four faces of institutionalism

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The Four Faces of Institutionalism: Public Policyand a Pluralistic Perspective

SIMON REICH*

Contending conceptions of the new institutionalism claim to offerapproaches that can develop generalizable social scientific theories ofbehavior. This article challenges that proposition, arguing that contingen-cies exist in which specific forms of institutionalism are best suited toaddressing particular types of questions. Viewed through the prism ofpublic policy, it develops the argument that policy dictates politics. Itsuggests that four variants of institutionalism (historical, new economic,

normative, and billiard ball) are each systematically most appropriate toexamine the issues in the policy domains of redistribution, regulation,modernization, and liberalization, respectively.

New institutionalism has become a catchphrase concerning anapproach to the study of social science. Yet the term conceals a number ofdistinct approaches that compete with one another as explanations ofpolitical behavior. Some proponents of variants of institutionalism assertthat they are trying to develop general theories of behavior. Some of the

contributors to this issue of the journal represent efforts drawn from thesedifferent traditions. In this article I offer a contrasting perspective, oneembedded in the notion that theories of institutions have identifiable anddelineated contours that make them most appropriate for explanations ofspecific kinds of problems. This argument is based more on intuition thanon science. It is one that is explored neither as exhaustively nor as deliber-ately as I would like, but that reflects my current state of thinking. It is pre-sented in the form of a think piece which I believe is suitable for a forumof the type offered by a special edition symposium.

I propose that there are four forms of new institutionalism. Each hasspecific features that suggest they are systematically best suited to thestudy of particular forms of public policy by virtue of the distinct charac-ter of politics in that domain. Reorienting and extending the seminal workof Theodore J. Lowi, I outline a resulting contingent argument challengingthe claim that any one form of institutionalism is most suited to develop-ing a general theory. Rather, each policy domain has a particular set ofcharacteristics that capture a particular dimension of politics, and no one

*Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and Department of Political Science,University of Pittsburgh

Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 4, October 2000(pp. 501522). 2000 Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148, USA, and 108Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. ISSN 0952-1895


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variant of new institutionalism provides a general theory that can sub-sume the other approaches and thus capture all such characteristics.1 So, Isuggest, the way forward is to recognize that particular forms of institu-tional analysis are best suited to the study of particular policy domains.

The next stage is to wrestle with the intricacies of how and why they arebest suited, and in which ways they can be improved.The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to try and describe the alter-

native conceptions of institutionalism; second, to identify the broad link-ages between four prominent domains of public policy and theseformulations; specifically, to identify how and in which ways eachdomain is best suited to an alternative form of institutional analysis. I offernothing conclusive, preferring at this stage simply to try and provide abasis for further dialogue between adherents of these different

approaches.

THE ARGUMENT

In this article I offer a central argument: Consistent with the spirit of Theo-dore Lowis seminal World Politics article of 1964, I contend that thecharacter of a policy arena or domain is most influential in determiningthe most appropriate form of institutional analysis (Lowi 1964; see esp.pp. 688689). Lowi identified three policy domainsdistributive,

redistributive, and regulatory (then later added a fourth domain of consti-tutive policy (Lowi 1971)). His analysis specified thatthe characteristics ofparticular policy domains tend to dictate the most appropriate institutional form,by virtue of the contours of politics in each.

As Lowi states,

Areas of policy or government activity constitute real arenas of power. Each arena tendsto develop its own characteristic political structure, political process, elites and grouprelations(original italics) (1971, 689690).

I expand upon Lowis argument in two ways. First, reflecting my

grounding in the study of globalization, I reorient and expand his threeoriginal categories of public policy (distributive, regulatory, andredistributive) in favor of reconstituting and delineating four policydomains (redistribution, regulation, democratization/modernization,and liberalization, whose characteristics are discussed in more detailbelow). I attempt to outline the respective central analytical problems andinstitutional actors in each area. I do so in the belief that these four policydomains constitute the most important ones in a world where nationalborders are not of less importance but of increasingly uneven importance.

Second, I expand the theoretical scope of the argument to suggest that adifferent form of institutionalism is most compatible, in analytic terms,with each respective policy arena or domain. My claims thus emphasizethe contingent nature of relations according to what I argue are these four

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major policy domains that may link, yet simultaneously delineate, hith-erto seemingly irreconcilable perspectives on new institutionalism.

Thus, I delineate four major approaches to the study of institutions.I identify these as historical institutionalism, new economic

institutionalism, institutions as cognitive frameworks, and institutionsas actors. In the realm of political science, these are largely treated asalternative perspectives (or explanations) that are largely unreconciledin their formulations. I accept the claim that each of these four alter-native formulations of institutions can indeed potentially be applied toexplain behavior in any policy domainto issues concerning redistri-bution, democratization, liberalization, or regulation. I respond, how-ever, by suggesting that each isbest suitedto analysis in oneparticularpolicy domain.

Key to this assertion is the nature of politics in each approach, theunderlying assumptions of the form of institutionalism itself, and thedefinition, purpose, and nature of institutions. For example, are institu-tions defined as actors, in power relational terms, as values, or bytheir interest structures? Is the form of institutionalism predicated onpositive-sum solutions or negative-sum assumptions, or is it agnostic onthis point?

