fishing for success without rocking the boat: value conflict and work control in a maritime context

Fishing for Succes s Without Rock ing the Boat: Value Confl ict and Work Control in a Marit ime Context

Carolyn Ellis University of South Florida

ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the role of work control in managing tensions between communitarian social organization and individualistic values. It uses data from a peripheral mari t ime community, where communitarian control is emphasized above all else; yet work there is organized as petty entrepreneurship, with expressed values on individualism and the Protestant Ethic. The dominant community inst i tut ion controlling work (the Methodist Church), the structure of the work place and social organization of labor, and the face-to-face transactions concerning work and rewards that have allowed these conflicting ideologies to coexist on a day-to-day basis are examined. For example, entrepreneurial success is controlled by informal communal and church pressures, which encourage watermen to produce at the same levels. Consumption is controlled by community norms and gossip so that people have basically the same possessions. These practices, along with work information control mechanisms, curtail tendencies to convert individual work outcomes into community status. They permit a sense of individual freedom and success in the work place yet at the same time control it so that equality and communitarianism predominate.

This paper is concerned wi th the problem of manag ing tensions between communi t a r i an social organizat ion and individual is t ic values. It uses data from a field s tudy of a per iphera l f ishing community, Seafood Is land (a pseudonym), a communi ty wi th a high level of communi ta r ian i sm whose members s imul taneous ly express fierce individual ism and the P ro t e s t an t Ethic in the occupational domain. Seafood Is land is an ins t ruc t ive case s tudy of a communi ty tha t has been able to ma in ta in informal communi t a r i an control at the same t ime as it has organized the work sys tem as individual en t repreneur- ship. Values of responsibi l i ty and cont r ibut ion to communi ty and communi ta r ian control have exis ted side by side, wi th an emphasis on individual success and a sense of freedom and independence in the

The author wishes to thank Steven Cole, Rose Laub Coser, Bill Gromfein, Lyle Hallowell, Robert W. Hodge, John McCarthy, Charles Perrow, Pat Roos, Ed Royce, Gerald Suttles, Eugene Weinstein, Glenn Yago, Stony Brook Research Seminar, and editors and reviewers of Qualitative Sociology for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Address correspondence to: Department of Sociology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620.

Qualitative Sociology, 8(3), Fall 1985 203 © 1985 by Human Sciences Press

204 QUALITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

work arena. The dominant community insti tution controlling work (the Methodist Church), the structure of the work place and social organization of labor, and the face-to-face transactions concerning work and rewards that have allowed these conflicting ideologies to coexist on a day-to-day basis are examined.

Analyses of collective control over the amount of work have concen- trated on work control in the context of an insti tutional structure such as a factory. The well-known Bank Wiring Observation Room experiment by Roethl isberger and Dickson (1939), for example, showed that workers deliberately controlled and restricted their out- put by establishing a norm for a proper day's work. Workers recog- nized that they had little to gain individually from harder work because, in the long run, management used individual incentives such as piecework to gain control over the definition of adequate productivity (cf. Burawoy, 1979; Goldberg, 1980; Gordon, Edwards, and Reich, 1982; Kalleberg, et al., 1981; Roy, 1952; and Thompson, 1983).

Small, independent en t rep reneurs also collectively control the amount of work they do. 1 Note that in many communities independent cleaners and grocery stores are closed the same day of the week and are opened essentially during the same hours. This may be a result of laws (such as Blue Laws) or voluntary ar rangement through Merchants ' Associations. Business people in direct head-to-head competition may collectively agree to abate economic competition or follow the practices set by others, which has the same result. For example, steam cleaning services advertise the same services for the same fees and the same specials around the same time of the year. Even more informally, two or more oral surgeons may agree to take the same number of vacations per year and limit each of them to only a week. This control moderates the effects of competition on the individual merchant by providing for adequate leisure t ime without risk of loss of business.

Work control on Seafood differs from both entrepreneurial competition and worker incentives. While Seafooders are independent entrepreneurs (or, at the most, hire one temporary helper), competition is limited by factors in addition to those facing most other petite bourgeoise or small employers (Aldrich and Weiss, 1981). It is important to control competition on Seafood because almost everyone in the community works in the seafood business. Even while working in a different boat, everyone is "in the same boat" and subject to the same legal and social constraints. 2 Unrestrained competition be-

Value Conflict and Worker Control 205

tween two people would soon mean change in the Island ideology of communitarianism, a disaster for a population that is isolated, working in a risky occupation, and dependent on mutual aid. Public visibility, which results in everyone knowing what everyone else is doing, means covert competition violating the Island ideology would be difficult.

