ethnic political recruitment in the ussr

Canadian Slavonic Papers

Ethnic Political Recruitment in the USSRAuthor(s): BOHDAN HARASYMIWSource: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes, Vol. 30, No. 2 (June 1988),pp. 171-189Published by: Canadian Association of SlavistsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40868896 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 03:25

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Canadian Association of Slavists and Canadian Slavonic Papers are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.77.28 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 03:25:31 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=canassocslav

http://www.jstor.org/stable/40868896?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


ARTICLES

BOHDAN HARASYMIW

Ethnic Political Recruitment in the USSR Recruitment into politics in industrial societies is determined to a large extent by an individual's (or a group's) social status. Usually status is indicated by education, occupational prestige, and income or wealth. The higher one's status, as measured by high ratings on one or more of these scales, the more likely is one to be drawn into a political role.1 In multi- ethnic societies, ethnicity may also be an indicator of social standing. In such instances, ethnic affiliation will be an additional - and either com- plementary or competing - determinant of ability to participate in politics and to share in the exercise of power. In multi-ethnic societies, the politi- cally dominant ethnic group usually controls the system of political recruitment.

In the USSR ethnicity has always had this kind of relevance in politics. Its continued importance was illustrated recently by the disturbances in Alma-Ata at the end of 1986 following the replacement of a native as First Secretary of Kazakhstan by a Russian. One of the questions raised by this dramatic event is whether it was unique and anomalous or whether struc- tural reasons embedded in the Soviet political system account for it. It will be argued here that the system of political recruitment rests on such struc- tural underpinnings, and that more explosive tensions may be anticipated in the future (depending, naturally, on such other important factors as national consciousness as well as the decisions and actions of the Soviet power elite at the centre in Moscow). This prognostication is based on the strong association between ethnicity and membership of the Communist Party which promises to continue rather than become eroded by the forces of economic modernization. No pretense to a comprehensive treatment of ethnic politics in the Soviet Union can be made in this work owing to limitations of space and data. This article will try to show that ethnicity and political recruitment have been closely linked in the recent past and are

1. Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1976), pp. 38-40. Putnam follows Harold Lasswell in designating this combination of the criteria of social and political standing "agglutination" (p. 22).

Originally presented as a paper at the annual meeting of the Canadian Association of Slavists, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, 29 May 1987. The author expresses sincere thanks to this journal's two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and incisive criticisms.



172 I Canadian Slavonic Papers June 1988

likely to remain so in the USSR for the foreseeable future. That linkage in turn could provide a basis for the politicization of ethnicity and for further ethnic conflict.

Nationalities in the CPSU More than one observer of Soviet affairs has noted the steady con-

traction of the number of Russians within the rank-and-file of the Com- munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).2 The cause has not been pro- perly explained,3 and its significance, therefore, is not adequately under- stood. If the Russians are, as is commonly emphasized,4 the predominant ethnic group in the Soviet Union, then why can they not control effectively the growth of the membership of the CPSU so as to assure their own numerical superiority? I believe that, as in other industrial societies, recruitment into the CPSU has become largely status-driven and is not amenable to control or manipulation by the central party leadership, except for at- tempts at correction after the fact.5

Previous research has established that a strong relationship exists between education and party membership (and hence also between it and

2. John H. Miller, "The Communist Party: Trends and Problems," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser (Eds.), Soviet Policy for the 1980s (London, 1982), p. 16; Bohdan Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Union (London, 1984), pp. 115-21; Ronald J. Hill and Peter Frank, The Soviet Communist Party, 3d ed. (Boston, 1986), pp. 39-40.

3. Mary McAuley, "Party Recruitment and the Nationalities in the USSR: A Study in Centre-Republican Relationships," British Journal of Political Science, 10, part 4 (October 1980), 461-87, has attempted to do so. Her analysis is seriously flawed, however, because she makes the incorrect assumption that the growth rate of the party is equivalent to recruitment into it. As explained below, this is in- complete. She also infers power relationships (between the centre and republics) from variations in republic patterns of party membership, a highly dubious en- deavour for which she provides no satisfactory theoretical justification. The patterns McAuley observes are there; her explanation for them is questionable.

4. For instance, by Frederick C. Barghoorn and Thomas F. Remington, Politics in the USSR, 3d ed. (Boston and Toronto, 1986), pp. 74-79.

5. This, I think, is a safer and sounder hypothesis than McAuley s (n. 3 above), which requires an assumption - for which there is no evidence - that quotas of ethnic recruitment are set by the centre and - another assumption - these are either followed or wilfully ignored by the republic leaders. The data available do not allow investigation of these power relationships: we should need information on what one side of the relationship can do to the other. To infer motives and power from statistics on party membership is sheer speculation.



Vol. XXX, No. 2 Ethnic Political Recruitment in the USSR | 173

party recruitment, allowance being made for individuals' upgrading their educational qualifications subsequent to their entry into the CPSU).6 It has also been observed that ethnicity, too, is relevant; otherwise the various nationalities would be represented in the party in proportion to their percentage of the adult population, which is not the case.7 Ethnicity does not, however, determine recruitment into the CPSU directly. Of the several ways in which these two variables could be combined to produce an effect on recruitment, the most fruitful posits education as an inter- vening variable between ethnicity and recruitment. The relationship could therefore be rendered in shorthand as follows:

ethnicity >education Recruitment.

