five negotiation mistakes

7/29/2019 Five Negotiation Mistakes

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Business Negotiation Skills5 Common Business Negotiation Mistakes

In this Special Report, the experts and editors from Harvards Program

on Negotiation offer advice from past issues of the Negotiation

newsletter to help you avoid common pitfalls and build better

relationships and agreements with your colleagues, clients, and those

closest to you. You will learn to:

Identify opportunities to expand the pie of resources.

Take steps to ensure you dont overvalue your assets.Guard against a backlash from less powerful parties.

Gain a keener understanding of what you really want.

Avoid being hurt by overcommitment to a deal.

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Negotiation Editorial Board

Board members are leading negotiationfaculty, researchers, and consultantsafliated with the Program onNegotiation at Harvard Law School.

Max H. BazermanHarvard Business School

Iris BohnetKennedy School of Government,Harvard University

Robert C. BordoneHarvard Law School

John S. HammondJohn S. Hammond & Associates

Deborah M. KolbSimmons School of Management

David LaxLax Sebenius, LLC

Robert MnookinHarvard Law School

Bruce PattonVantage Partners, LLC

Jeswald SalacuseThe Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,Tufts University

James SebeniusHarvard Business School

Guhan SubramanianHarvard Law School andHarvard Business School

Lawrence SusskindMassachusetts Institute of Technology

Michael WheelerHarvard Business School

Negotiation Editorial Sta

Academic Editor

Guhan Subramanian

Joseph Flom Professor of Law andBusiness, Harvard Law School

Douglas Weaver Professor ofBusiness Law, Harvard BusinessSchool

Editor

Katherine Shonk

Art Director

Heather Derocher

Published by

Program on Negotiation

Harvard Law School

Managing Director

Susan Hackley

Assistant Director

James Kerwin

About Negotiation

The articles in this Special Report were previously published in Negotiation,

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Mistake No. 1:

Viewing negotiation as a fixed pie

I , why is competition so ofenthe norm, while coop-

eration seems like an impossible goal? Why do we so ofen settle or better than

nothing compromises?

One o the most destructive assumptions we bring to negotiations is the

assumption that the pie o resources is xed. e mythical-xed-pie mindset

leads us to interpret most competitive situations as purely win-lose. O course,

a small percentage o negotiations are distributivethe parties are restricted to

making claims on a xed resource. For instance, i price is the only issue on the

table, your gains come at the expense o the other party and vice versa. Haggling

over a piece o jewelry in a bazaar is one type o distributive negotiation.

But in organizational negotiations, ar more issues than price are typically

involved, including delivery, service, nancing, bonuses, timing, and relation-

ships. For those who recognize opportunities to grow the pie o value through

mutually benecial tradeos among issues, the complexity o such negotiations is

an asset. Tradeos allow you and your negotiating partner to achieve more thanyou would i you merely compromised on each issue. For instance, buyer and

seller negotiating a purchase might both be satised by increasing the order size

and slightly decreasing the price per unit.

Finding tradeos can be easy when negotiators know to look or them, yet

our assumptions about the other partys interests ofen keep us rom this search.

In this NegotiationSpecial Report, we offer expert advice from the Negotiationnewsletter

to help you avoid common mistakes in negotiation and create better agreements. In

this report, you will learn to identify opportunities to expand the pie, value your assets

appropriately, guard against a backlash from less powerful parties, determine what you

really want, and avoid overcommitment to a deal.


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To subscribe to Negotiation, call +1 800-391-8629, write to [email protected], or visit www.pon.harvard.edu.

e problem is, we tend to apply the xed-pie mentality too broadly, assuming

that any gain or the other side comes at our expense.

Finding trades.Once negotiators have broken the assumption o a mythical

xed pie, the search or value can begin. To create value, you need to learn aboutthe other partys interests and preerences. e three proven strategies that ollow

will increase your likelihood o uncovering value in the negotiation process.

