factionalism and local level politics in rural brazil

Factionalism and Local Level Politics in Rural BrazilAuthor(s): Daniel R. GrossSource: Journal of Anthropological Research, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Summer, 1973), pp. 123-144Published by: University of New MexicoStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3629987 .

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Factionalism and Local Level Politics in Rural Brazill DANIEL R. GROSS

Local factional strife has been interpreted as emanating from the strains of modernization as the "new society" struggles to throw off the bonds of the old. My findings show, on the contrary, that factionalism does not promote change but helps preserve the status quo. This paper sketches an outline of local level factional politics in rural Brazil and then presents a more detailed case study as an illustration. The trajectory of growth of rural settlements leads from a tiny shop in a farmhouse through the status of village and finally county seat. The conditions favoring the growth of settlements are discussed with special emphasis on the role of an entrepreneur combining commercial, political, and official roles. Factions emerge with the creation of independent municipios, and they become the source of divisions making possible the future fissioning of municipios. Factionalism and the fissioning of counties constitute an adaptive process enabling the expansion of rural stratification structures to keep pace with economic and population growth.

ALMOST EVERY OBSERVER of the Brazilian scene agrees that extensive changes resulting from "modernization" are taking place. Different sources frequently use similar phrases, e.g., "currents of

change," "breakdown of the patrimonial order," "the spread of rational administration," the "decline of clientistic politics." These changes are

al4gedly stimulated by the growing rational use of capital, new ideas diffusing from foreign or urban centers to the countryside, increased

participation in the market, or the rise of entrepreneurs where statuses had previously been ascribed. Insofar as modernization is defined empirically, one can test such assertions. One trait which is often taken as diagnostic of the "patrimonial" order of rural Brazilian society is coronelismo. Coroneis (or "colonels") are the legendary strong men of rural Brazil who exercise great power over their counties or regions and who stand at the apex of a localized patronage system (Leal 1948; Vilaqa and Albuquerque 1965).2

This paper deals with the relationships between social stratification

1 This paper was delivered orally at Columbia University on February 21, 1973. I wish to thank Professor Charles Wagley of the University of Florida for his guidance and encouragement in the research leading up to this paper, and Professor Marvin Harris of Columbia University for inspiration, constructive criticism, and encouragement. For helpful editorial and substantive

suggestions I thank Dr. Daniel Bates, Lucile Brockway, Dr. Kenneth Erickson, Dr. Shepard Forman, Joseph Gross, and Dr. Bernard Siegel. I am solely responsible for errors of fact and interpretation.

2 The term coronel was applied during the Empire and Old Republic to men who won (or purchased) commissions in their state's militia. Since about 1930, however, the term is applied only honorifically; today, its use seems to be dying out since it is regarded by some as pejorative. In this paper the term refers to any rural "big man" who combines his wealth earned from agriculture and/or commerce with strategic contacts among local, state, and federal authorities to construct a local power base. He has a following among local peasants and workers over whom he has great influence, not restricted to voting. I see no utility in restricting the term, as some authors do, to strictly agrarian types, or to illiterate or uneducated men (cf. Vilaga and Albuquerque 1965).

123 VOL. 29, 1973



124 JOURNAL OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH

and the growth of new political subdivisions in rural Brazil.3 The trajectory of growth common among rural communities-in both past and present-is correlated with the rise of a coronel who acts both as civic leader and entrepreneur. I will show that (1) coronelismo and factionalism are not dying out in rural Brazil but, rather, continue to be reproduced as new political subdivisions and settlements arise; (2) the maintenance of the clientistic system is not in spite of, but a result of economic growth, increased participation in markets, etc.; (3) the very individuals who, according to modernization theorists, should be the instigators of change may often assume and wield power in the traditional manner. It is precisely these individuals who have the greatest contact with urban centers and access to modern technology, capital, and influence.

FACTIONS AND FISSION

In this section I describe the typical sequence of growth of rural Brazilian settlements from farmstead to county seat (sede de municipio). Village growth involves an elaborate set of feedbacks, including the development of commerce, the rise of religious and social institutions, the creation of residential sites and other amenities, the expansion of employment, and increased occupational specialization. This process is closely tied to the career of a rising coronel. I have observed this sequence in a large number of cases, and believe that it is extremely regular and widespread. Beginning with a dispersed, relatively undifferentiated neighborhood (cf. Wagley 1971:136ff.), a rural shop is established, the settlement becomes nucleated, and then may be granted district status. Finally, rising elites may achieve political "emancipation" as a separate municipio (a county-like subdivision). In the early stages of development a single big man usually dominates the locality, politically and economically. As municipios form, factions-weakly developed or absent in districts-appear. These factions consist of rivalrous, structurally parallel groups, each led by an entrepreneur, which compete commer- cially as well as for votes and political influence. Factions and the followings they generate regulate much of the social and political life in rural communities. Social control is achieved by the exercise of clientistic power within factions. Factions also are subject to manipulation by state and federal governments, which may support one group at the expense of another through patronage or public expenditures (Burns 1970:329). Finally, factions provide a basis for further fissioning of

3 The descriptions herein are most applicable to the rural Northeast where I carried out research, but I believe that they apply to rural areas throughout Brazil, or-more operationally-to all those municipios which do not contain cities of over 20,000 population, large industrial concentrations, or plantation agriculture.



FACTIONALISM AND POLITICS IN RURAL BRAZIL 125

municipios, leading to replication of the process outlined above; in this context, factions may be regarded as mechanisms of self-regulation.

