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Critical Thinking, Chapter 6 – Application to Real Life Dona Warren

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EXERCISES, QUESTIONS, AND ACTIVITIES

My Answers READING: WILLIAM PALEY'S NATURAL THEOLOGY Question 1: I see two ideas in the opening paragraph of Chapter One and I see an inference between them. What are these two ideas and how does the inference go? Answer 1: The first of these ideas appears in the passage as “when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive … that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose…” Paley elaborates upon this idea quite a bit, discussing parts of the watch in detail, but fundamentally that entire discussion boils down to this claim. The second idea appears as “the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker.” (See how Paley is making the inference very clear?) We can rephrase the first idea as “A watch exhibits impressive design,” and the second idea as “A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker.” Let’s keep track of these ideas, with the inference, as follows.

1. A watch exhibits impressive design. 2. A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker.

(I won’t worry about identifying the ultimate conclusion is yet, so I’ll list the ideas in the order they appear. The ultimate conclusion will be wherever the argument ends up.) By the way, what about the stone? I don’t think any of Paley’s observations about the stone need to be included. The important point, for Paley, isn’t that stones don’t need designers. The important point is that watches do. We know this because we have some idea of where Paley is going, on the basis of our first reading. He’s going to argue that natural objects, like eyes, need designers, and he’s going to do this by comparing them to watches. That’s why the watch, and not the stone, is the star of this paragraph. So this paragraph has given us some argumentative material, which we’ve noted, and a lot of repetition, clarification, explanation, and many tangents, which we ignored.


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Question 2: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph I? Answer 2: I see one important point in this paragraph, expressed in the first sentence “Nor would it, I apprehend, weaken the conclusion, that we had never seen a watch made -- that we had never known an artist capable of making one -- that we were altogether incapable of executing such a piece of workmanship ourselves, or of understanding in what manner it was performed…” I’ll include this idea as number 3 in our list. 3. The fact that we don’t know anyone able to make a watch, that we can’t make a

watch ourselves, or that we don’t fully understand how watches are made shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the watch doesn’t have a designer.

Question 3: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph II? Answer 3: I see the important idea of this paragraph conveyed by the sentence “Neither, secondly, would it invalidate our conclusion, that the watch sometimes went wrong or that it seldom went exactly right.” I’ll add this to the list as idea 4. 4. The fact that the watch sometimes malfunctions shouldn’t lead us to conclude that it

doesn’t have a designer.

Question 4: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph III?

Answer 4: I think this paragraph conveys an important idea expressed by the sentence “Nor, thirdly, would it bring any uncertainty into the argument, if there were a few parts of the watch, concerning which we could not discover or had not yet discovered in what manner they conduced to the general effect; or even some parts, concerning which we could not ascertain whether they conduced to that effect in any manner whatever.” Now there is a little argument for this idea in the paragraph, but since we’re trying to get a sense of the overall argument, I’ve decided not to worry too much about the argument given for this claim. Besides, it seems to me like the idea is, itself, relatively uncontroversial; I think it’s okay if we just accept this idea, treating it as a premise, at least for now. (If you would you have included the ideas in support of this claim in your list, that’s fine. My decision to think only in terms of the main idea of this paragraph is one of those judgments calls we have to make. I’m simply trying to reduce the complexity of the argument wherever I can, so long as it doesn’t misrepresent the argument.)


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Let’s add the idea in this paragraph to our list, as idea 5. 5. The fact that we don’t understand the purpose of some parts of the watch, or that

some parts are unnecessary, shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the watch doesn’t have a designer.

Question 5: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph IV? Answer 5: This paragraph notes that although whatever we happened to find where we found the watch would have some internal structure or other, this fact shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the watch doesn’t have a designer. This claim strikes me as so obvious that it’s hardly worth making, and, generally speaking, claims that are hardly worth making are hardly worth recording in our list. However, in this case I’d include the idea anyway. After all, Paley though it was important enough to include with a number (“Nor, fourthly,…”) so let’s put it down as idea 6. 6. The fact that whatever we happened to find where we found the watch would have

some internal structure or other shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the watch doesn’t have a designer.

