“fire safety in the channel tunnel” - arena international€œfire safety in the channel tunnel...

Caroline Wake Eric Rebeyrotte

Steve Demetriou

Channel Tunnel Safety Authority

Fire Protection and Safety in Tunnels Conference Oslo

23-24 September 2015

“Fire Safety in the Channel Tunnel”

The Channel Tunnel:A vital link

Rome Bordeaux LYON

TOURS

LE MANS

RENNES

LAVAL

BREST

DISNEYLAND

PARIS

PARIS

LILLE

CALAIS

BRUSSELS

GHENT

THE HAGUE

AMSTERDAM

Frankfurt

ASHFORD

LONDON

Waterloo

BIRMINGHAM

The North /

Scotland

Hamburg

Zurich

Barcelona

BRUGES

FPST Conference Oslo 23 & 24 September 2015 Channel Tunnel Safety Authority

Channel Tunnel History

•1986 – Treaty of Canterbury Signed

•TML – A joint venture consortium between UK & France

•1990 – Service tunnel completed

•For the first time in 12000 years, people can walk across the channel

•8 years to design

•Cost of £9.6 billion = €13.4 billion


Open for Business

•The Channel Tunnel was officially opened by HM the Queen and President Mitterrand on 6 May 1994

•On the 19 May 1994 the Channel Tunnel opened as a commercial business

•Eurotunnel operate the Concession


Governance Arrangements

Inter-Governmental Commission (NSA)

Channel Tunnel Safety Authority

Rescue and Public Safety

Working Group

Emergency Planning

Committee/s

Rail Safety and Transport

Working Group


The Terminals

Folkestone - Kent Sangatte - Calais


The “Concession”


NVS

SVS

Fr portal

3 km Sangatte

38 km

Shakespeare Cliff

UK portal 9 km

Tunnel Ventilation


Rail Running Tunnel [7.6m diameter]


Service Tunnel [4.8m diameter]


Cross Passage Door


Eurotunnel Freight Shuttle


Eurotunnel Passenger Shuttle


Class 373 (Eurostar) Train


Class E320 (Eurostar) Train (in service November 2015)


National Freight Trains


Channel Tunnel and SRT TSI

The design of the CT is different from the requirements of the Safety in Railway Tunnel (SRT) TSI for very long tunnels (more than 20 km long):

The service tunnel provides a good level of safety and is not compulsory in SRT TSI.

The running tunnels have continuous water supply throughout, which can be used by fire fighters. This is not required by the SRT TSI

Installation of four “SAFE” (Station d’Attaque du Feu) stations in 2011. These are dedicated to lorry shuttles and freight trains and do not provide enough evacuation facilities to comply with the fire fighting points specified in SRT TSI 1303/2014, clause 4.2.1.7.e


Rolling stock requirements

All trains for passengers using the tunnel must have a running capability in case of fire of 30 minutes because we want them to keep running and leave the tunnel so that passengers can be evacuated outside the tunnel.

Category B trains (LOC & PAS TSI) only have 15 minutes running capability

Specific case in the LOC & PAS TSI was agreed, on the basis of a risk analysis referring to:

In the worst case it would take 30 minutes for a train on fire to get out of the tunnel

Stopping and evacuating the passengers into the service tunnel would

not provide the equivalent level of safety to taking them out of the tunnel (although it is possible to do so if the train fails)


Channel tunnel specific case (LOC & PAS TSI)

LOC&PAS TSI 1302/2014, clause 7.3.2.21, provides 2 possibilities for the CT:

Running capability must be 30 minutes at 100 km/h, as usual, OR

Compliance with a national rule permitting some trains with 15 minutes running capability at 80 km/h to use the tunnel

National rule has been defined and issued for consultation which ended on 28 August 2015. Need to assess the risk and maintain the level of safety in the tunnel.

Will require a change in principle – when a fire is identified on a train with only 15 minutes running capability it will have to stop and evacuate immediately as it cannot be guaranteed to reach the end of the tunnel.

Train companies will need to undertake an additional risk analysis to demonstrate the level of safety is improved or maintained.

Need to guarantee the evacuation of passengers into the Service Tunnel within 15 minutes from the fire starting.


Developments in passenger evacuation arrangements

The existing procedures for evacuating a passenger train:

No real case of application until now:

because of the very high level of safety of these specific passenger trains (Eurostar and ET passengers shuttles)

because there are means of fire extinction inside the engines and the carriages

The standard procedure is to drive the train out of the tunnel to an emergency siding



The existing procedures for evacuating a passenger train:

If a train on fire is not able to get out and stops in the tunnel, the passengers have to walk on the sidewalk until the next cross passage door (gap between two CP: 375 m; length of a HST: 400 m; length of a shuttle: 750 m). In a controlled stop the doors of the train align with the CPDs

In an uncontrolled stop the existing procedure for a fire separating the train in two parts is to use the ventilation to provide fresh air to the longest part of the train and to evacuate this part, and then to reverse the ventilation and evacuate the other part of the train

An exercise in January 2014 showed that this procedure takes too much time (1 hour)



The search for a new procedure of evacuation:

CTSA commissioned studies to help accelerate the passengers evacuation

The study examined:

Reports from actual fires on passenger trains,

Fire test data,

Human behaviour theories,

Modelled different evacuation procedures



The study concluded that:

A number of factors will have an impact on the number of people who will die or be seriously injured at these type of incidents. These factors included: Speed of fire development within the train Human management of the situation Effectiveness of evacuation systems, routes and procedures Quality of information and instruction given to the travelling

public



Findings regarding human behaviour included:

Railway operators should develop a standardised information strategy that sets out who gives the information, what information is given, how and how often it is given and in which languages

“Panic”, as people commonly perceives it, eventually turns out to be a much rarer phenomenon than expected when people’s actions are analysed

Existing relationships/roles between individuals are maintained when a situation of evacuation occurs (this means that train staff who are implicitly perceived as authority representatives and knowledgeable individuals are of great importance in the evacuation management).