Demographic growth frequently is associated with the rise of nucleated settlements, often because the usual flow of migrants from a

region is stemmed. Local economic expansion also stimulates the

growth of settlements, especially through increased cash crops, the extraction or processing of some local resource for external markets, and the construction of roads or railroads. Other conditions which must be

present are adequate water supplies and transportation facilities. In Brazil, however, the growth of a settlement is always promoted by an

aspiring individual or entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial talent and a willingness to take risks are abundantly

present even in the poorly nourished, illiterate, and fatalistic population of the Northeast (Wagley 1971:141; Forman 1970:57-58; Johnson 1971:133). The first small step in community building is often the establishment of a small shop, usually in the front room of a farmhouse. The shop owner usually possesses a moderate amount of land, perhaps owns a truck as well, and is likely to have had some education. The shop's inventory may be little more than some boxes of matches, and a few kilograms each of salt, sugar, and coffee. Tiny shops such as this become gathering places on Sundays for friends and relatives from nearby farms.

Success leads to expansion. New crops, more wage labor, and a

larger local population may all contribute to this success. Thus the common sight in rural Brazil of a ramshackle farmhouse with a new whitewashed shop alongside. The shop generally has a false front, typical of the attached row houses found in larger settlements. Inside the shop one finds a billiard table, a kerosene refrigerator, a radio, and several bottles of cachaga ("rum"). There is a ubiquitous sign behind the counter: "Let's be friends, don't ask for credit!" Credit buying, nevertheless, is the cornerstone of the business and is a principal means of building a reliable clientele.

At the same time, or somewhat later, the farmer/shopkeeper becomes a produce collector as well, buying and storing cattle hides, beans, manioc flour, and other rural products. A town-based buyer makes weekly visits to such locales, often on Sundays, when he can pick up merchandise, discuss local affairs with the boys in the bar, and talk business with the shopkeeper to whom he may be wholesaler and creditor as well.

Even though such a settlement may contain only two or three structures, they are invariably arranged according to a plan. A shop, the residence, and a small warehouse are aligned parallel to a large, cleared open space which, it is hoped, will be a town plaza some day. The




proprietor may permit a number of dwellings to be constructed on the site which he rents or sells to farmworkers, relatives, and others. At this

point the village is ripe for the entry of outsiders who may be motivated to settle there because of better housing, a free building site, low house rental, the presence (or promise) of a rural school, or simply to be near other people. In addition, where local economic growth is taking place employment is a motivating factor. The disadvantages of settling in a village include the greater difficulty of raising livestock, increased distance from agricultural plots, and the prevalence of disputes between families.

Early in the life of a settlement, the founder begins to discuss the need for a chapel. A chapel is significant since it implies that a number of people recognize the location as a central gathering place. As well, a

chapel is good for business; on days when the priest comes to celebrate mass or perform weddings and baptisms, the bar fills with men who drink beer and cachaqa while their wives pray. The leader seeks funds for the building from neighbors, his wholesalers, the municipal government, and contributes substantially himself. The leader also

supports the organization of a soccer team to compete with neighboring villages and farmsteads, helps to purchase uniforms for the team, and initiates the cooperative construction of a playing field. While these

developments may be described as reflecting the growth of the

community, they also contribute to the wealth of the entrepreneur who

instigates them. The founder is the center of life in his tiny village. The village often

will continue to be known by the founder's name or the name of his estate even after it receives an official designation from the municipio. The founder commonly is a landholding agriculturalist, but he may also be a merchant, artisan, or a successful returned migrant from Sao Paulo. There are even cases of outsiders locating in rural areas and

forming a power base in a village (e.g., Della Cava 1970:103). The

entrepreneur rarely devotes himself exclusively to shopkeeping or

produce collecting, but continues his previous activities as a rancher, planter, trucker, or artisan. No matter what his station in life, he must establish ties with local politicians in the county seat (sede de municipio) as quickly as possible. Through them he may secure legitimacy for his

village-building, funds for public works, and links to sources of credit and merchandise. If he succeeds in constructing a school, improving a road, or building a bridge or reservoir, his prestige will rise and his

leadership role will be enhanced. He may benefit personally from his

daughter's employment as a schoolteacher, improved roads for his trucks, or a drinking place for his cattle. Nearby landholders also will be benefited and will tend to support him. Of course, the simple growth of




the village population provides him with potential customers, employees, and political clients.

With political ties to the sede established, the founder becomes the unofficial district representante or cabo eleitoral ("ward heeler") of one of the factions in the county seat. A truly influential representante is one who can deliver his entire district's votes to the candidate of his choice. This connection gives him the right to act unofficially as a local magistrate, resolving disputes, ordering the arrest of unruly persons, and generally influencing the outcome of justice administered in the sede. He also acts as principal contractor for public works done in his area. Thus, in addition to being the principal merchant, a wealthy agriculturalist, and a land subdivider, the village entrepreneur also exercises considerable quasi-legal police power.

Family disputes may exist in a village setting but factions rarely develop, as the power of the leader is seldom challenged. He may not be personally popular, but his prestige and power are generally maintained so long as he remains in the favor of the dominant faction in the county seat. When he falls from their favor, or if they fail to win an election, he may be toppled himself; more commonly, when his patrons lose power, he shifts his allegiance. Such changes in alliance may also occur in anticipation of a shift in power holders.

If population continues to rise the village may seek recognition by the municipio as a vila or district seat. An officially designated distrito receives public services such as a police station, primary schools, a cemetery, a slaughterhouse, and voting station. Vilas may range from 50 to several hundred houses in size, and attain a population of 2,000 or more.4 Vilas often mirror the appearance and layout of county seats (legally cidades), but they are different in a number of important respects. Cidades almost invariably have more amenities than vilas, including paved streets, street lights, branches of state agencies, secondary schools, post offices and other federal agencies, banks, movie theaters, electric current, running water, and health posts. In addition to the above items vilas lack local autonomy, official representatives, county or other government employees, and do not receive revenues directly in any form.