Question 6: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph V? Answer 6: Here, the important point is that we can’t account for the presence of a watch by appealing to an alleged ‘principle of order’ which supposedly created and organized the watch. Let’s put this down as idea 7. 7. We can’t account for the presence of the watch by appealing to an alleged ‘principle

of order’ which supposedly created and organized the watch. Question 7: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph VI? Answer 7: Here Paley considers the objection that the intricate watch mechanism isn’t evidence that the watch was really designed by a watchmaker, but merely a reason that we that might be mislead into thinking that that the watch was designed by a watchmaker. By saying that someone would be “surprised to hear” this, and then dropping the matter, Paley implies that this objection isn’t really worth taking seriously. Let’s include something to that effect in our list of ideas.


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8. It’s ridiculous to maintain that the intricate watch mechanism isn’t evidence that the

watch was really designed by a watchmaker, but merely a reason that we that might be mislead into thinking that that the watch was designed by a watchmaker.

Question 8: In Chapter One, Paragraph VII, Paley claims that we can’t dispense with a watch designer by saying that the order of the watch is the result of laws of nature. Furthermore, he gives us reason to believe this by advancing a little argument for the claim. How does that argument go? Answer 8: Here’s how I would diagram the little argument in this paragraph.

9. We can’t dispense with a watch designer by saying that the order of the watch is the result of laws of nature.

10. Laws presuppose the existence of an agent. 11. Laws are the mode according to which an agent acts.

(Paley talks about a “power,” as well as an “agent” in this paragraph, but I’m reading these terms as basically the same here, or as close enough in meaning for our purposes to justify our treating them as the same.) Question 9: What is the main idea in Chapter One, Paragraph VIII? Answer 9: Paley is observing that the fact that we don’t know everything about the watch and related matters needn’t weaken our conclusion that the watch had a designer. Once again, this strikes me as pretty obvious, but let’s include it at least for now. 12. The fact that we don’t know everything about the watch and related matters needn’t

weaken our conclusion that the watch had a designer. Question 10: In Chapter Two, Paragraph I, Paley claims that even if the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our assumption that the watch had a designer. Furthermore, he gives us reason to believe this by advancing a little argument for the claim. How does that argument go? Answer 10: Here’s how I would diagram the little argument in this paragraph.

13. If the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our assumption that the watch had a designer.

14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design.


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Question 11: What is the main idea in Chapter Two, Paragraphs II and III? Answer 11: I think that there is only one important idea here, variously elaborated upon, and that the idea is relatively simple, specifically: 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not for

the presence of design. Question 12: What reason does Chapter Two, Paragraph IV give to support the claim that even if one watch were produced by one before it, which was produced by one before it and so on indefinitely, the presence of design would still be unaccounted for? Answer 12: Here’s the reasoning that I see.

16. Even if one watch were produced by one before it, which was produced by one before it and so on indefinitely, this wouldn’t account for the presence of design.

17. In the creation of one watch by another, there is no progress, or “continual approach toward a limit.”

Question 13: What is the ultimate conclusion of this argument? (Hint: I think that it doesn’t actually appear in the list of ideas.) From which ideas does this ultimate conclusion most immediately stem? Answer 13: It seems to me that the ultimate conclusion of this argument is “Natural objects must have a designer,” and that this stems from idea 2 (“A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker”) and idea 18 (“What is true of the watch is also true of natural objects”) taken together. 2 + 18 ↓ Natural objects must have a designer. Question 14: There are so many ideas in this argument that we’ll want to try grouping the ideas.

One way to group ideas is to find multiple independent lines of reasoning. Are there multiple independent lines of reasoning in this argument?

If there is only one line of reasoning in this argument, can you group ideas that intuitively “belong together?”


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Answer 14: I see only one line of reasoning because virtually all of the ideas in this list are aimed at proving idea 2, the claim that a watch must have a designer. The fact that is argument has only one line of reasoning is unfortunate insofar as multiple lines of reasoning would have allowed us to treat each line as an independent (and much smaller!) argument. This would have simplified the diagramming process considerably. Even with one very large line of reasoning, however, we can look for ideas that intuitively “belong together,” either because they talk about the same sort of thing, or because they are connected by inferences, or for some other reason. My attention is first drawn to ideas 9, 10, and 11, which together make up a little “natural laws” unit. Because I don’t see the argument giving us any reason to believe 11, idea 11 is a premise that has done its job in giving us 10. Similarly, 10 is a subconclusion that has done its job in giving us 9. This means that we can, for the purposes of diagramming this argument, forget for the moment about 10 and 11 and try to decide what role 9 is playing. I’ll note the 9, 10, 11 chain by putting these ideas in a box like so: 9. We can’t dispense with a watch designer by saying that the order of the watch is

the result of laws of nature. 10. Laws presuppose the existence of an agent. 11. Laws are the mode according to which an agent acts.

