former ussr.docx

7/27/2019 Former USSR.docx

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/former-ussrdocx 1/14

Former USSR-Russia Database

Georgia and Abkhazia, 1992-1993: the War of DatchasBy Tom Cooper

Sep 29, 2003, 12:14

Email this article Printer friendly page

The 13-month long bitter war between Georgia and Russian-supported Abkhazia saw a verylimited deployment of air power as well, albeit in a disorganized fashion. This complex war,in which there was no "good" or "bad" side, officially ended by a ceasefire. Nevertheless,tensions remain high until today.

Independence - Georgian Style

Georgia is - due to its strategic position, some oil reserves, but foremost its communicationroutes - a strategically important country. The first Georgian Republic was established in1918. Ruled by a form of social-democratic dictatorship of a single party, it lasted only untilthe country was invaded by the Soviet Red Army, in 1921. Abkhazia was originallyincorporated into Russia, in 1810, but declared independent after the revolution in 1917, andentered the North Caucasian Republic in the following year. This state included alsoDaghestan, Chechn-Ingushia, Ossetia, Karachay-Balkaria, Kabarda, and Adyghea. In the

period between 1919 and 1921 the Soviets conquered this area and declared Abkhazia anAutonomous Republic within the Soviet Republic of Georgia, in 1931, a status Abkhazia haduntil 1991. The population of Abkhazia numbered some 520.000 according to data from1989, of whom only some 100.000 were autochthonous Abkhazians.

A pleasant climate in summer months resulted with a number of holyday resorts for privileged communists being built there along the Georgian coast of the Black Sea. Aboveall, however, by 1989 there were no less but 80 well-developed military bases and real

properties of the Transcaucauss District of the Soviet Army, including a number ofinstallations of strategic importance (such as early-warning, long-range radar stations, andELINT/SIGINT-posts, covering the whole airspace over the Black Sea and a good part ofTurkey, Syria and Iran), foremost concentrated in the areas around Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Batumi,Vaziani, Akhalkalaki, and Kobuleti. Furthermore, a large State Aircraft Factory 31 (GAZ.31)was established in Tbilisi, manufacturing aircraft to MiG and Sukhoi design: it produced no

less but 1.133 MiG-21UMs between 1970 and 1984, and ever since was manufacturing Su-25s.

mailto:?subject=Georgia%20and%20Abkhazia%2C%201992-1993%3A%20the%20War%20of%20Datchas&body=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.acig.org%2Fartman%2Fpublish%2Farticle_282.shtml


http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/printer_282.shtml






Georgia declared its independence from the USSR already on 20 June 1990, when theGeorgian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution which declared all documents adopted duringSoviet times as null and void.

The first Georgian President, Sviyad Gamsakhurdia, governed as a dictator until ousted by amilitary-supported coup, in January 1992, when he was forced into exile following

particularly bitter fighting in Tbilisi. In the weeks afterwards, some of the militant groupsinvolved in overthrow of Gamsakhurdia entered Abkhazia, where they became invovled inraping and killing of local civilians. In response, Abkhazians invited a number of Russian

Nazis, Cossacks and Armenians, but also Chechen Islamists under Basaev and Circassians tohelp them organize armed resistance.

Aside from this, after the former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze wasappointed a new president of Georgia, he faced strong opposition of local Soviet Armyofficers, many of whom accused him for the fall of the USSR and the pull-out of Eastern

Europe - but also the spread of organized crime and massive corruption. It did not take longuntil the elements within the Russian military established contacts to Abkhazian leaders -mostly former communist dignitaries, not few with quite a doubtful background – and then toGamsakhurdia in exile.

Abkhazia Splits

In accordance with the unilateral action of the Georgian Supreme Soviet from June 1990, on25 August 1990 also the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet declared “The State Sovereignity of theAbkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic”. Initially, the Abkhazian leaders proposed a federalunion with Georgia, but the Georgian leadership refused to solve the problem by peacefulmeans in the face of the fact that – supported by the Russian military presence – theAbkhazian leaders started creating their own armed forces, mainly equipped by weapons solddonated by the local Russian officers.

