hal o 2010 the small Central Asian nation

    o Kyrgyzstan1 imploded. An uprising ousted its pres-

    ident, the second such violent change o government

    in ive years, and parts o the country descended into

    chaos. Apparent ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and

    Uzbek communities resulted in the deaths o nearly

    500 people.2

    This let an already relatively poor country close to eco-

    nomic collapse with the inancial sector hit especial-

    ly hard. Kyrgyzstans largest bank, AsiaUniversalBank

    (AUB), was taken over by the Kyrgyz National Bank

    ater ofcials there alleged that AUB was insolvent due

    to wide-scale money laundering schemes.3 According to

    these ofcials, AUB was using a double book-keeping sys-

    tem that had allowed it to record alse transactions and

    make it appear as i it held signicantly more assets than

    it actually did.4 An audit o AUBs activities unded by

    the European Bank or Reconstruction and Development

    (EBRD) appears to support these allegations. Money

    was transerred out o AUB through its relationships

    with banks abroad (known as correspondent relation-

    ships), with the largest amount going through Citibank

    in New York.5 Back in 2006, the Central Bank o Russia

    had warned Russian banks about dubious transactions

    through AUB, and as a consequence the Swiss bank UBS

    stopped its correspondent relationship with AUB.6 But

    plenty o other Western banks kept their doors open to

    AUB and so the money was able to ow.

    Global Witness has seen evidence to suggest that millions

    o dollars were transerred through banks in Europe and

    the United States. The origin o this money is unknownthough at least one Kyrgyz ofcial has alleged that some

    state unds, including pension unds, went missing rom

    AUB.7 The amount o the state unds possibly missing

    up to US$64 million is considerably less than t he total

    o some suspicious transactions through AUB, which

    run into the billions and are a signicant proportion o

    the GDP o Kyrgyzstan. This suggests that, i the allega-

    tions o money laundering are accurate, AUB could have

    been used by unknown launderers or their own purpos-

    es as well as by those who might have been embezzling

    state unds. As the origins o the money in the suspicious

    transactions are unknown, it is not possible to draw aconclusion about whether or not this nancial activity

    constitutes money laundering without urther investiga-

    tion by competent authorities.

    The problems with the UKs system o company

    registration is shown by one company eatured in

    this report that was legally owned by a man rom

    a remote Russian region who had actually died

    beore the company was registered.

    Global Witness has spoken to many sources who attest to

    a strong relationship between AUB and the ormer pres-

    idents son, Maxim Bakiyev, which raises suspicions as

    to whether the bank was working or the good o its cli-

    ents or or the countrys ormer ruling elite.8 More than30 people have been indicted in Kyrgyzstan or money

    laundering and other alleged crimes in its banking sec-

    tor, including Maxim, AUBs ormer chairman Mikhail

    Nadel and two other men who had been AUB board mem-

    bers, Eugene Gourevitch and Alexei Yeliseev.9 These men

    reject the indictments, saying that they are politically

    motivated and unounded.

    Maxim, described beore the revolution by the US embas-

    sy in a Wikileaks cable as smart, corrupt and a good

    ally to have,10 arrived by private jet in the UK some

    weeks ater his ather was ousted. He has claimed asy-

    lum in the UK,11 though he is, as o June 2012, still listed

    on Interpols website as a ugitive wanted by the Kyrgyz

    authorities. 12 Rosa Otunbayeva, who was interim presi-

    dent o Kyrgyzstan until December 2011, has complained

    that the West ailed to respond to her governments

    request or assistance in extraditions or tracking down

    money, unlike its reaction to the potential loss o unds

    rom Libya.13

    Central Asia suers rom high levels o corruption and

    eatures a host o iron-sted dictators o varying degrees

    o ability, venality and thuggishness, and so an alleged

    money laundering scandal involving the presidentsamily may not raise too many eyebrows. Yet this report

    is not just about a ar o country o which we know

    little.14 There is a strong international public inter-

    est because it implicates the global nancial system to

    which AUB gained access through a network o relation-

    ships with some o the worlds biggest banks, including

    Citibank, Standard Char tered and Austrias Raieisen

    Zentralbank.15

    And ar rom involving only local players, AUBs reputa-

    tion was buttressed by Western companies: due diligence

    rm Kroll investigated its anti-money laundering meas-ures and did not ind major causes or concern, while

    Washington PR rm APCO advised the bank and helped

    recruit three ormer US Senators, including ormer presi-

    dential candidate Bob Dole, to AUBs board.16

    iNTRODuCTiON

    iNTRODuCTiON

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    The ability o an allegedly corrupt Kyrgyz bank to gain

    access to the global inancial system and the endorse-

    ment o respected international gures and rms matters

    because it shows how easily the system could be abused

    by those wishing to move dirty money. Global Witness is

    concerned about this because our research on the global

    inancial system repeatedly shows that those who loot

    the public purse or launder money are enabled to do so

    by a combination o banks willing to take the money, and

    hidden company ownership arrangements that help to

    hide the looters identities.17

    The Kyrgyz authorities allege that AUB was a money

    laundering operation; the ban ks ormer management

    and owners claim it has been expropriated by the new

    regime and that the indictments are politically motivat-

    ed, unounded and legally unstable. In the absence o

    any clarity, Global Witness has conducted its own exten-

    sive investigations including close analysis o documents

    that show suspicious transactions o many companieswith accounts at AUB in the months beore the Kyrgyz

    uprising in April 2010. This resulting report presents

    disturbing evidence that shell companies registered in

    the UK, New Zealand, Belize and Bulgaria, among oth-

    er places, may have acilitated an extensive money laun-

    dering scheme at AUB that took advantage o its corre-

    spondent banking relationships to transer money out o

    Kyrgyzstan to banks all over the world. This inormation

    is o public interest internationally, as well as to t he peo-

    ple o Kyrgyzstan.

    This story highlights the shocking inadequacy o how

    some o the worlds major economies monitor the reg-

    istration o companies. One UK company, whose AUB

    account, according to documents seen by Global Witness,

    saw about US$700 million ow through it in just under

    two years, was legally owned by a man living in a remote

    Russian region. That might be surprising in itsel, but

    what makes it suspicious is the act that the man had

    actually died beore the company was registered.18

    In just two and a hal years it appears that a staggering

    US$1.2 billion passed through the AUB accounts o just

    three UK-registered companies, yet they never led any

    account inormation at all beore dissolving.19

    Two urther UK companies appear to have had millions

    going through their AUB accounts while declaring to the

    UKs corporate registry that they were dormant, a breach

    o the Companies Act.20

    In relation to all o the companies in this report, the ori-

    gins o the money are still not known, nor its nal des-

    tination ater it let Kyrgyzstan. The secret ownership

    arrangements o these companies mean it is also unclear

    who stood behind these and other shell companies.

    According to documents seen by Global Witness, theKyrgyz authorities believe that some o these compa-

    nies may have potential direct links to Maxim Bakiyev,

    the ex-presidents son, and to ormer AUB chairman

    Mikhail Nadel.21

    In an interview w ith Global Witness, Nadel denied the

    money laundering allegations made by the Kyrgyz

    authorities and that Maxim had any involvement with

    the bank.22 Despite several eorts, Global Witness has

    been unable to contact Maxim Bakiyev in order to get his

    response. The British authorities need to work with their

    Kyrgyz counterparts in order to ascertain the truth o the

    matter and prosecute those responsible or any wrong-

    doing i such evidence is ound.