Market considerations also limit competition, since everyone re- ceives essentially the same price for his/her product from a limited number of buyers. Watermen do not need to develop competitive practices to woo individual clientele. Natural conditions (especially in relation to crabs) and regulatory processes (especially in relation to oysters) mean that the immediate effect of one waterman's catch of shellfish has only marginal impact at best on the profits of others. If there is plenty for one, there is usually plenty for all. One person's success does not mean loss of business the same way it does in retail trade; thus control does not occur through direct interpersonal nego- tiation motivated by fear of loss of business and profit. Competition is limited fur ther by Island ideology that encourages independent work and discourages working for wages. Thus, Seafood watermen do not compete by hiring others to work with them or by buying other boats and hiring others to run them. As Aldrich and Weiss (1981) point out, "the petite bourgeoise are able to compete with small employers [and, I might add, other petite bourgeoise] only by extending their working day and thus 'pumping absolute surplus value' out of themselves (and their families)" (p. 283).

However, watermen control the extension of the work day in similar ways and to the same extent as in the organization of production in a factory setting. Conservation taws and formal associations (see, for example, Orbach, 1980) play a limited role. But, more important, control practices on Seafood Island have their origin in the larger social organization of the community. Informal communal pressures operate to encourage watermen to produce at the same levels, inhibit- ing the development of a status system based on individual differences tha t would be so disruptive to the delicate balance of cemmunitarianism and a sense of individual freedom.

M e t h o d s

The data for this paper were gathered through participant observation techniques, recorded interviews, and examination of census and


other historical records. Most quotes included in the text are from tape recordings; a few are near-verbatim comments selected from categorized field notes that were recorded shortly after the interaction. Content analysis of field notes from known contacted house- holds ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e - h a l f of all househo lds ) g e n e r a t e d frequency counts that provided more systematic data on variables such as income.

Between 1977 and 1983, the author lived on Seafood Island for periods ranging from a few days to several months (approximately 150 days in all). While there, she lived in the Islanders' homes, participated in church and other community activities, packed crabs, shucked oysters, and went out on work boats. Since she was a woman, it was sometimes difficult penetrat ing the "men's world" However, several less traditional younger men accepted requests for accom- paniment on their boats and in their "shant ies" Her public identity of "researcher," respected by residents, also contributed to her successful entree.

The Community

Located in the Chesapeake Bay about 12 miles from the mainland, Seafood Island currently has approximately 650 residents. Many are direct descendants of the original seventeenth-century English settlers. Because of Seafood Island's historical and physical isolation, much kin in t ramarr iage has occurred-- three last names account for 75 percent of the population. Fishing for crabs and oysters provides the main source of income.

The Work Process

Water work on Seafood is organized as a one- or two-person opera- tion, with men fishing for oysters in winter and for crabs in summer. The work process requires considerable skills, many based on lore t r ansmi t t ed through in te rgenera t iona l socialization. Mastery of water, boats, and engines, and knowledge of shellf ish behavior, weather, legal constraints, and market ing options, are all necessary for entrepreneurial survival in this industry, with its increasingly high capital levels (a workboat may now involve financing of $30,000 to $50,000).

Oystering entails lowering tong heads (baskets) to grab up mud


and oysters from the Bay bottom. The baskets drop oysters onto a "culling" board where the waterman separates out those of legal size. The Islander then takes the oysters to the mainland to sell to local shucking houses, directly to trucks, or to large market boats (called buyboats) anchored in the water.

In summer, many Seafooders tu rn to hard or soft crabbing as their main occupation. Each hard crabber "sets" a number of pots (usually 150 to 300 wire cages) by lowering them in lines of 25 to the Bay bottom. Pots are placed about ten feet apart and marked by buoys with colors to distinguish ownership. Two men (an owner and a helper) can fish about 50 pots in an hour under normal conditions. In rough water, a waterman must possess considerable skill in order to maintain control of the tiller with his knee~ pull up pots by hand or with the aid of a winch, and avoid falling. The helper then culls crabs, separating large and small ones from the "peelers'wthose about to shed their hard outer covering--and from the few already soft crabs. The waterman next takes the hard crabs to the mainland to be sold to local crab houses or to the Island for picking by women. Peelers and "softies" are taken to an Island "shanty," the one-room buildings dotting the shore line around the Island.

A majority of Island men are involved only in soft crabbing, which is the most important and profitable occupation on Seafood Island. Crabs grow by shedding their shells. When about to shed, they seek cover of shallow, grassy water. A crabber is able to capture them by "scraping" them from the grass. A workboat, moving at low speed, drags a scraper over the shallow marsh, allowing the workman to pull up bundles of eel grass. The crabber must then quickly pluck the small peelers and few soft crabs that scurry, along with jellyfish and other sea creatures, to hide deep within the grass or to escape over the sides of the boat.

When the soft crabber returns to shore, he places the peelers into "shedding f loats"--rectangular bins with running water--according to the t ime he expects them to lose their shells. He knows when a crab will shed by observing the crab's fifth leg. A white line appearing through the translucent skin means that new skin is start ing to farm underneath old. As the crab gets closer to molting, the line turns pink and then red. The crabber checks the crabs constantly, dips them out immediately after they have shed (called "fishing up"), and packs them for market before they are eaten by the harder crabs or begin to harden themselves, a process that takes only a few hours. The men spend long hours in the afternoon and evening fishing up in their


crab shanties; women often fish up during the day while men are catching crabs from their boats. 3 Because soft crabs are a delicacy that must be completely fresh for full flavor, speed of market delivery is of utmost importance. Island ferries carry packed boxes of crabs to dealers on the mainland or to local trucks, which take the fresh seafood to distant markets.