The second thing I notice is that ideas 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17 all address watch reproduction. These ideas probably go together, but how? Let’s focus first on idea 15 because it’s the only idea in this group without an arrow going to or from it.


14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not

for the presence of design. 16. Even if one watch were produced by one before it, which was produced by one

before it and so on indefinitely, this wouldn’t account for the presence of design. 17. In the creation of one watch by another, there is no progress, or “continual

approach toward a limit.” Upon reflection, it seems to me that 15 is basically the same as 16. So let’s strike idea 15 from our list.


14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design.


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15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not



approach toward a limit.” Now what should we do with the rest of these ideas? Well, I think the main point of this little unit is idea 13 – the claim that the ability to reproduce shouldn’t prevent us from believing in a designer. Idea 17 is a premise that gives us idea 16, so it’s a safe bet that we don’t need to worry about 17 anymore. The only remaining question is “How do ideas 16 and 14 get us to 13? Do they support each other? Are they dependent reasons in support of 13, or are they independent reasons in support of 13?” Since it looks to me as though 14 does a good job of going directly to 13, I doubt that it will support 16. (That would involve 14 supporting two ideas at once, and that’s relatively rare.) Could 16 support 14? I don’t think so. First, Paley seemed to take idea 14 as a premise. Second, ideas 14 and 16 are talking about relatively different things. 14 says that the ability to reproduce is evidence for a designer. 16 says that only that that the ability to reproduce fails to show that a designer is unnecessary. Can you see the difference? It’s pretty subtle. 14 is a stronger claim than 16. Roughly speaking, 16 is analogous to the claim “the fact that little Bobby can entertain himself on the computer fails to establish that he no longer needs a babysitter,” whereas 14 is analogous to claim “the fact that little Bobby can entertain himself on the computer proves that he does need a babysitter all the more!” The fact that 14 and 16 are so different (in spite of being superficially similar), leads me to conclude that they are independent reasons in support of 13.


14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not



approach toward a limit.”

Question 15: Now let’s look at our list of ideas again, focusing on ideas 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13. What do they all have in common? What function are they all serving?


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1. A watch exhibits impressive design. 2. A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker. 3. The fact that we don’t know anyone able to make a watch, that we can’t make a


4. The fact that the watch sometimes malfunctions shouldn’t lead us to conclude that it doesn’t have a designer.

5. The fact that we don’t understand the purpose of some parts of the watch, or that some parts are unnecessary, shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the watch doesn’t have a designer.

6. The fact that whatever we happened to find where we found the watch would have some internal structure or other shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the watch doesn’t have a designer.

7. We can’t account for the presence of the watch by appealing to an alleged ‘principle of order’ which supposedly created and organized the watch.

8. It’s ridiculous to maintain that the intricate watch mechanism isn’t evidence that the watch was really designed by a watchmaker, but merely a reason that we that might be mislead into thinking that that the watch was designed by a watchmaker.


10. Laws presuppose the existence of an agent. 11. Laws are the mode according to which an agent acts. 12. The fact that we don’t know everything about the watch and related matters

needn’t weaken our conclusion that the watch had a designer. 13. If the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our

assumption that the watch had a designer. 14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not



approach toward a limit.” 18. What is true of the watch is also true of natural objects.

Answer 15: It looks to me like ideas 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13 all attempt to address, and refute, reasons why someone might not want to conclude idea 2 (“A watch must have a designer”) from idea 1 (“A watch exhibits impressive design”). In 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13, Paley is considering how someone might believe 1 without believing 2 and he’s maintaining that none of these “escape routes” are viable. Because ideas 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13 are collectively attempting to show that the appearance of design compels us to postulate the existence of a designer, it might be a


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good idea to include that idea as a missing subconclusion that stems from those ideas taken together, like this: 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 12 + 13 The appearance of design compels us to postulate a designer. At this point, we’ve determined how the diagram should go! Putting all of the parts together, this is what we get:

1. A watch exhibits impressive design. 2. A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker. 3. The fact that we don’t know anyone able to make a watch, that we can’t make a








10. Laws presuppose the existence of an agent. 11. Laws are the mode according to which an agent acts. 12. The fact that we don’t know everything about the watch and related matters

needn’t weaken our conclusion that the watch had a designer. 13. If the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our

assumption that the watch had a designer. 14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not



approach toward a limit.” 18. What is true of the watch is also true of natural objects.


