1

Lauren Barnhart, Laura Blackerby, Katherine Close,

Harrison Doyle, Amber Duncan, Maria Eckrich, Wesley Fox,

Ben Fredrickson, Anthony Junta, Shannon Mills, Nicholas Parker,

Angel Sharma, and Mark Tynan

The Refugee Crisis

in the Levant Demographics and Risk Factors for

Conflict in Jordan and Lebanon

2

I. Executive Summary ......................... 3

II. Introduction .................................... 4

III. Methodology .................................. 4

IV. Overall Demographic Changes ......... 5

A. Syria ......................................... 5

B. Lebanon .................................... 5

C. Jordan ....................................... 6

V. Case Studies of Demographic Change

in the Levant ....................................... 8

A. Aleppo, Syria ............................. 8

B. Shebaa, Lebanon ....................... 9

C. Mafraq, Jordan .......................... 9

VI. When do Refugees Cause Conflict in

Their Host Countries? ................................... 10

VII. Risk Factors for Refugee-Related

Conflict in Lebanon and Jordan .......... 14

A. Militarization of Refugees .......... 14

B. Capability of Host Governments to

Prevent Refugee Militarization ... 15

C. Long-term Alienation of Young Refu-

gees .......................................... 17

IX. Conclusions .................................... 19

Table of Contents

3

T he aim of this paper is to explore the effects

of the Syrian civil war on the demographics of the

Levant, and to identify risk factors that indicate

refugees may destabilize host countries. Our research

indicates that flows of Syrian refugees are straining

resources in Jordan and Lebanon, but are not yet

contributing to conflict spillover because (A) refugee

communities in these countries are not militarized;

and (B) because the host governments possess the

capacity and willingness to prevent militarization.

We identify three risk factors that may increase

the likelihood of refugee-related conflict:

militarization of refugees; degradation of the capacity

of security forces in Lebanon and Jordan; and, the

persistence of a young, marginalized refugee

population that is younger than the native populations

in Lebanon and Jordan.

Using case studies of Aleppo in Syria, the town of

Shebaa in Lebanon, and the Mafraq Governorate in

Jordan, we explore the potential challenges associated

with an influx of refugees, while also demonstrating

how the presence of refugees alone is not sufficient to

cause the collapse of public order or state stability.

This paper also draws on past refugee crises to

understand the circumstances under which refugee

flows have been known to spread violence to refugee-

hosting countries.

Finally, our research finds that refugee flows may

cause changes in the demographic structure of host

countries. Drawing from the “youth bulge” theory, we

find that societies with rapidly growing youth

populations often develop rampant unemployment

and large pools of disaffected youth, who are in turn

more susceptible to recruitment into rebel or extremist

groups. The influx of displaced youth in Jordan and

Lebanon means that the age structures of these

countries are at risk of delayed maturation. If not

integrated into the host society through employment

and educational opportunities, young Syrian refugees

may have destabilizing consequences for Jordan and

Lebanon.

Executive Summary

Syrian refugees are straining

resources of host countries, but

refugees are not yet contributing to

conflict spillover in the Levant

because:

Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon

do not appear to be militarized

The governments of Jordan and

Lebanon have the capacity and

willingness to prevent the

militarization of refugees

Risk factors to monitor for signs of

refugee-related conflict:

1. Militarization of refugees

2. Capability of host governments to

prevent refugee militarization,

recruitment in refugee camps, and

militant infiltration of refugee

communities

3. Long-term alienation of refugee

youth

Key Findings

Risk Factors

4

Since 2011, a devastating civil war in Syria has

driven nearly 11 million people from their homes, of

which more than four million have fled the country.1

Most of these refugees have sought shelter in the

neighboring states of Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and

Iraq. The flow of refugees has strained the capacity of

host governments and the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to respond to

the crisis, leaving many refugees impoverished and

vulnerable. This, combined with growing sectarian

tensions and terrorist networks in the region, raises

concerns that the massive population displacement

could destabilize Syria’s neighbors, and lead to a

spillover of the civil war.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the

demographic changes occurring in Lebanon, Jordan

and Syria as a result of the refugee crisis and to identify

risk factors for refugee-related conflict and

destabilization.

Our research indicates Syrian refugees are

indeed straining resources of host countries—but

are not yet contributing to conflict spillover in

Lebanon and Jordan because:

(A) Refugee communities in those countries do

not appear to be militarized; and

(B) Host governments possess the capacity and

willingness to prevent militarization of

refugees.

However, there are signs that the refugee

population is at risk of becoming militant and that the

young, marginalized refugee population may pose long

-term challenges to their host countries. The longer the

refugee crisis continues, the higher the likelihood that

refugees in Jordan and Lebanon will engage in cross-

border attacks with Syria, challenge host governments,

and clash with local populations.

To identify demographic changes resulting from

refugee flows, we examined data from a variety of

publicly-available sources, including reports from

international organizations such as the UNHCR and the

International Labour Organization (ILO), and

international and regional media sources. We also

interviewed regional experts, scholars, and

humanitarian aid workers. For the second part of our

study – an analysis of the potential implications of the

refugee crisis for Jordan and Lebanon – we drew on the

above sources as well as peer-reviewed academic

literature analyzing the impact of refugees and

demographic changes on political stability and conflict.

At the client’s request, the scope of this paper is

limited to assessing the implications of the refugee

crisis for Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. We recognize

that Iraq and particularly Turkey – which has accepted

nearly half of all Syrian refugees – are also

experiencing significant demographic change as a

result of the crisis; however we do not address them in

this paper. The migration of refugees to countries

outside of the Levant falls outside of the scope of this

paper.

Introduction

Methodology

Figure 2. Movements of Syrian Refugees

Syria’s neighbors have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis, with Turkey taking in more than 2 million refugees, Lebanon accepting over a million, and Jordan taking in over 600,000. (Data source: UNHCR)

5

The civil war in Syria has generated a population of

10.6 million displaced persons and refugees that is

characterized by youth, poverty and low education. As

a result of these population movements, people are now

concentrated in camps and urban areas in northern and

western Syria, eastern Lebanon and northern Jordan. In

the following section, we detail the key changes in

settlement patterns, age structure, and socioeconomic

status in each country. These three factors are critical

to assessing the potential implications of population

movements on the countries of the Levant.

Half of Syria’s Population is Displaced

More than 50 percent of Syria’s population of 21.1

million has been displaced internally or fled the

country as a result of the civil war that began in 2011.

Since January 2014, there has been a steady growth in

the number of refugees registering with UNHCR in

neighboring countries. The most concentrated outflow

of refugees occurred in December 2014, when 500,000

UNHCR-registered refugees fled the country.2

There are nearly twice as many internally displaced

persons (IDPs) within Syria as there are refugees

outside the country. This is significant because if

fighting in Syria worsens or spreads, millions more

Syrians may attempt to flee the country. Nearly all IDP

camps are located near borders with Turkey, Jordan

and Lebanon, further compounding this risk.3

Currently, four million of the total 6.5 million IDPs

within Syria are located in three governorates –

Aleppo, Damascus and Idlib – all of which border

neighboring countries.4

The civil war has pushed millions of Syrians into

poverty, which further catalyzes migration out of the

country and increases suffering among those who

remain. In 2014, more than 80 percent of people

remaining in Syria were estimated to be living in

poverty, and 65 percent were living in extreme poverty,

unable to meet their basic needs.5 The Syrian Center

for Policy Research estimates unemployment in Syria

increased from 15 percent to 58 percent between 2011

and the end of 2014.6 Not only does this drive

migration, it may also pose challenges for rebuilding

the Syrian economy after the war.

Displaced Syrians tend to be very young. Children

under 18 make up more than half of the Syrian

population, and this age structure is also reflected in

the population of registered Syrian refugees in the

Levant.7 This youthful age structure means that many

displaced Syrians are children who are growing up in

poverty and have limited access to education. If this

situation continues, these refugee children may grow to

feel marginalized within their host communities and

underprepared to contribute to the rebuilding of Syria.

Additionally, the Syrian population is younger than the

populations of Lebanon and Jordan, meaning that the

influx of Syrian refugees has made the populations of

those countries more youthful.

In Lebanon, refugees disrupt the

transition to a more stable society

Lebanon has accepted the greatest number of

refugees in proportion to its population. With over one

million Syrian refugees now residing in Lebanon, one

in five people in the country is a Syrian refugee.8 This

influx of overwhelmingly young and impoverished

refugees has increased competition for resources such

as housing, but the biggest challenges are likely to

come in the future if refugees remain in Lebanon long-

term without the ability to work or integrate into

Lebanese society.

