government politics reading notes

7/27/2019 Government Politics Reading NOtes

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TA: [email protected]

Office hours: Tuesday 1230-130pm LEA 112-A

Conference Notes:

Does democracy have deep roots in Europe?o

Howard: Party of order vs party of movement is the way that Howard

deals with democracy. Talks about it specifically in regards to the

French Revolution and then applies it to Europe as a whole. Not

necessarily to say that the two don’t interact in some way, more

evident in Mazower stuff. Especially with the liberal authoritarian bit,

intellectual class of the 19th century. They see individual rights as an

important thing but not necessarily democracy.

o Retroactivity of law. It applies for the future

Government & Politics Notes:

Lecture #2:

European political development

Long 19th century:

o

1789-1945

o Makes a claim that there is an organized logic to this period.

o

Begins in revolution (French) and ends in war.

o Period marked by domestic political instability across most of

Europe and recurring interstate wars/conflict.

o Some consequences of French Revolution having enduring

repercussions on European political history in 19th and 20th

century.o

Central implications of FR:

Intent at reform begins the FR. Motives and goals of

those seeking to influence French politics. Revolution

begins as an attempt to constitutionally limit the power

of the absolutist monarch in France.

Early stages: goal is to not do away with the principle of

monarchy but to liberalize the monarchy and impose

constitutional limits on the powers of the French

monarchy.

Often the case in attempts at reform process that

can’t be completely managed In this instance, reform quickly becomes a

movement for deeper kinds of transformation—

social and political.

Reform gives way to a more radical challenge to

the French regime.

That transition from reform to revolution is

associated with “democratic republicanism”

mailto:[email protected]





The introduction of republican ideas radicalizes

the movement in France and it’s from these ideas

that we get the full-blown FR.

Republican Ideas in the French context.

Distinguishing Republican commitments

o

1. Radical republicans are suspicious ofrepresentative government.

o

Favor direct democracy

o

2. Resistant and suspicious to

professional standing armies ideal is to

depend on citizen militias

o 3. Commitment to a form of patriotism

(civic patriotism)

6 things bout Republican movement in FR and why it

matters for all of Europe:

It was a challenge not just to French institutions

but to institutions across Europe. Republicans in France don’t just want to

constitutionally limit the French monarchy but

do away with it all.

o Moving towards in effect a republican

constitution.

o That does not recognize the priority or

superiority of a hereditary monarch.

o A liberal in the same circumstance may

not be inclined to do away with the

monarch together, a liberal seeks to

constitutionally limit.o

British monarchy is a classical liberal

monarchy (republicans in France could

not do with this)

2nd important feature antimonarchical and

anti-Catholic. Wanted to break social and

cultural hegemony in France, monarch and

church support each other and thus both have to

go. They’re imagining French society and politics

centered on devotion to the republic as opposed

to the church.

Points 1 and 2 gives you 3: republicanism is

more than a liberal challenge

o

Liberals can live with a constitutionally

limited monarch and make their peace

with their organized religion. Both of

which republicans cannot. Fearing the

social power of Catholicism.



4:

o

French republicanism attempts to break

with the French past altogether.

o

New calendar introduced for example and

attempt to introduce a new social

etiquette. All in the interest ofconsolidating republican virtue.

o Distinction between virtue and

corruption. Virtue motivates and has to

be consolidated.

5th and 6th points:

o Projection of republican principles on

Europe as a whole in the revolutionary

and post-revolutionary period.

o

European wide implications—implicit

attack on monarchy and Catholicism

wherever found in Europe. Importantorganizing principles across Europe.

o

6th: French revolution and its republican

principles are modular… something that

can be diffused through a process of

imitation.

o Think of Howard’s reading here.

o

Republicanism:

French revolution is an incomplete revolution in terms

of French politics.

Revolutionary forces are powerful enough to push

institutions of old regime not completely off thehistorical stage but towards the edge.

Not powerful enough to completely control French

politics. Powerful enough to change things, but not

powerful enough to instill republican ideas without

question.

Forces of order vs the forces of movement.

Polarizes French politics in French society.

Indication of polarization: Produces a long

history of domestic political instability. Never

completely solves the question about how

France would be governed politically.

How many regimes have their been? There have

been attempts to push back republican ideas.

Division in thought about how France would be

governed.

Highlights the challenges to and limits of

democratic republicans



o

End of the long 19th century (1945)

End of WWII, why it matters?

Marks military defeat of fascism

Fascism was a political option that emerged in the

interwar period. A powerful and supported political

option. And appears could not be defeated domesticallythrough electoral politics or domestic challenges to

fascism. Fascism ended in Europe upon the defeat of the

Fascist powers, literally took a war.

Marks the rehabilitation of Germany: a leading kind of

issue going forward from 1945 onwards. Germany

mattered so much for 2 kinds of reasons leading in

different directions: Germany and France fought 3 wars,

Franco-Prussian, WWI, WWII, so Germany in a sense

had a history of aggressive foreign policy from its

origins. The success of Germany in the Franco-Prussian

war was closely associated with the formation of theGerman state, relatively late in historical time. Yet

considered an aggressor and needed to solve the

German problem (aggressive foreign policy) onward.

Dilemma was that the German economy was the

linchpin, or industrial heart, of European economy.

Important for the economic reconstruction of Europe

post 1945.

So had to find a way to rehabilitate Germany and

encourage reconstruction in Europe given Germany’s

importance in the European economy.

Cap German industrialization, keeping it weak as aneconomic power, would be one solution to the

aggressor problem. But remember the dilemma of

European reconstruction.

To solve the dilemma: Allow reindustrialization, but

find ways of binding German economy to other

economies in Europe in ways unprecedented. Bringing

it into something larger than itself. --> Seed of the

current European Union.

What emerged in an institutional way known as the

European coal and steel community 1951—seedbed for

European Economic Community and eventually theEuropean Union.

1945 onwards—consolidation of democracy in 3

important cases:

Germany, Italy, France.



Important going forward from 1945 was

consolidating democracy precisely because it

had failed in the interwar period.

In all 3 cases, democratic consolidation was

associated with the creation of republican

constitutions.

Lecture #3:

Howard captures tension introduced in Euro politics as a consequence of

the French Revolution

o

Party of order vs party of movement

o

Associated with republican challenges to old regimes

o When Howard says party he’s talking about the emergence of

tendencies in euro politics.

o

Draws attention to the fact that this conflict is civil war

Consequence of this tension is domestic political instability. What type of regime should we live under?

Contest between movement and order also influences foreign policies.

Forces of counterrevolution expressed in domestic politics and interstate

relations.

1789-1945 historical turning points within:

o tend to be connected to revolutions, wars and peace settlements

o

1789

o 1815 congress of Vienna

an attempt to contain the corrosive effects of democratic

republicanism on old regimes.

An expression of monarchial solidarity 2 functions: ends Napoleonic wars and peace settlement

controlled and organized by monarchs.

o 1848 Series of failed social revolutions across Europe.

Pickup certain themes introduced in FR period.

o

1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War

Important why… important part of the formation of the

German state in the early part of the 1870s.

Consolidates a place for Prussia in the newly formed Germany

state.

Marks the transition to the third republic in France.

And the Third republic will prove to be the most sustainedform of political regime in post revolutionary France for the

19th and most of the 20th century.

o 1917: Russian Revolution

o

1918- WWI ends

Begins the collapse of 3 important empires (important

imperial organizations)

Austro-Hungarian empire



Ottoman Empire

Russian Empire

Formation of new group of states in the remnants of the

empires.

o 1933:

Coming to power peacefully of Hitler in Germanyo 1945: WWII ends, long 19th century ends.

o

Tremendous amount of challenge and discontinuity in this period.

o

One enduring feature of European politics in this period:

How should European states be governed?

What form of democratic rule or autocratic rule? Autocracy vs

Democracy?

One constant is simply the importantce of territorial state in

European politics.

Most basic organizing feature in euro politics

Principal of the territorial state is consolidated

Emphasizing the distinction between state and regime. Regimes are not states. States are more basic.

o

Illustration: France and regime changes

characterizing France post 1789: several forms

of autocratic rule and 5 republics tremendous

change in terms of regime and political rules in

which the French live under.

o

A regime provides the political rules of the

game… distinction between autocracy and

democracy

o Despite all this, borders of the French state

remain relatively constant throughout the long19th century.

o

State is territorial, regime is a set of political

rules.

Consolidation of the state system:

Need to make distinction between domestic hierarchy

and interstate anarchy.

States are categorized and defined by concentrated

political power at their center.

States are sovereign at the apex of the state is

concentrated power associated with the legitimate useof violence within territorial or state boundaries.

And we measure the success of the state to the extent of

maintain sovereign authority within borders.

States are sovereign actors/units, and that’s what he

means by domestic hierarchy.



And we measure state capacity to the extent that it’s

able to extend control from the center to its borders

(periphery)

o

What society looks like within a state

European society:

o

Lacks a sovereign power at the European levelequivalent to sovereign power at the state level.

That’s the contrast between domestic hierarchy

and interstate anarchy.

o Interstate anarchy refers to a state in which no

sovereign power is present.

States are a constant feature of European political life.

Democracy is not a constant however.

Democracy only moves towards fairly full consolidation in

Europe in 1945. Under challenge from 1789-1945.

Mazerov points out that democracy is not a European birth

right, something that had to be achieved slowly over time.Democratization as a kind of process that’s only consolidated

relatively late in historical time.

Democratic forces for change are not powerful enough

to become hegemonic

o 1945:

Fascism is replaced by democracy in important cases but it

takes a interstate war to defeat fascism

Powerful enough domestically that it takes such a war.