    The act that many o these companies were registered in

    the UK shows that this is not just a story about the prob-

    lems o oshore jurisdictions: there are just as many

    problems with opaque shell companies onshore, includ-

    ing in the UK. Current lax regulation does not provide

    adequate oversight over company registration and allows

    iNTRODuCTiON

    The real owners o companies can hide their identitiesbehind legal structures.

    Photo: Mortal Coil Media

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    iNTRODuCTiON

    shady individuals to hide their identity and their activ-

    ities behind a veil o corporate secrecy with ease, while

    using our nancial system with impunity. The privilege

    o a limited liability company is being abused by those

    who wish to hide their identity.

    The many ways in which hidden company own-

    ership can be achieved are used quite deliberate-

    ly by those wishing to shield their activities rom the

    public eye: one respondent to Global Witnesss enquir-

    ies concerning a company that eatures in this report

    said he was asked to advise his client on jurisdic-

    tions where the beneiciaries are conidential. 23

    The resulting companies were set up in Belize, which

    lists no ownership inormation, and New Zealand, which

    does list legal shareholding, but in this case the share-

    holder was a nominee someone paid to act as the share-

    holder, thus hiding the name o the real person who

    actually owns the company. It is no coincidence that

    people choose such jurisdictions and structures or theircompanies.

    The global anti-money laundering standard requires the

    corporate service providers who set up these shell com-

    panies and act as their directors, shareholders and com-

    pany secretaries to know who they are acting or, and to

    report any suspicions they have about these businesses to

    the authorities.24

    There are three problems with the current regulatory set-

    up. Firstly, some countries have not incorporated this glo-

    bal anti-money laundering standard into their laws, such

    as the USA and Russia. Secondly, many o those countries

    that have, like the UK, do little to enorce it.

    Thirdly, it is currently quite legal or company service

    providers to pimp their identity as nominee directors and

    shareholders to customers about whose business they

    know little, even i they have been able to tick the anti-

    money laundering laws box that requires them to have

    a copy o their customers passport and proo o address.

    I the company is later ound or suspected to have been

    used or money laundering or other criminality, they

    explain that they knew nothing about it. Yet the eect o

    their actions has arguably been to provide a ront behindwhich that criminal behaviour can take place.

    This means that companies registered in the UK and

    elsewhere are not just vulnerable to misuse by the cor-

    rupt, but can also be used or tax evasion and other seri-

    ous crimes not discussed in this report such as human

    trafcking, drug trafcking, illicit weapons sales and the

    movement o terrorist nance. The system is in serious

    need o an overhaul.

    The international community must opt or a system

    where companies are required to disclose the real personwho controls a company known as the ultimate bene-

    cial owner and where company service providers are

    held responsible or their clients act ions. There was a

    recent opportunity to make this happen, but the worlds

    richest nations lunked it. The Financial Action Task

    Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body that sets the

    global standard or anti-money laundering laws, spent

    the last two years reviewing its standards, including the

    ownership inormation that countries should require

    rom companies incorporating in their jurisdiction.25 In

    the end FATF made ew changes; beneicial ownership

    registries remain only optional and so the current crim-

    inogenic system prevails.

    But the European Commission is now re-examining its

    rules, and this is where the opportunities or change now

    lie. Brussels must take heed o this problem, and use its

    2012-13 review o its anti-money laundering system to

    change the rules. An EU Internal Security Strategy pub-

    lished in 2010 has already called or change in this direc-

    tion, suggesting that the EUs anti-money laundering

    rules should be used to improve transparency on com-

    pany ownership.26 Europe should take the lead in optingor a system in which countries must have a registry o

    ultimate benecial ownership o companies incorporat-

    ed there, and those EU countries with oshore connec-

    tions, such as the UK with its Crown Dependencies and

    Overseas Territories, should use their inuence to extend

    such a standard to those jurisdictions.

    The irst chapter o this report outlines the events

    that took place in Kyrgyzstan rom April 2010,

    the nationalisation o AUB and the claim made by

    the new authorities that all was not as it seemed at the

    bank, as well as the version o events according to AUBs

    Mikhail Nadel and other key gures.

    Chapter 2 sets out Global Witnesss investigation o a

    number o shell companies with accounts at AUB, whose

    management arrangements and transactions suggest

    alarming red lags or money laundering. This chap-

    ter examines the role o the company service providers

    that set them up, and looks at the loopholes in the global

    standards or company registration.

    Chapter 3 introduces some o the main characters asso-ciated with the bank who are now under suspicion by the

    Kyrgyz authorities, and sets out the extraordinary control

    they gained over the Kyrgyz economy and public nanc-

    es in the last years o President Bakiyevs regime. It then

    sets out some intriguing links between a ew o these

    characters and several o the shell companies identied

    inchapter 2.

    The inal chapter briely examines the ways that AUB

    was able to access the global nancial system, including

    its correspondent banks, and t he role o a Washington

    PR rm that put three ormer US senators on the banksboard. The report concludes with a discussion about what

    governments must do to end the problem o hidden com-

    pany ownership.

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    CHAPTER 1.

    ASiAuNiVERSALBANk:COOkiNG THE BOOkS?T h i s c h a p t e r s e t s o u t w h a t h a p p e n e d a t

    AsiaUniversalBank (AUB) rom April 2010, its nation-

    alisation and the al legation o the new authorities

    that AUB was alsiying its inancial records and

    acting as a money laundering vehicle. It also looksat the ndings o an independent audit on AUB and

    covers the response o the banks ormer chairman

    Mikhail Nadel and other key gures, who deny the

    allegations made against AUB.

    When the t hen-president o Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek

    Bakiyev, was orced to ee the capital Bishkek in ear or

    his lie because o a popular uprising on 7 April 2010, of-

    cials quickly took steps to prevent a possible outow o

    capital rom the country. The ollowing day, the National

    Bank o Kyrgyzstan replaced the management o sev-

    eral banks, including AUB, the countrys largest bank,

    because o the circumstances o thet and a threat o

    thet.27 Global Witness understands rom a number o

    sources that AUB in particular was targeted due to a long-

    standing and widely-held belie in Kyrgyzstan that the

    Bakiyev amily enjoyed a close relationship with AUBs

    senior managers.28

    According to statements given to the press by Kyrgyz

    National Bank ofcials, these eorts were too late as the

    money had already gone.29 AUB was declared insolvent in

    October 2010 and subsequently nationalised.30 According

    to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kyrgyzstans

    nancial system was deeply aected by the crisis, pri-

    marily through the impact on the systemically impor-tant Asia Universal Bank.31 The World Bank also cit-

    ed the restructuring o AUB as one o the reasons why

    Kyrgyzstans economy shrunk in 2010.32

    Ofcials investigating the bank ater the nationalisation

    were in or a big shock: at rst glance the books appeared

    to show that around US$240 million had been withdrawn

    and moved out o Kyrgyzstan in the week beore the revo-

    lution.33 An October 2010 IMF report also shows massive

    withdrawals (see diagram below).34

    The ormer chairman o AUB, Mikhail Nadel, justiied

    some transers in a press interview, acknowledging a

    surge in withdrawals at the time o the government col-

    lapse, but arguing it was only clients rescuing their unds

    rom a coup: One has to remember that this is the sec-

    ond revolution in Kyrgyzstan in ve years. [] In hind-

    sight, clients were right to panic [...]. It was clients who

    withdrew their money and, I believe, it was a normal

    reaction.35 Nadels lawyer told Global Witness that Nadel

    did not withdraw his own personal unds.36

    CHAPTER 1: ASiAuNiVERSALBANk: COOkiNG THE BOOkS?