Overall Demographic Changes

in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon

Figure 1. Population of Syria

Nearly half of Syria’s prewar population of 22 million people has

been displaced by the war, either as refugees or Internally Dis-

placed Persons (iDPs). (Data sources: UNHCR, World Bank)

6

Initially, Syrian refugees entering Lebanon settled

in areas near the Syrian border, such as the Bekaa

Valley. While Syrian refugees are predominantly

Sunni, the areas in which they initially settled were

largely Shia and Christian. As Syrians continued to

arrive and border areas reached their absorption

capacity, refugees began to move deeper into Lebanon,

settling throughout the country’s Sunni, Shia and

Christian communities.9 Today, the largest numbers of

refugees in Lebanon are in Beirut, the Bekaa Valley

and in the north near Tripoli.

The relative youth of Syrian refugees compared to

the native Lebanese population has fundamentally

altered the age structure of Lebanon by lowering the

median age of the population. Lebanon has been

transitioning from a youthful to a more mature

population age structure, which may have benefits for

the stability of the country. The influx of young Syrian

refugees has disrupted this maturation process. If the

refugees are not repatriated or resettled, Lebanon may

take longer to complete the demographic transition to a

more mature population.

Syrian refugees also tend to be poorer than

the native Lebanese population. Without

sufficient humanitarian aid or the ability to

work, refugees tend to adopt negative coping

strategies like child labor and crime in order to

survive economically. The UNHCR’s

Lebanon Response Plan estimates that 37.5

percent of all Lebanese live below the poverty

line.10 Meanwhile, the poverty rate of Syrian

refugees is estimated at 70 percent, up from 50

percent in 2014.11 The most economically

vulnerable refugee populations are in the

Bekaa, Hermel, and Akkar districts.12

In Jordan, refugees settle in

northern cities

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has

taken in fewer refugees than Lebanon –

630,176 registered refugees as of November

2015. Syrian refugees in Jordan are more

likely to be separated from the Jordanian

population by living in large refugee camps or

poor urban areas.13 The flow of Syrian

refugees into Jordan has increased Jordan’s

population by at least 8 percent, a much

smaller percentage than in Lebanon.14 The

greatest influx of refugees into Jordan

Refugees have settled throughout Lebanon, with the largest populations in

the Bekaa Valley, Beirut, and northern Lebanon. (Data source: UNHCR)

Figure 4: Syrian Refugee Populations in Lebanese Districts, October 2015

Figure 3: Total population of Lebanon, 2015

Approximately 1 in 5 people living in Lebanon today is a Syrian refugee. (Data sources: UNHCR, World Bank)

7

occurred in 2013, when more than 300,000 refugees

entered the country. The decline in the number of

refugees entering the country in 2014 and 2015 is

attributed to border restrictions implemented by the

Jordanian government.15

In addition to registered refugees, Jordan’s

government estimates that more than

600,000 unregistered Syrian migrants live

in Jordan, bringing the total number of

Syrians in Jordan to approximately 1.3

million.16 There is little data currently

available about the population of

unregistered refugees. However, in

February 2016, the Jordanian government

will release results of a nationwide census

that officials have indicated will include

data on all residents of the country,

including refugees and other foreign

nationals.17

The influx of refugees has placed the

greatest stress on already poor areas in

northern Jordan, where the majority of

refugees have settled. Over 80 percent of

Syrian refugees in Jordan have settled in

cities, with Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa

hosting the greatest numbers.18 Before the

influx of refugees, the north of Jordan

already contained 57 percent of the

population living below the poverty line.19

Already suffering from high levels of

poverty and vulnerability, the governorates

of Amman, Irbid, Mafraq and Zarqa have

now accepted nearly 60 percent of the refugee

population.20

Jordan also has several refugee camps, which serve

17.9 percent of the refugee population in the country.21

The largest of these camps, Zaatari, was opened in

2012 and with nearly 80,000 inhabitants it has

effectively become the fourth most populous city in

Jordan.22 Syrian refugees and the native Jordanian

population are both predominantly Sunni, so refugee

settlement has not affected sectarian divisions in

Jordan.

As with the refugee population overall, more than

half of Syrian refugees in Jordan are under the age of

18. The refugee population is younger than the native

Jordanian population.23 This poses challenges for

Jordan’s educational system, slows the country’s

demographic transition, and means that more than

300,000 Syrian children are growing up in refugee

camps and poor urban communities.

In May 2015, the UNHCR found that 86 percent of

Syrian refugees in Jordan were living below the

Figure 6: Population of Jordan

Syrian refugees make up about eight percent of the population

of Jordan. (Data sources: UNHCR, World Bank)

The largest refugee populations in Jordan are in the country’s northernmost

governorates. (Data source: UNHCR)

Figure 5: Refugee settlement in Jordan

8

poverty line and 10 percent were living in extreme

poverty, meaning they cannot meet basic needs.24 The

poverty rate of Syrian refugees is significantly higher

than that of the native Jordanian population; only 14.4

percent of Jordanians live below the poverty line.25

Refugees are not authorized to work in Jordan, so

most are reliant on international assistance, savings,

and work in the informal sector for income. Poverty

among refugees in Jordan is not distributed evenly

throughout settlement areas. Refugees living in

northern Jordan are more likely to live in poverty,

compared with those living in the center, south, or east

of the country.26

Case Studies of Demographic

Change in the Levant

The following section explores how demographic

changes are playing out on the ground in three sub-

national areas: the city of Aleppo in Syria, the town of

Shebaa in Lebanon, and the Mafraq Governorate in

Jordan. These localities showcase some of the potential

challenges associated with the influx of refugees, while

also demonstrating that refugees alone are not

sufficient to cause the large-scale collapse of public

order or ultimately threaten state stability.

Aleppo, Syria: Accepted many IDPs, but did not collapse until attacked

from the outside

Aleppo, Syria’s commercial center and most

populous city, was largely spared the violence that

spread throughout the country in the early years of the

civil war.27 In 2011 and 2012, the city of Aleppo, with

a population of 2.1 million, absorbed an estimated

100,000 or more IDPs from other regions in Syria. This

influx strained local resources and contributed to the

rise of large informal settlements with poor access to

basic sanitation and infrastructure.28 The increased

burden of IDPs came after years of drought and

disruption had already driven nearly half of Aleppo’s

population into informal settlements.29

However, this population influx and the scarcity of

resources to support IDPs did not spark conflict in the

city. Aleppo’s robust business environment, significant

police presence, and prominent clerics discouraging

violence, worked to placate the city’s residents –

including the largely Sunni merchant class – and

maintained relative calm for over a year of fighting

throughout the rest of the country.30 Even as fighting

raged throughout the country, Aleppo itself did not see

major violence in 2011 and much of 2012.31

Furthermore, fighting did not break out in Aleppo until

the Free Syrian Army and al-Tawhid Battalion stormed

the city in July and August 2012.32 According to one

rebel commander who stormed the city: “We waited

and waited for Aleppo to rise, and it didn't. We couldn't

rely on them to do it for themselves so we had to bring

the revolution to them.”33

Today, Aleppo is scarcely recognizable as the

commercial center it once was. Previously a refuge for

many IDPs in the early days of the Syrian conflict, by

Figure 7: Aleppo at night before and after the civil war spread to the city

The civil war took over a year to reach Aleppo, despite the arrival

of more than 100,000 IDPs. When fighting did come to Aleppo,

the effects were devastating. (Image source: New York Times)

