Evolution of Aircraft Carriers

THE EARLY ATTACK CARRIERS‘We have hit the Japanese very hard in the Solomon Islands. We have probably broken the backbone of the power of

their Fleet. They have still too many aircraft carriers to suit me, but soon we may well sink some more of them. . . . We are going to press our advantages in the Southwest pacific and I am sure that we are destroying far more Japanese air. planes and sinking far more of their ships than they can build.’—Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of United States, 1942.

AT THE OUTBREAK of World War II,the United States had in com-

mission seven aircraft carriers and oneescort carrier. USS Langley, the ex-perimental ship officially classed asCV-1, had been assigned to duty as aseaplane tender on September 15, 1936.

After the abrogation by Japan fromdisarmament treaties, the U.S. took arealistic look at its naval strength. ByAct of Congress on May 17, 1938, anincrease of 40,000 tons in aircraftcarriers was authorized. This per-mitted the building of USS H o r n e t(CV-8) and USS Essex (CV-9). OnJune 14, 1940, another increase intonnage was authorized. Among theships built under this program werethe Intrepid and the new Yorktown.On July 19, an additional 200,000tons for carriers was authorized.

Adm. H. R. Stark, then Chief ofNaval Operations, reported to theSecretary of the Navy: “In June 1940,the Congress granted the Navy an11% increase in combat strength and,in July, a further increase of approxi-mately 70%. When these ships andaircraft are completed, the U.S. Navyin underage and overage ships will in-clude 32 battleships, 18 aircraft car-riers, 91 cruisers, 325 destroyers, 185submarines, and 15,000 airplanes. . . .

B y S c o t M a c D o n a l d

“From 1921 to 1933, the UnitedStates tried the experiment of dis-armament in fact and by example.This experiment failed. It cost usdearly in relative naval strength—butthe greatest loss is TIME . Dollars can-not buy yesterday. Our present Fleetis strong, but it is not strong enough.”

Additional tonnage was authorizedDecember 23, 1941 and July 9, 1942.

USS ESSEX (CV-9) was f irst o f a ser ies o fearly attack aircraft carriers of World War II.

CV-9 was to be the prototype of anespecialy designed 27,000-ton (stand-ard displacement) aircraft carrier,considerably larger than the Enterpiseand smaller than the Saratoga. Thesewere to become known as the Essexclass carrier, although this classifi-cation was dropped in the '50’s.

On September 9, 1940, eight moreof these carriers were ordered andwere to become the Hornet, Franklin,Ticonderoga, Randolph, Lexington,Bunker Hill, Wasp and H a n c o c k ,CV-12 through -19, respectively. Re-use of the Lexington , Wasp a n dHornet names was in line with theNavy’s intent to carry on the tradi-tions of the fighting predecessors:Lcxington (CV-2) was lost in theBattle of the Coral Sea in May 1942;Wasp (CV-7) was sunk Septemberthat year in the South Pacific whileescorting a troop convoy to Guadal-canal; Hornet (CV-8) was lost thefollowing month in the Battle ofSanta Cruz Islands.

It is appropriate to comment herethat the ships’ names at commission-ing date did not all bear the same nameat the date of their programming.Names were changed during construc-tion. Hornet (CV-12) was originallyKearsarge, Ticonderoga (CV-14) was

F IGHTER A IRCRAFT of Air Group 9 are parked aboard the aircraft During WW II, U.S. sbipyards built and Navy commissioned 16 sistercarrier Essex during her shakedown cruise in the Caribbean in 1943. ships. Including post-war production 24 Essex class were commissioned.

44 NAVAL AVIATION NEWS

USS RANDOLPH (CV-15) was the 13th Essex class carrier to be commis- ing to the builder for post-shakedown work. She participated in the Iwosioned. She was the first of these carriers to enter combat without return- Jima, Okinawa, and Third Fleet operations against Japan in 1945.

the Hancock , Lex ington ( C V - 1 6 )w a s C a b o t , W a s p ( C V - 1 8 ) w a sOriskany, and Hancock (CV-19) wasoriginally Ticonderoga.

