essays by bnk sharma

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MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCHPAPERS

byMadhvamunipriya, Maha -mahopa-dhya-ya

Dr. B. N. K. Sharma, M.A. PhD. D.Litt.

Retired Professor of Sanskrit and ArdhamagadhiRuparel College

Mumbai - 400 016.

2001

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MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERSby

DR. B. N. K. SHARMA,E-mail : [email protected]

Published by : The Author,

4/2 Shah Bldg.,

Bhagat Road,

Mumbai - 400 016.

Printed at : Navin Printers,

Near Ruparel College,

Matunga (W), Mumbai - 400 016.

Pages : 74

Price : Rs. 50/-

April 2001

Copyright Reserved by the Author.

CONTENTS

Preface 5

1. (a) Brahmatarka and other unknown source books

of Madhva 7

(b) Vedanta Desika's strictures on Alepakamata in

his Satadusani (Ch. 65)

(c) His denunciation of interpolations by its

activists in to the body politic of traditional

Sampradayic Sanyasadharma Texts as quoted

by Prof. Mesquita on 7 of his work.

(d) These have absolutely nothing to do with

the bona fides of M's now non - extant

sources, on which he had developed his

philosophical system and its theology, for

which Appayya Diksita had arraigned him. 31-34

2. Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta -

A farfetched theory. 35

3. The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya

to the interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras. 45

4. Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati 59

5. Appendix - The question of the

Date of Madhvacarya 67

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PREFACE

The Dvaita School of Vedanta entered the modern academic

forum effectively only in the early years of the last century.

Since then, it has made steady and rapid progress, during

the last sixty years and has crossed the seas, in the modern

academic sense. It has established an enviable record of upto

date literary output of research work of outstanding merit in

the history of Dvaita literature and its philosophical classics through

international literary medium, by way of translations and expositions

through leading Publishing Houses like the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,

Motilal Banarsidass and Munshiram Manoharlal. It has established

its own institutes for Advance studies and research foundations

at Bangalore and Anandatirtha Pratisthana under the Akhila Bharata

Madhva Mahamandala. A Variorum edition of the Nyayamrta,

Tarangini and Advaitasiddhi has been published in 3 volumes

- a historical event, by Prof. K. T. Pandurangi. Many western

scholars like Suzanne Siauve, Stafford Betty, Edwin Gerow and

Michael Warren Myers have enriched Dvaita philosophy with their

writings. Moving with the time spirit, the Dvaita School has

established its links with the most modern electronic media of

the Internet / Website through the pioneering efforts of a band

of scholars from the States. In short, it has carved out for itself

a niche in the temple of spiritual quest in the West and has

acquitted itself very well in recapturing its esteemed position

as one of the three living principal schools of Vedanta, whose

study is capable of contributing seminal ideas for the development

of a Global Philosophy of Theism in the future.

Of late, there seem to be some undercurrents of hidden Agenda

to denigrate the growing prestige of the school by maligning

the fair name of its Founder, by calling into question the textual

bona fides of his source books, many of which are now non

- extant. They are sought to be made out to be works of his

own authorship, intended to be passed off as ancient authorities

to delude the gullible. Akin to this is another attempt to establish

a Jain Background to the development of some aspects of Dvaita

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logic and Epistemology, its acceptance of Memory as a source

of valid knowledge, the definition and classification of Pramana

into Kevala and Anu etc. These claim to be in the nature of

open research pursued for its own sake by Western scholarship

and have been published in the West recently.

The Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation and

the Anandatir tha Pratisthana should lose no time in countering

such moves, by undertaking a massive research project to deal

with such issues, as and when they are raised. My aim in the

present publication is to make a beginning to set the ball rolling

in the right direction by drawing attention to the new challenges

of the times which the school will have to face in the realm

of advanced research. The two other papers included here, are

in the nature of routine book-reviews.

My grand daughter-in-law Smt. Asha Purandar Bhavani has

most cheerfully taken the trouble to get the Mss. of these papers

computer - typed for the press and my son Dr. S. K. Bhavani

took the entire responsibility of seeing them through the press.

I thank them both for their co-operation.

Vaisa-kha Sukla Aks.aya Tr. ti-ya- B. N. K. Sharma

26-April-2001

4/2 Shah Building,

Bhagat Road,

Mumbai - 400 016.

(Phone : 022 - 431 0035)

6 Preface I. BRAHMATARKA AND OTHERUNKNOWN SOURCE

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

BOOKS OF MADHVA

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

PART - I

It is significant that the question of the genuineness of a

large number of unknown and non-extant literary sources cited

by Madhva, the founder of one of the three principal schools

of Vedanta in India, in the 13th century, was raised only in the

Post -Vyasatirtha period, by Appayya Diksita and others. They

had been dismayed by the devastating criticisms of the foundations

and superstructure of Advaita Metaphysics and its interpretation

of the Brahmasutras, by Vyasatirtha in his Nyayamrta and Candrika.

In their chagrin, they raised the bogey of unknown source books

of Madhva as a vulnerable point of attack. These critics were

promptly met and answered by Vijayindratirtha and Narayanacarya

of Advaita - Kalanala fame and many others like Vanamali Misra

from the North. There the controversy ended.

The question has now been re-opened in a big way by Prof.

Roque Mesquita in his book written in German and published

by the indological Department of the Vienna University (1997).

It has been briefly reviewed in English by Prof. Jan Houben.

I have also discussed this question in my History of Dvaita

School of Vedanta (Motilal B. Dass publication), in the light of

contemporary historical facts and internal evidences of these

texts, of various kinds, linguistic and philological, the varying

lengths of quotes and references to the names of interlocutors

in the texts impugned. I am not able to see from the brief review

in English, if Prof. Mesquita has given due consideration for

accepting the genuineness of the sources and giving Madhva

the benefit of the doubt, at this distance of time. It is not my

contention that this matter should not be investigated afresh

on modern lines. But this discussion should be in a balanced

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way, without imputing motives of fraud and fabrication and with

the courtesy and regard due to the founder of one of the Principal

Schools of Vedanta Philosophy, without straying into sensitive

issues relating to the Avatarhood of the person concerned.

The 13th Century which saw the bir th of Madhva was a period

of grave socio-religious and political upheavals in the history

of the country - in the wake of Muslim invasions, occupation

and expansion involving destruction of temples, forced conversions

and destruction of vast manuscript libraries, housing priceless

treasures in all branches of Sanskrit learning, in various parts

of the country. From certain remarks of Madhva in his Mbh.

TN (II 3-7) it seems, that he exerted himself to salvage and

restore to posterity as much of the fading and forgotten sources,

by incorporating them into his own works as much as was possible

and in keeping with his requirements and pass it on to posterity.

It is unfor tunate that instead of appreciating and being grateful

to this Great Son of India and a Jnanopasaka, later day critics

like Appayya Diksita should have chosen to accuse him of fraud

and fabrication. It is difficult to believe with Prof. Mesquita that

the authenticity of the Source Books of Madhva had already

been raised in Madhva's own days or soon after, by Varadaguru

and Venkatanatha and not by Appayyadiksita for the first time

in the 16th Century after Vyasatirtha. It is indeed difficult to

believe that so damaging a charge would have been left unanswered

by any of the stalwarts among the followers of Madhva such

as Aksobhyatir tha who disputed with the famous Vidyaranya on

Tattvamasi or by the lynx-eyed great commentator Jayatir tha

or by Visnudasacarya of Vadaratnavali fame or even by the great

Vyasatir tha himself and it was left to Vyasatir tha's disciple

Vi jay indrat i r tha. Even Madhusudana Sarasvat i had not

raised the problem of the authenticity of the sources of Madhva.

I t was Vi jay indra - who was the f i rs t to take cudgels

against Appayya.

Brahma Tarka is Prof. Mesquita's main target of attack on

Madhva. He regards it as a bogus work authored by Madhva

himself and passed off as an ancient authority. This sensational

theory of his rests on most slippery foundations of a passing

reference to B. T. in the concluding Mangalacarana verse of

Madhva's Upadhikhandana (Brahmatarkokti margatah) that

the t reatment of the subject is in accordance with the

teachings of B. T.

Reading too much between the lines of the Mangalacarana

verse, Prof. Mesquita has a brain wave that the entire body

of the text of the Up. Kh. is a verbatim carbon copy of B. T.,

barring the Mangalacarana. It so happens that in keeping with

the title of his work Up. Kh., Madhva comes down heavily on

a desperate plea of Istasiddhi of Vimuktatman that the very

irrationality of the Advaita Concept of Avidya operating as an

Upadhi (limiting adjunct) in obscuring the Nirvisesa - B and

producing an illusory appearance of a multiplicity of Jivatmans,

is not a defect : as such irrationality of Avidya is an embellishment

and not a defect : Durghatatvam Avidyayah Bhusanam Na Tu

Dusanam. This invites a fitting retort from Madhva :

Durghatatvam Bhusanam cet Syad avidyatvamatmanah

Andham tamopyalamkaro Nityaduhkham Siromanih

(Up. Kh.)

Having arrived at the conclusion that Up. Kh. itself is an integral

part of the B. T., emanating from it, Prof. Mesquita triumphantly

declares that the B. T. "polemizes upon Istasiddhi". And as the

I stasiddhi can be placed only between 10th and 11th centuries,

the B. T. too which "polemizes upon it" must have been written

much later in the 13th Century in Madhva's own life time and

by himself. It is all such simple logic! Only, Prof. Mesquita is

reckoning without the host.

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 98 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

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Prof. Mesqui ta 's ascr ipt ion of B. T. to Madhva's own

authorship hinges on the casual reference to B. T. in theconcluding Mangala verse of Madhva's Up. Kh. and gives him

a jumping ground. But unfortunately for him, there are two other

references to Durghatatvam of Avidya being an embellishment,

in Madhva's A. V. one in 1 - 1 - 1 - Avidyadurghatatvam ced

syada- tma- pihi ta- drsah and another - Alamkrtah Sadaivayam

durghataireva bhusanih, in the Iksatyadhi. In both these cases,there is no mention of B. T. in the vicinity or neighbourhood

to g ive any handle for Prof. Mesqui ta to int roduce his

hobby horse.

The Up. Khandana is an out and out dialectical work capa pie demolishing the Advaita doctrine of Brahma- jna-nava-da frombeginning to end, unsparingly going into the nooks and cornersof the dialectical method. The B. T. on the other hand is a constructivetreatise dealing with a wide range of subjects against a backgroundof multi-dimensional subjects covering theistic logic, epistemologyand metaphysics as well as principles of textual exegesis relatingto Upasanas and Vaisnava theology in its widest range. Thetwo works are not thus in pari materia and a dialectical worklike the Up. Khandana cannot be treated as forming a part ofthe B. T. by any stretch of the imagination.

Nay, there is one more full-dress dialectic refutation ofIstasiddhi's desperate plea in the V. T. N of Madhva runningover seventeen sentences, short and long, beginning with Naca Mithyavastuno durghatatvameva bhusanam and ending withdurghatasya bhusanatve durghatamapi atmamithyatvam syad eva.Here also, there is no contextual connection with the B. T. Aboveall, the VTN is a prose work of Madhva in the main, (thougha few verses are quoted here and there) and Madhva expresslysays that he is the author of VTN by using the first personin the second opening verse Sa-dhayisya-mi tanyeva kramad. Prof.Mesquita will do well to abandon his chasing a shadow andtrying to make out that the B. T. is one of Madhva's own works,paraded as an ancient authority. He must apologise to Madhva.

It is significant that Madhva pays homage to Vyasa as his

Guru de jure even in his first work on the Gita, before he went

on his pilgrimage to Vyasasrama. What is most interesting is

that even before he wrote his B. S. B. he had a deep insight

and clear anticipation of the correct interpretation of the sutras

such as A-bha-sa eva ca (ii-3-50), Ya-vadatmabhavitvat (ii-3-30)

in regard to the metaphysical relation between Brahman and

the Jiva in terms of Jiva's Sa- ru-pya, not based on any external

Upadhi. This is derived from two crucial terms Anasi and Aprameya

in Gita II, 18. In the Anandamaya Adhikarana S. throws the

Sutrakara overboard by saying Idam tviha Vaktavyam. Sutrani

tu evam Vyakhyeyani and accuses the Sutrakara of a logical

fallacy in giving the sense of superabundance to "maya" in

Anandmaya alone in the Sutra Vikarasabdat neticenna pracuryat.

Madhva shows that the Sutrakara is a much more astute logician

than S. gives him credit for, as he has impartially extended

the significance of superabundance to all the five forms in the

series. A true disciple is one who stands by his teacher always

and not one who defies him. Judged in this light, Madhva richly

deserves to be regarded as a true disciple of Vyasa, irrespective

of accepting or not accepting that he ever visited Vyasasrama.

Trivikrama Pandita says that Madhva visited Badari twice in his

lifetime. Madhva Vij. says Madhva observed a vow of silence

and meditation for for ty-eight days praying for a call from Badari

to meet Vyasa. If Madhva believed himself to have been sent

down with a special mission to resuscitate Vedantic Theism and

communicated it to his chosen disciples, it was fo r their edification.

Others are free to judge him on his merits.

The B. S. is a theistic treatise which debars the released

soul from exercising the prerogatives of B's creative activities

(iv-4-17). Does not this show that Madhva is a more faithful

commentator? A Theistic philosophy is expected to give a high

place to Bhakti among Sadhanas. According to S. there is no

reference for Bhakti in the Su- tras. It is Madhva who has provided


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a rightful place for Bhakti in the Su- tras by allotting an entire

pa-da in Adh. III-2 immediately after Vairagya Pa-da, as a true

disciple of the Sutrakara. The Upanishads extol Guru Bhakti

and Guru's grace in the development of disciple's advancement,

through many stories. It is Madhva who has given a special

place to Guru's Grace, in the Su- tra Prada-navadeva taduktam

(iii-3-44) where the prefix pra signifies bestowal of grace lovingly.

Do these not show that Madhva was the most faithful disciple

of the Su- trakara? These are crucial facts which entitle us to

decide whether Madhva is justified in claiming himself to be

a true disciple of Vyasa consistent with the tradition of his visit

to Badari for a refresher course.

OTHER NON-EXTANT SOURCES OF MADHVA

Next to B. T. in importance are the numerous Pancaratra

Samhitas from which Madhva has drawn most of his quotations.

The number of Pancaratra Samhitas is more than two hundred.

Prof. Otto Schrader former Director of Adyar Library in his

Introduction to Pancaratras (of which he was pleased to present

me with a complimentary copy) has listed a large number of

them, which still await exploration. The P. R. Samhitas deal with

their subject under four heads of Jnanapada, Kriyapada, Yogapada

and Caryapada.

A verse from Mbh. expressly affirms -

Pancaratrasya krtsnasya vakta Narayanah svayam.

Jnanesu etesu rajendra sarvesu etad visisyate

Yatha yogam yatha nyayam nistha narayanah parah

(XII. 359)

that Visnu - Narayana is the sole author of the entire P. R.

literature. It is on this pronouncement that Madhva, while quoting

from some of them describes them as Visnu Krta Sattatva etc.

This way of reference to some of them in the course of citation

has been twisted by Prof. Mesquita as calculated to confer on

his own fabricated texts the stamp of divine authority - to

defame Madhva.

