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ESCAPEfrom

FREERIDERSJun Kobayashi (U of Chicago)

Hirokuni Ooura (Teikyo U)Hideki Ishihara (Rikkyo U)

August 21, 2003Marstrand, Sweden

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1 QUESTIONIn MODERN SOCIETIES…

We can CHANGE PARTNERS.

Divorce, Move, Change Job, Immigration.

COOPERATION in Dilemmas… when CHANGE PARTNERS?

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2 THEORYSELECTIVE INTERACTION (Dawes),ESCAPING (Hayashi).Prediction…ESCAPE COOPERATION.

But NOT SELF-EVIDENT… b/c Defectors FOLLOW.

CC

CDD

D

CD

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3 HYPOTHESES"ESCAPING TIT-for-TAT"…

TIT-for-TAT in a Group,EXIT when DEFECTED,Cooperate in NEW Group.

H1 SOME play "Escaping TFT."

H2Earn MORE than DEFECTORS.

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4 EXPERIMENTWEB-BASED.Repeat S.D. Game in a GROUP,MOVE to Anther Group, No COST.ANONYMOUS.

15-20 Subjects (students).20-40 Games, 3-6 Moves.

6 Sessions, 111 Subjects.2 Universities in Japan, Nov. 2002.

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5 GAMEWork at one of 4 FIRMS.If D (Work LAZILY), PAYOFF…

# Cooperators 4 .# Workers in FirmIf C (Work HARD), PAYOFF…

D's Payoff － 2.

# Cooperators

Payoff DefectionCooperation

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Your CHOICE, PAYOFFEach FIRM's

PAYOFF,#Workers

EACH MONTH

HOW to WORK?

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EVERY 6 MONTHS History of Each FIRM's PAYOFF,

#WorkersEach FIRM's AVERAGE PAYOFF

WHERE to WORK?

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6 RESULT

groupＡ groupＢ groupＣ groupＤ Σ Ｎｃ3 5 15 18 19 1 4 10 12 17 8 11 13 14 16 20 2 6 7 94 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 4 4 0 4 84 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 70 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 80 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 4 94 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 90 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 4 7

5 13 17 18 3 4 16 19 7 8 10 1 2 6 9 11 12 14 15 200 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 80 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 4 4 4 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 4 4 70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 50 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 4 0 0 4 5

9 4 18 2 3 1 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 19 204 4 4 4 4 0 0 4 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 84 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 94 4 4 4 4 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 74 4 0 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 74 4 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 64 4 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 6

2 7 10 11 12 14 18 20 4 5 15 19 1 3 6 8 9 13 16 170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 0 0 4 6

Mean SD

C .40 .24

Move .54 .24

Payoff .80 .38

6 Sessions111 Subjects-2 < Payoff < 4

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7 ESCAPING TFT? move

behav.

ESCAPE FIXED RANDOM total

TFT 30 10 8 48All C 1 4 1 6All D 7 3 2 12RANDOM 12 10 5 27

Other 8 8 2 18total 58 35 18 111

→YES!

27%

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8 BETTER? move behav. ESCAPE FIXED RANDOM total

TFT 0.77 0.90 0.80 0.80

All C 0.09 0.66 1.01 0.62

All D 0.91 0.87 1.39 0.98RANDOM 0.83 0.68 0.88 0.79

Other 0.74 0.87 0.25 0.74

total 0.79 0.80 0.84 0.80 →NO!

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9 CONCLUSIONCOOPERATION by ESCAPING?Something MORE.

Theory… MOVING COST.

Test… More Experiments / Surveys.