In practice, I suggest that historical institutionalism, for example, isconsistent with the nature of the debates within the redistributive policy

domain given the substance of politics over the division of scarceresources. Regulation, in contrast, is carried on between and among actorsseeking to gain greater efficiency (or arbitrate differences across systemsto avoid friction) through cooperation. It often deals with market failureor collective action problems. The search for solutions to common prob-lems that cannot be resolved unilaterally leads to the adoption of newstructures that reflect the assumptions of the new economicinstitutionalism. The third policy domain, namely, modernization,focuses heavily on debates regarding democratization, and is value-laden

and cognitive in tone. In that dimension, at least, it approximates PeterKatzensteins definition of institutions as a normative context that consti-tutes actors and provides a set of norms in which the reputation of theactors acquire meaning and value (Katzenstein 1997, 1213). Finally,liberalization as a policy domain consistently employs the notion of insti-tutions primarily as actors. Here institutions are characterized as havinggreater agencyas international financial organizations, for example, thatdemand states reform their policies, as transnational corporations thatnegotiate incentives, or even as markets that punish what they adjudge as

malfeasance in government policy.In sum, policy creates politics, discriminating in favor of a particular

form of institutional analysis. I seek to begin a discussion of the efficacy ofthis claim.

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INSTITUTIONALISM: FOUR VARIANTS

Guy Peters points to the evolving character of institutionalism. He statesthat the old institutionalism was descriptive, while new institutionalism is

characterized by an explicit concern with theory development. . . . [It] seeks toexplain [institutions] as a dependent variable and, more importantly,to explain other phenomena with institutions as the independent variablesshaping policy and administrative behavior. . . . Further, contemporary institu-tional analysis looks at actual behavior rather than only at the formal, structuralaspects of institutions (1996, 206).

Peters acknowledges that the new institutionalism itself is fragmentedinto many contending forms. Here I offer four characterizations of con-temporary institutionalism.

Historical Institutionalism

In descr ib ing those working in the t radi t ion of his tor icalinstitutionalism, Guy Peters states that this approach emphasizes

the role of institutional choices made early in the development of policy areas, oreven of political systems. The argument is that these initial choices (structural aswell as normative) will have a pervasive effect on subsequent policy choices . . .have an enduring impact. . . . [T]he state is not discussed as a single entity butrather as an aggregation of organizations and institutions, each with its owninterests (1996, 210).

Elsewhere, Bert Rockman has called this the historical-comparativeapproach (Rockman 1994, 146), noting that

the historical approach seeks . . . to intertwine the play of societal forces withinstitutional structures and processes. . . . From the perspective ofneo-institutionalists fishing in the historical stream, however, the searchingfor precise and decomposable causal structures is likely to be regarded as amisplaced effort (1994, 147148).

Institutions in this form of analysis determine the identity and number

of the legitimate actors, the ordering of action, the information that actorswill have about each others intentions, and, cumulatively, a relevantagendawhat Theda Skocpol labeled a Tocquevillian approach. Hereorganizational configurations, along with overall patterns of activity,affect political culture, encourage some kind of group formation and col-lective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising ofcertain political issues (but not others) (1985, 21).2 Skocpol concludesthat, from this perspective,

the investigator looks more macroscopically at the ways in which the structures

and activities of states unintentionally influence the formation of groups and thepolitical capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society (1985, 21).

Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor state that historical institutionalists seethe institutional organization of the polity or political economy as theprincipal factor structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive

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outcomes (Hall and Taylor 1996, 937). But, as Rockman points out, therelationship of institutions to outcomes in this mode of analysis is proba-bilistic. He states that institutional arrangements make opportunitiesmore or less available and increase or decrease the risk of acting (1994,

149).Hall and Taylor suggest that institutions, in this context, are defined as

the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embeddedin the organizational structure of the polity or the political economy. They canrange from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating proce-dures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behavior orbank-firm relations (1996, 938).

Although Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstrethsnotable edited volume illustrates that the historical institutionalist

approach can be and is applied across a variety of policy areas (Steinmo,Thelen and Longstreth 1992), this approach is perhaps most often andeffectively used in the domain of redistributive policy, notably concerningwelfarism. Hall and Taylor, for example, note:

From group theory, historical institutionalists accepted the contention that con-flict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics but theysought better explanations for the distinctiveness of national political outcomesand for the inequalities that mark these outcomes. . . . Rather than emphasize thedegree to which an outcome makes everyone better off, they tend to stress howsome groups lose while others win (1996, 941).

Historical institutionalism thus emphasizes the zero-sum politics of redis-tribution.3 Who gets what is about how a given amount of resources areredistributed, not about how a pie is enlarged.

New Economic Institutionalism

Emerging predominantly out of new institutional economics, and initiallyapplied in political science to the study of American politics, this variantof institutionalism posits that actors are driven by rational cost/benefitassumptions.4 Focusing largely on property rights, rent-seeking, and thetransaction costs of making deals, the primary intent of this approach isto solve individual collective action problems through the use of variousbargaining games or strategies (Hall and Taylor 1996, 943). It is thereforemicro in approach, working from the level of the individual actor upward.

