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The Development of Epistemology and Logic in the Old Nyaya and the Buddhist School Of Epistemology with an annoteted translation of Dharmakirti's Pramana Vartitka II ( Pramana Siddhi ) VV. 1-7 by Vittorio A. Van Biljert

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Page 1: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority
Page 2: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority
Page 3: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

WSTB 20

Page 4: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

WIENER STUDIEN

ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE

HERAUSGEGEBEN VON

ERNST STEINKELLNER

HEFT 20

WIEN 1989

ARBEITSKREIS FUR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIENUNIVERSITAT WIEN

Page 5: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

VITTORIO A. VAN BIJLERT

EPISTEMOLOGY AND SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC IN THEOLD NYAYA AND THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL OF EPISTEMOLOGY

WITH AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF DHARMAKIRTI'SPRAMANAVARTTIKA II (PRAMANASIDDHI) W . 1-7

WIEN 1989

ARBEITSKREIS FUR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIENUNIVERSITAT WIEN

Page 6: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

Preis: OS 230,-

zu beziehen von:

Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische StudienMaria Theresien-Stra|3e 3/4/26, 1090 Wien, Austria

Page 7: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

PREFACE

This book was previously brought out as a PhD-thesis entitled

"The Buddha as a Means of valid Cognition". Originally it had

been my intention to add new findings to this edition, findings

concerning the beginnings of Indian epistemology and logic, such

as are found scattered in various texts antedating the Nyaya

Sutra, as well as further discussion on the interpretation of

Buddhist logic. But certain technical problems and the bulk and

nature of the new material prevented me from adding much to the

present text. They will appear in a separate publication.

Printing errors have been corrected as far as possible, although

I am sure that some have escaped notice, for which I ask the

indulgence of the reader. Certain numberings in the index will at

first sight seem rather erratic, this is due to technical

problems, but if the numbering is read in a specific mathematical

order, the text-place can be easily found.

It remains for me to express my gratitude especially to the

following persons who have contributed greatly to the making of

this book: Dr. T.E. Vetter, Dr. J.C. Heesterman, Leiden, and

Dr. E. Steinkellner, Dr. G. Oberhammer and their pupils, Vienna,

for their scholarly comments on my translations and interpreta-

tion of certain passages; Mrs. Upinder Singh, Delhi, for checking

my English; Mr. T. Meindersma, Groningen, for having been a

willing victim of my classes on Indian epistemology and logic,

the firm Tekstyle, Amsterdam for typesetting this book, and

lastly my grandmother for her encouragement.

The Hague, 1988 V.A. van Bijlert

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Page 9: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

Table of Contents

Abbreviations

Introduction

Notes

VII

IX

XIX

XXII

CHAPTER I The Beginnings of Systematic

Epistemology and Logic

1.1 The highest Good

1.2 The theory of knowledge, the

four Means of Valid Cognition

1.3 Perception

1.4 Inference

1.5 Comparison based on analogy

1.6 Reliable Statement

1.7 The Syllogism

1.8 Trustworthiness of the Speaker

Notes

CHAPTER II Buddhist Epistemology and Logic

before Dharmakirti

2.1 Vasubandhu

2.2 Perception

2.3 Inference

2.4 The Syllogism

2.5 Dignaga

2.6 The two objects of knowledge

2.7 Perception

2.8 Pramana and its

Result are not different

2.9 Inference for oneself

2.10 The syllogism

2.11 Reliable statement

Notes

11

4

7

10

15

16

20

30

35

45

45

45

48

50

54

55

58

62

64

70

80

83

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VIII

CHAPTER III Dharmakirti's Logic 93

3.1 The utility of Inference 93

3.2 A compendious definition

of the Probans 94

3.3 Effect as Probans 99

3.4 Essential property as Probans 101

3.5 Non-perception as Probans 102

3.6 Four kinds of Non-perception 104

3.7 The DrstSnta 107

Notes 111

CHAPTER IV The Pramana-definitions of the

Pramlfnasiddhi chapter of PV, vv 1-7 115

lab 120

lcb 125

led 130

2 132

3ab 140

2bd 141

4ac 146

4d-5a 147

5b 149

5c 150

5d-6a 153

6bc 155

Index 181

Page 11: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

IX

Abbreviations

AKBh Abhidharmakosabhasyam of Vasubandhu, ed.