Tells you something about the degree of its important in

interwar period.

Difficult to push off historical stage.

Occupation of Germany and entrenchment of the distinction in

euro politics between east and west.

Germany is occupied after 1945 by the Allied powers, it

is divided eventually along the lines of allied powers.

Soviet sector etc

Becomes the rough basis of division of west and east

Germany.

Occupation and eventual division is associated with the

cold war.

Why occupation and division between east and westmattered going forward?

o Western pattern of political development post

1945:

Tend to see successful democratic

consolidation, pattern of development

centered around the importance of states,

states tend to have relatively stable



territorial boundaries (connected to 2nd

point), economies of the west are market

economies, and for the most part these

are political systems in the west in which

radical politics tend to be mainstream and

disciplined. + 1945 will initiate “longpeace” period the elimination of

interstate wars, very few full blown civil

wars. “incrementalism” change that

occurs incrementally and peace built over

time.

o

Eastern pattern of political development:

Democratic transition delayed and

consolidation of democracy incomplete.

Hybrid political regimes found in the

eastern side, not fully authoritarian nor

democratic, combining features of both. Especially the case in the East after

the collapse of communism 1989-

1990

The regimes are hardly fully

consolidated democratic

regimes “competitive

authoritarian regimes”

Development tends to not be state led.

Soviet Union imperial structure.

States that were apart of the

empire, their interests and needstended to be subordinated to the

foreign policy interests of the USSR.

States in the soviet bloc tended to

lack internal and external

sovereignty just because of their

subordinated position.

Planned economies controlled by the

party state.

Model of change that characterizes

political development in the east, a

pattern of change in which we get long

periods of stability followed by a period

of rupture.

As a consequence of the collapse of the

USSR, you will see something very

unusual in post 1945 euro politics

ethnic wars emerging in Baltics.



New states emerge…tremendous

territorial change after 1989.

Formation of new states in a process of

succession.

State of still prime importance in Western Europe.

Lecture # 4:

Still following outline for lecture 1, still going on about the end of

the long 19th century.

Monday discussing about states and territory, meaning by Monday

to read Philpot under topic 1.

Should be through Howard and Mazower.

Democratic consolidation in the west: how politics in three

important cases changed going forward from 1945

What happened in the immediate aftermath of the end of WWII.

Democratic consolidation in the west:

o Why are we interested in these cases? Germany and Italy…

Cases with complete democratic breakdowns in the 20s

and 30s. two classic cases of Nazism in Germany and

fascism in Italy

o

France matters, allied side in the war and never completely

collapses in democratic terms, but experiences an

important degree of political instability in the 30s

connected to challenges from the extreme right to the

democratic institutions of the third republic. o Cant say democracy completely collapsed for France then.

o

Was a period in which France was occupied and the

occupied forces, the German, are working with the Vichy

government.

o

There were significant forces in france who thought it was

preferable to live under nazi occupation, that under

institutions of a democratic republic.

o Must recognize the direction in which these three cases

move after 1945

o Process and pattern of consolidation points:

In all 3 cases, what emerges is a form of republicangovernment. France puts in place a new republican

constitution. 1946 marks the transition to the 4th

republic in France. Short lived 4th republic though.

Italy puts in place the constitution of the first Italian

republic. From 1946 on, Italy is organized under a

republican constitution, big break from the past:



1870-1871 emerges as a state, organized as a

constitutional monarchy, a liberal one.

This is replaced in 1922 by Fascist

government

1946, the republican question in Italian

politics is resolved once and for all. They geta republican constitution done as a result of a

national referendum

West Germany organized also as a republic

important break to some extent with the German

past.

Emerges as a state in latter part of 19th

century imperial monarchy, a conservative

form of monarchial rule

Short period of republican government in

Germany in the 1920s, Weimar republic…

short lived and collapses into nationalsocialist rule

The constitution of West Germany, the base

of law of 1945 entrenches a republican

political regime.

Republican question settled in all 3 cases.

These are the firsts set of points

o The modernizing coalitions that led this process of political

reconstruction in these 3 cases:

Italy and France modernizing coalition…. The

political factions that contributed to political

modernization.

3 political coalitions in Italy and France:

Christian democrats

Socialists

Communists

Lead in initial phase of modernization

because: They have a lot of political

credibility because of the contribution they

made to domestic resistance to fascist rule in

Italy or nazi occupation and vichy

government in France. Political fractions that were an important

part to the French and Italian resistance to

Authoritarian rule.--> able to cash that in at

the end of WWII.

Presence of Christian democrats in these

modernizing coalitions is very important for

both countries: provides some reassurance to



Catholics in both nations that the new

republican governments will not be anti-

Catholic: remember earlier point-describing

republicanism in Europe tended to have anti-

Catholic orientations. Helps reconcile

Catholics to republican government. Socialists and Communists important

elements for the resistance, but the presence

of communists in the modernizing coalitions

in Italy and France is relatively short lived.

Late 1940s’ communist political party

excluded from political forces that are

pursuing an agenda of modernization.

Excluded politically, but never legally banned,

contrasting to west Germany.

o Means that for Italy and France going

forward, communism is a veryimportant political and social force

even if excluded from government in

these cases until the 1980s.

Communist party is so powerful in these

cases because it has deep roots in society and

economy in Italy and France, the communist

party in Italy and france is very closely

associated with powerful trading roots.

Why were they excluded so quickly though?

o

Consequence of their exclusion, the

modernizing coalitions that resultafter the communists are pushed off,

they are relatively moderate and

relatively centrist in political terms.

o 3 things that account for their

exclusion:

external pressure from

American interests and

American government.

Concerned with

encouraging political

moderation

Encourage both Italian

and French

governments to exclude

communists from

political power and they

have a tremendous



amount of influence in

terms of their

importance to economic

reconstruction post WII:

These domestic communist

parties became suspect as thecold war deepened:

Exclusion to some extent in

part a consequence of self-

exclusion, important elements

within communist movement,

both trading in party, that saw

participation in “bourgeois

government” as apathetical to

the identity of communist

challenges to industrial

capitalism. The more theycooperated/participated, the

radical commitments of

communism would be diluted.

The fear of cooption.

What you get going forward is

a typical modernizing coalition

that’s relatively politically

centrist, and in Italy and

Germany and to some extent

France, the key party which

emerges, the party that’lldominate Italian and German

politics inn particular, some

extent French politics, is

Christian democratic parties.

Dominating Italian

politics well into 1970s

as well

Influence of Christian

democratic party in

decline for France, in

1960s it is squeezed out,a centrist party that gets

caught between the

polarization of French

politics on a left-right

kind of dimension.



Important point for now

is that Christian

democracy is a force for

moderation, reconciles

Catholics who had

feared republicangovernment and

dominates political

reconstruction in Italy

and Geramny.

o

Communist party in Germany was

banned. even stronger commitment

to moderation and to some extent a

consequence of foreign pressure, and

consequence of the fact that Germany

was occupied by Allied powers and

had much greater interest inintervening in the reconstruction of

Germany than they did in Italy and

France. What would be encouraged

going forward was political

moderation, allied powers made sure

of that.

By 1945: Western Europe in general is

democratically consolidated. Taken a long

time.

Process of democratization consolidated by

1945 Socialists not a force in German politics until

1960s (Answered question asked in class)

Exceptions to democratic consolidations:

France is only fully democratically

consolidated after the transition rom the 4th

to the 5th republic. Tremendously important

phase in French political history.

o Formation of the 5th republic in France

which ends the republican question.

o 1958-1960s rocky road in politics, an

attempted coup’detat and what’s

running through all of this is the crisis

of decolonization in Algeria. The

solution of the decolonization in

Algeria is closely connected to the

formation of the 5th republic



Spain and Portugal undergo transitions from

Authoritarian rule in the 1970s.

o

Transition in Portugal connected to a

colonial crisis

o

The transition in Spain is connected to

the death of a long-time dictator,Franco.

o 3 features of the transitions in Spain

and Portugal from Authoritarian to

democratic rule.

Drawing a comparison with

democratic transition as a

consequence of the collapse of

the Soviet Union, these

transitions in Spain and

Portugal are fairly strictly

understood as politicaltransitions, not dual transitions.

Transition out of a form of

authoritarian rule but also an

economic transition from

planned to market economy.

More difficult to manage dual

transitions, in spain and

Portugal they were not dual

transitions. Their economies

were already capitalist

economies. Economies thatweren’t planned in the soviet

sense, corporatist economies.

2nd thing to say about these

transitions, comment about

Spain, these are democratic

transitions that occur without

any change to state boundaries.

Comparing to the collapse of

communism in USSR which

produced new states, and

didn’t happen in Spain. Andinteresting for Spain because

Spain is multinational, and the

course of 20th century Spanish

History is punctuated by

challenges from the Basques

and the Catalans to centralize

Spanish rule. Both Basques and



Catalans did not fundamentally

challenge the integrity of the

territorial boundaries of Spain

during the transition 1976-

1979 because it feared that

might make democratictransition more difficult. They

are doing it now though.

Remember comparative

reference point here, collapse

of soviet union.

Third point: Portugal becomes

a democratic republic; Spain

will be organized as a

constitutional monarchy with a

limited practical role for the

monarch. Vision of a federal Europe:

o Talking about the origins of the interests of economic and

political integration.

o 1st lesson involved trying to answer the question of what to

do with Germany. Three European wars involving Germany.

An interest in permanent settlement in the German

problem. Looking for a permanent solution to the

problem of Franco-German relations.

o

2nd lesson that some policy makers drew looking back:

1930s characterized by a series of trade wars

between and among European states. Increasedtariff protection.

