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Salvador Raza\\RLH Comments Page 1 3/13/2022DRAFT TOWARD A THEORY OF FORCE DESIGN: The Foundation of Capability-based Defense Planning Salvador Ghelfi Raza 1 , Ph.D. ABSTRACT Emerging from a millennium capped by a half century of defense thinking dominated by Cold War- era necessities, now tainted by the aftershocks of September 11 th and aware of the inadequacy of traditional rigid defense structures (whatever their military might,) every nation state is finding a need for a new concept and framework for defense theory. Force Design--a complex-yet-taxonomic decision making process which amalgamates policy 1 Dr. Salvador Ghelfi. Raza is professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Studies (CHDS) in the National Defense University. He received a Ph.D in Strategic Studies from the University of Rio de Janeiro, and has a M.A from the University of London. He is a member of the Group for Strategic Studies (Grupo de Estudos Estratégicos) of the University of Brazil (UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro). His current research and teaching interests include force design, defense analysis, games and simulation, and crisis management. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied do not reflect views of any agency, organization or government. ([email protected]). 1

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  1. 1. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 1 2/24/2015DRAFT TOWARD A THEORY OF FORCE DESIGN: The Foundation of Capability-based Defense Planning Salvador Ghelfi Raza1 , Ph.D. ABSTRACT Emerging from a millennium capped by a half century of defense thinking dominated by Cold War- era necessities, now tainted by the aftershocks of September 11th and aware of the inadequacy of traditional rigid defense structures (whatever their military might,) every nation state is finding a need for a new concept and framework for defense theory. Force Design--a complex-yet-taxonomic decision making process which amalgamates policy formulation, modernization of military hardware, and organizational restructuring with changes in the decision-making processesfulfills that need. In conjunction with effective decision-making processes that recognize long-term goals (as well as 1 Dr. Salvador Ghelfi. Raza is professor of National Security Affairs at the Center for Hemispheric Studies (CHDS) in the National Defense University. He received a Ph.D in Strategic Studies from the University of Rio de Janeiro, and has a M.A from the University of London. He is a member of the Group for Strategic Studies (Grupo de Estudos Estratgicos) of the University of Brazil (UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro). His current research and teaching interests include force design, defense analysis, games and simulation, and crisis management. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied do not reflect views of any agency, organization or government. ([email protected]). 1
  2. 2. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 2 2/24/2015DRAFT procedures that can guide its execution,) Force Design affords the two-way flow of critical information and assessments needed both at the political level and within defense ministries and their subparts. Through Force Design a professional defense sector can be created, appropriately sized, based on an efficient use of resources, working within precise guidelines and therefore subject to democratic control. Absent Force Design, decisions are taken based on a set of foundations seen axiomatic and absolute only because they remain unexamined; as a result ministries and the political leadership often appear to respond to events as they unfold. When problems arise, the problem becomes the focus of attention. In such situation, the urgency of decision making in and of itself pushes aside the seemingly abstract notion of force design. Unless Force Design is addressed head on, unless a system competent to address force design is already in place, choices offered by ministries to the political leadership are often no broader than 2
  3. 3. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 3 2/24/2015DRAFT between building more of the same (easier than doing a comprehensive review) and developing an entirely new approach (generally hinged imprudently to some form of technology). Lacking an existing force design capability, inappropriate defense decisions taken in a hurry generally fail to take into account the various tradeoffs cannot systematically examine their interaction(s). That is, decisions made tend to result in capabilities later to be found incapable of meeting defense objectives, i.e., operational failure. What is Force Design? This paper attempts to depict the dynamic which it is. Its foundation is capability-based defense planning. Upon this foundation is a set of coherent concepts and a framework that make them practical in both term and significance. The resultant analytical construct abstracts military capabilities into their component elements, explicating concept and relationships. Framework and concept to form a hierarchy which articulates processes that allow ways and means to 3
  4. 4. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 4 2/24/2015DRAFT develop and choose defense alternatives--even when limitations of knowledge and information exclude the possibility of assessing all expected outcomes. The final goal of Force Design is to accomplish a system of concepts manifest within a framework which is an open-ended measurement tool capable of 1) assessing the changing relationship between capabilities requirements and defense demands properly addressing the challenge of defense planning in an era of uncertainty of threats and information technology and 2) specifying capabilities to be added that might lead to different choices under three concurring perspectives - adaptation, modernization and transformation. 4
  5. 5. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 5 2/24/2015DRAFT INTRODUCTION The demise of the Cold War, information technology trends, and other contemporary factors are associated causes for the emergence of new uncertainties and threats to the States security goals. However diffuse and asymmetric in their impact, these causes have imposed defense reforms in order to face a broad and more complex nexus of old and new tasks, associated with efforts to eliminate redundancy and inefficiency in the defense resource allocation process. Such accounts often fail to predict correctly that defense reforms effort in is determining required military capabilities, connecting present fiscal possibilities with future demands of the use or threat of force towards politically oriented objectives. The term defense reform sounds like an aggressive approach to get military superiority and organizational strength. In fact, it is usually just the opposite an attempt to break out of a 5
  6. 6. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 6 2/24/2015DRAFT deteriorating situation, more likely to reflect a recognition that one has fallen behind than an attempt to exploit new possibilities. The most telling basis for judging the complexity of defense reforms is the degree of uncertainty of political objectives, evolving technological possibilities and resource allocation priorities, considering that defense can both inhibit and stimulate economic growth2 . A few examples might give the sense of the manifestation of these reform trends and goals in the Western Hemisphere3 : Argentina recently changed in its military conscript/professional personnel ratio and is endeavoring to integrate planning, programming, and budgeting procedures in its defense planning and 2 There is a lack of consensus in the empirical literature on the positive and negative economic effects of defense spending. On one hand, it is assumed that defense spending divert resources from private and public non-defense investments (crowding out); on the other, it is assumed that defense spending increases the utilization of capital (crowding in). The latter position is support by the Benoit Thesis, referring to a positive association found between defense spending and growth for 44 less developed countries over the 1950-65 period. See Benoit, Emile, Defense and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Boston, USA: Heath, 1973. Sandler, T. E Hartley, K. The Economics of Defense. Cambridge, Ma: Cambridge University Press, 1995. pp. 200-220. review the literature and tabulate models alternative to that of Benoit arrising at different conclusion. 3 The object of analysis for this paper was limited to the Western Hemisphere The Americas. However, its conclusions and the proposed theoretical model it offers have higher ambitions in their possible applications. 6
  7. 7. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 7 2/24/2015DRAFT resource management system, struggling to maintain its operational military capability4 . Bolivia, Ecuador and the Dominican Republic are endeavoring to produce Defense White Books within the context of new roles for their Armed Forces; whereas Chile is in the stage of revising its White Book. Peru is reforming its defense organizational structure. And the Paraguay is struggling in the political arena to approve its Defense Organization Law that would redefine military roles and mission and reorganize the defense sector, eventually changing the responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense. Brazil faces complex civil-military relations in the wake of the creation of its Ministry of Defense (1999) and its National Defense Policy (1996), with impacts on its defense command and 4 Argentina, Cmara de Diputados de La Nacin, Ley 24.948 de 18 de febrero de 1998. Reestructuracin de las fuerzas armadas. For Directives of Military Planning, see http//www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/ d000 cbd2 htm. (Oct/02/9). And for operational capabilities, see http://64.69. 09.103/mic/eabstract.cfm?recno=8796 (Jun/ 25/2002). 7
  8. 8. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 8 2/24/2015DRAFT control structure. Brazils National Multi annual Plan PPA, explicitly declares that5 : The modernization of the Defense National System will be the main objective of the project for reequipping and adjusting the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Navy and the Brazilian Air Force, together with the project for managing the armed forces policy. Both projects will contribute to reequip and adjust force structure to a new technological pattern, assuring the country higher protection. In the US case, particularly, 11th catalyzed, albeit drastically, post-Cold War demands for reform. As early as February 2001, the Project on Defense Alternatives of the Commonwealth Institute at Cambridge already pointed out four causes of inefficiencies of the US Armed Forces, demanding reforms in the context of the Quadrennial Defense Review: 5 Brazil, National Government. Plano Plurianual. http://www.abrasil.gov.br/anexos/links/links.htm . For an oeverview of current status of Brazilian Defense Reforms, see http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/ especial/militar/militar/militar16.html; and http://www.estado.estadao.com.br/edicao/especial/militar/militar/ militar11.html. (Oct 2001). 8