The municipio (roughly equivalent to the United States county), by contrast, has its own sources of revenue, mainly from federal subventions, and is governed by a mayor (prefeito) and a council (camara de vereadores). Municipios provide most government services including educa-

4 There were 3,882 vilas in Brazil in 1970, a number approximately equal to the number of municipios ("counties"). Thus, the average municipio in Brazil has one district in addition to that of the sede de municipio. ("county seat"). Mean vila population in 1970 was 1,445 (IBGE 1971:88-92). While the census distinguishes between urban, suburban, and rural settlements, cities and towns are not incorporated separately from the municpios in which they are located.




tion, public health, public utilities, paving and lighting of streets, sanitation, etc. In most cases there is an extreme imbalance between the level of services provided in the sede and elsewhere in the municipio.5 Aside from the concentration of county services in the cidade, nearly all federal and state offices and branches of private firms are located in

county seats. The resident priest officiates at the matriz ("mother church") and only occasionally visits outlying chapels in the parish. Secondary, vocational, and other specialized education usually is confined exclusively to cidades. Often the primary and secondary schools are staffed with graduates of normal schools who earn state salaries, while in outlying villages classes are conducted by untrained county teachers earning one-fifth or less than state teachers. The political dominance of the cidade may be reinforced by this educational

inequality, as literacy has been the primary requirement for voting in Brazil since 1881.

It should not be surprising to find, then, that districts desire the status of municipio as soon as they achieve the size and economic

importance they feel merits it. The dismemberment of a distrito from its

parent municipio is known as "emancipation," and represents the

political maturity of a Brazilian community. To achieve emancipation, a number of legal requirements must be met and approval won from the national congress.6 Table 1 shows how common this process is in

TABLE 1

Growth in Number of Municipios in Brazil since 1940

Year of Number of Population Mean Population Census Municipios of Brazil per Municipio

1940 1574 41,236,315 26,198 1950 1890 51,994,397 27,510 1960 2766 70,992,343 25,666 1970 3952 94,508,554 23,914

Brazil's recent history. The lion's share of the rewards of emancipation go to the successful leader of an emancipation movement and his coterie of supporters and dependents. For example, every municipio has a large

5 For example, the village of Sdo Damido is located in the Municipio of Vitoria, Bahia, next to a large reservoir. This reservoir feeds a water system in the county seat 20 km. away, while the village of Sho Damido with its 1,200 inhabitants has no running water.

6 The constitution of 1946 "prescribed that a new municipio must (1) have a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants, (2) be able to raise twenty contos of taxes for local use, (3) have as its seat a population center containing at least one thousand 'good houses,' (4) provide in the new seat adequate buildings for the local governmental offices, a jail and at least two schools . . ." (Smith 1963:579-580). Smith observes that many municipios were formed which did not even meet the first three requirements. Additional requirements were imposed by each of the states.




number of civil servants appointed directly or indirectly by the mayor. In Minas Velhas, Bahia, 12% of all households derived their principal income from civil service in 1951 (Harris 1956:47). Until a recent civil service reform, local judges and tax collectors were nominated locally and appointed by the state governor. The mayor selects the police chief and all municipal employees from street sweepers up.

Patronage power is used to further the interests and fortunes of the dominant town faction. The leader of a municipio can easily manipulate the disbursement of funds for road, dam, and school construction to benefit his allies; often he can choose where other improvements will be made. Perhaps even more important is a mayor's access to leading business, financial, and political leaders in the state. He and his friends find it easier to obtain credit in state banks, as well as services such as

agricultural extension and health care. The power of patronage permits the leader to extend or withhold practically any service to a citizen of the county. A coronel (by now we are entitled to refer to him as such) invariably builds up a coterie of supporters in all the villages and districts of his county. Votes are manipulated through them, or directly by means of largesse and the corralling of voters (cf. Harris 1956:202). Coroneis also control blocks of votes for federal and state legislators who are all elected at large.

The establishment of a municipio, then, creates a new focus of urban

power in the countryside and thus a new segment of the sociopolitical hierarchy which characterizes most of rural Brazil. Political and economic powers are always focussed in cidades. Not only do the most

powerful individuals in a municipio usually reside in the sede, but they also have their major electoral support from sedes and they identify with urban interests even where their wealth derives mainly from the land. The urban-rural distinction in Brazil is fundamentally a class division; the airs affected by urbanites in relation to "hicks" are primarily symbolic of the differences in power and prestige they undeniably enjoy (cf. Harris 1956:239ff.). The creation of a new municipio may be viewed as the extension of the stratification system to a new center, keeping pace with economic and demographic growth. Table 1 shows how the

segmenting of municipios kept pace with the growth of population since 1940. The population size of Brazilian municipios has remained relatively constant, fluctuating around a mean of 25,822 (s.d. = 1,291).

Of course, the leaders in any municipio are usually loath to allow dismemberment. Emancipation of any part of the county reduces the tax base, the electorate, and the size of federal subventions made on a

per capita or areal basis. Since resources are not distributed equally throughout the municipio, this will mean a net loss of benefits to the cidade. (The aftermath of emancipation is less strongly felt in the




villages.) Moreover, the establishment of a new cidade near an older one can pose a threat to the commercial and social hegemony of the older elite, principally by drawing away business. How, then, is the resistance of county leaders overcome and emancipation achieved?

While villages are generally dominated by a single strong man, municipios, and particularly the cidade, are invariably divided by factions.' Town elites are seldom, if ever, united. In contrast, although feuds of varying degrees of intensity are common enough in all rural

neighborhoods in Brazil, they rarely involve more than the principals to the dispute and their immediate families. One does not often encounter villages with most of the population divided on one or the other side of a dispute.

