everybody loves html5,h4ck3rs too
TRANSCRIPT
Everybody loves html5,h4ck3rs too
~#Whoami
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Nahidul Kibria
Co-Leader, OWASP Bangladesh,Senior Software Engineer, KAZ Software Ltd.
Security Enthusiastic
Which part you care
Everybody loves html5…Well
h4ck3rs too… What!!!
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What is HTML5
Next major version of HTML.
The Hypertext Markup Language version 5 (HTML5) is the successor of HTML 4.01, XHTML 1.0 and XHTML 1.1
Adds new tags, event handlers to HTML. Many more….
HTML5 is not finished
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HTML5 is already here.
HTML5 TEST - http://html5test.com/
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Many features
supported by
latest versions of
FireFox, Chrome,
Safari and Opera
.
Standard web model
HTML5 OVERVIEW
Web
sockets
COR
Iframe
Sandboxing
Web Messaging
WEB BROWSER SECURITY MODELS
The same origin policy
The cookies security mode
The Flash security model/SandBox
Same Origin Policy
The same origin policy prevents document or script loaded from one origin, from getting or setting properties from a of a document from a different origin.
An origin is defined as the combination of
• host name,
• protocol,
• and port number;
The Browser “Same Origin” Policy
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bank.com
blog.net
XHR
XHR
document,
cookies
TAG
TAG
JS
What Happens if the Same Origin Policy Is Broken?
Some major HTML5 feature
• CORS-Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
• WebSockets
• WebWorkers
• Javascript APIs
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Today I want to show you
how far an attacker go
with simple JavaScript and html5
So you can convince your boss
to give effort on security measure
My intention is not make you panic
Disclaimer
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Cross Origin Request (COR)
• Originally Ajax calls were subject to Same OriginPolicy
• Site A cannot make XMLHttpRequests to Site B
• HTML5 makes it possible to make these cross domain
• Calls site A can now make XMLHttpRequeststo Site B as long as Site B allows it.
Response from Site B should include a header:
Access ‐Control ‐Allow‐Origin: Site A
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Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
<allow-access-from domain="*">
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
CORS-Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
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Why programmer happy?
Lets see from attacker view
XSS-Cross Site Scripting
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Demo
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xss attack vector
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Impact of xss
History Stealing
Intranet Hacking
XSS Defacements
DNS pinning
IMAP3
MHTML
Hacking JSON
Cookie stealing
Clipboard stealing
Cookie stealing
Pr3venting
XSS Defacements
If you still cannot manage your bossMore Evil use
I do not care
Show me how my
org is effected
Attacking intranet
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Obtaining NAT’ed IP Addresses
Java applet
Java applet
Java applet
If the victim’s Web browser is a Mozilla/Firefox, it’s possible to skip the applet
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<script>function natIP() {
var w = window.location;var host = w.host;var port = w.port || 80;var Socket = (new
java.net.Socket(host, port)).getLocalAddress().getHostAddress();return Socket;
}</script>
Demo
Not only NAT’ed IP ,You can lots more system info
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Port Scanning
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O’ Really
Port Scanningwindow.onerror = err;
<script src=http://ip/></script>
if (! msg.match(/Error loading script/))
//ip does not exit’s
Else
Find internal ip
Blind Web Server Fingerprinting
Apache Web Server /icons/apache_pb.gif
HP Printer /hp/device/hp_invent_logo.gif
<img src="http://intranet_ip/unique_image_url"onerror="fingerprint()" />
HTML5 Made it easy
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www.andlabs.org/tools/jsrecon.html
Demo
What just happed
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Port Scanning: Beating protections
Blocking example for known ports
(Firefox, WebSockets and CORS)
➔ http://example.com:22
Workaround!
