p

-A

•.A,-frs_

'C

From Makin to Bougainville:Marine Raiders in the Pacific Warby Major Jon I Hoffman, USMCR

n February 1942, Lieu-tenant General ThomasHolcomb, the Com-mandant of the MarineCorps, ordered the cre-

ation of a new unit designated the 1stMarine Raider Battalion. This eliteforce, and its three sister battalions,went on to gain considerable fame forfighting prowess in World War II.There is more to the story of theseunits, however, than a simple tale ofcombat heroics. The inception,growth, and sudden end of the raid-ers reveals a great deal about the de-veloprnent and conduct of amphib-ious operations during the war, andabout the challenges the Corps facedin expanding from 19,000 men tonearly a half million. The raiders alsoattracted more than their share ofstrong leaders. The resulting combi-nation of courage, doctrine, organi-zation, and personalities makes thisone of the most interesting chaptersin Marine Corps history.

On the Cover: The Browning air-cooled.30-caliber machine gun was the weaponof choice for raider battalions because ofit5 low weight in comparison to otheravailable machine guns. The raider bat-talions were not armed with heavyweapons. Department of Defense Pho-to (USMC) 56108At left: Marine riflemen take on Japanesesnipers while others put a captured37mm field gun into operation duringthe raid on Koiari. Parachutists and raid-ers expected to surprise the enemy, butwere themselves surprised instead whenthey landed in the midst of a well-defended supply dump. The enemypinned the Marines to the beach withheavy fire, until evening. Department ofDefense Photo (USMC) 69783

Two completely independentforces were responsible for the ap-pearance of the raiders in early 1942.Several historians have fully tracedone of these sets of circumstances,which began with the friendshipdeveloped between Franklin D.Roosevelt and Evans F. Carlson. Asa result of his experiences in China,Carlson was convinced that guerrillawarfare was the wave of the future.One of his adherents in 1941 wasCaptain James Roosevelt, the presi-dent's son. At the same time, anotherpresidential confidant, William J.Donovan, was pushing a similartheme. Donovan had been an Armyhero in World War I and was nowa senior advisor on intelligence mat-ters. He wanted to create a guerrillaforce that would infiltrate occupiedterritory and assist resistance groups.He made a formal proposal alongthese lines to President Roosevelt inDecember 1941. In January, theyounger Roosevelt wrote to theMajor General Commandant of theMarine Corps and recommended cre-ation of ifa unit for purposes similarto the British Commandos and theChinese Guerrillas:'

These ideas were appealing at thetime because the war was going bad-ly for the Allies. The Germans hadforced the British off the continent ofEurope, and the Japanese weresweeping the United States and Bri-tain from much of the Pacific Themilitary forces of the Allies were tooweak to slug it out in conventionalbattles with the Axis powers, so guer-rilla warfare and quick raids ap-peared to be viable alternatives. TheBritish commandos had already con-

:1

ducted numerous forays against theEuropean coastline, and PrimeMinister Winston S. Churchill en-thusiastically endorsed the concept toPresident Roosevelt. The MarineCommandant, Major General Tho-mas Holcomb, allegedly succumbedto this high-level pressure and or-ganized the raider battalions, thoughhe himself thought that any proper-ly trained Marine unit could performamphibious raids.

That scenario is mostly accurate,but it tells only half of the story.Two other men also were responsi-ble for the genesis of the raiders. Onewas General Holland M. Smith.Although the Marine Corps Schoolshad created the first manual on am-phibious operations in 1935, duringthe early days of World War II Smithfaced the unenviable task of tryingto convert that paper doctrine intoreality. As a brigadier general hecommanded the 1st Marine Brigadein Fleet Landing Exercise 6, whichtook place in the Caribbean in early1940. There he discovered that sever-al factors, to include the lack ofadequate landing craft, made it im-possible to rapidly build up combatpower on a hostile shore. The initialassault elements would thus be vul-nerable to counterattack and defeatwhile most of the amphibious forceremained on board its transports.

As a partial response to thisproblem, Smith seized upon the new-ly developed destroyer transport.During FLEX 6, his plan called for theManley (APD 1) to land a companyof the 5th Marines via rubber boatsat H-minus three hours (prior todawn) at a point away from theprimary assault beach. This force

Major General Merritt A. Edson, USMCerritt A. Edson's militarycareer began in the fall of1915 when he enlisted in the

1st Vermont Infantry (a National Guardoutfit). In the summer of 1916 he servedin the Mexican border campaign. Whenthe United States entered World War Iin April 1917, he earned a commissionas a Marine officer, but he did not ar-rive in France until just before the Ar-mistice.

He ultimately more than made up formissing out on "the war to end all wars."In 1921 he began his long career in com-petitive shooting as part of the 10-manteam that won the National Rifle TeamTrophy for the Marine Corps. He earnedhis pilot's wings in 1922 and flew for fiveyears before poor depth perceptionforced him back into the infantry. In1927, he received command of the Ma-rine detachment on board the Denver(CL 16). He and his men soon becameinvolved in the effort to rid Nicaraguaof Augusto Sandino. Edson spent 14months ashore, most of it deep in the in-terior of the country. In the process, hewon a reputation as an aggressive, sav-vy small-unit leader. He bested Sandi-no's forces in more than a dozenskirmishes, earned his first Navy Crossfor valor, and came away with the nick-

name "Red Mike" (in honor of the color-ful beard he sported in the field).

Edson spent the first half of the 1930sas a tactics instructor at the Basic Schoolfor new lieutenants, and then as ord-nance officer at the Philadelphia Depotof Supplies. During the summers he con-tinued to shoot; ultimately he captainedthe rifle team to consecutive nationalchampionships in 1935 and 1936. In thesummer of 1937 he transferred to Shan-ghai to become the operations officer forthe 4th Marines. He arrived just in timefor a ringside seat when the Sino-Japanese War engulfed that city. Thatgave him ample opportunity to observeJapanese combat techniques at closerange. In June 1941, Red Mike assumedcommand of the 1st Battalion, 5th Ma-rines at Quantico.

After his stint with the 1st Raiders andthe 5th Marines on Guadalcanal, Edsonremained in the Pacific. He served aschief of staff of the 2d Marine Divisionat Tarawa, and as assistant division com-mander on Saipan and Tinian. Duringeach of these campaigns he again distin-guished himself under fire. Ultimately,the Marine Corps discovered that Ed-son's courage was matched by his skillas a staff officer. He spent nine monthsas chief of staff for the Fleet Marine

Force Pacific and closed out the war incharge of the Service Command.

Following the war Edson headed theeffort to preserve the Marine Corps inthe face of President Truman's drive to"unify" the services. lie waged a fiercecampaign in the halls of Congress, in themedia, and in public appearances acrossthe nation. Finally, he resigned his com-mission in order to testify publicly be-fore committees of both houses ofCongress. His efforts played a key rolein preserving the Marine Corps. Afterstints as the Commissioner of PublicSafety in Vermont, and as ExecutiveDirector of the National Rifle Associa-tion, Edson died in August 1955.

would advance inland, seize key ter-rain dominating the proposed beach-head, and thus protect the mainlanding from counterattack. A yearlater, during FLEX 7, Smith had threedestroyer transports. He designatedthe three companies of the 7th Ma-rines embarked on these ships as theMobile Landing Group. During theexercise these units again made nightlandings to protect the main assault,or conducted diversionary attacks.

Smith eventually crystallized hisnew ideas about amphibious opera-tions. He envisioned making futureassaults with three distinct echelons.The first wave would be composedof fast-moving forces that could seizekey terrain prior to the main assault.This first element would consist of aparachute regiment, an air infantry

regiment (gliderborne troops), a lighttank battalion, and "at least one APD[highspeed destroyer transport] bat-talion:' With a relatively securebeachhead, the more ponderouscombat units of the assault forcewould come ashore. The third eche-lon would consist of the reserve forceand service units.