  9. 9. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 9 2/24/2015DRAFT One type of inefficiency is manifest in excess infrastructure a Cold War residue. Today, the US Armed Forces still maintain 20 percent of excess infrastructure. Crude, costly and seemingly intractable, this problem has had little political salience. The support of excess infrastructure drains money away from training, maintenance, and quality-of-life accounts. A second type of inefficiency derives from inter-service rivalry and redundancy. A third type of inefficiency involves having military tools and procedures that do not correspond closely to todays operational challenges. Persistent shortages despite the expenditure of more than $250 billion on procurement during the past five years indicates a failure to configure our armed forces to meet current needs. A final type of inefficiency results from the failure to fully exploit information-age technology and organizational principles, which could reduce structural redundancies in our military and increase its flexibility. By 9
  10. 10. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 10 2/24/2015DRAFT contemporary business standards, our military remains an industrial age organization 6 . What is extraordinary are not these changes in themselves, since defense has an evolutionary nature, been future oriented; but the scale and scope of current defense reforms, with countries endeavoring simultaneously to: Define organizational requirements in association with new decision-making, control and oversight mechanisms aiming at a higher degree of political control over defense issues and priorities. Increase the efficiency, efficacy and economy7 of defense resource allocation, with a focus on the processes and criteria used for the formulation, spending and evaluation of the defense budget. 6 The Commonwealth Institute. The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18. 5 February 2001. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA. pp. 6 Captured at http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo18.html. (8/28/2001). 7 Efficacy is defined as a measure of task accomplishment: the degree to which the activity/process and resultant output delivered met the desired expectation. Efficiency translates the best combination of resources to maximize efficacy. It is measured as a relationship of outputs to imputs, usually expressed in terms of a ratio. A higher efficiency ratio translates a situation where changes in defense capabilities for a small change in resources are balanced across all resources used to produce those capabilities. Economy reflects the degree to which efficiency is obtained with lesser fiscal spending 10
  11. 11. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 11 2/24/2015DRAFT Define affordable military forces, balanced against multiple axes, to hedge against uncertainty in the current and future threat environment. These overarching themes are linked into mutually determinant chains of cause and causality, making few of the decisions in security requirements and defense planning either simple or noncrontoversial. Previously unnoticed is the necessity of an articulated set of concepts and its associated analytical framework for planning defense alternatives based on military capabilities. That is why the following questions are always present: What criteria oriented the identification of military capabilities? What strategies do those capabilities support and how do those strategies support political objectives? How are budgets related to those capabilities? All these questions pertaining to the defense reform debate in its different shapes and perceived priorities have a common goal and a common assumption. The common goal is to determine credible military capabilities that connect current 11
  12. 12. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 12 2/24/2015DRAFT fiscal possibilities to future alternatives of possible military action, with an acceptable degree of political risk. The common assumption is that peace has yielded insofar as the strength and credibility of military capabilities to deter threatening intentions by others. While these central arguments of defense planning are rather common-sensical, it is important to keep in perspective that defining requirements for affordable and credible military capabilities is a complex issue demanding a set of valid conceptual propositions articulated by a coherent internal logic. Conceptual propositions breed from reasoning and a critical examination of past events while setting requirements for future register that will bring empirical evidence which, eventually, will make them invalid. No conceptual proposition that pretends to be scientific may postulate eternal validity. The internal logic of the conceptual system provides the articulating rules of its component propositions, establishing a causal relationship between concepts, 12
  13. 13. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 13 2/24/2015DRAFT which provides the starting point and the interdependency of the parts for the desired or intended final product8 . This logic is only valid insofar as it is useful for instructing the collection, organization and interpretation of quantitative and qualitative information; orienting the research of alternative solutions for the assorted problems; flanking its analysis with consistent and explicit criteria; and allowing the precise communication of results. The validity of a conceptual system and its internal logic assures that the devised problem is the real problem, and not that it can be solved within its domain of existing competencies; and that the solutions proposed consider the relevant aspects of the problem. Without the support of a valid conceptual system, defense reform propositions are mere opinions, without any ways of ascertaining which opinion is better. 8 This is the requirement of making the axiology of the method explicit as condition of scientific research. Without an axiological option explicated, the criteria used to define the problem, determine appropriate research and integrate results are methodologically flawed. For a theoretical discussion of axiological options and its relation with developing conceptual systems, see OLIVA, A. Conhecimento e Liberdade. 2 ed. Porto Alegre: Edipurs, 1999. pp. 124. 13
  14. 14. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 14 2/24/2015DRAFT The required mind set for approaching defense reforms must take into account the fact that most conceptual propositions and their articulating logic used for defense planning have their origin in the last 50 years, in the wake of the Cold War, and are already becoming either obsolete or inadequate. This situation is potentially harmful for three intertwined reasons: It might harbor inefficiency, compromising the effectiveness of military capability. It might create misleading performance evaluation criteria, masking capability inefficiencies through methodologies deprived of analytical rigor. It might cause the breakdown of policy, strategy and resource allocation into isolated processes, breeding into stove piping capabilities. The outcome of this condition entails risks that are not always recognized, with defense planners often trying to purchase a breakthrough model through experiences taken from other cases. 14
  15. 15. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 15 2/24/2015DRAFT Unfortunately, these models do not work properly because they do not import the conceptual system and the people who understand it. Given post-Cold War demands of security and defense, and the aftermath of September Eleven, past conceptual system are to be taken with a grain of salt. It seems appropriate and opportune to propose a new conceptual framework for designing defense alternatives. This would focus on the reevaluation of the concepts of security and defense, taking into consideration its evolving nature and diffused contours; the mechanisms for forecasting contingencies, within a framework that integrate distinctive rising and falling patterns; and requirements for efficiency and economy in defense resource management. Such endeavor should more properly be called Force Design. This paper offers a conceptual framework for force design with the identification and relationship of variables required to understand and plan defense reforms, accommodating three 15
  16. 16. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 16 2/24/2015DRAFT potentially concurring circumstances: adaptation, modernization and transformation. It proposes an innovative approach for understanding defense reform trends and possibilities, systematically articulating concepts and processes to assure armed forces efficacy, efficiency and economy, providing unity of purpose, unity of effort and unity of action for effectively wielding power in support of national will. Its overarching thesis is that force design must serve as a guide to defense planning, contributing to armed forces accountability, professionalism and civilian control. Thus, defense reforms can play an important role in both preparing for the use of force and in maintaining peace. Its underlying assumption is that defense reform demands emerge as the differential between current defense capabilities and the outcome of defense planning offer of future conditions. The paper is organized in four parts. Part one, Force Design, sets the stage. It defines force design as the fabric of military capability and 16
  17. 17. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 17 2/24/2015DRAFT develops a theoretical construct (an idealization of a situation appropriate for a problem) that abstracts capabilities components and identify its relationships, discussing some tensions among these components and its relationships. Part two, Force Design Framework, presents three logical blocks, articulated in an approach that examines the concept of security and defense, presents mechanisms for developing scenarios, and examining defense superintendence requirements. Part three uses force design concepts to present some judgments about actual trends in defense reforms, taking a hard look at current defense superintendence potential mismanagement in the Western Hemisphere. Part four, explores both the construct of capabilities and the force design framework to present the concepts and interrelationship of Adaptation, Modernization and Transformation. The paper progress from a rather conceptual approach in parts one and two to a pragmatic proposal of a template in part five, to conclude presenting Force Design as a new area of 17
  18. 18. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 18 2/24/2015DRAFT study with its own articulated set of concepts and hypotheses. 18
  19. 19. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 19 2/24/2015DRAFT PART 1 FORCE DESIGN Force design is the fabric of military capabilities and, as such, it provides the foundations for an integrated project of defense. Its purpose is the conceptualization, development and evaluation of alternative military capabilities to attend defense requirements in response to security demands, assuring that the proper set of effective and efficient military is economically identified, developed, organized, fielded and supported. Force design results an integrated project of defense - is the source of guiding principles that contributes to communicate goals and plans that are reinforced through rules and norms at all levels of the defense organization. Such a project ties objectives together and gives meaning and purpose to 19