1. Build trust and share information.e most direct way or parties to

create value is to share inormation in an open, truthul manner. But even in

negotiations within companies, parties ail to ollow this strategy. e value cre-

ated by sharing inormation with your most trusted customers will ofen outweigh

the risk o having that inormation misused. I the two parties can put their

tendency to claim value on hold, they may well be able to share valuable inor-mation about how much each side cares about each issue. On-time delivery is

critical to us, you might tell a representative o a technology consulting rm in a

negotiation over new business. Our old contractor did good work, but couldnt

meet deadlines. Now tell me some o your key concerns.

2. Ask questions. Your goal is to understand the other partys interests as

well as possible, yet both parties may be unwilling to ully disclose condential

inormation. What should you do next? Ask lots o questions! Many executives,

especially those trained in sales persuasion tactics, view negotiating primarily

as an opportunity to inuence the other party. As a result, we do more talking

than listening, and when the other side is talking, we tend to concentrate more

on what well say next than on the inormation being conveyed. Listening and

asking questions are the keys to collecting important new inormation. What

mechanisms does your rm have in place to make sure you meet our deadlines?

you might ask the consulting rep.

3. Make multiple oers simultaneously. Most negotiators tend to put oneoer on the table at a time. I its turned down, they learn very little that will help

move the process orward. Instead, imagine making three oers that are very di-

erent but all equally protable to your side. I the other party rejects all the oers

but is particularly negative about the rst and the last, you have learned whats

most important to them and where potential trades are located. For example,


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afer you learn whats most important to a consulting rm youre talking to,

present three preemptive oers that demonstrate your exibility and your com-

mitment to sealing the deal.

Adapted from Te Mythical Fixed Pie, by Max H. Bazerman

Negotiation,November 2003

Mistake No. 2:

Overvaluing your assets

I rom one city to another and putting your

home on the market. How would you determine the true value o the residence?

Now imagine that you are in the market or the same residence rather than sell-

ing it. How would you determine its value? Do you think you would reach the

same estimate regardless o whether you were the buyer or the seller?

According to basic economic principles, we should place the same value

on an item whether were selling it, buying it, or merely window-shopping. Yet

ew o us behave with such level-headed rationality. Specically, psychological

research shows that sellers typically value their own possessions more highlythan the possessions o others. In negotiation, thats a problem i you need to

make a sale.

Priceless or pseudosacred? Some possessions truly are pricelesswe wouldnt

part with them or any amount o money. Others are virtuallypriceless, or pseu-

dosacred, according to Harvard Business School proessor Max Bazerman. We

might claim that these possessions arent negotiable, but we would consider mak-

ing a trade under certain conditions. Your mothers engagement ring might be

permanently sacred, or instance, but your great-uncles watch may be another

matter when money is tight.

What happens when you decide youre ready to part with a pseudosacred pos-

session? Youll be prone to resist benecial tradeos and compromises and to

respond to counteroers with anger and rigiditynot a recipe or a successul deal.


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Consider what ofen happens when a amilys longtime home goes on the

market. Sacred memories lead amily members to set an irrationally high asking

price or the house. Afer an initial urry o interest, the house sits on the market

or months, even years. Price cuts ail to attract much interest, and a once-beloved

home becomes a source o stress and anxiety.

Your treasure, their trash.Interestingly, we also tend to overvalue ordinary pos-

sessions that have no sentimental value. In a 1990Journal of Political Economy

article, researchers Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard aler describe

what happened when they gave ordinary objects such as coee mugs, pens, and

chocolate bars to the college students participating in their experiments. Sudden,

arbitrary ownership provoked participants to value these triing goods more

than other participants did, a phenomenon the researchers dubbed the endow-ment eectin this case, the instantendowment eect.

Contrary to rational economic theory, we seem to view almost anything as

more valuable once it belongs to us. Why? Ownership, like any stroke o good

ortune, is accompanied by the threat o loss relative to the status quo. is loss

aversion can lead us to overvalue our assets and ask too much or them.

4 tough questions for sellers. To overcome loss aversion and put together a

more rational and competitive package prior to your next sale, answer thesequestions as honestly and thoroughly as possible:

1. Would I want it if it werent mine?Once youve made the dicult

decision to part with a possession, imagine how youd react i someone

were pitching it to you. When you put yoursel in a prospective buyers

shoes, the item might not look as appealing.