In the summer of 1941 Smith wasnearly in a position to put these ideasinto effect. He now commanded theAmphibious Force Atlantic Fleet(AFAF), which consisted of the 1stMarine Division and the Army's 1stInfantry Division. During maneuversat the recently acquired Marine baseat New River, North Carolina, Smithembarked the 1st Battalion, 5th Ma-rines, in six APDs and made it an in-dependent command reporting

2

directly to his headquarters. Theoperations plan further attached theMarine division's sole company oftanks and its single company ofparachutists to the APD battalion.The general did not use this taskforce to lead the assault, but insteadlanded it on D plus 2 of the exercise,on a beach well in the rear of the ene-my's lines. With all aviation assetsworking in direct support, the mo-bile force quickly moved inland, sur-prised and destroyed the enemyreserves, and took control of keylines of communication. Smith calledit a "spearhead thrust around thehostile flank:'

The AFAF commander had notrandomly selected the 1st Battalion,5th Marines, for this role. In June1941 he personally had picked Lieu-

tenant Colonel Merritt A. "Red Mike"Edson to command that battalionand had designated it to serve per-manently with the Navy's APD squa-dron. Smith began to refer to Edson'soutfit as the "light battalion" or the"APD battalion:' When the 5th Ma-rines and the other elements of the1st Marine Division moved down toNew River that fall, the 1st Battal-ion remained behind in Quanticowith Force headquarters. Reports go-ing to and from AFAF placed the bat-talion in a category separate from therest of the division of which it wasstill technically a part. LieutenantColonel Gerald C. Thomas, the di-vision operations officer, ruefullyreferred to the battalion as "the play-

thing of headquarters:'Edson's unit was unique in other

ways. In a lengthy August 1941report, the lieutenant colonel evalu-ated the organization and missionsof his unit. He believed that the APDbattalion would focus primarilyon reconnaissance, raids, and otherspecial operations—in his mind itwas a waterborne version of theparachutists. In a similar fashion, thebattalion would rely on speed andmobility, not firepower, as its tacti-cal mainstay. Since the APDs couldneither embark nor offload vehicles,that meant the battalion had to beentirely foot mobile once ashore,again like the parachutists. Toachieve rapid movement, Edson

recommended a new table of organi-zation that made his force muchlighter than other infantry battalions.He wanted to trade in his 81mm mor-tars and heavy machine guns forlighter models. There also would befewer of these weapons, but theywould have larger crews to carry theammunition. Given the limitations ofthe APDs, each company would besmaller than its standard counter-part. There would be four rifle com-panies, a weapons company, and aheadquarters company with a largedemolitions platoon. The main as:sault craft would be 10-man rubberboats.

The only thing that kept Smithfrom formally removing the 1st Bat-

Brigadier General Evans E Carlson, USMCvans K Carlson got an earlystart in his career as a maverick.He ran away from his home in

Vermont at the age of 14 and two yearslater bluffed his way past the recruitersto enlist in the Army. When war brokeout in 1917, he already had five yearsof service under his belt. Like Merritt A.Edson, he soon won a commission, butarrived at the front too late to see com-bat. After the war he tried to make it asa salesman, but gave that up in 1922 andenlisted in the Marine Corps. In a fewmonths he earned a commission again.Other than a failed attempt at flightschool, his first several years as a Ma-rine lieutenant were unremarkable.

In 1927 Carlson deployed to Shanghaiwith the 4th Marines. There he becameregimental intelligence officer and deve-loped a deep interest in China thatwould shape the remainder of his days.Three years later, commanding an out-post of the Guardia Nacional inNicaragua, he had his first brush withguerrilla warfare. That became the se-cond guiding star of his career. In hisonly battle, he successfully engaged anddispersed an enemy unit in a daringnight attack. There followed a tour withthe Legation Guard in Peking, and a stintas executive officer of the presidentialguard detachment at Warm Springs, Ge-

orgia. In the latter job Carlson came toknow Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Captain Carlson arrived in Shanghaifor his third China tour in July 1937.Again like Edson, he watched theJapanese seize control of the city.Detailed to duty as an observer, Carlsonsought and received permission to ac-company the Chinese CommunistParty's 8th Route Army, which was fight-ing against the Japanese. For the nextyear he divided his time between thefront lines and the temporary Chinesecapital of Hangkow. During that time hedeveloped his ideas on guerrilla warfareand ethical indoctrination. When asenior naval officer censured him forgranting newspaper interviews, Carlsonreturned to the States and resigned sothat he could speak out about the situa-tion in China. He believed passionatelythat the United States should do moreto help the Chinese in their war withJapan.

During the next two years Carlsonspoke and wrote on the subject, to in-clude two books (The Chinese Armyand Twin Stars of China), and madeanother trip to China. With war loom-ing for the United States, he sought torejoin the Corps in April 1941. TheCommandant granted his request, madehim a major in the reserves, and prompt-

3

ly brought him onto active duty. Tenmonths later he created the 2d RaiderBattalion.

After his departure from the raiders in1943, Carlson served as operationsofficer of the 4th Marine Division. Hemade the Tarawa landing as an observ-er and participated with his division inthe assaults on Kwajalein and Saipan. Inthe latter battle he received severewounds in the arm and leg while tryingto pull his wounded radio operator outof the line of fire of an enemy machinegun. After the war Carlson retired fromthe Marine Corps and made a brief runin the 1946 California Senate race beforea heart attack forced him out of the cam-paign. He died in May 1947.

Destroyer Transports

T he origins of the destroyer transports are relativelyobscure. The first mention of them came in the 1stMarine Brigades after action report on Fleet Land-

ing Exercise 3 (FLEX 3). Brigadier General James J. Meadesuggested in that February 1937 document that destroyersmight solve the dual problem of a shortage of amphibioustransports and fire support. With such ships "troops couldmove quickly close into shore and disembark under pro-tection of the ships' guns" The Navy apparently agreed anddecided to experiment with one of its flush-deck, four-stackdestroyers. It had built a large number of these duringWorld War I and most were now in mothballs.

In November 1938 the Navy reclassified Manley (DD 74)as a miscellaneous auxiliary (AG 28). After a few weeksof hasty work in the New York Navy Yard, the ship servedas a transport for Marine units in the Caribbean. In thefall of 1939 Manley went back into the yards for a moreextensive conversion. Workers removed all torpedo tubes,one gun, two boilers, and their stacks. That created a holdamidships for cargo and troops. The Chief of Naval Oper-ations made it a rush job so the ship would be availablefor FLEX 6 in early 1940. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5thMarines, was the first unit to use the revamped Manley.It used rubber boats to execute its 23 February 1940 assaultlanding against Culebra in the Caribbean.

Satisfied by the utility of the destroyer transport, theNavy redesignated Manley yet again, this time as the leadship of a new class, APD-1. The APD designation denot-ed a highspeed transport. By the end of 1940 the Navyyards had reactivated five of Manley's sister ships and con-verted them in the same fashion. In its haste, the Navy hadleft out any semblance of amenities for embarked Marines.When Lieutenant Colonel Edson took his battalion onboard the APD squadron in the summer of 1941, eachtroop compartment was nothing more than an empty

space — no ventilation, no bunks, and just four washbasinsfor 130 men. It took a high-level investigation, launchedby one Marine's letter to his congressman, to get the billet-ing spaces upgraded.

These original six APDs would be the only ones availa-ble until the Navy rushed to complete more in the after-math of Pearl Harbor. As the two raider battalions movedout into the Pacific so did the APDs. All six ships saw serv-ice in the Solomons campaign, but only Manley and String-ham (APD 6) survived. Japanese bombers sank Coihoun(APD 2) on 30 August 1942, just after it had transferreda company of the 1st Raiders from Tulagi to Guadalcanal.Enemy destroyers sank Gregory (APD 3) and Little (APD4) in the early morning hours of 5 September 1942 afterthe two transports had participated with the 1st Raidersin a reconnaissance of Savo Island. A torpedo bomber end-ed the existence of McKean (APD 5) on 17 November 1943as she ferried troops to Bougainville. Before the war wasover, the Navy would convert another 133 destroyers anddestroyer escorts to the transport role.

ii

talion, 5th Marines, from the 1st Ma-rine Division was the lack of troopsto make the regiment whole again.As it was, many units of the divisionstill existed only on paper in the fallof 1941. At the very beginning of1942, with the United States iow atwar and recruits pouring into theCorps, Smith wrote the MajorGeneral Commandant and asked himto redesignate the battalion. On 7January Edson received word that henow headed the 1st Separate. Bat-talion.