“We waited and waited

for Aleppo to rise, and it

didn't. We couldn't rely on

them to do it for

themselves so we had to

bring the revolution to

them.” -Syrian rebel commander

9

March 2013, more than one million Syrians had fled

the Aleppo governorate itself, displaced by intense

fighting between the Syrian government and Free

Syrian Army that has damaged nearly a third of all

structures in the city.34

Shebaa, Lebanon: Refugees cause

resource shortages, but not conflict

In Shebaa, Lebanon, a largely Sunni town in a

region known for strong support of Hezbollah, violence

between refugees and native Lebanese has been

minimal despite an influx of Sunni refugees and

increased strain on local services.35 Located in

southeastern Lebanon, bordering Syria, Shebaa hosts

nearly 3,000 registered Syrian refugees according to

UNHCR, however local officials estimate the number

to be as high as 4,500.36 Despite electricity, water, and

housing shortages, the residents of Shebaa have largely

refused to turn away refugees, most of whom are

women and children, opting to shelter the Syrians in

local schools, mosques, and private residences.37

Though some residents complain about declining

wages, the mayor of Shebaa insists the town has a duty

to take in those who might otherwise be killed in their

home country.38

Residents of Shebaa - Shia, Sunni, and Druze alike

- report that they are committed to preventing spillover

from Syria, and they praise the Lebanese Army for

enforcing border controls that prevent Syrian fighters

from crossing into Lebanon with legitimate

refugees.41 Pointing to the town’s military presence,

careful monitoring of refugees, and the non-

inflammatory messaging of local preachers, residents

insist the town remains secure despite intense clashes

between rebel groups just across the border.40

Lebanon, with its delicate political balance, history

of civil war, and the highest per capita rate of refugees

in the world, has faced dire predictions of impending

instability since the early days of the Syrian crisis.41

Yet, violent clashes between refugees and citizens are

rare, even in some of the country’s most vulnerable

communities, such as Shebaa. As fighting in Syria

moves beyond its fifth year, spillover to Lebanon

remains localized and short-lived. This is not to say

that Lebanon is politically stable. Though the recent

bombings targeting Shia communities in Beirut

prompted displays of unity from the city’s residents,

continued infiltration of Lebanon by militants and

attacks of a sectarian nature could undermine

stability.42

Mafraq, Jordan: Security forces and

community policing quell violence

Located north of Amman, the population of the

Mafraq governorate in Jordan has doubled as a result of

hosting Zaatari, the country’s largest refugee camp.

While Mafraq illustrates some of the challenges

associated with a burgeoning youth population, the

area is another example of relative stability in the face

of large refugee flows.

Mafraq has received 154,744 Syrian refugees since

the beginning of the conflict, two-thirds of whom live

below the poverty line.43 Refugees in Mafraq

experience the highest levels of vulnerability among

refugees in Jordan, as they lack basic needs and

frequently resort to the use of emergency coping

strategies to secure income.44

Despite harsh living conditions and aid shortfalls,

Jordanian security forces have been able to quell

violence within Mafraq’s refugee communities – such

as the Zaatari camp – relatively quickly. In April 2014,

riots and clashes with police resulted in the death of a

single refugee, before calm was restored within days.45

Learning from incidents such as the April riots,

Jordanian authorities have stepped up patrols,

implemented new community policing initiatives with

the help of UK advisors, and launched investigations

into those responsible for inciting the violence.46 Early

indications from the community policing initiatives

have been positive, as residents have become more

comfortable reporting crimes to the authorities, and the

Even as Jordanian schools

implement a double-shift

system, one in three

children in Zaatari do not

attend school.

10

Jordanian police have increased their positive

interactions with the refugee population.47

While the situation in Mafraq appears to pose little

threat to Jordan’s stability in the short term, the Zaatari

camp also illustrates the potentially destabilizing

effects on Jordan’s demographics in the coming years.

Thirty-five percent of the Syrian refugee population in

Jordan is between 5 and 17 years of age, and the

Jordanian school system is already overcrowded and

overstretched.48 Even as Jordanian schools implement a

double-shift system, one in three children in the Zaatari

camp do not attend school.49 This severe under-

enrollment has led aid agencies and officials to warn of

a “lost generation” of refugee children. Without quality

education for these children, the long-term economic

and social stability of individuals, families, and

communities may be at risk.50 The effect on Jordan,

should these refugees fail to return to Syria, could be

destabilizing, straining social services and exacerbating

the “youth bulge,” discussed in detail below.

When Do Refugees Cause Violent

Conflict in Their Host Countries?

Syrian refugees have not yet destabilized Lebanon

and Jordan, but there is concern that they might do so

in the future. To assess this issue, we looked at past

refugee crises to identify the circumstances in which

refugees might cause conflict in their host countries.

Although the vast majority of individual refugees are

innocent victims of conflict, studies have shown that

refugee flows are statistically significant contributors

to the eruption of civil wars in host countries.51 One

key way that refugee flows can create conflict is by

facilitating the spread of rebel networks from a

neighboring civil war – a scenario that is of great

concern in the Syrian case.52 The spread of rebel

networks through refugee flows occurs when

combatants flee a civil war as part of a group of

refugees, or when civilians mobilize politically and

militarily after arriving as refugees in their host

country.

When refugees are politically mobilized and

armed – either from the start or over time – they

may use refugee camps and communities as bases

for political and military activity.53 Most frequently,

these “refugee-warriors” launch cross-border attacks

against their home country, but they can also challenge

host country authorities or clash with local

populations.54 Either activity threatens to destabilize

the countries in which refugees find sanctuary.

Examples of refugees provoking conflict spillover

include the Hutu refugees in Zaire in the mid-1990s

and the Palestinian refugees in Jordan in the late 1960s.

In both cases, militant leaders among the refugees used

the sanctuary of their host country to re-engage in the

conflict in their home country. In 1994, following the

genocide in Rwanda and the takeover of the Rwandan

government by a Tutsi force, Hutu refugees fled to

refugee camps in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic

of Congo). Some of these refugees had been leaders of

the former government and the militias that organized

the genocide, and they used the refugee camps as bases

to launch cross-border attacks against Rwanda.

Retaliation by the Rwandan government against the

camps escalated to war between Rwanda and Zaire.55

In another example, a group of highly politicized

Palestinian refugees operating through the Palestine

Liberation Organization (PLO) challenged the

authority of the Jordanian government in 1970. In

defiance of the orders of King Hussein, the PLO

launched cross-border attacks against Israel, formed

police forces, collected taxes in refugee camps,

hijacked airplanes and landed them in Jordanian

territory, and even tried to kill the King himself. The

subsequent crackdown by the Jordanian government,

known as Black September, led to the deaths of an

estimated 1,000 people.56

While it is possible for refugee flows to cause

conflict spillover in host states, it is not inevitable.

Three factors affect the likelihood of refugee-related

conflict:

1.The cause of the refugees’ flight;

2.The response of the receiving country;

3.The ability of militants to control aid

intended for refugees.57

The likelihood that refugees will engage in militant

activity depends in part on their reasons for fleeing

their home country.58 Whether refugees are situational,

persecuted, or state-in-exile determines their “political

cohesion” and readiness to militarize.59 These can be

broken down into three general types:

11

Situational refugees are the least likely to

become violent: they flee their homes to escape

the general chaos of war and they want to

return home as soon as fighting ends. Many

Syrians fit the profile of situational refugees.

Persecuted refugees flee because parties to the

civil war directly target them, whether for

ethnic, political, or other reasons. The

experience of persecution can motivate these

refugees to organize themselves in pursuit of

political goals like retribution against their

persecutors or political rights in their host

country. This political mobilization, which is

more likely to occur the longer a refugee crisis

lasts, may increase the chances that refugees

will attack their home state or challenge their

host government.60

State-in-exile refugees have the highest

propensity for violence. State-in-exile refugees

flee due to defeat in war, and they seek the

sanctuary of a neighboring country in order to

plan their re-engagement in the civil war.61 The

Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda after the

genocide fit this profile, as many were military

and political leaders who sought to recapture

their country from the Tutsi forces that had

stopped the genocide and taken over the

government.

The policies of the refugee-receiving country also

affect whether refugees become militarized and

generate violent conflict. A host government must be

both capable and willing to prevent combatants from

infiltrating refugee camps.62 Capability is a function of

the intelligence, technology, personnel, and political

will of the host government. Weak states may simply

be unable to identify and separate militants from

civilians within the refugee population, allowing

militants to exploit refugee camps as bases for cross-

border attacks, recruitment, and stealing of

humanitarian aid.

More commonly, the host government is unwilling

to maintain the civilian character of refugee camps

because the government tacitly or overtly supports one

side in the neighboring civil war. For example, if a host

country government is a rival of the sending country

government, the host government may encourage

refugees to use camps as sanctuaries for fighters. This

was the case with Zaire and the Hutu refugees who

attacked Rwanda.63 In contrast, Tanzania also took in

Hutu refugees in 1994 but was willing and able to

manage security in the camps so that they did not serve

as safe havens for combatants.64

Finally, the approach to providing humanitarian aid

can affect whether militant groups are able to take

advantage of refugee camps as sanctuaries. From the

perspective of militants, one of the key benefits of

refugee camps is the access they provide to the food,

housing, and money provided by international aid

agencies. Collecting these resources frees militants

from having to provide these goods for themselves and

their families. As refugees become politically and

militarily mobilized, leaders sometimes attempt to

divert humanitarian aid through “taxes” on other

refugees or other interference with the distribution of

aid in camps in order to fund militant activities. The

policies of aid organizations on who receives aid, and

how it is distributed, affect whether militants can take

advantage of these resources.65

Malawi is an example of a country that successfully

managed an enormous influx of refugees when

observers worried the nation would be unable to

cope.66 In the late 1980s, Malawi took in approximately

one million refugees fleeing the civil war in

Mozambique. With refugees making up nearly 10

percent of its already struggling population, Malawi

initially struggled to provide for the refugees.