An Institute for the special study of P. R. texts, exclusively,

called Pancaratra Parisodhana Parisad was established in Madras

in 1982 headed by Prof. H. Daniel Smith an American Prof.

in collaboration with Dr. K. K. A. Venkatachari. The institute

brought out four publications. It has listed 104 Samhitas / Tantras

with the Adhyaya titles where available, in full or in par t. These

104 works have been surveyed. The second publication pertains

to Hindu Iconography based on P. R. texts. The third is jointly

edited by Prof. Sampat of the Presidency College, Chennai, and

Smt. Sita Padmanabhan of Q.M.C. Chennai. The fourth work

on Padma Samhita Par t II was edited by the Indological Institute,

Pondicherry. Prof. Otto Schrader has pointed out that P. R. Samhitas

originated in North India, and gradually spread to the South.

The Agama Pramanya of Yamunacarya, now lost, bore the title

of Kashmira-gama Pra-ma-nya.

The publication of the Pancaratra Parisodhana Parishad has

six appendixes.

In Appendix-I are found the names of Kapila or Kapileya,

Citrasikhandi, Visnu Rahasya, Hayagriva Samhita, Sanatkumara

Samhita, Dattatreya Samhita and Krsna Samhita, Satya Samhita,

Narayanatantra, Mayavaibhavatantra etc.

Appendix-II has Hari Samhita, Vaisvanara, Satyasamhitas.

In Appendix-III we have Vyasayoga, Kriyayoga, Dattatreyayoga,

Dhyanayoga, Mahayoga, etc.

In Appendix-IV we have Guruviveka, Karmaviveka, Amsaviveka,

Bha- s. a- viveka, Bhavaviveka, Sakti Viveka, Vedar thaviveka,

Padaviveka, Tattvaviveka.

In Appendix-V we have Vibhutitattva, Sabdatattva, Jivatattva,

Dharmatattva, Muktitattva, Sattattva, Bhavatattva.


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In Appendix-VI we have Adhyatma, Narayanadhyatma,

Vasudevadhyatma, Ya-dava-dhyatma.

In Appendix-VII Gitakalpa, Narayana Astaksarakalpa, Narayana

Gopala Kalpa, Ramakalpa, all quoted by Madhva.

A more intensive search of the Adyar Library P. R. manuscripts

may well reveal many more titles and sub titles of the P. R.

texts there. Thus a preliminary survey of the contents of the

P. R. Samhitas conducted by the Madras Institute has definitely

improved the prospects of fur ther light coming from the Adyar

collection also.

Prof. Mesquita's effort to condemn Madhva on both the fronts

of B. T. and P. R. Samhitas has definitely misfired. He should

now have the grace to withdraw his sweeping charges against

Madhva and apologise for rushing into print on delusive data.

The G. T. of Madhva (III 42-43) deals with the subject of

merger (Laya) of various abhima-ni davatas of different tattvas

in their higherups at the time of utkranti of Aparoksa jnanis

from their bodies, as stated in the srutis. However, there are

several discrepancies in the accounts in the texts. These conflicting

accounts of the merger of the abhimani devatas, is the subject

of discussion in the G. T. (III - 42-43). This is represented by

two quotes one of 6 lines in the beginning, which is followed

by an objection in prose pointing to discrepancy and another

two verses solving the conflict in an amicable way. The three

verses are quoted with just an itica as in the earlier case. It

stands to reason that the two sets of verses form a unity of

theme from the same source and further elucidation of the manner

of the reconciliation is presented in the GT in the two other

passages, one from Sabdanirnaya and another from the

Brahmatarka as such. Now the same subject of the manner

of laya is referred to in BS IV.2.1 in a particular order. The

earliest commentator on Madhva is his close contemporary

Trivikramapandita. He has suo motu raised this question of

conflicting accounts of the manner of laya in other scriptural

texts. In resolving this conflict amicably, Trivikrama has quoted

the self same three verses beginning with Sarvabhimanino Devah

and referring them to its source as Brahmatarka and the text

of the two other single verses quoted in the G. T. as from

Sabdanirnaya and Brahmatarka respectively. Trivikrama has

explained that there is no difficulty in admitting that in the case

of merger, more than one Abhimanidevata may be admitted in

subordination to other ones, without conflict : Ekatra bahunam

abhimana-avirodhah, citing the example of a King and his village

officers Yatha visayasvami gramasya. It is a matter of simple

logic and we need not suppose that Trivikramapandita was obliged

to seek clarification from Madhva, as a school boy, when one

of the two single quotes connected with the same topic has

been traced to Brahmatarka in the G. T. itself.

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PART - II

I have since got a copy of the complete English Edition of

Prof. Mesquita's work "Madhva's unknown Literary Sources -

Some Observations" published by Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi.

I am now in a better position to offer my comments on all aspects

of the problem as dealt with by him.

At the very outset, in the chapter on M and his Critics on

P. 27, the Prof. makes an astounding statement about me."As admitted by the followers of M. Venkatanatha (13th Century)

was one of his outspoken critics" and in a foot note to this,

adds "Sharma is widely mistaken in that he thinks Venkatanatha

(1268-1369) lived after Appayya Diksita and his pupil Bhattoji".

I am constrained to enlighten the Professor that the Venkatanatha

I was referring to placing him after Bhattoji, is quite a different

person, later than Madhusudana Sarasvati and a cantankerous

commentator on the Gita. He has taken M to task on several

occasions.


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Venkatanatha was the personal name of the celebrated Leader

of the Vadagalai sect of the Ramanuja school, respectfully referred

to as Vedanta Desika in Visistadvaita tradition. We in S. India

always refer to him as Desika or Vedanta Desika, following the

custom. I have in all my writings all these sixty years and more

always referred to him by that name and nowhere by his personal

name. It is Prof. Mesquita in his over-enthusiasm who has

committed an error of judgement of mistaken identification,

which I can not help.

The mistake could have been avoided if the Prof. had taken

note of other established facts known about Desika's acting as

a referee in the historic debate on the import of the Tattvam

asi text between Aksobhya Tir tha and Vidyaranya and giving

his verdict in favor of Aksobhya in the well known verse :

Asina- Tattvamasina- Parajivaprabhedina-

Vidyaran.yam maharan.yam Aks.obhyamunir acchinat

which is well attested by early Visistadvaitic works. Moreover,

Vedanta Desika agrees with M. in condemning Advaita as

Pracchanna Bauddha and calls upon the faithful to root it out

and counsels them to remain steadfast to R. or else to accept

M's school as nearest to R's heart. Both M and Desika hold

the Pancaratras highly authoritative and do quote from Ekayana

Srutis and Daivi Mimamsa which to S and Appayya are highly

suspect. In these circumstances, it is highly incredible that

Venkatanatha alias Desika could have accused M. of fabricating

texts in support of his philosophical system (unlike Appayya).

The subject matter of the Alepakamatabhangavada of Vekatanatha

quoted by the Prof. and the charges it makes against unscrupulous

writers advocating heretical innovations polluting the time honored

rigid codes of Sannyasa Dharma and quoting from non - extant

texts attributed to Vyasa and other sources in their support,

has nothing to do with the theological and philosophical doctrines

of M and his interpretations of the Sutras and Upanisads-against

which Appayya had his complaint . But the quotes from

Venkatanatha's Alepakamatabhanga given by Prof. Mesquita have

nothing to do with Vedanta or theology but are wholly connected

with the Yatidharma and its violators. How have these criticisms

been presumed to be directed against M? The offenders are

nowhere mentioned by their names and M's name is conspicuous

by its absence throughout. Why, if he is the chief offender and

the main culprit? While Appayya has expressly named M why

has the author of the Alepakamatabhanga not named M? What

is the Professor's answer to these straight questions? Or, is

it all a case of pure hallucination on his part? Who are the

Papis. t.has Venkatanatha has in mind? We wait for an answer.

Or is i t a case of Abaddham pat.hitva kucodyam karoti?

There is not even a shred of evidence that these charges

have been levelled against M. M has paid eloquent tributes

to the sanctity of Yatyasrama and Yatidharma in his Gitabhasya

(MGB III 4). He has quoted Narayana As. t.aks. arakalpa in

support which according to the Prof. is an unknown source

but which has been listed in the Pancaratra Samsodhana

Publications referred to in Par t I.

S had downgraded Karmayoga of the Gita and equated it

with Ka-myakarma and deemed Arjuna to be unfit for Jna-namarga

(SGB II 47). M on the other hand, showed that Karmayoga of

the Gita was essentially the same as Nivrttakarma as opposed

to Pravrttakarma and is based on enlightened action dedicated

to the Supreme :

Niska-mam jna-napu- rvam to nivrttam iha cocyate,

R quotes a Parallel from P. R.

Tasma- t samyak parambrahma Va-sudeva-khyam avyayam

Asma-d ava-pyate sa-stra- t Jna-napu- rvena karman.a-

(Sribhasya II.2.41)


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To S. Arjuna is only a Madhyama-dhikari not fit for jna-nanistha-

(II 47). To M. Arjuna is an Uttamadhikari like Janaka and Priyavrata

of the Bhagavatapurana (II.7.45). Arjuna is the chosen exemplar

of Lokasangraha (III. 20). Jnanamarga and Karmamarga are

not water tight compartments. Efficient performance of either

yields the benefit of both (V. 4) which implies that each has

an appreciable content of the other. The only difference is there

is more of external activity and social responsibility than in other

(M. G. T). Hence the statement sankocat bahyakarmanah and

the clarification : Jna-nina-m api hi karma anus. t.heyam karmina-

pi jna- tavyo Bhagava-n (M. G. T). There is nothing in all this

to warrant Prof. Mesquita's surmise that it refers to authors

degrading the function of dharma or karma, going back to Vyasa

himself and his disciples, like Jaimini, Asmarathya and "the principle

of first interpolate and then claim to find them in some Puranas"

(P. 28). Incidentally Vyasa Smrti has been listed in the P. R.

Samsodan Publication and quoted by S. (VSNB).

M would be the last person to countenance / encourage or

connive at any inroads on Yatidharma by anyone. In his

BSB III.4.3 he administers a stern warning that even an

Aparoksajnani shall not transgress any established codes of

conduct of ascetic discipline.

Atita-anagatajna-ni Trailokyoddharan.aks.amah

Etadrsopi na-ca- ram srautam sma- rtam parityajet.

Trivikrama Pandita records that M had set an exemplary record

of adherence to Yatidharma, as a Paramahamsa :

Sla-ghyah Pa- ramahamsya a-sramavaro Yacchila

Ganga- jalasna- to

vyaktam ayogya sangamabhuvo dos.a- t Punar moks. itah

The Prof. makes a sneaking attempt to connect the charges

of meddling with Sanyasadharma by some unscrupulous authors

mentioned by Venkatanatha, with the topic of the various ways

in which the Samanvaya of Karmakanda texts in B have been

attuned with B by Audulomi, Jaimini Kasakrtsna as disciples

of Vyasa, as partial aspects of his teaching in the Vakya-nvaya

Sutra of the B. S. (1.4.20) with the licentiousness towards

Yat idhar ma let loose by some Dissenters according to

Venkatanatha. This is highly objectionable. The two have nothing

in common.

Krsnadvaipayanamatad ekadesavidah pare

Vadanti te yathaprajnam no virodhah kathamcana

(M.BSB.1.4.23)

The Professor's remarks in this connection are baseless,

motivated and uncalled for. His is mixing up issues deliberately.

His hypothesis that M. put up his claims to be an Avatara

of Vayu only after his visit to Badari and receiving Vyasa's mandate,

tho true, does not mean that M. was not sure or aware of his

Avatarhood earlier. The fact that his earliest work the Gita Bhasya

pays homage to Narayana and Vyasa as his Devata and Guru

(see f. n. on p. 34 and also AV 2c).

Devam Narayanam natva- sarvadosavivarjitam

Paripurnam Gurumsca-n Gita- rtham vaksya-mi lesatah1

confirms his faith in his being a direct sisya of Narayana - Vyasa

come to fulfil a Divine mission. It would be otherwise impossible

to explain his unerr ing quotations from many lost Vedic

Sa- khas like Gaupavana Agnivesya, Aya- sya, Anabhimlana,

Madhucchandasa, Sa-ndilya, Pippala-da, Yaska and a number of

PR Texts like Narayana Astaksara Kalpa, Gita Kalpa, Vyasasmrti

and others in his very first work. There are indications of this

in M.Vij.V.53. The formal authorisation of M to write a commentary

on the B. S. described in M.Vij. VIII.46 only completes the picture.

Glowing with a new illumination and a renewed faith in his mission

in life M returns to his camp, writes his Bhasya on the Sutras,

has it copied by Satyatir tha, sends an advance copy of it to


-11- (5TH PROOF)

Acyutaprajna his Asramaguru at Udupi and returns after visiting

great centres of learning on the Godavari and acquiring fresh

disciples on the way back. (M. vij IX. 5-6)

Sayana in his introduction to Rgveda bhasya says :Yuga-nte antarhita-n Veda-n Setihasan maharsayah

Lebhire tapasa purvam anujna- ta-h svayambhuva- .

Among the direct disciples of M, Trivikrama Pandita is the

only one who gives us a personal description of the Acarya's

personality as a Mahapurusa both physically and intellectually.The Acarya himself defines a Mahapurusa :

S.an.n.avatyangulotsedho Nyagrodhaparimandalah

Saptatalas caturhastah sa Devairapi pujyate

Vimsallaksanato anunah tapasvi bahuvedavit

Veda ityeva yam pasyet sa vedo jna-nadarsana- t

Trivikrama writes -

Pratyaks.am eva etallaks. an. am dr.syate Bhagavati

Bha-s.yaka- re

And proceeds saying :

Sabra-hman.opanisadah nikhilas susiddha-h Veda-h vettum

tadasya mahima-yam acintaniyah

The variety, voluminosity and multidimensional range of his literary

contributions to the sum total of human knowledge of his times

stands unparalleled to this day. His poetic talents find expression

thro' different genre. His logic is inexorable and his spiritual

mysticism deep and abiding. His devotion to God is unparalleled.

He is the only Indian philosopher and Vedantin who has recognised

the continuation of Bhakti even after Moksa, as an end in itself.

Bhaktya- Jna-nam tato Bhaktih Tato drs. tih tatasca sa-

Tato muktih tato bhaktih saiva sya- t sukharupin. i

(A. V. 1639)

The Gita says God descends on earth in all Yugas and surely

some of the gods too do so with Him. The BV Bhavan, Mumbai

has published a volume of Vedic Su-ktas conforming to Rgvedic

prototype in language, idiom and accentuation, tested by experts.2

If a gifted genius of our own times can do this, why disbelieve

the ability of a great thinker like M to be able to recapture lost

sakhas by his Yogic spiritual power, centuries ago, for the benefit

of posterity?

Over a dozen commentaries are known to have been written

on the Sutras of Badarayana till the times of M. Still, there

is no consensus among Vedantins about their teachings.

Commentators have been going on the merry-go-round of real

Brahmaparinamavada either wholly or in part, Bhedabhedavada,

Vivartavada, Sacchaktiparinamavada etc. Do these exhaust the

possibilities of a solution? Is there no possibility of going beyond

the beaten track including the Nyayavaisesika conception of a

Cosmic Potmaker and conceive of B in a better light as the

efficient cause only in terms of being the source of the being,

becoming and functioning of all finite reality, with primordial Matter

as the material cause, since Vedanta philosophy does not subscribe

to creation de novo and ex-nihilo. Why should such a conception

be looked at askance, instead of as a viable solution?