In describing such an approach, Bo Rothstein notes:

Preferences can only be held by individuals and that they are exogenous to insti-tutions. The actors come to the institutionalized game with a fixed set of pref-erences which, moreover, they are able to rank among actors, but the institutionsas such do not influence preferences. As utility maximizers, actors rank theirpreferences and engage in a strategic logic of exchange with other agentswithin the constraints set by prevailing institutional rules. If the institutionschange, actors usually change their strategy, but not their preferences. This is alogic of exchange approach, the calculative nature of action being universal asthe agents preferences are always to maximize expected individual utility. The



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The approach, working from the micro level upward, thus contrastswith the historical institutionalist approach. First applied in U.S. congres-sional studies, such an approach has been extended, notably in the appli-cation of such principles to supranational bodies such as the European

Union (see Tsebelis 1994; 2000). Whether engaged in multilateral or bilat-eral negotiations, states pool sovereignty in order to achieve importantbenefits, such as regulatory goals that they cannot generate unilaterally ina process of hard interstate bargaining (Martin 1992; Oye 1993; Axelrod1997).5

Elinor Ostrom addresses the problem of resistance to regulatory limita-tions and what it implies for Tragedy of the Commons situations bysuggesting that it is the structure of the institution that plays the decisiverole in changing individuals views of their self-interest, independent of

the existence of property rights (Ostrom 1990). As Rothstein summarizesthe situation, transparent decisionmaking encourages actors to conform tosocial norms as they redefine their self-interest so that it accords with thecollective interest in not draining the common resource. The discursiveand public character of the institution launders the individuals prefer-ences (1996, 149). Regulatory goals, in the context of appropriatelydefined institutions, can therefore be achieved in order to overcomesuboptimal outcomes where the product is something that works to thedetriment of all. Markets may fail to achieve a common good; regula-

tory rules may assist in repairing such institutional defects.

Cognitive Conceptions of Institutions

Arising out of the work of sociologists, a third way of viewing institutionsis from the perspective of institutionsasnormative contexts themselves.6

Hall and Taylor note that from the end of the 1970s, some sociologistsrejected the distinction between means-end rationality and culture. Theyargued that

many of the institutional forms and procedures used by modern organizationswere not adopted simply because they were the most efficient for the tasks athand, in line with some transcendent rationality. Instead . . . many of theseforms and procedures should be seen as culturally-specific practices, akin to themyths and ceremonies devised by many societies and assimilated into organiza-tions, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as aresult of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural prac-tices more generally. Thus, they argued, even the most seemingly bureaucraticof practices have to be explained in cultural terms (1996, 947).

As Walter W. Powell suggests, Even the most efficiently-minded organi-

zations rely on socially constructed beliefs such as more is better (1991,187).

Among the forerunners of the adaptation of this variant of institutionalanalysis to political science was the work of James March and JohanOlsen. They emphasize the significance of political structure, defining it as



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a collection of institutions, rules of behavior, norms roles, physical arrange-ments, buildings, and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turn-over of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences andexpectations of individuals. . . . Theories of political structure assume action isthe fulfillment of duties and obligations. . . . [W]e assume that political actors

consult personal preferences and subjective expectations, then select actionsthat are as consistent as possible with those preferences and expectations. . . .That political actors associate certain actions with certain situations by rules ofappropriateness. What is appropriate for a particular person in a particular situ-ation is defined by the political and social system and transmitted throughsocialization.7

Symbols become important here not . . . as devices of the powerful forconfusing the weak, but more in the sense of symbols as devices of inter-pretative order (March and Olsen 1984, 741). In describing the concept ofnormative order, March and Olsen note that action is often based moreon discovering the normatively appropriate behavior than on calculatingthe return expected from alternative choices. As a result, political behav-ior, like other behavior, can be described in terms of duties, obligations,roles, and rules. . . . A broader theoretical examination of normative orderwould consider the relations among norms, the significance of ambiguityand inconsistency in norms, and the time path of the transformation ofnormative structures (1984, 744). Likewise, symbolic orderthe role ofsymbols, myths, and rituals in ordering and transforming political lifeiscentral to developing this notion of institutionalism (1984, 744).

Building on this sociological work, Peter Katzenstein suggests that, inessence, institutions are more abstract in character in the sense that theyare inherently cognitive. As Katzenstein develops the idea,

Bargaining theory typically overlooks a central aspect of all bargainingtheframework or context in which a particular issue should be seen. A richerconception thus emphasizes not only how institutions facilitate bargains amongpolitical actors. It also investigates how institutions affect the context of bargain-ing, primarily through the effects they have on the identity of the political actorswho make political choices (1997, 14).