    SOURCE:IMFCOUNTR

    YREPORTNO,

    10/336,

    OCTOBER2010.

    imF DiAGRAm SHOwiNG LARGE DOLLAR wiTHDRAwALSFROm AuB TO ABROAD BEFORE THE 2010 REVOLuTiON

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    However, the story did not end there. Ater urther

    research, senior ofcials rom the National Bank alleged

    in the press that AUB had been systematically trans-

    erring money out o the country or a period o years

    and had covered this up by manipulating bank trans-

    action records to hide the act that the money was gone.

    Baktygul Jeenbaeva, then-acting governor o the National

    Bank and now a deputy chair, commented: Now we can

    say with conidence that the management o AUB had

    been alsiying their data over the course o 10 years. 37

    Ulan Sarbanov, who was head o the National Bank o

    Kyrgyzstan rom 1999-2005 and a credible source38

    according to a leaked US government cable, made similar

    allegations, telling the Wall Street Journal that during his

    tenure he was suspicious o AUBs activities, as it could

    produce dierent balance sheets on the same day.39

    A Kyrgyz newspaper, citing National Bank deputy chair

    Abdybaly tegin Suerkul, reported that such huge trans-

    ers had not actually taken place in the week o the upris-

    ing: a check has shown that no-one removed US$240

    million [rom AUB] a day beore the events in April. That

    sum simply did not exist, as it was only a ction written

    down on paper.40 Global Witness understands that mil-

    lions did leave AUB in the irst week o April, but how

    much in total, and where it went to, remains unclear.

    According to the article, AUBs system recorded thou-

    sands o ctitious payments and in reality AUB owned

    much less than what was shown on its accounts and inpress reports: 80% o the banks own capital was made

    up o air, it was virtual.41

    An investigative report by Kyrgyz inancial magazine

    Finansist alleged that on the day o the uprising AUB

    claimed to have 12 billion Kyrgyz som (US$265 million)

    more in correspondent accounts at other banks than it

    actually held.42

    Why did the bank appear to have so little mon-

    ey? According to the National Banks then governor,

    Jeenbaeva, speaking in 2011 in a Kyrgyz press interview:

    ormer shareholders and directors had withdrawn the

    banks assets. [] AUB showed large amounts o money

    on its balance sheets, but ater a cross-check o 60 corre-

    spondent banks it became clear that the money was taken

    out o the bank almost immediately ater it came in.43

    In other words, AUB had, according to National Bank of-

    cials, tried to make its books appear balanced in the week

    beore the uprising by creating nancial statements that

    showed around US$240 million being transerred out o

    the country. But this money had already been transerred

    out o the bank at a much earlier time, ofcials alleged.

    So when the National Bank launched its investigation, itdiscovered that AUB was insolvent as virtually all o its

    capital had been transerred out o the bank. The bank

    was taken over by the Kyrgyz authorities and restruc-

    tured as a result.

    The Kyrgyz prosecutor has since alleged that corrupt

    schemes [at AUB] used alsication o accounts and cli-

    ent transactions, and that the maintenance o accounts

    o ictitious companies and the manipulation o the

    banks balance sheet involving large sums served as an

    instrument or the illegal extraction o revenue [and] the

    embezzlement o budget unds []. 44

    Following the uprising, the investigative article in

    Finansist documented the unknown war rom around

    2000 between AUB and the National Bank o Kyrgyzstan

    regarding AUBs ailure, according to the latter, to comply

    with reporting requirements.45 Former chairman o the

    National Bank o Kyrgyzstan, Ulan Sarbanov, has also

    gone on the record in the press with his concerns about

    the way AUB was run, and alleged that when as chairman

    he tried to help the Russian Central Bank investigate sus-

    picious transactions between AUB and Russian banks, he

    was orced out o his job by President Bakiyev.46

    The claims that AUB was involved in illegal activity

    are supported by an independent audit, unded by the

    European Bank or Reconstruction and Development

    (EBRD), completed around February 2011. Global Witness

    understands that the audit, by multinational account-

    ancy rm BDO, ocused on transers immediately prior

    to the April 2010 events and concludes that it is proba-

    ble that AUB was predominantly being used or criminal

    purposes, that AUB knowingly acilitated money laun-

    dering, that the banks IT system, BANK++, was probably

    manipulated to disguise payments and that more than

    80% o transactions reviewed were not corroborated bySWIFT, the international payment system. It also said

    that the banks market value was nil, and that its liabili-

    ties outweighed its assets.47

    President Bakiyev did little to curb corruption andnepotism in Kyrgyzstan while in power.Photo: ASSOCIATED PRESS / Alexander Zemlianichenko

    CHAPTER 1: ASiAuNiVERSALBANk: COOkiNG THE BOOkS?

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    The BANK++ system was provided by a Russian irm

    called Fininor, a company that has close ties to AUB

    through its shareholders and personnel. Mikhail Nadel

    conrmed to Global Witness that BANK++ was AUBs core

    banking system and explained that Alexandra Katrin, an

    AUB employee, was responsible or it.48 It is not clear i

    Alexandra Katrin was involved in the alleged manipula-

    tion o BANK++. However, she was an AUB board member

    rom 1999 and, crucially, chair o its audit committee, so

    arguably she could be expected to have an oversight role

    o the banks nances. She worked closely with Fininor,

    one o whose shareholders was her husband, who also

    held shares in AUB.49 Katrin has been indicted by the

    Kyrgyz authorities in regard to the money laundering

    allegations; her husband has not.50 Neither Alexandra

    Katrin nor her husband responded to questions posed by

    Global Witness.

    Fininors General Director said that allegations put to

    him by Global Witness that BANK++ may have been used

    raudulently by AUB, acilitated by close connections

    between the two companies, were groundless, and that:

    it is just impossible to use the Bank++ or any alsica-

    tion or raud. [] Bank++ has been subject to IT security

    audit numerous times. Not once did any o the interna-

    tional auditing companies accuse Bank ++ o any impro-

    prieties. [] Fininor has never been and could not be

    involved in AUB operations, as it is not a bank, but sepa-

    rate independent sotware-development entity. He alsosaid the BANK++ system was developed in a way that did

    not allow any operations which were not within ofcially

    approved bank procedures, in line with National Bank o

    Kyrgyzstan requirements, and added that the allegations

    made against Fininor were part o the political attack

    against AUB.51

    Nadel also denies BANK++ had been misused, and main-

    tains his own innocence, vigorously disputing the allega-

    tion that AUB was a money laundering vehicle.