A week later James Rooseveltwrote his letter to the Commandantabout raid forces. On 14 January

General Holcomb sought the reactionof his senior generals to the Presi-dent's plan to place Donovan incharge of a Marine Corps version ofthe commandos. In his 20 January re-ply to the younger Roosevelt, theMajor General Commandant point-ed out that "the APD Battalionis organized, equipped, and trainedfor this duty, including in particularthe use of rubber boats in night land-ings." He expressed the hope that theNavy would make destroyer trans-ports available on the West Coast inthe near future to support organiza-tioñ of a second APD battalion there.Holcomb obviously intended to use

4

Smith's new force as a convenientmeans to channel outside interferencetoward a useful end. His plan did notentirely work.

On 23 January the Navy leader-ship, undoubtedly in response topolitical pressure, directed the PacificFleet to put together a commando-type unit. The 2d Separate Battalionofficially came to life on 4 February.To ensure that this new organizationdeveloped along proper lines,the Commandant ordered Edson totransfer a one-third slice of his unitto California as a cadre for the 2dSeparate Battalion, which initiallyexisted only on paper. Headquarters

also adopted Red Mike's recommend-ed tables of organization and pro-mulgated them to both battalions.The only change was the addition ofan 81mm mortar platoon (thoughthere was no room on the ships ofthe APD squadron to accommodatethe increase). Holcomb even offeredto transfer Edson to the 2d Separate,butin the end the Commandant al-lowed the commanding general of the2d Marine Division, Major GeneralCharles R B. Price, to place MajorCarlson in charge. James Rooseveltbecame the executive officer of theunit. In mid-February at Price's sug-gestion, the Major General Comman-dant redesignated his new organ-izations as Marine Raider Battalions.Edson's group became the 1st Raid-ers on 16 February; Carlson's outfitwas redesignated to the 2d Raidersthree days later.

The raider battalions soon receivedfirst priority in the Marine Corps onmen and equipment. Edson and Carl-son combed the ranks of their respec-tive divisions and also siphoned offmany of the best men pouring forthfrom the recruit depots. They had nodifficulty attracting volunteers withthe promise that they would be thefirst to fight the Japanese. Carlson'sexactions were much greater thanthose required to fill out Edson's bat-talion, but both generated resentmentfrom fellow officers struggling toflesh out the rapidly expanding di-visions on a meager skeleton of ex-perienced men. The raiders also hadcarte blanche to obtain any equip-ment they deemed necessary,whether or not it was standard issueanywhere else in the Corps.

Carlson and Roosevelt soon brokethe shackles that Holcomb had at:tempted to impose on them. They re-jected most of the men whom Edsonsent them, and they adjusted the or-ganization of their battalion to suittheir purposes. They also inculcatedthe unit with an unconventional mili-tary philosophy that was an admix-

ture of Chinese culture, Communistegalitarianism, and New Englandtown hall democracy. Every manwould have the right to say what hethought, and their battle cry wouldbe "Gung Ho!"— Chinese for "worktogether:' Officers would have nogreater privileges than the men, andwould lead by consensus rather thanrank. There also would be "ethical in-doctrination," which Carlsondescribed as "giv[ing] convictionthrough persuasion:' That processsupposedly ensured that each manknew what he was fighting for andwhy.

The 2d Raiders set up their puptents at Jacques Farm in the hills ofCamp Elliot, where they remainedlargely segregated from civilization.Carlson rarely granted liberty, andsometimes held musters in the mid-dle of the night to catch anyone whoslipped away for an evening on thetown. He even tried to convince mento forego leave for family emergen-cies, though he did not altogetherprohibit it.

Training focused heavily onweapons practice, hand-to-handfighting, demolitions, and physicalconditioning, to include an empha-sis on long hikes. As the men grewtougher and acquired field skills, thefocus shifted to more night work.Carlson also implemented an impor-tant change to the raider organizationpromulgated from Washington. In-stead of a unitary eight-man squad,he created a 10-man unit composedof a squad leader and three fire teamsof three men each. Each fire teamboasted a Thompson submachinegun, a Browning automatic rifle(BAR), and one of the new GarandM-1 semiautomatic rifles. To keepmanpower within the constraints ofthe carrying capacity of an APD,each rifle company had just two ri-fle platoons and a weapons platoon.Carlson's system of organization andtraining was designed to create aforce suited "for infiltration and theattainment of objectives by unortho-

5

dox and unexpected methods:' Heand Roosevelt were developing theguerrilla unit they had envisioned.

Edson's battalion retained the ta-ble of organization he had designed.It was based on an eight-man squad,with a leader, two BAR men, fourriflemen armed with the M-1903Springfield bolt-operated rifle, and asniper carrying a Springfield mount-ing a telescopic sight. (Later in thewar he would champion the four-man fire team that became the stan-dard for all Marine infantry.) Withsmaller squads, his companies con-tained three rifle platoons and aweapons platoon. His weapons com-pany provided additional lightmachine guns and 60mm mortars.(The 81mm mortar platoon, addedto the headquarters company by theCommandant, would not deployoverseas with the battalion.)

Training was similar to that in the2d Raiders, except for more rubberboat work due to the convenient lo-cation of Quantico on the PotomacRiver. The 1st Raiders also strove toreach a pace of seven miles per houron hikes, more than twice the nor-mal speed of infantry. They did soby alternating periods of double-timing with fast walking. AlthoughRed Mike emphasized light infantrytactics, his men were not guerrillas.Instead, they formed a highly trainedbattalion prepared for special oper-ations as well as more conventionalemployment.

Edson's style of leadership con-trasted starkly with that of his coun-terpart. He encouraged initiative inhis subordinates, but rank carriedboth responsibility and authority fordecision-making. He was a quietman who impressed his troops withhis ability on the march and on thefiring ranges, not with speeches. Hisraiders received regular liberty, andhe even organized battalion dancesattended by busloads of secretariesfrom nearby Washington.

The two raider battalions bore thesame name, but they could hardly

Sgt Clyde Thomason was posthumous-ly decorated with the Medal of Honorfor his leadership in turning back aJapanese counterattack during theMakin raid. He was the first enlisted Ma-rine so decorated in World War II.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 310616

against Japanese machine guns andsnipers. Then the enemy launchedtwo banzai attacks, each announcedwith a bugle call. Marine fire easilydispatched both groups of chargingenemy soldiers. Unbeknownst to theAmericans, they had nearly wipedout the Japanese garrison at thatpoint in the battle.

At 1130 two enemy aircraft ap-peared over the island and scoutedthe scene of action. Carlson hadtrained his men to remain motionlessand not fire at planes. WiIh notroops in sight and no contact fromtheir own ground force, the planesfinally dropped their bombs, thoughnone landed within Marine lines.Two hours later 12 planes arrived onthe scene, several of them seaplanes.Two of the larger flying boats land-ed in the lagoon. Raider machineguns and Boys antitank rifles fired atthem. One burst into flame and theother crashed on takeoff after receiv-ing numerous hits. The remainingaircraft bombed and strafed the is-

7

1Q00 0 000 2000 3000 4000 5000—-SCALE IN FEET

land for an hour, again with most ofthe ordnance hitting enemy-occupiedterritory. Another air attack camelate in the afternoon.

The natives on the island willing-ly assisted the Americans throughoutthe day. They carried ammunitionand provided intelligence. The latterreports suggested that enemy rein-forcements had come ashore from theseaplanes and from two small shipsin the lagoon. (The submarines latertook the boats under indirect firewith their deck guns and miraculous-ly sunk both.) Based on this infor-mation, Carlson was certain therewas still a sizable Japanese force onthe island. At 1700 he called severalindividuals together and contemplat-ed his options. Roosevelt and the bat-talion operations officer argued fora withdrawal as planned in prepara-tion for the next day's landing on Lit-tle Makin. Concerned that he mightbecome too heavily engaged if hetried to advance, Carlson decided tofollow their recommendation.

'' Palm Tree, cod Scrub Brush ._) Ceder of Japanese Resistonce

mainder of the landing force wasback on board the Nautilus and Ar-gonaut. Since the entire withdrawalhad been so disorganized, the twocompanies were intermingled on thesubmarines and it was not until theyreturned to Pearl Harbor that theycould make an accurate accountingof their losses. The official tally was18 dead and 12 missing.