Intuition going forward from that observation,

Europe has to find a way to encourage economic

independence, it has to be entrenched in some

fashion going forward to remove the ability or

incentive to use tariffs as an economic instrument of

foreign policy.

o

3rd lesson:

Argument about the downside of state sovereignty

the intuition is that state sovereignty should not be

absolute post 1945.

An argument that Europeans have to find a way to

weaken the distinction between interstate anarchy

and domestic hierarchy.

If you want to establish permanent peace, you have

to escape interstate anarchy.

And you do that by building supranational political

authority above states, the linchpin.



Very different way of political organization in

Europe.

The difficulty is that it might be desirable but it is in

the short term not feasible to directly move towards

supranational authority above states. And one of the

readings makes this point, no common language,long history of national rivalries, and deeply

embedded national traditions. So how do you move

towards the construction of the appropriate type of

institutions at the supranational level?

Solution: You pursue political integration,

supranational political integration peacefully and

incrementally, not all at once.--> political integration

something to be accomplished over a long time

horizoin. It also implies you have to approach the

problem of integration indirectly. So what you do is

the third point: You begin with small steps that involve

cooperation in relatively narrow economic

areas. What you hope for through time is the

emergence of political integration. Economic

integration is going over time to lock states in,

difficult to turn back, an argument of a kind

of path dependence. The more deeply

integrated economies are the more likely it is

they will buy political necessity and develop

an interest in sharing political authority.

visionary point of view held by thoseimagined something different for Europe

politically in the future, basically a federal

Europe.

So pay attention to the lessons, and how

those lessons were applied + strategic

thinking of how economic integration was to

contribute to political integration.-->

European Coal and Steel community An

economic instrument with political goals in

mind, a step that will lock members into

deeper forms of integration, the seedbed for

the European Union.

END.

Lecture #5:

Midterm is October 15th, Wednesday after thanksgiving Monday. Short essay

format, he’ll give us more information later on.



Done with Howard and Mazower, Moving on to Philpott

Should be reading Philpott and Bunce this week.

Moving towards the end of Topic 1 and starting to leave behind the long 19th

century.

Going to start to talk about the European state system. Today and

Wednesday, moving on to discussion of Bunce reading and division of eastand west in contemporary politics.

Taking the territorial state as the basic structure of European politics.

o To this point in the discussion of the long 19th century, we have talked

about how Europe might be politically organized, thought in terms of

different political regimes.

o Some form of autocratic, democratic regime or somewhere in

between.

o Under what were the regime alternatives for European politics?

o

Democracy as a political regime was only fully consolidated in

Western Europe in 1945 w/ some exceptions.

o

We can think about regimes as specifications of the rules of thepolitical game. While states refer to the territorial lines.

o But there’s nothing in the definition of the political regime whom the

rules apply to

o

Over whom will these rules hold?

o

What type of political regime is most appropriate? We are asking a

question about how political relations should be organized within

states. States are a constant in European political life. There is lots of

churning European politics post 1789 around this question about

appropriate type of political regime. But there’s one feature of

European politics that goes relatively unchallenged in the long 19th

century importance of territory in politics and the importance ofthe state as an expression of territorial politics. States are the basic

structure of European society, there will be limits or qualifications we

might introduce to that proposal of proposition. But they are

relatively marginal.

o

When we say that the state is the most basic political structure in

Europe by extension implying that the state is the most basic

political structure in international society in general.

An argument that the state as a principal of political

organization is something that can be exported, imitated, and

replicated elsewhere.

The origins of the importance of the state in intl. society has its

own origins in the emergence of the territorial state in

European political history.

o States do have a historical origin- philpott argues.

o

Once the state system is consolidated becomes kind of political

equilibrium suggesting that it becomes something relatively

difficult to change or challenge.



o

This equilibrium ties political order to territory. A sticky

equilibrium very difficult to change, challenged at the margins only.

o

Imagine what a political equilibrium would be like that supplied order

without states. We tend to take states as something natural and

associate with thte supply of order

o

Territorial states have 3 important characteristics: Centralized.

Specialized.

Monopolize the legitimate use of force within their territories.

o

Some challenges to the importance of the principal of the state but as

he has indicated they have tended to be marginal.

o

These challenges are:

One challenge is anarchism a political commitment to try to

find a way to supply political order without the centralize

specialized agencies of the state.

Of some historical importance in terms of radical

democracy and some forms of socialism in the 19th century

As a credible alternative to the challenge of the state has

withered away in European politics.

Commitment to pluralism a pluralist tries to hollow out the

state from within. To break the centralizing control of the state

within its borders, at least by limiting it or diluting it. Like

attempts to regionalize politics so that state authority and

power is devolved from special agencies at the center, to the

regional elected assemblies of some kind. That kind of

pluralism is associated with federalism… a federal state is still

a state but a federal state is not characterized by a centralpower at the apex of the state.

Another example of pluralism is attempts to preserve

the autonomy of associations in civil society= hollowing

out the state.

Forms of transnational organizations and institutions the

institutions of European integration. Especially those

institutions that we associate with supranational institutions,

institutions that exist above the member states of the EU and if

these institutions work successfully they limit the power and

capacity of member states. EU is just one.

One kind of challenge to the state system which isn’t really

those movements within the peripheries of existing states that

seek through a process of succession to form a new state.

Succession is in some ways a politically conservative force as it

doesn’t challenge the principal of the state, it simply

reproduces the organizing logic of societies of states.

o

This is why states matter.



Philpott:

o

Gives us an argument about the origins of the European system of

states.

o

Interesting twist in what he wants to argue. There’s a conventional

part and one that’s more original.

o

First part of Philpott’s argument:

Draws on whole book not just required reading

Origins of the system of sovereign states in Europe can be

found in the Peace of Westphalia… series of peace treaties

signed in the middle part of the 17th century everyone has

argued that in some way

o

2nd part of his argument:

Westphalia is primarily a byproduct of the protestant

reformation.

No protestant reformationno peace of Westphalia no

consolidation of the state system in the middle part of the 17th

century.

The peace of Westphalia is a real critical juncture, a before and

after. Not just an incremental mile markera fundamental

break from the past. Puts European politics on a new direction

not available before the peace treaty.

Westphalia is robust i.e. the provisions of the treaty continue to

endure today and to have consequences. 400 years after the

treaty was signed.

Peace of Westphalia is a peace settlement that ended wars of

religion, it removes religion as a cause of war between states in

Europe. A peace settlement which ends wars of religion. And

consists of three treaties signed in 1648, treaties that ended 3wars, one between Spain and Netherlands, another between

holy roman emperor and Sweden and one that ended war

between France and holy Roman empire.

Peace of Westphalia has 4 important elements that organize

political life going forward in basic ways:

The principals of Westphalia are intended to apply to all

of Europe. That’s despite the fact that the signatories to

these treaties were major powers. The principals were

to extend to Europe as a whole.

It rejected universal papal and imperial authority in

favor of state authority.

Westphalia treats states as formally equal.

Westphalia contributes to the principal of non-

intervention of one state in the internal affairs of

another state.

In a nutshell what Westphalia entrenches is the distinction

between domestic hierarchy and interstate anarchy.



States are equal, autonomous and they are not subject to any

overarching authority or sovereign power.

From these principals, flow 2 basic questions that orient a

great deal of political through from 1648 going forward:

How in the absence of an overarching sovereign

authority can peace be maintained among states? Itremoves religion as a cause of war but does not

diminish other causes of war precisely because of the

absence of sovereign authority between and among

states.

How in the presence of centralized political authority

within states might abuses of authority be limited?

Those are classic questions of normative and political

theory.

The peace of Westphalia is an event, an episode.

The peace of Westphalia is a result of a very specific quarrel

between Protestants and Catholics an argument aboutdoctrine and faith within the Catholic Church, an argument that

quickly becomes politicized. It’s the ideas in dispute between

Catholics and Protestants, the protest propositions that

provide the connection between religious conflict and the

reformation and the principals of Westphalia as just outlined.

There’s something about the protestant challenge to

Catholicism that enabled the emergence of a system of states.

Important points:

Westphalia consolidates a process of historical change;

it’s an event that crystalized a long-term process of

historical change. It’s a settlement that comes after a series of wars. In a

sense t hat’s why I call it a political equilibrium,

consequence of negotiations among parties that

produced an agreement.

Westphalia elevates the state and diminishes empire.

Dooms the long-term longevity of the Holy Roman

empire.

Westphalia as a religious settlement non-intervention

principal of Westphalia had a very particular theological

meaning no intervention to contest religion within

another ruler’s territory non-intervention emerged as

a principal in a religious context. That’s the principal

Philpot argues that removes religion as a cause of war.

Next point is an extension of last point takes the

settlement to be a protestant victory because it allowed

wide parts of Europe to remain protestant. And the



political device that protected Protestants was the

principal of sovereign statehood (important point).

Qualification to P’s argument:

o

Basic counterfactual argument of what would

happen historically under different

circumstances.o

What he is arguing is that without the

reformation, the principal of sovereign statehood

might well have become entrenched in European

politics but would have occurred much later in

historical time. The long run tendency of political

development in Europe was towards

convergence on the principal of sovereign states.

But this process was crystalized in a particular

way in the middle part of the 17th century as a

consequence of the terms of the settlement.

Point 8: the content of protestant theology counts inunderstanding the origins of the state system, core

ideas in the reformation which connect it to the

reformation of Westphalia.