    He alleges that the authorities at the National Bank

    o Kyrgyzstan intentionally bankrupted AUB in order

    to take over its assets illegally. In response to Global

    Witnesss enquiries, Nadels lawyer stated that the tempo-

    rary administration installed by the interim government

    at AUB improperly wrote o substantial debts owed to

    AUB and created a alse picture o its nancial worth.52

    When Global Witness interviewed Nadel he brought one

    o his ormer AUB colleagues, Denis Slobodyan. The lat-

    ter commented that because AUB was the countrys big-

    gest bank with the most easily identiable assets, under

    the pretext o preserving assets o the country, they [of-

    cials rom the National Bank o Kyrgyzstan] took over thebank and actually destroyed it.53 Nadels ull rebuttal is

    overlea. As ar as Global Witness is aware, the Kyrgyz

    authorities have not indicted Denis Slobodyan and there

    is no evidence that he was himsel involved in money

    laundering or any illegal activity.

    This report examines these competing claims about AUB

    using the evidence available to us, and comes to the con-

    clusion that, despite Nadels denials, there is evidence o

    very suspicious nancial activity at AUB, and it centres

    on dozens o companies which held accounts there which

    are apparent shell companies that is to say companiesthat exist in name only and are not involved in any legiti-

    mate business activity. One o the reasons we are present-

    ing this evidence is that these companies were incorpo-

    rated in other jurisdictions, including the UK and New

    Zealand. Full investigations should be undertaken by the

    authorities in all o the countries involved.

    CHAPTER 1: ASiAuNiVERSALBANk: COOkiNG THE BOOkS?

    AsiaUniversalBanks ormer headquarters in Bishkek. The bank is alleged by the new authorities to have been a moneylaundering vehicle.

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    ANOTHER SiDETO THE STORY:

    THAT mONEYLAuNDERiNGDiD NOT TAkEPLACE AT AuB

    Former AUB chairman Mikhail Nadel and other key

    gures mentioned in this report have told Global Witness

    that they believe the events o April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan

    were not an uprising but a coup orchestrated by the

    opposition which had no constitutional oundation and

    that the accusations against AUB are baseless. Nadel

    maintains that the nationalisation o AUB was part o the

    coup, and similarly in breach o the law o Kyrgyzstan.

    On the takeover o AUB, Nadels lawyer told Global

    Witness that a group o heavily armed men arrived at

    AUBs head oice without notice in the early hours o

    the morning o 8 April 2010 and demanded immediate

    and unrestricted access to AUB computer servers.

    Nadel claims that the consequent placing o AUB into

    temporary administration, the replacement o AUB

    management and the purported nationalisation o AUB

    shares, including his own personal shareholding, were

    all contrary to Kyrgyz law. He argues that these acts were

    carried out by the new government in order to illegallyobtain the banks unds and due to a mistaken perception

    that AUB had been close to the previous regime.54

    Global Witness wrote to the National Bank o Kyrgyzstan

    to get its side o the story. In an emailed response a

    senior ofcial explained that the initial plan had been to

    recapitalise AUB, but urther investigation revealed what

    the oicial described as aked inancial reporting at

    AUB. The same ofcial believed that as Nadel may have

    been complicit in the alleged schemes, the rehabilitation

    and the return o the bank to the person who [is] suspected

    o committing serious economic crimes against our

    country or us is not acceptable.55

    Nadels lawyer stated: [Nadel] also believes that money

    rom AUB sae deposit boxes which belonged to clients

    o AUB were split between (and signed or by) members

    o the new government and provided Global Witness

    with documentation that in Nadels opinion shows such

    signatures. Money rom AUBs saety deposit boxes,

    according to a news article orwarded by Nadels lawyer,

    was not transerred to the Kyrgyz budget.56 The National

    Bank ofcial commented to Global Witness: we assure

    you that seizure o unds rom the bank o cells was

    conducted in compliance with the procedural rules oour country. [] All the money is saely deposited in the

    National Bank as evidence.57

    The stealing o money rom saety deposit boxes, while

    a serious crime i true, would not in Global Witnesss

    view explain the disappearance o millions o dollars

    that the bank supposedly held as o April 2010. Nadels

    explanation to the press o the disappearance o AUBs

    asset base was as ollows: I anyone is to be accused o

    embezzlement, I would like to pose an open question

    as to how a bank which was audited and conirmed

    by the new regime to have more assets than liabilitiessuddenly suers a tremendous loss in assets and is

    pushed towards technical bankruptcy, which served

    as a pre-text or nationalization. This, in my opinion,

    is embezzlement. 58

    Was the international community too quick to lavishawards on Mikhail Nadel and his AUB?Photo: The Asian Banker

    CHAPTER 1: ASiAuNiVERSALBANk: COOkiNG THE BOOkS?

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    However, the above-quoted press interviews with

    National Bank ofcials suggest that the alleged schemes

    in place at AUB took some time to reveal: Nadels open

    question regarding how a supposedly a sset-rich bank

    can suer a loss in assets could, in Global Witnesss view,

    potentially be explained by the alleged manipulation o

    its banking system that was only discovered some time

    ater the revolution. The EBRD-unded audit o AUB

    which supported the view that the bank actually had

    very ew assets and was manipulating its transaction

    reporting system was only completed some ten months

    ater the uprising.

    Nadel argues that this orensic audit was conducted

    ater more than six months o government control o

    AUB by which time the temporary administration had

    purposeully r un down t he banks condition. However,

    Global Witness understands that the audit, though

    completed in February 2011, ocused on a review o AUBs

    nancial records during the period immediately prior tothe April 2010 events. Nadels lawyer commented: At the

    time o our clients last involvement with AUB i.e. pre-

    revolution in April 2010, AUB was both solvent and, as

    ar as our client was aware, run in accordance with AML

    [anti-money laundering] procedures. The lawyer added

    that by April 2010 AUB held one-third o the total assets

    in the Kyrgyz banking system, and that, until the bank

    was taken over, the unds remained in AUBs account.59

    Nadel also rejects the claim that AUB was used to launder

    or steal money. His lawyer commented: As recently as

    31 December 2008, the [National Bank o Kyrgyzstan]

    provided a certicate attesting to AUBs compliance with

    all the relevant regulatory requirements. [] Mr Nadel

    and the other directors o the bank placed a high value on

    the importance o anti-corruption policies overseeing

    the implementation o the extensive AML procedures at

    AUB. [] During the time that our client was involved in

    the running o AUB, such corrupt schemes did not take

    place, or i they did, our client was not aware o them.60

    Another ormer AUB board member, not named in this

    report, told Global Witness that: as board members, we

    have done all we can to ensure AUB activities were as

    transparent as possible [] As a board member, it wouldbe difcult to know exactly each and every transaction

    eected. However, with the help o reports rom Kroll

    Associates [see page 62] and the Management Board, we

    careully scrutinised the banks activities to the best o

    my knowledge, we are not aware o any o the allegations

    that have been put orth by the Kyrgyz prosecutors

    regarding illicit activities.61

    The current Kyrgyz authorities do not agree with the AUB

    managers version o events. In February 2011 the Kyrgyz

    Prosecutor publicly revealed that over 30 people had been

    indicted in relation to alleged money laundering andraud schemes at Kyrgyz banks, including AUB.62

    However, the independence o the legal system in

    Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian countries has long

    been a concern o many observers, including the US

    State Department.63 Global Witness has been given

    documents by one o those indicted showing that the

    Bishkek District Court had ordered the case to be sent

    back to the prosecutor to remedy the deiciencies and

    procedural irregularities t hat were in contravention o

    Kyrgyz law.64 For example, many people were indicted

    without being present.