Ronald Jepperson offers an even more comprehensive view of institu-tions when he suggests that

[i]nstitutions are those social patterns that, when chronically reproduced, owetheir survival to relatively self-activating social processes. Their persistence isnot dependent, notably, upon recurrent collective mobilization, mobilizationrepetitively reengineered and reactivated in order to secure the reproduction ofa pattern. That is, institutions are not reproduced by action. . . . Rather, routinereproductive procedures support and sustain the pattern, furthering its repro-duction (1991, 145).

To Jepperson, this is not the same thing as institutionalization, whichdenotes the ongoing or social reproduction of such patterns. Democracy,for example, can be a norm but is not necessarily institutionalized unlessits formal aspects are reproduced through elections (1991, 145). Indeed,institutions are frameworks of programs or rules establishing identities

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and activity scripts for such identities (1991, 146). They are socially con-structed, routine-reproduced (ceteris paribus), program or rule systems(1991, 149).

Rothstein contends that political institutions in a narrower sense can

be defined as formal arrangements for aggregating individuals and regu-lating their behavior through the use of explicit rules and decision pro-cesses enforced by an actor or set of actors formally recognized aspossessing such power. Obviously, culture, norms, and so on are nei-ther explicit nor formalized (1996, 145). Thus institutions provide a logicof appropriateness, informing the relevant actors about what they oughtto prefer in the specific situation. In this approach

[i]nstitutions not only determine actors preferences but also to some extentcreate them. Institutions create or socially construct the actors identities,

belongings, definitions of reality and shared meanings. In a given institutionalsetting, the agent usually does not calculate what action would enhance his orher utility the most. Instead, by reference to the institutional setting, she asksWho am I? . . . and what is the most appropriate action for such an individualin this situation . . . [thus] action is not universal but rather situational, as theindividuals preferences vary in different institutional settings (Rothstein 1996,147148).

Hall and Taylor concur, suggest ing that many sociologicalinstitutionalists put a new emphasis on what I might think of as the cog-nitive (1996, 948).

This form of institutionalism addresses matters of the relative degreeand type of institutional homogeneity or heterogeneity, and central ques-tions about how values and practices get diffused (Hall and Taylor 1996,947). In the aftermath of the Cold War, much of this work has stressed theprocess of expanding and incorporating political and economic normsconsistent with a neoliberal agenda, specifically Lockean variants of liber-alism and capitalism.8

Institutions as Actors

Finally, I briefly return to an earlier (albeit postwar) conception ofinstitutionsas actors themselves. Theda Skocpol labeled this aWeberian-Hintzean approach in which states are composed oforganizationally coherent collectivities of state officials, especiallycollectivities of career officials relatively insulated from ties to cur-rently dominant socioeconomic interests (1985, 9). States may be rela-tively autonomous actors, depending on contingent factors includingforeign and domestic challenges and the resources they can utilize.9

Furthermore, such actions, which are often the product of crisis, arecarried out by elites.

Such an approach has been applied to both authoritarian regimes andtheir advanced industrial counterparts. States are capable of formulatingholistic and long-term strategies transcending partial, short-sighteddemands from [for example] profit-seeking capitalists or narrowly



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self-interested social groups (Skocpol 1985, 14). Though often misguided,state action can be coherent and appropriate as

autonomous state actions will regularly take forms that attempt to reinforce theauthority, political longevity, and social control of the state organizations whose

incumbents generated the relevant policies or policy ideas. . . . Whether rationalpolicies result may depend on how rational is defined and might even belargely accidental. The point is that policies different from those demanded bystate action will be produced (Skocpol 1985, 15).

As March and Olsen summarize it,

The argument that institutions can be treated as political actors is a claim ofinstitutional coherence and autonomy. The claim of coherence is necessary inorder to treat institutions as decision-makers. From such a point of view, theissue is whether we wish to picture the state (or some other political institution)as making choices on the basis of somecollectiveinterest or intention (e.g., prefer-ences, goals, purposes), alternatives, and expectations. . . . The pragmatic answerappears to be that the coherence of institutions varies but is sometimes substan-tial enough to justify viewing a collectivity as acting coherently (1984, 739).

Stephen D. Krasner suggests that even the American state, noted for itsweak, fragmented structure, has autonomous elements (Krasner 1978).On a personal note, it might be suggested that those scholars who suggestthat the American state is pluralist, weak, and fragmented have neverbeen exposed (unlike foreigners) to the arbitrary power of the Immigra-tion and Naturalization Service (INS)or perhaps, as citizens, never beenaudited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for that matter! In bothinstances those under scrutiny soon discover they have few rights and lit-tle recourse. No bill of rights exists, for example, for those (potential)immigrants being reviewed by the INS. Yet such claims about states asinstitutions (with their own relative autonomy) immeasurably benefitfrom comparative analysis across countries. There, a rich literature formsthe basis for a comparative institutional assessment about both stateautonomy and state capacity that dates back at least to the popularity ofliterature in the early to mid-1980s, as described extensively by Skocpol inBringing the State Back In.