Last two of the 13 originally pro-grammed CV-9 class aircraft carriers,Bennington (CV-20) and Boxer (CV-21), were ordered on Dec. 15, 1941.

In drawing up the preliminary de-sign for USS Essex, particular atten-tion was directed at the size of bothher flight and hangar decks. Aircraftdesign had come a long way from thecomparatively light planes used incarriers during the Thirties. Flightdecks now required more takeoff spacefor the heavier fighters and bombersbeing developed. Most of the first-linecarriers of the pre-war years wereequipped with flush deck catapults,but owing to the speed and size ofthese ships very little catapulting wasdone—except for experimental pur-poses. With the advent of war, air-plane weights began to go up as armorand armament got heavier; crewsize aboard the planes also increased.It was inevitable, noted the Bureau ofAeronautics toward the war’s end in1945, that catapult launchings wouldbecome more common under thesecircumstances. Some carrier com-manding officers reported that asmuch as 40 per cent of launchings

NOVEMBER 1962

were effected by the ships’ catapults.The hangar area design came in for

many conferences between Bureausand much more official correspondence.Not only were the supporting struc-tures to the flight deck to carry theincreased weight of the landing andparked aircraft, but they were to havesufficient strength to support the tric-ing up of spare fuselages and parts(50 per cent of each plane typeaboard) under the flight deck and stillprovide adequate working space forthe men using the area below.

“At present,” noted the Bureau ofConstruction and Repair in Apri l1940, “it appears that a few of thesmaller fuselages can be triced upoverhead in locations where encroach-ment on head-room is acceptable, andthat the larger fuselages will have tobe stowed on deck in the after end ofthe hangar. The number to be stowedwill depend upon the amount of reduc-tion in operating space in the hangarwhich can be accepted.”

Capt. Marc A. Mitscher, then As-sistant Chief BUAE R, answered: “Thequestion of spare airplanes is nowunder reconsideration in correspond-ence with the Fleet and the resultsdecided upon will have a bearing inthe case of CV-9.”

A startling innovation in CV-9 was

a port side deck edge elevator in addi-tion to two inboard elevators. Earlier,B U A ER experimented with a ramparrangement between the hangar andflight decks, up which aircraft werehauled by crane. This proved tooslow. BUSHIPS and the Chief Engineerof A.B.C. Elevator Co., designed theengine for the side elevator. Essen-tially, it was a standard elevator, 60feet by 34 in platform surface, whichtravelled vertically on the port side ofthe ship. Capt. Donald B. Duncan,Essex’s first commanding officer, wasenthusiastic. After the f i rst fourmonths of operation after commission-ing, he wrote to BUA E R:

“The elevator has functioned mostsatisfactorily in all respects and it isdesired to point out some of the oper-ational advantages realized with thistype of elevator.

“Since there is no large hole in theflight deck when the elevator is in the‘down’ position, it is easier to continuenormal operations on deck, irrespec-tive of the position of the elevator.The elevator increases the effectivedeck space when it is in the ‘up’ posi-tion by providing additional parkingroom outside the normal contours ofthe flight deck, and increases the effec-tive area on the hangar deck by theabsence of elevator pits.”

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The elevator performed well, itsmachinery less complex than the twoinboard elevators, requiring about 20per cent fewer man-hours of mainte-nance. Capt. Duncan recommendedthat consideration be given using twodeck edge elevators, one on each side.B U A E R, in forwarding the recom-mendation to BUSHIPS, offered anotheradvantage for consideration: a con-ventional elevator suffering a casualtywhile in the “down” position “wouldleave a large hole in the flight deckwhile the deck edge type would causeonly minor and non-critical loss offlight deck area.”

BUSHIPS, obviously pleased with theoperational performance of the newelevator—the first of its kind—re-luctantly turned down the recom-mendation, however. The Bureaunoted that the addition of a star-board deck-edge elevator would notpermit an Essex class aircraft carrierto transit the Panama Canal. Anyother location for a second such ele-vator would involve structural andarrangement changes too extensive tobe considered.