  20. 20. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 20 2/24/2015DRAFT operational procedures, enabling all parts of the organization consistently contribute to the overall effort even though they have to act independently in an environment changing rapidly. Equally important, it include an indication of what capabilities will not be develop, retaining an appropriate focus in building essential capabilities. The basic purpose of an integrate project of defense is to provide guidance to those whose actions can affect the focus and development of the required military capabilities. Although subordinating all defense operational processes to a common purpose force design allows the necessary latitude for leadership and initiatives serving as an umbrella over the various functional activities developed within the defense establishment, establishing the context within which day-to-day decisions are made and sets the bounds on strategic options. Further, an integrated project of defense guides in making trade-offs among competing requirements for short-term and long-term goals. Finally, it provides consistency among programs 20
  21. 21. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 21 2/24/2015DRAFT providing the instance of reference for resource allocation. These guiding principles are defined as the pattern of decisions that determine the ultimate set of military capabilities; being the blueprint for force planning, programming and budgeting9 , underpinning all defense related functions, to include procurement and acquisition; intelligence gathering; operational training and evaluation; personnel (civil and military); educational requirements; and technology research. Essentially it is because of the ability of these guiding principles to coordinate operational activities with policy requirements assuring consistency over time: that military capabilities development evolve in a directed manner renewing, augmenting and contracting its components to reinforce and expand defense possibilities. 9 The traditional methodological approach for determining defense requirements was through procedures commonly named either as force planning, strategic planning or military planning. These are methodological approaches inherited from the Cold War period, led by the US initiative under the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). This System provided the benchmark for other similar national initiatives, like the Brazilian Navy Systematic for High Level Planning with its associated Director Plan. 21
  22. 22. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 22 2/24/2015DRAFT Although force design mills operational requirements into defense alternatives, it is not merely the application of military planning at ministerial level, warning those who enter its domains about the inadequacy of military operational planning10 concepts and methodologies for the processes and products that fall under its purposes. This requires attention to the organizational structure of a ministry of defense, involving determining the number and qualification of the individuals on the force design team. Force design provides a set of concepts and its articulating logic required for swiveling political options into military capability requirements and for cranking these requirements into force alternatives, assuring jointness and interoperability. It provides a functional logic for management of the defense system, disciplining the relationships of its component parts. 10 Military operational planning refers to current practiced methodologies used to determine the best alternative form of assigning tasks and to direct actions to secure military objectives by the application or the threat of force. 22
  23. 23. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 23 2/24/2015DRAFT Once an integrated project of defense has been defined, it informs the development of subparts related to individual services and defense agencies that will converge to produce the required set of military capabilities. The same logic that provide focus on the required decisions at ministerial level can help to divide responsibilities among multiple agents, dedicating portions of effort to each subunit of the defense establishment. To insure that the alternatives chosen by subunits is adhered to over time demands of an integrated project of demand, force design provide a systemic perspective in support of decisions regarding preemptive additions or contraction in the military inventory based of forecasted demands of military capabilities required for the desired level of efficacy; the exploitation of better integration and synergy among component parts of the military system in order to maximize its efficiency; and exploit economies of scale and scope that compete on the basis of price in order to assure economy within acceptable levels of risk. 23
  24. 24. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 24 2/24/2015DRAFT MILITARY CAPABILITY Common sense, capabilities are understood as the quality of being able to use of be used in a specified way.11 However, for specific force design purposes, a military capability is the potential ability of force components to perform a defense task under specific pre-determined conditions, with an expected degree of success. Military capabilities are designed to fulfill the demands of the use of force for political purposes, having no intrinsic value their value derives from the assessment of success in its intended use and has, therefore, a political nature. The above statement is crucial for force design, because it casts light on the fundamental question: how much is enough? Providing the understanding that the only acceptable answer for this question results from the political priorities for defense; which allows developing criteria to pair wise anticipated tasks with requirements of quantitative and qualitative 11 Ganer B. The Oxford Dictionary of American Usage and Style. New York: Berkley Books, 2000. pp. 57 24
  25. 25. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 25 2/24/2015DRAFT dimensioning of force components under resource constraints and acceptable level of risk. The nature of these capabilities instrumental in the practice of violence under state authority - define individualizing competencies defense components have to acquire and circumscribes its use within the political realm. Therefore, military capabilities are not absolute values that could be measured in terms of such things as the currently available quantity of military assets, the number of military personnel, and the possession of weapons. Their value results from the assessment of the potential ability of successfully perform defense tasks in the pursuit of politically defined objectives. Structure of relationships Military capabilities emerge in the functional relationship of force components and operational tasks. This functional outline of military 25
  26. 26. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 26 2/24/2015DRAFT capabilities determines its relationships with force structure and concept of employment12 . Figure 1 depicts a general overview of elements that converge to produce military capability as currently found in the literature13 . Force structure defines the size, type, dimension, and stationing of military assets. The performance of its components depends on how they are organized, equipped, trained, upgraded, maintained and supported. 12 The literature of force planning uses the term strategy as a synonym for concept of employment. This paper will use the latter to develop the capability construct, reserving the former to translate the use of combat for the purpose of war, in association with tactics, the use of force components in the engagements. 13 For an in-depth discussion of defense planning, see, for example, DAVIS, P. K. e KLALILZAD, Z. M. A Composite Approach to Air Force Planning. California, EUA: RAND Corporation, 1996. DEWAR, J. e BUILDER, C. H. Assumption-based Planning. California, EUA: Rand Corporation, 1993. HAFFA, R. Jr. Planning U.S. Forces. USA: NDU, 1988. KAUFFMANN, W.N. Assessing the Base Force: How Much is Enough. Washington, DC. EUA: Brookings Institution, 1992. Support Maintenance Trainining Support Maintenance Trainining Military AssetsMilitary Assets ObjectivesObjectives Missions Operations Missions Operations Force Components Force Structure Concept of Employment Operational Structures Capabilities Operational Tasks Policy Guidelines 26
  27. 27. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 27 2/24/2015DRAFT Figure 1: Structure of relationships Force components are the functional aggregation of force structure elements in combat and associated support structures accordingly to practiced doctrine. The concept of Employment is a set of articulated decisions that express the prioritization of missions and operations, relating them with a political logic. Objectives are elements, either material or insubstantial, that must be worked over through operations, in order to provide an intended benefit that contributes to a specific mission. Tasks are required actions to achieve objectives, towards which there is some sort of opposition or threat.14 Countries have their defense assets (number and size) stationed or deployed in military bases. 14 These concepts will be retaken further on in this paper. Here they are stated with the purpose of supporting arguments to explain the nature of military capabilities. 27
  28. 28. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 28 2/24/2015DRAFT However, these assets are not in themselves military capabilities. It is meaningless to say, for example, that Brazils aircraft carrier So Paulo is a military capability. It is only an asset. Brazils military capability reflects the scale and scope of tasks that force components, where this asset might be integrated, could perform with expected degree of success. One alternative of military capability for Brazil could include the So Paulo in a force component to contribute to defend Brazils sovereignty in the Amazon area (defense objective), aiming to deter international greed for the Amazon forest. The resulting capability is conditioned by the readiness15 degree of its component air wing, the degree of training of its crew, and the ability to sustain continuous operation for an extended period of time. The Aircraft Carrier So Paulo is based in Rio de Janeiro, taking approximately 4 days to deploy (non- stop) to the Amazon area, requiring the support of 15 At this point, it is proposed to understand readiness as the performance required to accomplish a mission with expected degree of success. 28
  29. 29. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 29 2/24/2015DRAFT other assets with the technical ability for replenishment at sea tanker ships, in this case, to refuel the escorts of the So Paulo. Similarly, these tanker ships are not also in themselves a military capability. Replenishment at sea is only a technical requirement; the derived military capability is the ability of the Brazilian Navy to support continuous operation of its sea assets. Brazils required military capability to defend its sovereignty in the Amazon Area, exploring the combat possibilities of air wing of So Paulo aircraft carrier in a force capable to escort a convoy transporting Army troops and material to the region, would only be constrained by the availability of tanker ships, if its defense posture (relating the concepts of employment with force structure), would demand short reaction time, whereas keeping the So Paulo stationed in the Naval Base of Rio de Janeiro (imposing non-stop deploy and therefore requiring replenishment at sea). If Brazil decides to station/deploy the So Paulo to a northern naval base (changing force structure), 29