This is a simplification, since it ignores such factors as historical tradition and political-mobilizational role, but it emphasizes the most important factor in this process - education.8 Opportunities for education vary for different nationalities, and thus ethnicity indirectly determines political recruitment.

In order to test the hypothesis about status as the driving force behind recruitment into politics in the USSR we may measure the relationship (in both strength and direction) between education and party membership among the union-republic nationalities. The latter variable can be observed directly from the data on distribution of nationalities within the CPSU published from time to time by the party itself. This is only an indirect indicator of the recruitment of nationalities into the party, but it must be resorted to because no better one exists. We assume that the presence of given numbers of nationalities in the party is the result of recruitment; in fact, these numbers are the net resultant of several factors besides recruitment - deaths and expulsions, to name but two. The number of members a particular nationality has in the CPSU, then, is indicative of but not equivalent to the numbers actually inducted into the party. For

6. See, for example, Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment, pp. 1 1 1-15, and McAuley, "Party Recruitment," pp. 470-71.

7. David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR, 2d ed. (Oxford, 1978), p. 134. Lane notes the discrepancies in rates of representation, but avoids explain- ing them. See also McAuley, "Party Recruitment," pp. 475-78.

8. The strong association between nationality, education, and party membership in the union republics is noted in Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment, p. 119, and by McAuley, "Party Recruitment," p. 474.



174 I Revue Canadienne des Slavistes Juin 1988

the other variable, education, we may use as an indicator the number of specialists with higher and secondary education employed in the national economy by their nationality.9 When these two distributions are expressed as percentages of each respective total, the coefficient of correlation, r, can be used to gauge the strength of the association between education and party membership, at least for the fifteen nationalities of union-republic status in the Soviet Union.10 The value of r may be either positive or nega- tive, and can range from zero (no correlation) to one (perfect correlation).

Since the points in time at which the two sets of data are provided seldom coincide (as to years, let alone month or day), few such precisely coincidental measurements are possible.11 I have attempted four such comparisons, and the resulting coefficients of correlation are reported in Table I.

Table I

Coefficient of Correlation for Percentage of Specialists and of CPSU Members, by Nationality, USSR, Selected Years12

Year Value of r

1961 +0.9998

1965 +0.9988

1971 +0.9997

1975-77 +0.9979

9. This approach, comparing nationalities in the party with nationalities

among specialists, is both simple and appropriate. Each of these entities encom-

passes the same age cohort, hence the comparison avoids problems not only of cal-

culating the age-structure of each nationality's population but also of the distortion which the larger number of children among Central Asians creates when party membership is compared directly with population. See Ellen Jones and Fred W.

Grupp, "Measuring Nationality Trends in the Soviet Union: A Research Note," Slavic Review, 41, no. 1 (1982), 112-22.

10. In this article only these major groups could be studied at the all-Umon level because of the way in which the data were reported in the sources. The author

hopes in future to be able to extend the analysis to include nationalities of less than union republic status.




There is an almost perfect correlation between the two indicators, which means that there is in the Soviet Union a very strong association between ethnicity, education, and political recruitment, at least as measured here. Furthermore, it has changed so little that it undoubtedly has been that way for some time before 1961 and will likely have been the same - or as nearly as makes no difference - down to the present day and for some time to come.

Given this near-identity between the distribution of nationalities among specialists employed in the national economy and their distribution within the CPSU, there should also be some positive relationship between the growth rates of nationalities within these two categories. Change in the one should be transmitted in due course to the other so that the changing proportions of nationalities in the party keep pace with their changing proportions of specialist manpower in the labour force. This is a causal relationship rather than merely a presumed statistical association, because party members tend to be drawn disproportionately from persons with greater education. Thus the more well-educated a group becomes, the

The problem is that although the economic handbooks occasionally provide data on the breakdown of specialists and students by non-union-republic nationality, the party statistics very seldom do so. The single comparison available for 25 nationalities of less than union republic status in 1976, however, produced a value of r of +0.9773. Partiinaia zhizn', 1976, No. 10, p. 16, and Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR (Moscow, 1977), p. 296. This is somewhat lower than the values for the 15 union republic nationalities (see Table I), but still 95.5 per cent of the variation is explained thereby.

11. Data on specialists m the labour force are usually given for November or December; on party membership, for 1 January. In this paper, however, this discrepancy is ignored and the year given in every case here should be taken to mean "at the end of the preceding year and the beginning of the given one." It should also be noted that data on specialists in the national economy by nationality for the USSR as a whole are published very infrequently. The writer would be grateful for direction as to more complete and comprehensive sources for these data.