Church and Communi ty

Independence, both local and personal, has endured as a central value from the community's beginning. The original settlers, families of adventurers and indentured servants, stressed independence and dedication as they looked for a new place to live that would offer them land of their own. Members have continued to value independence, although the economy has tong since been water- rather than land-based. Along with hard work and economic success, independence is central to their work ethic. Seafood Islanders, as is common among watermen, frequently emphasize that the most attractive part of working on the water is that "you get to be your own boss" (cf. Norr and Norr, 1974; Poggie and Gersuny, 1974; Pollnac and Carmo, 1980). Many of the young people who leave the Island for other occupations later return because the water offers an opportunity for being "one's own boss" along with financial success.

In addition to the emphasis on independence, Seafood Island has stressed communitarianism to the point of sharing some essential features with communes (Kanter, 1972; Zablocki, 1980). For example, Seafood Island has a dominant central insti tution with a shared sense of commitment and communal ideology. Also, similar to communes, it is insulated from outside agencies, with decisions about the community made internally.

The strong central inst i tut ion that gives the Island its commune- like flavor is the Methodist Church. It was established on Seafood Island by Joshua Thomas, a charismatic reformer of the period (Wal- lace, 1861), as a reaction to Anglican formality. This insti tution provided the first local organizational nexus for coordinating activity among kin groups. As one of its early projects, it established an Island school so that children could be taught to read the Bible.

From its beginning, the church was heavily involved in other local institutions. This pat tern continued to develop so that, even in the present, the church is actually the polity on the Island. As the polity,


it connects the communi ty into a ne twork of in ter locking councils, committees, and act ivi ty groups, so tha t church-related events are part of the daily common consciousness of Seafooders. Funct ioning as the local government , the church organizes local resources for hea l th care, s t reet l ight ing, and family assistance; it also serves as the interface wi th state and federal government agencies. The minis te r acts as the "mayor" of the Island. He describes his role in an inter- view:

You get so involved with the political aspects of the Island. You have the church functioning in the market place and as the religious community, but they are not separated. It puts me in the unique position of being more than just a priest that people come to for counseling but they might counsel about business things or the street lights or the activities of the fire department or the recreation for the kids on the Island or the road situations such as it is now, The church needs political clout to alter the situation .... The church furnishes the medical attention, the nurse's home, the dentist's office, and electric, and water, and takes care of the collections complaints .. . . I meet with county commissioners, Depart- ment of Recreation, with the road boards, the school boards.., and speak to the judge, go to the jails, work with drug rehabilitation.

Today, almost everyone on the Is land is a member of the church and on any Sunday morning over two thirds of them will be in a t tendance. Many also a t tend Sunday and Wednesday evening services, partici- pate in some of the dai ly prayer mee t ings and special gather ings , and join in the four week-long revivals each year~ Over and over, minis ters and par ishioners endorse the values of ega l i ta r ian ism, mu tua l aid, and collective responsibility. This communi ty ideology is the out- come of an historical process of adapta t ion of Methodism to the conditions of Is land life, in pa r t i cu la r those of isolation and danger. The church clothes the values it espouses into images of how the worthy life is to be led. They permeate almost all the s ignif icant arenas of everyday life. Special emphasis is placed on images of civic status th rough contr ibut ion to the community. These images reinforce the hegemony of the church since, on the Island, church and communi ty are essent ia l ly the same.

The local version of Methodism has a strong Calvinist ic flavor and sermons by the min i s te r emphasize asceticism and hard work on the water and for the community. The minis te r ta lks about how well the crab season is going, importance of fai th in God tha t he will provide crabs next year, and doing the best one can in work. Crab Reefers feel that "Chr is t ians and the i r s t rong beliefs de te rmine whether the crab


season is good or not: ' They often s ta te t ha t t h rough the i r rel igious act ivi t ies they can cause an abundance of crabs: "Yes, God sent a sign of l igh tn ing while we were in the t abernac le last night . And th is morning the re were more crabs t h a n the men knew what to do wi th because of our grea t service: ' Note the following excerpts f rom a minister 's t aped discussion of the Is landers:

The value of work .. . . the congregation's philosophy about it is that you work. And by the sweat of your brow you earn the living. And they are very hard working and get up very early in the morning .... They believe in hard work.

They believe that hard work is a part of their religious lives .... maybe [they do] not openly recognize that, but subtly, behind it all, this has been the teaching of the church.