However, in cooperation with the UNHCR and the

World Food Program, Malawi focused on integrating

Political mobilization,

which is more likely to

occur the longer a

refugee crisis lasts, may

increase the chances

that refugees will attack

their home state or host

government.

12

refugees into local communities by providing refugees

with access to land and employment.67

When the civil war in Mozambique ended, the

refugees returned home. Malawi had several key

factors in its favor for preventing the spread of conflict:

the refugees fled their homes for situational reasons,

and sought to return as soon as it was peaceful;

Malawi’s government was highly motivated to prevent

the civil war in Mozambique from spreading into its

borders; and extensive cooperation with international

partners enabled Malawi to manage the provision of

aid in a way that did not support militants.68

A youthful, marginalized refugee population may present long-term

challenges

In addition to facilitating the spread of rebel

networks, refugee flows may cause changes in birth,

death, and migration rates in host countries that can

have destabilizing effects over the next 10-15 years.

The “youth bulge” thesis, developed over the past four

decades through the successive efforts of political

demographers, asserts that states with youthful age

structures face an elevated risk of experiencing armed

intrastate conflict and other types of political

violence.69 According to a 2007 report by Population

Action International, 80 percent of civil conflicts

between 1970 and the end of the millennium took place

in nations where more than half of the population had

not reached the age of 30.70 Today, there are 67

countries worldwide that have youth bulges, or

youthful age structures, and 60 of these are

experiencing social unrest and violence with at least 25

battle deaths per year.71

For a modern state, a median age of 25 years

appears as a milestone. When the median age rises

above 25 and the youth population begins to shrink,

the incidence of civil conflict declines measurably,

and the chance of being a stable, liberal democracy

increases markedly.72

If, however, a country’s youth population increases

in size, the quantity of available job prospects,

resources and opportunity for social mobility fall. This

may lead to social discontent, followed by unrest. In

turn, this gives governments the excuse to implement

campaigns of oppression – and the cycle continues.73

Further, this theory argues that societies with rapidly

growing youth populations often develop rampant

unemployment and large pools of disaffected youths

who are more susceptible to recruitment into rebel

or extremist groups. This process may be

exacerbated in countries with weak political

institutions, which are the most vulnerable to youth-

bulge-related violence and social unrest. 74

While youth bulges are an important demographic

indicator, it is important to note that they do not alone

cause civil conflict or violence. The key variable is a

lack of societal integration of the youth population. As

demographer Henrik Urdal puts it, “if young people are

left with no alternative but unemployment and poverty,

they are increasingly likely to join a rebellion as an

alternative way of generating an income.”75 Studies

have shown a direct relationship between cohort size

and unemployment: large youth cohorts are associated

with an increase in youth unemployment rates. These

studies have also shown that youths belonging to larger

cohorts generally have lower opportunity costs relative

to those born into smaller cohorts.76 High

unemployment, a mismatch of jobs and skills, and

political insecurity have made it difficult for youth to

stimulate economic growth and makes the youth bulge

a net drain on resources rather than a bonus to

economic and social development.77

Richard Cincotta, a political demographer with the

Stimson Center, has conducted extensive research on

“...if young people are left

with no alternative but

unemployment and

poverty, they are

increasingly likely to join

a rebellion as an

alternative way of

generating an income.”

- Henrik Urdal, demographer

13

youth bulge theory and, in particular, has refined the

theory to represent a demographic arrangement known

as “persistent minority youth bulge.” In coining this

term, Cincotta refers to “a rapidly growing, age-

structurally youthful minority that is politically

dissonant and regionally or residentially segregated

within a more mature country-level population.”78

Cincotta concludes that in youthful, economically

depressed, politically embittered geographic corners of

otherwise developed states, conflicts involving a

youthful minority can grind on for decades, extracting

debilitating political, social, and economic costs.79

This is concerning because it is precisely what is

occurring in Jordan and Lebanon. Young Syrian

refugees are entering these countries where they are

minorities, segregated, unable to work, living in

impoverished conditions, and rapidly changing the age

structure of their host nations. Unless Syrian refugees

are properly integrated into Lebanese and Jordanian

society, there is a risk of a persistent minority youth

bulge with the repercussions Cincotta predicts.

The silver lining of the youth bulge

A youthful age structure does not necessarily have

only negative repercussions. Countries with aging

populations, including Lebanon, could reap long-term

benefits from the refugee influx, as it has the potential

to renew the supply of young workers on whom these

countries’ economies depend. In fact, many European

countries are experiencing a youth-drain situation;

Italy, Greece, Germany, Portugal, Finland and Bulgaria

are countries where at least 20 percent of the

population is age 65 or older.80 Coping with rising

numbers of dependents and concomitant declines in the

working-age population is already posing considerable

social, economic and political challenges in these

countries, and likely will do so in other societies as

they age, including the U.S., where 14.8 percent of the

population now is 65 or older.81 If given the

opportunity to work and integrate into society, refugees

could bring tangible benefits to their host countries.

Figure 10: Jordanian Population Pyramid, 2014

The population age structure in Jordan is skewed younger than

that of Lebanon. (Image source: CIA World Factbook)

Figure 8: Syrian Population Pyramid, 2014

The age structure of the Syrian population shows a significant

youth bulge. (Image source: CIA World Factbook)

Figure 9: Lebanese Population Pyramid, 2014

Lebanon’s age structure has been maturing and the youth popu-

lation has been shrinking. (Image source: CIA World Factbook)

14

Risk Factors for Refugee-related

Conflict in Lebanon and Jordan

As previously discussed, the likelihood that refugee

flows will lead to violence in the host country in the

short-term is low, based on the characteristics of the

refugee population and the policies of the receiving

state. In the next 10-15 years, refugees may change the

age structure of a country to make it more youthful. If

the refugee crisis persists and refugees are not

integrated, countries may experience civil unrest and

violence.

In the following section, we discuss risk factors for

conflict and assess the extent to which they are present

in Lebanon and Jordan. We identify three risk factors

that may indicate impending conflict stemming from

refugee flows:

1. Militarization of Syrian refugees;

2. Lack of capability or willingness by the

Lebanese and Jordanian governments to

prevent refugee militarization;

3. A persistent population of young, marginalized

Syrian refugees.

Risk factor #1: Militarization of

refugees

When refugees take up arms, they can cause

conflict in both their host country and their country of

origin. Based on past refugee crises, we identify three

indicators to determine whether Syrian refugees are

mobilizing militarily and politically in ways that could

lead to cross-border attacks or host country conflict.

First, the presence of militant leadership in refugee

communities may to lead to refugee camps being used

as staging grounds for violence. Militant leaders can

control the information that reaches the refugees and

the distribution of humanitarian aid. This may cause

other refugees to mobilize because they believe their

safety is in jeopardy.82 Furthermore, when militants

lead refugee camps, they are likely to allow rebel

groups from the home country to operate in the refugee

camps and communities.83 As the militant group’s base

of operations expands in the refugee camps, the local

population may also aid or be compelled to aid the

militants.

This can lead to a second important indicator of

militarization: military recruitment in refugee camps.

Syrian refugees who are dependent on foreign

assistance have very few productive alternatives to

joining rebel organizations, which may offer vulnerable

young people an income and a sense of purpose.84

Persistent recruitment in refugee camps by Syrian rebel

groups may lead to the spread of conflict.

Third, militant infiltration of refugee communities

can serve to support a war economy, relieve

combatants of the need to secure food and resources in

other ways, and compel refugees to join the militant

group that controls their aid. Approaches to capturing

aid money and food include stealing it at the source,

controlling the distribution of aid, and levying taxes on

refugee populations. If militant groups are found to be

intercepting aid intended for refugees, it may provoke

and prolong conflict.