An unprejudiced critical and comparative study of the existing

Bhasyas on the sutras discloses many directions in which M's

Bhasya has been far ahead of earlier ones. While the others

have explained a-di in BS i.1.2 as referring only to Sthiti and

dissolution of the world, the internal evidence of Sutra III.2.5

shows obscuration of Jivas' Jnana by Ajnana and consequent

bondage and subsequent release by the gracious will of the

Lord (Para-abhidhyanat) which add up to e ight cosmic

dispensations by the Lord as Jagatkarana (See also BS i-3,

10-11). Sutra IV.4.17 debars released souls from exercising the

Divine prerogatives of Jagadvyapara. Where then is there any


-12- (5TH PROOF)

possibility of identity between Jiva and B in Moksa, in the

philosophy of Badarayana?

Advaita dismisses Jivasvarupa as an illusory appearance of

B like the reflected image of the sun in the waters. The opening

words of the Sutra Ata eva (meaning, as already stated) upama

suryakadivat (iii, 2.18) calls attention to the particular grounds

on which the relation is intended to be taken and not in a literal

sense, which would reduce the Jivasvarupa to an insentient

reflection brought about by a medium and hence impermanent

non-eternal. But not only are Jivas Nitya according to Katha

Up. (II:2, 13), B. S. (IV 4.17) and Gita (II.18.XIV.2) but are sentient

beings and not Jadas - which shows that the words of the Sutra

Ata eva (Upama) are intended to make clear in what precise

sense the simile is to be understood and in what sense it

should not be misunderstood. Hence, M commentary :

Ata eva-bhinnatva-tadadhinatva sa-drsya-bhya-m eva

Suryaka-dyupama- Na upa-dhyadhinatva-dina-

(M.B.S.B. III. 2. 18)

referring back to Sutras II.3.1; II.3.28; II.3.29. The association

of Buddhi with Jivasvarupa cannot at all be regarded as ya-vada-

tmabha-vi (II.3, 30) without interpolating of Samsarabhavi after

A-tma- as S would have it. The significance of the warning sounded

by Ata eva (as above) cannot be missed.

The term A-bha-sa (B. S. II.3.50) deserves to be understood

in a much better sense than that of a lifeless, insentient reflection

of B. M's interpretation of A-bha-sa as one who shines forth as

a conscious being on account of B and bears a similarity to

it in terms of tadgunasa- ratva raises the spiritual status of the

Jiva from that of a l i feless inanimate reflection to "Tata

a-bha-sate nityam tadvad abhasate pi ca Bha-nam astitvam api

caiva a- samantad yatas tatah. Jiva a-bha-sa uddistah sadaiva

Paramatmanah (AV)". Only such an exalted inherent everlasting

spiritual relation between Jiva and B which is yavadatmabhavi

II.3.30 could be consistent with the status of both. The Sruti

: Rupam Rupam pra t i r upo babhuva Tadasya Rupam

praticaksana-ya (RV VII.47.18) makes it clear that the Bimba

form of B is intended to be perceived by the Jiva (asya

praticaksanaya). The perceiving Jiva must be a real person and

not a lifeless insentient projection, like the Suryaka. Such are

the new trails of light on the teachings of the B. S. blazed by

M's Bhasya -

It is sickening to see seasoned modern research scholars

like Prof. Mesquita to still go on repeating parrot-like old and

worn out opinions of Bhandarkar or Ghate and their assessment

of M's bhasya as "a performance of little or no merit." "He (M)

has interpreted the Sutras in a fantastic manner and he would

very well have set them aside altogether but that their uncontested

authoritativeness prevented his doing so" (P. 20 fn) as Gospel

truth - at this distance of time. Why should our most modern

scholars not profit by the latest critical and comparative studies

of all the commentaries of the principal schools of Vedanta now

made available to them and think for themselves instead of holding

to the apron strings of a Ghate or a Bhandarkar; for a change,

even after so much has been written, discussed, published and

made available, on behalf of the Dvaita school?

M believes in a threefold classification of souls based on

their svarupayogyata (inherent fitness) or Tr ividha sraddha-

expressing itself according to Gita XVII. 2-3 (sattvanurupa) -

satva meaning the core of the being of the selves, as Aurobindo

has pointed out.

On P. 69 the Prof. acknowledges that Otto Schrader has

shown that it has the support of PR. What is wrong then if

M accepts it on the same authority, apart from his own independent

logical arguments in favor of it :


-13- (5TH PROOF)

Yadyana-dir viseso na sa-mpratam katham eva tu

Adrs. t.a-devacadrstam svikrtam sarvavadibhih (AV III.4.41)

The BS speak of seven Hells (III. 1. 16). In the same context

the wording of III. 1.14 referring to the Aroha (Upward Journey)

and Avaroha (Downward Journey) of some others (itaresam)

lends support to the existence of a region of utter darkness

(andham tamas). The Hayagriva Samhita (p. 84) is not "unknown

work". It is listed in the PR Samsodhanaparishad Publication

along with Visnukr ta - Tattvaviveka. Tantrabha- gavata is not

"unknown" (P. 211). It is mentioned by Jiva Gosvamin as a part

of Hayasirsa Pancaratra. Parama Samhita- is not "unidentified"

(P.231). It has been quoted by both R & M and listed in the

PR Samsodhana Publication.

The attempted raid on M's Library at the instigation of

Padmatir tha mentioned in M. Vij (XIV. 2) is cur tly dismissed

by Prof. Mesquita as a "myth" (P. 176). When religious passions

are roused, such retaliatory measures are not uncommon and

need not cause any disbelief. The M. Vij may be a hagiological

work and may be in some respects panegyrical. But at the core,

it is an outstanding historical biography and a near contemporary

one at that. It has set a very high standard of authenticity and

historical accuracy of details of M's tours, places visited en

route, names of scholars met in disputation giving even the Tulu

names of villages in South Kanara and wrestlers who challenged

him for a trial of strength with them, in their Sanskritised form.

In regard to copiousness of details and accuracy of facts narrated,

it stands on a higher pedestal than the Sankaravijayas which

are mutually in discord and are not less than four or five centuries

later than the subject of their biography and often anachronistic

Cf. Sa hi khan. d.anaka- ramu-d.hadarpam

The author of the M. Vij, on the other hand, in his own notes

on M. Vij. (Bhavaprakasika) has given details of the steps he


has taken to verify the historical details from collateral sources

collected and cross checking them. The miracles attributed to

M in the biography are well within the possibility of Yogasiddhis

(M. Vij. XVI. 25,26, 29 & 30).

The s ta tus o f Mukhyaprana (Vayu) whose avatar M

claims to be is very high already in the Upanisads. He is

the only deity who never sets (anastamita- devata- ) (Brh.

Up. IV, 5, 22). He renders account of our doings to God

(Isa 4). He is the immaculate base of meditat ion on B

unthwar ted by asuric influences (Chan. Up. 1.2.7-8). The

Santi mantra recited by all Brahmins before commencing

Vedic recitation and at its close, hails Vayu - Namaste Vayo.

You are the visible Brahma. I proclaim you as such. I am stating

the truth and nothing but the truth.

Prof. Mesquita is precipitate in declaring "all unknown sources

proclaiming Vyasa as a primary Avatar should be regarded as

later productions of M" (P. 51). This statement is belied by clear

statements to the contrary and the Skandapurana quoted both

by M and Sudarsanasuri a predecessor of Desika. This quotation

consists of twelve verses beginning with :

Narayanad vinispannam Jnanam krtayuge...

and runs on :

Avatirno mahayogi bhagavan purusottamah cakara

Brahmasutrani etc.

The test of Anusandhana as the only proof of personal identity

of being put forward by M to which the Prof. seems to demur

is approved by the Lord in the Gita (IV. 5). One wonders

why the Prof. should take exception to M's view that the

body of Vyasa the direct Avatar of Visnu is not caused by

karma and not made of Prakrti (P. 38). The authority quoted

in support by M :

Na tasya Pra-krta- murtih mamsamedo asthi sambhava

-14- (5TH PROOF)

is also quoted by Ramanujiyas. We have already seen that

Sudarsanasuri accepts Vyasa as a direct avatar of Narayana.

At the conclusion of his Nyaya Vivarana M pays a soulful

homage to his spiritual Guru Vyasa in the most eloquent terms

and with deepest feelings :

Aham tu tatprasadaika maha-spadabaloddhatah

Tatprasadam rte kasya saktih samsarasagare

..... tatkat.a- ks.aikasamedhitah

Ka- nu saktih bhaven naiva tat kotra ativismayah?

There are similar statements so often made by M in most

of his other writings which show that he was imbued with a

deep inward conviction of being a chosen instrument of the

Almighty to redeem the eligibles (See M. Vij VIII.50).

On P. 110 the Prof. has tried to play down the outspoken

criticism of Mayavadins in the text of the Maitrayaniya Up (VII

8-9) as a mere general warning to orthodox believers to be

on guard against those who try to mislead them with their deceitful

argumentation. The words used in the text such as Mithyatarka,

drstantas, kuhakendrajala have a close family resemblance with

the terms of the Mithyattvanumana of Advaita and its Drstantas

like shell-silver, snake in the rope and Dvaitendrajala used by

Suresvara and especially the phrase Vaidikesu paristhatum icchanti

which are all tell tale. They deserve to be compared with the

outspoken denunciations by early writers like Bhaskara : Vigitam

Vicchinnamulam mahayanikam Bauddha gathitam mayavadam

vyavarnayantah lokan Vyamohayanti. Parthasarathi Misra writes

Tadvaram mayavadan Mahayanikam and Yadavaprakasa observes

Yuyam ca Baudhasca samana sampadah. The words Vaidikesu

paristhatum icchanti are particularly significant. Buddhists are

frankly Nairatmyavadis. They do not care or wish to be regarded

as Vaidikas or Atmavadins. Atmasvarupa according to Advaita

is incapable of knowing itself as an object of its own consciousness

(Atmani svakriyavirodhat). As for accepting the Vedas as eternal,

S writes isyate vedasyapi abhavah prabodhe (BSB). Advaita has

a threefold classification of reality which has its parallel in the

Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga (310-390 A-D) (Edited by V.

V. Gokhale JRAS 1947). The differences are purely terminological.

Neither Paingi Up., Paingi rahasya brahmana nor Bhallaveya

sakha is extant. If S's citations from them can pass muster

why not M's? A quotation given by Suresvara speaks of the

highest place of Visnu. M's quote from Bhallaveya also reads

Tam vai Visnum paramam udaharanti and both are metrical and

non - extant.

On P. 10, 63 and 64-65 the Prof. has erred in misconstruing

the verse from Mbh. T. N. (XXXII. 158) : "Vedetihasamsca purana

yuktan as claiming that M himself has composed all the Vedas

together with the PR" and adds a footnote that according to

the statement M appears as the author of the Vedas' (P. 65).

A little more attention to elementary Sanskrit grammar will show

that the Vedas have already been mentioned in the plural as

Vedan in the first quarter and that the term Veda in the third

quarter is the finite verb of the entire verse and is to be separated

from itihasa in Vedetihasa-n.

M is a staunch believer in the Apauruseyatva of the Vedas

and has established their Nityatva and svatah Pramanya at the

very outset of his VTN and earlier in the GB III 5b quoting

Vaca Virupa Nityaya (RV VIII, 75. 6) and Anadinidhana nitya

vagutsrsta svayambhuva and Ata evaca nityatvam (BS). It is

preposterous to maintain as the Prof. seeks to do that such

an ardent believer in the Apauruseyata of the Vedas should put

up an absurd claim to be the author of the Vedas. This is clearly

a case of Abaddham pathitva kucodyam karoti.

On P. 106 the Prof. has a fling at M that he has "twisted"

the thesis of Monism expressed in the verse "Prapanco yadi


-15- (5TH PROOF)

Vidyeta nivarteta" to mean just the opposite and interpreted

vidyeta as utpadyeta and so on. First of all it is a disputed

issue whether the verses are explanatory of the Mandukya Up.

as its part or of Gaudapada's Agamasastra. Opinion is divided

on this point even among traditional Advaitins like Appayya Diksita,

Brahmayogi and Anandagir i , not to speak of Ramanuja,

Kuranarayana and of course M.

Irrespective of this difference of opinion about the status of

the verses, it has to be admitted that the wording : Prapanco

yadi Vidyeta and nivarteta shows that it is formulated as a

hypothetical proposition with two Ifs and two ling forms of the

predicate (Vidyeta and Nivarteta) which are unmistakable proof

of a Tarka form of argument called Prasanga in Indian Logic,

corresponding to a reductio ad absurdum. In short, it is not

an affirmative proposition at all, either from the Advaita standpoint

or the Dvaita. Both have to grapple with it as a hypothetical

proposition. There is no alternative. The hypothetical proposition

Yadi vidyeta has to rest on a sound invariable logical concomitance

(Vyapti) between whatever exists and its sublation (from the

Advaita point of view). That is impossible as the Advaita Brahman

exists for ever and is never sublated. There is the rub and a

complete breakdown of the Vyapti. This calls for a viable

interpretation of Vidyeta and nivarteta willynilly irrespective of

the question whether it is a part of Gaudapada's work or a

Sruti. According to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan "Gaudapada had

a deep insight into Tarkasastra" (Gaudapada - A Study of Early

Advaita P. 86) and we cannot believe he would have blundered

so egregiously in formulating a viable vyapti. Qua Sruti, a viable

vyapti can be formulated in terms of Utpadyeta (if produced)

it is sure to be destroyed some time (nivarteta) Utpattireva hi

Nivrttiyuk prayah.

The location of the intriguing explanatory verses in the Mandukya

Up. renders it possible to overcome the breakdown of the Vyapti

between Vidyeta and Nivar teta by assigning more viable

meanings to them, as has been done by M.

The disapproval of the view of creation of the Universe as

akin to dream creations of Maya in favor of the Siddhanta view

as the outcome of the Lord's will as in "Apta kamasya ka sprha"

(9 cd) provides support to accepting the viable interpretation

of Vidyeta and Nivarteta put forward by M on sound logical

foundations. The root vida sattayam can justifiably be understood

in its nearest cognate sense of genesis Utpatti (asatas satta

samavayo janih) and Nivrtti in the sense of liability to destruction

later so that the Vyapti is not violated. The description of B

as "Deva" and "Advaita" among all other existents - Devah

Sarvabhavanam Advaitah - using the selective genitive (Nirdharana

Sasthi) bears out the fact that B stands towering over all other

reals (Sarvabhavanam). Thus M's interpretation fits in admirably

in getting over the muddle created by the breakdown of the

Vyapti created by the hypothetical proposition in its Advatitic

application.