The church insula tes communi ty members f rom ex te rna l control and, in tha t respect , conveys a sense of local freedom. No s ta te police, courts, or ja i l exists on the Island. School is the only public agency there and Is landers describe the one Is land sher i f f as a " f igurehead: '

Or ien ta t ion toward insu la t ion extends to work on the water. Water- men a t t empt to avoid agencies of social control such as the mar ine police. Since wa te rmen often engage in i l legal ac t iv i t ies (for example, f ishing in i l legal water, us ing i l legal equipment , and catching illegal seafood), au thor i t ies , to them, mean trouble. Even outside agencies tha t could offer ass is tance are usua l ly scorned by watermen. The Coast Guard, for example, is contacted infrequent ly . A wa te rman explains why:

The Coast Guard is really bad. People would rather get each other to help. You can depend on each other. Watermen can be counted on to know the water and the same location markers. The Coast Guard takes so long to get there. They ask all kinds of questions, like your exact location, name, address, boat number, and so on before they even come. You could die before they get there. Then when they come they ask more questions. Then, when it is all over, you have to fill out about nine forms. If you do not fill them out, you have to go to court. One man never received his forms because they sent them to the wrong place, and he had to go to court.

Seafood Is landers ins tead depend on each o ther to help out in t imes of distress, which include ge t t i ng into t rouble with author i t ies . I f a wa te rman is engaging in i l legal activity, o ther wa te rmen will warn him if au thor i t ies are coming. This cooperat ion is needed since many act ivi t ies in the water i ndus t ry violate s ta te and county conservat ion


or boundary laws (cf. Bryan t and Shoemaker, 1975). One man de- scribed an incident this way:

Yeah, Jim was being chased by the police for having scrapes that were too large. Men were on the CB telling him to run with his scrapes down, because the police cannot make you pull them up, and they cannot pull them up themselves. Jim got away anyway. If you get to land they cannot get you.

Usual ly even this does not happen, because someone will warn a waterman before author i t ies arrive, so tha t he can leave illegal wa- ters or go in land with i l legal equipment .

Work C o n t r o l o n t h e Water

The communi ty is able to sus ta in the not ion of individual hard work, yet at the same t ime m a i n t a i n values of mu tua l assistance and equality. This is accomplished wi thout direct or formal communi ty control of e i ther production and dis t r ibut ion or consumption of resources, the arenas in which indiv idual i sm has its greatest potent ial impact. While individuals are presumably free to set the i r own levels of aspirat ion for mee t ing values in these arenas, collective control over the amount of work does occur.

As their own "bosses," watermen theoret ica l ly can work as much or as l i t t le as they want. State laws provide the only formal mechanisms for res t r ic t ing hours of work by watermen (such as to dayl ight hours and to five or six days a week), and they are rout ine ly violated. Market considerations and na tu ra l conditions also affect amount of work watermen do. But wi th in an average range of supply, informal mechanisms control the amount of work. Values of Seafood Is landers stress work to such as extent tha t watermen engage in actions tha t control m in imum effort. At the same t ime, a number of communal work control practices also l imit production. As a result , watermen encourage each other to produce at a round the same levels, minimizing s t ra t i f icat ion and cons t ra in ing competit ion.

Controll ing Rate-Bust ing

What const i tutes an appropriate day's work is a ma t t e r of collective defini t ion emerging out of gossip and exchange of informat ion among watermen about what they are doing and when they are doing it.


Freedom, in practice, often means f reedom to copy each other. In the summer almost all scrapers go out to crab each day at the same time. Potters also go out as a group at the same time. When asked why they leave so ear ly in the morning, wa te rmen have no set answer. Typical answers include: "I guess because there aren ' t as many s torms then;" "it is not as hot;" and "crabbin's 's best then: ' Similarly, in winter, oys termen leave the Is land at the same t ime each day. Each group also comes in at a round the same t ime.

Almost all wa te rmen work long hours when the season is productive. Scrapers usua l ly work five days a week in their shanty, beginning around 4:30 A.M. They fish up, pack crabs, and are in their boats by 5:00. They scrape unt i l 2:30 P.M., work at shant ies unt i l 3:30 or 4:00, and go back to fish up again from 7:00 to 8:00. On Sa turday scrapers work from 5:00 unt i l noon. Pot ters go out at 4:00 A.M. and work unt i l noon. Then they t ake the i r crabs to the mainland, re turn- ing home be tween 3:30 and 4:00. If they have caught soft crabs, they must also a t tend to them. Sa turday is a full working day for potters, since they still have to pull in all their pots. Sunday is a day of rest, except tha t scrapers have to fish up soft crabs at least four t imes a day.

All workmen s tay out a l i t t le longer on Mondays because pot ters have double crabs in pots they did not empty on Sunday and because scrapers feel tha t they can catch more crabs since grassy bot toms have been und is tu rbed for a whole day. Both groups work 75 or more hours a week dur ing this season. A typical oyster day is shorter. During oyster season, men s ta r t work at about 7:00, ending collec- t ively anywhere from noon unt i l 4:00 depending on the day's productivity. Men rou t ine ly oyster only unt i l noon on Saturdays . Thus, during oyster season, men work about a 40-hour week.

