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75THE CONCORD REVIEW

Elizabeth Lee Jemison is at Princeton . She wrote th is paper at St. Marys

Episcopal School in Memp his, Tennessee, for Ms. Joan Traffas Hon ors

World H istory II course in the 2003-2004 academic year.

THE NAZI INFLUENCE

IN TH E FORMATION OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA

Elizabeth Lee Jemison

South African apar theid was a system developed to p ro-tect the supremacy of Afrikaans-speaking whites and to repress

non-white groups through a policy of almost complete separation .

The Afrikaner people, the descendants of the first Dutch settlersin southern Africa, were the dominant white minority and , once

un ified beh ind the cause of apartheid, formed a majority of the all-

white electorate. Apar theid, the Afrikaans word for separateness,

began as a govern mental system after the elections of 1948 when

the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, became the majority Party, and

this system lasted until 1994. The Afrikaner white population

developed the apartheid system in 1948 in part as an outgrowth of

the ideology of Nazi Germany, an ideology the Afrikaners readilyaccepted because of the affinity they felt towards German s, and

because they feared being dominated by the English minority who

had previously controlled the coun try.

The desire of the Afrikaners for complete power in South

Africa began when the British took over the Cape area in 1806, in

an effort to p revent Napoleon from gaining control of the region.

The introduction of another European group vying for power


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76 Elizabeth Lee Jemison

served to awaken Afrikaner nationalism. The British who settled in

the Cape area in the ear ly 19th century brought with th em concepts

of the 18th century Enlightenment and the pro-business liberalism

of the 19th century. These ideas conflicted sharply with the con ser-

vative Calvinist ideology of the Dutch who h ad settled South Africa

beginning in th e mid-17th cen tury. As the result of the an ti-slavery

lobby in Britain and of the efforts of Christian missionaries to end

racial prejud ice, the British advocated a lessen ing of segregation

to allow some non-whites to participate at least partially in the

white-dominated society. Overall, the English possessed a more

advanced culture an d lifestyle than the Dutch living at the Cape,

so the Dutch were likely to be absorbed into a colonial British

society as secon d-class citizen s. Indignan t about the possibility of

such a fate and without sufficient skill to fend off the British, man y

of the Dutch Boers moved fur ther inland to areas to the northwest

of the Cape area beginning in 1835. These Afrikaners or

Voortrekkers conquered the land of native African tribes and

established au tonomous Boer republics. There, Afrikaners beganto cultivate an Afrikaner culture.1

These Afrikaner or Boer republics began to prosper,

especially after the discovery of gold an d diamonds within their

lands. This new-found wealth, however, worked to the detr imen t

of the Boer republics because when the British learned of the gold

and diamonds to be found further inland , they vied for control.

The conflicts erupting from the attempt on the part of the British

to incorporate th e Boer republics into th e British Empire even tu-

ally caused two Boer Wars. The first of these lasted from 1881-1882

and the second from 1899-1902. During these wars, the British

suppressed and mistreated Afrikaners. The British created volun -

tary concentration camps during the second Boer War where

many women and children came for protection, yet conditions in

these camps were such that 26,000 Afrikaners died of disease and

starvation. Towards the end of the second Boer War, the Britishbegan to burn Boer farmsdestroying crops and razing home-

steads. These wars illustrated the dangers of two self-proclaimed

Christian nations going to war against each other when both

nations believed in the same God and both were certain that God


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justified all their actions. 2 Th e Freethinker, a liberal English journal,

reported in October 1899, The Boer has a Mauser rifle in one

hand and a Dutch Bible in the other, while the Britisher hasweapon s in both hands and a Bible behind his back...Each informs

the God of that book which side he ought to take in the quarrel.3

Ultimately, the British gained control of the Boer Republics with

the Treaty of Vereeniging of 1902.

Though the Afrikaners were rou ted, many loyal Afrikaners

chose to destroy their weapon s rather than surrender th em to the

British, while still others accepted deportation rather than swearallegiance to Britain.4 Despite th eir defeat, many Boers felt pr ide

that while Britain used 448,000 soldiers in the war where 7,000 of

them died, the Boers never h ad more th an 70,000 soldiers ( rarely

more than 40,000) and most of these were civilians. Only 4,000

Boers died in th e war. This pr ide in their military record evolved

into a new wave of Afrikaner nationalism. Their defeat after

bloody wars made them more bitter towards the British than if

Britain had seized control of the Boer republics withou t a struggle.5

This century of conflict (1806-1902) encouraged Afrikaner unity

and a strong anti-British attitude that would serve as an initial

impetus for German sympathy culminating in intense pro-Nazism

in th e mid-20th century.

The extent of Afrikaner anti-British sentiment was most

eviden t in Afrikaners opposition to th e leadership of Jan Chris-

tian Smuts. Smuts, though an Afrikaner himself, was willing tonegotiate with the British; he served in a variety of offices in British-

controlled South Africa including two terms as prime minister.

Smuts had fought on the Boer side of the second Boer War but

later became active in seeking compromise between the two sides

by leading the Boer negotiations for surrender as the Transvaal

State Attorney. Smuts explained the Boer position,

We are n ot h ere as an army but as a people...Everyone rep resents the

Afrikaner peop le...They call up on us to avoid all measures which maylead to the decline and extermination of the Afrikaner people...We

commen ced this struggle and continued it to th is moment because

we wished to maintain our independence...But we may not sacrifice

the Afrikaner people for that independence. As soon as we are


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convinced th at, human ly speaking, there is no reasonable chance to

retain our indepen dence as republics, it clearly becomes our duty to

stop the struggle in order that we may not perhaps sacrifice ourpeop le and ou r future for a mere idea which cannot be realized.6

As the result of his efforts to lead the post-war n egotiations, Smuts

played crucial roles in convincing Britain to give Afrikaners gen-

eral auton omy and in uniting the defeated Boer republics with

British provinces to form the Un ion of South Africa in 1910.

Smuts belief that Britain h ad the right to rule South Africa

earn ed him a pro-British label and alienated man y fervent Afrikaner

nationalists. The first evidence of th is conflict appeared in 1914 at

the beginning of World War I when Smuts fought to en d a pro-

German rebellion led by Afrikaners. Smuts opposition to the

rebellion pr imarily caused the formation of the Afrikaner Nation-

alist Party later that year by J.B.M. Hertzog who wanted to make

British and Afrikaner cultures equal but separate entities.7 Th e

Nationalist Party grew in strength from 1914 until 1948 when it

gained a majority. From that political vantage, it was able to enactits policies of apartheid th at it developed during th is per iod of

ascendan cy. The Party became increasingly devoted to Afrikaner

sup remacy rather than Hertzogs initial policy of equality between

the two white groups.