Only after the war would the Ma-rine Corps discover that nine of themissing raiders had been left alive onthe island. These men had becomeseparated from the main body at onepoint or another during the opera-tion. With the assistance of the na-tives the group evaded capture for atime, but finally surrendered on 30August. A few weeks later theJapanese beheaded them on the is-land of Kwajalein.

The raid itself had mixed results.Reports painted it as a great victoryand it boosted morale on the homefront. Many believed it achieved itsoriginal goal of diverting forces fromGuadalcanal, but the Japanese hadimmediately guessed the size andpurpose of the operation and had notlet it alter their plans for the Solo-mons. However, it did cause the ene-my to worry about the potential forother such raids on rear area instal-lations. On the negative side, thatthreat may have played a part in thesubsequent Japanese decision to for-tify heavily places like Tarawa Atoll,the scene of a costly amphibious as-sault later in the war. At the tacticallevel, the 2d Raiders had proventhemselves in direct combat with theenemy. Their greatest difficulties hadinvolved rough seas and poor equip-ment; bravery could not fix thoselimitations. Despite the trumpetedsuccess of the operation, the Navynever again attempted to use subma-rines to conduct raids behind enemylines.

Carlson received the Navy Crossfor his efforts on Makin, and thepublic accorded him hero status. Afew of those who served with himwere not equally pleased with his

performance. No one questioned hisdemonstrated bravery under fire, butsome junior officers were critical ofhis leadership, especially the attemptto surrender to a non-existent enemy.Carlson himself later noted that hehad reached "a spiritual low" on thenight of the 17th. And again on theevening of the lath, the battalioncommander contemplated remainingon the island to organize the nativesfor resistance, while others super-vised the withdrawal of his unit.Those who criticized him thought hehad lost his aggressiveness and abil-ity to think clearly when the chipswere down. But he and his raiderswould have another crack at the ene-my in the not too distant future.

The Makin operation had not beenNimitz's first choice for an amphibi-ous raid. In late May he had pro-posed an attack by the 1st Raidersagainst the Japanese seaplane base onTulagi, in the lower Solomon Islands.The target was in the Southwest Pa-cific Area, however, and GeneralDouglas MacArthur opposed theplan. But Tulagi remained a signifi-

9

cant threat to the maritime lifeline toAustralia. After the Midway victo-ry opened the door for a more offen-sive Allied posture, the Japaneseadvance positions in the Solomonsbecame a priority objective. In lateJune the Joint Chiefs of Staff shiftedthat region from MacArthur's com-mand to Nimitz's Pacific OceanAreas command, and ordered the sei-zure of Tulagi. The Americans soondiscovered that the Japanese werebuilding an airfield on nearbyGuadalcanal, and that became theprimary target for Operation Wat-chtower. The 1st Marine Division,with the 1st Raider Battalion at-tached, received the assignment.

In answer to Edson's repeated re-quests, the rear echelon of his bat-talion (less the 81mm mortarplatoon) finally joined up with himon 3 July in Samoa. The entire unitthen moved on to New Caledonia.The 1st Raiders received definitiveword on Watchtower on 20 July.They would seize Tulagi, with the 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, in support.The 1st Parachute Battalion wouldtake the conjoined islets of Gavutu-Tanambogo. The 1st Marine Divi-

- -

c"uu':'S..v ?a -

'lO!j,1,, %,4,""ni,siuj,, '¼,, % "'4S ",

C' ''0, S -q4 '04,, -

4sSS fl "%.Blue S*F, %4 S Phase theABeach "*,,,,s .."* -

N5, 01,,0pfl 0ç9

A ' p1¼4

I , S1tOiflijH %S 0' 'ffjjflfl,, 't,0J

_______________________________

, )TULAGI

7 -8 Aug 1942

O 1/4 1(2

CMiles

sion, less one regiment in reserve,would capture the incomplete airfieldon Guadalcanal.

Edson offered to make amphibiousreconnaissance patrols of the objec-tives, but the naval commander re-jected that idea. Most of theinformation on Tulagi would comefrom three Australians, all formercolonial officials familiar with thearea. Tulagi was 4,000 yards long andno more than 1,000 yards wide, anda high ridge ran along its length, ex-cept for a low, open saddle near thesoutheast end. The only suitablelanding beaches from a hydrographicstandpoint were those on either sideof this low ground, since coral for-mations fringed the rest of the island.Intelligence officers estimated that theisland held several hundred men ofthe Japanese Special Naval LandingForce; these were elite troops ofproven fighting ability. Aerial recon-naissance indicated they were dug into defend the obvious landing sites.Planners thus chose to make the as-sault halfway up the western coast ata place designated as Beach Blue.They wisely decided to make the firstAmerican amphibious assault of thewar against natural obstacles, notenemy gunfire.

The raiders sailed from NewCaledonia on 23 July and joined upwith the main task force for rehear-sals on Koro Island in the Fijis. Thesewent poorly, since the Navy boatcrews and most of the 1st Marine Di-vision were too green. On the morn-ing of 7 August the task force hoveto and commenced unloading inwhat would become known as Iron-bottom Sound. Although Edson'smen had trained hard on their rub-ber boats, they would make thislanding from Higgins boats. After apreliminary bombardment by acruiser and destroyer, the first wave,composed of Companies B and D,headed for shore. Coral forced themto debark and wade the last 100yards, but there was no enemy op-position. Companies A and C quick-

ly followed them. The four riflecompanies spread out across thewaist of the island and then advancedin line to the southeast. They metonly occasional sniper fire until theyreached Phase Line A at the end ofthe ridge, where they halted asplanned while naval guns fir?d an ad-ditional preparation on the enemydefenses.

The attack jumped off again justbefore noon, and promptly ran intoheavy Japanese resistance. For the re-mainder of the day the raiders foughtto gain control of the saddle from theentrenched enemy, who would notsurrender under any circumstances.The Marines quickly discovered thattheir only recourse was to employ ex-plosives to destroy the men occupy-ing the caves and bunkers. Asevening approached, the battalionsettled into defensive lines that cir-cled the small ridge (Hill 281) on thetip of the island. The 2d Battalion,5th Marines, had already scoured theremainder of the island and nowtook up positions in the rear of theraiders.

The Japanese launched their clas-sic banzai counterattack at 2200 thatnight. The initial effort punched asmall hole in the raider lines betweenCompanies A and C. A second as-sault, which might have exploitedthis gap, instead struck full againstCompany As front. This time theraiders held their ground. For the re-mainder of the night the Japanese re-lied on infiltration tactics, withindividuals and small groups tryingto make their way into the Americanrear by stealth. By this means theyattacked both the 2d Battalion's com-mand post (CP) and the aid stationset up near Blue Beach. They alsocame within 50 yards of the raiderCP. Edson tried to call for reinforce-ments, but communications wereout.

In the morning things lookedmuch better, just as they had onMakin. At 0900 two companies ofthe 5th Marines passed through raid-er lines and swept over the southern

10

portions of Hill 281. The remainingenemy were now isolated in a ravinein the midst of the small ridge. Af-ter a lengthy barrage by the 60mmmortars of Company E and theirheavier 81mm cousins of the riflebattalion, infantrymen from bothoutfits moved through the final ene-my pocket. Grenades and dynamitewere the weapons of choice againstthe Japanese still holed up in theircaves and dugouts. At 1500 Edsondeclared the island secured. That didnot mean the fighting was entirelyover. For the next few days Marinesscoured the island by day, and fend-ed off occasional infiltrators at night,until they had killed off the last ene-my soldier. In the entire battle, theraiders suffered losses of 38 dead and55 wounded. There were an addi-tional 33 casualties among other Ma-rine units on the island. All but threeof the 350 Japanese defenders haddied.