Using these three indicators of militarization, we

can assess the current situation in Jordan and Lebanon

to determine the plausibility that refugees will take up

arms. In Jordan, the Zaatari refugee camp operates

under the formal authority of the Jordanian government

and the UNHCR. The camp has an informal leadership

structure consisting of street leaders, district leaders,

and imams. We find little evidence that combatants in

the civil war are controlling the camp. Operating with

informal authority in the localities they occupy, the

Zaatari street leaders closely coordinate with the more

formal authorities of the UNHCR, which manages

relief operations in the camp, and with the Jordanian

security forces. While these community leaders fill a

vital role in managing day-to-day life within the

refugee camp and providing a source of information for

relief and security organizations, their power within the

The presence of militant

leadership in refugee

communities may lead to

refugee camps being used

as staging grounds for

violence.

15

camp is checked by the more formal authorities of the

UNHCR and, most importantly, the Jordanian security

forces.85 The continued authority of these organizations

reduces the risk of militant leadership taking control.

Syrian refugees are overwhelmingly Sunni, a group

that has been the backbone of the Syrian rebellion, and

most refugees fled from rebel-dominated areas bearing

the brunt of the Syrian military’s crackdown on the

uprising.86 However, refugee recruitment in camps

does not appear to be a major problem. In 2012 and

2013, there were reports that the Free Syrian Army

(FSA) recruited dozens of refugees in Jordan’s

camps.87 After 2013, however, we find few, if any,

credible reports of widespread recruitment in Jordan’s

refugee camps.

Perhaps most importantly, there has been little

indication of infiltration by extremist groups such as

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra.88 Jordan has been careful not

to take a hard stance for or against the Assad regime

and the government has sought to avoid militarization

of rebel groups within its borders because of the

internal security risk.89 Jordan has also increased

border security to prevent militants entering Jordan

disguised as refugees. Jordanian commanders report

that would-be entrants are carefully screened and

suspected militants detained or denied access.90

Lebanon may be at greater risk than Jordan of

refugee-related violence due to its weaker security

forces and the presence of Syrian rebel groups in

border areas. The situation in the Baalbak town of

Arsal, on the border with Syria, illustrates this danger.

ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra are active near Arsal and

have carried out bombings and attacks, most notably in

August 2014 when Islamist groups killed three and

captured more than two dozen members of the

Lebanese security forces.91 Arsal is host to almost

100,000 Syrian refugees, and Lebanese security forces

have conducted frequent raids looking for militants

hidden among the refugees.92

There have been scattered reports of Syrian

refugees aligning with groups like ISIS and Jabhat al-

Nusra. In one case, local news media reported that

Syrian refugees raised an ISIS flag in front of the

municipal building in Arsal in protest of a crackdown

on refugees by the Lebanese army.93 Other reports

indicated that this may have been done in protest after

the army burned down a refugee camp. The credibility

of these reports and the extent of the problem is

difficult to ascertain with publicly-available sources,

but this case highlights the danger that grievances

against the Lebanese government may spur refugees to

align with militant groups.94

Terrorist attacks and instances of conflict spillover

in Lebanon are not necessarily attributable to the

presence of refugees. Politics in Syria and Lebanon

have long been intimately connected, and Syrian rebel

groups view Lebanon as a target independent of the

refugee situation. While some Syrian refugees in

Lebanon may be involved with militant groups, there is

little, if any, indication of widespread militarization of

refugees.95

Risk factor #2: Capability of host

governments to prevent militarization

Jordanian and Lebanese security forces have the

military capacity to conduct effective counter-

insurgency and policing operations. These activities

have helped mitigate any emerging militant activity in

refugee communities. As long as Lebanese and

Jordanian security forces continue to demonstrate

capacity to conduct effective counterterrorism and

policing of refugees without resorting to

indiscriminate, lethal violence against civilians,

refugees are not likely to cause violent conflict.

Community leaders fill a

vital role in managing day

-to-day life in the refugee

camps, but their power is

checked by the more

formal authorities of the

UNHCR and the

Jordanian security forces.

16

Under direct control of the King, Jordan’s military,

known as the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF), is among

the most professional in the region. While small

compared to other regional militaries, JAF benefits

from high levels of defense spending relative to GDP,

and strong relations with their US and UK

counterparts, who help with training. The

responsibilities of Jordan’s military forces, including

its well-trained air force and special operations crews,

include border and internal security. These forces are

more than capable of combat and assisting in

international expeditionary missions. Further, Jordan

has developed a highly sophisticated Special Forces

training center, which has enhanced its 14,000-member

Special Forces division.96

In addition to the JAF, the Kingdom also boasts an

excellent intelligence service, the General Intelligence

Directorate (GID). The agency is known for its

exceptional collection capabilities, and it has a strong

history of success against top al-Qaeda and the Islamic

State leaders within Iraq. Moreover, GID also has close

ties to many Sunni groups throughout the region, which

proved successful at weeding out key al-Qaeda

members, and is currently a critical player in efforts to

defeat the Islamic State.97

On the other hand, the Lebanese Armed

Forces’ (LAF) main role has been the containment and

mitigation of localized violence within Lebanon.

Moreover, it has also served as a mediator between

warring groups in the region. Despite such efforts,

Lebanon continues to experience periodic terrorist

attacks. For example, in November 2013, an “al-Qaeda

-inspired” militant group carried out a bombing of the

Iranian embassy in Beirut, which killed 25 people.98

Two years later, on November 12, 2015, Beirut was

struck by a pair of suicide bombings that killed 41,

with another 200 people wounded in a Hezbollah-

controlled area.99 It is important to note that the Syrian

civil war has had political and security implications for

Lebanon beyond the refugee influx. The existence of

terrorist attacks in Lebanon should not necessarily be

considered a result of refugee movements unless those

attacks can be traced to refugee communities.

In September 2013, Lebanon began implementing a

five-year plan to modernize LAF’s capabilities and

draw up a strategy to determine force requirements,

including the potential incorporation of Hezbollah into

the LAF.100 This shift in policy is a result of the

fragility of the LAF, which has frequently relied on

Hezbollah to help address security issues in Lebanon.

In an effort to crack down on violence within the

country, the LAF undertook a series of security

measures (as yet undisclosed) throughout the country

during the month of October 2015. According to a

press release from Lebanon’s Ministry of Defense’s on

November 10, 2015, these new security measures led

to the arrest of over 1,000 individuals involved in

terrorist operations, assaulting citizens using lethal

force, and narcotics trafficking.101 The LAF has also

erected monitoring towers in sensitive areas along the

Lebanese-Syrian border.102

According to Basem Shabb, a member of the

Lebanese parliamentary Committee for National

Defense and Interior, the LAF’s elite units, most

notably the rangers, commandos and navy seals, “were

specifically trained in urban warfare and in confronting

irregular forces and counterinsurgency.”103 In an effort

to strengthen its capacity, the LAF has accepted $5

billion worth of military aid from the US and Saudi

Arabia over the past eight years. This has resulted in a

sizable increase in the firepower of the LAF, which has

doubled its arsenal of M198 howitzer guns. These

guns, in conjunction with M-60A3 and M48A5

armored tanks, have contributed to the LAF’s efforts to

suppress insurgency with “continuous and accurate

firepower.”104 Equally important, Lebanon’s recent

receipt of Cessna aircraft from the US has provided the

LAF with advanced surveillance and reconnaissance

abilities.105 Saudi Arabia most recently funded the

The ability of security

forces to undertake

targeted, measured, and

effective actions that do

not escalate tensions is

just as important as sheer

power.

17

purchase of $3 billion worth of French weapons and

military equipment to bolster the LAF’s capabilities.106

While the military aid bolsters the LAF’s

capabilities to be an adequate security force, military

capacity cannot be assessed solely in terms of troop

numbers and military material. As the Syrian civil war

demonstrates, the ability of security forces to undertake

targeted, measured, and effective actions that do not

escalate tensions is just as important as sheer power.

For example, before the war, the Syrian military

enjoyed a reputation as a relatively competent and

professional security force.107 However, the security

forces were ineffective in containing conflict because

they could not consistently and accurately distinguish

between adversaries and civilians. The military used

indiscriminate violence to quash early revolts, sparking

uprisings and army defections that became the core of

the opposition to the Assad regime. In early 2011,

regime forces arrested and reportedly tortured 14 or 15

school children, prompting a demonstration on March

18, in which security forces opened fire and killed four

people.108 Regime forces further targeted innocent

civilians by open firing at people attending the funeral

of those killed during the demonstration.109 The regime

again fired upon protesters in Dara’a on March 20 and

March 25, and killed even more civilians during a raid

on a hospital on March 22.110

According to the Congressional Research Service,

“violent government response to an isolated incident in

the southern town of Dara’a in March provided a

decisive spark for the emergence of protest

movements.”111 The first official opposition group, the

Free Syrian Army, was spearheaded by Syrian army

defectors and local militiamen disgusted by the actions

of government forces.112 The Syrian case study

demonstrates that brutal and indiscriminate action

against restive populations can contribute to the

eruption of widespread violence.