On 14 August 1992 the Georgian National Guard, supported by a number of para-militarygroups, moved in to prevent the Abkhazian independence, attacking the parliament inSukhumi. In response, and in the light of the countless atrocities against the local population,the Abkhazian militia and foreign volunteers counterattacked, occupying the most important

points in the city after a series of pitched battles. Especially Chechen volunteers underBasaev, but also Armenians, soon became known for their cruelty in dealing with Georgian

irregulars. The locally based Russian troops officially attempted to position themselves between the two sides, but actually did their best in supporting the Abkhazians.



Map of Georgia showing all three regions that attempted to separate - Abkhasia, Ossetia and Ajaria,as well as the three most important airfields. The coast between Sochi (today in Russia) andSuchumi, the capital of Abkhasia, is full of sea-side resorts and beautifull long sand-strands - aswell as datachas of former Soviet politicians and high military officers. Many of locally basedRussian-generals disliked the idea of losing their possessions here, and this appears to have beenone of main reasons for their support of Abkhasians in this conflict. This, in turn, is also the reasonwhy the Abkhasian war against Georgia is sometimes called "The War of Datchas". (Map by Tom

Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)

The Georgian Air Force

The Georgians were relatively swift to bring into being their own air force (GeAF), mainlyequipped with six or seven Su-25s (including two two-seaters) and two MiG-21U/UM/US'found at the former GAZ.31 in Tbilisi (now called TAM), most of which had to becompleted, and a number - reportedly up to 12 - Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters (two of thesewere Mi-8MTV-1 VIP-transport versions, coded "01" and "02") of the former Soviet Armyunit based at Novo Alexeevka. Since the GAZ.31 works at Tbilisi have stopped

manufacturing aircraft already at the time of the demise of USSR, in 1991, and a better partof the machinery and tooling for production of Su-25s was taken away to Russia, theGeorgians had considerable problems in assembling their Sukhois, even if significanttechnical support for the new air force was still possible. For example, although they wereable to eventually assemble at least nine Su-25s, these initially had to be left in bare metaloverall, because thee was no suitable paint to camouflage them. At least eight Su-25UBs, Su-25Ks, and Su-25KMs were never assembled, but stored in "almost" finished condition atTAM. Instead, the TAM was claimed to have re-started production of air-to-air missiles: asGAZ.31 it is known to have manufactured no less but 30.000 R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) and 6.000R-73 (AA-11 Archer) missiles.



Georgian Su-25s were originally reported as having been flown in "bare metal" overall during thewar in Abkhazia, but it seems that at least some of them were actually found in camouflage andmarkings of the former Soviet Air Force at the GAZ.31 factory. Most likely they were also left inthe same camo: only the Soviet Red Star was removed and replaced by GeAF roundel, whichconsists of a seven-pointed star in Dark Red on White field, outlined in Black. The serial "07" (seenwere also "16" - see bellow - and a two-seater wearing the serial "21") was applied in Red and

outlined in White. The "Bird of prey" - seen on the forward fuselage of this Sukhoi - wasmeanwhile applied on almost all Georgian Aircraft, including trainers, and is usually associatedwith the TAM Works, not with any of the GeAF units. (artwork by Tom Cooper)

Eventually, the GeAF was to boast a strenght of some 2.500 personnel (also an airborne brigade was formed, with 2.500 airborne assault troops), and include two flying units, oneequipped with Su-25s, and other with helicopters. Its main bases became Kopitnari, Marneuli,and Telavi, of which the later was housing mainly helicopters. Marneuli was and remains the

best equipped airfield in the country, formerly basing a full regiment of Su-15TM

interceptors of the Soviet V-PVO. In fact, a number of wrecked Sukhois was left behindwhen the Russians departed, together with some Yak-18Ts, Yak-52, and L-29 trainingaircraft. At Tbilisi- Novo Alekseyevka airport the Georgians also put under their control anumber of civilian aircraft, including some Yak-40s, An-26s, and Tu-134s.