Though hardly a proponent of the Weberian view that organizationscohere, Walter Powell reminds us that our analysis should not be confinedto the study of states when it comes to institutional analysis. Many otherkinds of institutions have similar propertieswhether defined as hierar-chical and collectivist or not. Market-driven actors, for example, may alsohave organizational characteristics comparable to states. Institutional het-erogeneity should not be assumed but should be studied (Powell 1991,183). Institutions, regardless of whether they are public or private actors,international or domestic, may reflect similar propensities toward effi-ciency or appropriateness of form, isomorphism or sustained heterogene-ity, autonomy or subject to being insinuated, independent capability ordependent. Political science has been relatively slow to grasp this notion.The state as actor paradigm may be among the oldest in the discipline,

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but Realism (for example) treats such actors as relatively homogeneous incharacter, distinguished by their degree of power oraccording todomestic structure variantsby their resources relative to society.

Although increasingly popular in the literature of international polit-

ical economy (IPE), the relationship between the state and private actorsremains largely underdeveloped. Whether liberals or Marxists, bothgroups of scholars in IPE tend to focus on the issues of privatization ofassets and liberalization of markets, fostered by capital mobility, asdeterminants of state behavior. It is private actors (corporations) andinternational institutions that are here given a coherence of policy andcollectivist character formerly reserved (under the assumptions of Real-ism) for the unitary state.10

POLICY DOMAINS AND INSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CONTEXT

OF GLOBALIZATION

Earlier I suggested that the nature of policy corresponds to an appropriatetype of institutionalism; each policy domain having characteristics thatdiscriminate in favor of the use of a specific type of institutionalism. I havenow identified four typeshistorical, new economic, cognitive, andstate-as-actor. These are linked to the four major domains of policy in anincreasingly porous national system marked by a greater propensity

toward globalization. I now identify these domains of policy, describingtheir characteristic features, and begin a discussion concerning how theysystematically link to different forms of institutionalism.

Redistribution

The end of embedded liberalism results in a new set of winners andlosers. While economic pressures may build, political will and policy com-petence offer the opportunity for meaningful levels of policy autonomyover redistributive issues. The agency of actors, albeit path-dependent, is

important in bringing about change.The replacement of the Keynesian welfare state with a neoliberal coun-

terpart is not the same thing as the end of the state itself but rather of aparticular form of state. The state no longer fulfills the Keynesian functionof defending domestic welfare from exogenous pressures. Rather, it is atransmission belt in which neoliberal policy passes from the global tothe national policy domain (Cox 1992, 2643; Gill 1993), leading the stateto be primarily a receptor rather than an author or an encoder of moderncapitalism (Panitch 1992). As such, the neoliberal state is an instrument ofglobalization.

But many convergence theorists who stress the terminal nature ofthe state ignore the weakness of this approach as an analytical instru-ment.11 It assumes that the institutions and values of governance are beingassimilatedlargely toward an Anglo-American model of John Lockes



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politics and Adam Smiths economics. Furthermore, states still largelydetermine the issue of who gets what within national borders throughthe instruments of tax and social welfare policies. Of the four policydomains outlined, redistribution thus remains the most insulated from

external forces of globalization despite the states changing character.Globalization certainly influences the distribution of resources, but thisissue is strongly mediated by states. In that sense, redistributive policy isheavily conditioned by domestic factors and thus the legacy of historicand political constraints. Such constraints mitigate against the concept ofthe end of history endemic in much of the work of proponents of theradical effects of globalization.

Although, for example, we are often told that the total amount ofresources that states have to allocate to social welfare has dwindled, this is

not necessarily supported empirically. While the Clinton administration,for example, shifted the focus of decisionmaking in its federalist systemfrom the national to subnational authorities, total welfare expendituresremained intact for the first half of the 1990s according to Paul Petersen.12

I thus contend that historical institutionalism seems best suited out ofthe four institutionalisms for its explanatory power in the context ofredistributive policies. Historical patterns of development are very influ-ential in the broad determination of who gets what, limiting the propen-sities for change in an environment where the state looms so importantly

in the context of primarily domestic considerations. Domestic intereststherefore compete within an environment where external factors maycondition the size of the pie, but not how it gets dividedthe latter beingstrictly a zero-sum game.

Illustrations of this point are provided by a series of recent ethnic con-flicts, stretching from Chiapas in Mexico across the Balkans and intoRwanda. A consistent theme of such disputes is the historic basis of theidea of one side being maltreated and seeking the redistribution ofresources through the instrument of war. I argue that these conflicts are

not fueled by nationalism but by the idea that some historic wrongshould be addressed by the seizure of land. The Serbs genocidal effortsperhaps provide the best example in their quest to conquer first Bosniaand then Kosovo. These actions were motivated largely by an attempt toredress what they felt was an effective policy of misallocation in the origi-nal division of Yugoslavia. As a largely rural population, the Serbs feltthat too much had been distributed to an urban population where theywere underrepresented. Such a justification for war was thus part of ahistorical cycle in the region.13 These wars represented the ultimate ver-

sion of zero-sum contests.