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11 17 10 14 16

3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 12 + 13

1 + The appearance of design compels us to postulate a designer. 2 + 18

Natural objects must have a designer.

Question 16: I think I might disagree with an aspect of this argument. What about you? Do you see anything amiss with this bit of reasoning? Answer 16: 1. A watch exhibits impressive design. 2. A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker. 3. The fact that we don’t know anyone able to make a watch, that we can’t make a








10. Laws presuppose the existence of an agent. 11. Laws are the mode according to which an agent acts. 12. The fact that we don’t know everything about the watch and related matters needn’t

weaken our conclusion that the watch had a designer. 13. If the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our

assumption that the watch had a designer. 14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not for

the presence of design.


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16. Even if one watch were produced by one before it, which was produced by one

before it and so on indefinitely, this wouldn’t account for the presence of design. 17. In the creation of one watch by another, there is no progress, or “continual approach

toward a limit.” 18. What is true of the watch is also true of natural objects.

11 17 10 14 16

3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 12 + 13


Natural objects must have a designer.

I’m not entirely convinced by the argument. My first concern has to do with what Paley says about laws in ideas 9, 10, and 11. Specifically, in premise 11, Paley claims that laws are the mode according to which an agent acts. But are all laws like this? Certainly some laws, like criminal and civil laws, might be understood as “modes according to which an agent acts.” You and I are agents, in Paley’s sense; we think, and make plans, and act to carry these plans out. And it seems as though we do act according to criminal and civil laws insofar as we either try to conform our behavior to these laws or else we risk the consequences of our infractions. But what about the laws of nature, like the law of gravity, or the second law of thermodynamics? Are these laws the mode according to which an agent acts? It hardly seems so. We needn’t suppose that a being who thinks and acts is somehow “behind” gravity or thermodynamics, directing the laws, or is directing things to act in accordance with the laws. My problem with this concern, however, is that it almost seems too obvious. It might not be obvious to you right now, because you haven’t had much time to think about this argument, but it should have occurred to Paley who thought about this argument very carefully for a very long time. Paley, like us, lived in a world containing criminal laws and laws of nature, and he was certainly capable of spotting the important differences between them. The principle of charitable interpretation, then, leads me suspect that Paley might not mean by premise 11 exactly what I’m taking that premise to mean. Maybe, by “agent” he just means “nature,” for instance. In order to avoid leveling a criticism that quite possibly rests upon a misinterpretation of the text, I won’t place too much weight on my first concern. My second concern has to do with Paley’s ideas 17, 16, and 13, which are related to each other as follows:


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13. If the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our

assumption that the watch had a designer. 16. Even if one watch were produced by one before it, which was produced by one


toward a limit.”

17 16 13

Is it true that, when one natural object creates another, there is no “continual approach toward a limit?” I don’t think so. Thanks to evolution by natural selection, organisms do change over successive generations, and they change in a way that renders them more fit for their environment. (At the very least, this is a viable, and naturalistic, explanation for the appearance of design in the world.) This is exactly the sort of “continual approach to a limit” that Paley seems to be denying in premise 17. In fact, because organisms ancestors might be less structurally complex than the organism itself, the might be in less need of a designer. In this way, by tracing the history of the organism back sufficiently far, we might dispense with the need for a designer entirely. Idea 17, therefore, might be false. This isn’t enough to undermine the entire argument, of course, because idea 13 might be supported by idea 14, but the possibly falsity of 17 is certainly worth discussing.

11 17 10 14 16

3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 12 + 13


Natural objects must have a designer. I’m much clearer on my disagreement at this point. What about recognition? Does the Paley reading remind me of anything? In fact, it does ring a bell. I think that I remember reading some similar by Aquinas. And am I curious about anything? I guess I am. I find myself wondering if Aquinas really does say something similar to what we just say Paley saying, and, if so, whether Aquinas’s argument falls prey to the same problems.