This Mi-8 or Mi-17 of the Georgian Air Force was reported as in service at Tbilisi, in 1998. It was painted in a Dark Green colour on the upper side and the "Soviet Light Blue-Grey" on theunderside. The serial "15" is applied in a light colour, possibly white, on both sides of the fuselage,and the title "Montana" was applied in Black, also on both sides of the fuselage. The GeAFoperated a second Mi-8 as well, serialled "Blue 19": this wore a three-colour camouflage pattern.(artwork by Tom Cooper)

In addition to aircraft mentioned above, the newest reports indicate that in 1991 and 1992 the



Georgian military also obtained no less but 350 tanks and APCs, over 3.000 vehicles, 400artillery pieces and 50 mortars, more than 47.000 small ar ms, and 15 sets of “groundtechnology and equipment of the air defence system” (probably radars and SAM-sites) fromthe Russian Army. Aside from this Georgia nationalized the former Black Sea Fleet’s Batumi(in Ajaria) and Sukhumi (in Abkhazia) Naval Bases, acquiring a considerable military infra-

structure. Eventually, some Russian sources complained that the that the total worth ofweapons obtained by Georgia from the Soviet military “at no cost” was over $600 million.

Abkhazian Resistance

Despite being well-equipped, the ill-disciplined Georgian National Guard has had it not easyin Abkhazia, especially as its and the atrocities against the local population committed byvarious of Georgian para-military groups forced most non-Georgians to consolidate aroundthe Abkhazian authorities. Well-armed and supported by the Russians, the Abkhazians wereswift to start claiming first military successes, and already on 5 September 1992, they haveshot down a Georgian helicopter near Carga Bzyb, by 14.5mm heavy machine-gun.

Such losses were nothing that would deter Shevardnadze from sending the National Guardinto Abkhazia in an attempt to bring the area under control, in turn causing a spread ofviollence. But, such actions resulted in an even more active involvement of the Russians.Under the pretext of supporting an evacuation of the Russian population from Abkhazia unitsof Russian Army drove out of their bases along the Black Sea coast and toop positions alongmost of the roads and neuralgic points in contested areas.

Additional sharp clashes occurred in October and November 1992, with Georgians beingfacing an increasing number of problems as their National Guards proved unable to tackle thelocal points of Abkhazian resistance – especially when these were defended by the RussianArmy: in November 1992, in fact, the then Georgian Defence Minister Kitovani accusedRussia for the first time in public for preparing a war against Georgia in Abkhazia.Apparently, this statement came in the light of several heavy strikes by Russian Air Force(RuAF) fighters against villages and towns in Abkhazia predominantly populated byGeorgians. The indiscriminate strikes forced thousands of people to leave their homes, andfurther stressed the poor Georgian economy by forcing it to support a large number ofrefugees.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), deployed severalemissaries into the area, attempting to start negotiations between the Georgians, Abkhazians

and Russians, but there were no obvious results until 14 December 1992, when an armisticewas agreed, mediated by the OSCE and the Russian Army general Segudkin. However, thiswas not observed by any of the involved sides.

Quite on the contrary, in mid-December 1992, in response to several Georgian air strikesagainst targets under Russian and Abkhazian control, the local Russian Army commandersopenly threatened to open fire against GeAF aircraft and helicopters. The Georgians were notonly publishing threats, but firing back: on 14 December 1992 they shot down a RussianArmy Mi-8 helicopter by SA-14 MANPADs. The downed helicopter was - in the view ofsuch a danger - escorted by two Su-25s and another Mi-8, but these did not prevent it from

being shot down, with the loss of three crew-members and 58 passengers, mainly Russian

refugees. In the light of this incident, on 16 December Shevardnadze requested from Russians



to evacuate their nationals from Abkhazia via other routes, foremost the Black Sea, but alsoto limit the number of missions flown from Gudauta, the main Russian air base in the area.