On April 28, 1941, keel for the USSEssex was laid at Newport News Ship-b u i l d i n g a n d D r y D o c k C o . O nOctober 2, the following year, herprospective commanding officer filedhis first weekly progress- and readinessreport to the Chief of Naval Oper-ations. He noted that there wasmarked speed-up of work on the shipduring the preceding month and esti-mated that the ship would probablybe delivered on February 1, 1942.

“There are certain items that havebeen authorized for installation on theCV-9-19 class carrier,” he said, “butwill not be accomplished on this vessel

USS YORKTOWN (CV-10) was third Essex com-missioned, sponsored by Mrs. F. D. Roosevelt.

prior to delivery.” The ship waslaunched July 31, 1942.

RAdm. Walter S. Anderson, presi-dent of the dock trials and inspectionteam of CV-9 on December 23, 1942,noted a few of these discrepancies inhis report:

“Due to late authorization of anumber of changes arising out ofrecent war experiences, the volume ofuncompleted hull work was greaterthan normal. . . . The Board regretsthat the catapults for this vessel werenot delivered in time for installation,as military value of the vessel wouldbe much improved thereby. . . . Onlythe starboard flight deck track wasinstalled . . . . This class of carriers isdesigned to include cruising turbinesas part of the main drive turbine in-stallation. However, due to produc-

tion difficulties and as a result ofefforts to expedite delivery, cruisingturbines were omitted. Space and con-nections for their future installationare provided and this can be accom-plished with very little alteration . . . .”

Nevertheless, the Board was pleasedand impressed with progress on con-struction of the Essex. Adm. Ander-son recommended acceptance of theship. “On 31 December 1942,” hesaid, “only slightly over 20 monthswill have elapsed since keel-laying,which is, in the opinion of the Board,a record worthy of commendation.This indicates a high degree of cooper-ation between the Supervisor of Ship-building, the Newport News Ship-building and Dry Dock Co., and repre-sentatives of the officers and men ofthe ship’s company.” On the last dayof 1942, USS Essex was commissioned.

Capt. Duncan was proud of his newcommand, but not so impressed as toignore certain discrepancies that stillexisted. The ventilation system, forinstance, was less than satisfactory.B US HIPS sent representatives to theship to assist in correcting discrep-ancies, during sea trials March 1 inthe North Atlantic and, a month anda half later, when the ship was againat Norfolk and still had complaints.

A s o t h e r C V - 9 c a r r i e r s w e r elaunched, the complaints continued tobe registered. BUSHIPS investigatedthe ventilation system as installed inUSS Intrepid (CV-11) and outlinedcorrective measures in future carriersof the class.

Requested to comment on the ade-quacy and operation of the trashburner installed in the Essex, Capt .Duncan started off quietly enough. “Itis most unsatisfactory,” he said. Then

he warmed to his subject. “It is doubt-ful if it could be worse. It is in thevery center of the office spaces. Thereis no satisfactory place for collectionof trash waiting its turn to be burned.All of it has to be carried through thepassageways in the vicinity of the de-partmental offices. The heat from thetrash burner when it is operating(which is not often because it is usu-ally broken down) is such as tomake the surrounding spaces almostuntenable.

“The design of the trash burner ispoor. Its construction is worse. Theship had not been in commission amonth before it practically fell apart.The brick work fell down, the doorfell off and it suffered other casualtiestoo numerous to mention. It has takenconstant attention from the Engineer’sforce to keep it operating at all andthe heat generated in the compartmentin which it is located is such that itis physically impossible for men to stayin it for continuous operation.”

The trash burner was redesigned.Lexington w a s commissioned on

February 17, 1943, followed by York-town on April 15, Bunker Hill on May25, Intrepid on August 16, Wasp o nNovember 24, and Hornet on Novem-ber 29 that year. In 1944, Franklinwas commissioned on January 31,Hancock on April 15, Ticonderoga o nMay 8, Bennington on August 6, andRandolph on October 9. The last ofthe programmed 13 CV-9’s, Boxer ,was commissioned on April 16, 1945.