Collective def ini t ions of appropr ia te t imes and amounts of work vary wi th the marke t . Wha t would be ra te -bus t ing in oyster season would be slacking off in crab season. The amount of money tha t can be made in a pa r t i cu la r s i tua t ion (e.g., season, day) is cer ta in ly an impor tant pa r t of an Islander 's calculat ions of what to do. But these calculat ions are rou t ine ly set in a f ramework which considers what other people are doing. So, communi ty members are str ict about res t ing from work on Sunday. But even then, they allow "necessary" work such as f ishing up (so that soft crabs do not die) or boat repai r (needed for the boat to be in work ing condit ion on Monday). They consistently des ignate cer ta in periods as vacation t ime. Nobody, "unless he is real ly in need of money," works the week of Chris tmas.


Seafooders expect everyone to t ake off at least a month between seasons to res t and p repare for the next season.

Any one w a t e r m a n could often make more money t han others by pu t t ing in more hours t han they do, but this r a r e ly takes place. When exceptions occur, o ther wa te rmen ques t ion the behavior. A young man offers the following example:

I had to tow a man in the other day, so I went back out and tried to get in a day's work after the time to go in. You wouldn't imagine how many people asked me what I was doing. The man I sold to said, "You're supposed to be in already. What you doing out?"

If exceptions happen too often, o thers view a w a t e r m a n as " c r a z y : ' For example, I saw a man coming in f rom po t t ing ha l f an hour la te r t han most men. A young boy said to me, "No wonder John [the man's son] never wants to out wi th him. He is crazy to be coming back at this t ime: '

Men are expected to r e t u r n or s tay at home when wea ther is bad. When it is "bad enough" is, again, a collective matter . Two young men were t a lk ing on a Sunday night .

"It's blowin' tonight. Bet we don't go out tomorrow." The other man replied, "Well, if it's bad tomorrow, I hope it is bad enough not to go out. I'll talk to you in the morning before we leave, to decide:'

Al though one should not be a "coward" about the necessa ry r isk involved in the job, I s landers pa r t i cu l a r l y r e sen t those who put themselves in unnecessa ry danger. In the win te r of 1977, for example, bad ice s torms caused people to be s t r anded on Seafood Is land tbr some period. Dur ing this t ime, one young man made his way t h rough ice to dredge oysters. Someone f rom Seafood Is land a le r t ed the police about his being out wi th i l legal equipment . Ordinar i ly , such a com- pla int to outside au tho r i t y would be un th inkab le . However, before police came by helicopter, someone else a le r t ed this man so that , while forced to come in, he did not get into legal t rouble . In the local gossip, foolhardiness was not the only issue. Wha t was deeply re- sented was the a t t emp t to make money when no one e l se was mak ing any.

Seafood wa te rmen s t a r t each season collectively. At some point af ter the season has begun, a rumor will c i rculate tha t crabs are runn ing or tha t oysters are in abundance . Then wa te rmen rush to


finish prepar ing for the season and get the i r boats into the water. Unt i l tha t t ime, men go out for shor t periods to repor t back on the activity, bu t a lmost everyone s t a r t s in ea rnes t the same week. The few who s ta r t before everyone else is ready are usua l ly newcomers, not very skilled, and not well liked. One boy repor ted tha t he and his father had gone crabbing in the ra in in ear ly May. He said, "There are only three crabbers tha t went out yes te rday and none of them stayed out very long. Most have not s t a r t ed yet. They are sti l l t ry ing to get their boats ready: ' This boy's fa ther is not a nat ive Seafood Islander, and he and his son are often referred to by other Is landers as "being crazy" and "only af ter a dol lar"

Discouraging Goldbricking

Informal collective control of amount of work operates to specify min imum as well as " ra te -bus t ing" effort. This becomes especial ly apparent at the end of a "season;" since crabbing and oyster ing seasons overlap, wa te rmen mus t decide when to change from one occupational ac t iv i ty to another. Dur ing an unproduct ive end of a period, wa te rmen commonly grumble: "The season is too long. Wish it were over. Nobody is catching much anymore anyway" But the men who are complaining cont inue work ing along wi th everyone else unt i l a group decision is made tha t the season is rea l ly "over"

Is landers have a concept of a "good week's w o r k " Seafooders expect that a man will not t ake t ime off from his work week for recrea t ion or to do chores tha t women can do. "Goes to the main land on any excuse, tha t one does," complains one Islander. "The people would talk," explains a wate rman, discussing react ions to hun t ing dur ing the week. "Bad enough to go on a Sa tu rday" Even then a wa t e rman is careful not to go hun t ing "too many" Sa turdays ins tead of going out with other oys termen. And no one would th ink of going hun t ing on a Sunday. That i t t akes place on an i l legal day is not the reason; it be ing the Sabba th is the problem.