Georgian Offensive

In the last weeks of 1992 a Georgian offensive resulted in a number of Abkhazian villages being taken, as well as a loss of a GeAF Mi-8 near Vladimirovka to a Russian or AbkhazianSA-7 or SA-14. This success was only temporary, then in the early 1993 the Rusians putSuchumi under artillery attacks. Kitovani immediately requested additional negotiations withMarshal Pavel Grachov, the then Russian Defence Minister, and later also with local Russiancommanders: the Russians agreed not to fly their aircraft and helicopters over Georgia, butalmost exactly opposite was to happen. Reinforced by significant number of tanks, APCs, andartillery from local Russian units, as well as supported by RuAF aircraft and helicopters, inmid-January 1993 the Abkhazian militia started an offensive that saw an almost completedestruction of Georgian para-military bands, and brought the Abkhazians into the suburbs ofSuchumi. The Georgians counterattacked several times over the Gumista River, on

Otchamtchira and against Tkvaritchely, but without success.

The fighting for Tkvaritchely wn was especially bitter, then this city, predominantly inhabited by the Russians, was put under a siege by the National Guard and a number of civiliansreportedly starved to death. The Russians attempted to establish an air bridge but suffered aloss of a Su-25 that was escorting several helicopters, on 15 January, and on the same dayalso a Georgian Mi-8T was shot down in the area. Given that all three sides were meanwhilefiring at anything that was flying, it is possible that the Russian Su-25 was actually shot down

by the Abkhazians: surely enough, they claimed destruction of a Georgian Sukhoi on this dayin this area as well.



Situation in Abkhasia as of autumn and winter 1992-1993. Pink-marked areas were then still held by Georgian troops. Main battlefields - one NW of Sukhumi and the other NW of Otchamtchira -are marked red. Note the "Abkhasian" bridgehead in the alter area, established after a fullamphibious attack: how should this have been undertaken without Russian support - as claimed byAbkhasians and Russians - remains unclear. It was, however, this event that broke the back ofGeorgian troops in Abkhasia, then it cut off the main supply route between Georgia and Sukhumi.(Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003)

Fall of Suchumi

The third round of Russo-Georgian negotiations, on 5 February 1993, once again endedwithout any useful results, the rumours indicating that it was the ultra-nationalistic leader ofthe Georgian National Guard who was to blame this time, and the fighting – characterised byair strikes, ethnic cleansing, and takings of hostages – intensified. The increasing capabilitiesof Georgian military were worrying the Russian officers, and on 20 February they finallyordered an all-out attack on Suchumi. This was procedeed by a strike of six Su-25s againstthe city, which killed 20 and injured over 600 (including 200 Russians), Moscow laterexplaining this was in retaliation for a similar attack of GeAF fighters against an unknownRussian Army unit.

Actually, at the time the RuAF was already deeply involved in this conflict, flying almost

permanent CAPs over the battlefield and disturbing a number of strike sorties flown by GeAFSukhois. The situation worsened as the Russians and Abkhazians increased the pressure on



Suchumi, and Shevardnadze publicly stated that the loss of this city would be equal to theloss of Georgian independence. Gratchov then increased the Russian involvement, stating theRussian Army is to remain in the country and “defend the strategic interests in the Black Seaarea”. Suchumi remained under heavy artillery bombardment and in the early March washeavily hit by RuAF fighter-bombers again.

Heavy fighting was reported on the ground as well, with considerable loses on both sides:during only one day – on 16 March 1993 – the Abkhazians counted over 50 and Georgians atleast 20 killed.

Under heavy pressure, Shevardnadze then requested from Russian President Yel’tsin to bringthe situation under control and pull back the Russian Army units, ignoring the fact thatmeanwhile over 50% of the Abkhazian population - including some 250.000 Georgians - wasethnically cleansed and forced to left their homes. Indeed, Yel’tsin ordered per decree thesupreme command of the Russian units to be moved from Tbilisi to Stavropol, but, hesimultaneously permitted deployment of two airborne divisions and two motorized brigades

to Georgia – or, more precisely, to Abkhazia. An additional airborne division, together with afull wing of attack and transport helicopters, was also brought closer to Caucasus, but notinvolved in fighting.