On the night of 8 August aJapanese surface force arrived fromRabaul and surprised the Alliednaval forces guarding the transports.In a brief engagement the enemysank four cruisers and a destroyer,damaged other ships, and killed1,200 sailors, all at minimal cost tothemselves. The American navalcommander had little choice the nextmorning but to order the early with-drawal of his force. Most of thetransports would depart that after-noon with their cargo holds still halffull. The raiders were in a particular-ly bad way. They had come ashorewith little food because the plancalled for their immediate withdrawalafter seizing the island. Moreover,since they had not cleared the ene-my from the only usable beaches un-til D plus 1, there had been little timeto unload anything. The result wouldbe short rations for some time tocome.

The 1st Raiders performed well intheir initial exposure to combat. Liketheir compatriots in the 2d Raiders,they were both brave and daring.

r

Major Kenneth D. Bailey demon-strated the type of leadership thatwas common to both units. When anenemy machine gun held up the ad-vance of his company on D-day, hepersonally circled around the bunker,crawled on top, and pushed a

grenade into the firing port. In theprocess he received a gunshot woundin the thigh. Edson established hisreputation for fearlessness by spend-ing most of his time in the front lines,where he contemptuously stood upin the face of enemy fire. More im-

portant, he aggressively employedhis force in battle, while many othersenior commanders had grown timidafter years of peacetime service.Major General Alexander A. Van-degrift, commander of the 1st Ma-rine Division, soon wrote Com-mandant Holcomb that "Edson is oneof the finest troop leaders I ever saw:'

As August progressed the Japanesemoved a steady stream of reinforce-ments to Guadalcanal in nightly runsby destroyers and barges, a processsoon dubbed the "Tokyo Express:'The Marines repulsed the first ene-my attack at the Tenaru River on 21August, but Vandegrift knew that hewould need all the strength he couldmuster to defend the extendedperimeter surrounding the airfield.At the end of the month he broughtthe raiders and parachutists acrossthe sound and placed them in reservenear Lunga Point. The latter battal-ion had suffered heavily in its assaulton Gavutu-Tanambogo, to includethe loss of its commander, so Van-degrift attached the parachutists toRed Mike's force.

Edson quickly established a rap-

This enemy Model 92 7.7mm Lewis machine gun was sited tocover the obvious landing beaches on the southeastern shore

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 50969

of Tulagi. The 1st Raider Battalion made a safe landing byassaulting unfavorable but undefended terrain elsewhere.

Marine Gunner Angus H. Goss (shown here training other raiders in 1943) playedan unexpected lead role in the seizure of Tulagi. When Japanese holed up in caves,Goss and his demolition platoon attached TNT charges to ends of poles andfashioned the techniques needed to root out the remaining defenders on the island.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 55268

11.

:1 ':<hi'

Lirj

port with Lieutenant Colonel Tho-mas, the division operations officer,and convinced him to use the raid-ers offensively. The first product ofthis effort was a two-company patrolon 4 September to Savo Island,where intelligence believed the ene-my had an observation post. WhileGriffith commanded that operation,Red Mike planned a reconnaissance-in-force against Cape Esperance forthe next day. When the Savo patrolreturned in the late afternoon on Lit-tle (APD 4) and Gregory (APD 3),the men began debarking before theyreceived the order to remain on boardin preparation for the next mission.Once he became aware of the mix-up, Edson let the offload process pro-ceed to completion. That nightJapanese destroyers of the Tokyo Ex-press sank the two APDs. It was thesecond close escape for the raiders.During the shift to Guadalcanal, ene-

This photo, taken on Guadalcanal in 1942, captured three menwho figured prominently in the brief history of the raiders.LtGen Thomas Holcomb, left front, authorized the activationof the raiders in February 1942. Cot Merritt A. Edson, right

12

rear, played a major hand in creating the raider concept. Maj-Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, left rear, relied heavily on theraiders in winning the Guadal canal campaign, then disband-ed them in early 1944 when he became Commandant.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC} 5132

a

00

Savo

G UADALCANALSep 1942

0 10 20I I

Miles

Sea/ark Channel

±

A

Guadalcanal

Edson's Ridge

my planes had sunk the Co/houn(APD 2) just after it had unloaded acompany.

Marine attention soon shifted fromCape Esperance as it became evidentthat the primary terminus of theTokyo Express was the village ofTasimboko. On 6 September Edsonand Thomas won permission fromVandegrift to raid the area on theeighth. After the loss of three of theirAPDs, shipping was at a premium,so the raiders boarded the McKean(APD 5), Manley (APD 1), and twoconverted tuna boats for the opera-tion. The raider rifle companieswould comprise the first echelon; theships then would shuttle back to theLunga for the weapons company andthe parachutists. Native scoutsreported there were several thousandJapanese in the area, but divisionplanners discounted that figure.However, Edson did rely on theirreports that the enemy defenses facedwest toward Marine lines. He decid-ed to land beyond the village at TaivuPoint and then advance overland totake the target from the rear.

When the raiders went ashore justprior to dawn on 8 September, theyquickly realized the scouting reportshad been accurate. As they movedalong the coast toward Tasimboko,they discovered more than a thou-sand life preservers placed in neatrows, a large number of foxholes,and even several unattended 37mmantitank guns. In previous daysMajor General Kiyotaki Kawaguchihad landed an entire brigade atTasimboko, but it was then advanc-ing inland. Only a rearguard ofabout 300 men secured the villageand the Japanese supply dumps lo-cated there, though this force wasnearly as big as the raider first eche-lon. The Marines soon ran into stub-born resistance, to include 75mmartillery pieces firing pointblankdown the coastal road and the ord-erly rows of a coconut plantation.While Edson fixed the attention ofthe defenders with two companies,

he sent Griffith and Company Awide to the left flank.

Concerned that he might be fac-ing the enemy main force, Red Mikeradioed a plea for a supplementallanding to the west of Tasimboko.The last part of the message indicat-ed there was trouble: "If not, requestinstructions regarding my embarka-tion:' Forty-five minutes later Edsonagain asked for fresh troops and formore air support. Division respond-ed the same way each time — the raid-ers were to break off the action andwithdraw. Red Mike ignored thatorder and continued the attack. Notlong afterwards, enemy resistancemelted away, and both wings of theraider force entered the villagearound noon. The area was stock-piled with large quantities of food,ammunition, and weapons rangingup to 75mm artillery pieces. Van-degrift radioed a "well done" andrepeated his order to withdraw yetagain.

The raider commander chose tostay put for the time being, and hismen set about destroying as much ofthe cache as they could. Troopswrecked a powerful radio station,bayoneted cans of food, tore openbags of rice and urinated on the con-tents or spilled them on the ground,tied guns to landing boats and towedthem into deep water, and then final-ly put the torch to everything thatwas left. They also gathered all avail-able documents. As the sun wentdown, the men reembarked andheaded for the perimeter, many ofthem a little bit heavier with liberat-ed chow, cigarettes, and alcohol.

The raid was a minor tactical vic-tory in terms of actual fighting. TheMarines counted 27 enemy bodiesand estimated they had killed 50.Their own losses were two dead andsix wounded. But the battle had im-portant repercussions. The raidershad put a serious dent in Japaneselogistics, fire support, and commu-nications. The intelligence gatheredhad more far-reaching consequences,

13

since it revealed many of the detailsof the coming Japanese offensive. Fi-nally, the setback hurt the enemy'smorale and further boosted that ofthe raiders. They had defeated theJapanese yet again, and were literal-ly feasting on the fruits of the victory.

The next day Red Mike discussedthe situation with division planners.Intelligence officers translating thecaptured documents confirmed that3,000 Japanese were cutting their waythrough the jungle southwest ofTasimboko. Edson was convincedthat they planned to attack the cur-rently unguarded southern portion ofthe perimeter. From an aerial photo-graph he picked out a grass-coveredridge that pointed like a knife at theairfield. His hunch was based on hisown experience in jungle fighting andwith the Japanese. He knew theyliked to attack at night, and that wasalso the only time they could get firesupport from the sea. And a night at-tack in the jungle only had a chanceif it moved along a well-definedavenue of approach. The ridge wasthe obvious choice. Thomas agreed.Vandegrift did not, but they con-vinced the general to let the raidersand parachutists shift their bivouacto the ridge in order to get out of thepattern of bombs falling around theairfield.