In rural municipios economic issues usually lie at the root of factional conflict, but the most visible arena in which disputes are enacted is that of local electoral politics. From the participants' point of view many different issues may be considered basic, such as insults traded in the

past, alleged dishonesty or corruption, the degree of love or loyalty to the people of the municipio, etc. Each faction focuses on a single leader who is supported by segments of his kindred, his employees, and other

dependents. Nearly all the prominent families of a given town are

ranged on one side or the other, although a given kindred may be

internally divided. There are no invariant patterns of segmentation of kin groups. At some points consanguineal ties are dominant; at others affinal ties win out. Members of opposed factions may be on relatively polite terms with each other in non-election years and even attend the

baptisms and weddings of each others' children, but rarely do cross-factional relationships become warm and cordial with the frequent visiting, gift-giving, and economic cooperation which may characterize intrafactional relationships.

A rural cidade generally has but two factions and each one identifies with a national political party. Although on the state and national levels the parties have divergent bases of support and different

ideological tendencies (cf. Skidmore 1967), these differences were scarcely reflected in small town politics.8 Where a third party is

7 Factions may be defined here following Nicholas (1965) as non-corporate political groups, based on conflict, recruited by leaders on diverse principles, but united by individual self-interest. My acceptance of his definition, however, does not extend to his characterization of the conditions which favor factional politics at a local level: rapid sociopolitical change. This is because my evidence from Brazil suggests that factionalism functions in a context of stability, not change.

8 Before the 1964 military coup in Brazil, the two major parties were UDN (Unido Democritica Nacional) and PSD (Partido Social Democratico). Nearly every town in the country had branches of these and other parties, but little of the ideological predilections of the national parties were reflected at the local level. As an illustration, one may cite the ethnographer Cruz's (1959) study of Rio Rico, a small, remote town in the interior of Bahia State. An informant described the period following the breakup of Getulio Vargas' dictatorship in 1945 before local




represented in a town, an alliance is formed to offer candidates on a joint ticket. Election time is the prime season for factional conflicts; disputes may become acrimonious, with outbursts of insults, denun- ciations, vandalism, intimidation, or even violence.

There are further aspects of factionalism in Brazilian towns. Each faction commonly builds parallel and competing commercial estab- lishments, each catering to its own members. A relatively simple way of constructing a map of factions in a given town is to inquire of one faction member where certain goods or services may be acquired. In one cidade in Bahia State, Harris (1956:197-198) observed that

In this . . . town there are two separate public address systems. Loudspeakers placed on opposite sides of the squares and streets simultaneously blare out propaganda for the respective political parties. One barber cuts only UDN hair, another.only PSD hair; one bar wets UDN throats, another only those of the PSD.

Participation in factional disputes is most intense at higher social levels, but the division touches nearly everyone regardless of his status or where he lives. Lower class peasants tend to be identified with their employers, creditors, or other patronal figures, but their factional participation is generally limited to attending rallies during campaigns and voting, if eligible. Peasants may perform their duty to their patrons but do not hesitate to fraternize with supporters of rival factions, while their leaders are not on speaking terms. Unquestioning support of one's patron is regarded as natural and normal: you help him because he helped you. Jose always votes as Carlos tells him because Carlos loaned him money, helped his son get a job, took his wife to the hospital, got him out of jail once, and so on. While not forced to participate constantly in factional disputes, peasants are seriously affected by the struggle. A village dominated by a representante of the opposition faction will not have its road graded, its teachers may go for months without pay, and promised public works will not materialize. Studies have shown that cooperatives or other forms of mutual assistance are extremely difficult to organize because factional interests always threaten to sabotage them (Forman 1970:43-44, 127-130; Harris 1956:205; Galjart 1968:99ff.; cf. Siegel and Beals 1960). Finally, many public works such as hospitals and schools are never completed because their initiators are turned out of office.

Factionalism feeds in to the practice of fissioning of municipios

elections were to be held: "We belonged to the UDN but Franco [the opposition] went to [the capital] and seeing that UDN was going to win the [statewide] election, he joined UDN. We therefore switched over to PSD and registered too. The interest was purely local; there were no federal or state considerations" (Cruz 1959:134).




described above. The strategies for achieving emancipation depend on the manipulation of factions in the sede do municipio. In one strategy, the leader of a district bidding for autonomy may throw his support behind the opposition faction in the municipio. If the district in question has a substantial number of voters, their support, added to that of the

opposition, may be sufficient to vote the incumbents out of office. The latter, therefore, may agree to dismemberment, knowing that the detachment of the insurgent district will enable them to preserve their

majority. Another possibility is for a district to garner support for emancipation outside the municipio, and then take the case to a state governor or federal deputy dependent on votes from that region. An example of this strategy follows.

Della Cava (1970) describes the rapid growth of Joaseiro, Cearit, caused by the influx of pilgrims attracted by Cicero, the miracle-work-

ing priest. This vila, in the Municipio of Crato, Cearat, grew from about 2,500 persons in 1890 to over 15,000 in 1909. A group of artisans and merchants began to seek autonomy as early as 1907, feeling that emancipation would permit economic growth unfettered by taxes and restrictions from Crato, the economic center of the Cariry region. Cicero was reluctant at first to espouse emancipation, because to do so meant opposing his long-time supporter, the mayor of Crato and cousin of the Governor. A series of incidents revolving around a land dispute led Cicero to support autonomy. He was persuaded to form an alliance with

political leaders from neighboring municipios who either had scores to settle with the mayor of Crato, or who sought to deflate Crato's economic hegemony. Together, these men persuaded the Governor -who was at the time facing a re-election campaign-to favor emancipation for Joaseiro, even though it meant defeat for his own cousin (Della Cava 1970:84, 101ff.)