    At a urther hearing in December 2011, the matter was

    sent back once more to the prosecutor or illing in

    the investigator gaps. Again, this centred around

    procedural and evidential deciencies. It was ound that

    allegations o money laundering were made without any

    evidence and the criminal case is completely missing

    any statutory procedural documents rom which it will

    arise that the deendants have received any income by

    illegal means and in what amount. [] The charges are

    mainly based on investigation suppositions, but not

    on the criminal case materials [] [the case has been]investigated supercially with accusatory bias.65 Global

    Witness understands that the investigation continues.

    In April 2011, Mikhail Nadel was ound guilty in absentia

    by a Kyrgyz court o money laundering and other crimes.

    Nadel denies the charges on the basis that they were

    completely baseless and politically motivated. He

    believes that he does not eature on the wanted persons

    section o the Interpol website because Interpol shared

    this view. He told Global Witness that my unlawul

    conviction in absentia was undermined by the Kyrgyz

    Court o Appeal in June last year, ater it determined

    that the evidence the prosecutors oice had relied on

    was not conclusive. His lawyer added urther: The

    law o Kyrgyzstan does not permit charging people in

    absentia. To do so directly contradicts established legal

    procedure [] [Nadel] has never been charged, served

    with proceedings or even inormed o the investigations

    [] For the charge o money laundering to be brought, the

    prosecution must rst demonstrate that the laundered

    unds were indeed the proceeds o illegal activities. No

    such evidence was provided by the prosecution []

    He was incorrectly convicted and sentenced and is

    now appealing. Mr Nadel denies any wrongdoing or

    involvement in the alleged corrupt schemes.66

    Following the response rom Nadels lawyer, Global

    Witness contacted a senior oicial in the Kyrgyz

    Prosecutors ofce in May 2012. In answer to a question

    about whether Nadels conviction was overturned, the

    senior oicial stated that the verdict o the Leninsky

    District Court is not repealed but remains in orce66b

    It is because o the uncerta inties over the indictments

    and prosecution o these cases, and the claims that they

    are politically motivated, that Global Witness carried out

    its own investigation into the companies with accountsat AUB. Since our powers are limited, it is a ll the more

    important that competent authorities o countries with

    a nexus to this case conduct their own investigations to

    discover the truth o the matter.

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    CHAPTER 2.THE uSE OF

    SHELL COmPANiES FORSuSPiCiOuS TRANSACTiONSThis chapter sets out Global Witnesss investigation

    o a number o shell companies with accounts at

    AUB, whose management arrangements and trans-

    actions suggest alarming red ags or money laun-

    dering. It examines the role o the company serv iceproviders who set them up, and looks at the loop-

    holes in the current global standa rds or company

    registration.

    i. Transactions through shell companies: an intro-

    duction to the evidence

    Global Witness has seen three documents which

    detail the transact ions o various companies with

    accounts at AUB. This section introduces the doc-

    uments, assesses the possibility that they could

    have been orged by those seeking to implicate

    AUB, and concludes that this is very unlikely.

    It then sets out the reasons or Global Witnesss

    belie that the structure and activities o these

    companies constitute signicant red ags or poten-

    tial money laundering.

    The rst two documents emerged rom the Kyrgyz inves-

    tigation into AUB. According to a source knowledgea-

    ble about the case in Bishkek, they record transactions

    between June 2008 and April 2010 made by six compa-

    nies with suspicious transactions through the bank. The

    documents include conirmation o the tran sactionsrom the SWIFT international bank payments system.67

    As this inormation was produced by the authorities in

    Kyrgyzstan, Global Witness cannot conirm it is accu-

    rate, though we have obtained conrmation o a ew o

    the payments rom companies that received them. We

    reer to these two documents as the SWIFT documents.

    (Note: these documents were not compiled by SWIFT

    itsel, but by the Kyrgyz authorities using inormation

    rom the SWIFT system.)

    The third document appears to be an AUB transaction

    record or the week beore the revolution. At this timethe bank was still chaired by Nadel.68 It lists the trans-

    actions o seven companies with accounts at AUB, and

    lists dozens o other companies which made payments to

    or received payments rom these seven. We will reer to

    this as the AUB document. I the allegation regarding

    manipulation o AUBs BANK++ system to create icti-

    tious payment records is true, the problem is that we can-

    not say whether a particular payment listed on this docu-

    ment actually happened or whether it was a transaction

    on paper only to cover up money already transerred. Thesource in Bishkek knowledgeable about the AUB case told

    Global Witness that this document includes a mixture o

    ake and real transactions.

    There would be two ways to veriy which transactions

    were real by accessing inormation rom the interna-

    tional correspondent banks which are necessary or any

    cross-border payment, or rom the SWIFT system. Global

    Witness does not have the authority to gather inorma-

    tion rom either o these sources. However, one company,

    Sorento Resources Ltd, is listed on both the SWIFT and

    the AUB documents and so the transactions as record-

    ed by each document can be compared. This SWIFT

    document also compares the date o the transactions

    as recorded by the SWIFT system and by AUBs own

    BANK++ system.69

    Sometimes both the amount o money transerred and

    the date on which it was transerred matches exactly in

    both the AUB and SWIFT documents. The act that

    some transactions appear in both documents which

    Global Witness obtained rom two dierent sources

    means that this is either a highly sophisticated co-ordi-

    nated orgery or that some o the transactions did actu-

    ally take place.

    Sometimes, the SWIFT documents and the AUB

    document match on the amounts o money transerred,

    but the dates dier by up to 75 days. I the SWIFT

    document contains authentic inormation rom the

    SWIFT system, this date discrepancy would support the

    allegation that AUB was producing inaccurate nancial

    reports.

    Other comparisons reveal that the AUB document

    eatures some payments that are not on the SWIFT

    document. I the SWIFT document is genuine and theAUB document is a record o transactions as logged by

    BANK++, then it would seem these payments may never

    have taken place, giving urther weight to the allegation

    (as made by the EBRD-unded audit) that AUB was alsi-

    ying its nancial statements.

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    Many o the companies mentioned on these documents

    are apparent shell companies organisations that are

    not engaged in genuine business other than the transer-

    ring o money. However, the AUB document also indi-

    cates payments made by some o these shell companies

    to real companies, i.e. to companies engaging in genuine

    business: a well-known law rm, a subsidiary o a major

    international oil and gas company, a logistics company

    and a PR rm. The SWIFT documents do not list the

    payments or six out o the seven companies on the AUB

    document, so Global Witness contacted the real compa-

    nies in question to see whether these transers had taken

    place. Each replied that they had conducted no business

    with the rms in question and had received no such pay-

    ment.70 I the AUB document was created by BANK++

    then this is more evidence supporting the allegation o

    manipulation o the BANK++ system, that is to say AUB

    logged payments to genuine companies that simply did

    not occur in reality, on any date.