Risk factor #3: Long-term

marginalization of young refugees

Because Syrian refugees are making the

populations of Jordan and Lebanon younger, these

countries are at risk for future political instability if the

Syrian refugees are not repatriated, relocated, or

integrated. For a modern state, a median age of 25

years appears as a milestone; around that timeframe,

the incidence of civil conflict declines dramatically,

and the chance of being a stable, liberal democracy

increases markedly.113 The current median age of the

Lebanese population is 29.4 years, excluding the influx

of Syrian refugees, while the current median age of

Syrians is 20.8 and 22.5 for Jordanians.114 This concern

is relevant for Lebanon and Jordan because the Syrian

refugee population tends to be younger than the native

population. If the crisis continues and refugees are not

repatriated or integrated, Syrian refugees could

constitute a rapidly growing youthful minority that is

politically marginalized and regionally or residentially

segregated within an older host country population.115

Prior to the Syrian civil war and resulting refugee

influx, Lebanon’s population was headed towards

maturation, which promised increased prospects for

internal security and stability. However, with the

enormous influxes of displaced youth, the country

instead faces an enormous population of foreign

children who, as they progress to teenagers and young

adults, will create a youth bulge that is likely to pose

serious threats to Lebanon’s security and stability.

Similarly, Jordan is experiencing a massive influx

of child refugees into its predominantly young

population. In 2025, the median age of Jordan is

expected to be roughly 24.9 years old. This indicates

that Jordan may have more time before a youth bulge

poses a threat to its internal political stability.

However, as the median age of the population moves

closer to 25, there is greater risk of this occurring. It is

important to recognize that all of the risk factors are

present for this youth bulge to become a legitimate

For a modern state, a

median age of 25 years

appears as a milestone;

around that timeframe,

the incidence of civil

conflict declines

dramatically.

18

problem for Jordan in the future, if refugees are not

resettled or integrated into society.

If the refugee-driven youth bulge persists, Syrian

refugees could be at the center of a “demographic

security dilemma.” This dilemma is a situation in

which a state (such as Lebanon or Jordan) “permits or

promotes the political, economic, and social

marginalization of an ethno-religious minority.”116

Syrian refugees could fit the profile of this ethno-

religious minority. Under conditions of being denied

education, economic opportunity, and social services,

ethno-religious minorities are likely to have higher

fertility rates than the more privileged majority.117 This

can be because the oppressed minority group retains

more traditional gender relationships and because they

are confined to low-income urban neighborhoods and

neglected rural regions.118 Without proactive policies to

bring youthful communities into the economic, social,

and political mainstream, we see many turn towards

radical and traditionalist religious political

organizations. Thus the demographic security dilemma:

the more states marginalize a minority group, the more

those youthful minorities tend to grow as a proportion

of the state’s population. In turn, the growth in the

minority population further exacerbates the

circumstances for political discontent and revolution.119

This has ramifications for the Middle East,

especially in Jordan and Lebanon, which have taken in

large refugee populations that are younger than their

native populations. If young refugees are not

repatriated or integrated and are instead marginalized

within their host countries, Jordan and Lebanon may

experience an elevated risk of the demographic security

dilemma and other civil conflict.

Figure 11: Risk assessment framework for population age structure

Countries like Jordan and Lebanon that have intermediate and maturing majority populations but young minority populations run a

higher risk of experiencing a demographic security dilemma and eventual ethnoreligious conflict (Image source: Richard Cincotta,

“Minority Youth Bulges and the Future of Intrastate Conflict.”)

Syrian refugees could be

at the center of a

“demographic security

dilemma.”

19

Conclusions

The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon and

Jordan creates a fragile situation in both countries, but

the refugees themselves are not yet provoking conflict

in their host countries. The key reasons for this are that

the Syrian refugees are not militant and that the host

governments possess the capability and willingness to

prevent refugees from taking up arms. However, the

risk that Syrian refugees will spark conflict in Lebanon

and Jordan increases if the refugees begin to mobilize

militarily and politically.

Risk factors to look for include: a pattern of

refugee participation in cross-border attacks or attacks

within the host countries, militant leaders taking

control of refugee camps and communities, and

degraded capacity of Lebanese and Jordanian security

forces. In the medium- to long-term, the young age

structure of the refugee population worsens the youth

bulge phenomenon in Lebanon and Jordan, threatening

to create a large population of marginalized young

people who may spark conflict.

As a key partner, the United States can support

Lebanon and Jordan in successfully managing the

refugee crisis in several ways:

First, it is important to maintain the civilian

character of refugee camps and communities. The U.S.

can support Lebanon and Jordan by ensuring that their

security forces continue to receive the hardware

needed to maintain their military capacity. In

conjunction, the U.S. can provide training programs to

increase effectiveness and professionalism. Sustaining

or increasing military aid and training programs may

be critical for building Jordanian and Lebanese military

capacity. The ability to identify militant activity and

flows of weapons into refugee communities can lead to

early identification of militant activity, which will be

critical to mounting an effective response.

Second, the U.S. should support Lebanon and

Jordan in planning for the eventual integration of

refugees who are not able to return to Syr ia. Even if

the civil war ends and many refugees return home, the

level of destruction and destitution in Syria means that

thousands of Syrians will inevitably stay in Lebanon

and Jordan. Enabling these refugees to integrate

economically and socially into their communities

through education, employment, and access to social

services can limit the refugees’ sense of

marginalization. This can circumvent the dangerous

potential of the youth bulge.

In this regard, the U.S. can support Lebanon and

Jordan by funding development and social cohesion

projects that benefit both refugees and native

communities, encouraging government planning for

refugee integration, and promoting employment

opportunities for refugees. For example, corporate

partnerships could allow private companies to work

with host countries to establish job placement schemes,

which allow refugees to secure work. This in turn

allows the refugees to legally contribute to the

economy of their host country, thereby elevating their

status as valued members of society, and enhancing

their relationship with the local population.120

In the meantime, the U.S. should support adequate

funding for the UNHCR, World Food Programme,

and other organizations tasked with providing aid

to refugees. If r efugees feel marginalized and unable

to meet their basic needs, they may perceive a lower

threshold for taking up arms and engaging in the civil

war.

Support security forces to

maintain the civilian character of

refugee camps and communities

Encourage host governments

to integrate refugees by

offering opportunities for

employment and education

Fund economic development

and social cohesion projects

Maintain adequate funding for

refugee aid organizations

Increase options for

resettlement of refugees

Achieve a peaceful resolution

to the Syrian civil war

Recommendations

20

Third, the resettlement of Syrian refugees in other

countries can lessen the burden on Syria’s neighbors.

The U.S. can contribute by increasing and expediting

its refugee acceptance program. Other countr ies,

including in Europe, should also be encouraged and

supported in accepting additional refugees to provide

relief for Lebanon and Jordan. In fact, countries with

aging populations can actually benefit from the

injection of youthful refugee populations into their

workforces.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S.

should continue to seek a peaceful resolution to the

Syrian Civil War. Only an end to the war will enable

the large-scale repatriation of refugees and dramatically

reduce the burden on Lebanon and Jordan. Although

some refugees will stay on after the war, the vast

majority can be expected to return home.

21

Notes 1. “Syria Regional Refugee Response: Interagency

Information Sharing Portal,” UNHCR, accessed November

17, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/

regional.php#_ga=1.182256495.91437624.1441377489.

2. Ibid.

3. “Syria: Conflict Without Borders. Number and Location of

Refugees and IDPs,” Humanitarian Information Unit,

Department of State, August 27, 2015, https://hiu.state.gov/

Products/

Syria_ConflictWithoutBorders_Displacement_2015Aug27

_HIU_U1283.pdf.

4. “Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30

November 2015),” ReliefWeb, November 30, 2015, http://

reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

syr_humsnap_a4l_november2015.pdf .

5. “Alienation and Violence: Impact of Syria Crisis Report

2014,” Syrian Center for Policy Research, March 2015, 46.

6. Ibid.

7. “Syria Regional Refugee Response.”

8. Michael Pizzi, “In Syria’s War Refugees, Lebanon Sees

Echoes of Palestinian Crisis,” Al Jazeera, January 6, 2015,

http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/1/6/lebanon-

syria-refugees.html and Rana Ksaifi, “SYRIA REFUGEE

RESPONSE: LEBANON Syrian Refugees Registered,”

UNHCR, September 30, 2015.