A CASE STUDY

Vitoria, Bahia, provides a case history illustrating much of the preceding discussion.9 Located in the heart of the arid sertaio region of the northeast, Vitoria was in 1925 a tiny vila in the Municipio of Campo Grande. It stood at a crossroads about midway between Campo Grande and Serra Mansa, two established market towns. The undisputed leader of the community and president of the municipal council of Campo Grande was Jorge Rocha, a rancher, whose father Coronel Patricio Rocha had played a similar role before him. (See Fig. 1, where the genealogical positions of most of the individuals referred to in the case

9 My field work was conducted in a small vila belonging to the Municipio of Vitoria (a pseudonym) in Bahia State during 1967-1968 under the auspices of NIMH Grant Number 1R04-MH13789-01. I gratefully acknowledge this support. For further details on the economy, ecology, and society of the region, see Gross 1969 and 1970, and Gross and Underwood 1971.




study are depicted.) Like most of the traditional coronels of the sertao, Jorge dominated electoral politics and patronage in his area. A good representante, he "delivered" all the votes in his district to the ruling

A-0o PATRII ROCHA

BERNARDETE ALFREDO AILICE ROCHA DIAS MORAIS

AMARAL AMARAL AMARAL

JORGE JORGEEMANUEL ORNELAS ROCHA ROCHA

ADALBERTO JOAQUIM JORGEAA CIDREIRA JORGE ROCHA DAVID SAMUEL LUCIA ALDO

ORNELAS JUNIOR CASTRO CASTRO REIS REIS

ERNESTO NARA AURELIO ROBERTO MARIA EDUARDO JORGE PAULO JULIE TA EVERALDO EMILIA SlLViO MORAIS ROCHA ROCHA ROCHA ROCHA MORIAS MORIAS MORIAS AM ARAL LIMA MORAlS SOUZA

MORIAS REIS REIS MORiAS LIMA SOUZA

Fig. 1. Genealogy of Rocha and Morais Families.

faction in Campo Grande. As a reward Jorge was able to fill all official posts in the district with members of his coterie, primarily family members. His brother Emanuel became registrar of land titles in Vitoria, and Emanuel's sister-in-law, Lucia, was appointed civil registrar. In his old age, Jorge was succeeded as councilman by his son Jorge Junior who, in turn, was replaced by the old man's nephew, Joaquim Ornelas, a respected pharmacist. The old Coronel himself acted as police chief.

The economy of Vitoria was based primarily on ranching and subsistence farming, but in years of good rainfall beans, manioc, cotton, and tobacco were grown as cash crops. Jorge Rocha was a shopkeeper and the principal local produce buyer. Jorge recruited a young man, Samuel Castro, as his assistant, who subsequently became his son-in- law. This freed Jorge to carry out his political activities, which included a long campaign, launched by his father, to secure federal

funding for a reservoir in Vitoria. He finally succeeded in 1935 after the disastrous drought of 1930-1932 devastated much of the region and sent waves of migrants to other parts of Brazil. The reservoir brought new

population to the village, much of which remained after construction was completed. During this period a small weekly market was established, drawing local peasants who did not wish to make the long trip to the market centers.

Vitoria remained a sleepy little district until the late 1940's when a new cash crop-sisal-was introduced. Sisal (Agave sisalensis) is a

perennial, drought resistant plant yielding a fiber demanded for

agricultural twines in foreign markets. Its piecemeal introduction stimulated the founding of a dispersed, small-scale decortication




industry utilizing portable, diesel-powered, manually fed rasps for removing fiber from the leaf (Gross 1970). Jorge Rocha became involved in buying fiber in Vitoria, and soon his brother-in-law, Jorge Ornelas, began trucking sisal to Salvador for export.

Here began the career of Eduardo Morais, son of another of Coronel Jorge's brothers-in-law, Alfredo D. Amaral. Eduardo began working as a driver for Jorge Ornelas. From driving, Eduardo went into the butter business with his brother Paulo. With the profits from their small chum, Eduardo made a down payment on a truck and transported sisal fiber to Salvador. Sisal demand expanded rapidly and soon Eduardo and Paulo were buying and transporting sisal on their own; as well, they enlarged their sisal plantings. To further stimulate production, exporters began to channel credit for the purchase of decortication machinery through buyers in the countryside. Eduardo Morais won an exclusive franchise for the popular Yanmar motor and financed hundreds of units in Vitoria with this credit. Those who bought decortication units repaid their debts in fiber; they were obliged to sell exclusively to Eduardo, occasionally at disadvantageous prices. Still, most were grateful for the chance to acquire motors and seek profits in sisal production. Motor owners began to enjoy a higher standard of living while workers-drawn from subsistence pursuits-may have suffered a decline in well-being (Gross and Underwood 1971). Entrepreneurs like Morais realized very substantial profits, catapulting them to positions of influence and relative wealth in their regions.

Eduardo was quick to capitalize on his new found wealth and prestige. On frequent trips to Salvador he made contacts with politicians, bankers, and businessmen, including the influential Federal Deputy, Marcos Nunes. Eduardo invested in more sisal plantings, in other small businesses, and brought family members into the enterprise. He formed partnerships with his brothers and his brother-in-law, Silvio Souza, who owned a fabric shop in Vitoria where Jorge Morais (another brother of Eduardo) worked as a cashier. Jorge, an autodidact with a remarkable level of learning and polish, was groomed for a political role by Eduardo, who made him paymaster for the sisal buying operation. Eduardo did not marry until his late thirties when he took Maria Rocha Reis, a granddaughter of the old Coronel as his bride. Maria's brothers (Roberto and Aurelio) were drawn into the Morais enterprise as truck drivers, thus creating a potential rift with the Rocha kindred.