Regulation

Regulation remains a central policy domain in the context of globalizationdespite the purported retreat of the state. Huge increases in trade,

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foreign direct investment (FDI), and financial flows have exposed andmagnified the differences between national economies. Efforts to arbitratedifferences across systems or to achieve convergence, however, havelargely shifted the regulatory focus from the national to the supranational

level of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Regional organizations,in particular, have become more important and have proliferated becausethey provide shared rules of behavior and reflect the fact that the largestpercentage growth has primarily been in intraregional trade and FDI. Theworld is thus not so much globalizing as it is regionalizing, both in termsof IGOs and economic flows.

The same proposition about regulations growth in importance appliesas much to security as to economics. Migration, drugs, and proliferation(nuclear or chemical) represent new regulatory challenges that no state,

however powerful, can singularly redressrequiring collaborative effortsbetween states, whether organized on a bilateral, regional, or multilateralbasis. They provide situations where concerns about sovereignty clashwith those regarding the need to address potentially overwhelming pol-icy concerns.

In the areas of both economic and security policy, authority over regu-latory policy has shifted from the national to the supranational level.Whether through bilateral organizations, regional organizationssuch asAsia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the European Union (EU), or

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)or multilateralonessuch as the World Trade Organization (WTO)states have becomeincreasingly involved as participants in negotiation and bargaining. Inter-state bargaining, I contend, therefore creates a new dynamic as statesoften have the capacity to veto each others ability to address commonproblems such as those outlined above.

In that context, a central proposition of proponents of regulatory policyis that the purpose of an economy and polity remains highly contested,even as liberal democratic and capitalist values apparently spread in

influence. Rather than abandoning economic processes to the vagaries ofmarkets, regulation reemphasizes the role of the state in stressing rules ofconduct as a means to avoid conflict and to arbitrate fissures in contrast-ing forms of capitalism. It signals a shift away from antagonism andtoward cooperation, with states generally using organizations (even bilat-eral agreements) as a cipher for their own policy goals (Keohane 1984, 12).

Regulation therefore reasserts the importance of intergovernmentalnegotiation in the functioning of markets across boundaries. This isachieved through institutional competition (mutual recognition), harmo-

nization (in the sense of imposing standards), or managed tradeallthree processes reflecting the fact that differences are negotiated and con-sidered legitimate by the signatories to an agreement (Kahler 1996, esp.p. 300). The development of multilateralism, regionalism, or bilateralismimplies some usurpation of unilateral state authority in recognizing thatstates must bargainoften with other states. While economic sovereignty



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may have eroded, states continue to negotiate and arbitrate the inter-national rules of economic conduct and thus define the parameters ofinteraction. Negotiation here therefore represents a way of maneuveringseparate forms of capitalism through the maze of global integration, pre-

serving differences while compromising with the global economyif notan act of resistance to globalization (Johnson 1991).In this context, new economic institutionalism offers an analytic

approach that attempts to achieve cooperative solutions that are otherwiseunattainable. States concede a degree of sovereignty for strategic purposesto realize specific policy goals. They may thus concede intangible (andadmittedly, possibly tangible) resources for tangible rewards. Ironically,while weaker actors may be disadvantaged by having fewer resources, theneed for compromise may well push stronger actors to make side pay-

ments or generous compromises to achieve their desired goals.Mexican negotiations with the United States over drug policyexemplifies the dynamics of such a situation and the insight that newinstitutionalism provides. Public discourse in Mexico focuses heavily onthe rhetoric of sovereignty and autonomy. This concern was magnifiedafter the revelation concerning the Casablanca Affair, in which it wasdiscovered that American governmental officials conducted an illicit drugsting within Mexico in 1998 without the knowledge of Mexican govern-mental officials, designed to root out official corruption. Yet a subsequent

round of negotiations in 1999 between American and Mexican officialsover drug policy did not reflect the potential strains that such an incidentcould have caused. Instead, the focus was clearly on the issue of policycoordination and the side payments that the Mexican government couldobtain in exchange for their cooperation. Here, new institutionalismseems best suited to explaining the dynamics of state policy.15

Modernization and Democracy

Work in this realm, at its core, focuses on the hegemony of American

valueseither implicitly or explicitly, repackaging many of the notionsarticulated in the modernization literature.16 It restates an expectationof convergence, via the process of the institutional assimilation of liberaldemocratic and capitalist values.

In the modernization literature, failure to converge toward liberaldemocracy as a normative prescription risks a moral failure. As DavidApter comments, in describing the theme of thePolitics of Modernization,analysis begins with moral content . . . political life . . . can only be under-stood in moral terms. Thus beyond science lies moral intuition [and] theoverriding purpose of this book is to bring together some general methodsand their moral implications, the eventual objective being the formationof representative government (a concept of freedom and choice definedas morality) which Apter equates with liberal democracy (Apter 1965,xiiixiv, 3, 1012, 450458 passim).

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The common core between this and contemporary work on globaliza-tion is the assertion of a positive relationship between democracy anddevelopment as domestic political institutions in different countriesincreasingly assimilate, in tandem, the values of liberalism and free

market capitalism professed by the earlier modernization theories. Glob-alization theory is replete with the same teleological sentiments found inmuch of the earlier modernization literature. Francis Fukuyamas argu-ments about the triumph of liberalism echo Daniel Bells arguments ofnearly four decades earlier that modernity in America signaled the end ofideology (Bell 1960; Fukujama 1992).