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WRITING: A PAPER ON PALEY 1) FINDING SOMETHING TO WRITE ABOUT: FORMULATING A THESIS Question 17: How would you diagram this argument? Answer 17: Here’s my diagram of Aquinas’ argument. I’ve rephrased the ideas to make them a little easier to understand, but to help you see where these ideas come from in the passage, I’ll include Aquinas’ own words in parentheses. “The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.” 1. God exists. 2. Things without minds act in a way that helps them to achieve a specific goal. (“We

see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end…”) 3. Things without minds usually act in a way that helps them to achieve the best

outcome. (“…and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.”)

4. Things without minds achieve their specific goals on purpose. (“Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end.”)

5. Something without a mind can’t achieve their goals on purpose unless they are directed by something that does have a mind. (“Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer.”)

6. Something with a mind is directing things without minds. (“Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end…”)

7. God is the thing with a mind that’s directing things without minds. (“…and this being we call God.”)


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3 2 4 + 5

6 + 7 1 Don’t feel bad if you didn’t get this diagram! This is a tricky passage. Just see if my diagram makes sense to you. Question 18: How does Aquinas’s argument compare to Paley’s? In particular, is Aquinas, like Paley, advancing a version of the teleological argument? And does Aquinas, like Paley, fail to appreciate implications of evolution? Answer 18: Let’s compare these arguments, back-to-back. Aquinas’s Argument: 1. God exists. 2. Things without minds act in a way that helps them to achieve a specific goal. (“We








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3 2 4 + 5

6 + 7 1 Paley’s Argument: 1. A watch exhibits impressive design. 2. A watch must have a designer, or a watch maker. 3. The fact that we don’t know anyone able to make a watch, that we can’t make a








10. Laws presuppose the existence of an agent. 11. Laws are the mode according to which an agent acts. 12. The fact that we don’t know everything about the watch and related matters needn’t

weaken our conclusion that the watch had a designer. 13. If the watch were able to produce other watches, this wouldn’t defeat our

assumption that the watch had a designer. 14. The ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. 15. Creation by another watch would account only of the existence of the watch, not for

the presence of design. 16. Even if one watch were produced by one before it, which was produced by one


toward a limit.” 18. What is true of the watch is also true of natural objects.


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11 17 10 14 16

3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 12 + 13


Natural objects must have a designer. Aquinas is claiming that the presence of design – as demonstrated by the goal-oriented behavior of entities without minds - proves that God exists. Consequently, both Aquinas and Paley are advancing teleological (or “design-based”) arguments for God’s existence. We decided that Paley’s argument suffers from the incorrect assumption that organisms will remain fundamentally the same from generation to generation. Is Aquinas’s argument, like Paley’s, undermined by the theory of evolution? I think so. Premise 5 says that something without a mind can’t achieve its goals on purpose unless it is directed by something that does have a mind, but the theory of evolution gives us another way in which mindless things can act with apparent purpose – they could have evolved to do so. Consequently, premise 5 in Aquinas’s argument is possibly false. 1. God exists. 2. Things without minds act in a way that helps them to achieve a specific goal. (“We








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2 4 + 5

6 + 7 1 To summarize, I think we can say that both Aquinas and Paley are advancing versions of the teleological argument and that both of these arguments are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. But can we say more? In particular, can we blame Aquinas and Paley for this lack of insight? And does evolution undermine every version of the teleological argument? I doubt that we blame Aquinas and Paley for failing to appreciate the effects of evolution. Aquinas died in 1274 and Paley in 1805. Darwin wasn’t born until 1809. Certainly, then, we can’t blame Aquinas and Paley for being less conversant than we are with the theory of evolution and its implications, although this hardly keeps that theory or those implications from undermining their arguments. Does evolution undermine every version of the teleological argument? I would be hesitant to claim this much. First of all, we’ve only studied two versions of the argument and their might be many more versions out there. Second, and more significantly, one might want to argue that although evolution can explain the presence of design, the process of evolution itself can only be accounted for by appealing to the existence of God. Maybe the conditions necessary for the evolution of life are very precise and statistically unlikely, for example, in which case the fact that these conditions obtain might be cited as evidence for the existence of God. Since we can’t argue that Paley or Aquinas were being intellectually negligent, and since we can’t in good conscience extend our criticism of their arguments to all versions of the teleological argument, let’s focus our paper on establishing our original, modest, conclusion – specifically that both Aquinas’s and Paley’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. That will be the thesis of our paper. Question 19: In light of these rules, should we state our thesis near the beginning of our paper or near the end of our paper? Answer 19: Personally, I’d share our thesis with our readers near the beginning of our paper. By letting our readers know where we’re going, I hope that our readers will find our paper easier to follow.