Leading to 9th point: when Protestants challenge

Catholicism, they challenge in part how Catholicism is

politically organized. The protestant heresy is a

challenge to universal religion and political form

associated with this universal religion. Challenge

theology of Catholicism and in doing so they challenge

the connection between Catholicism and a universal

empire. Do so in the following way: the reformationimplies a very different form of political organization

than the organization associated with the holy roman

empire, it implies national churches organized within a

territory, dependent upon a territorial government, and

it further implies the transfer of the churches temporal

powers to secular rulers. The reformation in other

words implies sovereignty of states. In an intrinsic

connection between reformation theology and an

interest in sovereignty.

10th point: this is a settlement of a war and war’s have

winners and losers. So how do you understand the way

that forces broke politically during the war, and the

eventual outcome of the negotiations that we produced

the treaties that we associate with the peace of

Westphalia. They break in very clear ways. Those who

fought for Westphalia are uniformly protestant

Netherlands, German protestant states, and Sweden.



And important feature of these cases is that each

experienced a reformation crisis in the middle part of

the 16th century. These are the states that determined

the terms. Who fought against? Those parts in which the

protestant reformation were either unsuccessful or

eventually rolled back via a process ofcounterreformation. Where the protestant challenges

was ruled back, including: those parts of German that

were catholic, Spain, Italy, and Poland. This is how the

forces lined up and they fought a series of sustained

wars around issues of religion as a consequence of the

protestant challenge to the old way.

The case or country who decided who would win:

where France would ally itself. France interesting case.

o France experiences the protestant reformation,

but attempt to rollback protestant reformation in

France. That counterreformation in France isnever as successful as it was in Spain, Italy and

Poland. And France is a sense divided, can go

either way but opts to support protestants in the

wars of religion because it sees advantage for

France unconnected to religion, an opportunity

to advance its interests if it plays its cards in this

way notions of “raison d’etat”

We have identified one important challenge to

organized Catholicism: the protestant challenge that

originates as a heresy. But there is a different kind of

challenge to Catholicism in a different context:republican challenges.

o

Republicanism becomes a way to challenge

organized Catholicism in those societies in which

the protestant reformation is unsuccessful or

rolled back. Think of the cases where

republicanism in the 19th and earlier 20th

centuries where its a real challenge to

Catholicism. Catholics vs republicans… especially

Catholics supportive of a monarchy of some kind.

Countries with deep division between Catholics

vs republicans. Three cases come to mind wherethe republican question is very important in this

time period

France, Spain, Italy.

In all of these cases, cases in which

society still are predominately catholic

you get challenges to Catholicism that



don’t take the form of protestant, but

republicanism.

Lecture #6: (September 17, 2014)

o

Reading notes on mycourses and some lecture material from topic 1.

o

Should be finishing Philpott and starting B he’ll be starting B on

Mondayo

Recapping some bit from last class.

o Pursue a point made last class, a before Westphalia and after

Westphalia.

o

An event centered explanation of the origin of the state system in

Europe, or an argument about how historical process crystalizes in

the middle part of the 17th century a capstone to a longer process to

historical change and political revolution in Europe. State formation

as a process and not event.

o Two different types of states distinction that matter in how we

interpret early modern European political history.

Rational/legal states and patrimonial states.o

East- West divide in political history and the way it ties into types of

states.

o

Recap:

Core of Westphalia the importance of the sovereignty of

states. Have implications for how they are organized

domestically and how they interact in a society of states.

Emphasize that for P, state sovereignty is a protestant

device/invention. A commitment that protects the

organization of protestant churches and belief.

Emphasize the importance for P, of the timing of Westphalia

and by timing we mean the link of reformation and pece ofWestphalia. The conversion to the idea of sovereign state

comes shortly after the arrival of Protestantism.

The powers that fight for Westphalia are cases in which

reformation crisis is closely tied to their interest in

participation. German protestant states, NL, Sweden and

against that group of powers we have a series of powers

closely connected to the holy roman empire and Catholicism

Spain, Italy Poland. Catholic German principalities

Every polity that came to have an interest in a system of

sovereign state had experienced a strong reformation crisis.

And the powers that are pitted against these are cases in whichthe reformation did not take deep rote or were pushed back by

counterreformation.

This is a political settlement of religious wars—also a political

equilibrium a result of interaction among states that

becomes very difficult to dislodge. It’ll have knock -on

consequences for centuries. Very hard to imagine an

alternative to what this political equilibrium implies, it implies



that political order is going to be state centered moving

forward. States are critical to the supply of political order.

Exceptions to note about the centrality and endurance

of the principal of state centered political order

o

2 contemporary ways in which you might think

this principal is in some ways being challengedor being limited in contemporary Europe.

o The institutions of the European Union can be

taken to be a kind of challenge to or limit to

sovereign state authority

Counter to that: simply to propose that

the institutions of the EU still depend on

states. In 2 simple ways: the dominant

actors that matter in the EU continue to

be states, and you can think of the

European Union as constituted by a series

of treaties signed by member states.

Not to say that the process of political

integration is simply a reproduction of

state power, there are ways in which the

EU limits the capacity of sovereign states.

So we should not exaggerate the limits

associated with the institutions of the

European Union.

State sovereignty is still such an

important principal in euro politics

challenge for depending of the EU

One thing to widen it by bringingmore states in but deepening

means imposing more limits on

sovereign power of states.

o

The process of new state formation as a

consequence of succession:

Scotland, Catalonia, Basque, Flanders… all

places in which there is some interest in

devolution of political power from central

authority to these regions or complete

withdrawal of territory to form a new

state. These are cases that reproduce the

principal of the state. What they imagine

is an international society composed of

new states, not one organized around a

different set of constiuit principals.



Scotland for example reemphasizes the

importance of the state. Reorganizes the

logic.

Moving on to before Westphalia topic:

o

Philpott:

What Philpott is interested in is emphasize the importance ofideas in politics in general, and in international politics. By

doing so, he’s trying to playdown the importance of structures,

enduring structures that shape political outcomes.

Ideas that matter to him are the ideas of protestant

reformation, but you cant explain all of politics in terms of

structures and institutions; you need to focus on ideas.

Giving us a counter to what Philpott is arguing both about the

reformation and ideas in abstract theoretical terms. Giving us a

sense of the origins and evolutions of the state system as a

process, an argument that pays attention to structure more

than ideas. In this perspective Westphalia matters, but it is acapstone of a long process of historical change. You need to

grasp the logic of this process, but cant if you just focus on

ideas.

Before Westphalia:

Politically organized as an empire, the empire closely

connected to the catholic church, and in economic terms

this period of European History (12th century -17th

century) organized in a futile system, futile mode of

production.

Why does this matter?

o

Empire: Philpott argues that Westphaliadiminishes empire and elevates the state, Empire

as a principal of political organization is

beginning to be pushed off the historical stage.

What matters about Empire for philpott: it

doesn’t have fixed territorial parameters + very

difficult to identify places where political

sovereignty is concentrated, hard to find

supreme center of political authority, a political

mosaic as Philpott describes metaphorically.

Implies a set of political jurisdictions that

tend to overlap

In other words: before states begin to

emerge, there is no effective distinction

between domestic and international

politics. And that’s what changes with

Westphalia.



12thcentury-1648 and what we want to try to identify

are the forces of change and evolution that allowed

Westphalia to be such a critical point (capstone).

So we want to identify different forms of political

organization that began to emerge, ones that were

different from empire… one of those forms would be thestate.

o

Want to know the options/alternatives to the

state, then explain how the state came to

dominate.

o

So we need to identify some kind of change in

this period, some macro change that allowed

new political options to emerge, options

organized differently than structure of an empire.

o

What most identify as the shock that opened up

possibilities: a period or phase of economic

expansion in European economy. Tradeincreases dramatically, period in which

economic division of labor becomes specialized

and differentiated, and third a process of change

that produces a much greater rate of urban

growth/urbanization. An exogenous change in

European economy that results in the growth of

towns.

o Urbanization occurs in three patterns in the

context of early modern Europe and it’s those

patterns that are associated with different forms

of political organization.o There are polities usually connected to

commercially successful urban centers/cities,

polities that will pursue autonomy on their own,

these will be regions in which urbanization is

high and relatively concentrated. When

urbanization is high autonomous city-states.

Classic examples are the Italian city-states. No

central authority/coordination.

o

Another pattern emerges where urbanization is

as important but not as concentrated as it is in

Italian city-states. Here we have regions orterritories that are not willing to risk autonomy.

What emerges in this pattern a series of states

that become organized in very loose

confederations. They coordinate among

themselves and form some kind of league or

confederation, a loose one of primarily urban



economies. And the important thing about this

pattern is that you don’t get any significant

degree of political centralization in the league or

confederation. Here city states coordinate, but

the coordination is not substantial enough to

create a organized central authority within theleague.. example: the city states associated with

Germany….The Hanziatic league?

o Both of these options strictly speaking are not

territorial states, relatively small urban

economies though. Question is here is whether

they coordinate or they don’t. That difference

present by the 14th and 15th century will have

important consequences going forward because

Italy and Germany in the modern period, post

1789, share one important political

characteristic… theses states form relatively latein historical time. Emerged through a process of

unification late in historical time, process in

becoming territorial states. Understandable

given how they started to gather concentrated

political authority.

o

Third pattern which gives us the territorial state:

Urban centers ally with a political

authority that is in fact pursuing

territorial centralization.

Urbanization relatively lower than the

first two. And urban interests strike analliance with a political authority that is

extending control over territory. That is

the nucleus for the territorial state.

Example: first full blown territorial state,

the one that sets in motion a process

that’ll be replicated is France.