In 1919 Smuts had become prime minister when his pro-

British Union Party was still the majority party. Upon entering

office, he experienced dissent from the Afrikaners who viewed

him as a British agent for h is belief that the Un ion of South Africa

did not have the right to secede from the British empire. In th e

wake of his experience with the pro-German rebellion in 1914,

Smuts was very cautious in his opposition to the Afrikaners.8 After

he lost power to Hertzog in 1924, Smuts became more politically

astute and aware of the strength of his opposition. Smuts and

Hertzog reconciled their differen ces to form the Un ited Party in

1933 in which Smuts served as deputy pr ime minister un til Hertzogresigned from the government in 1939, when South Africa en-

tered World War II supporting the Allies. Hertzogs resignation

made Smuts very aware of the division among South Africans in

their opin ions on World War II an d of the possibility of a civil war


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resulting between the South Africans of British descent who were

pro-Allies and the Afrikaners who were pro-Nazi.9 Smuts leading

South African forces on the side of the British in World War IIangered the more conservative Afrikaners whose position the

newspaper,Die Burger, captured when it posed the question, Why

should we fight for Britain, the only country which has ever

attacked us?10 Although he was an Afrikaner, J. C. Smuts was the

object of many Afrikaners frustrations at the failed attempts at

Afrikaner independence, and he ironically became a symbol of

oppressive British imperialism. In an attempt to distance them-

selves from Smuts, many Afrikaners aligned themselves with Ger-

many against the old enemy, Britain. Anti-British sentiment was

not a d irect cause of the bu lk of pro-German and later p ro-Nazi

sentiment in South Africa, but it contr ibuted in laying the ground-

work for stronger ideological identification with Germany.

Where an ti-British sen timen t was un able to produce last-

ing German sympathies, ideological identification with German

nationalism especially through Afrikaners adoption of the con-cept of a volkgeist forged strong ties between Afrikaners and

Germans. Johann von H erder, an early romantic German nation-

alist coined the term volkin hisIdeas of a Philosophy of Human History

to describe the cultural heritage of the common people in an y

particular area; Herder called the character d istinctive to a culture

its volkgeist. A later German philosopher, J. G. Fichte, built on

Herders concepts ofvolkan d volkgeistby claiming in hisAddresses

to the German Nation that the German volkgeistwas superior to th at

of other cultures. Fichtes theor ies, first expressed in 1808, intro-

duced the concept of German supremacy that became the first

seeds of Nazism. Afrikaners adop ted this concept of a volkfor th eir

own purposes. The volk stood for the identity of the common

people, so Afrikaners used it to glorify the Voortrekkers who

traveled deeper into Africa, conquered native tribes, and estab-

lished the Boer Republics; they were the paragons of Afrikaneridealism.

In addition, many Afrikaners were of German as well as

Dutch ancestry and shared a common bond with Germans through


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their identification with Protestantism. Most Afrikaner students

who traveled to Europe to pursue their post-graduate stud ies at a

large university studied in Holland or Germany rather thanEngland despite the fact that more of these students spoke En-

glish, not German. Several future leaders of the apartheid era

encoun tered Nazism while studying in Germany.11

Strong pro-German sen timent was evident as ear ly as 1914

when German n ationalism caused an Afrikaner rebellion against

British ru le. Many Afrikaners opposed the Versailles Treaty end-

ing World War I. They viewed it as a cruel domination of thealready defeated Germans. Even Smuts attempted to persuade th e

British to negotiate a less debilitating treaty with Germany.12 As the

Nazi Party gained power in Germany, Afrikaners felt an inclina-

tion to support Nazism as both Nazism an d th eir own Voor trekker

heritage relied h eavily on the idea ofvolkto promote the concepts

of racial supremacy. Nazis and Afrikaners construed the concept

ofvolkto permit a form of xenoph obia that would p reserve their

Western Christian tradition from the dangers Asian and Sovietpowers posed.13 Afrikaners adopted Hitlers concept of a master

race and Nazi German n ationalism to th eir Afrikaner situation.14

Nazi influence in shaping the ideology of Afrikaners was not the

primary cause of Afrikaner belief in the superiority of whites over

blacks, but Nazism was largely responsible for encouraging the

idea th at Afrikaners were superior to any other groups of whites.15

Afrikaners distorted their Calvinist beliefs to fur ther th isattitude of not on ly white supremacy but also of sup remacy of the

Afrikaner volkover all other groups. Because Afrikaner culture

derived support from the Calvinist tradition, the religious ties of

Afrikaners were a natural place to find additional support for the

Afrikaner volk. Accordingly, they claimed that God had estab-

lished the volkas a tool for His purposes in South Africa. Afrikaners

took Calvinisms doctrine of election and claimed that it sup-

ported the spiritual, biological, and cultural superiority of theelect Afrikaner cultu re. Afrikaners further adapted Calvinism to

include a national consciousness in th e doctrines of election and

vocation, thus making the salvation of the Afrikaner nation from


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the evils of British domination appear comparable to the spiritual

salvation of its inhabitants. Through this combination of deeply

entrenched doctrines of Calvinism and the newer concept ofnationalism expressed through suppor t of the Afrikaner volk, th e

concept of Christian-Nationalism emerged. Afrikaner journalists

supported the concept of Christian-Nationalism by frequently

referring to the growth of Afrikaner power in the British-con-

trolled government as similar to the biblical story of the young

Hebrew boy, David, defeating the Philistine giant, Goliath.16 By

equating Calvinism to Nationalism and by seeing the struggle for

Afrikaner political power as obedience to divine will, Christian-

Nationalists stressed the State at the expense of more liberal ideas

of individual freedom. This made the emerging ideas of totalitari-

anism and fascism seem reasonable and compatible with Chris-

tian-Nationalism.17

The Chr istian-Nationalist movement grew in importance

and became a central part of the campaign for Afrikaner indepen-

den ce and for apartheid. Afrikaners, after h aving gained indepen-dence from Britain in 1961, revealed the degree to which they

thought that independence from Britain was their divinely or-

dained destiny when the Afrikaner newspaper, Die Transvaler,

reported, Our republic is the inevitable fulfillment of Gods plan

for our people...a plan formed in 1653 when [the first Dutch

settlers] ar rived at the Cape...for which the defeat of our Republics

in 1902 was a necessary step.18 In add ition to advocating indepen-

dence from Britain, Afrikaners manipulated Calvins teachings to

claim that Calvinisms clear delineation between the elect and th e

damned supported the formation of aparth eids rigid racial and

ethnic distinctions.19

While Christian-Nationalism provided an ideological jus-

tification for fascism, anti-Semitism in the 1930s further linked the

ideologies of Chr istian-Nationalism and Nazism. Both formulated

similar policies to control Jews within their respective countries.Interestingly, there was initially resistance to this trend from

powerful Afrikaner leaders. In 1929, General J.B.M. Hertzog, the

founder of the Nationalist Party, expressed decent tolerance,


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saying that the Jews were the ethnic group whose concerns were

most similar to those of the Afrikaner . In 1930 Dr. Daniel F. Malan,

who later became the head of the Nationalist Party and the firstprime minister of South Africa un der the aparth eid regime, also

outwardly supported Jewish equality; but at the same time, he

initiated the Immigration Quota Act to allow immigration only

from a select group of countries excluding those eastern Euro-

pean countries from which Jews most frequently immigrated.

