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MARCO SGARBI

Francisco Suárez and Christian Wolff A Missed Intellectual Legacy

1. Introduction

In the last century the philosophical studies have examined Christian Wolff’s

philosophy in the light of the connection with his Scholastic sources. Particu-

larly the scholarship has focused its attention on the relationship with Francisco

Suárez and on the problem of the subject of ontology. However, the compari-

sons between these two authors have been extremely extrinsic and founded

mainly on theoretical assumptions; just few investigations have dealt historically

with the problem.1

In this paper I want to assess the relationship between Suárez and Wolff by

analyzing firstly the most important interpretations on the topic and secondly

all the occurrences in which Wolff mentions Suárez, in order to determine the

impact of the Jesuit on the most important German Scholastic philosopher of

the eighteenth century.

2. Status quaestionis

In 1939 Mariano Campo, in his fundamental book Cristiano Wolff e il razionalismo

precritico, following Hans Pichler’s suggestion in Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie2,

characterized Wolff’s rationalistic ontology as a ‘mentalization’:

Sin dalle prime pagine del suo lavoro, il Pichler avverte il carattere daseinsfrei, gegen-

standsthoretisch dell’Ontologia wolfiana. […] l’Ontologia wolfiana tenderebbe a seques-

1 See J. ÉCOLE, Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scholastik, in H. DELFOSSE, M. OBERHAUSEN

and R. POZZO (hrg.), Vernunftkritik und Aufklärung. Studien zur Philosophie Kants und seines

Jahrhunderts: Norbert Hinske zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2001, pp. 115-

128. 2 See H. PICHLER, Über Christian Wolffs Ontologie, Leipzig 1910.

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trarsi nel possibile o nell’ideale; la sua sarebbe una daseinsfreie Betrachtung der Gegenstände,

una considerazione degli oggetti perfettamente libera da ogni riferimento all’esistenza

[…] Neanche noi possiamo sottrarci a quest’impressione. In Wolff, forse, l’ente, il sog-

getto, la sostanza tendono ad attenuarsi e a scomparire, risolvendosi nei loro attributi o

predicati o note. […] Wolff si trova a suo agio tra le essenze: è inutile accumularne le

prove.3

Nine years later, Étienne Gilson rigorized Campo’s analysis with his famous the-

sis on the ‘essentialization of the being’ in his thorough research L’être et l’essence,

establishing the canon to interpret the history of ontology in the modern phi-

losophy. In the chapter Aux orgines de l’ontologie Gilson wrote:

on peut se demander, notament, si l’essentialisation del’être […] n’a pas eu pour effet de

provoquer la rupture de la philosophie première et, en dissociant la théologie naturelle,

science de l’Être en tant qu’Être, d’une philosophie première axée sur la notion abstraite

del’être en tantu’être, de libérer une Ontologie pure de toute compromission avec l’être

actuellement existant. François Suárez n’est pas lui-même allé jusque-là, mais il s’est en-

gagé dans cette voie, et son influence est certainement pour beaucoup dans le mouve-

ment qui devait conduire à cette dissociation finale.4

The process of essentialization of the being, which began with Suárez, was

completely realized, according Gilson, only by his most faithful disciple Chris-

tian Wolff:5

Christian Wolff, don’t toute l’habitude d’esprit eût fait au XIIIe siècle un scolastique de

première grandeur, et qui n’ose se réclamer ouvertement d’une tradition don’t on verra

qu’il l’a pourtant continuée [...] c’est pourtant bien Wolff lui-même qui, le premier, a

constitué une ontologie sans théologie.6

Gilson’s interpretation has had a long lasting influence on the scholarship of

the second half of the twentieth century, which has focused its efforts in recon-

structing the leading thread from Suárez to Wolff in the wake of the ‘essentiali-

zation of the being’ thesis.

In Suárez et le système de la métaphysique Jean-François Courtine fulfils Gilson’s

project of the essentialization of being dealing with Suárez as the crucial mo-

3 M. CAMPO, Cristiano Wolff e il razionalismo precritico, Milano 1939, pp. 162-164. 4 É. GILSON, L’être et l’essence, Paris 1948, p. 144. 5 Ibi, pp. 175-176. 6 Ibi, p. 172.

FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND CHRISTIAN WOLFF

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ment of the history of metaphysics and with its impact on Wolff. According to

Courtine the importance of Suárez’s Disputationes metaphysicae is:

ce qu’elle transporte et transpose de l’horizon médiéval, et principalement de l’horizon

médiéval tardif – disons post-thomiste, scotiste et nominaliste –, et délivre ainsi à notre

modernité philosophique. En ce sens les Disputationes représentent moins une œuvre de