    All o this presumes, however, that the SWIFT inorma-

    tion provided by the Kyrgyz authorities is accurate. So,

    turning now to the SWIFT documents, these also list,

    among thousands o transactions, some real companies

    as receiving payments. Global Witness contacted some

    o these real companies, and unlike those on the AUB

    document, this time they conrmed they had received

    the payments (see box overlea or why these transac-

    tions raise urther questions about suspicious activity).71

    Although the volume o transactions means it is not

    practical to veriy them all, the act that some o these

    real companies received the payments is urther indi-

    cation that the transactions listed on the SWIFT doc-

    uments genuinely took place. Meanwhile, Nadel has

    claimed that any evidence used to justi y the national-

    isation could have been created by the National Banks

    new management.72

    To summarise, we have three documents which list doz-

    ens o companies making payments through AUB. Two

    were compiled by and came rom the Kyrgyz authorities

    and so are subject to Nadels concerns that ofcials were

    playing with the numbers to justiy nationalising AUB

    on the alse pretext that it was insolvent. The third doc-

    ument appears to have been produced by AUBs BANK++system and thus, i the allegations made against the bank

    are true, may include transactions that did not take place

    at that time but were created by a manipulated system to

    cover up transactions made at an earlier date.

    There is a key to the riddle, though, and it lies in the

    companies themselves. Global Witness sea rched or

    the companies listed in all the documents to nd out

    where they are incorporated and what business they

    are involved in. For many companies, no inorma-

    tion is available beyond corporate registry listings;

    we cannot nd them engaged in a ny legitimate busi-ness activity and most submitted no account inor-

    mation to company registries. A ew o them, identi-

    ed in the sections below, led dormant accounts in

    the UK, indicating that they had not done any busi-

    ness at all.73

    These companies were incorporated mainly in the

    UK, New Zealand and Belize, and all o them were

    registered ater President Bakiyevs rise to power

    in March 2005. Most importantly, many o them a re

    linked to each other via the company service provid-

    ers that registered them, which immediately makes

    the companies suspicious since they are purport-

    edly carrying out commercial trading transactions,

    (i.e. the sale o consumer and industrial goods)

    with each other. This is covered in more detail on

    pages 36 to 42 and on the chart on pa ges 22 and 23.

    Global Witness considers that or the inormation in

    the documents to have been aked by someone seek-

    ing to implicate AUB, the aker would have had to

    have gone to some extreme lengths. This is because:

    There are complex links between a signicant number

    o the companies in these documents: they share direc-

    tors, shareholders and company service providers whoset them up. These links exist independently o the

    transactions recorded on the transaction documents.

    These links could not be created simply by search-

    ing on corporate databases or companies that share

    the same director, as some o the inormation is not

    available in publicly searchable databases and can

    only be obtained by purchasing the documents rom

    the registry itsel, such as in Belize, in which case the

    aker would either need to know what he was look-

    ing or, or to have set all the companies up himsel.

    Forging either the SWIFT or AUB documents would

    thereore require prior knowledge o the links between

    these entities, or would need the orger himsel to set

    them up in the irst place. This is unlikely as it would

    have required our years o planning; some o the compa-

    nies were registered as ar back as 2006.

    Thereore, Global Witness believes that although these

    documents were obtained rom the Kyrgyz authorities,

    the details o the companies that did business at AUB

    have not been aked. This suggests that urther investi-

    gation is required, investigation that we believe is in the

    public interest.

    What we can say rom our own investigations is that a

    set o companies exist, as set out below, which do not

    have obvious business purposes and which all have

    links to others in the group. Evidence rom several docu-

    ments suggests that many o these companies had bank

    accounts at AUB. In addition, the SWIFT documents in

    particular appear to show that some o these companies

    have repeatedly transerred large sums o money to each

    other. Repeated transactions between related companies

    are an acknowledged red ag or money laundering activ-

    ity, as explained in the box overlea. Given their links toAUB, these companies and the correspondent banking

    records should be investigated by the relevant authori-

    ties to ascertain the acts.

    CHAPTER 2: THE uSE OF SHELL COmPANiES FOR SuSPiCiOuS TRANSACTiONS

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    SuSPiCiOuS SHELLCOmPANiES: A HOST

    OF RED FLAGSOur analysis o the shell companies and the SWIFTand AUB documents has highlighted the ollowing indi-

    cators which, taken together, suggest to Global Witness

    that suspicious activity was taking place:

    Virtually a ll o the corporate ofcers o these compa-

    nies (directors, shareholders, company secretaries) are

    acting as nominees people who are paid to take legal

    responsibility or these companies, thus hiding the name

    o the real person to whom the company actually belongs,

    reerred to as the ultimate benecial owner. This person,the true owner, thus does not necessarily eature on any

    public documentation and his or her identity remains hid-

    den. This is a widespread and entirely legal practice; or a

    company to have a nominee director or shareholder does

    not indicate dubious activity in itsel, but when coupled

    with the other red ags below it raises serious concerns.

    Many o the companies eature company ofcers rom

    countries that do not list ownership o companies, such

    as Belize, Vanuatu, the Seychelles, the Marshall Islands

    and the British Virgin Islands.

    The bank transer documents oten log payments

    as apparent purchases o sports equipment, clothing

    or building materials, sometimes totalling hundreds

    o thousands o dollars in separate payments made

    over several days (or the transactions are listed as loan

    repayments). This is a classic laundering technique since

    these are inconspicuous items commonly traded in large

    quantities.

    Many o these transactions that look like payments

    or commercial and industrial goods between compa-

    nies trading with each other in the open market are in

    act between companies that are related to each otherthrough the company service providers that set them up.

    In some cases, the documents show money transerred

    rom one company to another, and then back again.

    The cumulative size o some o these transers is equiv-

    alent to a signicant proportion o the GDP o Kyrgyzstan.

    For example, just three companies, which appeared to be

    doing no real business in Kyrgyzstan, had US$1.2 billion

    move through their AUB accounts in less than two years

    more than a quarter o the countrys GDP in the year o

    the revolution.74

    The majority o the UK and New Zealand companies

    mentioned below led no account inormation at all to

    their company registries, despite, in the case o three UK

    companies (see case study 2), appearing to handle over a

    billion dollars o transactions.

    The ew remaining companies in the UK, as indicat-

    ed below, actually told Companies House that they were

    dormant. Two o them (see case studies 1 and 2) appear

    to have handled millions o dollars during their period

    o dormancy.

    The majority o the payments in the bank documents

    appear to be transers between shell companies and there

    is little record o any o these companies themselves car-

    rying out legitimate real business, e.g. manuacturing,

    selling, advising.75 According to a source knowledgeable

    with the case in Kyrgyzstan, investigations revealed at

    least 3,000 shell companies with accounts at AUB.76

    Global Witness has evidence that suggests that at least

    one o these companies may have been used as a pay-

    ment vehicle in a possible tax avoidance scheme. A NewZealand company mentioned below, Lenymar Limited,

    appears to have made over 1,300 transactions in just over

    a year.77 The majority o them appear to be suspicious

    transactions with other shell companies, some o which

    eature in this report. However, the SWIFT documents

    indicate that some payments were also made to legiti-

    mate companies whose businesses encompass a wide

    range o products and services.