12. Sources: Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment, p. 120; Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1961), p. 49; "KPSS v tsifrakh (1961-1964 gody)" Partiinaia zhizn', 1965,No. 10, p. 12; Narodnoe khoziaistvo S SR v 1965 godu (Moscow, 1966), p. 5%2'Partiinoe stroitel' stvo: Uchebnoe posobie, 2d ed. (Moscow, 1971), p. 69; Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR: Statisti- cheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1971), p. 240; Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR (Moscow, 1977), p. 296; Partiinoe stroitel' stvo: Uchebnoe posobie, 5th ed. (Moscow, 1978), p. 72.




more likely will its members enter the party. It has been suggested that this transmission takes about a decade: thus, if the growth rates for the various nationalities are measured over a period of time and then rank- ordered, this ranking should correspond closely to the growth rates of the same nationalities within the CPSU ten years later. In fact, the measure of rank-order correlation, Spearman's rho, for the growth rates of nationalities among specialists in 1957-64 and among party members in 1967-77 was +0.74; for 1960-70 and 1971-81, respectively, it was +0.79; and for 1970-75 and 1981-86, +0.82.13 This means that the rate at which a given nationality contingent in the party grows relative to other nationality contingents is similar to the rate at which the contingent of that same nationality has been growing relative to others among the specialist labour force at a somewhat earlier time. Thus the growth of nationalities in the CPSU can be explained in large measure by the changing profile of one key component of the labour force, specialists with higher and secondary education. Again, there is a causal link here rather than just a spurious statistical association. Significantly, this association is becoming stronger contrary to the emphasis placed by the party leaders and their spokesmen on enhancing the working class component of the CPSU.

The growth rates of the major nationalities among specialists in 1971-76 as predictors of their growth in the CPSU in 1981-86 deserves comment. While the rank-order of nationalities by growth rate of specialists does not exactly correspond to their subsequent rank-order in terms of

13. Harasymiw, Political Elite Recruitment, pp. 120 and 123; Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR ( i 96 1 ), p. 49; Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kuV tura v SSSR (1971), p. 240; Partiinoe stroitel'stvo (1971), p. 69; Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka ikul'tura v SSSR (1977), p. 296; "KPSS v tsifrakh," Partiinaia zhizn', 1981, No. 14, p. 18; and 1986, No. 14, p. 24. Probability of chance occurrence in each of the three cases was less than one in 100.

For 25 nationalities of less than union republic status, the rank-order correlation between growth of specialists in 1964-70 and of party members in 1976-81 was +0.66, significant at less than .01 (the same as for union republic nationalities). Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika: Vypusk dvadtsat' pervyi, 1981 (Moscow, 1981), pp. 491-92; Partiinaia zhizn', 1976, No. 10, p. 16; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1964 g.: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1965) (hereafter Narkhoz SSSR v [year]), p. 567; and Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kuVtura v SSSR (1971), p. 240. Signi- ficantly, Jews were at the bottom in each list. Their average annual growth rate among specialists was 1.5 per cent (compared with 6.7 per cent for all nationalities in 1960-70); in the party, -2.3 per cent (as against an average of +2.2 for the entire CPSU membership).




growth in the party,14 the predicted placement of these ethnic groups either above or below the average rate of growth is generally correct. There are two exceptions: Georgians, predicted to be below average, in fact were above it within the CPSU; Ukrainians, on the contrary, should have been above average but were in fact below. Some affirmative action, and discrimination, respectively, must have been at work. Otherwise, Russians, Estonians, and Latvians were below average on both scores; the relative advantage of all other union republic nationalities, therefore, has been purchased at the expense of these three.

The growth of specialists among minor (non-union-republic) nationalities for 1971-76 cannot be checked against party growth in 1981-86 (because for 1986 Partiinaia zhizrì listed only the major nationalities). Of 26 such nationalities, however, all but six were above average in terms of growth of specialist manpower. If this were to be reflected accurately in the party, their relative advantage has been gained at the expense of these six, notable among them the Jews. The Jewish average annual rate of growth among specialists in 1971-75 was 1.0 per cent, while the entire category of specialists increased at a rate of 6.2 per cent. As in the previous decade, so also in the 1980s, the Jews in the CPSU are most likely to be the nationality with the very slowest rate of growth.

It should be pointed out that the acceleration of the rate of growth of non-Russians in both the specialist labour force and the party has not yet reduced the Russians to minority status. Their relative dominance has dwindled, but very slowly. For example, Russians constituted 67.8 per cent of CPSU members in 1946, and 59.1 per cent in 1986. 15 But their numbers grew from 3.7 million to 1 1.2. They are not likely to feel threatened as to political recruitment opportunities on the all-Union level for some time to come. But the trend of decline is evident, and the relative growth of the non- Russians is currently at their expense and that of a handful of other nationalities including the Jews (both relatively and - in the party - abso- lutely).

14. The most obvious differences are the higher rankings of the Turkmens (1 versus 6) and Azéris (4 versus 9), the beneficiaries of some sort of accelerated recruitment, and the lower positions of the Uzbeks (5 versus 1) and Kazakhs (7 versus 4). All others were within one place of their predicted positions. The Mos- cow-initiated purges in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, including removal of First Secretaries Rashidov and Kunaev, must account for the lower actual rates of growth in the party of the titular nationalities of those republics.