‘transition’ […] une œuvre de passage, à proprement parler, c’est-à-dire une œuvre qui

véhicule, et qui déforme nécessairement aussi, en les livrant à ses ‘neveux’, des pensées

plus anciennes ; […] La métaphysique scolaire – de tradition suarézienne – commence

par la division, ou plutôt l’opposition du possible et de l’impossible. […] On retrouve

assez exactement la même démarche chez Wolff, qui lui aussi édifie son Ontologia en

s’orientant sur un concept suprême, celui de nihil, ou plutôt sur la stricte disjonction nihil-

aliquid. En son ontologie […] la définition de l’étant (ens) ne surgit-elle pas immédiate-

ment, puisqu’elle n’apparaît qu’au § 134, c’est-à-dire après la mise en œuvre du principe

de contradiction, expressément destiné à exclure le non-être ou l’impossible – là encore

sous la figure de l’impensable ou de l’irreprésentable – du champ de l’être, celui-ci dès

lors se dé-finissant, se dé-limitant de cette exclusion même et de cette réduction. Rappel-

lons simplement l’énoncé des §§ 132-33 : «quod impossibile est, existere nequit», «quod

possibile est, illud existere potest». D’où la définition enfin donnée au § 134 : «ens dicitur,

quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non repugnat». Là encore, il apparaît

clairement que cette détermination de l’ens à partir du possible et en vue de l’existentia

repose en dernière instance su l’opposition radicale du nihil et de l’aliquid ; […] La con-

frontation de ces deux couples d’opposés (possible-impossible, nihil-aliquid) conduit à

distinguer nettement entre les deux concepts de nihil et de non-ens : est en effet étant (§

134) ce qui peut exister, ce à quoi l’existentia ne répugne pas ; corrélativement, le non-ens

s’entend comme ce qui ne peut pas exister, ce à quoi répugne l’existentia, sans que cette

répugnance n’entame à proprement parler la consistance intrinsèque du non-ens,

n’anéantisse totalement celui-ci. Le non-ens en tant même qu’‘impossible’ n’est rien, mais

sa nullité se détache elle-même sur fond de néant, à partir d’un nihil, certes pas plus abys-

sal, mais sans doute plus négatif, celui qui, abstraction fait de toute répugnance existen-

tielle, n’est précisément rien puisqu’aucun concept n’y correspond, aucune notion n’en

répond. En ce sens, le nihil, comme nihil negativum constitue l’arrière-plan de l’éla-

boration scolaire de la métaphysique, dont l’ontologie est en conséquence étude de

l’aliquid beaucoup plus que de l’ens, pour autant du moins que celui-ci s’oppose direc-

tement au non-ens.7

The Suárezian heritage in Wolff would consist therefore in conceiving the ens

beginning from the nihil following Martin Heidegger’s conception that «die Art

des Fragens nach dem Nichts kann als Gradmesser und Kennzeichen für die

7 J.-F. COURTINE, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, Paris 1990, pp. 247, 249, 251-252.

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Art des Fragens nach dem Seienden gelten»,8 [...] «Das Nichts ist die Ermögli-

chung der Offenbarkeit des Seienden».9

In opposition to the ‘essentialization of being’ thesis in Wolff is Jean École in

La notion d’être selon Wolff ou la désexistentialisation de l’essence. He shows that Wolff’s

ontology is not the «science des possibiles absolus définis par la non-contra-

diction» but its object is the ens «caractérisés en outré par la non-répugnace à

exister qui les tend vers l’existence». The centrality of not repugnance to exist,

instead of the possible in opposition to the impossible, shifts completely Wolff’s

point of view on metaphysics from that of Suárez. In fact, while in Suárez the

existence is already included in the essence, in Wolff the existence is a comple-

ment of the essence. In conclusion École firmly denies any heritage of Suárez in

Wolff.10 In Cet esprit de profondeur. Christian Wolff, l'ontologie et la métaphysique Jean-

Paul Paccioni follows Gilson and Courtine’s reading but he mitigates their per-

spectives with École’s interpretation:

Duns Scot définit l’ens: ‘hoc est cui non repugnant esse’. De même, Suárez admet que la

possibilité confère aux essences ‘une certaine aptitude, ou plutôt une non-contradiction

a être produite par Dieu avec cette form d’être (in tali esse)’. Wolff s’inscrit ainsi claire-

ment parmi les philosophes que Gilson désignait abruptent comme ‘essentialistes’. […]

Étienne Gilson a raison de souligner le fait que la philosophie wolffienne n’a pas pour

theme direct l’acte d’être. […] Wolff se donne effectivement les moyens de constituer

‘une ontologie sans théologie’: […] En ce sens la ‘désexistentialisation’ est fondamentale,

mais elle est circonscrite. L’étant est d’emblée envisagé en rapport avec l’existence et

l’essence n’est concevable que sur cette base. En ce sens, l’essence et l’existence sont en-

gagées collectivement et réciproquement dans le discours ontologique.11

In L’aptitude à exister et la métaphysique wolffienne, Paccioni denies any identifica-

tion between the possible and the ens because: «l’être implique bien un possibil-

ité d’exister». And this ‘possibility to exist’, which is involved in the concept of

not repugnance, circumscribes the ‘essentialization of being’ thesis.12

8 M. HEIDEGGER, Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt 1983, XL, p. 27. 9 M. HEIDEGGER, Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt 1998, IX, p. 38. 10 J. ÉCOLE, Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scholastik, pp. 124, 131. 11 J.-P. PACCIONI, Cet esprit de profondeur. Christian Wolff, l’ontologie et la métaphysique, Paris

2006, pp. 124, 131. 12 J.-P. PACCIONI, L’aptitude à exister et la métaphysique wolffienne, «Archives de Philosophie»,

65 (2002), pp. 65-80.