  30. 30. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 30 2/24/2015DRAFT it would produce a higher operational response tempo for the Amazon Area with fewer demands of replenishment at sea, with the compromise of reducing the responsiveness of that force component (integrating the So Paulo) to anti-submarine operations within a context of maritime warfare to protect the national flow of petrol in the South Atlantic. This would change Brazils defense posture, signaling a higher commitment to defend the Amazon Area and, at the same time, would impose the necessity of developing expensive shipyard facilities in the northern region of the Country, in order to provide repair facilities to this extremely complex ship. The required technical, fiscal and political costs would have to be weighed against the effectiveness of a reduced operational tempo associated with the lower demands of replenishment at sea. In addition, since the Army troops and material that the So Paulo would convoy to the Amazon Area would be held in Rio de Janeiro, the decision of re-deploying this asset to the northern 30
  31. 31. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 31 2/24/2015DRAFT region should take into consideration the technical characteristics and operational requirements of Brazilian Armys assets, increasing coordination and control demands. Referring to cost-effectiveness analysis, Brazil could have decided, instead of convoying Army troops and material using a force component integrated by the Aircraft Carrier So Paulo, to use near-the- shore maritime routes under the umbrella of the Brazilian Air Force aircraft (changing the concept of employment). In this case, the same task to protect the military flow of troops and material would be accomplished with other force components and associated operations, without significant changes in the defense posture. The extensive list of possible alternatives derived from Brazils case reflects the complexity of force design. The mission potential of military capabilities results from the assessment of task- force functional aggregations to achieve assigned objectives with force structure components. Similarly, Mexico faces force design problems with 31
  32. 32. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 32 2/24/2015DRAFT its two oceans; Argentina with Chile and Falklands/Malvinas; Venezuela with Suriname borders; Colombia with its internal conflict; to mention just a few other cases. Having outlined the purpose and several trends in force design, it remains to present its operational definition. Force design is a system of decisions aiming that the proper set of effective and efficient military capability is economically identified, developed, organized, fielded, and supported. Whitin this operation definition, design is related to a proposed solution to a perceived problem, presented with necessary and sufficient details to guide a course of action and evaluate its outcomes, and the force as composite of military capabilities explored to attend defense requirements in response to security demands. FORCE PLANNING The specific and limited purpose of force planning within force design is to determine the 32
  33. 33. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 33 2/24/2015DRAFT quantitative dimension, organization, and spatial distribution of military assets in association with a specific concept of employment for a determined theatre of operation. Force planning has different approaches that might include more or fewer components and processes, depending on the aggregation criteria ruled by specifics doctrinal understanding. Force design does not dispute these aggregation criteria or doctrine16 ; on the contrary, it recognizes these efforts as a valid procedure to rationalize the planning process, having as a reference the guidelines it provides. An example might help to clarify the distinction between force design and force planning. Force design might determine US capability requirements for protecting Americas interests in Central and South America, assuring combat efficacy against any specific country or regional coalition, and providing sea control and airspace interdiction against drug trafficking and illegal immigration. 16 For an example, see Kent G. A Framework for Defense Planning. California: RAND Corporation, 1989. 33
  34. 34. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 34 2/24/2015DRAFT The purpose of force planning for the Caribbean Basin Theatre of Operation specifically, would determine how many X surveillance aircraft and Y patrolling surface vessels based in Norfolk (VA) are required to deter and prevent illegal air and maritime traffic under strict rules of engagement limiting the use of force. Force planning would also determine the command and control requirements associated with an operational structure for these air and maritime assets to assure the required operational tempo. In addition, force planning would consider the redeployment of old surface patrol vessels from Norfolk to Guantanamo (Cuba) to reduce transit time, allowing fewer ships to perform the same tasks. It would also consider that the redeployment of these old patrol ships near the theatre of operation would contribute to lesser its aging rate until faster and less fuel consuming combat ships could be developed and stationed back in Norfolk. Force planning also considers what changes in the concept of employment these new assets might demand and determine how many new ships 34
  35. 35. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 35 2/24/2015DRAFT would be necessary and how enhanced air surveillance detection aids (radar, for example) could reduce the number of required surveillance aircraft. During these processes, Force Design would shape new rules of engagement and instruct Force Planning about the changing defense roles and missions in the Caribbean Basin, which would determine new tasks and evolving readiness and doctrine requirements, conditioning the specification, development and deployment of these new assets. Force design is, therefore, the instance of reference for force planning. It provides planning guidance while incorporating operational alternatives as a condition of possibility for its designing purposes. Although with complementary purpose, they do not fuse into one all encompassing process. Force Design is the master of force planning; recognizing that its servant would makes its designing requirement feasible. When these roles are inverted, or force design simply does not exist, force planning starts imposing limits to political alternatives. Politics will do what the military says it can do and it can 35
  36. 36. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 36 2/24/2015DRAFT do what it thinks should be done: the military becomes the master of policy. FORCE DESIGN ENVIRONMENT The complex interrelationship between the problems force design faces must be viewed and understood against the background of the political structure of the society in which they occur, although this may not always give us a clear understanding of every detail. Current mechanism to enforce defense reform range from reorganization acts, assuming the structuring principle that legal boundaries can create conditions for effective defense reform, to political guidelines provided by defense policy or white papers. The question, therefore, of what kind and what amount of information is need head into the devilish question of functional relevance. Applying these considerations, the most import feature in analyzing the force design environment is to ascertain the 36
  37. 37. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 37 2/24/2015DRAFT place at the hierarchy of defense decision-making from which its actions are guided. Force design processes are related to defense ministry functions, being deeply permeated with settled and routinized situations and decisions in situations that have not yet been subjected to regulation. Karl Mannheim, quoting the Austrian sociologist and statesman Albert Schffle, pointed out that: at any moment of social-political life two aspects are discernible first, a series of social events which have acquired a set pattern and recur regularly; and, second, those events which are still in the process of becoming, in which in individual cases, decisions have to be made that give rise to new and unique situations17 . This distinction developed to qualify the difference between the routine affairs of state and politics, also apply to qualify ministerial functions in the realm of administration and the realm of politics. Notwithstanding the boundary between these two 17 Mannheim, K. Ideology & Utopy: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. London, UK: Hancourt, 1936. pp.112. 37
  38. 38. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 38 2/24/2015DRAFT classes is rather difficulty, a set of enduring characteristics is present in the ministerial functions18 : To be the prime instrument for assuring civilian control over defense alternatives. To represent the nations defense requirements and advise on the implications of proposed alternatives. To balance military expertise and administrative-fiscal viewpoints on formulating defense alternatives Force design contribute to this ministerial functions because it demands the explanation of the assumptions that support the formulation of military capability requirements, and determine making explicit the articulating links between military capability requirements and defense objective demands, integrating and assessing those assumptions, requirements and objectives with a political logic. 18 Some of these functions are reflected in Huntingtons perspective of the Departamental Structure of Civil-Military Relations. Huntington, S. P. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press: 2000. pp.428-455. 38
  39. 39. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 39 2/24/2015DRAFT This is not without problems. For example, the analysis of the definition of capability presented by the Joint Pub 1-02 can explain a chain of unexpected consequences of force design concepts in the environment and vice-versa. This publication defines military capability as: The ability to execute a specified course of action (a capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention)19 . This view transforms military capability in a self- sufficient ability to perform operations. When military instrumentality becomes dissociated from political goals, it allows military control of policy alternatives, jeopardizing the prerogatives of popularly elected governments to decide upon defense alternatives. Richard H. Kohn suggests evidence for this trend in the US: The U.S. Military is now more alienate from its civilian leadership than at any time in American history, and more vocal about it. The warning signs are very clear, most noticeable in the frequency 19 USA, Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 9 April 2002). pp.62. 39