Watermen are also expected to work what is considered a "good day" If a wa t e rman hab i tua l ly stays ashore when other men work, they describe h im as lazy or no good. Similarly, i f a man goes out la ter or r e tu rns to the Is land ear l ier t han others wi thout "good reason," he runs the r isk of being ostracized. For example, one young man had that r epu ta t ion and other men made the following remarks: "Yeah, Jack real ly l ikes to sleepY' "Somet imes he doesn ' t go crabbing unt i l af ter 7:00" "He is never going to make i t " Another man had t rouble


with a rope breaking. Hea r ing about this over the Citizens' Band radio, a second wa te rman informed the man wi th the problem tha t a rope was available. The f i rs t man's decision to t ake his boat in ear ly anyway led to negat ive remarks : "That 's a good excuse for coming in early. Any excuse will do for tha t one: '

Min imum work norms are affected by mar i ta l s ta tus and genera- t ional differences. The unmar r i ed can be a l i t t le tax in the i r work practices wi thout being ostracized. But mar r i ed men observe rigid schedules and r isk other Is landers ' gossip if they do not s tay out as long as common pract ice dictates. Difference in norms is revealed in this r emark from a single, 28-year-old divorced man: "I used to take days off, or come in early, bu t now I t ry to keep up with the mar r ied men. I work jus t l ike I was married."

Genera t ional divisions, observed in other f ishing s tudies (cf. Good- lad, 1970), d i f ferent ia te acceptable m in imum work levels. Younger men say they resent feeling tha t they are expected to live up to the s tandards of the older man, who somet imes go out ear l ier and stay longer than they do. They complain: "Yeah, he and them others s tay out jus t on a chance. And they act l ike you're common if you don't, too. They don't know how to enjoy themselves . They th ink having a good t ime is going to church: ' As a result , young men somet imes t ry to convince other wa te rmen tha t they should go in before the end of the day if the weather is bad or if they are not catching much. If a group can be convinced to quit early, it leg i t imates b reak ing of normal working hours. But unless one is wil l ing to r isk crit icism, he never goes in alone. The following is a typical way of ending work early:

Hey, John (over the CB). Are you catching anything? No. Me neither. Want to go in after two more "licks" and have a beer? Okay. See how Larry feels.

After this exchange, a small group s t a r t ed for the Is land and the bulk of the f leet followed.

In the same way, ends of seasons are de te rmined more by t rad i t ion es tabl ished by the older wa te rmen than by profit. Since seasons overlap, wa te rmen have to decide when to change from one occupa- t ional ac t iv i ty to another. At the unproduct ive end e ra season, young watermen commonly complain: "The season is too long. Wish it were over. Nobody is catching much anymore anyway" But they cont inue work ing un t i l t he older men decide to change occupat ions . The change then occurs even though there is still money to be made in the


previous work. One man explains: "The potters are quitt ing because this is the t ime they usually quit to go tonging. They say the prices are too low. Too many crabs. But they are still making $600 a week:'

The variation in norms according to marital and generational status appears to be connected to the importance of age-grading as a source of organization on the Island. When one becomes an adult (which is at least part ly determined by marital status), the work ethic becomes more important. Marriage also reinforces expectations because, for the marr ied person, work has consequences for others in addition to one's self. Even if single, however, a waterman in his twenties should work like a "grown m a n " While some of the younger complain, they are still members of the community. And they still see in the work of older watermen (who have been less influenced by the outside world) concrete images of how community values are to be translated into everyday activity.

The Etiquette of Partial Disclosure

Work control mechanisms operate to inhibi t achievement differences and invidiousness and manage the more visible aspects of competit iveness. Yet people still value success and individual achievement. Overt displays of "superiority," though, would violate the Island's egali tarian ideology. Competitively concealing information, on the other hand, runs counter to ideals of open cooperation. Seafooders satisfy both conditions in a system of partial disclosure that allows them to pursue success through a system of underground competition, by concealing details that are discrepant with professed values.

In discussing individual interaction, Goffman (1959) talks about idealization through strategic concealment. When a clash of values occurs, as on Seafood, Goffman's mode of adaptation can be culturally embodied; s t rategic concealment becomes incorporated into an etiquette of partial disclosure. Etiquette then serves to maintain cohesion by avoiding occasions of open incompatibility in one's "regu- lated improvisations:'

The etiquette of partial disclosure takes a number of different forms. For example, elaborate rituals have developed so that Seafood watermen can compare the day's productivity without directly discussing money. When watermen come in from work for the day, they usually exchange a hand or shoulder sign from their boats to signify


in general how productive the day has been. This sign consists of thumbs up for a good day, thumbs down for a bad day, and a shoulder shrug and palms raised and open to signal an average day. Islanders are reluctant to discuss numbers that translate too easily into income. Sometimes they make a comparison with a former t ime without disclosing amounts: "How'd you do today? . . . . Runnin' 'bout the same as last week:' Even if relatives ask a waterman about his day, they receive answers such as "not so well," "average," or "pretty well:'

It is also difficult, if not impossible, to get information on yearly earnings. "What does the average waterman make a year?" I asked many times. The Islanders' answers ranged from, " O h , I don't know" to "Well, it changes everyday and depends on a lot of things: ' One Islander reported that, "Some of them don't even tell their wives how much they make: ' It appears that a skilled Islander clears between $20,000 and $30,000 a year, although fluctuations from year to year are great. Some people may not know how much they make because of lack of writ ten records. Some watermen do not want others, especially outsiders, to have that information because of fear of income tax investigation. But mostly what is involved for watermen con- cerns definitions of good etiquette and "minding one's own business:' The fact that watermen exchange information about so many other "private" topics in such great detail suggests that this practice is part of a pat tern avoiding invidiousness that could disrupt values on egalitarianism.