The lighting system installed in theLexington came under the scrutiny ofBUSHIPS. Generally, it was consideredinadequate—“in intensity and qual-ity’’—in many passageways and com-partments, in addition to the running,signal, and anchor lights. A survey ofthe system produced the followingaction on the outside lights: the aheadmasthead light was relocated to theforward edge of the foretruck (frame92), the ahead range light was movedforward and shielded from illuminat-ing the deck below, the astern mast-head light was moved higher, so asnot to interfere with gunnery, and theastern range light was removed.

Nineteen more Essex-class shipswere ordered or scheduled, startingwith ten of them on August 7, 1942.They were Bon Homme Richard (CV-31) Kearsarge (CV-33) , O r i s k a n y(CV-34), Reprisal (CV-35), An-

T H E U S S C O W P E N S ( C V L - 2 5 ) , w a s o n e o fnine ccruiser-to-aircraft carrier conversions.

tietam (CV-36), Princeton (CV-37) ,Shangri La (CV-38), Lake Champlain( C V - 3 9 ) , T a r a w a ( C V - 4 0 ) , a n dCrown Point (CV-32)—later re-named Leyte. The last three orderedwere Valley Forge (CV-45), Iwo Jima(CV-46), and Philippine Sea ( C V -47). The keels were laid for Reprisaland Iwo Jima on July 1, 1944 andJanuary 29, 1945, but both were can-celled on August 11, 1945. Six addi-tional 27,000-tonners, CV's 50 through55, were canceled on March 27, 1945.

In recap, after WW II erupted and

USS INDEPENDENCE (CVL-22) has SBD’s andTBF Avengers on deck in July 1943 in Pacific.

until its successful conclusion byAllied forces, the U.S. Navy ordered32 aircraft carriers of the CV-9 class,of which the keels of 25 were laiddown. A total of 17 were actuallycommissioned during the war years.The total number of CV-9’s com-missioned—including those commis-sioned after the war—was 24.

Several characteristics marked theEssex class carriers upon their intro-duction to the Fleet. The pyramidalisland structure, for instance, rosecleanly from the starboard side, toppedby a short stack and a light tripodmast. The port elevator was also adistinguishing feature, along with thetwo inboard elevators. Ticonderoga,Randolph, Hancock, Bennington andBoxer, as well as hull numbers fromCV-31 on, had rounded bows extend-ing beyond the flight deck.

Overall lengths varied within thisclass; they were either 872 feet longor 888. It is interesting to note thatthey had a uniform water line lengthof 820 feet. All were armed with 12five-inch .38 caliber dual purposeguns, but some had 17 quadruple40mm anti-aircraft mounts whileothers had 18. A few also had 20mmAA armament. Generally, there wereaccommodations aboard each for 360officers and 3088 enlisted men.

Except for CV-2 and CV-3, L e x -ington and Saratoga, the power plantswere increased over other aircraftcarriers in the Fleet. The machinerywas “entirely modern in design andarranged so as to gain the maximumresistance to derangement and battledamage. There are eight controlsuperheat boilers arranged in four fire-rooms. Steam lines are such that theboilers in each fireroom can be con-nected to one main machinery unit sothat the plant can be operated as fourseparate units.” They had four screws.

These carriers had better protectingarmor than their predecessors (againexcepting Lex and Sara), better facili-ties for handling ammunition, saferand greater fueling capacity, and moreeffective damage control equipment.

THE T ACTICAL employment Of U.S.carriers changed as the war pro-

gressed. In early operations, through1942, the doctrine was to operatesingly or in pairs, joining together forthe offense and separating when on thedefense—the theory being that a

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separation of carriers under attack notonly provided a protective screen foreach, but also dispersed the targetsand divided the enemy’s attack. Com-bat experience in those early oper-ations did not bear out the theory andnew proposals for tactical deploymentwere the subject of much discussion.As the new Essex and Independenceclass carriers became available, thesenew ideas were put to the test.