Vitoria grew economically with the influx of sisal earnings, the expansion of services ancillary to trucking and sisal decortication, the growth of food retailing, and the decline of subsistence agriculture. Many villages in the region, including Vitoria, increased in population as a result of the influx of peasants who formerly resided in dispersed




farm households but now sought work on sisal decortication units. It was easier to find work in a village where motor operators were hiring crews. As an added reason for migration many small holders planted most or all of their plots in sisal and were forced onto the job market for at least four years as the crop matured (cf. Gross 1970; Gross and Underwood 1971).

As Vitoria's population rose from less than 1,000 in 1950 to over 3,500 in 1970, political changes took place. Jorge Rocha had represented the powerful PSD faction in Campo Grande. In 1958, Eduardo Morais prevailed on Marcos Nunes (UDN) to sponsor legislation making Vitoria a separate Municipio. The PSD stalwarts in Campo Grande, aware of Eduardo's prestige, did not offer serious opposition probably because their own position was precarious and the emancipation of Vitoria removed a potential threat to their hegemony.

With the autonomy of Vitoria achieved, Jorge Morais ran for mayor in the first election. The Rocha faction, seriously demoralized, did not present a candidate, although Joaquim Ornelas and Jorge Rocha Junior were elected as councilmen (vereadores). In the 1962 election, Joaquim Ornelas ran but lost in the mayoral race against Roberto Rocha Reis (Eduardo's brother-in-law).'0 In the third election in 1966, Jorge Morais, though stricken with a debilitating illness, was unop- posed. The Rocha faction contested the election again in 1970 but Roberto Reis was returned to office. Since recognition as a municipio all appointive offices in Vitoria have been filled by friends or relatives of the Morais family.

During this period the Morais faction consolidated its commercial and political interests. Eduardo continued to expand his sisal holdings. In partnership with Jorge, he purchased real estate in the state capital. With Roberto Reis, Silvio Souza, and Jorge and Paulo Morais, Eduardo set up the Willys auto franchise in Vitoria, a Chevrolet truck franchise in another town, a gas station, a construction supplies store, a major appliance store, and an auto-parts shop. On his own initiative Eduardo built a movie theater and an ice-cream parlor. The Morais business enterprises and political activities became so extensive that an office was rented in downtown Salvador which became known as the "Vitoria consulate." The brothers began to spend more and more time in Salvador on business and in contact with politicians.

Political fences were constantly mended during this period as well. Jorge and Eduardo set aside an unoccupied house in Salvador for seriously ill persons from Vitoria to occupy while they sought medical treatment in the capital. Silvio's older son (Eduardo's nephew), a

10 The alternation of candidates is primarily because of a provision of the Brazilian constitution which prohibits mayors from succeeding themselves.




medical student, was given the task of arranging for tests and admissions to state hospitals. When the nephew graduated from medical school, Eduardo succeeded in having him hired as a state physician in Vitoria.

Still more significant were the large numbers of loans which Eduardo co-signed for friends and neighbors in Vitoria. He used his influence with the Banco do Brasil and other banks to obtain credit for his allies to extend sisal plantings, purchase trucks, build sisal combing plants, and buy other businesses in Vitoria. This earned him the strong support and affection of numerous influential men from Vitoria.

Eduardo and Jorge built close ties to Federal and State legislators and through them won numerous benefits for the rapidly growing town of Vitoria. Largely because of their efforts and those of Marcos Nunes (who had become Eduardo's compadre), Vitoria was included in a rural electrification project, and a new highway which was constructed

through the sisal region passed through Vitoria. The municipio won

grants for the construction of a town hall (containing a post office, police radio, courtrooms, tax offices, etc.), a water system, a high school and normal school, a health post (later a hospital), and an agricultural extension station. This is an enviable record for so young a municipio and testifies to the vigor of the Morais faction and its ability to deliver votes.

Their network of contacts and influence was useful, no doubt, to the business interests of the Morais brothers themselves. To give one concrete example, Eduardo enjoyed an advantage over other sisal

buyers because he was able to utilize the state police radio network to send price quotations to Vitoria from Salvador. In spite of heavy commitments in Salvador, Jorge and Eduardo never failed to appear on market day in Vitoria, even if it meant awakening at 4:00 a.m. to make the four-hour drive and returning the same day. This arduous regime was necessary in order to maintain personal contacts and direct lines of communication with the home folk. Jorge Morais held an informal audience every Saturday and discussed civic affairs, politics, the weather, cattle, and other subjects as he made payments to sisal growers.

All this does not imply that the Morais faction crushed the Rocha faction. On the contrary, Samuel Castro expanded his father-in-law's

(Jorge) sisal buying business into one rivaling Eduardo's in size. Joaquim Ornelas' pharmacy continued to do excellent business in spite of competition from another one opened by Everaldo Lima, Eduardo Morais' brother-in-law. The pharmacy helped Joaquim maintain his political following, since he dispensed free medical advice in addition to medicine (cf. Shirley 1971:94). Joaquim also opened a gas station opposite the Morais pump, and a home-appliance store just down the




street from the Morais family store. Recently, the waning Rocha faction

gained new blood when a young sisal buyer, formerly allied with Eduardo, began to have political ambitions. As President of the council, this man, Floriano, assumed the mayor's office temporarily while Jorge Morais was abroad receiving medical treatment. During this time Floriano hired a large road scraper to improve roads near certain villages where he thought he could capture support.

Aside from this defection, neither faction made any significant inroads on the loyalties of the members of the other during 15 years of Morais rule. The lines between the most prominent families are rigidly drawn. In some cases, there are residual ties of the former unity of the village. For example, Joaquim Ornelas is baptismal godfather to Silvio Souza's 23-year-old daughter. Joaquim attended her wedding wearing a smile and even appeared for ten uncomfortable minutes at the wedding feast, but there was noticeable relief when he left. In a few areas there is limited cooperation across factional lines, such as in the founding and decoration of a social club which caters mainly to young members of the local elite. The entire town supports the soccer team, and Eduardo Morais contributed land and materials for the construction of a stadium bearing his name on the outskirts of town. Nevertheless, relationships between factions are generally less than cordial even in non-election years.