Watermen also conceal information concerning other aspects of work life. They tend to be most cooperative when it does not directly detract from their own productivity or overly increase income of others. "Cooperative they are," says one informant, "that is until you get to the dollar" Thus, they willingly help one another fix pots and boats, and give i n f o r m a t i o n on r igg ing and o ther procedures; however, they are less likely to inform each other about recently discovered prolific fishing spots or to assist companions who are making unusual profit from illegal or risky activities.

Levels of disclosure, partial disclosure, and timed disclosure give the appearance that "all is being told" even in these situations. While in the presence of the informer, others react as though they believe all is being revealed to them at that time, the earliest convenient mo- ment they could have received the information. Howeveb partici~ pants know that all is not being told and act accordingly to find out concealed information. They exchange information later with others,


voicing doubts as to the completeness and accuracy of earl ier informat ion gained. Adding together all the bits of knowledge from vari- ous sources then usua l ly serves to confirm the i r suspicions.

To i l lustrate , wa te rmen genera l ly keep in touch wi th one another about cur ren t product iv i ty of well-known f ishing areas. Men usua l ly go to areas in groups because it is the local pa t t e rn and because of the danger of being by oneself on the water. A wa te rman who f requent ly goes off alone and refuses to report his location and degree of success would be ostracized and not viewed as a good communi ty member.

I f a man "hi ts" on a good place, however, he may "cheat" a l i t t le and keep it secret un t i l it becomes obvious from the many crabs he brings in to sell in the next few days t ha t he has discovered an unknown productive area. Then, in order not to r isk his communi ty s tanding, he is obligated by communi ty norms to spread the word about its location, a l though he may sti l l choose whom he will tell. He knows the location will not r emain a secret for long anyway because of local gossip networks and Citizens ' Band radios, and the daily observa- t ional checks men make on one another 's visible inshore act ivi t ies (cf. Cordell, 1980). At the same t ime, he wants to control who knows, and when they know. Concurrent ly, other men are t ry ing to f ind out where the successful wa te rman is f ishing before he actual ly reveals any information, since being there before others means profit. But this mus t be accomplished discreet ly and indirectly, since one should not let on in public tha t one th inks any informat ion is being kept secret. No one asks the man who k n o w s - - t h e y ask others who migh t have some inside informat ion. Note the following story

I worked for a man among the best. He told me, '~knybody asks you anything about how much we make or anything about the boat or where we go, send them to me. I'll tell them what I want them to know when I want them to know it" He didn't want them crowding his spot trying to get up side him for one thing.

Consumption Control

In addi t ion to controls on income, Is landers are careful not to let consumpt ion become a source of inv id iousness . Con t ro l l ing consumption is a way of fu r the r reducing the possibil i ty of s ta tus consequences developing out of the actual income differences tha t do occur, a l though concealed by local practices. Wives are the chief pract i t ioners in this domain, since they handle family finances.


Islanders expect other community members to maintain a certain standard of living and ostracize them through gossip if they do not. People should not let their boats run down or fail to repair and paint their houses, nor should they buy something tha t is "not good enough" and cheap. On the other hand, Islanders should not call a t tent ion to themselves th rough buying items tha t are "osten~ tatiously" better than other residents' possessions. Most people on Seafood Island buy the same furni ture and clothes (although pat- terns and colors may differ) from the same stores at the same time. Buying an item a "little better" is permissible and others soon go out to buy the same thing. There is a constant at t i tude of"Where did you get it? I want one too," which is the way they learn about available items to buy.

As crabs have become more lucrative for Seafooders, the overall level of consumption for pleasure has increased incrementally. The high degree of visibility on the Island means that even this increase is controlled. Almost everything is brought to the Island on the public ferry, which also carries people back and forth to the Island. Fre- quently heard comments on the boat include: "What does she need that for? .... She a l ready has one bird feeder in her yard. That's enough." "Have you ever seen such a show-off thing?" Then, once on the Island, because of closeness in space and gossip networks, pur- chases are again in public view and scrutinized by neighbors.