15. Partiinaia zhizn', 1973, No. 14, p. 18, and 1986, No. 14, p. 24.




This persistent and strong relationship suggests the possibility of predicting the future composition of the CPSU, or at least the outlines of it, in terms of nationalities. One way would be to use the data on specialists, but since at the time of writing (1987) these were not yet available for 1980-85, no projection beyond the present date is possible. Another would be to go to the data on the formative stage of the specialist manpower, that is, on the nationality distribution of students in higher and specialized secondary institutions. Again we may assume that the relative rates of growth of nationalities among the student body should be reflected after the passage of some time, say ten years, in correspondingly relative rates of growth for those same nationalities in the specialist contingent of the labour force. Indeed, such would appear to be the case: when the growth rates of nationalities among students in the period 1950-60 are compared with the growth rates among specialists in the national economy ten years later, 1960-70, the coefficient of rank-order correlation is +0.89, significant at the .001 level.16 This very much stronger association should not be surprising insofar as there is a greater probability of students becoming specialists than of specialists becoming party members. But it also means that the changing nationality composition of the student body may be used as a predictor of changes in the nationality composition of the CPSU, as well as of potential friction points where growth of numbers of students does not eventuate in commensurate growth of numbers of party members.

The available data allow us to test the predictive power of the changing nationality composition of the student body in the USSR as a forecast of the changing nationality composition of the Communist Party. The measure of rank-order correlation between the growth rates of nationalities in the student bodies over the period 1957-67, and the growth rates of nationalities in the CPSU twenty years later, in 1977-86, is +0.78. 17 This is not as strong as the association between the former variable (students) and the growth of specialists, but it is still a significant relationship. Let us look in detail at the two sets of growth rates - for students in 1957-67, and for party members in 1977-86, by nationality- presented in Table II.

16. Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR (1961), p. 49; Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR (1971); Narkhoz SSSR v 1962 (1963), p. 573; and ibid., 1961 (1962), p. 700.

17. Narkhoz SSSR v 1959 (1960), p. 752; Narkhoz SSSR v 7957(1968), p. 803; Partiinoe stroitel'stvo (1978), p. 72; and "KPSS v tsifrakh" (1986), p. 24. Probability of a coincidental relationship in this instance is less than .01.




Table II

Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates for Students in Higher and Specialized Secondary Institutions, 1957-67, and for CPSU

Members, 1977-86, Rank-Ordered by Nationality, USSR1«

Students, 1957-67 CPSU, 1977-86 Rank Rank

1. Moldavians 15.8 2. Moldavians 4.8 2.5 Uzbeks 15.4 2. Kirghizes 4.8 2.5 Kazakhs 15.4 2. Turkmens 4.8 4. Azéris 14.0 3.5 Azéris 3.8 5. Kirghizes 13.1 3.5 Uzbeks 3.8 6. Lithuanians 13.0 6. Tadzhiks 3.3 7. Belorussians 12.9 7.5 Lithuanians 3.2 8. Tadzhiks 12.4 7.5 Kazakhs 3.2 9. Armenians 12.3 9. Belorussians 2.5 10. Turkmens 12.0 10.5 Armenians 2.2 11. Ukrainians 11.6 10.5 Georgians 2.2

12. Estonians 2.1 Average 11.5 13. Ukrainians 1.9

12. Georgians 11.2 14. Latvians 1.8 13. Russians 11.1 15. Russians 1.7 14. Estonians 8.2 15. Latvians 6.7

The following observations seem reasonable: (1) the changing makeup of the student body does not predict with absolute accuracy the correspond- ing changes in the CPSU twenty years on, but it is largely correct in identi- fying the nationalities which are likely to experience above- and below- average rates of growth in the party; (2) these data on students indicated that, in the decade 1977-87, Russians, Georgians, Latvians, and Estonians should have experienced below-average rates of growth in the party; all others, above-average rates; (3) the prediction was wrong about the Georgians and Estonians, who in fact experienced above-average rates of growth within the CPSU; (4) the prediction was correct for all of the above- average categories of student growth rates; and (5) on balance, the prediction was right for 13 of 15 cases, using the simple dichotomy of belo w-

18. Sources: ibid.




and above-average instead of the actual rankings.19 The growth rates of nationalities among students in higher and specialized secondary institutions, therefore, can be used as an approximate forecast of the growth rates of those same nationalities in the CPSU two decades hence; since nationality is an attribute which does not change in a person's lifetime, these growth rates can be taken as indicative of relative chances of recruitment into the party, at least for the major nationalities.

So much for uniformities. A word is in order about the evident discrepancies between the two lists in Table II. The anomalous position of the Georgians and Estonians has already been mentioned. Obviously, they are being recruited into the party at faster than normal (or being expelled at slower than normal) rates, for some reasons which cannot be uncovered by the present set of data. At the same time, other nationalities, while all in the above-average category, have experienced growth rates in the party which give them a ranking considerably different from their standing among the student population in the late 1950s and early 1960s. If we take the average difference between rankings on the two scales to be 2, then three nationalities exceed that average: Turkmens (a difference of +8.0), Kirghizes (+3.0), and Kazakhs (-5.0). In effect, the first two have been given "a leg up" into the party in the past ten years by comparison with their growth among the student population during the early post-Stalin period. The Kazakhs, on the other hand, have had their opportunities for political recruitment blocked, or else have rejected being recruited into the party even while accepting the opportunity of acquiring specialized education. In general, therefore, nationalities have to depend on their access to education as a facilitator of political recruitment; the convention- ally "less developed" nationalities have been the evident beneficiaries of both educational and party membership opportunities as opposed to the "more developed" (Baits, Russians, Ukrainians, and Transcaucasians), but factors unpredictable by these indicators and data other than education - and hence status - are at work here as well.