2. How much is it really worth?Improve your estimate o an items value

by consulting an expert in the eld, such as a nancial adviser or an art,

jewelry, antique, or real-estate appraiser.3. What if it doesnt sell? Imagine what will happen i you are unable to

make a sale afer a month or a year passes. I that wouldnt be a problem,

go ahead and aim high. But i it would cause nancial or other diculties,

rethink your goal.


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4. What other value can I oer? In most negotiations, price should not be

the only issue on the table. I you can provide delivery options, payment

plans, matching rights, or an ongoing relationship to a potential buyer,

you may be able to justiy a higher-than-average price.

Why Your Selling Price May Be oo High, by the Editors

(Reproduced in its entirety.)Negotiation, October 2007

Mistake No. 3:

Going on a power trip

W more than you need him, Take it or

leave it can seem like the simplest negotiating gambit. I a seller is desperate

to unload his business and youre the sole bidder, why not make a rock-bottom

oer? And i youre hiring in a competitive job market, you might as well aim to

keep labor costs as low as possible, right?

Its true that negotiators with abundant power tend to get better deals than

their weaker counterparts. Yet whether their power springs rom a title, resources,

or (most typically) a strong outside alternative to agreement, powerul negotia-tors ofen make a number o predictable and costly mistakes. Most notably, the

powerul are susceptible to underestimating their opponent, overlooking the

other sides perspective and devaluing his concerns.

I someone leaves the bargaining table eeling that youve disrespected or

mistreated her, you may end up the victim o a power backlash. e next time

you think you hold all the cards, prepare to ward o the ollowing three common

reactions to perceived abuses o power.

Power Backlash No. 1: Tey dig in their heels.Powerul negotiators gener-

ally dont devote enough time to considering the other sides point o view,

Northwestern University proessor Adam D. Galinsky and New York University

proessor Joe C. Magee have written in Negotiation. As a consequence, the pow-

erul may ail to anticipate irrational behavior rom their counterparts. When


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conronted with your demands, someone may reuse to concede on principle de-

spite a weak bargaining position.

Heres one example, as reported by Russell Working in the Chicago Tribune.

During 200 contract negotiations with its service employees union, the Congress

Plaza Hotel in Chicago insisted on a salary reeze and the right to subcontract

certain jobs. Blaming a slump in the travel industry or its tough stance, the

independently owned hotel took a gamble that Unite Here Local 1, a relatively low-

clout union, would cave. Yet with their salaries already trailing industry averages,

11 Congress employees, primarily housekeepers and restaurant sta, chose to

strike instead. e hotel brought in temporary workers to replace them.

Four years passed, neither side budged, and the strike became the longest-

running in Chicago history. e constant picket line drove guests away, and the

Congress slashed its rates. For business negotiators, the Congress oers a cau-

tionary tale. e hotel owners underestimated their employees tenacity and

overlooked the unions outside interests. One striker told the Tribune that a ve-

or six-year strike would be a small sacrice or those who had worked at the

hotel or decades.

Power Backlash No. 2: Tey renege on the deal.e greater the power dier-

ential in a negotiation, the more parties tend to ocus on maximizing individ-

ual gain, Notre Dame University proessor Ann Tenbrunsel and Northwestern

University proessor David Messick ound in their research. When you are the

stronger party, that competitive attitude could lead you to coerce your opponent

into accepting a deal she cant ulll. Suppose a big-box retailer tells a sporting-

goods supplier that it must submit a lower bid to retain a contract. Reluctantly,

the supplier delivers a revised bid with a slim-to-none prot margin. It should

surprise no one i the supplier misses delivery targets, sacrices product quality,

or deects to one o the retailers competitors.Even the biggest industry behemoth should be motivated to build trust-

ing business relationships based on more than just a short-term price. To do so,

spend time exploring the other partys vantage point beore talks begin. What are

their outside alternatives and strengths in the broader marketplace? ey may be

more powerul than you think. MIT proessor Lawrence Susskind advises less-


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powerul negotiators to seek an elegant solution that will meet both sides in-

terests. For the sporting-goods company, that might mean proposing to sell new

products to market segments that the retailer wants to bring into its stores. Let

your ellow negotiators know that you are eager to listen to their ideas and brain-

storm value-creating opportunities.