The 1970 election campaign was a bitter one, although by law the winner was to serve only two years. Roberto Reis again ran under the Morais banner; his opponent was Floriano, who was supported by Joaquim Ornelas. Slogans uncomplimentary to one side or the other appeared on walls as early as 1968 and a few acts of vandalism occurred. In the aftermath of the campaign, members of the Rocha faction took Jorge Morais to court, alleging malfeasance in office. Morais was exonerated but the incident prolonged the bitter feeling after the election. Another vengeful act on the part of the losing Rocha faction was to persuade the state governor to remove the highly regarded headmistress of one of Vitoria's schools who had been installed by the Morais faction; she was replaced by an inexperienced man who was not even interested in the job.

Recent events indicate that more defections and shifts in factional alignments are likely to occur, spelling the probable loss of prestige and influence of the Morais group. The sisal boom has been in a decline since 1963 and, discounting minor fluctuations in price, it will probably not again produce a local building spree and euphoria similar to that of the 1950's and early 1960's (see Gross 1970). Little new sisal is being planted, and the sale of machinery has dropped almost to zero. These factors can only loosen the sway Morais holds over his associates and




dependents in Vitoria. His other local enterprises are likely to share the same fate as his declining sisal business, since they are dependent on the same income. A number of businessmen whose loans Eduardo co-signed have recently become bankrupt, seriously eroding his financial position and forcing him to liquidate, among other holdings, his property in Salvador, including the home for Vitoria's ill people.

Although the Morais group won the 1970 election, they did so by the smallest margin yet-largely because of the supporting votes of the Sio Damiio district. This district, with its center in a large and thriving vila with over 1200 population, is led by a personable young sisal buyer named Florindo who has for some time supported Eduardo Morais. But there is a strong potential for discontent in Sio Damiio, which lacks

paved streets, street lights, and other amenities; there is already some talk of emancipation for the vila. The Morais faction shrewdly presented Florindo as their candidate in the 1972 mayoral election, leaving the

opposition off balance. In outward appearance, the political scene in Vitoria was considerably calmer in 1972 than in 1970, since the two

parties agreed-under government pressure-to offer a single candidate under the ARENA banner with no "sublegendas."11 Any misapprehen- sions over "pacification" were quickly dispelled in the balloting, however, when more than 1,000 blank ballots (of a total of about 3,000 votes) were cast in an evident protest against the Morais candidate.

DISCUSSION

A striking aspect of rural factionalism in Brazil is that factions are almost invariably two in number. Where there are three or more groups, they usually reduce themselves to two by means of alliances formed

through marriage, ritual kinship, partnership, or friendship between

high-ranking members. There are a number of possible explanations for the dual character of factions.

One explanation links dual factionalism to the existence of a two

party system at the federal or state level. But factions do not always correspond to higher level partisan divisions. Secondly, there have

frequently been more than two national parties, particularly during the 1945-1964 period. Thirdly, there is little evidence to suggest that local factions are simply excrescences of state or federal party structures (cf. footnote 8; Pang 1971). Finally, at some times both local factions identified themselves with the same state or national party. For

11 Since 1965, only two parties are officially permitted in Brazil, ARENA (AlianGa Renovadora Nacional) and MDB (Movimento Democrntico Brasileiro). In some locales, the old factions have simply picked one or the other party label and continued as before. In many other cases, however, factions have utilized "sublegendas" ARENA I and ARENA II since neither wishes to be identified with the virtually powerless MDB, the "opposition" party tolerated by the military government.




example, during the Old Republic, the so-called "politics of the governors" (Della Cava 1971:94) resulted in disputes between local factions as to which could deliver more votes to the same candidate. Presently, in many Brazilian municipios both factions pay allegiance to the ruling government party, ARENA, completly ignoring the tolerated opposition (MDB).

Another interpretation suggests that factional struggle represents a dialectic between two opposing forces: the traditional, land-holding "feudal" elite against the rising, modernizing, commercial bourgeoisie (Fac6 1963:22, 154, 158, 161, 170, 214; Burns 1970:329). A number of instances could be cited which superficially conform to this model, e.g., the rise of the new sisal buyer group in Vitoria, the upstart Joaseiro merchants (Della Cava 1970:110ff.), and an enterprising doctor in Cunha (Shirley 1970:81-82). But, according to all these accounts, after power had been achieved the very parties who ostensibly represented the "modernizing influence" assumed precisely the same roles as the traditional coron.is whom they challenged (Shirley 1970:90ff.; Della Cava 1970:125-128; Gross 1969:8ff.). Other cases could be cited where there is no clear distinction in economic function or outlook between the contenders for power. The salient point is that while factional conflict may be a dialectical process, it does not alter the structure of a

society but, rather, serves to maintain it.12 A more plausible suggestion was made by Singer (1965:72-73):

In areas of colonial economy in Brazil, political struggle takes place between two groups, identical in social structure and ideology, each one led by an "area chief." Within municipio politics, it is curious to note that in each one there are only two factions--even when the number of large landowners is much larger. The reason is as follows: the objective of each coronel is to obtain favors from the state or federal government, credit in official banks, concessions to new lands or public offices for himself or members of his clan. If one of the local factions has the luck to be allied with the group in power in the federal or state government, the majority tries to link up with that faction to participate in the advantages of power. Those who are excluded from the distribution of goods, unite in opposition so as not to be crushed. Why don't all groups ally themselves with the group in power? Some because of old enmities with those in power. Others [remain aloof] deliberately, foreseeing that today's opposition will be in power

12 A dramatic case in point occurred in Joaseiro where, upon the resolution of the conflict surrounding the emancipation of Joaseiro from Crato in 1911, the coroneis of the entire Cariry region convened and signed a pact in defense of the traditional political system of the state and the Acciolino party in particular. Shortly thereafter, they successfully overthrew a reformist governor in Ceara by manipulating old ties in the national capital (Della Cava 1970:127; Fac6 1963:152ff.). Similarly, with regard to the "Revolt of the Bahian Corontis, " Pang (1971:25) concluded that: "It is myopic to regard the coronelista revolt as anything but outgrowth [sic] of a struggle for power within Bahian coronelismo. It was not a conscious social and political crusade to unseat the Bahian state oligarchy as the Convention Party tried to make it appear."




tomorrow. Others, because the advantages which the central government can bestow are not enough for everyone.