Despite such voices, anti-Semitism rose at an alarming rate in both

Germany and South Africa during the 1930s. In fact, South African

anti-Semitism was directly related to th e an ti-Semitism an d perse-

cution policies in Germany. Because of the persecution of Jews in

Germany, there was a dramatic increase in the number of Jews

immigrating to South Africa from Germany. Many Afrikaners

noted th is increase with alarm, fearing that Jews would even tually

overpower Afrikaners economic and political con trol. Thus, with

the Immigration Quota Act, the govern men t seemed to legitimize

anti-Semitism,20

and anti-Semitism became an official policy of theAfrikaner Nation alist Par ty.

Several militan t Nazi-sympath izing organizations protested

the immigration of Jews into South Africa. One such gang was The

South African Grey Shirt Party, led by L.T. Weichardt, a South

African of German descent. The Grey Shirts became very active in

anti-Semitic protest against th e r ising n umbers of German Jewish

immigrants.21 These immigran ts formed 57.4% of the 6,295 Ger-

mans immigrating to South Africa from 1933-1936. Other Nazi

sympathizing organizations included the Boerenasie and the New

Order; all these were anti-Semitic, but the Grey Shirts were the

most vehemently anti-Semitic of these groups.22 Initially, the

Afrikaner Nationalist Party attempted to oppose the Grey Shirts

anti-Semitism, bu t the Party soon became involved in pressing for

a new restriction on immigration of Jews that went into effect on

November 1, 1936. Before th is new restriction went in to effect, theSS Stuttgart, a chartered ship, carr ied 600 German-Jewish refugees

to South Africa. A protest organized by the Grey Shirts met the ship

near the docks in Cape Town as a show of the force various militant

groups possessed. 23 In reaction to the SS Stuttgart incident, the


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Nationalist Party met n ear Stellenbosch University, a cen ter for

Afrikaner volkidentification. Here Dr. Hendrik Venvoerd, a Na-

tionalist Party member, and five other Stellenbosch professorspledged th emselves to pursue an end to all Jewish immigration.24

Verwoerd further pursued anti-Semitic policies by suggesting to

the government that it no longer give Jews any new trading

licenses.25 Verwoerd became even more ou tspoken on the subject

of anti-Semitism when , in 1937, he became ed itor ofDie Transvaler,

the newspaper published by the Nationalist Party of the Tran svaal

region, which provided a prominent voice on Party issues for

several decades. His first editorial was a caustic diatribe against

Jews.26

Afrikaners con tinued to pursue increasingly radical anti-

Semitic legislation throughout the late 1930s, keeping pace with

that of Nazi German y. In 1937, the Aliens Act created an Immi-

grant Selection Board to ensure assimilability among all immi-

grants. Although this act did not explicitly prohibit Jewish immi-

gration, Afrikaners often considered Jews non -assimilables andprevented them from immigrating.27 The ambiguities in the Aliens

Act caused the Nationalist Party to fight for a number of new

deman ds to prevent all Jewish immigration and thus minimize the

role of Jews in South Africa. These demands included the explicit

prohibition of all future Jewish immigration, the removal of

Yiddish as an approved European language for immigration

purposes, and prohibition of Jews and other non-assimilable

groups from joining certain professions.28 Following these de-

mands of the Nation alist Party, Eric Louw, later Foreign Minister ,

introduced another an ti-Semitic bill that strongly resembled Nazi

legislationthe Aliens Amendment an d Immigration Bill of 1939.

His bill was a means of suppressing all Jews. This bill suggested that

Jews threatened to overpower Protestants in the business world

and were innately cunning and manipulative, and th at Jews were

a dan ger to society. To support h is claim, Louw maintained th atJews were involved in the Bolshevik Revolution and therefore

intended to spread Communism worldwide. This bill defined Jews

as anyone with parents who were at least par tly Jewish regardless

of actual religious faith or practices. The majority Union Party


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however vehemently opposed and rejected this bill. Stuttaford,

then Minister of the Inter ior, remarked that the bill reminded h im

of the Inquisition du ring the Middle Ages, and J. H. Hofmeyer, aUnion Party member of Parliament, considered the bill even

worse in parts than Nazi rhetoric. Although the Aliens Amend-

ment and Immigration Bill failed, the fact that politicians intro-

duced such bills showed the extremes of South African anti-

Semitism in the 1930s.29

Many of the Jews who immigrated to South Africa adapted

more readily to urban life than the largely agrarian Afrikaners andwere generally better educated; subsequently, most Jews seemed

noticeably wealth ier th an Afrikaners. Afrikaners blamed th e Jews

for their own lack of wealth by branding them enemies of society

and of the Afrikaner in particular.30 Thus, by blaming Jews for

Afrikaner economic hardships and by seeking to prevent Jewish

immigration , Afrikaners found a scapegoat for their own difficulty

in adjusting to an urban, industrial society. This anti-Semitism

grew in its irrationality and contrad iction un til Afrikaners accusedJews of being both ruth less capitalists and subversive Commun ists.

A 1937 poster for the South African Nationalist Peoples Move-

ment read, We say: Down with the Jewish Communism! Down

with the exploiters of Democracy! Down with the exploiters of the

Trade Unions! Down with the Bolshevik agitators who want...to

satisfy their hatred of...Christian Afrikaners...Down with Judaism,

the enemy of the whole world!31 Dr. D.F. Malan, the incoming

leader of the Afrikaner Nationalist Party, voiced this slander in a

speech made on July 10, 1939: Behind the organized South

African Jewry stands organized world Jewry...They have robbed

the population of its heritage so that the Afrikaner lives in the land

of his father but no longer possesses it.32 Malan also voiced his

opinion that Jews should never comprise more than five percen t

of the population of any region. In add ition to an ti-Semitism from

the political arena, a committee within a synod of the DutchReformed Church concluded after much examination that the

Jews were not Gods chosen people as described in the Old

Testament. While the whole synod voted against accepting this

committee declaration, the introduction of such a claim revealed


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the extent of Afrikaner anti-Semitism at this time.33 This strong

attitude of anti-Semitism fed the ideological bond between

Afrikaners and Nazi German y. This, along with the con cepts of theAfrikaner volkand Christian-Nationalism, provided a firm foun da-

tion for the formation of strong, Nazi-sympathizing organizations.

The Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood) was the earli-

est conservative Afrikaner group which closely aligned itself with

Nazi Germany, and which was influential in the founding of

aparth eid in 1948. The Broederbond began as a fratern ity of men

devoted to the Afrikaner cause in 1918 and became a secretorganization in 1924. In 1918, a mob interrupted a Nationalist

Party gathering in Johan nesburg where Dr. D.F. Malan, then the

Party leader in Cape Town, was speaking. The mob vandalized the

Nationalist Club building and injured some of the Party members

attending the meeting. This disturbance left a deep impression

especially on three Afrikaner teenagers at this meetingH.J.