What does this imply about French

exceptionalism? France is first

territorial state, decides how

religious wars would be settled,

and third is the home of the mostimportant republican challenge to

old regimes (FR).

State formation in france vs germany: the

process by which state forms in Germany

is in many ways a conscious process by

which particular elites and parts of

territory of Germany take the lead. For



France process by which states emerge,

but not as conscious as the German case.

We have 3 options and we know that the

principal of the territorial state dominates.

But not told why.

In a sense it’s a selection processand the state emerges as the

winner.

Simplified: some extent

combination of survival of the

fittest, it has a competitive edge, +

deliberate imitation i.e. it is

diffused through a process of

imitation.

France illustrates how regimes and states are different.

Types of state:

Distinction b/w rational-legal states and patrimonialstates.

Why it matters? Argues that the patrimonial state is

characteristic of states in what we call for the moment

Eastern Europe. Most importantly the East is

represented by Russia, and the organizing principals of

the Russian empire are patrimonial principals. To

distinguish east and west we have to understand the

different types of states that emerged in the early

modern period in both east and western Europe.

Rational-Legal state most typically occurring in WE.

o

Features: you have an independent statebureaucracy, you can make a distinction

between state and society.. other words: a

differentiated public administration that has 2

important features individuals will fill these

positions chosen a basis of merit. Access to

positions in the state bureaucracy is not tied to

patronage. You cant build a family dynasty in the

public bureaucracy of a rational legal state.

Driven by merit. And non-elected and not

susceptible o patronage politics. (Ideally)

o

These offices are very well defined in terms of

their duties and responsibilities. Individuals who

hold those offices can thus be held responsible

for their performance.

o

3rd feature: there is some kind of balance

between the resources that the state extracts

from society and the kinds of services it provides



for its population. A sense of reciprocity, states

do things essentially public goods in exchange

for the resources etracted

o 4th important principal: states have

infrastructural power. They penetrated society,

close relations between state and society.o Rational legal states are the outgrowth of the

Westphalian state.

o This sets up a contrast with the patrimonial state

Patrimonial State:

o

Difficult to establish a distinction between state

and society, between the private and public

sphere.

o

The state and its territory is the private property

of the ruler or prince, part of his household and

administered as such.

o

2nd important feature: its public administrationis not differentiated. And offices are filled via

different mechanisms compared to a rational

legal state. Offices can be bought and sold like

property, even through inheritance/legacy.

Offices can be allocated via personalism …

patronage much more important almost a

defining feature of administration in patrimonial

state.

o

END.

Lecture September 22, 2014

Start reading topic 2 as topic 2 starts Wednesday.

The different types of states introduced as of last class, distinction between

rational legal and patrimonial state. It helps us understand the historical

origins between east and west.

Rational legal state:

o

Most typically occurring state in Western Europe.

o Clear distinction between public and private here, between state and

society.

o

Suggests that there is a public administration that is specialized anddifferentiated from society.

o State bureaucracy here then have some important characteristics

outlined last class:

A bureaucracy that is staffed on principal of merit and

performance in office is connected to merit

The offices that define S-B are well defined in terms of

duties/responsibilities.



Patrimonial State:

o

Distinction between private and public is difficult to draw.

o

As is the distinction between state and society.

o

Reason that a patrimonial state is like this in the context of a

patrimonial state, territory is essentially apart of the household

economy of the ruler or prince.o

Without this public private distinction and state and society, you get a

distinctive type of state bureaucracy. key contrast between the two.

o

State offices can be considered a form of private property, can be past

on within family, can be bought and sold, and thus patronage politics

are much more important here.

o

Tend to be associated with economies that have not made full

transition to industrialism. Economies that tend to continue to depend

on an agrarian sector. And economies that are usually not fully

monetized depend on barter is what that means.

o

Patrimonial states may have tremendous despotic power over

subjects. But lack infrastructural power, states that have not reallydeeply penetrated societies. Not intertwined with social organizations,

and as a consequence they tend to be organized exploitation of

resources from society, but provide relatively little in return for that

extraction. Contrast with RL states: tend to have infrastructural

power, they are not parasitic on society/economy, they have sunk

roots into social organizations, and delivers something in return in

terms of services. A reciprocal relationship between state and

society/economy. Another way to put the contrast: rational legal

states deliver public goods that are widely distributed, the goods

provided by patrimonial states tend to be more privatized and

personalized directed @ specific segments in the population. Politicalpatronage relied upon in patrimonial states.

East/West division:

o

Bunce: makes the basic point that the distinction between east and

west is not the only distinction, but what she calls the most striking

contrast.

The contrast b/w E and W predates the period of state

socialism. The division between east and west is not just an

artifact of the cold war, the contrast predates the period of

state socialism (post-1945).

The differences between east and west are durable. i.e. still

important after the collapse of communism in late 80s early90s. The historical mold is set relatively early in political

history and historical time and the differences are transferred

over time so to speak in political culture and institutions.

Rational legal vs patrimonial states: patrimonial states often

associated with the politics of empire, and imperial



organization occurs much more longer and later in time in

eastern Europe than it is in western Europe.

If the pattern is set early in time and reproduced through time

i.e. durable it implies a kind of determinism hard to get off

the path of development associated with E and W.

Russia will personify of the east in the east/west binary. 1945 is a very visible date in the history of the east and west.

Emphasized by K&K.

What historically lies behind the emergence of state socialism

in 1945 you are led back to 1917, no Russian revolution no

state socialism-> 1917 counts as it introduces state socialism

into the politics of Eastern Europe.

Bunce then implies, you have to ask: why was the revolution in

Russia that took a socialist form that led to a communist

regime? Argues about the distinctive feature of the political

institutions of the Russian Empire Russian Exceptionalism.

Something distinctive about it that enables social andpolitical revolution in ways that don’t occur in the West.

And those distinctive features are those of a patrimonial

state

Type of institutional structure that will be vulnerable from

challenge from below.

Rational legal states are more difficult to overturn, the

patrimonial institutions of the Russian Empire are those types

of institutions radicals can imagine doing away with all

together, it is parasitical, penetrated society, and in that

context that a Marxist revolution occurs.

Russian Exceptionalism Political organization of Russianstate.

How did those three empires collapse in the aftermath of

WWI?

3 imperial structures that organized EE.

Ottoman, Hapsburg, Russian. All 3 collapsed.

1 reemerges as a new form of imperial structure

organized around a Russian core and committed to

socialist principles.

o

Topic 2:

State and nation formation in our 4 major cases in Western

Europe.

Britain France Italy Germany.

Basic contrast drawn: early state and nation formation and late

state and nation formation.

2 cases of early state and nation formation: GB and France.

2 cases of late state and nation formation: Germany and Italy



We are going to compare the 2 early developers, GB and France,

with these questions:

To identify the different types of states which emerge in

both cases.

Rational Legal states distinction within, 2 types here:

o

Unitary state or a state union/compensate state Compensate state: GB

Unitary State: France

How territorial politics emerge in these cases?

o

Argues that accommodation is characteristic of

how the British nation state was formed. In

contrast with France, the pattern is not

accommodation but assimilation.

o

Assimilation vs Accommodation contrasts. And

paying attention to how closely each of these

cases matches the model or the idea of a nation

state.o

British state is a multinational state in a way

French are not. It recognizes regional differences

that historically the French have been unwilling

to do.

o Tremendous consequences for territorial politics

therefore. No coincidence that there was a

referendum in Scotland.

Contrast their political and religious settlements: point

being that there is a political and religious settlement

reached relatively early in GB, it accepts a liberal

constitutional monarchy, in GB political history the CMis a very durable institutions that has not undergone

challenge in centuries. @ the same time there was a

religious settlement that emerged early in British

political history, it identified this CM as a protestant

monarchy. Exception of which is Ireland. It is isolated

and integrated in very different ways than the rest of

the protestant Britain because it is catholic.

Contrast is France: this settlement occurs much later in

time. Modern French political history categorized by

division and contestation about the political form of

regime, republic vs monarchy. France in some ways

may be a catholic society, but the republican dimension

of French political culture is in some ways hostile to

Catholicism. The importance of republicanism FR

political history meant that the settlement occurred

much later.

o Comparison between Germany and Italy:



Attention to the context to which the both emerged

To the fact that they emerged as late industrializers, GB and FR

had already begun to fully experience the industrial revolution

by the time that Germany and Italy are emerging as states. And

late industrializers tend to face some problems catching up.

Consequences of state emergence due to late industrialization: States are fairly deeply involved in the mgmt. of the

economy.

State power is used in the process of catching up. But

why catch-up? To compete industrially b/c if you cant

compete industrially may not be able to preserve your

independence in anarchical state society.--> geo-

strategic context, a competitive state system.

States in Italy and Germany play a leading role in

encourage industrialization. Directly involved for

example in the financing of new industry. They’ll

become directly involved putting in place tariff barriersthat protect infant industries.

States that are emerging in the period of mass political

mobilization states emerging in a period In which the

working class is becoming politically active. Has to face difficult

of integrating the working class into political institutions.

Late 19th century Europe is entering the “age of nationalism”.

And an important impotence for the formation of these states

will be to link nations to states. More to say later.

These are states relatively early in their history that’ll

experience the shocks of war and defeat.

Final point about state formation in terms of these latedevelopers: to some extent state formation is a kind of

conscious process, it is led by elites who are trying to create in

a relatively short period of time a set of institutions. Elite

politics and institution creation, and the contrast with early

developers, is state development much longer historical

process and not as subject to a before and after, a moment @

which states are crystalized.