    Global Witness contacted some o these rms. One com-

    pany, a Germany cleaning equipment company, said

    that a Russian chemical company had purchased clean-

    ing materials rom them and paid using unds rom an

    account held by Lenymar at AUB. However, another legit-

    imate German company that was also paid by Lenymar

    told Global Witness that it had no business with this

    Russian chemical company, and that its client in this

    case was another company based in Russia that had pur-

    chased uorescent light tubes.78

    I this inormation is accurate, it suggests that a range o

    dierent companies were using Lenymar to pay or goods

    and services in Europe or transportation to Russia. Why

    would Russian companies buying goods rom Germany

    use a Kyrgyz bank account in the name o a New Zealandcompany? One possibility might be in order to avoid tax.

    In 2006, the Russian Central Bank suggested that certain

    AUB transactions concealed payments or grey import

    schemes a way or clients in the ormer Soviet Union to

    avoid import tax (see page 59).

    The act that Lenymar a shell company registered in

    New Zealand79 had an account at AUB which was used

    by various Russian companies suggests that these pay-

    ments may all into this category. It also raises the pos-

    sibility that companies such as Lenymar could have

    been used or a variety o suspicious deals through AUB,including tax avoidance, and, potentially, because o the

    vast amounts o cash owing through them, as launder-

    ing vehicles. Obviously, it would require the powers o

    competent authorities to investigate this ully.

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    In summary, our investigations show that these

    companies were oten transacting with a group o

    companies not only whose ownership is hidden but

    who are related through the use o the same ofcers

    or same company services provider, and thus are

    likely to have been set up by one individual or group

    or a particular purpose.

    In an interview with a Kyrgyz news agency, Nadel deend-

    ed the act that many o his clients were oshore compa-

    nies: Oshore companies arent a carte blanche or steal-

    ing. The companies are [used] worldwide [] to minimize

    taxation o [these] structures owners. Look at the owner-

    ship structure o the ten largest banks in the world: their

    principal owners are oshore unds.80

    Nadel is not wrong about the extensive use o oshore

    companies or tax avoidance. The cross-border tax avoid-

    ance strategies o major multinationals are current-

    ly receiving growing media and policy attention. Theshell companies in this report do not obviously t into

    this category, since they do not appear to be subsidiaries

    o major businesses (unless any links to them are excep-

    tionally well hidden). They may, as the Lenymar example

    above shows, t into the category o smaller import-ex-

    port companies apparently using such payment vehicles

    to avoid their tax obligations.

    The point remains, though, that these companies do

    not appear to be carrying out any business in the real

    sense o oering a product or service and employing peo-

    ple; they are vehicles or moving money. Tax avoidance

    is one reason or moving money, and while it may all on

    the legal side o the illegal-legal divide, the mechanisms

    used to achieve it create pipelines or the movement o

    money that is denitely illegal: tax evasion, corruption

    and organised crime. I a shell company structure can be

    used or technically legal tax avoidance purposes, it can

    also be used to move entirely dirty money, as Raymond

    Baker so clearly pointed out in his book Capitalisms

    Achilles Heel.81

    This is why Global Witness believes that the shell com-

    pany structures that eature in this report are at the very

    least suspicious and support the allegations o money

    laundering at AUB. While no conclusions can be drawn

    as the origins o the money are unknown, t hey are cer-

    tainly worthy o urt her investigation. Unless otherwiseexplained, the red lags above suggest that these com-

    panies were mere shells and may have been created to

    hide other, perhaps illegal, activity. Nadels lawyer

    explained to us that, given Nadelss supervisory role as the

    chairman o AUB, he is unable to conrm or deny wheth-

    er the companies mentioned in this report had accounts

    at AUB.82

    Vanuatu: a paradise especially or those looking to set up a company anonymously.Photo: Atlantide Phototravel/Corbis

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    ii. How the companies are linked to each other

    This section sets out the evidence or one o the

    main red lags indicating suspicious activity by

    these companies: the way they are closely related

    through the service providers that set them up. Two

    case studies involving UK-registered companies pro-

    vide compelling examples o these connections, and

    demonstrate classic techniques o achieving hid-

    den company ownership. They also show how the

    nominee director industry makes a mockery o the

    UKs Companies Act. The legislation requires direc-

    tors to take responsibility or iling accurate com-

    pany accounts, yet nominees oten know next to

    nothing about the activities o the companies they

    represent.

    The AUB document lists the supposed transactions

    o seven companies. Five o them were registered in

    Kyrgyzstan: Tez Mobile, CTC Distributors, FurniservGroup, Eurohouse and Ganytime Goods.83 Under

    President Bakiyev, it became very di icult to discover

    even legal shareholding inormation (which some coun-

    tries list), let alone the real, benecial, owners o Kyrgyz-

    registered companies, and so proving links between these

    companies is impossible without urther inormation.

    The sixth company, Brasort Limited is registered in

    Belize, according to the AUB document. Belize also

    does not list owner inormation. This company was

    registered on 9 August 2007, according to Belize registry

    documents.84

    The nal company, Sorento Resources Ltd, is registered

    in the UK (see case study 1 below). According to docu-

    ments rom the Kyrgyz authorities seen by Global Witness

    in August 2010, all seven are suspected o being involved

    in suspicious nancial activity, although the authorities

    have not made public statements about them. Between

    them they supposedly sold shoes and clothing, metal

    products, cars and car parts, and nancial and consult-

    ing services.85

    The AUB document lists the transactions o these seven

    companies, which thereore gives us the names o dozens

    o other companies that these seven supposedly did busi-

    ness with. Global Witness has searched through various

    countries corporate registries to see i any o t he names

    match. O these dozens o other companies:

    At least ten match the names o companies registered

    in the UK. Global Witness is concentrating on ive o

    these which are lin ked to ot her companies mentioned

    in the AUB document through directorships, date or

    place o registration or through the company and indi-

    viduals that registered them. (The remaining ive also

    appear to be shell companies but do not have links to

    other companies that can be drawn through publicly

    CHAPTER 2: THE uSE OF SHELL COmPANiES FOR SuSPiCiOuS TRANSACTiONS

    Some o the UK companies were registered at mail-orwarding ofces, such as this one in London.Photo: Global Witness

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    CHAPTER 2: THE uSE OF SHELL COmPANiES FOR SuSPiCiOuS TRANSACTiONS

    available documents.) The ive we concentrate on are:

    Delanco Limited, Malvin Commodities Ltd, Sois Untek

    LLP, Sorento Resources Ltd and Velion Limited. O these, at

    least the last three appear to have had accounts at AUB.86

    Four companies appear to be registered in New Zealand

    (Cratur Viss Limited, Economic Group Limited, Lenymar

    Limited, Magali Limited) and one in Bulgaria (Rideks

    Consult).87 Again, these companies can be linked to the

    same company service providers that registered or admin-

    istered other companies mentioned in this report.88

    Five o them match the names o entities registered

    in Belize: Grexton Capital Ltd, Dovepark Limited, Merel

    Marketing Ltd, Leader Pro Limited, Aron Capital Ltd.89

    All six Belize-registered companies (including Brasort,

    whose transactions are listed in the AUB document)

    were registered between June 2006 and October 2008

    and appear to be linked to each other in two groups: all

    six share just two company service providers and tworegistered addresses: 1 Mapp Street and Suite 102, Blake

    Building, Belize.90 This second address orms a link to

    two UK companies, one mentioned by the Kyrgyz author-

    ities in a document seen by Global Witness and one on

    the AUB document.91 Suite 102, Blake Building is also

    the registered address o a shell company involved in

    another controversy in which it is alleged Maxim Bakiyev

    and his associates took over Kyrgyzstans largest mobile

    phone service provider (see page 56).