Klopper, H.W. van der Merwe, and Daniel H.C. du Plessiswho

met the following day to p ledge themselves to restore th e Afrikanerto h is rightful place in South Africa. On Jun e 5, 1918, these three

under the guidance of Rev. J.F. Naude of the Dutch Reformed

Church, held a meeting in du Plessis home. This meeting marked

the beginn ing of the Broederbond . The n ame of the organization

that th ey began with on ly eighteen members was Jong Suid-Afrika

(Young South Africa), bu t by 1920, the organ ization took the

name Afrikaner Broederbond, and considered itself a quasi-

religious organization for the purpose of promoting Afrikaner

unity and of allowing young nationalist-minded Afrikaners to

meet on e anoth er. Membership was open , and the Broederbond

strongly encouraged its 37 members to wear Broederbon d buttons

to distinguish themselves.34 However, the Broederbond did not

remain as open and harmless an organization as it began.

As the Broederbond grew, its nature changed and it

became increasingly exclusive by the late 1930s. Membership wasvery limited. In 1944, membership was about 2,674 with 8.6% of

these being public servants and 33.3% educators.35 The mission of

the Broederbond was to promote Afrikaner interests in every area.


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Its secretive, cult-like nature prevented the South African people

from realizing the full extent of the power of the Broederbond

until it had gained a firm grip on South African politics. TheBroederbond was the means by which the ideological ideas of

Afrikaner volkand Christian-Nationalism attempted to unify all

Afrikaners into a single force.36 In 1946, Senator Andrew Conroy,

the Minister of Lands and an ou tspoken anti-Broederbond mem-

ber of the United Party, estimated that the Broederbond had

strong influence over nine out of ten Dutch Reformed Church

congregations. Because of this and other allegations of

Broederbond involvement in the Dutch Reformed Church, the

Church launched an investigation of the Broederbond in 1949.

They reported that the Broederbond was a ben ign social organi-

zation open to all Afrikaans-speaking Protestan ts who were loyal to

South Africa. Many of the Broederbonds critics argued that

precisely the Broederbonds influence within the church had

secured a favorable, though fraudu lent, report.37

Just as its critics feared, the Broederbonds membershipwas not as open as the Dutch Reformed Churchs report alleged.

The Broederbond denied membership to J.B.M. Hertzog and J.C.

Smuts, both Afrikaans-speaking Protestants, for their willingness

to negotiate with Britain and for their refusal to den y the r ight of

English-speaking South Africans to participate in govern ment.38

Hertzog also denounced the Broederbond for their refusal to

negotiate with English-speaking South Africans and for hindering

his diplomatic efforts. The Broederbond countered by accusing

Hertzog of trying to increase his own political power by provoking

English-speaking South Africans to fear Afrikaners.39 Smuts con-

sidered the Broederbond a dan gerous organization but failed to

oppose it publicly for some time despite h aving the power granted

by the special War Measures Act of 1941 to do so. Accord ing to h is

Director of Military Intelligence, E. G. Malherbe, Smuts chose not

to expose the Broederbond because so many Broederbond mem-bers were Dutch Reformed Church ministers and teachers, profes-

sions for which Smuts had great respect. Smuts refused to oppose

the p ro-Nazi attitudes of un iversity students and professors except

in the case of those who committed civil crimes.40 Even tually Smuts


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yielded to the repeated counsel of his military intelligence who

believed that the th reat posed by the Broederbond was great. The

Broederbond became aware of Smuts plans for action in 1943 butallowed members to deal with Smuts coming ultimatum as each

saw fit. In 1944, Smuts demanded that all Broederbond members

who were public servants ( including teachers) resign either from

the Broederbond or from their public service positions. After th is

order, 1,094 Broederbond members resigned from th e organiza-

tion, but man y more resigned from their civil service position . Of

those who resigned from the Broederbond, 807 rejoined after

Smuts administration lost power to the Nationalist Party in the

1948 elections. Broederbond members gained much public sym-

pathy du ring this period for their loyalty to th e Afrikaner cause,41

while Smuts publicly denounced th e Broederbond as A dan ger-

ous, cunning, political Fascist organ isation .42 Broederbond mem-

bers responded by repeatedly denying Smuts allegations, and

claiming that the Broederbond was a benign cultural organiza-

tion.When the Broederbond began in 1918, it was not the

fascist organ ization that Smuts denounced in 1944, but with th e

rise of Nazi Germany, the link between the ideology of the

Broederbond and that of Nazi Germany grew. This link became

critical to the Broederbond with the 1934 visit of Graf von

Durckheim Montmartin, a representative of Nazi Germany.

Montmartin came to South Africa with the official intention of

attending a conference on education, but according to docu-

men ts confiscated during World War II at the German diplomacy

headquarters for the Union of South Africa, Hitler sent Montmartin

with the purpose of determining what support South Africa might

provide to Germany in th e n ew world order that Hitler en visioned .

Montmartin met secretly with top Broederbond leaders to discuss

how the Broederbond might be of service to this end. After this

meeting with Montmartin, the Broederbond reorganized itself toresemble the Nazi Party. One exception in th is new organ ization

was the Broederbonds use of the Dutch Reformed Church to

inspire nationalism and support of all Afrikaners, whereas Hitler


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had reverted to the symbols of Nordic mythology to provide a

competitive religious awe for the Nazi Party.43

Montmartins appeal emph asized the value of anti-British

propaganda as a means of secur ing South African support for Nazi

Germany and included another sphere of possible influence,

young South African scholars whom the Broederbond encour-

aged to study at German universities. One implementation of

Montmartin an d the Broederbonds strategy of anti-British p ropa-

ganda during World War II involved a radio station in Zeesen,

Germany that broadcast very clearly to South Africa, more clearlythan the British Broadcasting Company or any South African

radio stations. This radio station was very popular for its music

programs. After the popular music programs, a South African

teacher studying in Germany, Dr. Erik Holm, broadcast vehemen t

anti-British and anti-Semitic messages in Afrikaans to the listen ers

in South Africa. After the war, a South African cou rt found Holm

guilty of treason and imprisoned him, but when the Nationalist

Party came into power after the elections of 1948, the n ew govern -ment released Holm from prison after on ly serving one year of his

10-year sentence. Ironically, Holm later received an appointment

to the Department of Education.44 Influenced by Holms pro-

Nazism, newspapers open ly began to reflect Nazi sympathy before

and during the war. One example wasDie Transvaler, published by

Dr. Verwoerd, a Broederbond member. In addition to his anti-

Semitic editorials, Verwoerd expressed delight at Allied defeats

and much dismay in h is reports on Nazi losses. Such Broederbond

propaganda prompted much concern among government offi-

cials about the growing power of the organization as the tie

between the Broederbond and th e Nazi Party became evident to

those outside of the organization.45

Janie Malherbe, a South African captain of Military Intel-

ligence, realized the danger of Broederbonds close alliance with

the Nazi Party after Montmartins visit. She reported : This ter ri-fying octopus-like grip on the South African way of life was made

possible by reorganising the Broederbond on the pattern of

Hitlers highly successful Nazi state, complete with fuehrer,


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gauleiters, group an d cell leaders, spread in a sinister network over

the whole of South Africa.46 The Afrikaner Broederbond fol-

lowed the ideological and organizational patterns of the NaziParty and advocated support of the Nazi Germany under the

assumption that in Hitlers new world order, Hitler would give

Afrikaners independent ru le of South Africa as a reward for their

loyalty to and support of Nazism.

