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<ul><li><p>Crowd psychology and crowd safety: From disaster to prevention </p><p>Dr John Drury School of Psychology University of Sussex </p><p>UK </p></li><li><p>Crowd psychology and crowd safety </p><p> an unlikely pairing? </p><p>Traditional ideas about crowd psychology: Mindlessness and barbarism Loss of self, loss of control Mass panic </p></li><li><p>Overview </p><p>1. How crowds behave in emergencies </p><p>2. The social identity approach </p><p>3. The role of crowds in disaster prevention </p></li><li><p>The received wisdom </p><p>Most deaths in night-club fires are due to crowd panic, not the fire itself </p><p> A textbook case: </p><p> Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire, 1942 (492 people died) </p></li><li><p>Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire, 1942 (Chertkoff &amp; Kushigian, 1999) </p><p> The emergency exit door was locked </p><p> Windows were sealed Many died from fumes and then a </p><p>ball of fire. </p><p> Enquiry: no implication that crowd over-reaction or selfishness caused the deaths. </p><p> The management were prosecuted for manslaughter and neglect of building laws. </p></li><li><p> Conceptual problems with mass panic </p><p>Quarantelli (1960) How do we know its panic? Flight is a more scientific term for behaviour. </p><p> To judge a response as </p><p>irrational/unreasonable requires a frame of reference. </p></li><li><p>Empirical problems with mass panic </p><p>Case studies note a lack of mass panic: Atomic bombing of Japan during World </p><p>War II (Janis, 1951) </p><p> Kings Cross Underground fire of 1987 </p><p>(Donald &amp; Canter, 1990) </p><p> 9/11 World Trade Center disaster (Blake, Galea, Westeng, &amp; Dixon, 2004) </p></li><li><p> Reviews of the evidence also note the </p><p>absence of panic </p><p> Panic is actually rare in crowds (Brown, 1965; </p><p>Johnson, 1988; Keating, 1982) </p><p> But what does this mean? </p></li><li><p>Generic or common reactions? Loss of behavioural control Selfishness Disorderly responses </p><p> BUT Cooperation is relatively common - within and </p><p>across emergencies Evacuations are often orderly </p></li><li><p>Explanations </p><p> 1. Social norms (Johnson, 1987, 1988) </p><p> Explaining or re-</p><p>describing? </p><p>The Beverly Hills Supper Club fire, 1977 156 fatalities </p><p>(Johnson, 1988) </p><p>Police records: interviews with 630 people present The elderly were helped more than the less vulnerable </p></li><li><p>Explanations </p><p>2. Ties of affiliation (Mawson, 2005, 2007) </p><p>Fire at the Summerland leisure complex, 1973 50 fatalities (Sime, 1983) </p><p> People tried to exit in small (family) groups, not alone People prefer to stay with loved ones, and even die together, </p><p>rather than escape alone. </p></li><li><p> How do strangers behave with each other in an emergency? </p></li><li><p>7th July 2005 London bombings 56 people died 700+ injuries Emergency services didnt reach all the survivors immediately The crowd was left in the dark for up to 20 minutes or more </p></li><li><p>The study </p><p> Accounts from over 146 witnesses 90 of whom were survivors 17 interviewed/written responses </p><p>Drury, Cocking, &amp; Reicher (2009) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters </p></li><li><p>Helping (versus personal selfishness) </p><p>(Helping = giving reassurance, sharing water, pulling people from the wreckage, supporting people up as they evacuated, tying tourniquets) </p><p>Contemporaneous newspaper accounts </p><p> Archive personal accounts </p><p> Primary data: Interviews and e-mails </p><p>I helped 57 42 13 I was helped 17 29 10 I saw help 140 50 17+ Selfish behaviours 3 11 4 </p><p>Drury, Cocking, &amp; Reicher (2009) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters </p></li><li><p>I remember walking towards the stairs and at the top of the stairs there was a guy coming from the other direction. I remember him kind of gesturing; kind of politely that I should go in front- you first that. And I was struck I thought, God even in a situation like this someone has kind of got manners, really. </p><p>(LB 11) </p><p>Drury, Cocking, &amp; Reicher (2009) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters </p></li><li><p>Why did people help each other? </p><p>Archive personal accounts </p><p> Interviews and e-mails </p><p> Possibility of death 68 12 Not going to die 2 1 With affiliates 8 2 With strangers 57 15 </p><p>Drury, Cocking, &amp; Reicher (2009) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters </p></li><li><p> SOCIAL IDENTITY We all have personal identities (me) </p><p> We also each have multiple social identities, </p><p>based on group memberships (us) </p><p> Physical crowds can become united through shifting from personal to shared social identity (Reicher, 1984) </p></li><li><p>Applying social identity to emergency crowds </p><p> Hypothesis 1: Antecedence of shared social identity </p><p> An emergency can create a sense of common fate (new group boundaries) </p><p> People use this common fate to define their identity Hypothesis 2: Consequences of a shared social identity </p><p> They = us Caring about others Giving social support </p></li><li><p>Int: Comparing to before the blast happened what do you think the unity was like before? </p><p>LB 1: Id say very low- three out of ten, I mean you dont really think about unity in a normal train journey, it just doesnt happen you just want to get from A to B, get a seat maybe </p><p>(LB 1) </p><p>Me in relation to other individuals </p></li><li><p>Interviewees references to we-ness: </p><p> unity, together similarity affinity part of a group </p><p> everybody, didnt matter what colour or nationality you thought these people knew each other teamness[sic] warmness vague solidity empathy </p><p>Afterwards: Us in relation to the bombing </p></li><li><p>Accounting for help </p><p> Archive personal accounts </p><p> Interviews and e-mails </p><p> Shared fate 11 5 Unity 20 11 Disunity 0 1 </p><p>Drury, Cocking, &amp; Reicher (2009) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters </p></li><li><p>Int: Can you say how much unity there was on a scale of one to ten [after the explosion]? </p><p>LB 1: Id say it was very high Id say it was seven or eight out of ten. </p><p>(LB 1) </p><p> Almost all who referred to unity also referred </p><p>to help </p><p>Drury, Cocking, &amp; Reicher (2009) International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters </p></li><li><p>Further research aims </p><p>1. Test the social identity account with a representative sample </p></li><li><p>Further research aims </p><p>1. Test the social identity account with a representative sample </p><p>2. Examine the (mediating) role of expected social support </p></li><li><p>Further research aims </p><p>1. Test the social identity account with a representative sample </p><p>2. Examine the (mediating) role of expected social support </p><p>3. Examine relationship between social identity and observing the (solidarity) behaviour of others </p></li><li><p>Our opportunity: The 2012 Solidarity Survey (MIDE UC </p><p>Measurement Center at Pontificia Universidad Catlica de Chile and Hogar de Cristo) </p><p> We piggy-backed that survey to ask about the Chile earthquake of 2010 </p><p>Drury, Brown, Gonzalez, &amp; Miranda (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Chile earthquake and tsunami, 2010 </p><p> Earthquake occurred off the coast of central Chile on 27th February 2010 </p><p> Triggered a tsunami in coastal towns </p><p> 521 died, 9% of the population in the affected areas lost their homes </p><p> Emergency services overwhelmed </p><p> Solidarity was therefore essential for survival and recovery </p><p>Drury, Brown, Gonzalez, &amp; Miranda (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Questionnaire </p><p>Survey of a representative sample of 1240 adults in the affected regions (non-affected regions excluded) </p></li><li><p>Results 1: Effects of social identification </p><p>Common fate </p><p>Social identification </p><p>Expect support </p><p>Give support </p><p>Coordinate </p></li><li><p>Results 2: Effects of others behaviour </p><p>Common fate </p><p>Social identification </p><p>Expect support </p><p>Give support </p><p>Coordinate </p><p>Others solidarity </p></li><li><p>Results 3: Moderation </p><p>Common fate </p><p>Social