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3. Suárez and Wolff. A Comparison

First of all it is necessary to remarks that Wolff deals with Suárez’s metaphysics

only in the Latin writings. In fact, the only reference to Suárez in the German

works, in the Anmerkungen über die vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und

der Seele des Menschen, is almost insignificant: he is listed together with Thomas

Aquinas, Johannes Duns Scoto, and Johannes Scaligerus, among who have

supported the thesis that Aristotle denied only the creation of time, but not of

the world.13 This could mean that Wolff studied carefully the Suárezian phi-

losophy only after the publication of his German writings during the period

when he was in Marburg, which was a stronghold of Schulmetaphysik since

Rudolph Goclenius’s teaching at the end of the sixteenth century.

In Christian Wolffs Metaphysik und die Scholastik, École recognizes the occur-

rences in which Wolff mentions Suárez and that, in the present paper, I will ex-

amine in comparison with the Suárezian writings.

The first reference of Suárez occurs in the § 169 of Philosophia prima sive On-

tologia in the definition of essentia:

Notio ista essentia, quod sit primum, quod de ente concipitur, et ceterorum, cur insit; vel in esse

possint, rationem contineat, est notioni philosophorum conformis. Sane Francisco Suarez et Socie-

tate Jesu, quem inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profundis meditatum esse constant, in

Disputationibus Metaphysicis Tom. 1. Disp. 2. Sect. 4. § 5. F. 57. Essentiam rei id esse dicit,

quod est primum et radicale ac intimum principium ominum actionum ac proprie-

tatum, quae rei conveniunt. Quam hoc sensu essentiam eandem esse cum natura unius

cujusque rei autoritate Aristotelis et D. Thomae probet; mox tamen addit, essentiam rei

secundo dici ex mente D. Thomae, quae per definitionem explicatur, atque adeo, que-

madmodum hinc infert, essentiam rei esse illud, quod concipimus primo illi convenire et

primo constitui in esse rei vel talis rei. Subjungit porro, essentiam realem esse, quae in

sese nullam involvit repugnatiam, neque est mere conficta per intellectum, vel etiam

quod sit principium vel radix realium operationum, vel effectuum. Si igitur magis ad

ideam respicias, quae animo Metaphysici obversata fuit, quam ad verba, quibus ea enun-

ciavit, quae in ista contuebatur (§ 920 Log.), facile apparet, quod entis essentiam concep-

turus 1 in eo, ubi tanquam omnimode indeterminatum supponitur (§ 105), ponere de-

beat aliquid tantuam primum, quod 2 ea nonnisi talia contineat, quae sibi mutuo non

repugnant, seu contradictionem nullam involvunt, nec per alia, quae simul insusnt, de-

terminantur, cum alias determinantia ipsis essent priora; quodque 3 rationem contineat

ceterorum, quae constanter insunt, vel inesse possunt, cum alias non posset dici radix

proprietatum et actionum, unde scilicet istae oriantur. Eadem igitur essentiae notio

13 C. WOLFF, Anmerkungen über die vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des

Menschen, Frankfurt 1724, p. 620.

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animo D. Thomae ac Suárezii obversata fuit, quam nos a priori deduximus et magis distinc-

tam at que determinatam effecimus. Cartesius notionem essentiae, quam in Scholia Pa-

trum Societatis Jesu ex philosophia scholastica hauferat, retinuit. [...] Notionem naturae

nos suo loco dabimas distinctam, ubi ejus ab essentia differentia manifesta evadet. Non

minus Suárezius, quam Claubergius viderunt, naturam essentiae esse agnatam, ab ea tamen

differre sed quousque convenient, quomodo different, satis distincte exponere non

puterunt14.

Wolff states explicitly that his notion of essence is conform to the notion of

Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suárez, René Descartes and Johann Clauberg. Par-

ticularly he mentions the passage in Suárez’s DM, II.4.6, which is devoted to ex-

plain what is the real essence and what is its real being. In this paragraph Suárez

provides four definitions of essence:

Primo modo dicimus, essentiam rei esse id quod est primum et radicale, ac intimum

principium omnium actionum ac proprietatum quae rei conveniunt, et sub hac ratione

dicitur natura uniuscuiusque rei, ut constat ex Aristot., V Metaph., text. 5; et notat D. Tho-

mas, De Ente et Essentia, c. 1, et Quodl. I, a. 4, et saepe alias. Secundo autem modo di-

cimus essentiam rei esse quae per definitionem explicatur, ut dicit etiam D. Thomas,

dicto opusculo De Ente et Essentia, c. 2, et sic etiam dici solet illud esse essentiam rei

quod primo concipitur de re; primo (inquam) non ordine originis (sic enim potius

solemus conceptionem rei inchoare ab his quae sunt extra essentiam rei), sed ordine no-

tabilitatis potius et primitatis obiecti; nam id est de essentia rei, quod concipimus primo

illi convenire et primo constitui intrinsece in esse rei vel talis rei, et hoc modo etiam voca-

tur essentia quidditas in ordine ad locutiones nostras, quia est id per quod respondemus

ad quaestionem quid sit res. Ac denique appellatur essentia, quia est id quod per actum

essendi primo esse intelligitur in unaquaque re. Ratio ergo essentiae his modis potest a

nobis declarari.