19. I have treated the Ukrainian case as a correct prediction, since the difference between that group's actual percentage growth of students and the average for all the union-republic nationalities was only 0. 1 per cent, which is not practical- ly significant.

For 24 minor (non-union-republic) nationalities, however, the measure of rank-order correlation between growth of students in 1962-63 and in the CPSU in 1976-81 was -0.26, which is statistically insignificant. Sources: as in n. 12, except Narkhoz SSSR v 1964 (1965), p. 691. In this instance, the available time-frame for measuring growth of students was not ideal (it should have been 1956-61), and this may have affected the result.




On the basis of the above findings, a cautious forecast may be made of of the chances for growth within the ranks of the Communist Party as- cribable to the union-republic nationalities of the USSR for the decade 1990-2000. Based on the rank-ordering of the growth rates of nationalities among post-secondary and specialized secondary students between 1970 and 1980, one should expect that their relative chances of political recruitment in the final decade of this century should be approximately as de- picted in Table III.

Table III

Average Annual Growth Rates of Union-Republic Nationalities among Students in Higher and Specialized Secondary

Institutions, Rank-Ordered, 1970-1980, and Forecast of their Growth Rates in CPSU, 1990-2000, USSR20

Average annual growth 1970-80 1990-2000

Nationality Per cent Forecast

1. Kazakhs 5.4 2. Kirghizes 4.9 3. Tadzhiks 4.2 4. Turkmens 4. 1 5. Uzbeks 3.8 ¿^ 6. Moldavians 2.6 g 7. Azens 2.0 8. Belorussians 1.8 9. Lithuanians 1.6 10. Latvians 1.1 11. Armenians 1.0

Average 0.9 Average

12. Ukrainians 0.7 13. Estonians 0.5 n , a a ^ * * Below n , 14. a a Georgians ^ 0.4 * *

15. Russians 0,4 ""**'

20. Sources: Narkhoz SSSR 1922-1972 (1972), p. 446; Narkhoz SSSR 1922- 1982 (Ì9S2), p. 517.




In summary, Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and Estonians may expect to be added to the party ranks at below-average rates. All other nationalities, including the Central Asians, the other Transcaucasians, Moldavians, and the other Baits, should expect to augment the CPSU at rates above the average and thus to continue to erode the numerical preponderance of the Russians.21

Nationalities in the Republic Communist Parties While the leaders of the CPSU can do little if anything to halt the drive

of social status which propels individuals into the party, they can nevertheless control the assignment of Communists to jobs and locations. We may therefore measure that control and ascertain its effectiveness by per- forming at the republic level statistical tests similar to those reported above for the all-Union level. Since students, specialists, and party members are all geographically mobile, the problem at this level becomes much more complex, but at the very least we should be able to identify those regions of the country which conform to the nation-wide patterns and those which differ. It will be left to further research to give a fuller explanation of opportunities for ethnic political recruitment in the union republics and their determinants and implications.22

My research has uncovered data on the nationality composition of specialists, comparable to data on the nationality makeup of the Com- munist Party, for only nine of the fifteen union republics. But even these data are spotty. The results of comparing the percentage distribution of nationalities among specialists and the percentage distribution of nation-

21. Of 20 minority nationalities, only Karelians grew below the average rate for all students from 1970-71 to 1980-81; their drift into the party in 1990-2000 may be expected to be similar. (Sources as in n. 20.) Jews are not included in the most recent student figures, but from 1967-68 to 1976-77, when the entire Soviet student body grew by 1.0 per cent per annum, the Jewish contingent was shrinking at a rate of 4.8 per cent. Narkhoz SSSR v 1967 (1968), p. 803, and Narkhoz SSSR za 60 let (1977), p. 588. There can be no doubt that the high rate of Jewish attrition among the student population is and will continue to be transmitted into the specialist labour force as well as into a precipitous decline in rate of party recruitment.

22. At the republic level, as opposed to the all-Umon one, the assessment ot recruitment trends is complicated by the intrusion of the factor of migration into the picture. In a given republic, the growth of party membership is the net result not only of recruitment minus deaths minus expulsions, but of in- and out-migration. The level of party membership, therefore, cannot be treated as equivalent to recruitment or as resulting solely from it.




alities in the party within these nine republics are presented in Table IV, which reports the coefficients of correlation between the two distributions.