  40. 40. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 40 2/24/2015DRAFT with which officers have expressed disgust for the President over the last year Divorced now from broad parts of American society, the military, increasing Washington-wise, was determined never again to be committed to combat without the resources, public support, and freedom on the battlefield to win The military had accepted downsizing and reorganization, but not changes that invaded too dramatically the traditional function of each of the individual armed services, or that changed too radically the social composition of the forces, or cut too deeply into combat readiness, or otherwise undermined the quality and ability of the military to fullfill its functions.20 One of the undisputed givens is that armed forces are still a major player in national politics both in the US and in the region, with influence through expenditures, investments, and savings in the economy and social environment to which they belong. Thus, designing defense capabilities is an 20 Kohn, R.H. Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations. In The National Interests. Spring 1994, pp.3-17. 40
  41. 41. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 41 2/24/2015DRAFT influencing factor in the national and international arena. Zackkrisons21 study of the roles and missions of the armed forces of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru, brings a unique perspective to force design environment: Argentina has the most distance between the arguments, with civilians generally debating the need for armed forces and the military successfully lobbying the government for money to maintain international multilateral operations. Brazil has the largest armed forces, adequately funded, but has no real sense of missions and not enough public support to push a specific agenda. Chile has perhaps the best funded military in the region, and the best defined set of roles and missions, but faces just enough public hostility that the future after General Augusto Pinochets departure is a big question. 21 Zackrison, J.L. Drawdown to Instability: Defense Budgets and Mission Glide. 41
  42. 42. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 42 2/24/2015DRAFT Colombia has the most urgency in defining an adequate role for its armed forces because of the threat to national survival at the hand of the Marxist insurgents and drug traffickers. Peru faces the popular perception of having lost a recent border skirmish against a much smaller military, an increasing threat of insurgency, and pressure from the armed forces for more funding and better military equipment. These facts should be understood in the constantly changing configuration of experience in which they actually lived. Notwithstanding, they give an example of the ever- flowing stream of trends that shape force design environment. The measure of the relevance of this trends have need of an analytical model that can assure that the result to be achieved with force design do not become detached from the environment it belongs. It is needed to model the components and relationships of military capabilities understanding that the constituting characteristics of the whole will 42
  43. 43. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 43 2/24/2015DRAFT emerge through the relationships of the individual characteristics of its component parts. The goal is to understand not just the function of individual military assets, doctrine, tasks, objectives, but to learn how all of these components interact within capabilities possibilities hoping then to use this information to generate more accurate defense planning methodologies that will help to unravel the complexities of defense reforms and the underlying mechanisms that provoke inefficiency. MODELING MILITARY CAPABILITIES In order to design capabilities, first it is required to understand that capabilities are a measure of the resulting ability of force component arrangements to perform a range of tasks. The performances of these arrangements being depend on the performance of its component parts and the stability of its relationships. Secondly, it its required to comprehend that abstraction is the first step toward a model because it allows pointing out 43
  44. 44. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 44 2/24/2015DRAFT and organizing aspects of the reality as the object of analysis. As Bunge22 presents, abstraction is indispensable not only to apply causal ideas, but also to permit either empirical or theoretical investigation. Both provisions were included in the formulation of the construct of capabilities depicted in figure 2. This construct identifies military capability components, stating its precise meaning with the description of its basic qualities, delineating the outer edge of its component against the context they pertain. That means giving significance to the abstracted object of analysis, defining its variety23 as pertaining to a system24 . 22 Bunge, M. La Causalidade: El Principio de Causalidade en la Ciencia Moderna. trad. Aernan Rodrigues. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Sudamericana, 1959. pp 189. 23 Variety is a concept developed by Ross Ashby within the Theory of Cybernetics. It is used to explain the distinguishable conjuncts, regardless of the order in which they appear, necessary and sufficient to describe the essential characteristics of the systems at the required level of abstraction. ASHBY, W Ross. Introduction to Cybernetics. So Paulo: Perspectiva, 1970. Chap. 7. 24 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who introduced the General Theory of Systems in 1925/6, provides the concept of system: a conjunct of interacting elements. The defense components are a system because they possess a mutual dependency and complementary relationship: the performance of the whole depends on the performance of its component parts. Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: fundamentos, desarrollo, aplicaciones. Trad. Juan Almela. Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1968, pag. 38. There are authors, such Bertalanffy himself, who recognizes that the founder of Theory of System would be W. Kohler, with his work Die Phsischen Gestalten in Ruhe and in Staionaaren Zustand. Erlangen, 1924. Notwithstanding, the literature credits Bertalanffy for developing the Theory of System because Kohlers work is restricted to applying the concept of system to biological phenomena, restricting its amplitude. For applications of the Theory, see Bertoglio, J. Introduction a la Teoria General de los Sistemas. Mxico: Limusa, 1982. This theory provides an investigative methodology that could be synthetically described as: take the reality as it is presented, examine its component systems and enunciate valid regularities presented. This methodology was named empirical-inductive. For a critique of the theory and investigation methodology, see Ashby, W.R. 44
  45. 45. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 45 2/24/2015DRAFT The capability construct is an ideal25 model with two purposes. The first purpose is to abstract the complexity of the empirical reality in necessary and sufficiently analytical variables; and explaining how these variables interact, contract and maintain relationships that enable a required capability to be obtained. The second purpose is to explain the sensibility of military capability to changes in the security and defense environment, providing assessment criteria of its efficiency, efficacy and economy in adapting, modernizing and transforming the defense sector in response to changes in the security environment. The sensitivity analysis of General Systems Theory as a New Discipline. EUA, General System, 3, 1958, pp. 1-6. Ashby proposes an opposite approach, named deductive: instead of studying the system in a progressive form, from inferior to superior levels of abstraction, he recommends taking the conjunct of all conceivable systems and reduce them to a unique system of acceptable dimension. Luhmann, N. Power. Toronto: John Willey & Sons, 1979, proposes interpreting a macro system society as the most complex macro system - using the deductive methodology. He aims to eliminate the main restriction of Bertalanffys approach that in macro system the distinction between the surrounding environment and the objected system under analysis becomes blurred. Luhmanns theory wasnt completely accepted because it cannot be applicable to others fields that have more restricted objects of analysis. 25 Ideal models, according to Weber, are theoretical models resulting from a selective process that blocks some elements from the reality and explains its content unequivocally. Ideal models do not exist as part of the reality; they are only a proposition of a hypothetical relationship of elements abstract from that reality. Weber, M. Ensaios Sobre a Teoria da Cincia. Paris: Plon, 1965. pp.76. Ideal models are not a description of the reality, because they retain only some of its aspects, representing relevant aspects of the totality that are regularly presented in the object of investigation. They are not also an average term of the reality because ideal models do not emerge from quantitative notion. Popper converges to Webers understanding of ideal models and explains its utility in preventing contradictions and impreciseness when theorizing upon selected aspects of reality. Lvis-Strauss has a different interpretation of ideal model. According to him, an ideal model is a simulacra, a relational conjunct that simplifies reality in order to explains the totality of the phenomenon. See Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinmica da Pesquisa em Cincias Sociais: Os Polos da Prtica Metodolgica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48. 45
  46. 46. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 46 2/24/2015DRAFT military capability to changes in the security and defense environment requires making explicit possible forms of its relationships and logical consequences. That means supporting hypothesis formulation and explaining its elements of refutation. The capability construct, as an ideal model in the sense o logical -, is not a hypothesis and, therefore, can be neither true nor false but valid or not valid depending on its utility for understanding reality26 . That means that it has its own conditions of possibility; it contains its own principle of constitution, encapsulating a conjunct of defined predicative, arbitrarily created accordingly to the necessity of the investigation, that can be used or not as an instance of reference to compare empirical data drawn from the reality . The construct models capabilities as an open system. It assumes a flow of materials, information, etc. from and to the surrounding environment, 26 Bruyne, P. Herman, J. and Schoutheete, M. Dinmica da Pesquisa em Cincias Sociais: Os Polos da Prtica Metodolgica. 5 ed. trad. Ruth Joffily Rio de Janeiro: Francisco Alves. pp. 48, 182. 46