In the first sense, essence is the first and intrinsic principle of all actions and

properties that convene to a thing. In the second case, essence is the definition,

that is what is first conceivable of a thing. Thirdly, essence is the quidditas: it an-

swer at the question «what is it?». At last, essence is what that is thinkable as first

according to its act of being. Wolff recalls and makes own the first two notions

of essence, even if he upholds the common ground of the essence as what is

first conceivable of a thing and that is through which all the other things are

explainable.

Moreover, Wolff mentions directly the passage in which Suárez defines the

real being of the essence:

14 C. WOLFF, Philosophia prima sive Ontologia (=O), Frankfurt-Leipzig 1736, pp. 137-139.


233

Quid autem sit essentiam esse realem, possumus aut per negationem aut per affirma-

tionem exponere. Priori modo dicimus essentiam realem esse quae in sese nullam in-

volvit repugnantiam, neque est mere conficta per intellectum. Posteriori autem modo

explicari potest, vel a posteriori per hoc quod sit principium vel radix realium opera-

tionum vel effectuum, sive sit in genere causae efficientis, sive formalis, sive materialis; sic

enim nulla est essentia realis quae non possit habere aliquem effectum vel proprietatem

realem. A priori vero potest explicari per causam extrinsecam (quamvis hoc non simplic-

iter de essentia, sed de essentia creata verum habeat), et sic dicimus essentiam esse

realem, quae a Deo realiter produci potest, et constitui in esse entis actualis. Per intrinse-

cam autem causam non potest proprie haec ratio essentiae explicari, quia ipsa est prima

causa vel ratio intrinseca entis et simplicissima, ut hoc communissimo conceptu essentiae

concipitur; unde solum dicere possumus essentiam realem eam esse quae ex se apta est

esse, seu realiter existere.15

This is a crucial passage for the history of ontology because Suárez explains 1)

what is the real essence when it does not exist actually, 2) what is the actual exis-

tence and its necessity in things, and 3) how existence differs from essence.

Suárez states that the real being of the essence can be defined either negatively

or positively.

Negatively, real essence is what in itself does not imply any repugnance and

is not a mere invention of the mind.

Positively, real essence can be defined either a posteriori because it is the

principle of real effects or a priori through the extrinsic cause in a way that it is

what can be created actually by God and can be constitute in the being of an

actual being. Then Suárez adds that this reason of essence, the extrinsic one, is

not properly the definition of essence if it is explained through the intrinsic

cause; the essence is therefore what is apt to be or apt to actually exist. The real

existence of the real essence depends only by the extrinsic cause. To this regard

it is noteworthy to recall a passage of DM, XXX in which Suárez states «omne

illud quod repugnantiam non involvit, est possibile respectu omnipotentiae

Dei».16 What does not repugnate existence is possible, but, Suárez very mean-

ingfully adds, according to the divine omnipotence.17

15 DM, II.4.7. 16 DM, XXX.17.10. 17 Also in DM XXXI.2.1 and in DM XXX.2.2 it is possible to find similar ideas: «Principio

statuendum est essentiam creaturae, seu creaturam de se et priusquam a Deo fiat, nullum

habere in se verum esse reale, et in hoc sensu, praeciso esse existentiae, essentiam non

esse rem aliquam, sed omnino esse nihil», «Hoc vero esse essentiae ita postea Capreolus

declarat, ut ex parte creaturae, antequam a Deo producatur, non existimet esse aliquam

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At first glance Suárez’s position seems to match that of Wolff, but a through

investigation shows radical differences. At first in §§ 153-154 Wolff writes that

«per essentiam ens possibile est» or better that «essentiam entis intelligit, qui

possibilitatem ejus intrinsecam agnoscit».18 Possible, according to Wolff, is

«quod nullam contradictionem involvit, seu, quod non est impossibile».19 In

Wolff the essence is merely what does not imply any contradiction and not as in

Suárez what does not imply any repugnance. In fact, what does not imply any

contradiction is not the same to what does not imply any repugnance. The

former can be without involving existence or to have a possibility to exist, while

the latter involves directly the existence because there is not any repugnance

and therefore there is not the repugnance to exist, which could be imply in the

conception of non contradiction: a thing can be not contradictory but can be

repugnant of existence. In sum Wolff’s definition is exclusively logical and it

does not match with that of Suárez.

The Wolffian notion of essence according to Suárez would present at least

two problems. Firstly, it is grounded on a mere intrinsic definition of essence,

while Suárez states that the real essence in the proper sense is what we can con-

ceive through the extrinsic cause. Secondly, the real essence can not be a mere

invention of the mind, which, instead, could be Wolff’s possible.