Table IV

Correlation Coefficients for Percentage of Specialists and Percentage of Republic Communist Party, by Nationality,

Selected Union Republics and Years23

N of nationality Republic categories Year Value of r

Azerbaidzhán 4 1961 +0.9881 1963 +0.9900 1965 +0.9934

Belorussia 4 1961 +0.9986 4 1967 +0.9998 4 1971 +0.9998 8 1974 +0.9999 4 1976 +1.0000

Georgia 8 1963 +0.9987 Kazakhstan 7 1960 +0.8851

1961 +0.8926 1962 +0.9007 1965 +0.9230 1967 +0.9337 1969 +0.9327 1971 +0.9456 1974 +0.9396 1976 +0.9421 1978 +0.9477 1981 +0.9539

23. Sources: Razvitie narodnogo khoziaistva Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR i rosi material' nogo i kul'turnogo urovnia zhizni naroda (Baku, 1961), p. 199; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR v 1962 godu: Statisticheskii -sbornik (Baku, 1963), p. 152; Narkhoz Azerb SSR 1964, p. 153; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Azerbaid- zhanskoi SSR k 60-letiiu obrazovaniia SSSR: Iubileinii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (1982), p. 27

' 1; Kommunisticheskaia partiia Azerbaidzhana v tsifrakh: Statisticheskii

sbornik (Baku, 1970), pp. 45, 53, and 61; Statisticheskii ezhegodnik Belorusskoi SSR, 1973: Narodnoe khoziaistvo respubliki v 1972 godu (Minsk, 1973), p. 158; Narkhoz Belor. SSR 1976, pp. 161-62; Kommunisticheskaia partiia Belo-




Republic N of nationality Year Value of r categories

Kirghizia 6 1958 +0.9191 1960 +0.9100 1961 +0.9158 1963 +0.9137 1964 +0.9161

Lithuania 8 1958 +0.9446 1960 +0.9563 1961 +0.9682 1962 +0.9704 1963 +0.9740 1965 +0.9444 1967 +0.9841 1969 +0.9868 1971 +0.9879 1974 +0.9900

Tadzhikistan 4 1958 +0.6668 1960 +0.6299 1961 +0.6189 1963 +0.6425 1965 +0.6270

Turkmenia 6 1963 +0.8505 10 1971 +0.9034

Uzbekistan 10 1963 +0.9010

russii v tsifrakh, 1918-1978 (Minsk, 1978), pp. 102-105; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Gru- zinskoi SSR v 1962 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Tbilisi, 1963), p. 288; Kom- munisticheskaia partiia Gruzii v tsifrakh (1921-1979 gg.): (Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov) (Tbilisi, 1971), p. 233; Kazakhstan za 40 let: Statisticheskii sbornik (Alma-Ata, 1960), p. 304; Narkhoz Kazakhstana (1968), p. 258; Narkhoz Ka- zakhstana 1968, pp. 243-44; Narkhoz Kazakhstana 1974, p. 208; Narkhoz Ka- zakhstana 1980, p. l%0;KompartiiaKazakhstanaza50let(1921-1971):Rostireguli- rovanie sostava partiinoi organizai sii respubliki (Alma-Ata, 1972), p. 2S0' Kommu- nisticheskaia partiia Kazakhstana v usloviiakh razvitogo sotsializma: Rost i organizatsionno-politicheskoe ukreplenie. 1966-1981 gg. (Alma-Ata, 1983), pp. 47-48; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Kirgizskoi SSR v I960 g.: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Frunze, 1961), p. 178; Narkhoz Kirgizskoi SSR 1963, p. 145; Rost i regulirovanie sostava Kommunisticheskoi partii Kirgizii (1918-1962 gg.): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Frunze, 1963), pp. 254, 268, and 272; Kompartiia Kirgizii za 40 let ([Frunze], 1966), p. 43; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR v 1965 godu: Statisti-




Four of the republics - Azerbaidzhán, Belorussia, Georgia, and Lithuania - show levels of correlation of at least +0.99 in the most recently available measurement, which is roughly similar to the nation-wide figure (see again Table I). These republics seem to conform to the all-Union pattern: the percentages of nationalities among specialists conform almost perfectly to the percentages among party members within the republic.24 If there is in- and out-migration of party members in these republics, then it must be balanced in terms of both ethnicity and education. In the remaining five, however, the correlations are markedly lower, ranging downward at the latest reading from +0.95 in Kazakhstan, to +0.92 in Kirghizia, +0.90 in Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, and +0.63 in Tadzhikistan. How can ethnicity, education, and party membership be aligned at the national

cheskii sbornik (ViFnius, 1966), p. 190; Ekonomika i kul' tura Litovskoi SSR v 1970 godu (1971), pp. 278 and 280; Lietuvos Komunistu partija skaiciais, 1918-1975: Statistikos duomenu rinkinys (Vilnius, 1976), pp. 121-23; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Tadzhikskoi SSR v 1960 godu: Statisticheskii sbornik (Dushanbe, 1961), p. 211; Narkhoz Tadzhikskoi SSR 1964, p. 158; Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v tsifrakh za 50 let (1924-1974 gg.)( Rost i regulirovanie sostava partiinoi organi- zatsii respubliki (Dushanbe, 1977), pp. 55 and 77; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SredneiAzii v 1963 godu: Statisticheskii sbornik (Tashkent, 1964), pp. 280 and 284; Narodnoe khoziaistvo Turkmenskoi SSR v 1977 godu: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Ashkhabad, 1979), p. 93; Kommunisticheskaia partiia Turkmenistana v tsifrakh (1924-1974): Statisticheskii sbornik (Ashkhabad, 1975), pp. 179-80 and 214-25; and Kommu- nisticheskaia partiia Uzbekistana v tsifrakh: (Sbornik statisticheskikh materialov, 1924-1977 gg.) (Tashkent, 1979), p. 244.