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Let’s plan to start the outline of our paper with a statement of our thesis. I) Statement of our thesis: Paley’s and Aquinas’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. Question 20: Should we defend our thesis before we state and respond to the objections, or should we state and respond to the objections before we defend our thesis? Answer 20: I think that our readers might be confused if we discuss the objections to our thesis before we defend our thesis so let’s plan to defend our thesis and then discuss the objections. We can continue our outline as follows: I) Statement of our thesis: Paley’s and Aquinas’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. II) Defense of our thesis III) Objections to our thesis IV) Our response to the objections to our thesis Question 21: We want to defend our thesis by setting out and evaluating the arguments given by Paley and Aquinas. Should we set out Paley’s argument before we set out Aquinas’s, or should we set out Aquinas’s argument before we set out Paley’s? Answer 21: Even though we read Paley before we read Aquinas, I would discuss Aquinas before discussing Paley. Why? Because Aquinas predated Paley and by discussing the authors in the order they lived, we might be able to illustrate how the teleological argument has evolved (no pun intended) over time. This means that we can flesh out our outline like this: I) Statement of our thesis: Paley’s and Aquinas’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. II) Defense of our thesis

Set out Aquinas’s argument Set out Paley’s argument

III) Objections to our thesis IV) Our response to the objections to our thesis Question 22: Of course, we don’t just want to set out these arguments; we want to evaluate them, too. Where should we put our evaluations? Should we set out both


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arguments before leveling our criticisms, or should we level our criticism of each argument immediately after setting out that argument?

For example, should we set out Paley’s argument, set out Aquinas’s argument, explain our criticism of Paley, and then explain our criticism of Aquinas? Or should we set out Paley’s argument, explain our criticism of Paley, set out Aquinas’s argument, and then explain our criticism of Aquinas? Answer 22: By delaying our criticisms of Aquinas until after we set out Paley’s argument, and by delaying our criticism of Paley until after we criticize Aquinas, we force our readers to think back to arguments themselves in order to understand our criticisms of those arguments. This could be confusing and frustrating to our readers. Ideally, a criticism of a position should be located as close to that position as possible. We can, therefore, develop our outline as follows: I) Statement of our thesis: Paley’s and Aquinas’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. II) Defense of our thesis

Set out Aquinas’s argument Our evaluation of Aquinas’s argument Set out Paley’s argument Our evaluation of Paley’s argument

III) Objections to our thesis IV) Our response to the objections to our thesis This outline has a number of very attractive features: By beginning with a statement of our position, we let our readers know where we’re

going and help them to follow along. By discussing Aquinas before Paley, we treat the authors in chronological order,

thereby giving ourselves an opportunity to note how the argument may have changed over time.

By discussing the criticism of each argument immediately after discussing the argument itself, our readers will have the argument fresh in their minds when they’re presented with our evaluation.

By thoroughly setting out our position before discussing an objection to it, our readers will find the objection easier to understand.

Question 23: What do you think about our paper so far? Can you see anything that needs to be repaired or improved?


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Answer 23: I think see some changes that we might want to make. I’ll discuss them in the text, in red, noting which characteristics of a good paper seem to be violated and proposing solutions.

“Both Aquinas’s and Paley’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection. [This introduction seems to flow poorly. I found it a little abrupt. And it’s a bit unclear because our readers might not know what the teleological argument is. If they don’t, they’ll feel confused right from the start. Let’s flesh out this introduction a little, easing our readers into our paper and defining key terms.]