Here nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a pivotal role aspurveyors of international liberal democratic norms. Although independ-ent of American government tutelage, they often articulate comparable

values despite their occasional tendency pointedly to accuse the UnitedStates of human rights abuses. These NGOs, in tandem with internationalorganizations and (alternatively muted or trumpeted) American govern-mental pressure, encourage the assimilation of both norms and institu-tional structures of transparent, accountable, and stable liberal democraticpolities.

In terms of the application of institutionalist approaches, cognitive con-ceptions of institutions appear particularly appropriate for application tothe issue of democratization. For that issue is intrinsically linked to the

spread and convergence of specific norms rather than interests. Indeed,from some perspectives, the grafting of such norms onto existing societ-ies, remaking them in form and structure, is a project designed to mini-mize the influences of (if not defy) history. As Fukuyama suggests, theprocess of democratization signals the end of history. The purpose is toembed norms in institutions, reflective of the notion of a living andbreathing constitution. The outcome of successful democratization is,optimally, positive-sum.

An illustration of such norm-based behavior is evident in the reformist

impulses that have taken hold in Mexico since the infamous stolen elec-tion of the 1980s in which the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)was accused of rigging the results to retain presidential power. Externalactors, governmental and nongovernmental alike, have played an increas-ingly important role in reforms both within the political parties and acrossthe electoral system more generally. These effects have largely been theproducts of the activities of nongovernmental actors with little leveragerather than international financial institutions (IFIs), international organi-zations (IOs), or governmental actors with either incentives or sanctions to

offer.17

It may be premature to anticipate the effects of these reforms with-out sufficient hindsight regarding the 2000 presidential election. Butpreliminary indications suggest that the effect has changed the nature ofthe electoral process in Mexico, with primaries now contested rather thancandidates appointed, and the ultimate loss of presidential power by thePRI.



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Liberalization

The substantive elements of this policy domain involve the liberalizationand deregulation of markets, privatization of assets, dismantling of statefunctions (particularly welfare ones), diffusion of technology,

cross-national distribution of manufacturing production, foreign directinvestment, and the integration of capital markets. In its narrowest formu-lation, the term refers to a worldwide spread of sales, production facilities,and manufacturing processes, all of which reconstitute the internationaldivision of labor.

Its most extreme theoretical perspective posits the view that we are wit-nessing a decisive shift away from industrial capitalism to a postindustrialconception of economic relations. The economic phenomena identifiedearlier are important not just because they represent a uniqueclusterof

activity but because they represent a new form of activity, depicting astriking revolution among techno-industrial elites that ultimately rendersthe globe a single market.18 This is a comprehensive and complex vision ofglobally integrated production, of specialized but interdependent labormarkets, rapid privatization of state assets, and the inextricable linkage oftechnology across conventional national borders.

It therefore reconceptualizes not only the importance of traditionalfactor endowmentsland, labor, and capitalin the context of newknowledge-based industries, but also a variety of social and economic

relations. It is labeled the new economy.19 Normatively and prescrip-tively, proponents of this perspective take an optimistic view. The expan-sion of international economic activity relative to state-based activityoffers the prospect for efficiency gains through specialization. Arguingthat a rising tide lifts all ships, the proponents discount negativeredistributive consequences. Using a utilitarian calculus, they assert thatcosts to displaced individuals are offset by overall welfare gains. Marketsare the central authoritative mechanisms, with corporations developingstrategies designed to transcend borders and institutionalize themselves

locally, thus enhancing their flexibility and establishing geographicallydispersed networks.

At its worst, though, this thesis can descend into a crude technologicaldeterminism. Critics castigate the assertion of inevitability that lies behindthe transference of authority to private nonstate actors and the marketmechanism. It should be recognized that states have been significant con-tributors through their own regulatory reforms which some now fearhave led to a growing ungovernability of global financial markets.

Yet a paradox exists at the heart of this approach. For while it decriesthe significance of states as actors, proclaiming the renewed import of themarket as an authoritative mechanism in the allocation of resources, itattaches increasing importance to the role of both international financialinstitutions and corporations (generally multinational or transnational) asinstitutional actors. In that sense, it sustains a form of institutionalism

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despite the apparent shift in authority from states to markets. For it is thesubstitution of who the dominant actors are, rather than their characteris-tics, that shifts. Proponents of globalization (descriptively and norma-tively) talk of states in retreat as if they are living, coherent, organic

beings. They certainly talk of corporations as organic and often as coher-ent hierarchies (like states). The autonomy these nonstate actors enjoy isfrom states. A relational transfer of authority is thus seemingly underway.

Such characterizations are most evident in the case of IFIs such as theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF). Policymakers, the press, and scholarscommonly depict the IMF as coherent and autonomous. Furthermore,they attribute to it both the motive and the capacity to implement policynotably in the context of economic crises when the pressures of market

demands, the desires of state actors, and the limitations of time shouldmost heavily challenge such assumptions. Under globalization, statesmay well be in retreat but it is the institutions as actors approach thatendures, whether analyzing public or private sector actors, and seemssuited to the role in the context of liberalization.