It is meaningful that Wolff recalls only the intrinsic definition among those

presented by Suárez positively: «principium vel radix realium operationum vel

effectuum». It is also significant that at the end of the § 169 Wolff distinguishes

the notion of essentia from the notion of natura, where for essentia he upholds

only the first negative definition of Suárez’s real essence, while in the Cosmologia

identifies natura with the intrinsic positive a priori definition: «natura definiri

potest per principium actionum et passionum corporis, et in genere per prin-

cipium actionum et passionum entis internum».20

We are only at the level of the essence, but the difference between Suárez

and Wolff is radical. At the level of the beings, things differ even more. Wolff

defines the ens as «quod existere potest, consequenter cui existentia non re-

veram rem distinctam a Deo, quae sit simpliciter extra nihil, sed ut ex parte creaturae di-

cat quamdam aptitudinem, seu potius non repugnantiam, ut in tali esse a Deo produca-

tur; in hoc enim distinguuntur essentiae creaturarum a rebus fictitiis et impossibilibus ut

chymera, et hoc sensu dicuntur creaturae habere reales essentias, etiamsi non existant;

dicuntur autem habere, non actu, sed potestate, non per potentiam intrinsecam, sed ex-

trinsecam creatoris». 18 O, 136-137. 19 O, 114. 20 C. WOLFF, Cosmologia generalis, Frankfurt 1731, p. 125.


235

pugnat».21 I have shown that this definition is present also in Suárez, but he

does not deal with a possible in a absolute way, rather with a possible regarding

divine omnipotence and concerning with real essence. Therefore Courtine’s

statement that «l’essentialité ne pose que l’absence de contradiction. Seule cette

non-impossibilité, cette non-contradiction constitue ontologiquement le possi-

ble»,22 is right only if it is attributed to Wolff, but not to Suárez, because in the

latter the essence is not defined only through non-contradiction as in the for-

mer. But what is «quod existere potest» for Wolff?

In § 133 Wolff writes that «quod possibile est, illud existere potest». Ens’s

definition therefore would be «possibile, consequenter cui existentia non re-

pugnant». It would seem that there is an identification between ens and possibile.

It becomes extremely crucial to understand therefore whether the second part

of the ens’s definition, «consequenter cui existentia non repugnant», derives

from the possibile, as it would suggest the adverb «consequenter» or not. It

means to understand, as correctly Courtine says referring to Suárez, if

«l’aptitudo, la non-repugniatia désignent-elles un élément véritablement positif

qui appartiendrait en propre au possible, à l’esse essentiae, ou au contraire ne se

prédiquent-elles de l’essence que par une ‘dénomination extrinsèque’, eu

égard principalement à l’omnipotentia Dei?».23

I suggest to read «consequenter cui existentia non repugnant» as an addi-

tion to the notion of the possible, that is to the non contradiction, in such a way

that the notion of ens differs from the concept of possible. Wolff’s notion of ens,

however, as well École supports, does not involve directly the existence but the

possibility to exist. In this way Wolff’s concept of ens matches with the Suárez’s

notion of real essence, that is something that has the aptitudo to exist, to which

belongs the non repugnance.

Therefore it is possible to say that Wolff establishes a real distinction, among

the essence and the existence, which is defined «per complementum possibili-

tatis […] Dicitur existentia etiam Acutalitas».24 In fact, between the essence as

possible and the existence there is the ens. In Suárez, instead, it is well-known

that between essence and existence there is only a rational distinction, that is

the existence is already involved in the essence:

existentiam et essentiam non distingui in re ipsa, licet essentia, abstracte et praecise con-

cepta, ut est in potentia, distinguatur ab existentia actuali, tamquam non ens ab ente. Et

21 O, p. 115. 22 J.-F. COURTINE, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, p. 321. 23 Ibi, p. 302. 24 O, p. 143.

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hanc sententiam sic explicatam existimo esse omnino veram. Eiusque fundamentum

breviter est, quia non potest res aliqua intrinsece ac formaliter constitui in ratione entis

realis et actualis per aliud distinctum ab ipsa, quia, hoc ipso quod distinguitur unum ab

alio tamquam ens ab ente, utrumque habet quod sit ens, ut condistinctum ab alio, et

consequenter non per illud formaliter et intrinsece.25

Suárez would disagree with Wolff because the existence cannot be a predicate

or an accident of the essence, as well as also Avicenna thought.26

Furthermore Wolff mentions Suárez in other two important passages, in the

definitions veritas transcendentalis and of perfectio transcendentalis. On the notion of

transcendental truth, Wolff writes:

Notio veritatis transcendentalis seu metaphysicaea distincta, quam dedimus, non contrariatur notioni

confusae ejusdem, quae Scholasticis fuit. Notionem veritatis metaphysicae Scholasticis non

fuisse nisi confusam, satis inde intelligitur, quod eam verbis explicare minime potuerint,

etsi terminorum penuria neutiquam laborarent: id quod haud fallax eo in causa notionis

confusae iudicium est (§ 90 e Log.). Etsi autem distinctam veritatis transcedentalis no-

tionem tradere minime potuerint; ea tamen tradidere, quae sufficiunt ad evicendam

identitatem notionis distinctae, quam nos dedimus, cum confusa, quae ipsis fuit. Francis-

cus Suarez Dispu. Metaphys. 8 Sect 7 f. 192 et seqq. Ad veritatem transcedentalem requirit

entitatem realem ipsius rei, quae nihil tamen ei intrinsecum superaddit: etsi autem veri-

tatem istam independenter ab intellectu ei tribuit, ita ut ens verum sit, si vel maxime in

nullo intellectu, ne quidem divino, dari per impossibile supponatur ejus idea; eam tamen

rem aptam reddere agnoscit, ut ipsa in intellectu repraesentari possit, qualis est. Ex nostra

notione veritas transcedentalis est ordo eorum, quae enti conveniunt, seu determina-

tionum, quas habet, intrinsecarum (§ 502), qui, quemadmodum in ordine fieri debet (§