Power Backlash No. 3: Tey take you to court. People tend to hold the pow-

erul to higher ethical and moral standards than they do the weak, Tenbrunsel

and Messick ound in their research. Our legal system does as well. In par-

ticular, says Harvard proessor Guhan Subramanian, the courts may constrain

the actions o the powerul by policing the terms o a deal, reading additional

terms into a contract, or imposing procedural constraints on a negotiation.

In the amous 198 Canadian case Harry v. Kreutziger, a boat owner soldhis boat and accompanying shing license to an individual who knew consider-

ably more than the seller about the local boating situation. e seller settled or

a nominal sum, thinking that his boat was not worth very much. He was right

about the boatbut he ound out afer the sale that the shing license was ex-

tremely valuable. He took the buyer to court and successully reversed the sale.

e judge ound that the seller had been dominated and overborne by the

buyer, who had ailed in his obligation to be air and reasonable in his dealings

with the seller.

e lesson: Because power can inspire resentment, when you hold all the

cards, you must make an extra eort to meet your own airness standards and

abide by the relevant legal rules.

Why Your Next Negotiation Power rip Could Backre, by the Editors

(Reproduced in its entirety.)Negotiation, December 2007


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Mistake No. 4:

Not knowing what you really want

H i your preerred U.S. presidential can-

didate wins the next election? How about i your avorite sports team wins its next

national championship? Now imagine how upset you will be i your candidate

narrowly loses the election or i your team just misses winning the championship.

I youre like most people (and i you care about sports, politics, or both),

you just committed an error in judgment: you overestimated how happy a win

would make you and how devastating a loss would eel.

Across the board, people predict that uture eventswhether a World Series

win, a promotion, or even the death o a loved onewill have a strong, lasting

impact on their happiness, psychologists Daniel Gilbert o Harvard University

and Timothy Wilson o the University o Virginia have ound. Yet when such

events come to pass, they have a lesser long-term eect on happiness than people

expect, a phenomenon that Gilbert and Wilson call the impact bias.

In negotiation, the impact bias can lead us to make mistakes when choosing

what will bring us pleasure or spare us pain, a phenomenon Gilbert has labeled

miswanting. Although miswanting has both pros and cons, overall youll benetrom thinking more careully about what might make you happy.

Emotions, weak and eeting.People overestimate the intensity and duration o

their emotional responses to a wide array o events, according to Gilbert, Wilson,

and proessors George Loewenstein o Carnegie Mellon University and Daniel

Kahneman o Princeton University. In their research, groups o students, voters,

newspaper readers, and job seekers all overestimated their unhappy reactions to

ailed romances, political deeats, upsetting news, and personal rejections, respec-tively. We accurately expect that well be cheered by good ortune and upset by bad

news, but we err in assuming how strong and lasting that mood will be.

Te ups and downs of miswanting. Because our brains are wired to adapt to

changing circumstances, we tend to return to a set level o happiness afer a

boost or a setback, say scholars in the eld o positive psychology. As each new


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achievement becomes ordinary and less pleasurable, we seek out the next one

that we think will bring us lasting happiness.

Does that mean negotiation is a pointless enterprise, one youre doomed to

repeat in an elusive quest or greater happiness? On the contrary: e prospect

o delight and the ear o disaster can be powerul motivators or positive change,

whether that means winning a new contract, getting out o a destructive relation-

ship, advocating or your childrens saety, or nding a better job.

Yet a keener understanding o what will make you happy can help you make

better choices in negotiation. In particular, keep in mind that vivid ears and de-

sires as well as obvious dierences between options are likely to capture your at-

tention. Balance these concerns by actoring other issues that will aect your hap-

piness into the equation. Research shows that money does not correlate strongly

with lasting happiness, or instance, but that riendships and other social ties do.

For negotiators who agonize over hard choices, awareness o the impact bias

can bring solace. Knowing that youre likely to bounce back rom adversity may

ree you to take calculated risks, and overcoming unrealistic expectations may

promote greater long-term contentment.

