evolution and future of the access safety and control systems
DESCRIPTION
Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP Thanks to: J. Axensalva, F. Chapuis, S. Hutchins, J-L. Duran Lopez, G. Roy, M. Tavlet, M. Widorski, PPS project team members,. Evolution and future of the Access safety and control systems. IEFC W ork S hop 2011 21 – 24 March 2011. Contents. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
EVOLUTION AND FUTURE OF THE ACCESS SAFETY AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
Thanks to: J. Axensalva, F. Chapuis, S. Hutchins, J-L. Duran Lopez, G. Roy, M. Tavlet, M. Widorski, PPS project team members, .....
IEFC Work Shop 201121 – 24 March 2011
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Contents
Present PS system
Future PS system and changes w.r.t.
LHC
System Deployment
What about SPS & Experimental Areas ?
Concluding remarks
IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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Present PS system
Future PS system and changes w.r.t.
LHC
System Deployment
What about SPS & Experimental Areas ?
Concluding remarks
IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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The PS Complex
Very compact and complex zoning as the PS Complex was extended and changed over many years
Integration of equipment in small access areas will not always be easy
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17 interlinked zones
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Access to the Different Zones
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CPS
Switchyard
CPS
SwitchyardPSPS
East
Area
East
Area
DIRACDIRAC
LEIRLEIRLINAC3LINAC3LINAC2
later
LINAC4
LINAC2
later
LINAC4
PSBPSB
ISOLDE
TT70
ISOLDE
TT70
GPS & HRSGPS & HRS
TT2TT2
AD-HallAD-Hall
AD-TargetAD-Target
TT10TT10
nTOF nTOF
CTF3-LINACCTF3-LINAC CTF3
Delay Loop
Combiner ring
CTF3
Delay Loop
Combiner ringCTF3-CLEXCTF3-CLEXCTF3-CTF2CTF3-CTF2
AD-RingAD-Ring
The majority of the zones have only 1 access point Otherwise only emergency or large material access
doors
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Source and Destination Zones
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Beams flow through many zones source & destination principle
CPS SwitchyardCPS Switchyard PSPS
East
Area
East
Area
DIRACDIRAC
LEIRLEIRLINAC3LINAC3LINAC2
later
LINAC4
LINAC2
later
LINAC4
PSBPSB
ISOLDE-TT70ISOLDE-TT70
GPS & HRSGPS & HRS
TT2TT2
AD-HallAD-Hall
AD-TargetAD-TargetTT10TT10 nTOF nTOF
AD-RingAD-Ring
LINAC2/4
Source
LINAC2/4
Source
CTF3-LINACCTF3-LINAC CTF3
Delay Loop
Combiner ring
CTF3
Delay Loop
Combiner ringCTF3-CLEXCTF3-CLEXCTF3-CTF2CTF3-CTF2
Laser RoomLaser Room
Example:Beam production for DIRAC
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Redundancy
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The new system will re-used the redundancy that we already have in the present system
•TT2 EIS.1•TT2 EIS.2 TT2 •AD-Target EIS.1
•AD-Target EIS.2
AD Targe
t
• Beam Flow
PS SWY
The redundancy, in case of failure of one EIS-F, will be propagated one zone upstream of the zone where access takes place
In total up to three EIS-F can protect a zone
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Access Control Responsibility The PS Complex operations team:
Puts zones in safe for access state (trip of a zone) Distributes keys (authorization done by system) Unlocks remotely the access door Matches the number person entering with
number of keys taken
IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
Ensures that only persons enter that were authorized
Large responsibility with OP teams
No authentication Simple access pointsEV
OLU
TIO
N A
ND
FU
TURE
OF
THE
ACCE
SS A
ND
SAF
ETY
CON
TRO
L SY
STEM
S
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Present PS system
Future PS system and changes w.r.t.
LHC
System Deployment
What about SPS & Experimental Areas ?