Stepping back to talk about states and nations as organizing concepts:

o

Middle part of the 19th century political ideal at which Europe was

imagined to be organized, the model i.e. of where states should be

moving through time in the middle of 19th century this ideal is the

nation state.

It’s basically a form of political organization where the

boundaries of the nation match the boundaries of the state

o Arguments made for nation state as an ideal:

A NS is easier to govern as it is organized around a shared

sense of solidarity.



Because certain sorts of potential divisions are removed from

politics.

In fact a long-standing argument in 19th century that

liberalism was most compatible with the NS.

That liberalism depended on a shared sense of identity

2nd argument: NS have some comparative advantage in intl.politics.

States with have nations in other words, are states with

populations that are willing to make sacrifices on behalf

of the nation state.

From 1850 to relatively recently, nationalism has been seen as

a civilizing and progressive force. Important in the context of

late 19th century. As well nationalism is associated with

unification and or expansion. National movements are

expected to be movements for national unification.

Final point: liberal nationalism is not a contradiction in terms.

Nationalism consistent with progress, and an expression ofpolitical modernization.

The LR expectation is that borders of nations and states will

grow to align. And when they don’t align, there is tension and

conflict that’ll have to be reconciled. This LR tendency under

modernity is one in which nations and states come to be

recognized implies that nationalism will be associated with

assimilation

Nationalism in the modern period, another point: 1850 going

forward nation states will tend to be relatively large as a

consequence of the association between nationalism and

unification. But also because of certain features of Europeanpolitics in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

They had to be large enough to survive, as small ones would be

perished incorporated and assimilated or exist simply at the

margins of European society.

Implies that optimal size of states from roughly 1850

from 1970/80 is large.

Why?

o 2 arguments connected to economies of scale

o

Interstate anarchy in Euro society makes self-

preservation of states important and to an extent

difficult. And larger states have a better chance

of surviving than smaller states, and incentive

towards the process of unification.

o There are economic incentives to become parts

of larger economic organizations, because as this

happens you gain access to larger national



markets. Both military and economic incentives

therefore to become parts of larger holes.

o

One implication of the argument: as those

incentives change, and they will, nationalism will

no longer associated with unification. Post 1945-

WE, with the absence of interstate war andemergence of economic independence, you see

pressures of fragmentation for existing states in

places such as Scotland Catalonia etc.

o

Interdependence means that the optimal size of

states can be smaller under the conditions of

economic competition.

Lecture September 24, 2014:

List of proposed essay topics should be up on mycourses by Friday +

guidelines of expectations.

All topics that need to be fine tuned, they have to be worked by us to become

suitable for a paper.

Outline up for topic II.

Running through some features of the British State:

o

A composite state, in contrast to a unitary state (French)

Composite state captured in very notion of the United Kingdom,

emerges historically as a union of kingdoms and built

progressively from the extension of authority from central

core British state formed through a process of incorporation

and subordination of rival powers on the British Isles.

Key dates in process of incorporation:

1535

1707

1801

Dates that refer in sequence to the incorporation of

Wales, Scotland, and Ireland

In all of these moments, a common pattern exists: this

process is one in which these local communities give up

any kind of representative assembly that might’ve been

characteristic of their politics at the moment of

incorporation true for Wales and more important in

terms of Scotland and Ireland. Also a process of incorporation that recognizes certain

types of institutional differences in local communities-

Ireland a bit different.

In the case of Wales and then Scotland:

Wales:



o

a separate religious organization is allowed to be

maintained in Wales emergence of Methodism

in Welsh society/culture.

o Attempts to limit the use of Welsh, but religious

difference are accepted. A variation of

Protestantism that is.o Methodism is basically the place in which the

Welsh language is preserved. It is the language of

religious belief and practice.

o

Wales goes forward politically without any

representative assembly, becomes more

important through time through the process of

democratization as assemblies become more

important for expression of political opinion and

places for political organizations to pursue

political agendas.

Scotland:o

Act of Union 1707 Scotland becomes fully

integrated into GB.

o

2 important features:

It gives up legislature or parliament as a

result. An expression of the importance in

British political culture of parliamentary

sovereignty located in Westminster.

It may give up its legislature, but retains

other forms of institutional

distinctiveness. Such as a separate legal

system, a separate education system(especially at university level), and a

distinctive protestant church. Important

kinds of institutions that may contribute

to the maintenance of distinctive types of

cultural identities.

No attempt to completely eradicate those institutions or

cultural differences that differentiate the Welsh or

Scottish from the English.--> a practice of a kind of

accommodation.

o Type of territorial politics:

UK:

Associated with practice of accommodation, recognition

or acceptance of certain kinds of differences.

:

o

So far described, is a composite state on the one

hand but in a sense an emerging multinational

social structure.



o

In allowing differences to be preserved in Wales

and Scotland, it is to acknowledge that one can

be British and also Scottish or Welsh.

o A composite state is willing to accept a model of

nation and state in which that state contains

more than one nation to put it simply. The British and the English can live with local

communities that can maintain some cultural

commitment to a distinctive identity.

Leaving Ireland aside, we can talk about the nation:

shared commitment amongst England, Wales, Scotland

to some version of protestant practice and belief

Britain

Ireland not integrated/accommodated in the same way

as Scotland and Wales

1801: act of union strengthens the ties between Britain

and Ireland by removing the Irish parliament. Irelandbecomes progressively incorporated in political terms,

like Wales or Scotland.

Important differences for Ireland:

o

It will continue post 1801 to be governed by the

British as if Ireland was an internal colony.

o The institutional arrangements that link the

British government to Ireland, are much closer

than those relationships that would connect the

British government to parts of its blue sea

empire.--> Ireland as an internal colony.

o

More difficult in other words for the British toaccept cultural differences in Ireland, because

Ireland is a catholic society from the POV of

British authorities.

o

Administrative structure that emerges by which

Ireland is governed, and integrated, is similar to

that of those in the Blue Sea empire. 2 key offices

here:

Lord and Tennant.

Police force that is controlled by the

metropol i.e. by the British government.

1922:

o

South of Ireland in effect breaks away from Great

Britain and forms the Irish Free State. Ireland

now divided between the North and South.

Northern Ireland a part of the UK, and 1922

onwards recognized as “Great Britain & the

United Kingdom.”



o

Matters why? Here is a powerful territorial state

in Europe that gives up territory, very unusual in

European political history.

o Ireland is an exception in lots of ways, it is

catholic instead of protestant and by the latter

part of the 19th

century it is beginning to breakwith the liberal constitutional monarchy of Great

Britain.

o The movement of independence that results in

the Irish Free State is a movement organized

around a challenge not just to the territorial

structure of the British State, but to its regime

form as well.

o

Irish revolutionaries are republicans, and they

are challenging not just territorial integrity of the

state, but rejecting the government

characteristic of GB.o In Scotland and Wales same period: politics

becomes rationalized in Ireland (1850-formation

of Irish Free State). In Ireland first demand for

changes in the status quo doesn’t take the form

of a claim to be completely independent, the first

goal is simply to be able to retrieve a

representative assembly or parliament. The

parliament given up in 1801. Demands for what

was known in the British context as “home rule”.

o

Similar sorts of demands for home rule emerged

in Scotland, to a lesser extent in Wales. In Walesand Scotland, the interst in home rule never

became radicalized into a demand for

independence. In large part because these are

societies that found a reasonable place of

accommodation in British politics, unlike the

Irish. Catholics were excluded from political

office and restrictions on the right to vote well

into the 19th century for example.

o And as demands for home rule were rejected by

the British government as being too extreme,

Irish nationalists increased their demands. Themore they refused, the more interest they had

going forward along the path of outright

independence.

o

Ireland left Great Britain but remained a part of

the British empire, not a fully fledged

independent state in international society until

1949.



o

1922-1949 Irish free state retained the status

or rank of a dominion in the British Empire.

o

1949 when it declared itself a republic for the

first time, it left the common wealth.

o

Its independence was achieved in progressive

stages therefore between 1922-1949.o The Irish Free State was the result of two

important processes or interactions between

Irish politicians (republicans) and the British

government.

1. The Anglo-Irish war. Period in which

Irish republicans used force and coercion

in an attempt to induce concessions from

the British state. BS refused for quite a

long period of time to be pressured by

such means, and responded more or less

in kind with the use of force. But in1921 British government decided to

some extent to cut its losses, to make

some concession. Conceded Ireland can

take up status of dominion, would not

allow Ireland to move directly to a

Republican form of government because

it was feared that if they conceded that it

would threaten the integrity of the British

Empire, encouraging other parts of the BE

to seek outright independence. Important

concession while still empire preserving. 2. Political motive to allow for dominion

status for Ireland: British PM at the time

wanted to remove Ireland from British

politics in order to remove the

importance of the territorial cleavage

from British politics. This was a way by

which the British PM sought to realign

British Politics. LT goal being to allow the

emergence of a party of the political

center, powerful liberal party.

Ongoing fear or paranoia or suspicion about what theIrish were really up to, the possibility that this would be

a kind of Trojan horse within the British political

system for Catholicism. + Ireland was of some strategic

importance given the geopolitical location of the British

isles. The act of union 1801 followed after an attempt

for certain Irish politicians to find common cause or

alliance with France. But there is a multinational



structure described earlier. A sense of Scotland as a

subset nation by letting those institutions flourish, a

sense of cultural identity.

1997:

o

we see the creation of legislatures in Scotland

and Wales via referenda in Scotland and Waleso

in Perspective: these are legislatures that are

relatively limited in terms of the capacities or

powers that they have. Important to emphasize

that these legislatures exist strictly speaking at

the behest of the British house of commons.