Adapted from Are You Sure Tats What You Want? by the Editors

Negotiation, July 2008

Mistake No. 5:

Binding yourself too tightly to a deal

Consider these two real-lie negotiating scenarios:

A. An elderly couple put their Boston home up or sale with the plan o moving

into an assisted-living acility six months later. ey receive an oer at their

asking price immediately, afer the buyers agree to delay the closing by six

months. Six months pass, the subprime mortgage crisis descends, and the ap-

praised value o the house drops below the agreed-upon price. Claiming they

cannot secure nancing, the buyers walk away rom the deal, leaving the elder-

ly couple stuck in a buyers market with a lease on a new home.


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B. A telecommuter hires a carpenter to build a workstation or her home o-

ce. e carpenters contract requires payment o 0% upon signing, an ad-

ditional 0% halway through the job, and the nal 20% upon completion.

When the job is done, the woman is dismayed to nd that the cabinets are

misaligned. She calls the carpenter and tells him she wont pay him the nal

20% until he redoes his work. He tells her she can keep her 20%.

You probably caught the common thread in these cases: one party is more

committed (or risks being more committed) to a deal than the other. e Boston

couple were legally bound to the purchase contract, but the potential buyers were

able to walk away. e telecommuter is lef with a shoddy oce, and the carpen-

ter moves on to his next victim.

Researchers have documented the tendency o negotiators to irrationallyescalate commitment to a chosen course o action. A psychological process,

escalation typically occurs in competitive situations such as auctions, strikes,

custody battles, and mergers and acquisitions. When talks get dicult, it can

be easy to conclude that youve invested too much to quit and eel trapped in a

disappointing deal.

As these stories show, escalation o commitment is also a possible trap when

negotiating tactics and contract terms would bind you to an agreement more

than they would bind your counterpart. As these stories also suggest, accepting a

lopsided deal can be a recipe or disaster.

Manage your escalation of commitment. How can you ensure that you and

your counterpart are similarly committed to a deal? Harvard Business School

and Harvard Law School proessor Guhan Subramanian advises you to ollow

these three steps:

1. Play What if . . . ? Beore negotiating, ask yoursel how dicult it would

be to walk away without a deal, both psychologically and economically. Reduce the

potential or escalation by cultivating your best alternative to a negotiated agree-

ment(BATNA). For the elderly couple, this might have meant waiting or any oth-

er bids and negotiating a better deal. e telecommuter might have negotiated with

several carpenters and checked their reerences beore hiring one.


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2. Assess each sides commitment. During your negotiation (and beore

agreeing to a deal), assess each sides level o commitment. Ask yoursel the ol-

lowing questions:

How dicult will it be or me to back out o the deal i conditions change?

How dicult will it be or my counterpart to back out?

What will happen to me i the other side backs out?

3. Level the playing eld. Suppose your answers to these questions suggest

that you would be more committed to the potential deal than your counterpart

would. What should you do?

First, dont assume the other party is trying to take advantage o you. It

could be that your counterpart is simply trying to protect herselfrom escalating

commitment. Most home buyers wouldnt sign a purchase contract without thepossibility o walking away i they couldnt secure a mortgage. Similarly, a car-

penter might insist on upront payments afer being burned by past clients.

Its up to you to negotiate a more balanced dealand to be prepared to walk

away i your counterpart wont cooperate. Begin by pointing out your risk expo-

sure to the other side. What i Im unhappy with the completed work? the tele-

commuter might have said to the carpenter. How can we both be protected?

I the carpenter were condent in his workmanship, he might have been willing

to negotiate inspection rights beore payment o the 0% installment or even de-

erred payment o 80% until afer inspection.

Along these lines, the elderly couple could have insisted on a tighter deal

with respect to nancing or structured a contingency to bind the seller i the ap-

praised value o the home changed signicantly beore closing. A negotiator who

wants to do a deal will listen to you and consider making adjustments. I some-

one wont cooperate, you may need to explore alternatives to the current deal.

Adapted fromAre You Overly Committed to the Deal? by the EditorsNegotiation,April 2008


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