    The Kyrgyz authorities include the ollowing companies

    that held accounts at AUB as part o their investigation

    into suspicious nancial activity:

    A urther eleven companies registered in the UK which

    appear to have transerred money out o Kyrgyzstan

    as part o the alleged scheme at AUB: Aqvenor Ltd,*

    Avatroniks LLP, Demetra Consulting Ltd, Mastequest

    LLP, Mediton Limited, Nedox Limited, Novelta Limited,*

    Perect Partner Ltd, Taleord Limited, Velcona Limited*

    and Vestengold LLP*.

    Another our New Zealand-registered companies:

    Jorgentur Limited, Lenymar Limited,* Piar Active

    Limited,* and Merbayer & Co Limited.*92

    The asterisked companies also eature on the SWIFT

    transer documents. The others are not mentioned in

    the SWIFT or AUB documents, and we are there-

    ore relying on the Kyrgyz authorities investigationsthat they may be involved in suspicious transactions.

    However, Global Witness has ound links between all o

    these companies and others mentioned on the transac-

    tion documents independently rom the Kyrgyz author-

    ities or the SWIFT and AUB documents. This list is

    not even exhaustive: the SWIFT documents highlight

    many more companies that link to these entities. Global

    Witness has concentrated on the ones that appear to be

    signicant in terms o money transerred.

    The Blake Building, Belize City, Belize where some o the companies with suspicious transactions were registered.Photo: Global Witness

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    registered onthe same date

    registered onthe same date

    registered onthe same date

    THE COMPANYSERVICE PROVIDERSSEE PAGE 34

    Elisana Labonte Joahna AlcindorCinthia Alcindor

    Taleford Ltd(UK)

    Velion Ltd(UK)

    Novelta Ltd(UK)

    Mediton Ltd(UK)

    Nedox Ltd(UK)

    Velcona Ltd(UK)

    Dovepark Ltd(Belize)

    UnitedServices Ltd

    (Belize)

    Harris Overseas Ltd &Sky Management Company Ltd

    (Vanatu)

    Eriksonnel LLP(UK)

    Leader Pro Ltd(Belize)

    ParkvaleIndustries LLP

    (UK)

    Kintex Ltd(NZ)

    Nastek Ltd(NZ)

    Magali Ltd(NZ)

    EconomicGroup Ltd

    (NZ)

    Avatroniks LLP(UK)

    VestengoldLLP (UK)

    MastequestLLP (UK)

    Sofis UntekLLP (UK)

    MalvinCommodities

    Ltd (UK)

    Ian Taylor

    103 Sham Peng Tong Plaza(Seychelles)

    Suite 102, Blake Building(Belize)

    Apollo

    International(Seychelles)

    Chaplin, Bnddicte & Co

    (UK)

    GT Group Ltd(Vanuatu)

    registered NZ companies (including Kintex,Nastek and Magali) for Midland until October 2009

    registered atsame address

    registeredon same date

    director andshareholder

    employeeemployeeemployee

    initialdirector

    initialdirector

    initialdirector

    initialdirector

    secretary

    initialdirector

    initial directorwas employee of

    involved inregistration of

    worked for

    members of members of members of

    members of

    members of

    registered address was care of GT Group

    shareholders addresswas care of GT Group

    registered atsame address

    registered atsame address

    registered atsame address

    registeredaddress

    registeredaddress

    registeredaddress

    registeredaddress

    has two membersregistered at

    provided address forshareholders meeting

    provided address forshareholders meeting

    possibly works together,Seychelles offices situated

    next door to

    has a company secretary whoseaddress is

    head officelocated at

    CHAPTER 2: THE uSE OF SHELL COmPANiES FOR SuSPiCiOuS TRANSACTiONS

    CHART SHOWING THE LINKS BETWEEN THE COMPANIES WITH SUSPICIOUSTRANSACTIONS, THE MEGACOM COMPANIES (SEE PAGE 56)AND THE SERVICE PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN THEIR REGISTRATION

    In short, by analysing registration

    details Global Witness can nd links

    between more than twenty companies

    in the UK, New Zealand, Belize and

    Bulgaria, companies that at rst glance

    do not appear linked. All o t hem were

    registered in the same relatively short

    period o time, the majority rom 2006

    to 2009. This is an extraordinary situ-

    ation: many o these companies were

    supposedly carrying out commercial

    transactions such as the purchase o

    consumer goods, yet Global Witness

    has not been able to nd any ev idence

    that they were engaged in any mean-

    ingul real business. Moreover, they

    were linked to each other. The ollow-

    ing two case studies serve as a more

    detailed illustration; both show the

    extent to which the UK is acilitating

    such suspicious behaviour.

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    share same registeredoffice and registration

    agent

    share same registeredoffice and registration

    agent

    share same registeredoffice and Belize

    registration agent

    share sameregistered address

    Izeth Tapia

    SouthfieldManagement

    Ltd (Belize)

    MegaCom

    Vestatel UnitedLtd (NZ)

    MerelMarketing Ltd

    (Belize)

    Brasfort Ltd(Belize)

    GrextonCapital Ltd

    (Belize)

    AronCaptial Ltd

    (Belize)

    Perfect PartnerLtd (UK)

    Delanco Ltd(UK)

    DemetraConsulting Ltd

    (UK)

    Mita Consulting(BVI)

    SorentoResources Ltd

    (UK)

    Ridex Consult(Bulgaria)

    Aqvenor Ltd(UK)

    Lenymar Ltd(UK)

    Lenymar Ltd(NZ)

    Merbayer & CoLtd (NZ)

    Craftur VissLtd (NZ)

    Jorgentur Ltd(NZ)

    Mario Castillo

    Office 401, CenturyTower, Panama

    The Company Net(NZ)

    Midland Group

    (Cyprus, Russia, Panama)

    Piar Active Ltd(NZ)

    Volnegar Ltd(NZ)

    registeredon same date

    director andshareholder

    director andshareholder

    director and

    shareholder

    director and

    shareholder

    director and

    shareholder

    director and

    shareholder

    director and

    shareholder

    director and

    shareholder

    director andshareholder

    used asnomineedirector

    has used thisaddress in

    correspondance

    used as his address whenregistering companies

    directordirectordirectordirector

    employee

    shareholder shareholder shareholder shareholder

    indirectshareholder

    involved intakeover

    according toKyrgyz

    authorities

    indirectshareholder

    registered atsame address

    registered onsame date

    registered onsame date

    registered onsame date

    similarname

    registeredaddress

    registered atsame address

    involved inregistration of

    involved inregistration