In 1939, while th e Broederbond was growing in strength

and World War II was underway, Afrikaner conservatives who

wanted violently to pursue Afrikaner con trol of South Africa led anew military-minded organization, the Ossewa Brandwag (liter-

ally Brigade of Ox-wagon Sentinels, referring to the p ioneering

Voortrekkers). Colonel J.C.C. Laas, a former military officer

inten sely loyal to the Afrikaner volkand the Voortrekker heritage,

founded the Ossewa Brandwag to promote Afrikaner heritage, but

the organization quickly grew into a popular military movemen t.

Laas led the O ssewa Brandwag from February 1939 un til the rapid

growth of the organization expanded beyond h is managing capa-bilities, prompting his resignation in October 1940.47 After Laas

stepped down from the leadership, the Ossewa Brandwag became

more militant in nature under the leadership of Dr. Hans van

Rensburg. As the national leader, he h ad the title Comman dan t-

General, and local leaders became generals.

The Ossewa Brandwag, like the Broederbond, supported

Nazi Germany.48

The group strongly opposed the efforts of Smutsand his army to support the British; its opposition posed a signifi-

cant threat because the Ossewa Brandwag had more members

than Smuts army.49 The groups Nazi sympathy became clear

when it printed its constitution in German Gothic type and when

it chose an eagle, the emblem of the Nazi Reichstag, as its

emblem.50 The Ossewa Brandwag opposed the growth of urban

areas using the Dutch Reformed Churchs doctrine of British-

Jewish capitalism.51 A cartoon from the Afrikaner nationalistnewspaper,Die Burger, opposed the alleged control of the British

market system by Jewish professionals. The cartoon pictured an

exaggeratedly rotund, greedy Jew riding on the shoulders of a


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gaunt Smuts and Hertzog, and it suggested that wealthy Jews

controlled the pro-British government.52 Some Afrikaners ex-

pressed the opinion that Jews, in league with the British, deviouslyworked to increase their wealth and power at the expense of

hardworking Afrikaners who steadfastly did th eir best to survive in

a harsh world. To many, it appeared that the British and th e Jews

oppressed the Afrikaners; Afrikaners could free themselves by

supporting Nazi Germany, which promised to destroy both groups.

The Ossewa Bran dwag became increasingly Nazi-oriented .

They formed the Stormjaers (stormtroopers), who were a secre-tive part of the Ossewa Brandwag composed mostly of police

officers. The Stormjaers threatened and attacked anyone who was

not as conservative as they, including Nationalist Party leaders

such as Dr. Hen drik Verwoerd . The Stormjaers considered them-

selves to be acting for the best interests of the Ossewa Bran dwag

but may not have always acted under the direct orders of the

group.53 The violence of the Stormjaers demonstrated the grave

dan ger the O ssewa Brandwag posed as it sought to create a fasciststate.

J.C. Smuts, while hesitant to confront the Broederbond,

nonetheless opposed the Ossewa Brandwag with much fervor as

the type of organization that brought Hitler to power in Germany

and that might have the capability to bring a similar leader to

power in South Africa.54 His criticism was not without justification;

the Ossewa Brandwag was evidence of the growth of Nazi sympathyand dedication to Afrikaner supremacy in South Africa. Rev. J. D.

Vorster , one general in th e Ossewa Bran dwag, a Nationalist Party

leader, and a future Nationalist prime minister, expressed the

rapidly changing opinions of many who became increasingly

right-wing. In 1934, Vorster denounced Fascism and Nazism in

par ticular bu t after h e became an Assistant-hoof Komman dan t in

the Ossewa Brandwag, he expressed his admiration of Hitler and

his desire for a South Africa in which only Afrikaners had wealthand political powerall Jews expelled from the country, and

democratic elections terminated.55 Vorster h oped for a n ew South

African govern ment where, the Afrikaner will no longer cooper-


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ate with the Englishman. He will make the conditions and the

Englishman will be compelled to submit.56 Vorster spoke to the

Afrikaner Nationalist Studentebond, th e youth wing of the OssewaBrandwag, saying, Hitlers Mein Kampfshows the way to great-

nessthe path of South Africa. Hitler gave the Germans

a...fanaticism which causes them to stand back for no one. We

must follow his example because only by such holy fanaticism can

the Afrikaner nation achieve its calling.57 Because the violent

nature of Vorsters opinions threatened th e govern ments stabil-

ity, Smuts jailed Vorster along with some other Ossewa Brandwag

members dur ing much of World War II.58

Vorsters desire for a new South African govern ment an d

for the expulsion of Jews from South Africa was a common desire

throughout the O ssewa Brandwag. The group assured its mem-

bers that, the man with a crooked nose [is] the danger to the

country.59 In 1940, the Afrikaner Nationalist Studentebond, the

youth wing of the Ossewa Brandwag, acted upon the groups

desire for a n ew government and issued a Freedom Manifesto asa promise on the part of the youth to fight to overthrow the

parliamentary government and establish a Christian-Nationalist

govern men t under an elected d ictator. This plan included a state-

controlled press, a state education system with Christian-Nation al-

ist principles, and Afrikaans as the official language of South

Africa. While th is document n ever explicitly mentioned Nazism,

the government described was very similar to th e d ictatorship in

Nazi Germany.60

In September 1940, the newspaper, Die Suiderstem, pub-

lished Constitution from the Christian-Nationalist Republic as

the Ossewa Bran dwags plan for a new governmen t. This govern-

ment was viewed byDie Suiderstem as a Nazi state with only a few

changes such as the title of the dictator being president instead of

fueh rer, and the basis of the govern men t being Christian-Nation-

alist rather than Nation al-Socialist.61 During the same mon th, theCape Timespublished an article asserting that the Ossewa Brandwag

was in the process of arranging a coup to establish a Christian-

Nationalist dictatorship. This report claimed that there were


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Ossewa Brandwag members in important positions in public

service, the police force, and virtually every major private industry

such as mining and railroads who were ready to act upon thecommand of the group to assist in a coup designed to exile all Jews

and subject all British South Africans to Afrikaner control.62 In the

same year, the Ossewa Brandwag issued a similar plan for a new

South Africa with its Declaration on the Boer Republic. This new

government was to be a compilation of the governments of the

initial Boer Republics with many elements of Nazi government

and some aspects of other govern ments including that of Mussolini

in Italy. This govern ment called for a head of state with unlimited

power who would support the concentration of power and wealth

in th e hands of Afrikaners and discrimination against all English-

speakers.63

However, this republic never had a chance to become

more than an idea because with the Allies complete victory over

the Nazis in 1945, the Ossewa Bran dwag lost much of its support

and its members dispersed. Many joined the Nationalist Party,which grew in power during th is transition . Some Ossewa Brandwag

members formed another minor Fascist organization, but its

membership and influence were very small.64 The postwar era saw

the rapid growth of the Nationalist Party un til it won a majority in

1948 and began the system of apartheid.