identification </p><p>Expect support </p><p>Give support </p><p>Coordinate </p><p>Others solidarity </p></li><li><p>The story so far </p><p> 1. Cooperation among strangers is common in </p><p>emergencies </p><p>2. Social identity provides: Motivations to provide social support Expectations of social support </p></li><li><p>2. From disaster to prevention </p><p>The public as the fourth emergency service Necessary because of absence of professional </p><p>responders </p><p> What about potentially dangerous crowd events? Here too professionals may be limited in efficacy </p></li><li><p>A near disaster </p><p> 250,000 people (60,000 expected) Emergency services overwhelmed Exit routes blocked </p><p> Panic at DJ Fatboy Slims Beach party seaside resort [brought] to the brink </p><p>of disaster (Guardian, 21st July 2002) </p></li><li><p>A near disaster </p><p>1. Some people climbed up the lighting rigs </p><p>2. Part of the crowd was close to the waterline as the tide came in, a crowd surge as people tried to evacuate </p><p>3. Risk of crushing; some participants became distressed </p><p>BUT it WASNT the disaster that people feared! </p></li><li><p>Research questions </p><p>1. To what extent did social identity processes in the crowd explain resilient outcomes (e.g., safety)? </p><p>2. How did the professional groups and crowd participants perceive that disaster was averted? </p><p>(Intergroup perspective) </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Methods Questionnaire survey </p><p> (n = 48) </p><p> Interviews Crowd participants (n = 10) Professional groups (n = 10) </p><p> Contemporaneous archive data Video News reports Message-board material Official materials Written accounts by participants </p><p> Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Survey results </p><p>Expecting others to help </p><p>Crowd identification </p><p>Feeling safe </p><p>b = .54, p = .003 </p><p>b = .60, p &lt; .001 </p><p>Direct effect, b = .23, p = .18 Indirect effect, b = .32, 95% CI [0.09, </p><p>0.69] </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Survey results </p><p>Trusting others in an emergency </p><p>Crowd identification </p><p>Feeling safe </p><p>b = .71, p &lt; .001 </p><p>b = .54, p = .001 </p><p>Direct effect, b = .17, p = .37 Indirect effect, b = .38, 95% CI [0.16, </p><p>0.74] </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>How was disaster averted? </p><p>Police perspective 1. Own organizational resilience: </p><p>Dunkirk Spirit [ ] Individual Acts of near-heroism on the street/beach (esp. where crushing occurred) (Minutes from police debrief) </p><p> 2. Control, coercion </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>How was disaster averted? </p><p>Steward perspective Crowd perspective </p><p> 3. Crowd self-organization: </p><p>Im absolutely of the opinion that it was the crowd that stopped the disaster.. none of the barriers, none of the coppers, none of the stew.. stewards, none of the alleged things that were put into place .. to protect the crowd I dont think any of that mattered, I think it was the crowd that kept everything together (Crowd participant 4) </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Working with the crowd consent and coordination </p><p>Coordinated and careful evacuation: ...the key to the event, the key to the the fact that it didn't go wrong is only really because the crowd allowed it not to go wrong, they were happy, they were content, they were informed and the mood was great (Safety advisory group member, Big Beach Boutique, 2002) </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Working with the crowd defining norms How are we going to get him down? So I said, you ask the voice of God [DJ Fatboy Slim], turn the music down, ask the voice of God very nicely to say [ ] please get down, because the party cant carry on until youre back on the ground, but do it safely please. Peer pressure will bring him down, and he wont get his head kicked in, and that will stop anybody else climbing up. Music came down, voice of God came over, he waved a bit, everyone cheered, and theyre all going down, down, down, so he comes sliding all the way down, everyone cheers and thats it. No one else