by P. Pradhan, Patna 1975, Tibetan

Sanskrit Works Series vol. VIII

Burrow 1980 Burrow, T. , Sanskrit Ma- 'to ascertain1,

Transactions of the Philological Society,

Oxford 1980, p. 135-140

Chakrabarti 1977 Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar, The Logic of

Gotama, The University Press of Hawaii,

19 77, Monograph No. 5 of the Society for

Asian and Comparative Philosophy

Chemparathy 1983 Chemparathy, G. , l'Autorite du Veda selon

les Nyaya-Vaisesikas, Louvain-La-Neuve

1983

- Derge edition

DhP Dharmottarapradipa of Durvekamisra,

being a subcommentary on Dharmottara's

Nyayabindutlka, ed. by Dalsukhbhai

Malvania, Patna 19712, Tibetan Sanskrit

Works Series, vol. II

DvNC II Dvadasaram Nayacakram of Acarya SrT

Mallavadi Ksamasramana with the commentary

Nyayagamanusarini of Sri Simhasuri Gani

Vadi Ksamasramana; part II, ed. by Muni

Jambuvijaya-jT, Sri Jain Atmanand

Sabha-Bhavnagar, 1976, §ri Atmananda Jain

Granthamala Serial No. 94

Frauwallner 1933 Frauwallner, E., Zu den Fragmenten

buddhistischer Logiker im Nyayavarttikam,

WZKM 40, 1933, p. 281-304

Page 12: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

Frauwallner 1935 Frauwallner, E. , Beitrage zur Apohalehre,

WZKM 42, 1935, p. 93-102

Frauwallner 1954 Frauwallner, E. , Die Reihenfolge und

Entstehung der Werke Dharmaklrti's,

Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller, Leipzig

1954, p. 142-154

Frauwallner 1957 Frauwallner, E. , Vasubandhu's Vadavidhih

WZKSO 1, 1957, p. 104-146

Frauwallner 1957a Frauwallner, E. , Review of the edition of

PVBh in JAOS 77, 1957, p. 58-60

Frauwallner 1959 Frauwallner, E. , Dignaga, sein Werk und

seine Entwicklung, WZKSO 3, 1959,

p. 83-164

Frauwallner 1960 Frauwallner, E., Devendrabuddhi, WZKSO 4,

1960, p. 119-123

Frauwallner 1961 Frauwallner, E. , Landmarks in the History

of Indian Logic, WZKSO 5, 1961, p. 125-148

Frauwallner Gesch II - Frauwallner, E. , Geschichte der Indischen

Philosophie, II. Band, Otto Mtiller Verlag,

Salzburg 1956

Goekoop 19 67 The Logic of the invariable concommitance

in the Tattvacintamani, Reidel, Dordrecht

1967

GOS - Gaekwad Oriental Series

Gupta 1962 Gupta, B. , Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der

Nyayamanjarl, Bonn 1962

Page 13: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XI

Hattori 1968 Dignaga, On Perception, being the

Pratyaksapariccheda of Dignaga's

Pramanasamuccaya, transl. and ann. by

Masaaki Hattori, Harvard University Press,

Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968

Hayes 1980 Hayes, Richard P., Difinaga' s Views on

Reasoning (Svarthanumlna), JlPh 8, 1980,

p. 219-277

IIJ - Indo-Iranian Journal

JAOS - Journal of the American Oriental Society

JBORS The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa

Research Society

JlPh

Katsura 1975

Katsura 1984

- Journal of Indian Philosophy

- Katsura, Shoryu, New Sanskrit Fragments of

the PramSnasamuccaya, JlPh 3, 1975,

p. 67-78

- Katsura, Shoryu, Dharmaklrti's theory of

truth, JlPh 12, 1984, p. 215-235

Kitagawa 19 65 Kitagawa, Hidenori, Indo koten ronrigaku

no kenkyu: Jinna (Dignaga) no taikei,

Kyoto 1965 (The book contains an edition

of the Tibetan translations of PS,

Sanskrit fragments, and a Japanese

translation.)