The Nationalist Party that began in 1914 un der the leader-

ship of J.B.M. Hertzog grew steadily from its foun ding to WorldWar II, but it experienced its greatest growth un der Dr. D. F. Malan

dur ing World War II and immediately after the war, especially with

the collapse of the Ossewa Brandwag and other fascist groups.

During the growth of Afrikaner n ationalism in th e early 1930s, the

Nationalist Party un der Hertzog did not actively pu rsue indepen-

dence from Britain. The Nationalist Party thereby gave up the

relative freedom and autonomy of South Africa within the British

Empire for th is radical step for complete independen ce.65 WhenHertzog united with Smuts to form the United Party in 1933,

Malan assumed leadership of the Nationalist Party which began to

pursue a more radical path. At the apogee of Nazi Germanys


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power, the Nationalist Party attempted to maintain an official

position of neutrality between Britain an d Nazi German y because

it was an official political party in th e South Africa parliament andtherefore did not want to allow the pro-Nazi, radical Afrikaners to

sway its policy or to p reven t it from being able to work with the pro-

British government under Smuts. Although it did not go so far as

to declare open support of Nazi Germany, the Nationalist Party

did change its primary objective. No longer did it promote equal

political participation between Afrikaans-speaking and English-

speaking South Africans. Rather, its new priority was that of

establishing an indepen den t Afrikaner republic. The Nationalist

Party attempted to distinguish between its support of the Afrikaner

republic based on the doctrine of Christian-Nationalism, as the

will of God, and its opposition to Nazism. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd

vowed, The Afrikaner will have as little to do with German

National Socialism as with British imperialism...he will be as little

a tool of Hitler as of Chamberlain.66

Despite the official position of supporting the Afrikanerand not the Nazi, man y members of the Nationalist Party openly

supported Nazi Germany. Even Hertzog expressed his distrust of

a majority-ruled, democratic, free-market society with a free press

in favor of a new world order of Christian-Nationalism and

National Socialism.67 During the course of World War II, the

Nationalist Party published four documents that demonstrated

the extent of the Nationalist Partys Nazi support and the influ-

ence of the Ossewa Brandwag and other militant groups.68 Otto du

Plessis, the Nationalist Partys Secretary of Information , wrote the

first of these documents in 1940. In a pamph let entitled The New

South AfricaThe Revolution of the Twentieth Centuryhe heralded the

new place South Africa would have in the Nazis new world order.69

This document supported an Afrikaner state affirming, The

philosophy at the basis of the new order...is undiluted and un-

equivocal nationalism.70

Du Plessis fur ther argued,Afrikanerdom...has, under th e imported British system, not known

full political, economic, and social freedom. It consequently pines

for the new system of a new order, which would br ing with it true

national freedom in all spheres of life.71 In his plan, Du Plessis


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cited Germany as a model for this new order an d wanted Afrikaner

nationalism to imitate that of Germany, where Every German

must be small so that Germany can be great.72 The Nationalist

Party supported this extreme nationalism believing that it would

elevate the country at the expense of the ruth less foreign capital-

ist. The Ossewa Brandwag supported the Nationalist Partys

position in th is document by pattern ing several of its own docu-

ments after The New South AfricaThe Revolution of the Twentieth

Century.73 In 1941 Dr. Malan, the Nationalist Party leader, further

revealed the pro-Nazi stance of the Nationalist Party when he

wrote The Republican Order: Future Policy as Set Out by Dr. Malan.74

This document showed fewer parallels to the govern ment of Nazi

Germany than Du Plessis The New South Africa. Rather, The Repub-

lican Orderdescribed the political structure of the Boer republics

as a un iquely Afrikaner model of govern ment. This documen t did

link itself to Nazi Germany by its mentioning the expectation that

through its victory in World War II, Germany would drive the

British out of South Africa.75

Malan formed a strategic rather th anideological tie with Germany in his The Republican Order, but he

strengthened this tie in 1942 with his ideological Draft for a

Republic. The Christian-Nationalist republic that Malan described

in th is documen t had a presiden t with unlimited powers, directly

and only responsible to God.76 The p residen t had the power to

control and dismiss Parliament and his Cabinet, to declare war

and control the military, to control the economy, to prevent

competition, and to censor the press. Critics accused Malan ofsupporting Hitlers pure race concepts because he specified,

Each coloured group...will be segregated , not only as regards to

place of dwelling...but also with regard to sph eres of work.77 Th e

Eastern Province Herald, a pro-British newspaper, claimed in an

editorial published on January 24, 1942, that Malans document

Borrowed from Mussolini for his group system, Goebbles on the

matter of press and radio control and propaganda generally, Hitler

in respect of the arbitrary, all-embracing, over-riding powers of the

Fuehrer-President, ...[and] Mr. Pirows new order study group for

various odds and ends dictated by an earnest desire to steal their

synth etic thunder.78


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A fourth important publication by the Nationalist Party

during World War II was its 1944The Social and Economic Policy of the

Nationalist Party. This documen t maintained that all major aspects

of South African economics should be controlled by the state

through a Central Economics Coun cil to ensure the stability of the

economy and limit competition in all sectors. This plan con cluded

with the proud assertion, Our whole econ omic life will be con -

trolled by the Cen tral Economics Council. All key industries will be

controlled by the State...[This is] the sensible way of a con trolled

economic system within the framework of a national govern ment.

This is the way to th e New Order in th e Free Republic of South

Africa.79 This publication was the last of the documents of the

Nationalist Party that borrowed heavily from Nazi Germany. After

this point in th e war, German ys imminen t defeat weakened an y

bon d that Afrikaners wanted to claim with her. In 1945, the Ossewa

Brandwag and other militant pro-Nazi groups disbanded when

the Allies had completely defeated Nazi Germany.

The fascist documents that the Nationalist Party and oth erorganizations such as the Ossewa Brandwag published during

World War II represented th e more conservative en d of Afrikaner

political opinion. Other more moderate groups supported South

African neutrality in the war, aiding neither Britain nor German y,

while the most conservative Afrikaners supported Britain with

only minimal reservations. Because Afrikaner sentiment covered

this wide spectrum, World War II caused great division and

fragmentation of the Afrikaners. After the war, many of these

splintered groups joined the Nationalist Party, which became less

militant in its quest for fascism and refocused on its original

purpose, the elevation of the Afrikaner.80 In general, this postwar

period was a time of un ification of the many Afrikaner factions that

were splintered by World War II. The influence of the members of

the Ossewa Brandwag, who joined the Nationalist Party after their

organization collapsed in 1945, prevented the Nationalist Partyfrom becoming overly passive or conciliatory. Nonetheless, the

Party knew that it no longer had support for the totalitarian

governmen t described in its The New South AfricaThe Revolution

of the Twentieth Century and MalansDraft for a Republic. Still the


22/30


influence of Nazism remained as it had provided a foundation

upon which many of the Nationalist Party leaders built their

political beliefs and policies. Even when Nazism collapsed, the

seed of its ideology remained buried in the ideology of the

Nationalist Party. All of the new leaders had been members of the

Broederbond, and some had been members of the Ossewa

Brandwag. The men who would become the leaders of the apart-

heid regime d id not repudiate the ideology of Nazism; rather, they

adap ted their political positions on ly enough to win power in the

post-World War II South Africa.