The Independence class carriers—light carriers, designated CVL’s—were products of an effort to increasethis country’s sea-going air strengthin the early days of the war. Ninekeels to light cruisers of the Clevelandclass were laid down at the New YorkShipbuilding Corp. yard at Camden,

name was changed to USS Langleyand she was given the designationCVL. (Actually, all these cruiser-to-carrier conversions were originallydesignated CV’s when the decision toconvert was made; all were redesig-nated CVL’s on the same day.)

The N e w a r k ( C L - 1 0 0 ) h a d arougher time of it. On June 2, 1942,she was changed to CV-30; on June23, her name was changed to Reprisal,which she kept for a little over sixmonths. On Jan. 6, 1943, her namewas again changed, to San Jacinto.

The light carriers displaced 11,000tons standard. In design, the bridgewas box-like in appearance, with asmall crane forward. They had fourstacks, paired off in twos, on the star-

Japanese-held island of Marcus. TaskForce 15, which conducted the raid,cons is ted o f Y o r k t o w n ( C V - 1 0 ) ,Essex (CV-9) and I n d e p e n d e n c e(CVL-22), the cruisers Nashville andMobile, the battleship Indiana, and tendestroyers. Aircraft were launchedfrom the carriers at a point approxi-mately 130 miles north of the island.

On October 5 -6 , 1943, RAdm.Alfred E. Montgomery led Task Force14 on a second raid on Wake Island.The task force was comprised of twotask groups, operating a total of sixaircraft carriers— Essex, Yorktown(CV-10), Lexington (CV-16), I n d e -pendence, Belleau Wood, and Cowpens—seven cruisers and 24 DD’s, thelargest carrier task force yet assembled.

FAST CARRIER task forces included both Essex and Independence C lasS

carriers, shown above, and viewed from USS Lexington in January 1945.ON A PHOTO mission, a TBM passes USS Shangri La (CV-38), namedin honor of the Doolittle raid on Japan and paid in full by War Bonds.

N. J., three of them before the warstarted. They were to have been theAmsterdam (CL-59), Tallahasee (CL-61), New Haven (CL-76), Hunting-ton (CL-77), Dayton (CL-78), Fargo(CL-85), Wilmington (CL-79), B u f -falo (CL-99), and the Newark ( C L -100). They eventually became theIndependence, Princeton, Belleau Wood,Cowpens, Monterey, Langley, Cabot,Bataan, and the San Jacinto, CVL’s 22through 30, respectively.

Naming and designating these lastfour sometimes went through a rigor-ous and confusing metamorphosis,Neither Cabot nor Bataan encounteredany difficulty. The names and desig-nations were reached in June and July1943 without attending problemsBut Fargo was named Crown Point(CV-27) when the dec is ion wasreached to convert her to an aircraftcarrier. Then, on July 15, 1943, her

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board side, aft of the island. Thesestacks angled out from the hangardeck and rose vertically above theflight deck level.

As the Essex and Independence classcarriers joined the Fleet in increasingnumbers, it was possible to operateseveral carriers together, on a con-tinuing basis, forming a carrier taskgroup. Tactics changed. Experiencetaught the wisdom of combinedstrength. Under attack, the combinedanti-aircraft fire of the task groupcarriers and their screen provided amore effective umbrella of protection

against marauding enemy aircraft thanwas possible when the carriers sepa-rated. When two or more of thesetask groups supported each other, theyconstituted a fast carrier task force.

The first attempt to operate amulti-carrier group occurred on Au-gust 31, 1943, during a raid on the

In the course of the two-day strikes,ship handling techniques for a multi-carrier force, devised by RAdm.Frederick C. Sherman’s staff, weretested under combat conditions.

Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, thenCommander in Chief, Pacific Fleet,dispatched his congratulations. “Thethorough job done on Wake by planesand ships of your task force will haveresults reaching far beyond the heavydamage inflicted.”

The words were prophetic. Lessonslearned from operating the carriers asa single group of six, as two groupsof three, and three groups of two,provided the basis for many tacticswhich later characterized carrier taskforce operations. With the evolutionof the fast carrier task force andits successful employment in futureoperations, the rising sun of theeast began slowly to sink in the west.

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