In keeping with the requirements of the Vyapti the term

Prapanca itself has to be construed in the sense of a group

or a variety of five eternal distinctions embracing the three eternal

verities of Anadijivas, Anadimaya and the Supreme Being and

their mutual distinctions from one another, which add up to five

- denoted by the term Pra-panca as explained by M. The grammatical

derivation of Pancah as explained by Jayatir tha : Pancan sabdat

jatiyaro arthe dah is incontestable. The prefix pra has the sense

of excellence in that their knowledge is highly conducive to

liberation. (Moksopayogi jnanangataya). All that we need is a

contextual reference to the existence of these five distinctions

in the text of the verses. They are embodied in the verse immediately

preceeding verses 17-18 which reads :

Anadimayaya supto yada Jivah prabudhyate

Ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tada (1.16)


-16- (5TH PROOF)

Anadimaya is Jada. Jivas and B are both beginningless and

eternal. The Jivas are overpowered by Avidya-nidra. The Supreme

watching over them is wide awake (anidram asvapnam) and Advaita

one without an equal or superior. He towers over all other existents

Sarvabhavanam Advaitah as conveyed by the use of the selective

genitive case : Nirdharana Sasthi (Pan II.3.41). Do we need

any more evidence that the five eternal distinctions are given

in the text of the verses themselves?

It is therefore in keeping with these facts to read Jnate Dvaitam

na vidyate with an elided "a" grammatically permissible here

unlike in the case of 'Sambhuti' the opening word in Isa Up.

14 in Sankara's Bhasya, without any grammatical warranty

whatsoever. There are very good reasons to believe that the

prose passages of the Mandukya Up. of which the verses of

the Agama Prakarana are explanatory according to Anandagiri

too that the four Padas of 'Atman' referred to there are not

those of the Jivatman as such but of the Forms of the Antaryami

Brahman monitoring the states of the embodied Jivatman in the

Jagrat, Svapna and Susupti states under the names of Visva

Taijasa, Prajna & Turiya. This is confirmed by the prose text

of Mandukya 6 describing the Prajna the third (Prajnas Trtiyah)

as Sarvesvarah Esa Sarvajnah and above all as Eso Antaryami

etc. It goes without saying that when one of the three (Prajna)

is identified as Antaryami (impeller from within antahsthitva

yamayati) the others preceeding and following are also Antaryami

forms. The Mandukya is not alone in holding the Prajna to be

the Antaryami Brahman. BS i.2.18 also affirms it. Nay, Brh. Up.

IV. 3. 21 tells us that the embodied self Purusah lies locked

in the embrace of the Prajna Atman. This passage is made

the subject of the adhikarana in B. S. i.3.42. And S. in his Sutra

Bhasya commenting on this writes - Purus.ah. Sa- rirah Pra- jnah

Paramesvarah.

What more evidence do we need in support of M's position

that all the three in the series Visva, Taijasa, Prajna (and Turiya)

are indeed the monitoring forms of the Supreme Being? If the

commentary on the Mandukya Up. attributed to Adi Sankara

disagrees with the views of S author of the BSB, it can only

mean that the former must be apocryphal.

CONCLUSION

After acquiring a copy of Prof. Roque Mesquita's English edition

of his work "Madhva's unknown l i terary sources - some

Observations", I have carefully gone thro the two chapters

64-65 of Vedanta Desika's Satadusani edited and published with

his erudite Bhumika- in Sanskrit by Prof. V. Srivatsankacarya

(1974).

In his Yatilingabhedavada, Vedanta Desika refers to the views

of his Paramacarya Vatsya Varada on how best the authenticity

and acceptability of the Tridandi and Ekadandi orders of Orthodox

traditional Sanyasa Asrama, within the frame-work of Varnasrama

Dharma, can be reconciled on the basis of Vikalpa (option) in

terms of Mukhya and Amukhya respectively, with par ticular

reference to Tridanda and Ekadanda and the retention of the

Sikha (tuft of hair on the head) and the sacred thread (Yajnopavita)

or of dispensing with them, as current in the Tridanda and

Ekdanda orders. Desika quotes from Varada Guru's Yatilinga

Samarthanam, on the scope of the Vikalpa as defined by his

Paramacarya -

Mundah Sikhi Va- ityadi vikalpasyapi,

Tridanda, Ekadandadharana Vikalpavat Mukhya -

Amukhyatayaiva nirvahya tvat. va sabdah carthah iti

parama-ca- rya- Vya-cakhyuh

(Vada 64 - page 268)


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It may be noted in passing that ascetics and Pontiffs of the

Dvaita and Advaita schools follow Ekadandi traditions and those

of the Ramanuja School follow the Tridanda Sampradaya.

The subject matter of the Alepakamatabhanga (65) of Desika,

on the other hand, is entirely different. The Alepakas have been

defined as followers of an order of Sanyasins who have accepted

the philosophy of Mrsa-va-da (Ma-ya-va-da) and consider themselves

as Ana-sramins and Atya-sramins. They discard all taboos of right

and wrong conduct as liberated ones, taking and sporting the

name of "Knowers of Brahman" - in name only and indulging

in forbidden food and straying away from righteous conduct.

(P 7 Bhu-mika- ). They pose as Atyasramins and Anasramins -

not bound by traditional Asramic injunctions and prohibitions.

They claim to be beyond the pale of disciplinary codes of

Varnasrama - based sanyasa system, practise nudity, sport locks

of matted hair (Jata) on their heads, accepting food from all

people indiscriminately. They impart Upadesa of Mahavakyas

unrestr ictedly to their cl ientele. It does not appear from

Desika 's work that Varada Guru a lso had addressed

himself to the same subject.

Desika comes down virulently on the Sanyasins of the

Alepaka order of Mayavada. Perhaps, he had been feeling that

various circles of Mayavadins of his days were inclined to turn

a blind eye towards those who claimed or were regarded by

the lay people as Atyasramins and Anasramins who were prone

to Alepakavada and wanted to nip it in the bud, in all coscience.

It is significant that Desika refers in this connection to the claims

of some Alepaka Vadins that their non-conformism has the approval

and suppor t of the precepts and examples of respectable leaders

of their school of ancient times like Gaud.apa-da and Bhartr.hari

(Va-da 65 P. 281, Satadusani).

It is in this connection, Desika discusses the Puranic accounts

of the unconventional ways of life led by Jadabharata, Rbhu,

Suka, Samvartaka and others of the hoary past and offers suitable

explanations of them. He quotes -

Ana-sarmi, na tisthettu ks.an.ama- tram api Dvijah

He probably takes his stand on the parting Upadesa in the Taitt.

Up. (1,11,3) Ya-nyasma-kam sucaritani tani tvaya Upasyani no

itarani. He debunks the misinterpretations of Pa-ndityam nirvidya

ba- lyena tisthaset, quoting the Sutra Ana-vis. kurvan (B. S. III. 49).

It is in this context that Desika condemns the behavior of

the Papis. t.has (great sinners) who freely resort to interpolations

in favor of their defiance of established codes of ascetic discipline,

from unknown and unheard of texts into the existing body of

Puranic sources, attributing them to Vyasa and others, as quoted

by Prof. Mesquita on P. 27 of his English edition in the opening

chapter on 'Madhva and His Critics'. Any one who reads that

part of the text from Alepaka Vada Bhanga with open eyes in

the given context, will see that the subject matter of Desika's

denunciation is absolutely different from the question of the bona

fides of M's sources in support of his systematisation of his

philosophy and theological doctrines, raised by Appayya Diksita

in the 16th century. The way in which Prof. Mesquita has misused

the quotation from Desika's text in the Alepaka Matabhanga,

to mislead his readers is unforgivable.

It is a case of Abaddham pathitva kucodyam Karoti - brazen

suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.

In his over-self confidence to put Madhva on the dock,

Prof. Mesquita has placed himself in inextricable difficulties.

He has not been able to establish any one of his contentions:

1. That M is the author of Brahmatarka which he has tried

to pass off as an ancient authority,

2. That his quotes from PR Samhitas are spurious


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3. That he claims himself to be the author of the Vedas

and above all

4. That both Varada Guru and Vedanta Desika were the earliest

par t ies against Madhva in the controversy about the

bona fides of his source books in support of his philosophical

and theo log ica l doc t r ines - aga ins t wh ich Appayya

Diksita raised a hue and cry for the first t ime in the

sixteenth century.

To err is human. Even supposing that the Professor's charges

against Madhva are due purely to errors of judgement,

the i r cumulat ive ef fect may wel l have i ts own adverse

repercuss ions. I t would therefore be adv isable for the

Professor to withdraw his charges, apologise to Madhva

and close the chapter, for good once for all.

1. It is highly presumptuous of Prof. Mesquita to say "Nowhere in

the works of M. did I find a corraboration for the opinion of M.

Vij. that M. acknowledges Vyasa as his teacher" (Intro. P. 17 fn.).

This is a good illustration of Yaska's Nahyesa sthanoraparadhah

yadenam andho na pasyati. J. explains a-n as honorific reference

to Vyasa - Tannamasu pathat.

2. Chando Darsana by Daivarata Sharma (1968).

34 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva II. JAINA BACKGROUND OF DVAITA

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VEDANTA - A FARFETCHED THEORY

Madhva was the historical founder of a new system of Vedanta

which superseded many earlier ones which had accepted

Brahman's Parinama or personal transformation into the nature

of the world of matter and selves, wholly or in part. This amounts

to a loss of B's authentic being as an independent reality endowed

with auspicious attributes of infinite knowledge and bliss, never

subject to any change - as all change is ultimately due to external

causes, pressures and forces. The Vivar tavada of Sankara-dvaita

had made B a mute passive one subject to beginningless ignorance

(Avidya) not withstanding its self - luminosity (Svapraka- satva)

and yet the abode of beginningless ignorance and the object

of such an ignorance.

A-srayatva vis.ayatva bha-gini nirvisesacitir eva kevala-

(Sanksepasariraka)

In Nyayavaisesika, the atoms and Jivas are real in their own

right and do not owe them to God, ontologically. The Mimamsaka

had no place for a Supreme Being as such. He did not believe

in periodical Creation or Pralaya. The yoga school had assigned

no more than a secondary place to God as an auxiliary in creation

like rains in the production of crops.

In the field of epistemology, the Nyayavaisesika had defined

Pramana in such a way as would rule out the claims of Memory

to be a source of knowledge. The same was the case with

Mimamsa and Advaita Philosophy which pledged its support to

Bhattanaya in all Vyavahara. The thinkers of the Visistadvaita

school were divided in their opinion on the status of memory.

Madhva's mission in life was therefore primarily connected

with setting right the anomalies of the Vaidikadarsanas and restoring

Vedantadarsana to its rightful place as a robust Theistic philosophy

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with B. as the ultimate source of the being, becoming and functioning

of all else in finite reality (their satta, pratiti and pravrtti). His

main interest was therefore confined to rectifying the shortcomings

of the Vaidikadarsanas in the home front and only seconarily

with such aspects of Avaidikadarsanas in principle as taken note

of in the Brahmasutras. As there was already a broad agreement

between Madhva and the Jainas on the question of the status

of memory as a valid source of knowledge in principle there

was no need for him to go into the nature of its configuration

and its distinct terminology. But as this was not the case in

the treatment of memory in the Nyayavaisesika, Mimamsa and

Advaita schools, he had to address himself primarily to that

task alone.

The Jaina theory differed from Madhva's only in its methodology

of arriving at its validity - whereas in Vaidikadarsanas its validity

rested on the larger question of its pragmatic necessity affecting

human experience as a whole. This comes out from Madhva's

basic question Pu- rvanubhu- te kim ma-nam ityukte sya- t kim uttaram

at the starting point. This moot question does not also seem

to have been raised by the Jainas in their approach.

As Madhva's philosophy accepted only three Pramanas, the

case of memory could not be accommodated under Pratyaksa.

To rely on the impressions of the past experience as an image

for inference of memory, would again involve a memory of it.

It has therefore to be accommodated under Pratyaksa. Madhva

has therefore brought it under Manasapratyaksa as a direct mental

perception, given the lightning speed of the mind and its power

to penetrate in to the past as in Yogipratyaksa with the samskaras

(latent impressions) acting as a link (sannikarsa) with the past.

The involvement of Saksi, the Apperceiving Self and its

Svarupendriya as both Jnana - gra-haka and Jnana - pra-ma-nyagra-

haka in the system enabled Madhva to explain the presentation

of the first experience as "past" by memory, For every act of

awareness, be it a memory, a perception or an inference, has

always an in-built relation to its time factor. Memory takes the

form of that (past), experience that "this is X", and inference

takes the form of X is or was or will be. The present, past

and the future are not something unconnected with the time

factor intuited by the Saksi. This is borne out by everybody's

experience and cannot be gainsaid. Even the past and the future

are not beyond the grasp of the saksi.

Atita anagatau ka- lau api nah sa-ks. igocarau (AV)

The word pra-ma- -na has the suffix lyu. t (ana) which is used

in the sense of both an instrument (karane lyu. t) and bhava (basic

essence) or being true.

The term saksi which according to Panini's Grammar means

one that perceives directly and immediately. (Saksad drastari

samjna-ya-m) is the Apperceiving Self in mundane life. It is capable

of meeting all the needs of valid experience in life both physical

and psychological. There is no need to invest the physical sense

organs with their different innate powers as Bha-vendriya and

dravyendriyas as in Jainism. The saksi or the Jivasvarupa as

self-luminous in respect of its own being as well as in regard

to its objective experiences can do duty for the Bhavendriyas

as Saksi and its svarupendriyas are a unity in diversity (Savisesa

- abhinna). Moreover, there was no need for Madhva to seek

the help of Jainism to establish the claims of Smrti (memory)

as a pramana as the recognition of Smrti as a pramana goes

back to the Taittriya - Aranyaka text :

Smrtih pratyaksam aitihyam anumanacatustayam

Pramanam iti vijneyam dharmadyarthe bubhusubhih

(T. A. II. 1)

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 3736 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory

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Hence there was no need for Madhva to seek outside help to

establish the validity of memory.

The concept of Saksi is not alien to Vedanta. It has its roots

in the Upanisads and is current coin in Advaita vedanta as the

witness self (Saksi) which is the reflection of Suddhacaitanya

in Avidyavrtti. As such it is a tainted instrument open and common

to both Prama and Bhrama - valid knowledge in its Vyavaharic

sense and erroneous ones alike. But the Saksi of Dvaita philosophy

is not the reflection of Caitanya in Avidyavrtti and hence a tainted

instrument. It is the pure Apperceiving Self never erring and

ever infallible principle of validation (niyata yatha- r thya). For the

place of Saksi in Madhva's epistemology see my English version

of Nyayasudha of Jayatir tha Part II pp 252-53.

Dr. B. K. Matilal in his Logic, Language and Reality (Motilal

B. Dass P. 226) has argued that "it is not true that Memory

hangs on that object as one whose previous state has ceased.

For we do not have the awareness of the cessation of the previous

state. If I do not have the prior awareness of something, I cannot

have memory of it. If we did remember such a thing, it would

not be a memory." (P. 226). The difficulty raised by Matilal

has been met and answered by Jayatir tha centuries back in

his Prama-n.apaddhati :

Nanu Nivrtta purvavasthataya smrtih artham

visayikartum neste.

Tatha ananubhava- t. Ananubhuta visesa visayatve

atiprasanga- t (iticenna)

Ananubhuta - eta- van ma- trasya saksi visayataya na

a tiprasangah.

To explain - the mind with its power of penetration into the past,

aided by the latent impressions which provide the link takes

into account the first experience, by the saksi as the Jnanagrahaka

which intuites all time and space with its inherent powers and

coordinates the memory data with a past experience as its own,

as past and stamps it as "Past". Thus the temporal gap is bridged

by the saksi and legitimised in the memory report. Such is the

position of Dvaita. Thus the Madhva theory of memory as the

valid source of knowledge is a completely self contained and

a viable re-exposition on the basis of its own epistemological

resources.