Strictly speaking they could be removed through

an act or statute of parliament, that’s to say that

these are legislatures that do are not part of the

federation. This is a process of devolution of

political power and does not take the form of

creating federal institutions.o

What would a federation look like in the British

case? What would it have to have?

Federations divide power between levels:

the central level and federal level. To be

able to divide and separate powers

property, federations almost invariably

require a written constitution.

So a federation in Britain would imply a

change to a longstanding feature of

British political culture, i.e. a commitment

to unwritten constitution.

Federations, also because they divide

power, are incompatible with the notion

that sovereignty is located in a central

parliament such as the British House of

Commons.

If you move to a fully federal system, you

might also have to give up the

commitment in British political culture to

the importance of parliamentary

sovereignty. And parliamentary

sovereignty is important because it’sthrough this notion that the British

imposed constitutional limits on

monarchial power.

These are relatively limited kinds of

concessions. Local legislatures in Scotland

and Wales come up after centuries.



At the top of all this continues to be the

British House of Commons until 2014 and

the referendum that just ended, which

was a NO.

So why would the British government

agree to put in legislatures in S and W?Consequences?

These legislatures encouraged

Welsh and Scottish politicians to

demand more autonomy; it gave

them an institutional baseline in

which to build. If you’re lucky

enough to get a parliament, of

course you want it to have more

power. It gave some light to

Scottish nationalists whom at the

end of the day dreamed of having astate of their own.

With these 2 legislatures, if you

conceive more authority and

power to one, the other legislature

is going to expect and demand the

same.

It may be a no, but it is going to

potentially really change the

territorial structure of British

politics.

Third dimension of this comparison in the British case:o

The political and religious settlement in British

politics:

Basic historical point: the civil wars that

characterized British politics, the British

revolutions of the 1600s, were more

complete and durable than the political

and religious settlements that

characterized French politics. And also

occurred much earlier in time.

The religious settlement in some sense

was fairly simple protestant nation, but

still the exception of Ireland.

2nd point: the political settlement was

relatively early achieved, and

extraordinarily durable. The political

system was also relatively complete, and

again the only challenge to the political



settlement is Ireland (whom has interest

in republicanism).

Political settlement is organized around a

constitutional monarch limited by the

power of parliament.

It has never been seriously challenged Different way to put that point: the

question of political regime in Britain was

settled relatively early, Ireland is the

exception (in terms of religious

settlement, territorial structure and in

terms of type of regime).

Lecture September 29, 2014

Next week conference no assigned reading, a chance to go over material forthe midterm.

Check my courses for information to be found on the midterm and on topics

for the essay

8-10 topics can choose topic of your own in consultation with the teacher or

the TA.

Topics 1 and 2, and some part of topic 3 will be covered. Completing topic 2

Wednesday, latest Monday of next week. Rule of thumb: you can tell what to

focus on in the readings by what he emphasizes on in the lecture.

Covering tail end of Britain, going to cover France according to the outline in

Topic II, then doing the late developers comparisons.

Early developers Britain and France:

o

Recap about political and religious settlements associated with British

political development:

Both settlements are achieved relatively early in British

political history and relatively durable

By mid 17th century, Britain is effectively the protestant nation

What holds Britain together as cultural and political unity is

shared religion.

May be differences with Wales and Scotland and England but

they are variations on the protestant theme

Same can be said for political regime

issue of how it will begoverned removed relatively early from political contestation

Emerges from civil wars in 1600s as a liberal constitutional

monarchy

Liberal and constitutional part is associated from that point on

to commitment to parliamentary sovereignty sense or

notion that parliament sets limits on the authorities or



prerogatives of the monarch. Important commitment is

basic british political culture going forward.

o

Irish Exception:

Ireland is the exception in a sense in all terms

Challenge to religious settlement Catholicism

Challenge to territorial structure of British state emerges inlatter part of the 19th century and happens in 1921 in the

formation of the Irish Free State

IFS: remains a part of the British Empire, 1921-1949 has the

status of a dominion in the British common wealth, like Canada.

Not fully independent. Until 1949, all Irish politicians have to

swear an oath to allegiance to the British monarch

Unusual to see a state that consents to give up part of its

territory.

Ireland is an exception in terms of territorial politics that is.

Ireland is also an exception in terms of regime politics, or

political settlement it’s catholic, but organizes itsindependence movement around an alternative to the

institutions that characterize the British state.

Irish independence movements wants to establish a republic in

Ireland

1921-1922 Ireland divided, south of Ireland predominantly

catholic, north is predominantly protestant. North of Ireland

will remain apart of GB and the UK.

o

Legacies of British pattern of political development, legacies that

became visible in the relatively recent post-war history of GB. Post

1945 and post 1960 specifically.

The continuing problem of Ireland: The issue of the division of Ireland is a relatively

dormant, or unimportant political issue in Ireland or

British politics from the moment that Ireland is divided

in 1921 until 1966

Government in the south from 1921-1949 when it

became a republic into the 50s and 60s, more

concerned with consolidating the institutions of the

Irish state in the south

Mid 1960s marks a change in the political importance of

the north.

mid 1960s, Catholics in the north of Ireland, whom are a

minority in the north but part of the majority in the

country as a whole, begin to mobilize politically.-->

mobilization takes the form of political mobilization

that’s modeled on the American civil rights movement,

non violent i.e. done on the street/demonstrations,

nonviolent initially.



Why this choice of political tactics?

o

The formal institutions of NI worked against

Catholics, they were established so as to

maintain protestant domination in the north.

o

Mobilization prompted in the sense from a

feeling of exclusion from political institutions.o

Early part of 1970s for the first time a power

sharing government is formed, which includes

Protestants and Catholics. That government lasts

less than 2 years.

o

It was actually brought down by the resistance of

Protestants from the prospects of sharing

political power with a catholic minority.

o

When it collapses the political situation in NI

quickly becomes polarization

o

What occurs in the politics of the north is a

downward spiral, power sharing breaks down,polarization emerges, and forces used both sides.

o Formation of paramilitary forces emerges on

both sides.

o This polarization of politics in the north and

introduction of violence motivates the British

government to intervene with military force of

its own, sends army troops to attempt to achieve

and maintain peace in NI.

o

This intervention occurs relatively shortly after

the failure of power sharing power sharing

fails in 1974 and 1976 troops are visible. From1976 into early 1990s, relations between

Catholics and protestants in the north are very

difficult

o In the middle part of the 1990s, peace agreement

signed and relations return to somewhat normal

politics.

o Legacy of Irish politics division continues to be

a political problem in Ireland and in Irish

/British relations.

2nd legacy we talk about:

o

“NO” w/ a 10point difference.

o “Should Scotland be an independent state”

o

results of the referendum having a knock on

effects/political consequences on multinational

social structures.

o

Wales and Scotland were well integrated when

Ireland withdrew in 1921-1922.



o

Obvious that Scotland is no longer as integrated

as it once was.

o

In the latter part of the 19th century and early of

the 20th, demand for home rule has become a

demand for outright independence.

o

Raises the question: how should territorialpolitics be organized to accommodate the

multinational characteristics of british society

and culture? What should british political

institutions look like going forward?

o Parliament achieved for Scotland in 1977 no

longer enough to satisfy Scottish nationalists.

o Part of the reason they voted no is because if yes

then institutional change.

o Why might nationalists who have an interest in

independence, why might they vote no?

o

What explains the limits on the support onindependence?

2 kinds of limits:

independence is risky, uncertain, there

are transition costs involved in making

the transition from incorporation to the

formation of an independent state. And if

you vote yes in these kinds of contexts,

you have to be able to anticipate and bare

the costs.

A barrier associated with transition costs

that make it difficult to mobilize supportfor a yes vote. Those transition costs

amount to: Scotland would not be

guaranteed continued membership in the

EU, they would have to enter the process

of accession and entry like any other

potential member state, that’s a loss as

Scotland is part of the EU as part of the

UK.

The other limit: loss of business

investment, the economic cost of

independence. The transition costs to getto that state of economic viability might

be too high for the country to bare.

Connected to the potential loss of

investment.

Bank leaders and business leaders

pointed to the kinds of economic cost to

be borne if independence was chosen.



o

You would bare these costs if things were that

bad, there is no systematic oppression.

o

British political authorities basically made a

series of promises in the ways in which the

political situation in Scotland would be improved

o

So if the costs are relatively high, and you don’twant to bare those costs, and you got that

message from Westminster, it encourages a Yes

vote.

o

You are making a decision on part on how

credible you find the promises of the British

government when it publically promises more

devolution in the relations that define the

Scottish parliament and British political

institutions.

o

More authority and power for the S- Parliament

o

Implications of the referendum being a start of alonger process of change in British politics:

British government cant provide too little

change to Scottish political institutions as

they wont live up to promises

And may force another referendum in the

future.

But they can’t deliver too much, as it

would alienate other parts of GB Basic

dilemma, have to find a point of

compromise, enough for Scotland and not

too much for the rest of GB. Further problem: whatever you give to

Scotland would likely become the

Standard that Wales expect. Devolution to

S may mean devolution all around.

At some point this process of devolution

of power to the peripheries may

encourage the English to demand/expect

a parliament of their own.

3rd kicker that’s most telling a

multinational structure, in ideal terms

lets say, if you were to design the idealpolitical institutions for that social

structure what would it look like? It

wouldn’t look like what we have now

where Scotland and Wales have

legislatures with limited capacities. It

likely would involve more than just giving

these legislatures more power and



prerogatives .what it implies in the form

of accommodation is a form of federalism.

A federation implies a lot more than

devolution; we have devolution now but

no federation in Great Britain.