With the adven t of the post-World War II world, Afrikaners

felt threatened by the new spirit of liberalism introduced by the

Allies in the Atlantic declaration an d the U.N. Charter of Human

Rights. The increasing numbers of black laborers who were mov-

ing into the cities to find work also seemed to th reaten conserva-

tive Afrikaners when man y of these laborers embraced the grow-

ing Communist Party as a way to oppose their harsh working

conditions. The Communist influen ce on black laborers culmi-nated in a widespread strike among mine workers in 1946 that

further frightened Afrikaners who recognized Communism as a

threat to their livelihood. The African Mine Workers Union

organized th is strike of between 75,000 and 100,000 black mine

workers who worked in extremely dan gerous conditions for less

than a ten th of the pay of white workers. The strike on ly lasted a

week before the government violently forced workers back to th e

mines, yet it affected more th an 30 mines.81 The liberal post-war

doctrines and th e mineworkers strike encouraged Afrikaners to

retreat to a position of isolation from the new intellectual curren ts

abroad.82 Opposition to Smuts as pr ime minister grew during this

period. Smuts was reviled for leading South African troops to the

aid of the Allies and for intern ing some of the most conservative

Afrikaner nationalists ( such as Rev. J.D. Vorster ) , which reminded

Afrikaners of the British concentration camps in which manyBoers died during the Second Boer War.83

After 1945, the concepts of the Afrikaner volkand Chris-

tian-Nationalism became increasingly central to the Afrikaner


23/30


cause as Afrikaners became more un ified in their work toward pro-

Afrikaner ru le. The concepts of the volkand of Christian-Nation-

alism directly aided Afrikaner unity and effor ts towards auton omy,whereas concepts of Nazism or totalitarian governments, while

embraced by many Afrikaners, also divided the Afrikaners. The

concepts ofvolkand Christian-Nationalism had origins in Hegels

and Fichtes German nationalism and in the Dutch Reformed

Churchs bran d of Calvinism, both of which preceded the rise of

Nazi Germany. They did not lose validity by the end of World War

II. Increasing numbers of Afrikaners believed like Dr. D.F. Malan

that the purity of the Afrikaner volkdepended on the prevention

of intermarrying with other races and that without a rigid system

of separation of the races intermarrying would occur and the

Afrikaner race would lose some of its poten cy in its unique work of

fulfilling the will of God.84 Accordingly, the Nationalist Party

founded the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs in 1947 to

oppose th e South Africa Institute of Race Relations which man y

Nationalists considered too liberal and pro-British. Some Afrikanersderogatively referred to it as the English Institute. This organ iza-

tion was responsible for the development of the theory of apart-

heid and for the implementation of it after the Nationalist victory

in 1948.85 On e Broederbond member and former Ossewa Brandwag

general, Stellenbosch Professor G. Cronje, wrote in hisVoogdyskap

en Apartheid, The Christian standpoint boils down to the belief

that it is Gods will that there should be a variety of races, volks, and

cultures, and...the glorification an d maintenance of such variety,regarded from a Christian viewpoint, is justified an d moreover can

be taken as obedience to the will of God.86 Thus, the official

standpoint of the Dutch Reformed Church, the largest religious

denomination among Afrikaners, seemed to support a national

plan of segregation . Malan, who h ad been a minister p rior to h is

en try into the political realm, remarked that while establishing a

system of segregation is not under the jurisdiction of the church,

the govern men t should pay close atten tion to th e Churchs guide-

lines in the establishment of such a system. He meant that govern -

mental policies regarding race must stress separation .87


24/30


Aware of the growing desire among Afrikaners for an

institutionalized system of segregation , Malan led the Nationalist

Party on a platform of apartheid in the elections of 1948.88 Th e

Broederbond was active in the elections of 1948 with at least 60

Nationalist Party candidates known to be members, including

Malan who became prime minister. One of the candidates was

W.C. du Plessis who had served as a South African diplomat but

resigned when Smuts ordered in 1944 that no public servants

could be Broederbond members. The fact that du Plessis reen-

tered the political sph ere in the same election in which Smuts lost

power demonstrated the change of the political climate in South

Africa.89 In the final count, the Nationalist Party, with its political

ally, the much smaller Havengas Afrikaner Party, won 79 of the

150 seats in parliament. The two parties had each received a

plurality, not a majority, of all the votes cast.90 The alliance of these

two Afrikaner parties revealed the unification of all Afrikaners

after World War II to fight for political power, but their victory did

not represent the true will of the electorate that had cast 140,000more votes for the parties in opposition to the allied Nationalist

Party and Havengas Afrikaner Party than for this apartheid

platform.91 This election marked the beginning of apartheid in

South Africa. Under Malans leadership, the Nationalist Party

legislated th e complete separation of whites from non-whites ( that

had already been in practice) but also introduced th e separation

of one non-white group from another.

The Broederbond was influential in these first years of

apar theid by establishing the Institute for Christian-National Edu-

cation and th e Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Organizations as

well as by obtaining from th e Dutch Reformed Church a doctrinal

justification of apar theid.92 In 1948, the Federation of Afrikaans

Cultural Organizations published Christian-National Education Poli-

cies that outlined the principles the new government should

maintain to ensure that schools were, places where our childrenare soaked and nourished in the Christian-National spiritual

cultural stuff of our nation.93 The document included instruc-

tion on proposed teaching methods intended to provide an

education steeped in Christian-Nationalism, and it concluded


25/30


with the Afrikaner position on education of non-whites that

represented the emph asis on white supremacy in the new Nation-

alist government. Article 14Instruction and Education ofColoureds affirmed, We believe th at the instruction of Coloured

people should be regarded as a subdivision of the vocation and

task of the Afrikaner to Christianize the non-European by the

European, and par ticularly by the Afrikaner.94 The final section

of this document, Article 15The Teaching and Education of

Natives, professed white supremacy even more emphatically: We

believe that the education and task of white South Africa with

respect to th e n ative is to Christianize h im...and this vocation and

task has foun d its immediate application and task in the principles

of trusteeship, no[ t] placing of the native on the level of the white,

and in segregation.95 Thus, the new South African government

implemen ting aparth eid relied heavily on the p rinciples of Chris-

tian-Nationalism.