We have no such explanation from Zydenbos of how the

discrepancy and gap has been explained in the Jain theory on

its own.

However, Prof. Zydenbos who has sought to maintain in his

paper on Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedanta published in the

Journal of Indian philosophy (1991), Kluwer Academic Publishers,

Netherlands, has argued at length that the Dvaita view of the

validity of Smrti is largely indebted to the Jain theory as presented

in Tattvarthasutra and its commentary by Bhaskaranandi whose

terminus ad-quem has been placed at 1250 AD. Zydenbos has

also laid stress on circumstantial evidences such as the existence

of Jain settlements and widespread influence of the Jain community

in South Kanara and the existence of Jain rulers and chieftains

and centres of learning in the neighbourhood in the days of

Madhva himself.

It should be clarified from the full accounts of the details

of Jain theory and its epistemological concepts and categories

of the system if there is no good case for holding the outlines,

foundations and superstructure of the Dvaita theory on the status


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of memory are not and cannot be a harmonious development

from within, resting on its own distinctive epistemological

presuppositions and their natural outcome. Above all, in the social

and religious barriers between the Jaina and the Brahminical

community of those days and the Atheistic character of the Jaina

System it would be difficult to believe that there was scope

for initiating any warm exchange of thought on matters of mutual

interest in philosophical matters between the leaders of two

communities to support any theory of borrowing or adaptation

from one to the other. The circumstantial evidences cited are

therefore purely for tuitous and tenuous and cannot be magnified

and blown out of proportion.

On P. 259 of his paper, Prof. Zydenbos has observed that

under Brahmasutra II.2.26 all the Brahminical commentators have

misrepresented the Jaina Theory of Mukti as everlasting upward

movement of the soul which is far from correct and that it only

describes the conditions of the soul in the few movements

immediately following death in its final incarnation. Here he

complements J saying Jayatir tha shows an independent spirit

and greater fairness towards Jains when he describes their view

of Mukti as moksah sva-bha-vika- tma svarupa-virbha-vah.

These two ways of describing the Jain Theory need not be

taken to be mutually inconsistent or subject to any self contradiction.

Both may be equally true in themselves.

There is, however, one crucial point about the Jain theory

of the status of memory. Jayatir tha says (P. 250 NS press edition)

that according to Jainas the definition of Pramana is sva-apurva-

artha vyavasayatmakam jnanam and rejects it as inapplicable

as its terms exclude memory from its scope.

Tasya sva-apru-va-artha-visayakatva-abha-va- t as it depends on

an earlier experience, which is no longer existent. If the qualifying

adjunct sva-apurva is to be justified because memory too is

valid, in so far as it refers to a previous experience revealed

as now past (which is true enough) the adjunct would still be

uncalled for as there is no disagreement on the point. The example

of Dharavahika Bhrama would be irrelevant as according to

Anekantavada even ks. anikatva of thought is admissible and there

will be no continuity of fact left and as such it would also come

under the scope of Sva-purva- rtha.

It is on record that Jayatir tha was a native of N. Karnataka

and lived and studied in Manyakheta (Malkhed) the ancient capital

of the Rashtrakutas where Jainism flourished from earlier times

and that there is still a famous Jain monastery in Malkhed.

Jayatir tha in his NS (II. 2. See Page 414, NS Press edition)

tells us that ancient Jainas (Jarad Jaina-h) used the term Pudgala

in the sense of the Self as such instead of a physical substance

composed of rupa, rasa, gandha and sparsa.

Similarly, the one and only definition of Prama-na given by

him, according to Jainas as sva-apurva- rtha vyavasa-ya- tmakam

jna-nam (II. 1. P. 250) rules out the validity of memory as it

falls back upon a previous experience (sva-purva) whose data

have reference to an earlier space time setting, which is no

longer in existence. This really shows that the earlier school

of Jainas was against acceptance of Memory as a valid source

of knowledge like the Naiyayikas, Samkhyas and the Advaitins.

The question therefore arises - what were the forces at work

responsible for the Jainas breaking away from and abandoning

the earlier definition of Pramana and opting for a new, more


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positive, forthright and pragmatic one of "being true to the nature

of the object" - corresponding to the Dvaita definition of Pramana

as Yathartham or Ya- tha- rthyam. The Jainas were Realists. They

could not have failed to realise that a denial of validity to memory

would cut at the very root of rational life and business and

other transactions in var ious spheres of human l i fe and

development. They were bound to answer the common man's

rational question - in the absence of Memory and denial of its

validity, as a source of knowledge, what is the proof of the

reality of our own past experiences at all - purva-nubhu- te kim

manam?

The two meanings assigned to Pramana as valid knowledge

as such and the instruments of its acquisition rest on grammatical

sanction of Paninian grammar. Neither Jainism nor Dvaita

philosophy has a monopoly of them.

The concept of Sa- ks. i which plays a vital role in Dvaita

epistemology has its root in Panini's sutra 'Sa-ks.a-d dras. tari Samjna-

ya-m' (V. 2. 11). It is the name given to the apperceiving Self

whose judgements are ever veridical (niyata yatha- rthya). It bridges

the temporal gap between the first experience of the Smrti data,

which are now past and coordinates them with his own direct

experience - as the intuiting self of all events in time past, present

and future and establishes Tad - idamtva graha with the same

self on the basis of its own resources as has been explained

by Jayatirtha in his Pramana Paddhati quoted earlier.

The term Sa-ks. i does not figure in the Jaina theory of the

validation of Memory. The Jaina acceptance of five different bha-

vendriyas as 'Potentialities of the Soul' (Op. Cit. P. 256) by

Bhaskaranandi and other Jains has to rest on the acceptance

of Savisesa-abheda relation between them and the self. This

relation is derived in Dvaita thought on the basis of a Srutarthapatti

based on Sruti texts like evam dharman prthak pasyan (Katha,

II.1, 14), Ekadhaiva anudrastavyam neha nanasti kimcana (Br.

Up. IV. 4. 19), Avinasi va- ayam atma- anucchittidharma (Br. Up.

IV. 5. 14) and Para-sya Saktih vividhaiva sruyate svabhaviki jnana

bala kriya ca (Svet. Up. IV. 8).

Accepting parallel development on the question of Smrti

pramanya in Jainism and Dvaita thought on the basis of their

own respective epistemological resources and retention of technical

terms like Yatharthya > Yathathmya, Manasa Pratyaksa > Paroksa,

the question still remains to be answered as to what led to

the abandonment of the earlier definition of Pramana quoted

by Jayatir tha in favor of a more positive and pragmatic one

of yatharthyam > Sic Ya- tha- thmyam. From this point of view it

has to be admitted that the ball is still in the other court.

We have already seen that the classification of Pramana into

kevala and anupramana in M's philosophy rests on the grammatical

significance of the suffix lyut in terms of karana and bhava according

to Sanskrit Grammar in their inbuilt sense. The basic definition

(Pramana) as yathar tham is satisfied by both kevala and

anupramana as both are true to their data. Similarly, the threefold

classification of Jiva in Dvaita is derived from the doctrine of

threefold Sraddha- which is intrinsic to the nature of the different

types as explained in the Bhagavad Gita (XVII. 2. 3). The term

Sraddha- has been identified as per taining to the Svabhava of

different types of souls. And Svabhava cannot be adventitious.

The term Sattvanurupa (XVII. 3) similarly refers to the essential

nature of the Self as sattva has the sense of a living being,

according to Amarakosa (3.5.26.43) and Raghuvamsa (II). This

classification may be parallel to the Jain one of Jiva, Bhavya

and Abhavya. The Rgveda (VI. 47. 16) too speaks of a three

fold classification of beings.


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Commenting on the Syadvada of Jainism Prof. Zydenbos says

Sankara and other earlier commentators on BS had perverted

its original meaning and other Vedantins had followed suit (p.

254). As leading Jain writers like Bhaskaranandi (1250) came

long after Sankara, it is not made clear why he had not spoken

out and taken Sankara to task for his misrepresentation of

Anekantavada or whether any other Jain writers have dealt with

the point. If they had done so, it is upto Prof. Zydenbos to

bring it to light, instead of saying simply that the "Syadvada

does not say so" (p. 254).

The exegetical principle of Upajivyapramanaprabalya is not

in any way dependent on the Brahmatarka, as Zydenbos would

have it. It is a principle of Mimamsa sastra and has been accepted

in principle by Advaita writers also such as Sriharsa :

Pa- ramarthikam Advaitam pravisya saranam Srutih

Virodhat upajivyena na bibheti kutascana

44 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory III. THE A-RS.A TRADITION OF

APPROACH OF MADHVA-CA

-RYA

TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE

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VEDA-NTA SU

-TRAS

A friend of mine has just sent me a Xerox copy of the tenth

chapter of Dr.S.M. Srinivasachari's work on the philosophy of

the Vedanta Sutras from Ramanuja's point of view, published

by Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi.(1998). I have carefully

gone through this chapter containing the author's General

Evaluation and Conclusion.

I can understand Dr. Chari cannot approve of Sankara's

interpretation of the Brahmasutras as he agrees with M's. views

that the souls are many in reality and exist as separate entities

even in the state of Moksa, without losing their individuality and

that they cannot exercise B's prerogatives of creation of the

world, its maintenance and its dissolution.

Broadly speaking then, R's philosophy is in agreement with

M on these points. But it disagrees with M's holding that the

Cits (Jivas) and Acit (Avyakta or Prakrti) form an integral part

of B. Theirs is an intraorganic relation of parts and whole

(Aprthaksiddhi)-variously described in terms of Amsa-Amsi bhava,

Ananyatva, neither absolutely different from B. nor absolutely

identical, nor both different and identical in their primary senses

at the same time. The serpent and coil relation is also utilised

in the same connection. Though denied the right to exercise

Jagadvyapara, the Muktas are never the less said to enjoy the

fullest measure of the boundless and infinite bliss of B.

Some of these ideas are not acceptable to M's philosophy.

They have been discussed and set aside in the writings of M.and

his commentators. It is expected of an evaluator to have gone

into those objections of the Dvaita school and disposed of them

in order to make his Evaluation authentic and conclusive. There

is no sign of such a proceeding having been gone through in

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the main body of the book on these disputed issues in the Evaluation

to make it authentic and decisive. This omission leaves R's stand

on the disputed issues unsubstantiated.

It is regrettable that Dr. Chari should have observed that

M. seems to have developed an antagonism towards S to such

an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas of the Sutras from

the Upansisads and go to the Rgveda and other sources instead.

(P 173). We shall be seeing in what follows that M. has always

taken great care in choosing his Visayavakyas in var ious

Adhikaranas with due regard to the Adhyaya and Pada Sangatis

of their topics, their freedom from overlapping or repetition and

the criteria of homologous affinity between the key words of

the Sutras and those of the Visayavakyas-which are often violated

by S and R as we shall be seeing. The BS being a scientific

treatise divided into well knit chapters with their own subject

matter clearly fixed. it will be most improper to take up random

topics and Sutars torn out of their context in the so called new

approach to the Sutras without going chapter wise . The question

of relevant Sutras without reference to this fixed division of topics

will lead one nowhere.

It is true M draws his Visayavakyas from the pre-Upanisadic

sources of the Vedic heritage also, besides the Upanisads. This

is not because of any animosity against S or others but to his

adherence to the Arsa tradition which treats both the Vedic and

Upanisadic heritages as one integral revelation and Illumination

(Gati Samanyat) - whose contents form the subject matter of

investigation and import in terms of Brahma Vidya par excellence

as their Nirnayaka Sastra, for which role they have been cast

according to the ancient tradition recorded in the Skanda Purana

and borne out by the internal evidence of the wording of the

Sutra, Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam (Brahma) (III.3.1) as we shall

be seeing.

THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM 'VEDA-ANTA'.

It is an error of judgement to hold that 'Vedanta' means only

the closing part of the Vedic heritage- the Upansiads. Apart

from the received tradition that the Vedas are 'Ananta' (endless),

most of their thousand and more Sakhas mentioned by the

Mahabhasyakara and others are now totally lost to us. Lingering

statements such as "Sarve Veda yat Padam Amananti" (Katha

i.2.15) and "Vedaisca Sarvair Ahameva Vedyo Vedanta Kr t

Vedavideva Caham" (Gita XV.15) establish that the Lord alone

is competent to fix their authentic import. This term 'Anta' in

Vedanta Krit here can only mean the determination of their import

(Tatparya Nirnaya) - as in the earlier use of the same term

'Anta' in the Gita itself. 'Ubhayorapi Drsto Antah Anayos Tattva

Darsibhih' (II.6). Otherwise, Vedanta Krt may even tend to mean

one who puts an end to or destroys the Vedas, which would

be preposterous.

Given then, the correct meaning of the term 'Anta' in Vedanta

and the further reference to the BS in the Gita itself as 'Hetu

madbhih' and 'Viniscitaih' there can be no doubt that we will

be on the right track in identifying the BS as the Nirnayaka

Sastra which holds the key to the correct understanding and

interpretation of the entire source books of both the Vedic and

Upanisadic heritage as their Nirneya Sastra. It is this sense

that is conveyed by the opening Sutra of the Gunopasamhara

Pada of the Sadhana Adhyaya of the BS declaring B to be Sarva

Vedanta Pratyayam,the Being whose true knowledge (Pratyaya)

is authentically established by the decisive ruling (Anta) on the

pur por t of the entire Ved ic her i tage - Sar va Veda

Nirnayotpadyajnanam Brahma - as M puts it. No sane person

who holds the Vedic and Upanisadic heritage in equal respect

can object to this interpretation. M's commentator, Raghuttama

Tirtha explains the terse statement of M as follows: Sarva Vedanam

Antena (Nirnayena Utpadyamanah) Pratyayo (Jnanam) Yasya tat

(Brahma) iti Vyadhikarana Bahuvrihih. Anyapadartho Brahma.

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 4746 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya

-25- (5TH PROOF)

A veteran Mimamsaka and Visistadvaita scholar, the late D.

T. Tatacarya, in his Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures at

the Madras University in 1948 has observed - "The Rgveda

has the idea of Brahman. If we apply and I don't know why

they cannot apply, the principles of interpretation enunciated

by Badarayana as meaning B to the hymns of this Veda, we

cannot escape the conclusion that this Veda is as much connected

with B as to Upanisads.

This august role of the BS as 'Sarva Sastrartha Nirnayaka'

has been described in a group of twelve verses from the Skanda

Purana cited by M at the outset of his Sutrabhasya beginning

with the words:

'Narayanad Vinispannam Jnanam Krtayuge Sthitam'. After

referring to the reclamation of the Vedas, their division into four

with their respective sakhas and the composition of the BS to

fix their import (tasyarthavittaye), by the Vyasavatara, the text

of the Puranas concludes saying:

Sutresu yesu sarvepi nirnayas samudiritah

Sabda jatasya sarvasya yatpramanasca nirnayah

Evam vidhani sutrani krtva Vyaso mahayasah

The same group of verses from the Skanda has been quoted

by Sudarsana Suri in his C. on R's Sri Bhasya. But the crucial

line "Sabdajatasya sarvasya yatpramanasca nirnayah", as given

above is missing in the printed editions of the Srutaprakasa.