climbed a lamp post all night. (PG8 city council environmental health officer) </p><p>Drury, Novelli, &amp; Stott (2015) European Journal of Social Psychology </p></li><li><p>Hajj </p><p>Mount Arafat </p></li><li><p>Hajj 2006: 346 pilgrims died as they attempted to </p><p>stone the devil at Jamarat Bridge Official explanations: unruly pilgrims Crowd physics explanation: flow and density </p></li><li><p>2015: 2000+ pilgrims died outside Mecca at a cross-roads </p></li><li><p>Hajj 2012: A safe event </p><p>Holy Mosque: 356,800m2 (88.2 acres) Total capacity: two million* Average crowd density level of at least four people per square metre (4ppm2). However, at certain locations, levels of density as people get closer to the Kaaba = 6-8ppm2 </p></li><li><p>Hajj How does an event which routinely reaches </p><p>dangerous levels density pass without crushing incidents? </p><p> Limited psychological research Mecca closed to non-Muslims </p></li><li><p>The study 1,194 pilgrims </p><p> Languages groups: 420 (35%) were Arabic speakers, 150 (13%) of Malay, 150 (13%) of Urdu, 120 (10%) of French, 120 (10%) of Persian, 120 (10%) of Turkish, and 114 (9%) of English. </p><p> Sampled across the three phases of the Hajj in which the Holy Mosque would be most busy. </p><p>Alnabulsi &amp; Drury (2014) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences </p></li><li><p>Measures </p><p> Density people per square metre (researchers estimate) </p><p> Safety (perceived) </p><p> Identification with the crowd Perceived/expected social support Management competence </p><p>Alnabulsi &amp; Drury (2014) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences </p></li><li><p>Predictors of safety </p><p> Identification with the crowd ( = 0.22, P &lt; 0.001) Perceived support ( = 0.16, P &lt; 0.001) Management competence ( = 0.132, P &lt; 0.001) </p><p> As density increased so safety decreased, = 0.061, P = 0.037. </p><p>Alnabulsi &amp; Drury (2014) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences </p></li><li><p>Results 1: moderation </p><p>Alnabulsi &amp; Drury (2014) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences </p></li><li><p>Results 2: mediation </p><p>Perceived support </p><p>Identification with the crowd </p><p> Safety </p><p>b = .56, p &lt; .001 </p><p>b = .23, p &lt; .001 </p><p>Direct effect, b = .41, p &lt; .001 Indirect effect, b = .15, 95% CI </p><p>[0.10, 0.20] </p><p>Alnabulsi &amp; Drury (2014) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences </p></li><li><p>Warnings Density (over 5ppm2) IS dangerous shock waves </p><p> The argument is not that people never over-react to </p><p>threats, but that crowds are not inherently the basis of over-reaction </p><p> Not all crowds in emergencies are characterized by social support Some crowds are divided; some crowds remain physical </p><p>crowds Social identity: the conditions for social support, not </p><p>generic behaviours </p></li><li><p>Conclusions </p><p> Social identification is the basis of: Collective resilience in emergencies The social support and coordination needed to </p><p>prevent disaster in potentially dangerous events </p><p> This analysis has implications for: </p><p> Theories of crowd behaviour How we think about crowd safety management </p><p> Community Resilience: the community of circumstance </p></li><li><p>Acknowledgements Colleagues: Hani Alnabulsi, Rupert Brown, Chris Cocking, Roberto Gonzalez, Daniel Miranda, David Novelli, Steve Reicher, Clifford Stott </p><p> Funders Pontificia Universidad Catlica de Chile and the Interdisciplinary Center for </p><p>Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies, CONICYT/FONDAP/15130009 Leverhulme Trust, F/00 230/AO ESRC, RES-000-23-0446 </p><p> Contact details </p><p> j.drury@sussex.ac.uk </p><p>Crowds and Identities research group: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/psychology/crowdsidentities/ </p><p>@DrJohnDrury </p><p>mailto:j.drury@sussex.ac.ukhttp://www.sussex.ac.uk/psychology/crowdsidentities/http://www.sussex.ac.uk/psychology/crowdsidentities/</p><p>Crowd psychology and crowd safety: From disaster to preventionCrowd ps...</p></li></ul>

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