Carl Von Clausewitz

BRITAINARGENTINAFALKLAND2

BRITISH SEA HARRIERNUCLEAR SUBMARINE3

AIM 9SidewinderAM 39Exocet4

Falklands War5

Sequence Historical Background

Geography

National Interest and

Politico Military Objectives

Preparation for War

Falkland Campaign

Analysis of Air Operations

Lessons

Conclusion

6

Historical Background1592 John Davis 1st discovery1690 Captain John Strong Falkland1764 French colonist from Saint Mailo Malvinas1770 Spanish takeover1816 Argentine independence1820 Argentine claim over Falklands1833 British takeover1960 Negotiation began at United Nation1982 Argentine invasion (02 April)1982 British recapture (14 June)7

FALKLAND450 MILEBRITAIN8000 MILESSOUTH GEORGIA780 MILESGeography8ASCENSION ISLAND4200 MILES3800 MILES

EASTWEST About 200 Islands 4700 sq milesPORTSTANLEY

GOOSE GREENSAN CARLOSPEBBLE ISLANDFALKLAND ISLANDS9

National Interests and Politico MilitaryObjectives of the War Argentine Claim Embodiment of National pride

Sense of belonging

British Claim Basing on discovery

Self determination of locals

10

We must concern ourselves with the future.oil, gas, fish are all there. We need to develop all the wealth we can. - Argentine Foreign Minister ( In March 82 )11

FALKLANDSSOUTH GEORGIAGeneral Leopoldo Galtieri12

UN Resolution passed in 1965

Islands Committee in the House of Parliament in 1968

Lease back arrangement

13

Port Stanley seized - 02 April

British garrison of 78 marines

Landed at south Georgia - 04 April

Dispatch of force - 26-28 March

14

Argentine GoalThe main goal of Argentina was to capture, hold andcontrol the Falkland and South Georgia Islands Vision of General GaltieriThe armed forces should be the architects ofgreater Argentina15

Belief of Argentine President Accomplished fact

Lame protest by the USA

Victory over colonialism

Argentineans would forget long years of

dictatorial rule and economic mismanagement No awry perception by Russia

Britain will swallow a temporary discomfort

16

British GoalThe main goal of Britain was to recapture, hold andcontrol of the Falkland and South Georgia Islands

Margaret Thatcher17

Port StanleyPreparation for War Run way 4100 feet

140 tons per day

Total 10,000 troops

18

Argentine Maritime ForcesTEZVeinticinco de Mayo19

Argentine Air Defence in Falkland Roland Fire Unit Tiger Cat Blow Pipe SA 7 40,30 and 20 mm

PORTSTANLEYGOOSE GREENPEBBLE ISLAND20

ArgentinaArgentine Aircraft Deployment

PUERTO DESEADOJULIANSANTA CRUZGALLEGOSRIO GRANDE21

HMS SUPERBHMS SPARTANMEZ-200NMBritish Initial Response22

Operation Corporate Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) 30 April 198223

British Air Defence in South AtlanticTEZCAPFree Fire Missile Engagement ZoneArea Air DefenceTask ForceClose in Defence24

Super Entendard04Mirage III11Dagger31Sky hawks 45Pucara25KC/C-13009T-34C15Aeromacchi10Helicopters:

Chinook, Lynx, 30 + Sea-king , AlouetteORBAT - Argentine Air Arm25

ORBAT RAF

Sea Harriers28 Harrier GR310 Vulcan Bombers Nimrod VC-10 C-130 Victor Tanker11 Helicopters:

Sea-King, Lynx, Chinook, Wasps,100 +Wessex, Scout26

Ascension Island Coverage 7000 miles

South Georgia South Georgia Recaptured on 25 April

Santa Fe attacked

27

Falkland Campaign Recapturing of South Georgia

28

FALKLAND CAMPAIGN Recapturing of South Georgia

Failure of Haig Diplomacy

Operation Black Buck

29

Ascension IslandSouth GeorgiaFalklandRRRRRR 7800 miles round trip

6 in-flight refuelling

30

PORTSTANLEY

GOOSE GREENPEBBLE ISLANDFALKLAND ISLANDSAir Field Attack31

Centre of GravityBritish C O G A/C CarrierArgentine C O G Air attack Capability32

Argentine attack on British targets33

Ardent sinking

Ardent sinking

Landing crafts under attack

British Naval Operation Capturing of South Georgia on 24th April

Bombardment of port Stanley on 1st May

Sinking of Argentine Cruiser, General Belgrano

on 2nd May Amphibious landing over Falkland

34

BATTLE OF SAN CARLOSSan Carlos35

Land Battle36

British March towards Port Stanley37

ANALYSIS OF ARGENTINE AIR OPS Concentration Offensive Action

HMS Sheffield Surprise

38

DCAO : ARGENTINEArgentines could not employ:Principle of Flexibility Security

One Harrier shot by AAA

39

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT : ARGENTINEPrinciple of Administration was not observed40

Combat Support Operation : ArgentineAir Transport OpsAir to Air RefuellingReconnaissanceSAR /CASEVAC

41

Port Stanley Airfield after the conflictBRITISH OCAPrinciple of Surprise and Flexibility

Characteristics of Reach & Firepower

Principle of Offensive Action

Principle of Maintenance of Morale

42

BRITISH DCAO Killed 20+ FAA a/c 1100 CAP Sorties

43 AIM 9-L

Principle of Security

BRITISH CLOSE AIR SUPPORTPrinciple of Economy of Force44

British Combat Support Operation45

Electronic Warfare Blue Eric jammer ALE - 40 decoy

46

Analysis of the War Training

Train the way you intend to fight and fight the way you have trainedIn RAF we train as hard as any Air Force I know. We try to make things as realistic as possible. We really go for it. - Flt Lt Leeming47

Analysis of the War Training

International Support

Dependency on Airfield

Use of Advanced Technology / Smart Weapons

Importance of Engineering and Logistic Support

Preparation

48

Conclusion49 Argentine Leadership lacked situational

awareness.

No understanding of modern military operations.

Performance of Argentine Air Force and Naval assets.

Application of air power through out the Campaign.

Argentine Surrender on 14th June50