This point is amply illustrated by the negotiations surrounding theAsian economic crisis. In each episode, negotiations took place betweenIMF officials and a small elite of government officials regarded as rela-tively autonomous, coherent, and effectively able to implement policy by

their IFI counterparts. Just as the state was in retreat in each country,under pressure from both domestic and external forces, it was treated asan actor in an institutional sense by the very organization thatcriticsclaimwas seeking to undermine its authority.20

CONCLUSION

Policy makes politics was the adage prescribed by Theodore Lowi in hisarticle over three decades ago. I might amend his formulation to suggest

that politics makes analysis in application to the study of newinstitutionalism. Rather than invoke the claim that any one position cangenerate a general theory of politics, I contend that each of the four vari-ants of institutionalism provides keen insights into a particular slice ofpolitics. It is no peculiarity that proponents of historical institutionalismtend to study redistributive issues. Theda Skocpol provides insights thatare, perhaps, best suited to that realm. Likewise, while Terry Moe maybelieve that the new institutionalist approach may be extended as effec-tively to the study of pork barrel as to regulation, in an increasingly

porous economy (and polity) that may not be the case. Regulation isincreasingly becoming negotiated between states and not within them,with different (and perhaps more effective) veto players and a growingnumber of commons problems.

The four different policy areas I have outlined become increasinglymore subject to global forces as they move, respectively, from



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redistribution to regulation, democratization, and liberalization. Theeffect of such a transition is to introduce different actors with contrastingcapacities, changing the nature and dynamics of politics. This, I suggest,influences the dynamics of politicsand the explanatory power of each

approach to new institutionalism.In this article I fully concede that I have only just begun to scratch thesurface of an argument that needs both theoretical embroidery and empir-ical substantiation. It is a first step, provocative in intent and heuristic indesign. But perhaps, as an attempt to bridge different approaches ratherthan subsuming one within another, it may have served a useful purpose.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Barry Ames, Peter Katzenstein, Mark Peterson, and Bert

Rockman for comments.

Notes

1. For a general discussion of the nature and purpose of general and contin-gent theories see, e.g., George and Smoke, 1974.

2. Skocpol employs such an approach in herProtecting Soldiers and Mothers(1992).

3. As Peters points out, fine illustrative works reflecting this approach are to befound in Douglas Ashfords various analyses of British and French welfare

systems. See Ashford and Kelley 1986; Ashford 1988. For a comparable ex-ample drawn from the US see Weir, Orloff and Skocpol 1988.4. The list of notable works is long for both the new institutional economics

and its application to political science. Among economists, the works ofOliver Williamson and Douglass North are some of the most influential. SeeWilliamsonsMarkets and Hierarchies(1975) andThe Economic Institutions ofCapitalism (1985). See also North, Institutions, Institutional Change, andEconomic Performance(1990). Terry Moes work is among the most notableusing this approach in American politics (for good examples see Moe 1984;1987; 1990). For a discussion of presidents as institutional actors see Moe1993, esp. p. 338.

5. For an extensive discussion of this point, see Moravcsik 1998.6. See, e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1997; Meyer and Scott 1983; see also DiMaggio

and Powell 1991. For an application of this kind of an approach seeFinnemore 1996.

7. March and Olsen 1984, 741. For another example of important formativework on this subject, see Simon 1982.

8. For a discussion of this point, see Higgott and Reich 1998.9. For an example of such an approach, see Nordlinger 1981.

10. This includes a rich literature. But the assumptions of the unitary state un-der Realism are succinctly described by Graham T. Allison inThe Essence of

Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis(1971).11. For example, Susan Strange (1970) was justly critical of the deterministnature of much economistic analysis. In subsequent work, she forgot herown admonition of twenty-six years earlier. As she then said, markets win,governments lose (see Strange 1996, 5).

12. On the United States, see Petersen 1995.

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13. For a discussion of the causes of the destruction of the former Yugoslavia,see Silber and Little 1995.

14. Alternatively, regionalism may be considered as complementary to thespread of globalization, a stepping stone in the process of enlargement(Lawrence 1996, esp. p. 20). The Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD) contends that regionalism and globalization aremutually reinforcing phenomenona (OECD 1995, 14).15. For a discussion of this issue, see Ruiz-Cabaas 1998 and Chabat 1999.16. For a discussion, see Richard Higgott, 1986.17. For a discussion of this point, see Dresser 1996; Fox and Hernandez 1997;

and Millett 1994.18. Carnoy, Castells and Cohen (1993, 45) use the term in a generic sense to re-

fer to investment, production, management, markets, labor, information,and technology now organized across national borders. See also Castells1991.

19. For a full discussion of the term, see Herzenberg, Alic and Wial 1998. Seealso Drucker 1986, and 1997; Krugman 1997; Stiroh 1999; Weber 1997.

20. For just one example of such an analysis, see Neiss 1998.

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