9. “Syrian refugees head to Lebanon’s Shia south,” IRIN,

January 29, 2013, http://www.irinnews.org/report/97355/

syrian-refugees-head-to-lebanon-s-shia-south.

10. “Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016,” UNOCHA ,

December 15, 2014, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/

files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf.

11. “Greater support in countries of first asylum needed to

stem refugee outflows,” UNHCR, August 26, 2015,

www.unhcr.org/55ddd2c86.html.

12. Ibid.

13. “Registered Syrians in Jordan: External Statistical

Report ,” UNHCR, October 31, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/

syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9702.

14. Doris Carrion, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: Confronting

Difficult Truths,” Chatham House, September 2015,

https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/

field/

field_document/20150921SyrianRefugeesCarrion.pdf.

15. Luigi Achilli, “Syrian Refugees in Jordan: a Reality

Check,” Migration Policy Centre, February 2015, http://

cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34904/MPC_2015-

02_PB.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

16. “For Many Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan, Now is the

Time to Go,” Washington Post, 21 September 2015,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/for-many-syrians-

in-lebanon-and-jordan-now-is-the-time-to-

go/2015/09/21/513dfc9a-5d4a-11e5-8475-

781cc9851652_story.html

17. “Census includes all people on Jordanian soil, PM,” Jordan

News Agency, 28 November 2015. http://petranews.gov.jo/

nepras/2015/Nov/28/9000.htm

18. “Registered Syrians in Jordan: External Statistical Report,”

UNHCR, November 15, 2015, http://data.unhcr.org/

syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9792.

19. Omar Dahi, “The Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan:

The Need for Economic Development Spending,” Forced

Migration Review, September 2014, http://

www.fmreview.org/syria/dahi#sthash.ID04cywZ.dpuf.

20. Ibid.

21. “Registered Syrians in Jordan.”

22. Phoebe Weston, “Inside Zaatari refugee camp: the fourth

largest city in Jordan,” The Telegraph, August 5, 2015.,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/

jordan/11782770/What-is-life-like-inside-the-largest-

Syrian-refugee-camp-Zaatari-in-Jordan.html.

23. “Registered Syrians in Jordan.”

24. “Jordan Refugee Response: Vulnerability Assessment

Framework Baseline Survey,” UNHCR, May 2015, 14,

http://www.medbox.org/jordan-refugee-response-

vulnerability-assessment-framework-baseline-survey-may-

2015/download.pdf.

25. “Jordan Poverty Reduction Strategy: Final Report,”

UNDP, January 28 2013, 31, http://www.jo.undp.org/

content/dam/jordan/docs/Poverty/

Jordanpovertyreductionstrategy.pdf

26. “Jordan Refugee Response,” 15.

27. Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Uprising Finally Hits Syria’s ‘Silk

Road’ City,” Reuters, February 4, 2012, http://

www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/04/us-syria-aleppo-

idUSTRE81213720120204.

28. “ALEPPO - Governorate Profile,” ACAPS, March 2013, 1,

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

Aleppo%20Governorate%20profile%20March%

202013.pdf and “Syria Crisis – Aleppo City Report,”

REACH, June 2014, 4, http://www.reach-initiative.org/wp-

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29. “ALEPPO - Governorate Profile,” 8.

30. Oweis,“Uprising Finally Hits Syria’s ‘Silk Road’ City.”

31. “Security forces storm Syrian city of Aleppo, activist group

says,” CNN, September 27, 2011, http://

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Erika Solomon, “Pro-Assad Gun, Knife Attack Kills Four

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article/2012/05/03/us-syria-protest-

idUSBRE8420E820120503#4W3eFqOcmh1e7oc2.97.

32. Luke Harding and Martin Churov, “Syrian Rebels Fight

Assad Troops in Aleppo,” The Guardian, July 22, 2011,

Accessed October 27, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2012/jul/22/syrian-rebels-fight-aleppo.

33. Erika Solomon, “Rural Fighters Pour into Syria's Aleppo

for Battle,” Reuters, July 29, 2012, Accessed October 27,

2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/29/us-syria-

crisis-aleppo-idUSBRE86S06T20120729.

34. “ALEPPO - Governorate Profile,” ACAPS, March 2013,

14.

35. Mohamed Zaatari, “Hezbollah prepares for Liberation Day

22

ceremony in Nabatieh,” The Daily Star, May 23, 2015,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/

May-23/299092-hezbollah-prepares-for-liberation-day-

ceremony-in-nabatieh.ashx and Nour Samaha, “The

Strange Case of Lebanon’s Shebaa,” Al-Jazeera English,

July 2, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/

features/2013/07/20137218585519150.html.

36. Rana Ksaifi, “Syria Refugee Response: Lebanon Syrian

Refugees Registered,” UNHCR, February 28, 2015, http://

data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=9602 and

Samya Kullab and Ghinwa Obeidi, “Shebaa, the Town

Caught in the Middle,” The Daily Star, February 27, 2015,

http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/

Feb-27/288953-shebaa-the-town-caught-in-the-

middle.ashx.

37. Scott Simon, “Places Transformed: Syrian Refugees

Overwhelm Camps, Towns,” NPR, May 4, 2013, http://

www.npr.org/2013/05/04/181053781/a-place-transformed-

the-birth-of-a-jordanian-refugee-camp and Samaha, “The

Strange Case of Lebanon’s Shebaa.”

38. Simon, “Places Transformed.”

39. Mohamed Zaatari, “Shebaa Residents Back Syrian Rebel

Ban,” The Daily Star, November 10, 2014.

40. Ibid.

41. David Schenker, “Why Refugee Influx Threatens Lebanon,

Jordan Stability,” The Washington Institute, April 10,

2014, Accessed October 10, 2015, http://

www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/why-

refugee-influx-threatens-lebanon-jordan-stability and

“Syrian Refugee Crisis Threatens Lebanon’s Stability:

Report,” The Daily Star, June 5, 2012, http://

www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Jun-05/175723-

syrian-refugee-crisis-threatens-lebanons-stability-

report.ashx.

42. John Owens, “Squabbling Politicians Find Unity in Wake

of Beirut Bombings,” VOA, November 19, 2015, http://

www.voanews.com/content/squabbling-politicians-find-

unity-wake-beirut-bombings/3065604.html.

43. “Mafraq Governorate Fact Sheet,” UNHCR, April 26,

2015, 2, http://reliefweb.int/report/jordan/mafraq-

governorate-factsheet-april-2015 and “UNHCR Syria

Regional Refugee Response,” UNHCR Syria Regional

Refugee Response, December 2, 2015, http://

data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/region.php?id=77&.

44. “Mafraq Governorate Factsheet,” UNHCR, August 18,

2015, 1, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/

resources/MafraqFactSheetJULY.pdf.

45. “Syria Crisis: Deadly Clash in Jordan’s Zaatari Camp,”

BBC, April 6, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

middle-east-26908587 and Tamer al-Samadi, “Jordan Fears

Pro-Syrian Regime ‘Sleeper Cells’ in Zaatari,” Al-Monitor,

April 9, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/

security/2014/04/jordan-zaatari-camp-syria-refugees-riots-

sleeper-cells.htm and “On the Beat in Zaatari: How UK

Aid Is Helping Keep Syrians Safe in the World’s Second

Largest Refugee Camp,” Medium, September 15, 2015,

https://medium.com/syria-crisis-how-uk-aid-is-helping/on-

the-beat-in-zaatari-c72962740e9c#.fsxlj8rtm.

46. “On the Beat in Zaatari.”

47. Rana F. Sweis, “Jordan’s Schools Buckle Under Weight of

Syrian Refugees,” The New Y ork Times, October 6, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/world/middleeast/

jordans-schools-buckle-under-weight-of-syrian-

refugees.html?_r=0.

48. “Jordan’s Zaatari Refugee Camp Turns 3, Challenges for

the Future of the Thousands Living There,” UNHCR, July

28, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/55b89a1a9.html

49. Amy R. West, “Syrian Refugees Need More Than Food,”

Al Jazeera America, March 9, 2014, http://

america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/3/education-for-

syrianrefugeesinsufficient.html.

50. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees

and the Spread of Civil War,” International Organization

60, no. 02 (2006), 338.

51. Ibid.

52. Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International

Migration and National Security,” International Security

31, no. 1 (2006), 192.

53. Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee

Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid,

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 15.