This creates a serious gap and a break of continuity of thought

between the first and the third lines which makes the high

compliment paid to the Sutras in such glowing terms as "Evam

vidhani sutrani", hanging loose without a referent syntactically

connected with a proper antecedent such as Sabdajatasya sarvasya

nirnayah samudiritah. The mere fact of the Sutars being Alpaksara

etc. like other Sutras could be no compliment to the august

position of the BS as described earlier, as contrasted with other

Sutras referred to as Savisesana Sutrani and the BS as Nirvisesana

Sutrani. I have published a note on the missing line from the

Skanda Purana in the printed editions of Srutaprakasa in an

appendix to my English rendering of Jayatir tha's Nyayasudha

Vol. I (Raghavendra Ashram, Malleshwaram, Bangalore. 1995)

to which further reference is invited.

THE A-RS.A TRADITION

There is sufficient evidence in the RgVeda Suktas and the

Aranyakas that according to the Seers there is only one Supreme

Being who is the bearer of the names and epithets of the various

gods like Agni, Indra, Varuna with their own respective jurisdiction

over Cosmic government. Their names are applicable to them

in their conventional sense only. In their highest and fullest primary

connodenotation they refer to one Supreme Being. This is spelt

out in such texts as :

"Yo devanam namadha eka eva" (RV X.82.3)

"Indram Mitram Varunam Agnim Ahur atho divyah sa

suparno Garutman

Ekam Sad Viprah Bahudha Vadanti (RV I.164.46)

"Etam hyeva Bahvrca mahatyukthe Mimamsante etam

agnav Adhvaryavah

Etam mahavrate Chandogah etameva sarvesu bhutesu

Brahmetyacaksate"

(AA iii. 2. 3.)

"Sarve Vedah sarve Ghosah Sarva Rcah Ekaiva

Vyahrutih Pranarca Ityeva Vidyat (AA ii.2.2)

"Kaschandasam yogam aveda dhirah (RV X.114.9)

"Taddhaitat pasyanto rsayah Kavaseyah ahuh kimartha

vayam adhyesyamahe

kimartha vayam yaksyamahe iti" (AA iii. 2.3)

These texts have been quoted by M. They establish that there

is only one Sarvana-mava-n. They endorse the position that all


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sacrifices offered to various gods under their various names

are really intended in principle to reach the One Supreme thro

them. This is confirmed by the words of the Gita also: Aham

hi sarva yajnanam bhokta ca prabhur eva ca. (xi.24)

Thus the Arsa tradition provides the key to integrating the

seeming Polytheism of the Pantheon with an overall conception

of one Sarvanamavan. This paves the way for performance of

all sacrifices as intended in principle for the one Supreme. By

such an integral approach to the Vedic and Upanisadic sources

as a whole, M. has been able to set right the age long injustice

that has been done to India's Vedic heritage by the early Western

Indologists and their followers among modern Indian scholars

as well. By righting this wrong, M has also opened the eyes

of traditional commentators on the BS to the unmerited denigration

of their original status, to which our Vedic heritage has been

exposed all along. Suresvara in his Var tika on the Brh. Up. Bhasya

of S. has cited a metrical passage from the Bhallavi Sakha

which speaks of dedicated performance of karma in the spirit

of Phalatyaga which leads one to the highest abode of Visnu.

Another metrical line from the Bhallaveya Sruti cited by M speaks

of Visnu as the Sarvanamavan.

M has therefore rightly focussed attention on the Arsa tradition

as providing the master key to a smooth reconciliation of both

the seeming Polytheism of the Vedas and their sacrificial system

in the true spirit of the Upanisad : Yadeva vidyaya karoti sraddhaya

upanisada tadeva viryavattaram bhavati. (Chan. Up. ii, 10) with

Brahmavidya. He has accordingly worked out an excegetical method

based on a dual Sabdavrtti in terms of Paramamukhyavrtti and

a conventional mukhyavrtti of entire Sabda Jata by way of

Samanvaya of entire Sastra in B which he has adopted in his

interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras with remarkable results. His

approach is ratified by the opening words of the BS (III.3.1)

: Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam (Brahma) as has already been

pointed out.

BS I.1.3 Sastrayonitvat declares that B is truly knowable only

thro Sastras. S renders the word 'Sastra' as "Rgveda and others".

Elsewhere in his C. on BS III.3.5 he has quoted from the Ait.

A.III .2.3 "The one Supreme Being is the subject of worship,

meditation and realisation of the Rgvedins thro the Uktha, of

the Adhvaryus thro the sacred fire and of the Chandogas thro

the Mahavrata rites. These are all parts of the Karmakanda.''

This shows that S was fully aware of the possibility of attuning

the Karmakanda texts and rites also to BrahmaVidya in principle,

as part of the Arsa tradition as commended by the Upanisadic

passage 'Yadeva vidyaya karoti...'

Very probably, the Arsa tradition had come to be forgotten

and lost currency when long afterwards regular commentaries

came to be written on the BS by historical personages who

had therefore to confine their attention to the Upanisads alone.

And S too had to fall in line with them.

M was born in a family accredited to the Rksakha. He was

very deeply read in the Vedas and Aranyakas which he had

at his fingertips. He was naturally deeply inspired by the Arsa

tradition as may be seen from his illustrative c. on the first

forty Suktas of RgVeda and his c. on the Mahanamni hymns

in his Karmanirnaya in which the higher Adhyatma interpretation

of the Rks has been fully brought out. Many incidents of his

early and later life narrated in his near contemporary biography,

the M. Vij. (VI. 1, VI.13, VI.17, XVI.5; 43) bear witness to his

mastery of the Vedas and how deeply he was moved by the

message of the Arsa tradition. The spontaneous tribute he has

paid to the words of the Aranyakas : "Sarve Vedah, Sarve Ghosah,

Sarva Rchah, Ekaiva Vyahrtih Pranarca ityeva vidyat" (AA ii.2)

in his c.

"Kimuca Vedah Samudra Ghosa Vrksapatana

bheritadanadayah sarve sabdah

tasyaiva namani yatha yogam yojaniyani"


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speaks volumes of the heighs of his Mystic experience of the

Arsa tradition. No wonder his BSB should blaze a new trail of

light in this direction. Dr. Chari seems to be under the impression

that M. adopts a sectarion stance in using the term 'Visnu' with

reference to B in his Sutrabhasya. We have seen that to M

all the names of the Vedic gods refer to B in principle. But

the words 'Visnu' and 'Narayana' used by him have a special

significance as referring in their highest etymological sense in

the highest context to the Supreme Being who is the sole survivor

in Mahapralaya, when the entire universe, including the gods

lay submerged in the waters of Mahapralaya. (Arvag Deva Asya

Visarjanena) (RV X. 129). - There was only That One (Tadekam)

which was breathing windless by its own power (Anidavatam

Svadhaya tat ekam) and there was none else equal to or higher

than it. (RV X. 129. 2b). There are frequent references to the

Supreme B in the Vedic texts referring to it as Antah Samudre

(T.A.X, 1.1). Samudre Antah kavayo avayanti (T.A.X, 1.1). Yam

antah Samudre (T.A.X. 1.1). Mama yonih apsvantah samudre

(RV X.125.7). It is this Supreme Being which is designated as

Jalan (Jala-an) in the Chandogya text (III.14) : Sarvam Khalvidam

Brahma. Tat Jalan ityupasita. The term Sarvam in its old Vedic

usage signified what is full and complete (Purna) as in Sarvo

vava mama patih (Jai Br.)

The other term 'Narayana' refers to the Supreme One which

alone survives in Mahapralaya. Nara means the waters of Pralaya

and Narayana denotes the Being who abides (ayana) in the

waters of Pralaya, as explained in the Manusmrti. It is to indicate

the special importance of this name that M says 'Brahma - sabdasca

Visnaveva Narayanam Natva Sutrartha ucyate' at the outset of

his Bhasya. The Visistadvaita tradition too which believes in the

triunity of the Karma, Devata and Brahmamimamsa Sastra holds

that the two closing Sutras of the Daivi Mimamsa : Sa Visnur

aha hi. Tam Brahmetyacaksate Tam Brahmetyacaksate, speaks

for itself. If Dr. Chari had been acquainted with the Visistadvaita

tradition, he would not have rushed to find fault with M for

his use of the word Visnu to denote the Supreme B in principle.

R's Vedartha Samgraha which upholds the pre-eminence of Visnu

must have cooled down in his Sutra Bhasya after his bitter

experience in the Chola country which forced him to migrate

to Karnataka.

It is equally regrettable that Dr. Chari should have observed

that M seems to have developed an antagonism towards S to

such an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas from the

Upanisads and go to the RgVeda and other sources instead,

with a vengeance at it were. There is more heat than light in

this comment of Dr. Chari. A close examination of M's Visayavakyas

will show that they are chosen with the utmost regard for their

contextual relevance to the Adhyaya and Pada Sangatis, logical

maintainability of the wording of the Visayavakyas and their

homologous affinity between the key words of the Sutra and

the wording of the Visayavakyas. These are often transgressed

by S and R, as we shall be seeing.

Take S and R's interpretation of the Sutras, 'Sarvatra

prasiddhopadesa' (i. 2. 1). The 'Sautra' word is Sarvatra in the

locative sense, but the wording in S and R's Visayavakya from

Chan. Up. III. 14, is Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma, Tat jalan ityupasita.

M's Visayavakya on the other hand, from A. A III.2.3, has nearly

a dozen locative nouns, Mahavrate, Agnau, Vayau, Akase,

Sarvabhutesu etameva Brahmetyacaksate. S and R's explanation

of Tatjalan suffers from a needless transposition of the natural

and logical order of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the

world in Brahman as set forth in the Upanisad and accepted

by S and R too under BS i.1.2. What is the necessity for this

transposition of the natural and logical order here?

Take again M's preference for the Visayavakya from AA for

the Pranadhikarana. (i.1. 28-31) in lieu of S and R's choice

from Kausitaki Brahmana Up. (iii.3). According to S the Adhi

establishes B as Sarvatmaka but in the Kausitaki text, the


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Paramatman manifesting itself in Indra tells Pratardana "I Am

Prana". That is all. This does not make for Sarvatmakatva,

whereas in the AA text B manifesting itself in Indra appears

before Visvamitra, the interlocutor, who has at Indra's request

tirelessly repeated one thousand Brhatisahasra verses three times,

tells him in response to his request, "Tva-m eva vijaniyam", O

Sage, I am Prana, You are Prana, so are all these beings Prana,

which may tend to establish Prana's Sarvatmakatva, as S would

like to have it.

The declaration of Indra speaking thro the Antaryami B is

explained on the basis of Sastra Drsti or Antaryami Drsti by

M. According to S and R the term Vaktuh in the Sutra refers

to Indra the speaker, who is already covered by the reflexive

use of the pronoun, 'Atmopadesa' whereas in the AA text the

term Vaktuh refers to Visvamitra, the reciter (Samsita) of the

Brhati Sahasra and not Indra.

Take again the Arambhanadhi (II.1.15) whose Visayavakya

according to S and R is from the Chan. Up. (vi.1) based on

three illustrations, of one clod of clay, one nugget of gold and

a pair of nail scissors by knowing which all things made of

clay, gold etc are known. (Eka Vijnanena, Sarva Vijnanam). The

wording of these illustrations as they stand fail to support any

such material cause and effect relation between the pairs named.

A proper way of putting it would be Mrda Vijnataya Mrnmayam

jnatam bhavati. However, the illustration of Nakhanikrntana is

a misfit as it is itself an effect and not a cause of any other

effect. These glaring inadequacies in the wording, from the point

of view of S and R's interpretation cannot be dismissed as minor

te r mino log ica l inexac t i tudes, when a be t te r and more

commensurate explanation of the text as it stands worded can

be thought of on the basis of similarity, primacy and kaimutyanyaya,

as pointed out by M in his Chandogya bhasya is available (see

my Mahatatparya of Mahavakyas P. 75-77 and also my Nyayasudha

rendering Vol. 2 P. 291).

Apart from this, the key word in the Arambhana Adhi, according

to S and R does not tally with the opening Sautra word 'Arambhana'

(Sabda) which stands by itself as a single word whereas it figures

in S and R's interpretation as the second member of a compound

(vacarambhanam). M's interpretation of this Adhi. is not open

to the defect of Gatarthata (repetition) as in their case.

The problem raised by M in the Tadananyatva Adhi (II.1.15)

is a fresh one of the utmost importance to all Theistic philosophy

in general and with special reference to the Theism of the Up.

which recognises the eternality of many entities besides B. :

Nityo Nityanam - as creation in Upanisadic philosophy is not

ex-nihilo, as it is in Christianity. Naturally, this leads to a vexed

question : How far B's. making use of other eternal accessories

like Prakrti, Jivas, space, time, etc. would not be compromising

to B's metaphysical status of absolute independence of initiative,

if it is obliged to make use of other eternal accessories.

B cannot dispense with these pre-existent accessories which

would lead to creation, ex-nihilo. There is a lurking fallacy in

this dilemma. This adhi is therefore utilised by M to solve this

riddle without affecting B's status of absolute freedom and

independence of initiative in regard to accessories. The solution

is found by reading the Guna Sutra, Satvaca avarasya (II.1.17)

together with the opening sutra which would enable us to hold

that B's making use of pre existing accessories which are also

eternal is consistent with it's absolute independence in so far

as even the eternal existence of the eternal accessories and

their powers of functioning are all pre-determined by B's will

and pleasure. This is suppor ted by texts like Pacyamsca sarvan

parinamayed yah (Svet Up. V.5).

Dravyam karmaca kalasca svabhavo jiva eva ca

Yadanugrahatas santi na santi yadupeksaya (Bhag)

Vedanta Desika has also held that the independence of B is

not compromised in any way by making use of other eternal


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accessories in creation as their very existence and powers of

functioning are pre determined and subject to B's eternal will

and pleasure :

Sahakaribhih arambhe na svatantryam vihanyate

Tatsadbhava pravrttyosca svadhinatva vyavasthiteh

The double negative, Tat ananyatvam is to explain that the one

independent source of all creation is no other than the Supreme

One; Svatantra Karana - ananyat Brahma. There is no repetition

of the topic in this way of dealing with the adhi. as there is

in the interpretation of S and R in trying to establish B's material

causality of the world again and again.

On the whole, there are far too many adhis in R's interpretation

on the subject of the intra-organic relation between Cit and Acit

with B such as the Prakrtyadhi (I.4.24), Arambhana adhi (II.1.15),

Amsa adhi (II.3.43) and Ahikundala Adhi (III. 2. 28). Amsa-Amsi

bhava relation is possible only between a given substance and

its physical par ts as between a large piece of cloth and a bit

torn from it. It cannot be applied to two substances of opposite

natures too with a third one. As B is impartible and partless,

it cannot have parts.