In the air the Russians monitored the increased activity of the GeAF Su-25s: on average theRussian radar stations in the country tracked 14 combat sorties flown by Georgian Sukhois aday. Eventually, Moscow ordered the RuAF to bring an end to such activities. At 1640hrs of19 March 1993, a Russian Air Force Su-27S was scrambled from Gudauta AB to intercepttwo low-flying Su-25s approaching the Suchumi area from the south-east. Underway at alevel of 2.500ft the Russian pilot, Maj. Schipko, an instructor from the Flying School inKrasnodar, attempted to approach his opponents when his aircraft was suddenly hit and

blotted out of the skies by a singe SA-2 SAM. Maj. Schipko was killed. Who exactly firedthat missile remains unknown: it is at least not confirmed if the Georgians have had anyoperational SA-2 systems in their hands at the time. The two GeAF Su-25s completed theirmission as expected - without any disruption.

Most of the GeAF Su-25s haven't seen much of new paint since years, and show significant wearand weathering, so also this example, seen at Tbilisi-Marneuli AB, in 1999. The aircraft is alsowearing the "Bird of Prey" on the nose. Note that the seven-pointed star of the Georgian roundelwas applied in a different form on L-29s and Yak-52s - having much sharper points - and that thewhite field is often outlined in Blue, not in Black as here. Known serials of GeAF Su-25s are: "Red06", "Red 07", "Red 16" (meanwhile left in white outline only), "Red 17", and "Red 18" (single-

seaters), the sole Su-25KM Scorpion is wearing the registration "Blue 316", left from the Paris andFarnborough Air Shows, while the only known Su-25UB is "Red 21". (artwork by Tom Cooper)



It seems that this loss was quite a blow for the Russians, then in the following days theydeployed additional assets in the battle zone: on 20 March even two ships of the Russian

Navy appeared off of Suchumi and started shelling Georgian positions, while the number of

air strikes was once again increased. With such support, the Abkhazian troops crossed theGumista River in two places, but their advance was stopped in the face of bitter Georgianresistance, and the Abkhazians contained inside two small bridgeheads.

The fighting continued through the spring with no let up on either side. The outcome of the battle, however, was only a matter of time, then the Georgians lacked the resources, men,weapons, and ammunition to keep on fighting, and their air force could do nothing against theRussian air strikes. Time and again, of course, the units of the Georgian National Guardwould report downing of some Russian helicopter, like a Mi-24 on 24 June, or a Mi-8 sixdays later (the wreckage of which was found full of weapons that were to be delivered toAbkhazians).

Finally, in July 1993, the Abkhazians launched a dreadful offensive with full Russiansupport, putting the enemy under heavy air and artillery bombardments, as well as massivearmoured attacks. Initially, the Georgians held their positions and reported a number ofsuccessful defensive operations, including downing of a Russian Su-25 over Suchumi, on 3July, as well as a Yak-52 reconnaissance aircraft and a Mi-8T (in the Tkwartichely area) onthe following day. The GeAF remained active as well, losing also a Su-25 on 4 July, whenthis was shot down by several SA-14s over Nizhnaya Eshera: the pilot attempted to eject at avery low altitude but hit the water surface in the process. On the following day theAbkhazians reported to have shot down a Georgian Mi-24 over Suchumi, and the Georgiansadmitted to have lost another Su-25 – this time to their own anti-aircraft defences.

The situation of Georgian troops in the Suchumi area, however, was detoriating with eachnew enemy attack: the local road network was under almost permanent Russian air- andartillery strikes, and the Abkhazian troops were slowly advancing towards the south,eventually threatening to cut the city off. The GeAF flew dozens of supply sorties intoSuchumi, while evacuating civilians out of the place. During one such mission a Mi-8transporting refugees was shot down over Otchamchira on 7 July, killing 20. Eventually,when the Abkhazians capturing one of two roads leading to the south from Suchumi,effectively surrounding the city, panic spread between the defenders and they started leavingtheir positions.

Pressing a number of civilian transports and airliners into service the GeAF did everything possible to improve the supply situation inside Suchumi, but its aircraft were extremelyvulnerable to Russian and Abkhazian air defences and several were shot down: Suchumi fellin late August 1993.