54. Ibid., 23.

55. Ibid., 26-27.

56. Ibid., 10.

57. Edward O. Mogire. Victims as Security Threats: Refugee

Impact on Host State Security in Africa. (Surrey: Ashgate

Publishing, Ltd. 2011), 15.

58. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 19.

59. Ibid., 10.

60. Ibid., 19.

61. Salehyan and Gleditsch, "Refugees and the spread of civil

war," 10-11.

62. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 23.

63. Ibid., 30.

64. Adamson, Crossing Borders. 191-192.

65. Sheila Rule, “600,000 Mozambique Refugees Tax an

Already Desperate Malawi,” The New Y ork Times, July

18, 1988, http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/18/

world/600000-mozambique-refugees-tax-an-already-

desperate-malawi.html.

66. Salehyan and Gleditsch, “Refugees and the spread of civil

war,” 361.

67. Ibid.

68. Richard Cincotta, “Life Begins After 25: Demography and

the Societal Timing of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Policy

Research Institute, January 2012, http://www.fpri.org/

articles/2012/01/life-begins-after-25-demography-societal-

timing-arab-spring.

69. Lionel Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil

Conflicts,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 27, 2007,

http://www.cfr.org/world/effects-youth-bulge-civil-

conflicts/p13093.

70. Katherine Carter, “Is Youth Bulge a ‘Magic Indicator’ for

the Failed States Index?” New Security Beat, October 17,

2013, http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/10/youth-

23

bulge-magic-indicator-failed-states-index.

71. Cincotta, “Life Begins After 25.”

72. Beehner, “The Effects of ‘Youth Bulge’ on Civil

Conflicts.”

73. Ibid.

74. Henrik Urdal, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and

Political Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no.

3 (2006): 610.

75. Ibid., 610-611.

76. “The Implications of the Youth Bulge in Middle East and

North African Populations,” NATO Parliamentary

Assembly, January 25, 2011, http://www.nato-pa.int/

default.asp?SHORTCUT=2342.

77. Richard Cincotta, “Minority Youth Bulges and the Future

of Intrastate Conflict,” New Security Beat, October 13,

2011, http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2011/10/minority-

youth-bulges-and-the-future-of-intrastate-conflict/.

78. Ibid.

79. Drew Desilver, “Refugee Surge Brings Youth to an Aging

Europe,” Pew Research Center, October 8, 2015, http://

www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/08/refugee-surge-

brings-youth-to-an-aging-europe/.

80. Ibid.

81. Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries, 25.

82. Ibid., 10.

83. Salehyan and Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil

War,” 401.

84. Denis Sullivan and Sarah Tobin, “Security and Resilience

among Syrian Refugees in Jordan,” Middle East Research

and Information Project, October 14, 2014, accessed

October 22, 2014, http://merip.org/mero/mero101414.

85. Associated Press, “Syria Rebels Recruit at Refugee Camp,”

KTAR News, November 11, 2013.

86. Ibid.

87. Ibid.

88. Marwan Muasher, “Jordan’s Ambiguous Syria Policy,”

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 9,

2014, accessed October 22, 2015, http://

carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/09/jordan-s-ambiguous-

syria-policy.

89. Karin Laub, “AP Interview: Jordan Says Syria Militants

Try to Sneak in,” Business Insider, August 16, 2015,

accessed November 13, 2015, http://

www.businessinsider.com/ap-ap-interview-jordan-says-

syria-militants-try-to-sneak-in-2015-8.

90. Laila Bassam, “Lebanon Arrests Five Syrians, One

Palestinian Suspect in Beirut Bombings: Security Source,”

Reuters, November 14, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/

article/2015/11/14/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-

idUSKCN0T314120151114#E3e2FKJIhx7ZSvWu.97.

91. “Lebanon: Arsal Border Town Tocked by Bomb,” BBC

News, November 5, 2015, accessed December 5, 2015,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34735117.

92. Atassi, Basma, “A Voice of Horror from Lebanon’s Arsal,”

Al Jazeera, August 8, 2014, accessed December 5, 2015,

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/08/voice-

horror-from-lebanon-arsal-20148613521787274.html and

Sohl, Nidal, “Army Raids Arsal Refugee Camp,” May 28,

2015, accessed December 5, 2015, http://

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28/299586-army-raids-arsal-refugee-camp.ashx.

93. Moore, Jack, “ISIS Flag Raised By Syrian Refugees in

Arsal Camp in Lebanon,” International Business Times,

September 25, 2014, accessed December 5, 2015, http://

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arsal-camp-lebanon-1467209.

94. Carrion, Doris, “Are Syrian Refugees a Security Threat to

the Middle East?” Reuters, September 15, 2015, accessed

December 5, 2015, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-

debate/2015/09/15/are-syrian-refugees-a-security-threat-to-

the-middle-east/.

95. Mencutek, Zeynep Şahin, “The Impact of the Syrian

Refugee Crisis in Lebanon,” POMEAS Policy Brief, No.

10, June 2015, 6, http://www.pomeas.org/Home/index.php/

publications/pomeas-briefs/491-the-impact-of-the-syrian-

refugee-crisis-in-lebanon.

96. “Chapter 7: Middle East and North Africa,” The Military

Balance 115, no. 1 (2015): 335.

97. Shane Harris, “The Mouse that Roars,” Foreign Policy,

September 12, 2014, accessed November 14, 2015, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/12/the-mouse-that-roars/.

98. Martin Chulov, “Lebanon ‘captures Iranian embassy

bombing mastermind,” The Guardian, January 1, 2014,

accessed December 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2014/jan/01/lebanon-captures-iranian-embassy-

bombing-mastermind.

99. “Lebanon holds day of mourning after deadly Beirut

blasts,” BBC News, November 13, 2015, accessed

November 14, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-

middle-east-34805466.

100. “Chapter 7: Middle East and North Africa,” The Military

Balance 115, no. 1 (2015): 338.

101. “Results of the Security Measures During October,”

Ministry of Defense, Lebanese Armed Forces, accessed

November 12, 2015, http://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/en/

content/results-security-measures-during-october.

102. Basem Shabb, “The Syrian Conflict and the Ascendency of

the Lebanese Armed Forces,” Middle East Institute,

November 25, 2014, accessed November 14, 2015, http://

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ascendancy-lebanese-armed-forces.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. Awad Mustafa, “Saudi, US Aid Boost Lebanese

Firepower,” DefenseNews, July 11, 2015, accessed

November 14, 2015, http://www.defensenews.com/story/

defense/land/weapons/2015/07/11/lebanon-firepower-saudi

-us-increases/29913841/.

106. Oliver Holmes, “French Weapons Arrive in Lebanon in $3

Billion Saudi-funded Deal,” Reuters, April 20, 2015,

accessed November 21, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/

article/2015/04/20/uk-mideast-crisis-lebanon-army-

idUKKBN0NB0GE20150420.

107. Joseph Holliday, “The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of

Battle,” Institute for the Study of War, February 2013, 5,

24

http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/

SyrianArmy-DocOOB.pdf.

108. Hugh Macleod and Other, “Inside Deraa,” Al Jazeera,

April 19, 2011, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/

features/2011/04/201141918352728300.html and “In

Syria, Crackdown After Protests,” New Y ork Times,

March 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/19/

world/middleeast/19syria.html.

109. “Guide: Syria Crisis,” BBC News, April 9, 2012, http://

www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13855203.

110. Jeremy M. Sharp, “Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions

Against the Assad Regime,” Congressional Research

Service, August 9, 2011, 3, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/

organization/171370.pdf.

111. Ibid., 1.

112. Joseph Holliday, “Middle East Security Report 3: Syria’s

Armed Opposition,” Institute for the Study of War, March

2012, 9, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/

files/Syrias_Armed_Opposition.pdf. and “Defecting

Troops from 'Free Syrian Army', Target Assad Security

Forces,” World Tribune, August 3, 2011, http://

www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/

me_syria0973_08_03.asp and Sharp, “Unrest in Syria and

U.S. Sanctions Against the Assad Regime,” 8.

113. Cincotta, “Life Begins After 25.”

114. “World Population Prospects: Key Findings and Advance

Tables,” United Nations, 2015, 34-35, http://esa.un.org/

unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf.

115. Cincotta, “Minority Youth Bulges and the Future of

Intrastate Conflict.”

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. “The Benefits of Belonging: Local Integration Options and

Opportunities for Host Countries, Communities, and

Refugees,” UNHCR, July 29, 2011, 7, http://

www.refworld.org/docid/4e56170b2.html.

25

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