The Ahikundala adhi is an ideal one for establishing an intimate

and inseparable relation of identity which admits of a distinction

of reference to the attributes as such without a distinction of

essence. This relation is one of Savisesa-abheda as between

the serpent and its coil or time as a whole and its divisions

into past, present and future. It is not clear why R should fight

shy of it while he is so keen on establishing again and again

an organic and inseparable relation between B and Cit and Acit

of opposite natures. One would however expect of R an ardent

follower of Pancaratra theology which does not admit any mutual

difference or distinction among the Vyuha forms and Para-Vasudeva

or their six sovereign attributes as pointed out by S : Na ca

Pancaratra siddhantibhih, Vasudevadisu ekasmin sarvesuva

jnanaisvaryadi taratamyakr to bhedah abhyupagamyate (SBSB II.2. 44). One is left to wonder if the sovereign attributes of Satyam

Jnanam ananda etc mentioned in apposition with B in the Srutis

are ineligible to be treated as organically related to B much

more logically than Cit and Acit. The Svet. Up. speaks of jnana,

bala and kriya as inseparable saktis of B : Parasya Saktih vividhaiva

sruyate svabhaviki jnana bala kriya ca. The Visnu Purana often

quoted by R likens them to the intimate relation between fireand heat.

Saktayas sarvabhavanam acintyajnanagocarah

Yato ato Brahmanastah sargadya bhavasaktayah

Bhavanti tapatam srestha pavakasya yathosnata

(VP I.3.1-2)

Dr. Chari asserts that there is no mention of Aparoksa jnana

or Direct vision of God in the Sutras as accepted by M. This

observation is evidently due to the fact that according to R the

highest experience of B thro Dhyana is only an approximation

to actual vision (darsana samanakara) on this side of release.

But Mund. Up. (III.3) clearly says that the Supreme B reveals

its own form (svam tanum) to one whom it chooses. Cf.

Paramatmaparoksyam ca tat prasadadeva na jivasaktya (MBSB

III.2.23). The Isa. Up. refers to the prayer of the Jiva to the

Lord to show him that form of B which is Kalyana tamam, tat

te pasyami (I,6). The Brh. Up. says, Atmava are drastavyah,

srotavyo mantavyah. Sravana, Manana and Dhyana lead to

Darsana. The Gita also says,

Bhaktya tvananyaya sakya aham evam vidho Arjuna

Jnatum drastum ca pravestum ca parantapa (XI, 54).

Here, Jnana stands for Paroksa Jnana and Drastum for Direct

vision and Pravestum for Communion. All that apart, in the

Sadhana Adhyaya of BS (III.3) there are two consecutive Sutras

Vidyaivatu nirdharanat (III.3.48) and Darsanat (III.3.49). The former

evidently refers to Paroksa Jnana gained thro Sravana, Manana


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and Dhyana and Darsana must naturally be Direct vision - for

however short a while of a split second it may last, on this

side of release.

R holds that though forbidden to exercise the Lord's prerogatives

of world creation etc which are an expression of His infinite

blissfulness, released souls still enjoy the fullest measure of

the Lord's blissfulness. Apart from its illogicality, such a position

goes against the description of the highest state of Moksa described

in Brh. Up. (iv.3.32) : Esa Brahmalokah Esasya Paramagatih

Parama sampat Eso asya Paramolokah Eso asya Parama Anandah,

which concludes with a clear statement : Etasyaiva anandasya

anyani bhutani matram upajivanti (iv.3.32) that the denizens of

this world subsist on an iota of the boundless bliss of B. The

words Anyani bhutani in this context must necessarily denote

the actual residents of this world and not those st i l l in

Samsara.

Dr. Chari proffers an advice to followers of M to change the

name of Dvaita of their philosophy. This designation of Dvaita

is based on M's own classification of Tattva or Prameya defined

as Anaropitam pramiti visayah into two kinds as Svatantra and

Paratantra. Svatantra stands for the Supreme B which is not

dependent on any other for its being, knowing, functioning, unlike

the dependent (finite reality). Hence there is no need for a change

of the name, "Dvaita". The philosophy of Ramanuja stands midway

between Dvaita and Advaita with its acceptance of an inseparable

intraorganic relation of body and soul with B. But it seems possible

to subsume in principle the two categories of Acit and Cit into

a single head of finite reality dependent on B. thus arriving

at two broad categories. Would it not be more logical then for

R's philosophy to be renamed Dvaita, instead?

58 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

IV. MEET MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI

Advaitasiddhi-a critical study by Prof. K. Maheswaran Nair

- Kerala University - India Book Centre, 40/5, Saktinagar,

Delhi - 7 (1990).

Prof. Maheswaran Nair has made a distinctive, long awaited

contribution to the world of Vedanta scholarship by bringing out

a first English translation of Vyasatir tha's Nyayamrta and its

criticism the Advaitasiddhi side by side. It fills a great gap, as

till now no complete translation in English of either has been

available for modern scholars specialising in Vedanta dialectics.

But this edition suffers from want of a perspective index, which

is absolutely necessary for a modern work of such great importance.

The Dvaita known to Gaudapada and Sankara was not an

Aupanisada Darsana. It was Madhva who gave the final shape

to Vedanta as a robust Theism of the Prasthanatraya - the

triple canon and brought Dvaita - Advaita philosophical polemics

to contemporary attention with his monographs on disputed themes

like Mayavada, Upadhi and Mithyatva besides re-interpreting the

ten Upanisads, Brahmasutras and Gita. Jayatir tha and others

after him continued the polemics on the home front.

It was Vyasatirtha the Saint - Philosopher of the Vijayanagar

Empire who took Dvaita - Advaita philosophical polemics to an

All - India Forum in his Nyayamrta by widening the range and

scope of the subject and its dimensions, by placing in the hands

of his contemporaries a New Agenda for a more complete,

comprehensive and fruitful study, discussion and assessment

of the credentials and credibility of the contending systems.

Much of the credit given to Madhusudana Sarasvati for having

ushered in a Neo - Advaita, in its traditional setup, must really

go to Vyasatir tha, as has been handsomely acknowledged by

the late Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri, long ago. In dealing with

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the subject, Vyasatirtha had set for himself a very high standard

of parliamentary decorum and discipline in the use of controversial

language and vocabulary which was scrupulously adhered to

by the Tarangini in its reply to the A-siddhi, in glaring contrast

with the style of writing of both Madhusudana and Brahmananda.

The Tg in its replies invariably begins with the words Atra vadanti

and replies strictly to the point without heat or passion. Not

so Madhusudana and his commentator who freely indulge in

invective rhetoric, discourtesy, derision and abusive language,

to the extent of unprintable insults as on pages 50 and 119

in the translation. Dr. Nair should have taken the responsibility

to delete all such jarring notes in the English translations by

using his discretion and better judgment.

While paying dutiful respects to his Vidyaguru, Diksaguru and

Paramaguru at the outset, Madhusudana has omitted to do so

in respect of the A-diguru of Advaita namely A

-disankara - which

is in glaring contrast with the example set by Vyasatir tha.

Madhusudana wantonly twists and misconstrues Vyasatirtha's

statement : Yadrsam brahmanah satvam tadrsam syat jagatyapi

for the sake of jeering at his adversary, by resorting to a Chala,

by cutting a bad joke at his expense in the form of a foolish

suitor to the hand of a maiden, answering her father's question

of what his gotra may be, by telling him "it is the same as

yours, Sir".

What the statement of Vyasatirtha actually means and is

intended to convey is that like B the world too has an existence

and a reality, in the same way as B, though it may not be

self luminous (svaprakasa) like B. It is doubtful however if the

Advaitabrahman can be self - luminous, because it is claimed

by Sankara that it cannot know itself (atmani-svakriya virodhat).

That apart, the term yadrsam merely refers to a similarity of

nature and not identity. Vyasatirtha's statement does not mean

that the material world has no reality apart from B's. Vyasatir tha

has clarified :

Brahma ka- latrayepi sat. viyada-di kada-cideva iti nityatva -

anityatva-bhyam eva

vaisamyam na tu satyatva - mithya- tvabhya-m

(P. 37 Nym. Nirnayasagar Press Edn.)

There is nothing in this for Madhusudana to jump to the conclusion

that the world and B. share one and the same reality. Evidently,

Madhusudana is not aware of the fact that Dvaita Philosophy

does not accept anugatasatta- among existents -

Bhinnasca bhinnadharmasca padartha- nikhila- api (AV)

Difference and resemblance are both unique and sui generis

to each particular, tho made out thro their counter - correlates.

That apart, are we to take it that Madhusudana does not understand

the difference between Nitya and Anitya, as explained by Vyasatirtha

in the same work? No wonder, the Tg pulls up Madhusudana

: Bhava - anavabodhat.

Most Advaitins and their modern apologists continue to believe

and accuse Dvaita Philosophers of deliberately confounding the

Vyavaharika and the Paramarthika stand -points of S's Philosophy.

Dr. K. Narain, in his Critique of Madhva refutation of the Sankara

school of Vedanta, had done so and Prof. Nair has committed

the same mistake. It is all very well for him to insist that "the

practical reality of the world is never negated. What is negated

is its absolute reality." (P. 40 translation). But, the more important

question is from which angle or standpoint is the practical reality

sought to be negated. The Nym. has actually raised this moot

question - whether the vyavaharika prapanca is negated from

the Vyavaharika or the absolute point of view. Negation of the

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 6160 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati

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practical reality from the practical point of view would be suicidal.

The negation has to be from the absolute point of view. But

that is beset by an inextr icable logical fal lacy of mutual

interdependence (anyonyasraya). That is where the shoe pinches

and there lies the heel of Achilles. The words of Nym. are crystal

clear on the point. For Paramarthikatva, as defined by Advaita,

consists in uncontradictedness (abadhyatva). Only when one

has a complete knowledge of what is Paramarthika, as not open

to sublation with reference to all the three periods of time, can

one understand the nature of Mithyatva of the Vyavaharika as

liable to be negated with reference to all the three periods of

time. Unless one has such a knowledge of Mithyatva, one cannot

understand what Paramarthika reality is as not open to negation

at al l . After quot ing fai thful ly f rom Nym : Napi dvi t iyah

Abadhyatvarupa paramar th ika tvasya - badhyatvar upa

mi thyatvan i rupyatvat anyonyasrayatvat , the Log ic ian in

Madhusudana is forced to admit tamely - Maivam Svarupenaiva

traikalika nisedhasya prapance suktirupye ca angikarat (A - siddhi

Sri Vidya Press Edn). This lets the cat out of the bag.

This outspoken confession of Madhusudana, in dealing with

second definition of falsity in his A-siddhi, is nowhere to be

found, in Prof. Nair's English translation of the text of the A-

siddhi. One wonders why. Anyway, the frank confession of

Mdhusudana that both the illusory silver and the practical world

(Prapanca) are negated per se in respect of their own respective

forms of appearance as such (Svarupena as Asad - vilaksana

= Mithya) would consequently reduce them to an essenceless

void - as pointed out by Vyasatirtha -

Mithyabhu- tasya-pi svarupen.aiva traikalika nis.edha iti

paks.e, nihsvarupatvasya durva- ratva- t

The reader of the English translation is entitled to know what

Madhusudana's reactions are to the crucial point raised by

Vyasatir tha. The translation is silent on the point.

Madhusudana is prone to play tricks with evidence, in dealing

with the Advaita interpretation of Ekameva - advitiyam he adver ts

to the Nasadiya - Sukta (R.V. X, 129) where in the opening

line, there is reference to Tadanim with reference to the existence

of Time in Mahapralaya. Madhusudana, therefore, proceeds to

shift it to the next line to avoid a survival of Time as a reality

in Mahapralaya. But, the shifting of the term tadanim to the

next line can serve no purpose as the context remains the same

Mahapralaya. However, he also says the words Sat and Asat

in the opening line should be construed in what he calls their

wel l known (Prasiddhar tha) usage of Paramar thika and

Aparamarthika instead of in their scriptural meanings of Murta

and Amurta, as suggested by Madhva on the basis of the Brh.

Up. (II.3, 2-3). The undesirable consequence of Madhusudana's

move would be to reduce even the surviving residual B. in

Mahapralaya, as the one Sat breathing windless by its own power

(anid avatam svadhaya tadekam) to a state of anirvacaniya. To

avoid this, Madhusudana proposes to call to aid some other

Srutis from elsewhere, which is quite unnecessary, if Sat and

Asat are understood as Murta and Amurta as supported by Brh.

Up. As a Sastrajna, Madhusudana is expected to adhere to the

principle of interpretation of Sastric words in their scriptural

connotation : Sastrastha va tannimittatvat, as far as possible.

What surprises one is that Madhusudana has not even cared

to adhere to Sankara's interpretation of the words Sat and Asat,

used in Prasna Up. (II. 5) as Murta and Amurta, respectively.

Are we to suppose that Madhusudana had not read even Sankara's

own bhasya on the Upanisads? If he had, why has he not stuck

to them here?

After valiantly fighting for the establishment of B's formlessness

(nirakaratva), Madhusudana seems to have had a guilty conscience

and seems to have hastened to make amends by saying "I know

of no other higher than Murali Krsna : Krsnatparam kimapi tattvam


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aham na jane." This verse is relevant to the present section

and not to the beginning of the one as printed here. The

Kumbakonam edition places it at the end of the present section.

The same is the case with the abusive verse - Iha kumatih

atatve tatvavadi varakah which should appear in the Epilogue

and not where it is found in Prof. Nair's translation.

The trouble taken by Advaita to castrate B of its vital essences

of Satyam, Jnanam and Ananda and other metaphysical attributes

by Akhandartha surgery is an unfortunate exercise in futility

by taking it to the brink of Apohavada. Intellectual sophistry

cannot go beyond Akhandartha by smothering the Upanisadic

Brahman with a number of gags without a single gap of attributes

for it to breathe. When one reads the thrilling and sonorous

description of B in the Taitt. Up. as Satyam jnanam anantam

B, followed by an assurance that one who realises it reaches

it along with the enlightened Brahmadeva, one hardly suspects

that it can be twisted and mangled into so many negatives and

exclusions of their opposites only (atadvyavrtti). No wonder, even

a sincere Advaitin like Dr. P. K. Sundaram recoils from interpreting

satyam, jnanam etc. as the absence of existence, absence of

ignorance and absence of pain - a dark emptiness and blankness

and bankruptcy of being. The profound depth of existence of

B is not conveyed by denial but by affirmation, not by is not,

but by is. A reality which is said to be Satyasya satyam cannot

be an essenceless Vacuum (P. 6-7 E. T. of Istasiddhi). There

must be some linking agency, some internal mechanism in the

constitution of B to admit of a differenceless identity which however

facilitates a distinction of reference without necessitating a

distinction of essence. It cannot fall outside B's ontological essence

or an expression of it or one alien to it. The name Svarupavisesa

given to it in Dvaita philosophy is most appropriate, signifying

its own internal dynamism.

Karl Potter has made it clear that tho Advaita thought looks

upon self-knowledge as not given by any Pramana and is an

immediate intuition, still the precise nature of its content has

to be gathered from the sruti. Thus ultimately, it has to look

upon scripture and language, as its critical means of proof of

its truthfulness of such anubhava (Encyclopaedia of Indian

Philosophies Vol - I I P. 98). S too endorses the same :

Brahmatmabhavasya sastram antarena anavagamyamanatvat

(BSB I, 1, 4).