24. Below the union republic level, I have located data for the Altai Krai and the Komi, Mordovian, and Yakut ASSRs. These also conform to the norm. In the Komi ASSR, the correlation coefficients were +0.9265 (1961), +0.9704 (1967), and +0.9824 (1971). Komi oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh, 1921-1976 (Syktyvkar, 1977), p. 42; Komi ASSR za 50 let (Syktyvkar, 1971), p. 118; and Komi ASSR k 50-letiiu Sovetskoi vlasti: Statisticheskii sbornik (Syktyvkar, 1967), p. 96. In the Mordovian autonomous republic, they were +0.991 1 (1961), +0.9924 (1965), and +0.9925 (1967). Mordovskaia partiinaia organizatsiia v dokumentakh i tsifrakh (1918-1972 gg.) (Saransk, 1975), p. 176, dina Mordovskaia ASSR zagody Sovetskoi vlasti (v tsifrakh): Statisticheskii sbornik (Saransk, 1967), pp. 138-39. In Yakutia, r was +0.9144 in 1967. Iakutskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh, 1919-1980, 2d ed. (Iakutsk, 1981), p. 50, and Iakutiia za 50 let v tsifrakh (Iakutsk, 1967), p. 109. In Altai Krai, r reached an astonishing +0.9998. Altaiskaia kraevaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh, 1920-1975, ed. I. V. Iaroshenko (Barnaul, 1978), pp. 64-65, and Narodnoe khoziaistvo Altaiskogo kraia za 50 let sovetskoi vlasti (Statisticheskii sbornik) (Barnaul, 1967), p. 76.




level, yet be out of alignment for these very same groups in their own regions of the country?

In each of the Central Asian republics reported in Table IV, the si- tuation is basically this: the titular nationality constitutes a larger proportion of the republic party than it does of specialists; Russians, on the contrary, make up a consistently smaller fraction of the party than they do of specialists. This indicates that in these republics ethnic groups, and in particular the titular nationality, are not so dependent on education for access into the Communist Party. Thus for these nationalities the opportunities for political recruitment would appear to be much better on their home turf than they are within the USSR taken as a whole. More opportunity for titular nationalities means less opportunity for others. Hence the recent intervention by Moscow in the Central Asian republics' party membership and cadre recruitment practices.

The Tadzhik anomaly is the most remarkable of the four and deserves additional comment. According to the 1979 census, 20.5 per cent of all Tadzhiks lived in the Uzbek republic and made up 3.9 per cent of its population.25 In 1970-78, they experienced an above-average rate of growth among Communists in Uzbekistan. Underrepresented in the party within their own republic, the Tadzhiks would seem to be overrepresented next door in the Uzbek SSR, and thus on balance to have a fair share of party membership.

This puzzle could be unlocked if we knew more about the geographical mobility patterns of CPSU members. It may be that "natives" of these republics who are specialists and are party members emigrate to other parts of the union at greater than average rates, thus maintaining the statistical relationship between nationality, education, and party membership at the all-Union level while depressing it locally in the republic. This would be consistent with the central policy of "exchange of cadres" among the republics.26 But it might also deprive those cadres of leadership positions in their home regions, and this might stimulate frustration. The only other possible resolution of the puzzle is the unknown quantity in the available data - the presence of the military. Soviet statistical handbooks on the economy sometimes note that their data on specialists in the labour

25. Vestnik statistiki, 1980, No. 11, p. 66, and 1980, No. 9, p. 61. 26. The need to increase such interchange of personnel among the republics

and regions of the USSR was emphasized in the January 1987 Central Committee resolution, "O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii," Partiinaia zhizn', 1987, No. 4, pp. 45-54.



Vol. xxx, No. 2 Ethnic Political Recruitment in the USSR | 187

force exclude military service personnel. Party membership figures, on the other hand, presumably include the military on the territory of a given republic, but disguised under equivalent civilian occupational categories. If this is generally true, then the disproportionately large concentration of titular nationals in the republic parties in Central Asia can be explained by their disproportionate concentration in the more numerous lower ranks of the military. Conversely, one might speculate that the relatively small number of Russian officers in the military (unreported in the economic statistics) would have little impact on the size of the overall Russian contingent in the republic party. Following the same reasoning, there must be much less concentration of titular nationalities in the ranks of the military in the other four republics of Table IV. Otherwise, the parties in these republics may actually be recruiting members of the titular nationality at rates in excess of those of other nationalities, especially Russians, as Mary McAuley has suggested.27

The better explanation for the discrepancies in nationality representation in party ranks between the republic and ail-Union levels may lie in geographical mobility. In the Central Asian republics native specialists may be encouraged to emigrate, or if members of the party posted outside the home republic; their places may be taken by non-native immigrants. Lending some support to this possibility are the data for growth rates of specialists and of party members, by nationality, for six of the republics. These are summarized in Table V.