  47. 47. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 47 2/24/2015DRAFT implying that its variety assumes different values in time, as well as the relationship between its component are dynamically reconfigure, whereas keeping the system in a uniform state27 . This explains the characteristic of military capabilities to retain its efficacy while its components are reconfigured. It will also explain the limits and possibilities of adaptation, modernization and transformation trends. Pragmatically, the construct will help in problem definition in force design: what will (and will not) be considered as inputs and outputs. This entails defining the scope of the expected alternatives, what procedures will be followed in generating and evaluating alternatives, and in selecting the alternatives to recommend to political decision. 27 The concepts of closed and open system are part of Bertalanffys General Theory of Systems. A system is defined as closed when it can be considered in an equilibrium state independent of the surrounding environment. Chemistry, for example, deals with physical-chemical reactions in isolated recipients; and thermodynamics affirms that its laws are only applicable to closed systems. Opens systems have in their animus the governing factor towards higher states of order and organization. This paper uses the same characterization for capabilities, having adaptation, modernization and transformation as trends to higher states of order and organization. The biologist Driesch uses this description to characterize a system of living organisms. A uniform state is achieved when an open system is in equilibrium. Closed systems equilibrium is dependent of the initial conditions. The final concentration of a chemical product depends on the initial concentration of its components. However, in open systems, uniform state is achieved based on the systems own parameters, and therefore is independent of its initial conditions. Drischel, H. Formale Theorien der Organization. Halle: Nova Acta Leopoldina, 1968, pp. 136, in Bertalanffy, von L. Teoria General de los Sistemas: Fundamentos, Desarrollo, Aplicaciones. Trad. Juan Almela. Mxico: Fondo de Cultura Econmica, 1968. pp. 40. 47
  48. 48. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 48 2/24/2015DRAFT Readiness Rules of Engagement Enabling Elements Military Hardware Personel Operational Protocols Military Assets Combat Support Operational Structures C4 Tasks Objectives Interoperability Force Components Regulating Factors Concepts of Employment Doctrine Derivative Elements Operations ISR Figure 2: Capabilities construct Military capabilities alternatives are a particular manifestation of a (intended) stable relationship of three conjuncts28 of elements: the conjunct of force components, the conjunct of regulating factors, and the conjunct of concepts of employment, all interacting with each other in unique ways. 28 M.D. Mesarovic explains the concept of conjunct as the individualizing properties that provide to some type of cluster of elements within the environment its quality as system components. Each conjunct is, in itself, a system, defined by particular analytical criteria used to isolate them from the rest. Mesarovic, M.D. Foundations for a General System Theory. New York, USA: John Willey & Sons, 1964. pp. 1-24. 48
  49. 49. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 49 2/24/2015DRAFT The concept of employment, force components and regulating factors are mutually determined elements of capabilities. The first assures the proper relationship of tactical possibilities, strategic alternatives and political goals. The second determines the proper quantitative and qualitative dimensioning of military assets and organizations, being enabled by interoperability, jointness, command, control, communications and computing (C4) possibilities. The regulating factors link both force components and concepts of employment, assuring the external coherence of military capabilities with the political will and internal coherence between its component parts. By examining these complex interactions, it is possible to shed more light on how they alter defense reforms possibilities. THE CONJUNCT OF FORCE The conjunct of force emerges in the articulation of A) military assets possibilities, B) operational 49
  50. 50. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 50 2/24/2015DRAFT structures, and C) its enabling elements, which will make tactics and strategy possible. A) Military Assets Military assets are the means effectively used to accomplish assigned tasks and the means necessary to provide efficiency and sustain the tactical effort for a certain period. For analytical purposes, each military asset has three component elements: 1) military hardware; 2) personnel; and 3) protocol of operations29 . 1) Military hardware Military hardware is the machinery and equipment of war, such as tanks, aircraft, ships, rifles, etc. The identifying criterion for including an element in the conjunct of military asset is its sufficiency for a specific purpose. Such is the case with a war ship, with its sensors, weapon systems, engines, damage control systems, communication and command centers integrated into a single platform with the purpose of providing task efficiency. 29 For a typology of military assets, see Brzoska, M. et. al. Typology of Military Assets. Bonn, Ge: Bonn International Center for Conversion. Paper 16. April 2000. 50
  51. 51. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 51 2/24/2015DRAFT A Boeing 747 initially conceived for civilian airlines might become a military asset as a troop transport; a merchant freighter may become a tank carrier or an ordinary SUV may be converted into an armed scooter. On the other hand, if it is considered aircraft, warships or tanks originally conceived as war-machines, the question would be what are the distinguished features that typify a corvette, a frigate and a cruiser other than their size and weaponry? A corvette with sophisticated and powerful weaponry might overcome a frigate in an artillery duel, but the overweigh of this weaponry could restrain its speed and performance, allowing the frigate maneuver fast to overcome its weakness. Similar propositions could be posed to the entire war arsenal with its composing typology of fighters, bombers, aircraft carriers, tanks, guns, etc. Clearly, not only their aptitude to fly, navigate or off-road traffic empowers these material components as military assets. What defines these material means as military assets is their ability to provide tactical efficacy. However, because resources are 51
  52. 52. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 52 2/24/2015DRAFT always constrained, efficacy should be associated with efficiency. An efficient combat asset, for example, will perform tasks with less fuel, which is transformed into a wider deployment range or longer periods on station without replenishment. In other words, the criteria to define a military mean is whether it is able to provide an identifiable contribution to the required task, being a lever of influence in the outcome. Military assets are defined using four combining criteria: Mobility and staying power: the ability of military means to deploy and maintain continuous operations. Mobility and staying power can be enhanced by new transportation and communications technologies. Offensive and defensive firepower: offensive firepower regards the ability to damage (neutralize or destroy) adversaries fighting ability by attacking targets such as missile launch sites, airfields, naval vessels, command and control nodes, munitions stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure. 52
  53. 53. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 53 2/24/2015DRAFT Offensive firepower includes but is not limited to physical attack and/or destruction, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and special operations, and could also include computer network attack. Defensive firepower seeks to affect the adversarys ability to achieve or to promote specific damage against our assets. It includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies while simultaneously employing frequent movement, using deception and concealment or camouflage. Sustainability: the ability to perform tactical actions until successful accomplishment or revision of the tasks. Tactical Flexibility and Versatility: the ability to adjust assets configuration to confront changes in the environment, laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. 2) Military personnel Military personnel are considered in force design in its qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The 53
  54. 54. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 54 2/24/2015DRAFT qualitative dimension of military personnel translates both its total combat efficiency and the individual ability to assess complex situations making and implementing decisions within the domain of their professional expertise, with reasonable expectation of success. The quantitative dimension of military personnel deals with the required mix of active, reserve, professional and conscripts to effectively operate, deploy, and maintain material means required to attend a set of concepts of employments. The common trend in personnel reforms, supported by most scholars as a by-product of the end of the Cold War, has been downsizing the military and a complement of civilians. This is a monumental decision that has to be carefully throughout in its impacts. David McCormick30 summarizes its complexity: Judging the appropriateness of an armys downsizing objectives is more complicated than it might appear. The logic behind each of the four 30 McCormick, David. The Downsized Warrior: Americas Army in Transition. New York: New York University Press, 1998. pp 75-76. 54
  55. 55. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 55 2/24/2015DRAFT primary objectives protecting quality, shaping the force, sustaining personnel readiness, and demonstrating care and compassion is persuasive. An officer corps of exceptional quality is obviously crucial to a dynamic and effective military organization, even more so given the uncertain challenges of the post-Cold War era. Maintaining promotion opportunities and enhancing professional development opportunities as a means of retaining to performers seems reasonable, too, especially since downsizing organizations often lose their most valued performers. Similarly, there is an obvious and compelling need for shaping the officers corps by precisely identifying the individuals with the specific skill and expertise needed in a downsized organization and for distributing officer cuts across the entire officer corpsSustaining personnel readiness is also a reasonable objective. Personnel readiness in the aggregate is a telling indicator of the alignment between cuts in force structure and cuts in personnel, two activities that should ideally go 55
  56. 56. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 56 2/24/2015DRAFT hand in hand. Thus, personnel readiness allows the army to gauge how effectively it is managing this aspect of downsizing. In addition, at the unit level, reasonably high levels of personnel readiness are necessary for effective unit training and operations. And, personnel readiness obviously has significant implications for the armys wartime capabilities. Finally, a caring compassionate approach to downsizing is justified on moral as well as practical grounds. From a moral perspective, it has traditionally to those who loyally serve. And, as noted earlier, fair and compassionate treatment of downsizing victims affects the attitudes and performance of those who remain and influences an organizations ability to recruit new members. In the US case, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld believes that the military's personnel management system might be a Cold War relic that encourages too many service members to stay for 20 years, too few to stay thereafter, and most members to scurry 56