Concluding remarks
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Future PS System The future system is based on the main principles
of the LHC system: Comply with “Tripartite” agreement (ASN, IRSN,
OFSP,..) Use of airlock system to obtain unity passage Biometry (iris) to obtain authentication Less responsibility with OP teams and more automation Well defined system modes
However, A small material access will be added (back pack,
toolbox, oscilloscope, etc.) The access process will be optimized The lessons learn shall be taken into account
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Personnel Access Device The LHC PAD is
fully motorized
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The more complex it is the higher the risk of break-down
A simplified PAD is being considered, but no compromises on safety
A more manual version will require clear signs The MAD will be the same as used in the
LHC
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Optimized Access Process (PAD)
Key release on hold until access finished
OP labor intensive
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request
Authorization
Key distributio
nBiometry
Access
LHC in Restricted Access Mode PS in Restricted Access Mode
request
AuthorizationKey
distribution
Access request
Verification
Biometry
Access O
P in
volv
em
en
tA
uto
nom
ou
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The system modes The system will switch between the following
modes for each zone separately:
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Beam ModeBeam Mode
Transition ModeTransition Mode
Access ModeAccess Mode
Restricted Access
Mode
Restricted Access
ModeClosed
Mode
Closed
Mode
General Access
Mode
General Access
ModeRestricted
Access
Process
Restricted
Access
Process
Special
Permit
Process
Special
Permit
Process
Patrol
Process
Patrol
Process
No Access
-
No Beam
Mode
No Access
-
No Beam
Mode
To BEAM
To BEAM To
ACC
ESS
To A
CCES
S
The modes are only controlled from the CCC using keys and computers In access mode the key can be removed and stored safely A test mode is added to safely test EIS-F, using redundancy
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PS Complex Zoning
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The zoning of the PS Complex remains in many cases very similar to today’s situation
However, Some zones will or have been revisited All safety functions will be rationalized
(consequences for equipment groups) PS Switchyard will be added (inflector zone)
Each zone can be exploited independently, even when another zone is being re-configured
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PS Switchyard
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Will become a proper zone with its own access point
No use of magnetic switches close to the machine !
Advantage/disadvantage PSB can have beam
during access in a major part of the PS
No continuity in PS path all the time
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“Lost and Found”
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Visitor Cards Blind access
procedure Automatic EIS-F
control when zone is tripped
Vocal warning in the zone
Authentication Unity passage Autonomous access General access mode Special Permit RP VETO Switchyard zone Proper beam
imminent warning and evacuation alarm
...
Lost Found
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Present PS system
Future PS system and changes w.r.t.
LHC
System Deployment
What about SPS & Experimental Areas ?
Concluding remarks
IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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Complete or Partial Deployment The aim is to deploy the new PS access and safety
system during the 2013/2014 long shutdown (LS1) Most likely a partial deployment of a large number
of complete zones will take place However, non-renovated and renovated zones shall
be fully exploitable Safety links CCC console
LHC injector chain has priority Short shutdown periods for non-LHC related zones are
generally longer In any case good training for the Users and the OP
teams will have to be provided
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Present PS system
Future PS system and changes w.r.t.
LHC
System Deployment
What about SPS & Experimental Areas ?
Concluding remarks
IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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What about the SPS ? A working group started end of last year
GS/ASE BE-OP-SPS (J. Ridewood, J. Axensalva)
Presently an inventory of safety chains and hazards/risks is being made
No clear vision yet (too early) In order to comply with Tripartite
regulation same principles as used in LHC and PS Complex will have to be adopted
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The Experimental Areas In the PS experimental areas are autonomous
since years Experimentalists are responsible for access to their
zone(s) PS OP teams has a supervision system using TIM-
viewer for support SPS North Area is being renovated
Until now SPS OP team managed modes and keys The new system works with same principles as PS
experimental areas SPS OP teams will have a supervision system using
TIM-viewer for support (OP development) The new system has to be operational for start up
in MayIEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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Present PS system
Future PS system and changes w.r.t.
LHC
System Deployment
What about SPS & Experimental Areas ?
Concluding remarks
IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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Concluding Remarks (1) The new PS access control and safety system
will use same main principles as LHC Lessons learned will be taken into account
SPS will follow Many processes and procedures will
therefore be homogenized across all accelerators Unity passage Authentication using biometric checks Access using RF-Id on personal dosimeter Visitor categorization and access Material access
However, new(er)/other technology will be used IEFC Workshop, 21 - 24 March 2011Rende Steerenberg, BE-OP
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Concluding Remarks (2) Partial deployment requires careful
interfacing with present system Safety functions and Operability from CCC
Training on the new access and safety system for users and the OP teams is very important for successful exploitation
The access systems for experimental areas are all based on the same functional principle and require less intervention by CCC More autonomy with experimentalists, but
supervision remains available in CCC for support
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