In the following weeks the Abkhazians continued their advance towards the south, in some places pursuing retreating Georgian units. The GeAF was now engaged in deployingreinforcements to neuralgic positions, mainly by helicopters, but these have also sufferednumerous losses: on 30 September a Mi-8 should have been shot down near Racaka, and on 4October another was lost while transporting 60 refugees from eastern Abkhazia to Svanetya.

Eventually, Georgians were forced to pull out completely from Abchasia, and the fact thatsometimes during the autumn a Russian Mercenary pilot Zhshitnikov - who flew for the



GeAF - defected with his Su-25 from Georgia to Armenia, did not improve the situation theleast. The GeAF also lost at least one additional helicopter – probably a Mi-24 – before theOSCE-negotiated cease-fire, in December 1993.

By the end of the fighting, the whole Georgian population of Abkhasia - over 250.000 - was

ethnically cleansed, leaving the self-proclaimed "independent state" in hands of barely 50.000Abkhazians and several thousands of Soviet troops.

There is very little pictorial evidence about the Abkhazian Air Force. On a parade in 2004 three L-39s were shown, including the "Red 62", depicted here. Sadly, the exact position of the nationalmarking (shown in the left upper corner of this artwork) remains unconfirmed.

Ceasefire

On December 1, 1993 talks began in Geneva between the Georgian and Abkhazian sidesunder the aegis of the United Nations and with the Russian Federation as intermediary. Thesides signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" which stipulated a formal ceasefire,exchange of prisoners and continuation of the negotiation process. On April 4, 1994 the sidessigned in Moscow the "Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict", which drew the lines of a future common state which would includeGeorgia and Abkhazia. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its ownConstitution and legislation and appropriate state symbols, such as anthem, emblem and flagand would maintain its own internal sovereignty, but exercise a number of importantgovernment functions, including foreign affairs, taxation, border control, etc. by means of

joint Georgian-Abkhazian governmental organs. The Declaration was signed in Moscow bythe heads of Georgian and Abkhaz delegations, the United Nations Special Envoy EdouardBrunner, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Boris Pastukhov, the representative ofthe OSCE, Manno, and in the presence of the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev andthe UN General Secretary Boutros Gali.

In June 1994 CIS peacekeeping forces (PKF) were deployed along the "border" - i.e. thecease-fire line - between Abkhazia and Georgia, mainly running along the Ingur river, todivide the Georgian and Abkhaz forces. The operation was conducted on the basis of theGeorgian-Abkhazian Agreement of May 14, 1994 and under the approval of the UN SecurityCouncil and with the cooperation of UN Observers' Mission. Through 1994 the situation

slowly stabilized as both sides respected the truce: in fact, even the Russians were on the endwith their capability to support Abkhazians. Besides, increasing problems with Chechnya



warned Moscow that supporting Abkhazian separatists might not be the best idea in the lightof the fact that Russia was simultaneously about to start fighting against Chechen separatists.

Ever since, there were numerous assassination attempts against Shevardnadze: the struggleagainst his regime, which proved unable to establish a durable peace and initiate economical

recovery, lasted until late 2003, when Shevardnadze was forced to accept the results of the presidential elections. Meanwhile, the Russians, interested in strategic cooperation withGeorgia because of numerous reconnaissance installations they had to left there, were

pushing the Abkhazians to enter negotiations with Tbilisi, while pulling out all the 240fighter-bombers – manly Su-25s and Su-27s – from no less but 31 different airfields inGeorgia. Moscow was not entirely satisfied with the results of the war in the end, especiallyas the Abkhazian government proved not as cooperative as expected. Therefore, on 19September 1994 the Russians closed their border with Abkhazia, putting the country de-factounder a blockade and causing immense damage to the local economy. The official sea-

blockade was established on 30 October 1995, since when Russia is effectively preventingships and individuals from reaching Abkhazian ports, simultaneously declaring Abkhazian

passports for invalid outside the CIS countries. In this way, the Abkhazian citizens weredeprived of possibility to travel.

Forrest Brothers and Chechens

By 1996 only some 60.000 Georgians that fled Abkhazia in 1993 are said to have returned totheir homes. Together with them, however, also members of an armed Georgian organization,called “Forrest Brothers”, lead by certain David Shengelia, returned as well, and these aretime and again causing problems to Abkhazian security forces.