To be able to cope with this responsibility and to deliver clear information to the public while keeping their composure, train staff have to be well prepared and trained, have a clear definition of their responsibilities and a basic notion of crowd management.

Staff should be equipped with appropriate means of communication and crowd orientation.

During the evacuation of a train, high densities of people are foreseeable. Passengers tend to behave like people surrounding them when suffering from a lack of information, therefore information given to passenger is crucial if particular actions or behaviour are expected from the public.



Modelling of different procedures showed it was feasible to evacuate in a single phase rather than reverse the ventilation for two phase evacuation

Use of ‘all doors’ for evacuation was quicker than using ‘end doors’ but more time was spent on the evacuation walkway because it is narrow

Times to reach the Service Tunnel for both methods were equivalent but less exposure to fire products using ‘end doors’

CTSA/IGC will be considering proposals for new procedures based on these findings later in 2015


Eurotunnel

First Line of Response (FLOR)

Personnel from KFRS & ONET Securitie from 1 January 2013]

Second Line of Response (SLOR)

UK ERO’s

Second Line of Response

(SLOR) French ERO’s

Emergency Response Management


FLOR – First Line of Response Patrol the Service Tunnel in Service Tunnel Transportation System

(STTS) vehicles

2 teams of 4 based close to Portals.

Not restricted to mid-point boundary:

Main role: evacuation of passengers + initial fire fighting

UK FR


Emergency Response Contractors Duties

UK (KFRS) and French (ONET Securitie) FLOR work under

contract to Eurotunnel with the primary duties of:-

- Assisting the train crew with evacuation management.

- Provide first aid treatment for injured casualties

- Provide casualty care and assist train crew with the

transfer of passengers onto an evacuation train.

Both KFRS and SDIS62, have a statutory duty to undertake SLOR

duties regardless of the FLOR contract position.


SLOR - Second Line of Response UK & French Emergency Response Organisations (EROs)

Deployment underground via STTS Emergency fleet

UK 2 X SLOR FIRE – Personnel & equipment

2 x Ambulances – Equipment + 2 Stretchers

Communications STTS

FR

2 X SLOR FIRE – Personnel & equipment

2 x Ambulances – 2 x Equipment + Stretchers

Communications STTS


Channel Tunnel Fires – (Freight Shuttles)

18 November 1996 RT South, Interval 3 (France)

21 August 2006

RT North, Interval 4 (UK) 11 September 2008

RT North, Interval 6 (France)

29 November 2012 Emergency Sidings (France) 17 January 2015 RT North, Interval 4 (France)


1996 Fire


2006 Fire


2008 Fire


Fire Fighting Operations

The CT presents many challenges:

Access restrictions - transfer of personnel and equipment to the incident scene.

Distance of travel to the incident scene.

Arduous conditions – extreme temperatures and high humidity.

Communications, language.

Small quantities of dangerous goods maybe present


Cross Border Considerations Different cultures – different approach

Language Training Procedures

Different national processes

CBRN Hazmat

Organisational structures French report to Prefect – UK independent

Equipment

Hose connection Breathing Apparatus

Incident management

Command and control


Incident Structure

UK FRANCE

INCIDENT

PCO Incident

Co-ordination

Centre

Fire Equipment

Management

Centre

Fire Equipment

Management

Centre

Communications Vehicle

Video Conferencing

Eurotunnel

Rail Control Centre


PROJECT SALAMANDER


The Two Phases of Project Salamander

Salamander Intervention SAFE


Fire Fighting Intervention

• Project “Salamander” initiated after the fire on the 11 September 2008

• Developed by a “partnership” approach • Based on six predetermined scenarios • Catenary Earthing procedures • Deployment of water curtains to prevent longitudinal fire spread.


FLOR Intervention


FLOR Intervention Briefing Diagrams


Salamander Phase Two - SAFE

• “SAFE” (Stations d’Attaque du Feu) station project

• Partnership approach to developing a innovative system for the future

• Water Mist Fire Suppression System

• Each WMFSS head – 50lpm @ 50Bar

• Still a need for a F&RS intervention to extinguish the fire


Fire 17th January 2015


• 12:00hrs arcing of catenary at UK

portal

• 12:22hrs fire alarm actuated

• Controlled stop of Freight shuttle

• 16km from French portal

• Too late to stop in a SAFE station

• 38 passengers and 3 staff

evacuated to Service Tunnel – no

injuries

• French and UK fire services

responded

• Fire brought under control at

16:40hrs

• RAIB and BEATT investigating

Questions?

“fire safety in the channel tunnel” - arena international€œfire safety in the channel tunnel...

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