  57. 57. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 57 2/24/2015DRAFT between assignments at a pace harmful to unit cohesion and to families. 31 3) Operational protocols Operational protocols are the instructions of how to operate efficiently those material means, exploring their technical characteristics to maximize task effectiveness. An operational protocol for five similar surface ships to deploy in calm sea aiming sonar detection of low speed submarines would recommend a pattern of simultaneous turning to have a detection probability of 80%. Another protocol of operation for the same class of ships operating in rough sea would recommend another pattern for a 60% detection probability32 . More efficient protocols of operations can be developed by applying computational routines to a generic model, modifying its parameters to make military assets to satisfy performance requirements appropriated to a wide variety of conditions, or to 31 Tom Philpott. Military Update: Longer Careers, Fewer Moves: Two Of Rumsfeld's Tougher Goals. http://www.militarylifestyle.com/home/1,1210,S:1100:1:1187,00.html. (June 19, 2002). 32 For methodological processes of developing operational protocols, see NAVAL WAR COLLEGE. Naval Operations Analysis. (2. ed.). Annapolis, EUA: NWC Press, 1989. 57
  58. 58. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 58 2/24/2015DRAFT make them to perform existing tasks better, or to implement tasks never before performed. However, one of the most difficult and expensive activities of modern armed forces is exactly making efficient protocols of operations. It demands sophisticated centers of operational analysis and complex processing. For this reason, not all countries can afford such centers. The problem, therefore, is that they might employ newly acquired military assets with obsolete operational protocols, virtually neutralizing their efficiency. However, since they do not have such centers, they do not realize their necessity, or simply deny this problem. The error, therefore, is circular, with increasing costs of acquiring and maintaining technologically sophisticated assets with diminishing returns in terms of effectiveness. When defining the military assets conjunct, the relevant variable is the tooth-to-tail ratio of fighting assets to its supporting components. Fighting assets are designed to maximize combat ability relatively to foreseen opponents. Supporting 58
  59. 59. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 59 2/24/2015DRAFT components are designed to assure the maintenance of the cutting edge of fighting assets. The fighting tooth needs refueling and ammunition supplies to maintain combat ability. Without supplying vessels, tank aircraft, depots and bases, the fighting ability would be severed to the point of impairing task possibilities. In US, for example, the fighting tooth has required deployment of only 4% of active- duty personnel33 . The conjunct of military assets, therefore, includes both its cutting edge and its supporting device categories. Training and motivation of military personnel, the internal military organization, communications systems, logistical and other systems all may enhance or prejudice military capability because they possible impact on the possible tooth-to-tail ratio. B) Operational Structures The conjunct of operational structures creates the ability of military assets to perform operations 33 The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defense Policy: An agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. Project on Defense Alternatives, Briefing Memo # 18 5 February 2001. http:://www.comw.org/pda/0102bmemo 18.html. . pp. 5. (8/28/2001) 59
  60. 60. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 60 2/24/2015DRAFT in support of required tasks. They are designed, therefore, to attend command and control requirements, articulating military assets in order to get task efficacy through the efficient performance of the parts. Its role is to make the conjunct of military assets present in a military capability become more than the sum of the parts. For analytical purposes, operational structures have two distintive components: 1) Combat structures, and 2) Support Strutures. 1) Combat structures Combat structures allow parts of the conjunct of military assets to be detached and deployed to specific tasks, allowing expansion of the number of possible tasks that the conjunct might perform. Therefore, the synchronization of detachment and reincorporation of those parts maximizes the potential ability of military assets to accomplish the envisaged concept of employment.34 34 See Department of the Army, United States of America. 1986 US Army Field Manual 100-5, blueprint for the AirLand Battle. Washington DC: Brasseys (US), Inc, 1991. To identify the impact of combat structure in force structure and warfare see Deichman, P.F. der. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwffe Operations in Support of The Army: 1939-1945. New York, USA: IVY Books, 1996. Diechmans book is also relevant to see the functional role of doctrine in the relationship of combat structure and the conjunct of military assets. 60
  61. 61. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 61 2/24/2015DRAFT 2) Support structures Support Structures are designed to fulfill two simultaneous demands. The first refers to the maintenance of military effort in time. In this case, the purpose of support structures is to provide the adequate logistical flow to maintain both military means in their optimum technical performance, and personnel adequate supplied in order to assure the continuous validity of operational protocols, providing for the expected performance of military assets. The second demand imposed on support structures is to prepare the conjunct of military assets to attend operational requirements. In the first demand, support structures are articulated with combat structures, timely linking, for example, depot resources with theatre demands. In the second demand, support structures group military assets by types and classes, seeking a gain in scale in maintenance, repair and training. Decisions regarding military assets and the organizational design are highly dependent on the 61
  62. 62. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 62 2/24/2015DRAFT degree of require jointness, as well as on decisions regarding how force components are deployed, interconnected and specialized. C) Enabling Elements The range of possibilities provided by military assets in response to tasks depends on the 1) interoperability of their component parts, and 2) the possibilities created by command, control, communication, and computing. Together, they contribute to achieve and jointness synergy. 1) Interoperability Interoperability defines the degree of compatibility between force components that permits them to work together to produce expected tactical results. It explores technical features incorporated in military assets to perform operations. Interoperability is a technology function. It depends on a systemically integrated conjunct of knowledge and instructions that fulfill or create specific demands of force designing, and guide the 62
  63. 63. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 63 2/24/2015DRAFT production possibilities of defense products and processes though proper techniques35 . Technology differs from techniques in continuously reconstructing and transforming itself, having as reference all previous knowledge, whereas techniques are specific knowledge circumscribed in time and space oriented to use or produce required products and processes. Technology supports the presumption of certainty that force components will produce expected results to tasks demands, and determines the transforming rules of knowledge into force components possibilities36 . 35 Literature offers a variety of definitions of techniques within an unresolved discussion about the difference with technology. Longo defines technology as the organized assemblage of all scientific, empiric and intuitive knowledge used in the production and commercialization of goods and services; and techniques as the purely empirical and intuitive knowledge. Longo, W.L. O Desenvolvimento Cientfico e Tecnolgico do Brasil e suas Perspectivas Frente aos Desafios do Mundo Moderno. Belm: UNAMA, 2000. pp. 11,12. For Morais, technology is derived from the evolution of techniques. For him, techniques refers to Paleolithic, Neolithic, medieval or even modern humankind creative behavior used to provide human necessities though the transformation of the environment; and technology refers to more recent practice of objective human creativity. Morais, R. J.F. Cincia e Tecnologia. 2.ed. So Paulo: Cortez & Morais, 1978. pp.102. Munford has the same understanding of Morais regarding techniques: through technical improvements we create a new environment and highly organized new behavioral standards that have attended human necessity of living in a orderly and predicable world. Munford, L. Arte e Cincia. So Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1986. pp.14. Jacques Ellul has an inverted perspective of the concepts when he says that technology regards nave activities oriented toward perfection; and techniques as the contemporaneous mentality oriented to efficiency as a supreme goal. Ellul, J. A Tcnica e o Desafio do Sculo. trad. Roland Corbisier. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1968. pp. 445. Buzan sees in the technology the most important factor in determining the nature of military alternatives and means of force, isolated from political influence. Buzan, B. Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations. London, UK:MacMillan Press, 1987. pp.7. Hbermas, on the other hand, thinks that technical reasoning does not abandon its political content. Habermas, J. Tcnica e cincia como Ideologia. (trad. Arthur Moro). Lisboa, Portugal: Edies 70, 1968. pp. 46. 36 For a historical perspective of the composition and influence of technology upon force design, see: Macksey, K. Technology in War: the Impact of Science on Weapons Development and Modern Battle. London, UK: Armour Press, 1986. Creveld, M. van. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C to the Present. New York, USA: Free Press, 1991. Dupuy, T.N. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Fairfax, USA: Hero Books, 1984. Jones, A. The Art of War in the Western World. New 63
  64. 64. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 64 2/24/2015DRAFT 2) Command, Control, Communications and Computing (C4) Command and Control, Communications and Computing assure the processes transaction of operational and support structures in a logical fashion, being an integral part of force structure manifested in military capabilities. They can lead to fewer changeovers in force components and tasks to produce required military capabilities, reducing cycle time without changing military effectiveness or increasing military effectiveness using lesser- sophisticated conjunct of military assets. As the size of force components increases, it can exploit more and more tasks, but it also becomes increasingly complex to select the C4 system that makes it possible to provide effectiveness at a low total cost/risk ratio and at the same time assure interoperability37 . York, USA:Oxford University Press, 1987. OConnel, R.L. Of Arms and Men: A History of War, Weapons and Aggressions. London, UK: Oxford U.P., 1989. MacNeill, W. The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces and Society Since A.D. 1000. Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1982. 37 For a in-depth discussion of Command and Control, see Weisman, R.M.L. A Conceptual Model for Military Command and Control. Ontario, Canada: University of Ontario,UMI Dissertations Services. 1992. 64