In the proof for God’s existence presented in his ‘Fifth Way’ in The Summa Theologica, Aquinas appeals to the fact that natural objects without minds appear to act in a way that achieves the best outcome for them. Such behavior, Aquinas maintains, shows that natural objects act to achieve specific goals, and this, in turn, demonstrates that these mindless objects achieve their goals on purpose. [This discussion might be too fast, or incomplete. Let’s help our reader to understand this argument by giving a specific example of a natural object without a mind that appears to act in its own best interests.] But things without minds can achieve their goals on purpose only if they are directed by something that does have a mind, Aquinas claims, and so something with a mind must be directing things without minds. What could this all-directing being be? Well God, of course, says Aquinas. And so, from all this, we see that God exists. Natural objects could have naturally evolved to consistently behave in their own best interests. [The last sentence in this paragraph could give our readers whiplash because whereas the rest of the paragraph sets out Aquinas’ argument, the last sentence expresses a criticism of the argument. This disrupts the flow of our paper and is also a mechanical error. When the subject changes so dramatically, we need to begin a new paragraph, preferably starting that paragraph with a nice transition. And the criticism of Aquinas itself is incomplete. We should say a few more words about it. One sentence isn’t enough.]

Paley maintains that natural objects are like watches. [The flow could be better here. Let’s smooth the transition from Aquinas to Paley. And let’s avoid a mechanical error by ensuring that we cite the work in which Paley gives this argument.] Like watches, natural objects exhibit impressive design and this design compels us to conclude that they have a designer. This is because the fact that we don’t know anyone able to make a natural object, that we can’t make a natural object ourselves, or that we don’t fully understand how natural object are made shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the natural object doesn’t have a designer. The fact that the natural object sometimes malfunctions shouldn’t lead us to conclude that it doesn’t have a designer. The fact that we don’t understand the purpose of some parts of the natural object, or that some parts are unnecessary, shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the natural object doesn’t have a designer. The fact that whatever we happened to find where we found the natural object would have some internal structure or other shouldn’t lead us to conclude that the


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natural object doesn’t have a designer. We can’t account for the presence of the natural object by appealing to an alleged ‘principle of order’ which supposedly created and organized the natural object. It’s ridiculous to maintain that the intricate order of a natural object isn’t evidence that the natural object was really designed by God, but merely a reason that we might be mislead into thinking that that the natural object was designed by God. Natural laws don’t allow us to explain the existence of design without appealing to a designer because, since laws are nothing but the mode according to which an agent acts, even if natural laws are involved in the presence of design, there needs to be an agent acting in accordance with those laws and this, presumably, is God. The fact that we don’t know everything about the natural object and related matters needn’t weaken our conclusion that the natural object had a designer. And the fact that natural objects reproduce doesn’t defeat our assumption that they have a designer. This is for two reasons. First, the ability to reproduce would be, itself, evidence of design. Second, natural objects don’t change from generation, so even if one object was produced by another, which was produced by another, all the way back forever, the existence of the design would remain unexplained. [This paragraph is unfocused. There is much too much material here. We don’t need to set out each and every aspect of Paley’s argument – only those parts that are relevant to the criticism we want to make. By mentioning all of Paley’s ideas, we make it easy for our readers to get lost and we distract them from the really important points. We’ll want to cut a lot of this material.]

Is it true that, when one natural object creates another, there is no “continual approach toward a limit?” I don’t think so. Thanks to evolution by natural selection, organisms do change over successive generations, and they change in a way that renders them more fit for their environment. [The flow could be smoother here. We’re going from setting out Paley’s argument in the previous paragraph to criticizing that argument here. Let’s note this transition explicitly. Furthermore, as it stands, the criticism of Paley’s argument is incomplete. Let’s elaborate upon it a bit.]

I can imagine someone objecting to our argument by denying evolution and maintaining that God is, in fact, the immediate source of life and design in the world. There’s a lot of evidence to support evolution. For another thing, the mere possibility of evolution, the fact that it’s a viable explanation for the existence of order in the world, is enough to undercut Aquinas’ assertion that it’s impossible for an organism to achieve a goal unless it has a mind or is directed by something with a mind. And only a very weak acceptance of evolution - acceptance of the evolution of non-human species - is all that’s needed to undermine Paley’s denial of generational change. [There’s a mechanical mistake in this paragraph because whereas the first sentence expresses a criticism of our argument, the rest of this paragraph responds to the criticism. These are very different things so we need give each its own paragraph. There’s a flow problem, too, in the lack of transition between the criticism of our argument and our response to that criticism. We’ll want to say a few words to smooth that out.]

In conclusion, then, both Aquinas’s and Paley’s versions of the teleological argument are undermined by a failure to appreciate the effect of evolution by natural selection.” [As a conclusion, this is incomplete. Let’s add a few sentences to bring our paper to a more satisfactory close.]

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