The Georgians had therefore to conclude that they have effectivelly lost not only the best partof their army during the fighting in 1993, but also control over Abkhazia: while this is notrecognized internationally as anything like an independent country, it is meanwhile de-factoestablished as an independent territory – to a large degree due to deployment of RussianArmy “peacekeepers”, who ever since control the “border” between Georgia and Abkhazia.To make matters worse, in the late 1990s the Russians improved their relations to Abkhazia,and Moscow meanwhile brought several new laws, enabling "other countries" to becomemembers of the Russian Federation. This move was obviously undertaken as an offer toAbkhazia, and should be actually considered as quite sarcastic, given that simultaneously theRussians are undertaken whatever they can in order not to permit Chechenyan separatists togain ground in their country.

So far, Tbilisi found no solution for the situation in Abkhazia, nor have the Georgiansdeveloped a capability to attack Abkhazian separatists. On the contrary, they are meanwhilelosing control also of Ajaria and South Ossetia. During the following negotiations betweenRussia and Georgia, Georgian representatives stubbornly refused to accept any kind ofAbkhazian independence: for them, this was no "peaceful" solution, and could certainly notlead to any kind of re-integration of the two countries.



th Ossetian troops as seen in 2004, driving on BMP-2 and BRDM-2. In general, their appearance is very similar to thathe Russian VDV troops from the early 1990s. (ACIG.org archives)

Georgia and Anti-Terror War

Even if the Russians calmed to a degree after a defence pact with Georgia was signed(according to which Moscow was given the right to use specific Georgian militaryinstallations) the relations between Russia and Georgia therefore remained under strain – especially since a UN resolution that concluded that the Russian “peacekeepers” did not fulfiltheir mission in the region. Clearly, with Russian troops out of Abkhazia, the road to

Suchumi would be open for Georgians. Consequently the separatists in Suchumi have – incooperation with Moscow – done their best in order to blame the government in Tbilisi for

permitting Chechen separatists to hide in Abkhazia – as if the Georgian governmentseparated that part of the country per own wish, or would be in control of it.

Nevertheless, under pressure from Washington, in October 2001 Georgia attempted to deploy700 troops into Abkhazia to search for Chechen rebels – led by Ruslan Gelavev – hidingthere. These, however, were stopped by the Russian “peacekeepers” while entering theterritory in the Kodorsky gorge, Abkhazian President’s envoy in Moscow simultaneously“warning” that there is certainly going to be war if the Russian troops, then under commandof Nikolay Sidorichev, would be removed.

At around this time the “Forrest Brothers” became especially active within Abkhazia,apparently supported by some Chechen fighters. Shengelia appeared in the public declaringthat his fighters would now be, “…able to capture and hold Suchumi for a day or two…”.Obviously in response to his attacks and threats, on 9 October 2001 helicopters and aircraftwithout any recognizable markings flew a series of strikes against two Georgian villages inthe Kodor canyon, killing 14 in Noa. Whether the aircraft in question were Russian orGeorgian remains unclear, but it is known that on 17 October the Georgian authoritiescomplained about a violation of its airspace by six Russian Su-25s several days before.

Since late 2001 the USA became active in Georgia, in the frame of their actions of the Anti-Terror War, Bush’s administration eventually deciding to even supply ten UH-1H helicopters



to the GeAF. Certainly, the Georgian Air Force was in a bad need of such a reinforcement,then it was in a poor condition already since 1994, left with only between two and four Su-25s and four Mi-8s and Mi-24s in serviceable condition. Meanwhile, a limited-scale

production of Su-25s was re-established in Tbilisi, so that not only was a number of thesefighter-bombers manufactured for the Georgian Air Force to establish a single fighter

squadron, but four also exported to Congo (former Zaire).