478): id quod ex demonstratione veritatis hujus omni enti competentis (§ 497) uberius

elucescit. Ordo hic est enti intrinsecus atque adeo entitas rei realis, quae enti competit

independenter ab intellectu, nec demum eidem convenit, dum in intellectu repraesen-

tatur, neque etiam novam determinationem enti intrinsecum superaddit praeter eas de-

terminationes, quae in essentialium, attributorum et modorum numero sunt et ultra

quas aliae in ente dari non possunt (§ 149). Quatenus tamen essentialia per principium

contradictionis tanquam prima, attributa per principium rationis sufficientis tanquam a

primis orta et modi per idem determinantur tanquam illis superaccedentes et illis salvis

variabiles; eatenus fieri potest, ut ens in intellectu repraesentari possit, quale est, ac in-

primis ab aeterno in intellectu divino repraesentari potuerit: id quod non amplius possi-

bile concipitur, ubi ordo iste determinationum intrinsecarum entis tollitur. Apparet

adeo, nos entitatem illam realem, in qua veritatem transcedentalem considetere docuit

Suárezius, in apricum produxisse, consequnter notionem nostram distinctam non con-

25 DM, XXXI.1.12. 26 DM, II.4.13.


237

trariari notioni confusae Scholasticorum, cui convenienter quaedam veritatis transcen-

dentalis criteria tradit. Goclenius in Lexico philosophico veritatem metaphysicam definit

per conformitatem rei cum mente divina et natura sua. Duam conformitati rei cum idea

in intellectu divino conjungit conformtatem cum natura sua, haud obscure innuit se ag-

novisse, quod veritas metaphysica in re dari debeat sin relatione ad intellectum. Etsi enim

nulla rerum esset veritas, si nulla earum ideas produceret intellectus divinus; cum tamen

dari debeat ratio, cur intellectus divinus ideas rerum sic potius formet, quam aliter, ens

omnino ita concipendum, ut per naturam intellectus possibilis concipiatur ejus idea,

atque sic veritatem in ente absque relatione ad cognoscentem concipere licet: quae magis

clarioria evadent, ubi in Phsychologia notionem intellectus, et in Theologia naturali no-

tionem inprimis intellectus divini evolverimus. Quodsi vero ens ita concipitur, ut ejus

ideam formare possit intellectus, tum nihil in eo admittendum, nisi quod vi principii con-

tradictionis tanquam primum in eo poni et vi prinicipii rationis sufficientis ulterius in eo

locum habere potest. Quoniam haec non satis clara existimo iis, qui naturam intellectus

non sufficienter perspectam habent, ideo in praesente observasse sufficit, quod ex no-

tione entis uperius explicata appareat admissa veritate transcedentali, quam nos defini-

mus (§ 495), entia esse conformia cum mente divina, illa autem sublata tolli conformi-

tatem rerum cum ideis in intellectu divino, nec nisi per ordinem determinationum in-

trinsecum vi principii contradictionis et principii rationis sufficientis stabilitum confromi-

tatem rei cum natura sua intelligibili modi explicari: etenim conformitas cum natura sua

aut est sine mente sonus, aut designare debet realitatem, quae nihil rei intrinsecum su-

peraddit, quemadmodum Suárezius clarius mentem suam expressit.27

First of all Wolff says that his notion of veritas transcedentalis does not differ from

that of Scholastics, even if this latter is confuse and obscure, while his idea is dis-

tinct. According to Wolff the truth is intrinsic because it does not add anything

at the nature of the being. The truth is independent from the understanding

that conceives it, that is, it is true also without any knowledge of it: it is not alogi-

cal truth. Transcendental truth matches with Goclenius’s conception of meta-

physical truth, according to which the thing is in conformity with God’s mind.

In fact, his definition of transcendental truth is the order or intrinsic determina-

tion or essentialia that convene to the being, and nothing can convene to the be-

ing if it is not in agreement with God’s mind. In addition, essentialia’s order is

determined directly by the principle of non contradiction and that of sufficient

reason. Wolff’s notion of truth would match that of Suárez, which states:

27 O, pp. 387-389.

MARCO SGARBI

238

dico primo veritatem transcendentalem intrinsece dicere entitatem realem ipsius rei

quae vera denominatur, et praeter illam nihil ei intrinsecum, neque absolutum, neque

relativum, neque ex natura rei, nec sola ratione distinctum addere.28

However, there is a difference between Wolff and Suárez. If in Wolff the tran-

scendental truth concerns with a particular order of the intrinsic determination,

in Suárez the truth is a real attribute of the being as such and it differs from the

unum and bonum only because of its formal reason. This different notion of

truth as transcendental comes from the real distinction between essence and

existence that I have mentioned earlier and it concerns all the transcendental

in general, as the transcendental perfection:

Notio perfectionis distincta non contrariatur notioni confusae quam Scholasticis de bonitate trasceden-

tali habuere. Constat ex communibus libellis metaphysicis bonitatem transcedentalem seu

essentialem, cujus sit perfectio essentialis juxta Scholasticos consistere in eo, quod aliquid

habeat omnia, quae ad entis talis, quale est ens aliquod datum, essentiam requiruntur.