The men moved to the new loca-tion on 10 September. Contrary totheir hopes, it was not a rest zone.Japanese planes bombed the ridge onthe 11th and 12th. Native scoutsbrought reports of the approachingenemy column, and raider patrolssoon made contact with the advanceelements of the force. The Marinesworked to improve their position un-der severe handicaps. There was verylittle barbed wire and no sandbags orengineering tools. Troops on theridge itself could not dig far beforestriking coral; those on either flankwere hampered by thick jungle thatwould conceal the movement of theenemy. Casualties had thinned ranks,

or the result of lack of familiaritywith the terrain. In any case, thethick jungle offset the Marine advan-tage in firepower, and the Japanesefound plenty of room to infiltrate be-tween platoon strongpoints. Theysoon isolated the three platoons ofCompany C, each of which subse-quently made its way to the rear. TheMarines on the ridge remained com-paratively untouched. As daylightapproached the Japanese broke offthe action, but retained possession ofCompany C's former positions.Kawaguchi's officers began the slowprocess of regrouping their units,now scattered over the jungle and to-tally disoriented.

In the morning Edson ordered acounterattack by his reserve compa-nies. They made little headwayagainst the more-numerous Japanese,and Red Mike recalled them. Since hecould not restore an unbroken front,he decided to withdraw the entire lineto the reserve position. This had theadded benefit of forcing the enemyto cross more open ground on theridge before reaching Marine fight-ing holes. In the late afternoon theB Companies of both raiders andparachutists pulled back and an-chored themselves on the ridge mid-way between Hills 80 and 120.Thomas provided an engineer com-pany, which Edson inserted on theright of the ridge. Company A of theraiders covered the remaining dis-tance between the engineers and theLunga. The other two parachutecompanies withdrew slightly andbulked up the shoulder of the leftflank. The remains of Companies Cand D assumed a new reserve posi-tion on the west slope of the ridge,just behind Hill 120. Red Mike's com-mand post stayed in its previous lo-cation.

The Japanese made good use of thedaylight hours and prepared for afresh effort. This time Kawaguchiwould not make the mistake of get-ting bogged down in the jungle; hewould follow the tactics Edson hadoriginally expected and concentrate

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 310563Maj Kenneth D. Bailey was awarded theMedal of Honor for his part in the hat-tie of Edson's Ridge, which saved Hen-derson Field and the entire Marineperimeter. Although he survived that in-tense fight, he died just two weeks laterleading his men against a Japanese po-sition along the Matanikau River.

his attack on the open ground of theridge. The new assault kicked off justafter darkness fell. The initial blowstruck Company B's right flank nearthe lagoon. A mad rush of scream-ing soldiers drove the right half of theraider company out of position andthose men fell back to link up withCompany C on the ridge. Inexplica-bly, Kawaguchi did not exploit thegap he had created. Possibly themaneuver had been a diversion todraw Marine reserves off the ridgeand out of the way of the maineffort.

Edson had to decide quicklywhether to plug the hole with hisdwindling reserve or risk having thecenter of his line encircled by the nextassault. The enemy soon providedthe answer. By 2100 Japanese soldi-ers were massing around thesouthern nose of the ridge, makingtheir presence known with the usualbarrage of noisy chants. Theypresumably were going to launch afrontal assault on the center of theMarine line. Red Mike ordered Com-pany C of the raiders and CompanyA of the parachutists to form a

15

reserve line around the front andsides of Hill 120. Japanese mortarand machine-gun fire swept theridge; the Marines responded withartillery fire on suspected assemblyareas.

The assault waves finally surgedforward at 2200. The attack, on afront all across the ridge, immediate-ly unhinged the Marine center. AsJapanese swarmed toward the leftflank of his Company B, CaptainHarry L. Torgerson, the parachutebattalion executive officer, ordered itto withdraw. The parachutists inCompany C soon followed suit. Tor-gerson gathered these two units in therear of Company A's position on Hill120, where he attempted to reor-ganize them. The remaining Compa-ny B raiders were now isolated in thecenter. The situation lookeddesperate.

At this point, the Japanese seemedto take a breather. Heavy fire rakedthe ridge, but the enemy made nofresh assaults. Edson arranged formore artillery support, and got hisown force to provide covering fire forthe withdrawal of the exposed raid-ers of Company B. For a time itlooked like the series of rearwardmovements would degenerate into arout. As a few men around Hill 120began to filter to the rear, Red Miketook immediate steps to avert dis-aster. From his CP, now just a dozenyards behind the front, he made itknown that this was to be the finalstand. The word went round: "No-body moves, just die in your holes:'Major Bailey ranged up and downthe line raising his voice above thedin and breathing fresh nerve intothose on the verge of giving up. Thecommander of the Parachute Battal-ion broke down; Edson relieved himon the spot and placed Torgerson incharge.

The new position was not verystrong, just a small horseshoe bentaround the hill, with men from sever-al units intermingled on the bareslopes. Red Mike directed the ar-tillery to maintain a continuous bar-

rage close along his front. When theJapanese renewed their attack, eachfresh wave of Imperial soldiers boiledout of the jungle into a torrent of steeland lead. In addition to the firepowerof artillery and automatic weapons,men on the lines tossed grenade af-ter grenade at whatever shapes orsounds they could discern. Suppliesof ammunition dwindled rapidly,and division headquarters pushedforward cases of belted machine gunammunition and grenades.

One of the Japanese assaults, prob-ably avoiding the concentrated firesweeping the crest, pushed along thejungle edge at the bottom of the slopeand threatened to envelop the left

flank. Edson ordered Torgerson tolaunch a counterattack with his tworeorganized parachute companies.These Marines advanced, checkedthe enemy progress, and extended theline to prevent any recurrence. RedMike later cited this effort as "a deci-sive factor in our ultimate victory:'

At 0400 Edson asked Thomas tocommit the reserve battalion to bol-ster his depleted line. A company ata time, the men of the 2d Battalion,5th Marines, filed along the top ofthe ridge and into place beside thosewho had survived the long night. Bythat point the Japanese were largelyspent. Kawaguchi sent in two moreattacks, but they were hit by artillery

16

fire as the troops assembled andnever presented much of a threat. Asmall band actually made it past theridge and reached the vicinity of theairfield; the Marines providing secu-rity there dealt with them.

The onset of daylight brought anend to any organized effort, thoughremnants of Japanese assault unitswere scattered through the fringingjungle to the flanks and rear of theMarine position. Squads began thelong process of rooting out thesesnipers. Edson also ordered up an airattack to strike the enemy units cling-ing to the southern end of the ridge.A flight of P-400s answered the calland strafed the exposed enemygroups. Kawaguchi admitted failurethat afternoon and ordered his tat-tered brigade to retreat.

The raiders and parachutists hadalready turned over the ridge to otherMarines that morning. The 1st Raid-ers had lost 135 men, the 1stParachute Battalion another 128. Ofthose, 59 men were dead or missing-in-action. Seven hundred Japanesebodies littered the battlefield, andfew of Kawaguchi's 500 woundedwould survive the terrible trek backto the coast.

The battle was much more than atremendous tactical victory for theMarines. Edson and his men hadturned back one of the most seriousthreats the Japanese were to mountagainst Henderson Field. If the raid-ers and parachutists had failed, thelanding strip would have fallen intoenemy hands, and the lack of aircover probably would have led to thedefeat of the 1st Marine Division andthe loss of Guadalcanal. Such areversal would have had a grave im-pact on the course of the war and thefuture of the Corps.

Vandegrift wasted no time inrecommending Edson and Bailey forMedals of Honor. Red Mike's citationnoted his "marked degree of coolleadership and personal courage:' Atthe height of the battle, with friend-ly artillery shells landing just 75

Div

THE RIDGENight of 13-14 Sep 1942

0 100 200 300

Yards

Matanikau

yards to the front, and enemy bullets vent the enemy's return. That would a narrow shelf between the water andand mortars sweeping the knoll, Ed-son had never taken cover. Standingin the shallow hole that passed fora CP, he had calmly issued ordersand served as an inspiration to allwho saw him. War correspondentsvisiting the scene the day after thebattle dubbed it "Edson's Ridge:'

The depleted parachutists (55 per-cent casualties in the campaign) leftGuadalcanal on 17 September onboard the convoy that brought in the7th Marines. The 1st Raiders (33 per-cent casualties) remained, andreceived precious little rest. Just sixdays after the battle, Vandegrift or-dered them to make a reconnaissancesouth of Edson's Ridge and destroyany Japanese stragglers. The raiderspassed through their old position,now strongly defended by the 7thMarines, and followed the track oftheir beaten foe, a trail marked byabandoned weapons and bodies. Ed-son made liberal use of artillery andhis crew-served weapons against theslightest sign of resistance. At a costof three wounded, the raiders cap-tured a single dismantled howitzerand killed 19 enemy soldiers. Thegreatest point of danger in the oper-ation turned out to be the return trip.As the battalion neared friendlylines, the jittery new arrivals of the7th Marines opened fire on the raid-ers. Luckily no one was hit.