  65. 65. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 65 2/24/2015DRAFT Properly identified, C4 requirements lead demand growth of military capabilities with preemptive actions to exploit current deployment of military assets considering its different degrees of readiness tailored to expanding or contracting tasks demands within a specific concept of employment. THE CONJUNCT OF CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT The conjunct of concepts of employment define a set of articulated decisions that express the prioritization of objectives and its translation into tasks requirements having operations as its linking factors, whereas relating all of them with a political logic. In the US case, for example, the Navy has put emphasis on network-centric operations, the Air Force moves towards becoming an expeditionary force, the Mariness continuing experiments with concepts such as Desert Warrior and Urban Warrior, and the Armys recently announced effort to develop medium- sized brigades with increaded responsiveness38 . 38 Davis, P. Tranforming Military Force. California: Rand Corporation, 2002. pp. 231. http://www.rand.org/ contact/personal/pdavis/MR1306.1.sec6.pdf . (Mar/20/2002). 65
  66. 66. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 66 2/24/2015DRAFT A) Objectives Objectives are functionally sufficient descriptors of foreseeable demands of the use of force for political purposes. Each one encapsulates a comprehensive content that justifies its individuality and permanence, supporting the assumption that during the processes force design guides those demands of force will not change. There are five implicit premises in this formulation. First, that the objectives, once selected, are necessary and sufficient to achieve the predetermined purpose. Second, that the processes are logically articulated. Third, that if those objectives were achieved, the envisaged initial purpose would be accomplished. Forth, that its formulation and execution are bounded by some degree of sufficient rationality. Fifth, that during the processes, the objectives and the rules of transformation will not change. These premises support the proper linkages between national interests and defense capabilities 66
  67. 67. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 67 2/24/2015DRAFT towards higher states of effectiveness, efficiency, provided four conditions: Intelligibility: the denotative content of objectives are clearly defined and understood. Feasibility: objectives are achievable within the realm of practical possibilities and logical reasoning. Assessment possibility: the results are measurable either quantitatively or qualitatively. Compatibility: the effects are part of a chain of causality addressing defense requirements Intelligibility is the requirement for the proper developing of plausible hypothesis related to a set of accepted values and principles; and for clearly communicated results. Assessment Possibility is the requirement for determining the consistency of the proposed objectives and its sensibility to changes in the threat environment. Attending intelligibility and assessment possibility requirements are relevant to prevent three common risks in defining defense objectives. 67
  68. 68. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 68 2/24/2015DRAFT The first risk is making static a dynamic process. The second, is that objectives, as Lodi39 put, convey solutions in terms of re-scaling existing capabilities, increasing or downsizing, thus restricting the emergence of new capabilities based on different internal logic for rearranging force components. Finally, objectives tend to focus on the short term. Compatibility is the enable of strategic possibilities. It assures that the resulting effect of operations manifested in tactical use of military assets in the engagements might be articulated toward the political goals though a cascade of linked results. B) Tasks Tasks are a set of intended actions or desired effects of the application of force towards specific defense objectives. They are the building blocks of the concept of employment, defining the intention for using force components in a chain of linked 39 Lodi conclusions are taken for business strategic planning methodologies. However, his analyis and conclusions can be transposed to force design because both fields explore similar articulating logic and general concepts. See Lodi, J.B. Admininstrao por Objetivos: Uma Crtica. So Paulo: Pioneira, 1972. pp.25. 68
  69. 69. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 69 2/24/2015DRAFT tactical actions, expecting that the aggregated outcome of this chain will contribute to achieve a cascade of intermediate objectives having at its top the defense objective. The political logic that links objectives and tasks can be understood with the comprehension of its relation with 1) Defense Missions and 2) Defense Roles. 1) Defense missions Defense missions are the assemblage of tasks within the scope of an intended purpose. Each mission is related to a specific outcome, in the form a hypothetical combination of assumptions and chains of future developments that serve as a reference for the diagnosis of current and required tasks. Defense missions are, therefore, a proposition of reality aiming to anticipate possible, probable and plausible contingencies where the uses of military capabilities are considered. Determining and prioritizing missions are a prime political decision found in a set of compromises 69
  70. 70. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 70 2/24/2015DRAFT seeking to reconcile, and where possible, to balance conflicting questions of value. Once defined, they orient the bulk of national effort towards the political use of military capabilities in defense related tasks. At least three important characteristics are common to the use of the term mission: a) Time horizon: it defines a time horizon for the anticipated impact of the tasks required to carry out its mandate. b) Focus: it required concentration of effort on a narrow range of pursuits reducing the resources available for other activities. c) Chain of causality: in requires a series of decisions supportive to one another following a consistent pattern. 2) Defense roles Defense roles are generic descriptors of the nature of the effect, cause or consequence of applied military capabilities in defense tasks. Defense roles are usually categorized as nation 70
  71. 71. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 71 2/24/2015DRAFT building, diplomatic, combat, constabulary, and police; reflecting the different political rules and legal framework that bounds defense tasks. Nation building roles shape defense tasks towards the social and economic development of the state under democratic governance, civil law and economic rules of market regulation. International law and treaties bind diplomatic and combat roles in peace, crisis and war, asseverating Clausewitzs conclusion that war is the continuation of policy with the introduction of means of force. The importance of diplomatic roles lies in the fact that nations judge potential adversaries in terms of its military responsiveness, reliability, consistency, and, most of all, unity: unity of purpose, unity of effort, and unity of action40 . Constabulary and policy roles are oriented to the maintenance of order and enforcement of regulations, under national or coalition legal mandate. The priorities of defense roles reflect the mandate of politics in defense issues. The 40 Foster, GD. The Postmodern Military: The Irony of "Strengthening" Defense. Harvard International Review; Cambridge, Summer 2001. pp. 24-29. 71
  72. 72. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 72 2/24/2015DRAFT importance of clearly defined defense roles is the assignment of functions for defense, making it accountable for its results. Military capabilities acquire fighting, diplomatic, police, or constabulary roles depending on doctrine, the way they are organized, deployed, trained, sustained, commanded and controlled. The required status of each of these requirements are assessed taking into considerations topological characteristics of possible areas of operation, national and alliances fiscal and production possibilities to sustain existing capabilities or incorporate others during the course of operations. This, in turn, will require a sustained degree of readiness41 articulated with expected tempo of the military operations. The relationship of objectives, roles and missions, having tasks as its linking elements, define a matrix of cross impacts. 41 The concept of readiness will be retaken further on. Here, it is proposed to understand it as the degree of preparedness for a specific purpose. 72
  73. 73. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 73 2/24/2015DRAFT Objectives A B C D Mission 1 TasksTasksTasksTasks A Roles 2 TasksTasksTasksTasks b 3 TasksTasksTasksTasks c 4 TasksTasksTasksTasks d Figure 3: Cross-Impact matrix of objectives, tasks, missions, and roles Strategy links tactical intended results with the purpose of defense through a political logic; and use tasks, missions and roles to both instruct its formulation and assess its results. Canada offers an example of the relationship of mission, objectives, and tasks42 : Defense Mission: Defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security Defense Objective: 42 Canada. Defense Planning Guidance 2001 Chapter 2 Strategic Directions. http://www.vcds.ca/dgsp/dgp/ dgp2001/chap2e.asp. (Jun/01/2002). 73
  74. 74. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 74 2/24/2015DRAFT To conduct surveillance and control of Canadas territory, aerospace and maritime areas of jurisdiction. This Defense Objective will be met by Defense Tasks: 1. Protecting Canadian sovereignty through surveillance and control of Canadas territory, airspace and maritime areas of jurisdiction; and 2. Mounting an immediate, effective and appropriate response for the resolution of terrorist incidents that affect, or have the potential to affect, national interests. Tasks determine the chain of operations and actions [tactical] expected to be accomplished to achieve an objective. Defense mission instructs strategy formulation establishing the validity of linked task results for defense objectives and security goals. Defense Roles provide parameters to assess the degree of efficacy of these valid results to the envisage success defense and security policy determine. That means that strategy completes itself in the tactical possibilities and in the political 74
  75. 75. Salvador RazaRLH Comments Page 75 2/24/2015DRAFT determinants; having no significance isolated from any one. Finally, it should be kept in mind that objectives, roles and missions are enormously sensitive issues, for they means fiscal resources. C) Derivative elements Derivative elements mediate the process of desegregating tasks attending both the criteria formulated based on 1) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and 2) the practiced categories of operations. Together, they offer the criteria for developing guidelines for making decisions about the employment of the force components, reflecting how decision-makers define the hierarchy of tasks and describe through missions their understanding of the countrys requirements of security