Notio adeo Scholasticorum idem supponit, quo d notio confusa communis, nempe dari

aliquid unde intelligi possit, cur determinationes essentiales entis tales potius sint, quam

aliae, consequenter rationem quandam generalem, unde perfectio dijudicartur (§ 56).

Eodem igitur prorsus modo, quo ante (§ 526), ostenditur, notionem confusam perfec-

tionis seu bonitatis transcedentalis Scholasticorum in nostram recidere debere, si ea dis-

tincte explicetur: quod ubi factum fuerit, tum demum intelligere datur, quid sibi velit

Suárezius disp. Met. 10 sect. 1. F. 210 defendes, bonum supra ens solum posse addere ra-

tionem convenientiae, quae non sit proprie relatio, sed solum connotet in alio talem

naturam habentem naturalem inclinationem, capacitatem vel conjuctionem cum tali

perfectione, adeoque bonitatem dicere ipsam perfectionem rei connotando praedictam

convenitiam seu denotationem consurgentem ex coexistentia plurium. Etenim vi theo-

riae nostrae ob perfectionem enti nullae superaccedunt determinationes genericae vel

specifiae aliae, quam quas habet; quatenus tamen ipsum perfectum est, determinationes

istae conveniunt rationi determinanti perfectionis atque adeo praeter eas in eodem datur

convenientia quaedam. Quoniam determinationes non ideo combinari possunt, quia

rationi isti determinati conveniunt, sed quia sibi mutuo non preugnant; ideo non datur

ens aliud praeter hoc, quod hujus perfectionis sit capax. Quamobrem cum ens consid-

eratur ut perfectum, non refertur ad aliud, sed ad seipsum. Quatenus tamen contrariae

quaedam determinationes non minus sunt possibiles, cum quibus perfectio entis non

consistit, et ratio determinans perfectionis inservit explicandae perfectioni, ut intelloiga-

tur, cur in ente actuali determinationes istiusmodi potius sint quam aliae; ideo concipere

licet ens quoddam aliud, quod est ad determinationes istas non prorsus indifferens, sed

non modo capacitatem quandam habet eas recipendi, quatenus scilicet determinationes

ceterae eidem minime repugnant, vermum etiam inclinationem quandam anturalem ad

28 DM, VIII.7.24.


239

easdem, propterea quod supponitur, essentiam ejus rationi determinanti perfectionis

potius convenire, quam non convenire, debere.

Ex his ipsis, quae de sensu verborum Suárezii dicuntur, apparet, quant sit notionum dis-

tinctarum prae confusis praesentia, cum viri acumine praediti equidem in confusis per-

spiciant, quod in iis latet, idem tamen inde abstrahere nescientes fictitii quid admisceant,

ut distincte eloqui non possint, quod in ideis rerum continetur.29

In this case Wolff’s concept of transcendental perfection coincides with the ob-

scure Scholastic notion of transcendental or essential good, in particular to

Suárez’s definition in DM, X:

Dicendum ergo est bonum supra ens solum posse addere rationem convenientiae quae

non est proprie relatio, sed solum connotat in alio talem naturam habentem naturalem

inclinationem, capacitatem, vel coniunctionem cum tali perfectione; unde bonitas dicit

ipsam perfectionem rei, connotando praedictam convenientiam seu denotationem con-

surgentem ex coexistentia plurium.30

If according to Suárez the transcendentals do not add anything to the ens but

they are its intrinsic attributes, according to Wolff the transcendentals represent

a particular disposition of the essentialia, which according to a definite order

characterizes a specific perfection of the being. Morevoer, as well École re-

marks, the transcendentals unum, verum, perfectum (or bonum) are not special

features of the being as in Suárez, but they are among all the other general at-

tributes of the ens.31

Wolff refers explicitly to Suárez also in the concept of time, most of all to

emphasize the confusion between the imaginary notion and the real notion:

Notio temporis communis imaginaria est ac plerumque confusa. [...] Ceterum illa notio temporis

imaginaria, qua Mathematici utuntur, fuit etiam philosophorum affirmantium tempus

nihil aliud esse nisi unicum instans fluens: id quod jam observavit Suárezius Metaphys.