In late 2001 the US administration agreed - despite quite some protests from Moscow - to supplyten Bell UH-1H helicopters to Georgia. Eventually, only six ex-US Army UH-1Hs and two ex-Turkish Air Force UH-1Hs were supplied (the last two already in 2001: they are serialled 20 and21, and recognizible by their three-colour camouflage). These have meanwhile entered service withthe GeAF and are mainly used in cooperation with local special forces units. Except on this, serialson all other GeAF UH-1Hs are applied in Black. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

By February 2002 up to 40 US special forces instructors were providing training for Georgianmilitary, the reason being that Chechen fighters have established several bases in the areaknown as Pankisi Gorge. This lies within the Georgian territory but the authorities in Tbilisi

proved too weak to put the local rugged terrain and well-organized bands under control. TheRussians are known to have several times requested Georgians to act against the Chechens inthe Pakisi Gorge, but Tbilisi refused to permit stationing of Russian troops on its soil.

Eventually, the USA supplied ten UH-1Hs to GeAF, of which six entered service while fourare used as sources of spares. The helicopters were originally supported by one US Armytrainer and six contractors, which trained the Georgian personnel in their use.Simultaneously, there were also reports about reconnaissance operations of the USAF in thearea, with Americans apparently attempting to "test" the readiness of the Russian air defenceshere, but these were never confirmed: certainly, the Russians would bitterly complain if theywould have detected any. When, for example, on 22 March 2003 an USAF U-2 wasunderway over Georgia, and approached to only some 20-30km from the Russian border, theRuAF immediatelly scrambed two fighters to intercept it, with pilots being ordered to preventany violation of the Russian airspace. This was, reportedly, the third such flight by U-2s inthe area: the two previous should have occured on 27 February 27 and 7 March of the sameyear.

The Russian position in Georgia is obviously weak: although strikes by RuAF Su-25s against

targets in the Pankisi Gorge – and corresponding protests from Tbilisi against these – werereported several times in 2002, Moscow was interested in Georgian authorities to suppress



Chechen fighters active in the country, and also the same to be done in Abkhazia, but couldnot intervene directly. Russian reaction to the appearance of the US mission in Georgia wasthus a mix of fear that the USA would be establishing a foothold in the Caucasus, tosatisfaction that Washington is acknowledging that some Chechen fighters connected tointernational terrorism are active in Georgia, which in turn was an argument for Russian

actions in Chechnya.

Recent reports indicate that most of the Chechens have left the Pankisi Gorge and Georgiasince the appearance of the US instructors and the first Georgian actions in the area. Eversince, the Georgian officials do not tire of expressing their loyal feelings towards the US andthe NATO, simultaneously demonstrating a very negative attitude towards Moscow. In fact,the USA have announced a decision to spend $64 million for a project of developing andtraining Georgian anti-terror forces and deployment of their troops in the country.

Clearly, for the time being this money, training, weapons and forces are going to be used foranti-terror campaigns. But, the Georgian wish to punish Abkhazian separatists remains

strong, and this temporary widening of the war in Chechnya clearly showed the possibility ofTbilisi using some opportunity to become directly active against Abkhazia. In turn, however,the US presence guarantees some kind of stability, then one of the main of Washington’sinterests is also to secure Georgia as the route for a new oil-pipeline that is being built fromthe large oilfields on the Caspian Sea towards the Black Sea – thus leading around theRussian-held Chechnya.

The GeAF is meanwhile in barely operational condition. As of late 2004, it was left with onlyfour L-29s at Marneuli AB, used for flight training, and three Mi-24Ps (one was still waitingfor assembly), two Mi-14s, two Mi-8s and four UH-1Hs at Alekseevka AB. Out of a total offive Su-25Ks, one Su-25KM Scorpion, and one Su-25UB, only one or two were operationalon average (four Su-25s participated at the Georgian Independence Day celebrations, on 26May 2004), while the others were usually stored in open. Additionally, at the TAM Factory inTbilisi there were seven or eight Su-25UBs, Su-25KMs and Su-25Ks in incompletecondition, together with two GeAF Su-25s and one MiG-21UM apparently in need of acomplex overhaul.

The GeAF also operates three Mi-24Ps, all of which were overhauled in the Ukraine, during 2004.These helicopters are now stationed at Alekseevka AB. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

former ussr.docx

Documents