Despite the reliance of the Nationalist governmen t on the

concepts of Christian-Nationalism and the Afrikaner volk, th einfluence of Nazism remained within the Nationalist Party pr ima-

rily through the continued control of the governmen t by members

of the Broederbond. All pr ime ministers and most major political

leaders during the apartheid era were members of the

Broederbond. Through its secret nature, the Broederbond re-

tained much of its right-wing ideology during the period between

the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Nationalist Party victory in

1948. The leaders of South Africa after 1948 no longer espoused

Nazism as they had during World War II, but they had come to

their political and intellectual maturity un der the shadow of Nazi

Germany and had devoted years of their lives to the fur theran ce of

its ideology. Thus, a strain of the infamous regime that terrorized

Europe in the first half of the twentieth century persisted to

control South Africa for th e second h alf of the cen tury.


26/30


Endnotes

1

Charles Bloomberg, Christian-Nationalism and the Riseof the Afrikaner Broederbu nd in South Africa, 1918-1948

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989) pp. xix-xx; see

also William Henry Vatcher, Jr., White Laager: The Rise of

Afrikaner Nationalism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,

Publishers, 1965) pp. 3-42 David Nash, The Boer War and its Humanitarian

Critics, History Tod ay 49 (June 1999) p. 42, found using

InfoTrac Web: Stud ent Edition .3

Ibid., p. 34 Ivor Wilkins and H ans Strydom, The Broederbond ( New

York: Paddington Press, 1979)5 Ibid., pp . 37-386 Ibid., p. 367 Bloomberg, p. 1838 Kenneth Ingh am, Jan Christian Smuts: the Conscience of

a South African (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986) p. 1189 Bloomberg, p. 183

10

Vatcher, p. 6311 Bloomberg, p. 13712 Ibid., p. 13613 Bloomberg, p. 16214 Vatcher, p. 6015 Brian Bun ting, The Rise of the South African Reich

(Penguin Africa Library, 1969, Available as ebook at http:/ /

www.anc.org.za/ books/ reich.html) ch. 4. p. 2 of 1216 Ibid., p. xx17

Bloomberg, pp. 100-10118 Ibid., p. xxi19 Ibid., p. 10020 Bun ting, ch. 4, p. 2 of 1221 Vatcher, p. 6422 Bunting, ch. 4, pp. 3-4 of 1223 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 3 of 1224 Ibid., ch. 4, pp. 3-4 of 1225 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 3 of 1226

Vatcher, p. 6127 Bun ting, ch. 4, p. 4 of 1228 Ibid., ch. 4, p. 5 of 1229 Ibid., ch. 4, pp. 4-5 of 1230 Vatcher, p. 61


27/30


31 Ibid., p. 6232 Ibid., p. 6133

Ibid., pp . 61, 6334 Wilkins, pp. 44-4635 Bun ting, ch. 3 p. 3 of 836 Bloomberg, p . xxii37 Bun ting, ch. 3, p. 3 of 838 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 2 of 839 Ibid., ch. 3, p. 2 of 840 Wilkins, pp. 78-7941 Ibid., pp . 82-8442

Bunting, ch. 3, pp. 2-3 of 8; see also Wilkins, p. 8343 Bunting, ch. 3, pp. 1-2; see also Wilkins, pp. 76-7744 Wilkins, pp. 77-7845 Ibid., p. 7746 Bunting, ch. 3 pp. 1-2 of 847 Bloomberg, p. 16348 Ibid., pp . 161-16249 Wilkins, p. 7750 There is also some evidence that th e organization used a

swastika as a symbol of its power and prestige, bu t th at is notcertain. Vatcher , p. 66

51 Bloomberg, p. 16252 Vatcher, p. 6153 There are no clear records of any orders the Ossewa

Brandwag issued to th e Stormjaers probably because the grou p

did n ot wish any record of its respon sibility for acts of violence.

Bloomberg, p. 16654 Ibid., p. 16855

Ibid ., p. 167; see also Wilkins, pp . 77-7856 Vatcher, p. 6357 Ibid., p. 6358 Wilkins, pp. 77-7859 Vatcher, p. 6560 Bloomberg, pp. 165-166; see also Wilkins, pp. 256-25761 Vatcher, p. 6662 Ibid., p. 6663 Bloomberg, p. 16764

Ibid., pp . 201-20265 Ingham, p. 18266 Bloomberg, p. 16567 Bunting, ch. 4, pp . 1-2 of 8


28/30


My sources differed on the exten t to which they considered

the Nationalist Party to be sympathetic to the Nazis perhaps as

the result of the desire of the auth ors to present the NationalistParty in e ither a positive or negative light. Whatever the official

platform of the Party, most members were pro-Nazi as

dem onstrated by Nationalist Party publications during the war.68 This evidence of a radical faction within the Nationalist

Party causes a minority of scholars to con sider the Ossewa

Brand wag as no thing more than a radical branch of the

Nationalist Party. Kenneth Ingham suggested th is in h is

favorable biography on Smuts perhaps to min imize the degree

of opposition that Smuts faced. Ingham, p. 213; see alsoVatcher, p. 68

69 Bloomberg, p. 16570 Vatcher, p. 6971 Ibid., p. 6972 Ibid., p. 6973 Ibid., pp. 68-6974 Most branches of the Nationalist Party published this

document without its subtitle. The Transvaal bran ch of the

Party added the subtitle when it published th e documen t.75 Vatcher, p. 7076 Ibid., pp. 70-7277 Ibid., p. 7378 Ibid., p. 7379 Ibid., p. 7380 Bloomberg, pp. 202-20381 M.P. Naicker, The African Miners Strike of 1945, from

Notes and Documents, No. 21/ 76. Sept. 1976 http :/ /

www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/ history/ misc/ miners.html ( 1 July2003)

82 Ibid., pp. 202, 20483 Wilkins, p. 8084 D.F. Malan, person al letter, 12 February 195485 Vatcher, p. 15186 Bloomberg, pp. 203, 20587 Malan, letter88 Bloomberg, pp. 203-20489

Bun ting, ch. 3, p. 390 Bloomberg, p. 20591 Ibid., p. 20592 Ibid., p. 20893 Vatcher, p. 289


29/30


94 Ibid., p. 30095 Ibid., p. 300

Bibliography

Bloomberg, Char les, Christian Nationalism and the Rise of

the Afrikaner Broederbund in South Africa, 1918-1948

Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1989

Bunting, Brian, The Rise of the South African Reich

Penguin Africa Library, 1969, available as an ebook at http:/ /www.anc.org.za/ books/ reich.html

Ingh am, Kenneth , Jan Chr istian Smuts: the Conscience of a

Sou th African New York: St. Martins Press, 1986

Malan, Daniel F., Personal letter, 12 February 1954 (no

source given)

Naicker, M.P., The African Miners Strike of 1945, fromNotes and Documents, No. 21/ 76, Sept. 1976 http :/ /

www.anc.org.za/ ancdocs/ history/ misc/ miners.html ( 1 July

2003)

Nash, David, The Boer War and its Humanitarian Critics,

History Today 49 (June 1999): 42, found using InfoTrac Web:

Student Edition

Vatcher, William Henry, Jr., White Laager: The Rise ofAfrikaner Nationalism New York: Frederick A. Praeger ,

Publishers, 1965

Wilkins, Ivor, and H ans Strydom, The Broederbond New

York: Paddington Press, 1979


30/30


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