Gossip

Although consumption control helps keep invidiousness in check, the desire to be superior still exists. It gets played out in gossip, an accepted form of gaining and giving information. Public visibility in this community means there is much about which to gossip. Gossip by private groups of women, groups of men who gather at the stores, and as discussion at church meetings is regarded positively. Many women admit to liking gossip, just ifying it with "how else do we know what's happening in the community?" Many men regard their gossip as "taking care of Island business:' Groups of people working together in oyster houses justify it as a "good way to pass time: ' In church meetings, it is seen as a positive sign of caring. It is even formalized in "class meetings," half-hour meetings before the Sunday church service for people (mainly men) to talk to the group about personal problems. Everyone offers support and prayers, much as in group


therapy sessions. Afterwards, however, word about each person's confessions usually circulates in the community.

Gossip, then, is a means for the social construction of character. Generally it takes the form of indirectly claiming status for oneself by sharing with others the failure of those not present to meet some community s tandard. Pre tens ions to pure ega l i t a r ian ism can be dropped more openly because it is "only gossip" and therefore does not count. It also does not count because it is so variable: "People from here will change around, cross sides, or go back from a position. We know we're too dependent to let differences get too wide:' Islanders then present themselves to the outside as one happy f ami ly - - no violence, no confrontations, no bad feelings. This public presentation, released by the subterranean passing of negative information, allows structural communitar ianism to persist while permit- ting people to feel superior to one another.

C o n c l u s i o n s

This paper has emphasized how everyday practices inhibit the formation of a status system based on individual work, while at the same t ime allowing for a sense of individual freedom and success. This results in the preservation of communitarian control. Individ- ual competitive activities are concealed by "underground" practices in the world of work and consumption and curbed by the intense concern of Islanders with their public image. Seafood watermen validate value choices through social comparisons, forever checking on what everyone else is doing. This, along with an orientation toward minimizing expressed differences, constrains everyday interpersonal re la t ions so tha t a competing status system does not emerge. These practices operate fur ther to prevent any differences that do occur from being invested with invidious value.

How this works is related to the power of the church to penetrate everyday lives of its members. What makes church so powerful on Seafood is that it is the core of and instrument for preserving communi tar ianism, a value necessary in an isolated communi ty where members face constant environmental dangers in their work and day-to-day lives and where they often have only one another for mutual assistance. Church on Seafood is not just a n organizational resource; it is t h e organizational resource on the Island. It maintains hegemony because of its subtle but complete interpenetration of


work, consumption, and everyday interactional practices. The minister describes the encompassing power of the church:

So what you have is the church func t ion ing in the marketp lace and as the rel igious communi ty . But they are not separated, they are all in one. So tha t when people deal wi th one another, they deal in respect to how they are t r a ined in church, knowing tha t tha t is pa r t of the i r community. The church fami ly is pa r t of t he i r fami ly and therefore they are dea l ing with brothers and sisters, as they deal among themselves.

In the case of Seafood one need not claim that people are con- sciously at tempting to avoid al ternate status systems through work and information control. Indeed, Bourdieu (1977) argues that control of the kind discussed here can only operate if people are no t aware of the aggregate implications of their actions and from where they come. Collective work control practices operate without participants' direct knowledge (al though they recognize them when they are pointed out by this researcher). Islanders, from their point of view, are simply being polite; that is, they are preventing bad feelings on the part of others. They are avoiding envy, which they disvalue. And they are maintaining a presentation of self sufficiently cooperative and mutual ly assisting to warrant their claims to civic status and reciprocal mutual aid. However, the norms involving individual rela- tionships have an aggregate effect in that they both derive from and collectively reinforce images disseminated by and supporting the dominant core of the community. They allow Islanders to profess and believe in values of individualism and to practice individual success in work, yet leave communi ta r i an i sm as an Island ideology un- threatened.

Reference Notes

1. LittLe in format ion exists on work control among small , independent entrepreneurs. Most of the l i terature available deals with competitive control among large, complex organizations. For example, see Aiken and Hage (1968); Baron and Bielby (1984); Evan (1966); and Perrow (1979). See Edwards (1979) and Light (1972) for some discussion of control within small businesses. Recently there has been more concentration in the organizational literature on small firms, establishments, and "small employers:' See, for example, Aldrich and Weiss (1981) and Granovetter (1984).

2. I would like to thank Shulamit Reinharz for suggesting this idea. 3~ It has not been my intent ion to slight the role of women in the world of work.

However, sex role divisions in this community are traditional and rigid. Basically men are viewed as the economic agents. Islanders consider any income earned by

222 Q U A L I T A T I V E SOCIOLOGY

women as supplementary income to be spent for additional personal and house- hold items "for the women:' The world of work outside the home is the man's world. Local women do not go out on boats, and, with the exception of afternoon "fishing up," they do not occupy shanties. Historically, men have considered women on boats as bad luck; older men still do today. Women view boats as too strenuous and "not their place:' The main concern and day-to-day focus of women is adapting family routines to requirements imposed by the nature of work on the water. "Shore work" operations, such as assisting husbands in the soft crab industry, picking meat from hard crabs, cleaning and freezing soft-shell crabs, or working at the local oyster "shucking house," are the only "legitimate" women's activities directly connected to work on the water.

References

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fishing for success without rocking the boat: value conflict and work control in a maritime context

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