The house of commons is strictlyspeaking the agent that controls the kinds

of powers that Scotland and Wales will

hold in their legislatures

So here’s the kicker, what does a

federation imply and when you take this

into account can this be put in place in

GB?

A federation, historically, implies a

written constitution, and the purpose of a

written constitution is to first of all

explicitly divide power between thefederal legislature and the legislatures at

the local level. Westminster at the center

and the Scottish and Welsh parliaments.

2nd the constitution in effect guarantees

the existence of the local parliaments i.e.

they can’t be abolished at whim of the

central power.

3rd. a constitution usually sets out a set of

rules by which the constitution itself can

be changed. And those rules would often

set out further the conditions underwhich a region or territory can

leave/secede.

Federal constitutions are very

complicated arrangements and often why

they are set out in writing historically.

Difficult here in British case because

British constitutional tradition is one of

unwritten constitution. An important part

of british political culture, so to take a

federation you’d have to live with an

unwritten constitution. Many brits value an unwritten

constitution because they take it as a

signal of being British or being English.

2nd implication of a federation:

A federation will break with the

tradition of parliamentary

sovereignty



3rd implication of federation: a federation

would mean that the house of lords would

have to be reformed. Upper houses in a

federation usually are used to provide

representation for regions. House of lords

too closely connected to the institutionsof the monarchy to act in that fashion, so

it’ll have to be reformed, once that

happens to the constitutional monarchy

Moving towards a federation in the

British case is going to imply that the

English in particular break with long

established traditions and customs in

their political culture.

Contrast with France:

Different types of states/different types of politics/religious settlements

Similarity b/w the two: France also built through a process of successful

incorporation of territory and subordination of political authority to a core

region. Modern France built around the kingdom of Burgundy. Differences

are more important than similarities though.

Key date that sets up the French pattern: 1789

Revolution divides France politically as it politicizes the question of regime,

but politics post 1789 are in many ways are an expression of territorial

consolidation and nation formation.

Post-1789 pattern of state and nation formation which is “centralizing and

rationalizing”

A process of development that is geared towards inducing uniformity across

the territory of France. Post 1789 it is administratively reorganized into a

series of uniform departments, which is an administrative territory, each

department administered by a prefect.--> this is a process of administrative

rationalization designed to induce administrative homogeneity and political

uniformity

Post 1789 across all regimes there is a policy of linguistic assimilation that

takes the form of what are called the education wars in French political

history. Education wars pit the state against the catholic church in terms of

schooling in primary and secondary levels especially. State has an interest in

controlling supply of education and it attempts to replace private schoolsorganized around the catholic church with public schools.

Finally, the education wars are one expression of the larger interest the

French had of subordinating the catholic church to the power of the French

state. that process of contestation with the church only ends in 1901. In

1901 Church and state are separated. Catholic religion no longer subsidized

by the French state.

All of this can be summarized in the phrase: France on and Idivisible



Implications and legacies: the expressions of substate nationalism in France

are thus much weaker in France than in Britain, identities not mobilized in

the same way politically as they are in Britain. There’s no challenge to the

territorial integrity of the state that emanates from minority nations.

Final point in this pattern of unitary state/assimilation in terms of territorial

politics:o The French state has no interest in devolution of political power.

o

When the talk about moving power and authority from the center to

the other regions, they use power that is Deconcentrated from

bureaucrats in the center to those in the peripheries. Deconcentration

rather than devolution, they don’t get their own legislative assemblies

fore example.

Post 1789: a failure to achieve a political settlement, a story of regime

instability as we told before, political settlement in France comes late. Not

until post 1945 period.

2nd the religious settlement in France is not as successful as the religious

settlement in Britain. Because for a long period there is continued conflictbetween Catholics and republicans post 1789

3rd: the territorial structure in France demonstrates more durability than the

territorial structure of GB, which has been challenged twice in the case of

Irish independence and going to remake the political institutions of the UK

going forward. No similar moment in the political history of France post

1789 with one exception: Algeria.

o

Algeria was a colony but Algeria was at the same time part of the

French metropole and territorial state. Because citizens in Algeria

elected members to the chamber of deputies who were the national

assembly in Paris, in that sense the war of Algerian independence was

a challenge to the territorial integrity of the French state since theFrench had politically integrated Algeria in an unusual way. Not often

that metropols integrate colonies politically by giving them

representatives in an elected assembly at the center or apex of the

metropole.

Land of War, Land of Peace (Howard):

“Christendom” aka Europe being a land of war.

o

Warrior culture

o Families who ruled Europe during the millennium justified

their power and their privileges by their successful conduct of

war.



o

Defended Christendom against invaders and consolidated

power against one another through the formation of states.

o

15th-20th century, extended European hegemony over the rest

of the globe

Europeans were at the cutting edge of militarily, economic, and

ultimately scientific and intellectual advance. Militaristic Europe:

o

John Keegan points out that war has been an innate and

continuous cultural activity Europe no exception.

o Looking for instead of avoiding it.

Why? Paid handsomely in power and territory for those

conducting it and in loot for those who fought.

If unsuccessful, burden was borne by people not so

important. Even so, villages rapidly rebuilt and crops

resown.

War as an avenue of social mobility.

o

Thirty Years War highlighted the need for economic warfare.o Enlightenment brought the “antiwar movement”

End of the 18th century saw war become

counterproductive (in Europe at least)

Territorial acquisition marginal

Taxpayer burden mounting

Excluding colonial conquests, it did nothing to

increase wealth and status of the rulers

o

Why didn’t war come to an end?

For the most rationalistic societies and democratic

leaders, the military culture transmitted irreplaceable

values and skills necessary for state survival. War might be necessary if democracies and nation-

states were to promote and extend their values,

liberating people from the oppression of feudalism

The significance of extending loyalty towards a national

entity as opposed to a ruling dynasty embodied values

that were either unique or universal, and took on

quasireligious significance.

If war could be conducted economically, and in far away

regions of Asia and Africa, Europeans were content….

And this is how they entered 1914.

o

Disenchantment of war (1945)

Wanted to live in a land of peace by 1945.

Disenchantment with war had less to do with the

spread of democratic values than with the development

of industrial warfare.

There was 1. The slaughter of conscripted armies and 2.

Economic havoc that brought misery to citizens on a



scale never seen before and that did not match the

comparable gains.

If it oculd be done cost-free, would garner public

support.--> British discovered this in the Falklands in

1982 and Americans in Persian Gulf War in 1991.

Importance of technology War however can no longer be fought cost-free

in Europe itself.

o

Democracy:

Child of the Enlightenment

Belief in innate natural rights, the recognition of which

should be the fundamental duty and justification for all

human government.

Uphill battle of democracy in Europe as opposed to the

United States.

19th-20th century civil war between the Party of

Movement and the Party of Order. Democrats in large regions of Europe, west and east,

remained an embattled minority until WWII and in

places even later than that.

National socialism (Fascism) whether in combating the

barbaric egalitarianism of the eats or the materialistic

internationalism of the west was far greater throughout

continental Europe than it has been fashionable to

admit.

European culture inherited not synonymous with the

western values of the Enlightenment.

Something more ambiguous and complex Aristo-monarchial militarism and of

authoritarian clericalism= Europe

o

2 targets in which the Enlightenment

directed its fire.

+ irrational populist nationalism (US also prone

to)

o

Land of Peace:

Europeans want Europe to be a land of peace.

“We may try to restore and retain traditional cultural

environments where we can ourselves live comfortably

and which will attract lucrative tourism, but such

cultural theme parks are in fact as alien to the mass of

our population as they are to visitors from Japan”

Huge bulk of the population of Europe, modernized,

bureaucratized and bourgenoisfied, lives in conditions

indistinguishable form those of the US and shares

similar tastes and interests.



Security problems today are not of war but of peace, not

of the military that is but of the police. – no different

from anywhere else.

Europeans facing a fundamental paradox: if we were to

become Europeans in the sense that some idealists

would wish, with single organs of government andjustice and above all a common working language, we

would cease to be the people, or rather the peoples, that

we actually are.

Societies are held together not by abstract rational

principles or convenient administrative arrangements

but by deeply held habits of consensus and belief.

An irrational element to all human relationships exist.—

abstract principles applied to human affairs= dangerous

according to Edmund Burke.

Past regimes have exploited and recognized this

truth. And by exploiting it they have tamed it and made

it social productive

Attempts to ignore it and lay out a new society

on just rational principles have only produced

wider and more terrible outbursts of

irrationalism.

o Europeans must understand the past to not repeat it

Understand why we have been a land of war if we are to

successfully remain a land of peace.

o

Garden Analogy:

People of Europe and their institutions to be regardedas distinct living organisms, rooted in the peculiar soil

of their regions, their communities and their cultures. –

like all plants—their institutions need manuring,

training and sometimes plucking (taking care of

essentially and doing what’s necessary—and needs to

be done by the people themselves who have a feel for

their own soil and what will grow there and what will

not and as with all gardens, the work of cultivation is

never ending.

The Deserted Temple: Democracy’s Rise and Fall (Mazower)

After the collapse of the great autocratic empires of Russia, Austria-Hungry,

Hohenzollern Germany and Ottoman Turkey, the Paris peace settlement saw

parliamentary democracy enthroned across Europe.

New constitutions drawn up with the latest liberal principles.



James Bryce Modern Democracies: “universal acceptance of democracy as the

normal and natural form of government”

Liberalism triumph was short lived

o

Russian Revolution and the specter of communist subversion.

o Democratic values disappeared as political polarization brought much

of Europe to the verge of civil war.

The Republic and the Veil Conference Reading

government politics reading notes

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