Disp. 50 Sect. 9 § 21 differentiam inter notionem imaginariam ac realem haud obscure

pervidens, etsi realem distinctam non tradiderit ad definitionem temporis Aristotelicam

paulo ante allatam et a Scholastici propugnatam magis attentus, quam ad rerum succes-

29 O, pp. 409-410 30 DM, X.1.12. 31 See J. ÉCOLE, La métaphysique de Christian Wolff, Hildesheim 1990, pp. 188-189; J. ÉCOLE,

Contribution à l’histoire des propriétés transcendentales de l’être, «Filosofia Oggi», 19 (1996), pp.

367-394.

MARCO SGARBI

240

sionem, ut inde eliceret, quod in unaquaque successione idem est, quomodocunque res

successivae ipsa differant.32

In DM, L Suárez writes:

Atque hinc aliqui affirmant tempus nihil aliud esse nisi unum instans fluens, quod non

est ita intelligendum ac si vere et realiter in tempore esset huiusmodi instans fluens, tum

quia cum vera ratione instantis repugnat realis fluxus et successio, tum etiam quia, hoc

ipso quod instans intelligitur fluere, intelligitur transire et perire et alia instantia advenire.

Sed sicut mathematici declarant lineam per fluxum puncti, quamvis nullum sit punctus

vere fluens, sed imaginatione cogitatur ad declarandam dimensionem lineae, ita succes-

sio temporis declaratur ad instar instantis fluentis, ut intelligatur in tempore nunquam

esse aliquid totum simul, nisi instans per cuius fluxum successio temporis declaratur.33

At last, Wolff mentions Suárez about the notion of the simple being, which

would have been important also in Leibniz:

Notio entis simplicis recepta est: per inconstantiam tamen loquendi simplex dici solet, quod est minus

compositum. Scholastici simplex definire solent per id, quod ex aliis compositum non est:

quemadmodum in vulgus notum. Unde Suárezius Dispu. Metaphys. Part. 3 Disput. 30

Sect. 3 § 3 f. 50, certum esse pronunciat, simplicitatem supra rem, quae simplex denomi-

natur, non addere rem aliquam, sed dicere tantum negationem compositionis. Et licet

Scholastici multiplicem statuerint in rebus compositionem, in oppositione tamen sub-

stantiae materialis et immaterialis, veluti cum animam dixere simplicem, simplex appella-

runt, quod compositum non est ex partibus quantiativis.34

In DM, XXX Suárez states that:

Certum est enim simplicitatem supra rem quae simplex denominatur non addere rem

aliquam vel modum positivum, sed dicere tantum negationem compositionis, quia intel-

ligi non potest qualis sit ille modus positivus, aut quae sit necessitas fingendi illum. Item,

quia simplicitas aut est idem quod unitas quaedam perfecta et indivisibilis, aut certe non

solum ratione, sed habitudine proportionali distinguuntur, quia unitas multitudini, sim-

plicitas compositioni opponitur; sicut ergo unitas non addit aliquid positivum rei uni, sed

negationem tantum, ita nec simplicitas rei simplici.35

32 O, pp. 451-452 33 DM, L.9.21. 34 O, p. 515. 35 DM, XXX.3.3.


241

Suárez’s characteristic of indivisibility of the simple being is also shared by Wolff

himself, who in the § 676 writes: «ens simplex est indivisibile».36

4. Conclusion

In conclusion I have shown that Suárez is a real source of Wolff, but their meta-

physical project are extremely different because different are the notions of es-

sence, being, and existence as also their relations. Wolff mentions most of the

time Suárez as an appeal to authority to affirm that his ontological notions are

in agreement with those of the Scholastic tradition or to emphasize the obscu-

rity of the Scholastic language in opposition of his ‘elegant’ and ‘clear’ termi-

nology. In Wolffian ontology there is not a real heritage of Suárez’s metaphys-

ics, and therefore we can define their relationship as a missed dialogue. It is

possible to argue a mediate dialogue through the authors of the Schulmetaphysik

and to imagine probable or possible sources at the core of key-concepts and

doctrines of the Wolffian ontology. But this is not the point. Even if Wolff and

Suárez had two different metaphysical projects, both they did not intend to

elaborate an ontology without theology, which was a urgency that perhaps con-

cerned the Scholastics between the end of the sixteenth century and the begin-

ning of the seventeeenth century within the doctrinal theological controversies

where metaphysics became an appendix to theology.

In addition, a contemporary theologians to Wolff, such as Johann Joachim

Spalding, saw in his ontology a mere instrumental discipline, as logic was, in or-

der to provide all the principles through which theology could be known, and

the possible, not as a mere result of a process of mentalization of the notion of

being, but as a fundamental concept that structures the whole universe accord-

ing the divine omnipotence as ratio of every ens.37

Despite all this, the process of deesistenzialization of the essence in Wolff,

which has been outlined by Gilson and Courtine, is confirmed in the identifica-

tion of the possible with the essence and it is still a valid interpretation to read

the various vicissitudes of the history of ontology up to Hegel.

36 O, p. 512. 37 M. SGARBI, Il destino dell’ontologia. Johann Joachim Splading interprete di Christian Wolff, in F.

FABBIANELLI (hrg.), Zwischen Grundsätzen und Gegenständen. Die Ontologie von Christian Wolff,

Hildesheim 2011, forthcoming.

francisco suárez and christian wolff a missed intellectual ... · marco sgarbi francisco suárez...

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