TABLE V Result of Rank-Order Correlations for Growth of Specialists and of

Party Members, Selected Union Republics and Years28

Republic N Specialists Party Members Spearman's rho p

Belorussia 8 1960-65 1973-77 +0.3333 >.10 1960-70 1971-78 +0.5000 =.10

Lithuania 7 1957-62 1968-73 +0.3571 >.10 1962-68 1973-77 +0.7768 < .05

Kazakhstan 7 1960-70 1971-81 +0.7500 <.05 Kirghizia 6 1957-62 1968-73 +0.7143 <.10 Tadzhikistan 4 1957-64 1968-74 +1.0000 =.05 Turkmenia 6 1962-70 1973-74 -0.0140 VIO

27. McAuley, "Party Recruitment," p. 479. 28. Sources: As in n. 23, as well as Kommunisticheskaia partila Litvy




The generally low levels of significance for these correlations suggest that, while throughout the Soviet Union the aggregate rates of specialists and party members concur, in at least some of the republics specific nationalities are singled out for transfer to other places. Indeed, 5 of the 8 tests carried out in Table V are not statistically significant, which means that the nationality composition of the labour force and of the Communist Party are definitely out of synchronization in certain republics. Other- wise, the discrepancy between these and the USSR figures may be the result of the unavoidably varying time frames used to measure growth rates in the republics. Unfortunately, there is too little information to make further generalizations.29 All we can say is that ethnicity and political recruitment seem to be more directly related to each other in the union republics (rather than being mediated by education) than they are in the USSR taken as a whole - if it is indeed recruitment that we are detecting in the republics as opposed to physical movement.

In the aftermath of the Kazakh riots press reports have confirmed that nationality had been a criterion in the Central Asian republics not only in the recruitment of party members but also in admissions to higher education.30 In general, local and republic party officials - since re- moved - are said to have favoured indigenous over non-indigenous peoples in these processes. After the fact, the central authorities in Moscow have intervened to remove such misguided officials, to prescribe that republic parties conduct recruitment so as to "take into account the multi-national

v tsifrakh, 1918-1976: Sbornik statisticheskikh dannykh (ViFnius, 1977), pp. 273-74; Kommunisticheskaia partila Kirgizii (1918-1973): Rost i regulirovanie sostava (Frunze, 1973), pp. 216 and 256; and KP Turkmenistana (1975), pp. 225-26 and 230-31.

29. Probing for a relationship between the growth rates of nationalities among students and among specialists after a lag often years produced even more disappointing results (or encouraging, if one had been looking for a confirmation of the proverbial null hypothesis). For example, the rank-order correlation between the growth rates for seven nationalities among students in 1960-65, and specialists in 1970-73, in Lithuania was +0.2857, which is utterly without significance. For 1960-70 and 1970-80, respectively, in Kazakhstan, it was +0.2571 and equally insignificant. For Uzbekistan, the correlation coefficient between growth of students in 1950-60 and of party members in 1970-80 was +0.2727, also insignificant. Obviously, the movement of personnel begins very soon after grad- uation.

30. See Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 4 February 1987, p. 6, 1 1 February 1987, p. 8, 4 March 1987, p. 14, and 17 June 1987, p. 22.




structure of the population,"31 and to urge greater inter-republic exchange of students and responsible personnel.32 In other words, Central Asian party leaders have been effecting "affirmative action" on behalf of their fellow ethnics and are currently being brought to heel. This is probably not the first nor the last time such a thing will happen. Local and republic leaders obviously have more effective means for circumventing the social dynamics of political recruitment; their chiefs at the centre have more ultimate authority as well as more concern for national integration of the whole USSR rather than for local autonomy.

Conclusions Ethnic political recruitment in the USSR today is determined mainly

by education. As the non-Russian nationalities, especially those native to the economically less-developed borderlands, move through the educational system and into the labour force at a relatively faster pace so they also tend to fill the ranks of the Communist Party more quickly. Thus the nationality profile of the party progressively changes and the predominant position in it of the Russians is being inexorably undermined. In the 1990s all of the Central Asians, along with the Azéris, Moldavians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, and possibly the Armenians and Latvians, will form an in- creasing share of the party; the Russians, together with Ukrainians and possibly the Georgians and Estonians, will constitute a decreasing portion. Within the union republics, this straightforward relationship between education and party recruitment is not as evident. It is obscured by other factors such as differences in rates of migration, possible rejection of party membership by individuals, "affirmative action" on behalf of some titular nationalities by the grassroots recruiters as well as the republics' leaders, and the incompleteness of our data. Nevertheless, the tension between centre and periphery over equality versus discrimination in political recruitment in those localities will likely continue. This will especially be so in Central Asia and the other less-developed borderlands where there is now such a boom in the output of indigenous specialists. Within these republics, a similar tension will likely prevail between indigenous and nonindigenous peoples based on divergent opportunities for political recruitment and eventual movement into the local political elite. The dominance of Russians at the centre may remain; in the borderlands, thanks to education, it will not go unchallenged.

31. Pravda, 18 June 1987, p. 1, and 11 July 1987, p. 2. 32. Ibid., 4 June 1987, p. 2, 16 July 1987, p. 1, and 2 August 1987, p. 2.



ethnic political recruitment in the ussr

Documents