➔ ftp://example.com:22
It works on Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Safari
Based on timeouts, it can be configured
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WTFun
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Port Scanning: result
Self‐triggering XSS exploits with
HTML5A common XSS occurrence is injection inside some
attribute of INPUT tags. Current techniques require user interaction to trigger this XSS
<input type="text" value="‐>Injecting here"onmouseover="alert('Injected val')">
• HTML5 turns this in to self ‐triggering XSS
<input type="text” value="‐‐>Injecting here"onfocus="alert('Injected value')"autofocus>
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Black‐list XSS filtersHtml5 introduce many new tag
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How your browser become a proxy of an
attacker?
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http://erlend.oftedal.no/blog/?blogid=107
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
CSRF(Cross-Site Request Forgery)
The Sleeping Giant
Victim logon to bank.com
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
Converting POST to GET
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
Credentials Includedbank.com
blog.net
https://bank.com/fn?param=1
JSESSIONID=AC934234…
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
Cross-Site Request Forgery
bank.com
attacker’s post at blog.net
Go to Transfer Assets
https://bank.com/fn?param=1Select FROM Fund
https://bank.com/fn?param=1Select TO Fund
https://bank.com/fn?param=1Select Dollar Amount
https://bank.com/fn?param=1Submit Transaction
https://bank.com/fn?param=1Confirm Transaction
https://bank.com/fn?param=1
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
Demo
XSS & CSRF- Killer ComboProgrammers Prepare, Users Beware
<form method="POST" name="form0"
action="http://my.victim.mutillidae:81/mutillidae/index.php?page=add-to-your-blog.php">
<input type="hidden" name="csrf-token" value="SecurityIsDisabled"/>
<input type="hidden" name="blog_entry" value="This is come from CSRF"/>
<input type="hidden" name="add-to-your-blog-php-submit-button" value="Save Blog Entry"/>
</form>
The OWASP Foundationhttp://www.owasp.org
How Does CSRF Work?Tags
<img src=“https://bank.com/fn?param=1”>
<iframe src=“https://bank.com/fn?param=1”>
<script src=“https://bank.com/fn?param=1”>
Autoposting Forms<body onload="document.forms[0].submit()">
<form method="POST" action=“https://bank.com/fn”>
<input type="hidden" name="sp" value="8109"/>
</form>
XmlHttpRequestSubject to same origin policy
What Can Attackers Do with CSRF?
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Anything an authenticated user can do
• Click links
• Fill out and submit forms
• Follow all the steps of a wizard interface
Using CSRF to Attack Internal Pages
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attacker.com
internal.mybank.com
Allow
ed!
CSRF
Intern
al Site
TAG
internal browser
Web Workers Web Workers provide the possibility for JavaScript to run in the background.
Web Workers alone are not a security issue.
But they can be used indirectly for launching work intensive attacks without the user noticing it.
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http://www.andlabs.org/tools/ravan.html
Web Storage
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Web Storage Vuln. & Threats
Session Hijacking
• If session identifier is stored in local storage, it can be stolen with JavaScript.
• No HTTPOnly flag.
Disclosure of Confidential Data
• If sensitive data is stored in the local storage, it can be stolen with JavaScript.
User Tracking
• Additional possibility to identify a user.
Persistent attack vectors
• Attacker can be store persistently on the user browser
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Offline Web Application
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Cache Poisoning
• Caching of the root directory possible.
• HTTP and HTTPs caching possible.
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Ok Enough, Just tell
me can attacker Get a
remote (Control)shell
of my PC??
Infection method known as Drive by download
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In summary
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Web Worker Cracking Hashes in JS Cloud=
Web
Worker
Cross-origin
resource
sharing+ = Powerful DDoS attacks
Web
Worker +Cross-origin
resource
sharing+
Web
socket = Web-based Botnet.
Is HTML5 hopelessly(in)secure?
Ahem no…but security has been a major consideration in the design of the specification But it is incredibly hard to add features in any technology without increasing the possibility of abused.
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Reference
Compass Security AG
http://userguidepdf.info/html5-web-security-v1.html
http://html5sec.org
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet
http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html
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Twitter:@nahidupa
Be secure & safe
HTML5 make everybody happy including h4ck3rs and make security professional busy.