That same day Vandegrift shippedout several excess colonels and reor-ganized the senior ranks of the divi-sion. Edson took command of the 5thMarines and Griffith succeeded himas head of the 1st Raiders. Red Mike'sdeparture did not take the raider bat-talion out of the spotlight. LieutenantColonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller's 1stBattalion, 7th Marines, departed theperimeter on 23 September with themission of clearing enemy units fromthe vicinity of the Matanikau River.Once that was accomplished, divi-sion wanted to place the raiders in apatrol base near Kokumbona to pre-

keep Japanese artillery out of rangeof the airfield.

On the 24th Puller's men surpriseda Japanese unit and routed it, but lostseven killed and 25 wounded in theprocess. Division sent out the 2d Bat-talion, 5th Marines, as a relief force,since Puller had to use most of hisbattalion to get the casualties safelyback into the perimeter. Puller thencontinued on with his one remainingrifle company and the 2d Battalion.The combined force reached theMatanikau on 26 September, pro-ceeded down the east bank, thentried to cross the sandbar at theriver's mouth. A Japanese companyblocked the way and drove the Ma-rines back with heavy fire. Mean-while another enemy companymoved into defensive positions onthe eastern end of the single-logbridge that served as the only cross-ing upstream. The Marines remainedignorant of that move. That after-noon Vandegrift ordered Edson totake charge of the operation, andsent the raiders along to assist him.

Puller and Edson jointly devised anew plan that evening. In the morn-ing the raiders would move upriver,cross at the bridge, and then comeback downriver on the far bank totake the Japanese at the river mouthin the flank. To ensure that the ene-my force did not retreat out of thetrap, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,would pressure them with its own at-tack across the sandbar. Finally, thebulk of the 1st Battalion, 7th Ma-rines, then in the perimeter after thecasualty evacuation, would make anamphibious landing beyond PointCruz to slam shut any possible escaperoute. The ambitious plan receiveddivision's blessing.

After a night of heavy rain, the 2dBattalion launched its assault at theriver mouth, but made no progressagainst continuing strong opposition.The raiders, reinforced by Puller'slone company, advanced upriver, butsoon found themselves wedged into

17

a steep ridge. The Japanese hadplaced a tight stopper in this bottlewith infantry supported by machineguns and mortars. Bailey respondedin his typical fashion and tried to leadthe assault—he soon fell mortallywounded. Griffith ordered Compa-ny C up the ridge in an effort to out-flank the enemy. The Japanese hadthis approach covered too. When thebattalion commander appeared onthe ridgeline to observe the actionfirsthand, a sniper put a bullet in hisshoulder. With no outside fire sup-port, the raiders could make no head-way against the dug-in Japanese.

Poor communications made thingsworse. Edson misinterpreted a mes-sage from the raiders and thoughtthey were across the river. Helaunched the 2d Battalion, 5th Ma-rines, in yet another assault, this timewith help from additional mortarsand 37mm antitank guns, but it metthe same fate as all previous at-tempts. Upon landing in the enemy'srear, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,was surrounded by a large-force ene-my bivouaced in the vicinity. Theunit had brought no radios ashoreand consequently could not immedi-ately inform division of its plight.Eventually the Marines used airpanels to signal supporting aircraft.When that word reached Puller, hewanted the 2d Battalion to renew theassault to take pressure off his men,but Edson refused to incur furthercasualties in a hopeless frontalattack.

Puller eventually extricated his be-leaguered force with naval gunfireand messages passed by semaphoreflags. Red Mike then ordered theraiders to pull back to the rivermouth to join 2d Battalion, 5th Ma-rines, after which both units with-drew to the division perimeter. Theunits engaged had lost 67 dead and125 wounded in the course of theoperation. This aborted action alongthe Matanikau was the only defeatthe Marines suffered during the

-4

—

Guadalcanal campaign.Raider casualties during the all-day

action had been comparatively light— two killed and 11 wounded — butthat total included both seniorofficers in the battalion. Commandnow devolved upon Captain Ira J.

"Jake" Irwin. The battalion was worndown by two months of steady fight-ing, and by the ravages of the tropics.Large numbers of men were ill withmalaria and other diseases. The bat-talion had seen more action than anyother on the island, and rumors per-

sisted that they would soon ship outlike the parachutists. One raider laterrecalled that "a more sickly, bedrag-gled, miserable bunch of Marineswould have been hard to find:'

The 1st Raiders had one more bat-tle to go on Guadalcanal. In early

Raider Weapons and Equipmentiven their special priority early in the war,the raider battalions had ample opportunity toexperiment with weapons and equipment. The

result was an interesting collection of items that were oftenunique to the raiders. The most famous of these were thevarious models of raider knives. One was a heavy Bowie-type knife with a blade more than nine inches long. Thesewere manufactured specifically for the 2d Raiders and con-sequently came to be known as "Gung Ho" knives. An en-tirely different version, a lighter stiletto-type, was modeledon the Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife used by the Britishcommandos. These raider stilettos were issued to all fourbattalions for the later campaigns.

The emphasis on rapid movement on foot drove bothCarlson and Edson to emphasize the acquisition of lightweapons with a lot of firepower. Both men rejected thestandard heavy machine guns and 81mm mortars carriedby regular infantry and adopted lighter models. The 2dRaider Battalion was one of the first Marine units to receivethe semiautomatic Ml Garand .30-caliber rifle as standardissue; most units, including the 1st Raiders, started theGuadalcanal campaign with the old bolt-action SpringfieldM1903. The Browning automatic rifle, the reviled Reisingsub-machine gun, and the more dependable ThompsonA two-man Boys antitank rifle crew mans their weaponduring a training exercise in 1943. Two other raiders pro-

18

sub-machine gun, were favored weapons, particularly inthe 2d Raiders, where each fire team boasted a BAR anda Thompson.

Perhaps the oddest weapon carried by the raiders wasthe Boys antitank rifle, a 35-pound behemoth firing a.55-caliber round. Edson adopted these Canadian weaponsto provide his men with a light but serviceable capabilityagainst enemy armor. The rifle eventually saw use withother raider battalions. The heavy round was accurate atmore than 1,000 yards, and the 2d Raiders used a Boys onMakin to destroy two Japanese seaplanes.

The raiders experimented with a number of odd itemsof equipment, everything from collapsible bicycles to bel-ly bands. Carlson introduced the latter, a cloth rectanglethat could be wrapped around the midsection, where it sup-posedly prevented intestinal disorders. The 2d Raiders alsoemployed a hunting jacket that could double as a pack—inevitably it was dubbed the "Gung Ho" jacket. Edson's mentried out portable individual field stoves, toggle ropes, andother innovative items. The eight-foot toggle ropes had aloop at one end and a peg at the other; they were helpfulwhen it came time to scale cliffs. The raiders also pioneeredthe use of camouflage-patterned uniforms and of burlapstrips to break up the distinctive outline of their helmets.vide flank protection against enemy infantry. The Boysrifle fired a .55-caliber round guaranteed to penetrate armor.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 56107

October intelligence indicated thatthe Japanese were building up theirforces west of the Matanikau inpreparation for another offensiveagainst the perimeter. Division head-quarters decided to strike first to se-cure the crossings over the river. Ina plan reminiscent of the beginningsof the previous operation, two bat-talions of the 5th Marines wouldmove down the coast road, seize thenear bank of the Matanikau, and fixthe attention of the Japanese forceson the far side. Three other battal-ions would cross the Matanikau atthe single-log bridge and attack northtoward the sea. Once they cleared thefar side of the river, a force wouldgarrison Kokumbona and preventfurther enemy operations in the vi-cinity. In addition to strengtheningthe assault forces, this time divisionprovided ample fire support. Allunits were to move into position on7 October in preparation for launch-ing that attack the next morning.