It is for this reason that Vyasatir tha has given top priority

to the discussions of over twenty Advaita Srutis, with special

reference to their context, language, wording, syntax, concord

and significance of the illustrations given. Of these Madhusudana

has dealt with only Aham Brahmasmi and Tattvam asi (Akhandartha)

and has skipped Neha nanasti, vacarambhanam, Prapanco yadi

vidyeta and such other crucial texts and giving cursory attention

to Ekameva Advitiyam and a few others. Prof. Nair sums up

his comment on Ekam eva Advitiyam in two or three sentences.

We cannot, therefore, admit Prof. Nair's plea that Madhusudana

"does not explain all these other Srutis for fear of inordinate

length of the discussions" (P 74). He could have given more

attention to them, instead of enlarging on the topic of Vipratipatti

pradarsana at the beginning, which has no interest to modern

scholars. The Nadi Samudra drstanta in Tattvam asi has been

thrown out by Vacaspati Misra (Bhamati on BSB I.4.22). The

illustration of salt dissolved in water, the invisible power hidden

behind the tiny banyan seeds ordered to be cut open (broken),

the thief and imposter with stolen property caught red handed

and brought to trial, the dying man on his sick bed are all hard

nuts to crack, from an Advaita point of view. A baffled Madhusudana

beats a hasty retreat, saying that illustrations do not run on

all fours, or that they are not transparent, or do not refer to


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66 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati

any differences as really existing and lastly, and above all, that

they are indifferent alike to the existence of real difference or

real identity (between Jiva and Brahma - Vastavabheda abhedayor

audasinyena, P. 836 N. S. Press Edition). Prof. Nair's Translation

has drawn a black curtain over all such irresponsible and facetious

pleas of Madhusudana, in his Translation. Such replies are evasive.

The question is whether the illustrations given by Uddalaka support

the thesis of difference between Jiva Brahman or their identity.

They cannot do both. Neither can they be neutral and indifferent

to both. Yet, nothing daunted, Madhusudana coolly says they

do neither!! This is no compliment to the Sruti or to Uddalaka

or to our intelligence.

APPENDIX

THE QUESTION OF THE DATE OF

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

MADHVACARYA

The date of Acarya Madhva given by him in his Mahabharata

Tatparya Nirnaya (xxxii, 131) as "after the lapse of 4300 years

of Kaliyuga" is not an epigraphical evidence or a diary entry.

It is only a broad statement in terms of 43 centuries after (in

Kali). The precise date has therefore to be fixed after taking

into account all other relevant facts known about his life history.

Hrsikesa Tirtha, one of the eight Taulava disciples of the Acarya,

who later became the Head of the Palimar Mutt of Udupi, has

left us a complete Tulu Ms. copy of the collected works (Sarvamula)

of Madhva preserved in palm leaves in the Mutt for centuries.

It has been printed, edited by Bannanje Govindacarya on behalf

of Palimar Mutt, by the late Sri Vidyamanya Tir tha. The edition

mentions that in this collection is found the text of a short work

on Tithinirnaya by the Acarya dated corresponding to 1308 AD.

The Madhva Vijaya mentions Hrsikesa T. as a beloved and leading

disciple of the Acarya (Sisya Pravara XIII, 40) who used to recite

the Bhagavata Purana in a melodious voice which matched the

Acarya's. Two works of Hrsikesa T. have come down to us, a

Sampradaya Paddhati and an Anumadhvacarita. It is natural to

expect such a leading and beloved disciple of the Acarya to

have left us a short life sketch of the Acarya in which he has

given precise information about cyclic year of Madhva's exit from

the scene of his worldly activities, the tithi and month and the

cyclic year of his disappearance and his age at the time of

his leaving the earthly life :-

Ekonasiti varsani bhutva manusadrstigah

Pingalabde maghasuddha navamyam Badarim yayau

The verse clearly says that the Acarya left the world in his

79th year on the ninth day of the bright half of Magha in the

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cyclic year of Pingala which corresponds to 1317 (18) AD. To

this day the departure anniversary of the Acarya is observed

by the entire Madhva community and its Mathas on Magha Suddha

Navami as "Madhva Navami". The broad statement of the Mbh.

TN (XXXII, 131) read with the above precise data of the

Anumadhvacarita of the Acarya's own leading disciple Hrsikesa

T. should set at rest all doubts about the precise date of the

Acarya as 1238-1317 (18) AD.

The Guruparampara of the four up-ghat disciples of the Acarya

who succeeded to their Pitha one after the other till we come

to the fourth disciple Aks.obhya T. adds upto 33 years. If we

go by the theory of P. S. Seshagiri Acharya that the Acarya

lived for only 70 years from 1199 AD, the Acarya would have

left the world in 1270 AD. That would clash with the evidence

of the copper plate inscription of the fourth disciple Aksobhya

T. dated 1337 AD in which he is stated to have purified two

Brahmin brothers of their sin of Brahmahatya and restored their

social status as before. This record has been published by Kapatral

Krishna Rao of Gulbarga in the Kannada Tattvavada from Gadag

in April, 1968.

Narahari T. one of the four up-ghat disciples of Madhva was

converted and admitted to Sanyasa order in 1264 AD by his

Guru Ananda T. according to the earliest inscription of Narahari

T. His Srikurmam inscription dated 1281 AD mentions that he

belonged to the Ministerial family of the Kalinga kingdom and

was earnestly advised by the Acarya, his Guru, to assume charge

as Prime Minister of the state during the period of a grave crisis

and break down of law and order situation in the state on account

of the insurrect ions of the Sabara hordes (verse 6 of

Srikurmam inscription).

These are clear guidelines for us to go by in fixing the date

of Madhva between 1238-1317 (Pingala) overlooking the gap

of 39 years as already explained.

By-passing all these data Seshagiri Acharya of Mysore has

been doggedly upholding the date 1199-1270 in his controversy

with me in the Kannada Tattvavada of the Akhila Bharata Madhva

Mahamandala, Bangalore.

His latest move is to exploit the incident narrated in M. Vij.

V. 38 of a disputation between the young, rising M. and an

Advaitic monk in Anantasayana over M's criticism of some

interpretations of Brahmasutras by Sankara in the course of

his own exposition of the Sutras to an audience there. The Advaitic

Sanyasi is repor ted to have objected to M's cr i t icising

Sankarabhasya on the ground that M. had no business to criticise

a Bhasyakara when he himself had not produced any Bhasya

of his own. (Mahanatikramo Sutrarthavado akrtabhasyakesu -

M. Vij. V, 38). The Acarya asked him to reply and answer his

criticisms if he were able to do so and that he will certainly

be coming out with a Sutrabhasya of his own in good time (M.

Vij. V. 39).

Now who was this Advaita Sanyasi who had opposed M. at

Anantasayanam? Seshagiri Acharya identifies him with no less

a personage than Vidyatirtha the then ruling Pontiff of the prestigious

premier Advaitic Matha of South India, the Sringeri Pitha, on

the basis of a study of the records of Sringeri Matha by Prof.

K. Nilakantha Sastri of the Madras University and a staunch

disciple of the Matha that it was Vidyatir tha himself who is said

to have humbled the pride of M. at Anantasayanam. Seshagiri

Acharya has manipulated the date of Vidyatir tha to syncronise

with that of his own date for M. viz. 1199-1270.

The idea that it was Vidyatir tha, Head of the Sringeri Matha

who had taken part in the disputation with M. was first put forward

by CNK Aiyar of Coimbatore in his Madhva & Madhvaism (1907).

C. M. Padmanabhachar of Coimbatore while refuting many of

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 6968 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya

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CNK Aiyar's aspersions against M. in his Life & Teachings of

Madhva (1912) did not question his identification of the Advaita

monk (who disputed with M. at Anantasayanam) with Vidya

(Sankara) Tir tha of the Sringeri Mutt. The reason was that neither

of them had heard of or had access to the Bhavaprakasika notes

on M. Vij. by Narayana Panditacarya himself published in 1923

by the Kaniyur Math of Udupi in which the Advaita Sanyasi who

disputed with M. had been identified as a Taulava ascetic of

the Advaita school bearing the Taulava family surname of

Kudiposatur - aya whose Sanskrit equivalent had been given

in M. Vij. as Apramsunutnopapada - adhivasaja (M. Vij. V, 38).

The subsequent publication of Visvapati T.'s Com. on M. Vij.

by the Pejavar Mutt in 1951 also decodes it as Kudiposatur

aya. The mistaken identification of this Advaitic monk with Vidya

T. of Sringeri Mutt was first corrected by me in my paper on

"Madhva Vidyasankara Meeting - A Fiction" published in or about

1932 in the Annamalai University Journal (Vol. II). I do not know

if Pof. Nilakantha Sastri had taken any notice of it in his study

of the Sringeri Mutt records as he is said to have done by

Seshagiri Acharya.

The Taulava l ineage of Kudiposaturaya rules out the

possibility of his induction to the prestigious Sringeripitha,

recrui tment to which was and is not open to Taulavas.

Most probably this ascetic owed allegiance to a Bhagavata

Sampradaya Advaitic Matha of South Kanara of those days, such

as the Edaniru Matha whose Svamijis worship Visnu (Krsna)

and Siva on an equal footing, Krsna in the morning & noon

and Siva at night, wear ing Gopicandana dvadasanamas

during day Puja & Ahnika and Vibhuti (ashes) for evening

Puja of Siva. The Edaniru Mutt at Vishnumangala is the

Guru Matha of a large number of Tulu Brahmana families who

had not joined the M. fold.

CONCLUSION :

Irrespective of Nilakantha Sastri's study of the records of

the Sringeri Matha, the identification of the Advaitic Sanyasi

in question with Vidya T. of the Sringeri Matha can not pass

muster from the point of view of either side.

First look at it from the angle of the Sringeri Mutt. The Pontiffs

of this Mutt which represents the premier Advaita Pitha in South

India enjoy royal honors and insignia. It would be infra dig and

highly compromising to the prestige, standing and status of its

ruling Pontiff to let himself be drawn into any philosophical

disputation with a rebel, much younger and absolutely unknown

to fame and name from Udupi, who had not yet established

his credentials and reputation as the exponent of a new school

of thought by his writings - even as Kudiposaturaya himself puts

it to him so sarcastically and disdainfully - Mahan atikramo

sutrarthavado akrtabhasyakesu (M. Vij. V, 38). In the opinion

of Kudiposaturaya too the young Madhva was an upstart rebel

with no reputation to lose.

Worse still would be the attitude of the great Pontiff of the

Sringeri Mutt, Vidyatir tha, who would be the last man to be

lured unwarily into a debate with an unknown rebel with no

locus standi. All that we know from M. Vij. is that the Advaita

Sanyasi raised a point of order and did not answer the criticism.

There was thus actually no va-da at all. Seshagiri Achar has

disarmingly tried to put in that it is natural for each party to

a debate to claim victory. But the point here is Madhva's opponent

merely raised a point of order on technical grounds that only

a Bhasyakara can criticise another. He himself declined to go

into details in defence of Sankara. Where then is the "Va-da"

when one of the parties refuses to go further and rebut the

other's criticism?

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 7170 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya

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When even Kudiposaturaya declined to argue with M. so

patronisingly, worse still would be the attitude of the real Vidyatir tha

of the Sringeri Mutt, not to get into trouble if the odds went

against him as they seem to have from the evidence let in by

M. Vij. V. 46 and comments on it in the Bhavaprakasika. Even

when the famous Satyadhyana Tir tha of the Uttaradi Mutt issued

an open challenge to all the Advaita pithas, the Sringeri Mutt

only deputed its Pandits like Mm. Anantakrishna Shastri to take

part in the famous Kumbakonam debate.

Now, let us look at it from the other side. Narayana Pandita

must have heard all about the Kudiposaturaya episode from his

father. If this Kudiposaturaya was really Vidyatir tha of the Sringeri

Mutt why should he (Narayana Pandita) not have given us his

(Kudiposaturaya's) official name and designation but go on only

referring to him as Apramsunutnopapada-dhivasaja throughout

both in his M. Vij. and in the Bhavaprakasika? Why has he

not even once used his new official designation and name as

Vidyatir tha of the famous Sringeri Mutt if it was the fact and

the truth? Would it not have added greatly to the prestige of

the young rising M. if he had done so as common sense tells

us? Why has Narayana Pandita kept mum on this most important

detail? What would Seshagiri Achar himself have done had he

been the author of M. Vij.?

72 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya OTHER PUBLISHED BOOKS OF THE AUTHOR

1) Catus-Sutri Bhasya of Sri Madhvacharya with two unpub-

lished commentaries. English Introduction and Notes,

Foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Law Journal Press,

Chennai, 1934 (Now O. P.)

2) Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words. E. T. and anno-

tations of 150 selections from the Sarvamula. Pub. Bharatiya

Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 4th Edn. 1998.

3) Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya. Revised Second Edn.

Motilal Banrasidass, Delhi, 1999.

4) History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature.

Revised Enlarged Second Reprint Edition, (single volume)

Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2000.

5) Lectures on Vedanta, Karnatak University, Dharwad, 1973.

6) Brahmasutras and their Principal Commentaries of the

three Major Schools of Vedanta of Sankara, Ramanuja

and Madhva. First Edn. in three Vols. by Bharatiya Vidya

Bhavan, Mumbai (1971-76) Reprint Edn. in three vols.

Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1986.

7) Satyam eva Jayate. A Hagiological work, Sri Vyasaraja

Mutt, Bangalore, 1984.

8) Kannada Tr. of my History of Dvaita School of Vedanta

and Its Literature. By Prof. Bharatiramanachar in two Vols.

Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundat ion,

Bangalore - 4, 1988, 1993.

9) Madhva's Aupanisadam Darsanam.


Bangalore.

10) Brhadaranyaka Upanisad As Expounded by Madhvacarya.


Bangalore - 1988.

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11) English Translation of Sri Madhva's Gita Bhasya with

Tex t . Ananda T i r tha Pra t i s thana, A . B. M. M. ,

Bangalore - 28, 1989.

12) Aroor Srinivasa Rao Endowment Lectures on Dvaita

Philosophy (1989-90 Madras University)

13) Visvapriya-Vilasa Prabandha of Cochi Rangappacharya,

Vadi ra ja- s. t. aka etc . Ed i t ied wi th Engl ish Synopsis,

Chennai, 1992.

14) Advaita Siddhi Vs Nyayamr ta - An uptodate Crit ical

Re-Appraisal. Ananda Tir tha Pratisthana, A. B. M. M.

Bangalore - 28, 1994.

15) Numerous miscellaneous works, Research Papers, Articles

and Introductions to various Publications of other Scholars

and Institutions.

16) Two outstanding Contributions of Dvaita Thought to Indian

Epistemology. Narasimhacarya Endowment Lectures. (Pub.

Journal of Oriental Research, Kuppusvami Sastri Research

Institute, Chennai 1991)

17) Nya-yasudha- of Jayatir tha Panca-dhikarani, English render-

ing w i th Foreword by Pro f. Edwin Gerow.

Raghavendra Ashram, 56/10, 8th Main, Malleswaram,

Bangalore - 560 055 (1995).

18) Maha Tatparya of Maha-va-kyas and other Advaita Srutis.

Ananda Tir tha Pratisthana, Bangalore - 28, 1999.

19) Vijayindra Vijaya Kavya of Madhva Kavi.

✤ ✤ ✤

74 Other published books of the Author

essays by bnk sharma

Documents

vedanta sutras

enriched dvaita philosophy

history of dvaita literature

b vedanta desikas strictures

research papersbydr

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modern academicforum

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