The struggle for spoils and privileges dispensed by the central

government is certainly one of the most powerful factors creating and

conserving the factional struggles so common in Brazil. In addition to this, however, I believe that bifactionalism provides a form of political leverage which rising elites can exploit to achieve their emancipation. It also provides an opportunity for manipulation from above by the state and central governments. These are important aspects of Brazilian social structure.

It seems appropriate to deal briefly with those who have suggested recently that local-level factionalism is disappearing in Brazil under the influence of modernization and, particularly, since the military coup in 1964 when the government began to suppress some aspects of factionalism in favor of rational administration and planning (Shirley 1970:104ff.; Vilaqa and Albuquerque 1965; Burns 1970; Forman 1972). There is some evidence for these claims, as the central government, especially since 1968, exercised greater control in areas formerly left to local administration. Recent years have seen an increase in the number of regulatory, planning, and supervisory agencies headed, in large measure, by former army officers. In 1970 the Federal government embarked on a program of political "pacification" (pacificaGio)in the

municipios. The aim was to stifle the destructive and wasteful aspects of factionalism and to unite local populations behind national goals. New and stringent laws have been passed, which make it more difficult to achieve municipal emancipation; it is now a crime to make false accusations about public officials, and strict fiscal controls over municipal activities have been imposed. The collection of income taxes has been greatly increased. Some results are already apparent, particularly in the completion of numerous construction projects which formerly languished incomplete for years when their initiators were turned out of office.

In spite of these indications, the weight of the evidence with respect to this viewpoint seems to me negative. First, factional disputes have continued to rage in a number of widely distributed Brazilian municipios about which I have reliable information. The ballot-box protest mentioned above shows that factional tempers have hardly cooled in Vitoria. Similar events have occurred in many other municipios in spite of the government's "pacification" program and its opposition to the

"sublegendas." In some places, the extent of the factional conflict may have been masked by the changing articulations of local faction members to outside authorities. With the virtual destruction of the




brokerage power of federal and state deputies, contacts with "non-political" bureaucracies have assumed new importance. In one Sao Paulo municipio, a new faction which is explicitly non-political, has emerged in the form of a chapter of Rotary International. This group, nevertheless, is acting in much the same way as a political faction, e.g., sponsoring public works, attempting to discredit enemies (Bela Bianco, personal communication).

CONCLUSIONS

A full explanation of factionalism awaits a more systematic comparative study both within Brazil and elsewhere. The following conclusions are to be regarded as tentative and suggestive: (1) Factions are an important aspect of the hierarchical patron-client relationships which are widely recognized as forming the core of Brazilian social relations. But some analysts have taken this basic notion too far in suggesting that Brazil's entire sociopolitical structure consists of one monolithic patron- client network. The prevalence of factions reveals that the system is more complex. Political hierarchies are vertically segmented and there is competition between the segments which takes different forms at different hierarchical levels.

(2) Coronelismo, the wielding of great powers by local oligarchs in rural zones, is alive and well in Brazil. The factions led by coroneis do not represent challenges to the established order. Paradoxically, while intensified factional conflict may be the result of changing local conditions, fundamental change is not promoted. Since factions are not ideologically oriented and tend to crosscut socioeconomic strata, they reduce the possibility of class-based struggle by dissipating energy in petty strife serving private interests. The rewards are local political and economic dominance, but no faction seeks to upset the system which provides these rewards.

(3) Factions may endure for long periods with a high degree of internal solidarity, but they are not immutable. As the case study presented shows, cohesive groups such as kindreds may fission and begin to compete for new sets of rewards. Neither kin nor ritual kinship bonds present any serious obstacle to factional division.

(4) Factionalism is a political process allowing for a certain amount of interference by the central government in local affairs, while at the same time providing a means for local groups to channel resources into their communities. The municipio, unlike the North American county, provides the major point of articulation between the national society and rural peasants and workers. Factions, with all their violence and




inefficiency, are an integral part of the system of social control in rural Brazil.

(5) My data suggest that factionalism is not dying out in rural Brazil. The destruction of the present system of local government and

"spoils" would oblige the central government to provide another, e.g., rural unionization and sociopolitical mobilization similar to that which Getulio Vargas undertook among urban workers during the Estado Novo. Such a program might involve rural cooperatives, labor syndicates, and tenants' organizations which might be manipulated in a manner similar to urban labor. But I see little to suggest that the present military regime has any intention of fostering a massive reorganization of the rural masses, or that it has either the ideological commitment or the material means to provide for rural areas the level of services to which urban workers in Brazil are accustomed. On the contrary, the rural organizing which took place all over Brazil during the early 1960's -most prominently in the states of Pernambuco and Paraiba-has been all but completely suppressed (Forman 1971:22-23).

(6) Factions are self-regulating mechanisms in the sense that they provide a means for the fissioning of municipios. These units multiply and keep pace with economic and demographic growth. Thus, factions may help to maintain the present socioeconomic structure of Brazil in equilibrium.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Hunter College of the City University of New York New York, New York



factionalism and local level politics in rural brazil

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