When the 5th Marines deployedforward on 7 October, they ran intoa Japanese company dug in on thenear side of the river just inland fromthe sandbar. Edson's 2d Battalionmanaged to secure most of its as-signed frontage farther upriver, buthis 3d Battalion was unable to breakthe enemy resistance centered on awell-fortified defensive position. Hecommitted Company L to the battleand then radioed division for rein-forcements so he could reconstitutea regimental reserve. Division as-signed Company A, 1st Raiders tothe task and the unit marched offdown the coast road to bivouac nextto Red Mike's CP.

That night the Japanese on thenear side of the river probed the linesof the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, andmauled the company nearest thesandbar. Early in the morning of 8October, Edson decided to committhe raiders of Company A to the taskof reducing the Japanese pocket. Heplaced Major Lewis W. Walt incharge of the effort. (Walt had been

Company As commander until Ed-son had brought him over as opera-tions officer for the 5th Marines.)The raiders drove in a few enemyoutposts, but could make little head-way against the interlocking fires ofthe concealed Japanese positions.Meanwhile, heavy rains during thenight had continued into the day, anddivision delayed the move across theriver for 24 hours. Vandegrift alsodecided to alter his original plan toa quick envelopment of the westbank and a return to the perimeter.

Based on these changed circum-stances and his own observation atclose range of Company As predica-ment, Edson halted the attack on thestrongpoint. His 3d Battalion wouldcontinue to encircle most of the ene-my position, while Company A wentinto the defense on their right flank.The latter's position was shaped likea horseshoe, with the left linking upwith the 3d Battalion and facingsouth toward the bunker complex,the center facing west toward thesandspit, and the right on the beachfacing north toward the sea. To fillout the thin line, mortarmen andcompany headquarters personnel oc-cupied the left flank positions. Theraiders expected a Japanese assaultacross the river mouth to relieve thesurrounded bridgehead, so the Ma-rines strung barbed wire at thefriendly end of the sandbar. The re-mainder of the raider battalion cameup the coast road and went intoreserve.

Just after dusk the Japanese in thestrongpoint rushed from their posi-tions in an effort to break throughto their own lines. They quicklyoverran the surprised left flank ofCompany A and hit the center of theraider line from the rear. The enemywho survived the close-quartersfighting in both locations then ranheadlong into the wire, where firefrom the remaining Marines cut themdown. The lieutenant commandingthe raider company tried to recoverfrom the confusion and establish a

19

fresh line farther back along the coastroad. In the morning there was somemore fighting with a handful ofJapanese who had sought refuge inMarine foxholes. Company C of theraiders moved up to occupy the aban-doned enemy position and killedthree more Japanese still holed-upthere. They found an elaborate com-plex of trenches and bunkers con-nected by tunnels to an undergroundcommand post. The Marines count-ed 59 bodies stacked up against thewire or strewn about the perimeter.The battalion lost 12 dead and 22wounded during this stint on theMatanikau.

The raiders suffered one additionalcasualty during the operation. WhenRed Mike had gone over to the 5thMarines, he had taken with him hislongtime runner, Corporal Walter J.Burak. While carrying a messagealong the river on the afternoon of9 October, Japanese machine-gun firekilled the former raider. He was thelast member of the 1st Raiders to diein action on Guadalcanal. On 13 Oc-tober a convoy delivered the Army's164th Infantry to the island and em-barked the raider battalion for trans-port to New Caledonia. There werebarely 200 effectives left in theunit— just a quarter of the battalion'soriginal strength.

Not long after the departure of the1st Raiders, it was the turn of the 2dRaiders to fight on Guadalcanal.Carlson's outfit had been refitting inHawaii after the Midway and Makinbattles. In early September the unitboarded a transport for Espiritu San-to in the New Hebrides, the primarystaging area for most reinforcementsgoing to the southern Solomons.There they continued training untilRear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turn-er (Commander, Amphibious Force,South Pacific) decided to land a forceat Aola Bay on the northeast coastof Guadalcanal to build another air-field. He assigned Carlson and two

CARLSON'S PATROIcompanies of raiders to secure thebeachhead for an Army battalion,Seabees, and a Marine defense bat-talion. The McKean and Manleyplaced Companies C and E ashore onthe morning of 4 November. Therewas no opposition, though it soonbecame apparent the swampy junglewas no place to put an airfield.

On 5 November Vandegrift sent amessage to Carison by airdrop. Armyand Marine elements were movingeast from the perimeter to mop up alarge force of Japanese located nearthe Metapona River. This enemyunit, the 230th Infantry Regiment,had cut its way through the junglefrom the west as part of a late-October attack on Edson's Ridge bythe Sendal Division. For various rea-sons, the 230th had failed to partici-pate in the attack, and then hadcompleted a circumnavigation of theMarine perimeter to reach its currentlocation in the east. The Tokyo Ex-press had recently reinforced it witha battalion of the 228th Infantry.Vandegrift wanted the raiders tomarch from Aola and harass theJapanese from the rear. Carlson setout with his force on 6 November,with a coastwatcher and several na-tive scouts as guides. Among the is-landers was Sergeant Major JacobVouza, already a hero in the cam-paign. The men initially carried fourdays of canned rations.

The raiders moved inland beforeheading west. The trails were narrowand overgrown, but the native scoutsproved invaluable in leading the way.On 8 November the point ran intoa small Japanese ambush near Reko.The Marines killed two Japanese; onenative suffered wounds. The nextday the column reached Binu, a vil-lage on the Balesuna River eightmiles from the coast. There Carlsonhalted while his patrols made contactwith Marine and Army units closingin on the main Japanese force, On 10November Companies B, D, and F ofthe 2d Raiders landed at Tasimbokoand moved overland to join up with

/their commander. (Company D wasonly a platoon at this point, sinceCarlson had used most of its man-power to fill out the remaining com-panies prior to departing EspirituSanto.) From that point on the raid-ers also received periodic resupplies,usually via native porters dropped onthe coast by Higgins boats. Rationswere generally tea, rice, raisins, andbacon — the type of portable guerrillafood Carlson thrived on — reinforcedby an occasional D-ration chocolatebar.

3. LAOS

On the nights of 9 and 10 Novem-ber about 3,000 Japanese escapedfrom the American ring encirclingthem on the Metapona. They werehungry and tired, and probably dis-pirited now that they had orders toretrace their steps back to the westernside of the perimeter. But they werestill a formidable force.

On the 11th the 2d Raiders hadfour companies out on independentpatrols while the fifth guarded thebase camp at Binu. Each unit had aTBX radio. At mid-morning one out-

, Enemy forcesencountered

4 NOVEMBER - 4 DECEMBER 942US, perimeter

..i(— Roof,body

of atom SabsidiOry potrOls (. — —

5000 0 5000

YARDS

10000I

/30 NOV- Sorpnses 100 enatn.y

in biwOaoO, killing 75,

the final oction of Ihe p01,01.

29 ROy— Fo,nd and destroyedlarge binouoc 0700

including nApplieS end anIiIIery,

24N0V- POtrol reaches eppmTenaru River ornd es-

tablishes base for tyslemnaticpatrolling of Ihi area.

II NOV- Mom body •ngageiJapanese bof lotion

of Asomano and awaits retwflof Co F Patrol.

14 NOV - Co F Petrol encount-ers and destroys IS

man ouspost in defile near Gino.

I SNOV- Bose e,tabhshedat Binu,

8NOV- Ambush by somalI en.-j, my force at Reko.

7NOV- Patrol by-passes re-ported enemy concen-

tration at Koilotumorio.

4 ROy- 2d Raider Bn (lestdets) lands of 0010

Boy logethar with elements of147th 1sf and 5th Def Bn.Raiders move Out on combatpatrol.

4NI

-"ç4uib %Monley) 8cm,

(%titcteman

/ Neville

TASKFORCE %HvSomood

65

20