Kneale Kneale, W. and Kneale, M., The Development

of Logic, Clarendon Press. Oxford 1978

Page 14: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XII

Lindtner 1980 Lindtner, Christian, Apropos Dharmakirti -

Two new Works and a new Date, Acta

Orientalia 41, 1980, p. 27-37

Nagatomi 1959 Nagatomi, M. , The Framework of the

Pramanavarttika Book I, JAOS 79, 1959,

p. 263-266

Nagatomi 1967/1968 Nagatomi, M. , Arthakriya, The Adyar

Library Bulletin, No. 31-32, ly67-1968,

p. 52-72

NB - see DhP

NBh The Nyayadarsana of Gotama with the BhSsya

of Vatsyayana, ed. by Padmaprasada Sa"strl

and Harirama Sukla, Varanasi 19833, Kashi

Sanskrit Series 43

ND Nyayadarsanam, with Vatsyayana fs BhcEsya,

Uddyotakara's Varttika, Vacaspati Misra's

Tatparyatlka and Visva-natha1s Vrtti, ed.

by Taranatha Nyaya Tarkatirtha and

Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Calcutta

1936-1944, Reprint Rinsen Sanskrit Text

Series, 1-2, Kyoto 1982

NM - Nyayamukha of Dignaga

NS - Nyaya Sutra, see NBh

NS (G) Ganganatha Jha, M., The Nyaya-Sutras of

Gautama with Vatsyayanafs Bhasya and

Uddyotakara1s Varttika, Allahabad 1915,

Indian Thought Series, No. 7, vol. I-IV

Page 15: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XIII

NS (R) Die Nyayasutra1s, Text, Ubersetzung,

Erlauterungen und Glossar von Walter

Ruben, Leipzig 1928, Kraus Reprint Ltd.

Nendeln, Liechtenstein 1966

NS (V) The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama, translated by

M.M. Satisa Chandra Vidyabhushana, revised

and ed. by Nandalal Sinha, Motilal

Banarsidass, Delhi 1981

NV Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara, Kashi

Sanskrit Series No. 33, Benares 1915-1916

OAdW Osterreichische Akademie der Wissen-

schaften

Oberhammer 1963

Oberhammer 1964

Oberhammer 1964a

Oberhammer, G. , Ein Beitrag zu den

Vada-Traditionen Indiens, WZKSO 7, 1963,

p. 63-103

Oberhammer, G. , Der Svabhavika-sambandha,

ein Geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Nyaya-

Logik, WZKSO 8, 1964, p. 131-181

Oberhammer, G. , Paksilasvamin1s Intro-

duction to his Nyayabhasyam, Asian

Studies, vol. II, No. 3, Dec. 1964,

University of the Philippines, p. 302-322

Oberhammer 1966 Oberhammer, G., Zur Deutung von Nyaya-

sutram 1.1.5, WZKSO 10, 1966, p. 66-72

Oberhammer 1974 Oberhammer, G. , Die Uberlieferungs-

autoritSt im Hinduismus, in: Offenbarung,

Geistige RealitSt des Menschen, Wien 1974,

p. 41-92

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XIV

P - The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, ed.

by D.T. Suzuki, 168 vols, Otani Univer-

sity, Tokyo-Kyoto 1955-1961

Potter 1977 - Potter, Karl H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of

Indian Philosophies, vol. II, Nyaya-

Vai§esika, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1977

PS - Pramanasamuccaya

PS I - see Hattori 1968

PS II - see Hayes 1980

PV - Pramanavarttika

PV I - The Pramanavarttikam of Dharmakirti, The

first chapter with the Autocommentary, ed.

by Raniero Gnoli, Roma 1960, Serie

Orientale Roma 23

PV II - Pramanavarttika II, Pramanasiddhi

PV I (Mi) - Pramanavarttika-karika (Sanskrit and

Tibetan), ed. by Yusho Miyasaka, Acta

Indologica II, Naritasan Shinshoji

1971/1972, p. 2-41

PV II trsl Vetter - PV II. 131-285, Der Buddha und seine Lehre

in Dharmaklrtis Pramanavarttika, einge-

leitet, ediert und tibersetzt von Tilmann

Vetter, Arbeitskreis flir Tibetische und

Buddhistische Studien UniversitSt Wien,

Wien 1984, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie

und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 12

Page 17: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XV

PV III

PVBh

- Pramanavarttika III, Pratyaksapariccheda

- Prajnakaragupta1s Pramanavarttikabhasya

and Varttikalankara, ed. by R.

Samkrtyayana, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal

Research Institute, Patna 1953

PVin

PVP

- Pramanaviniscaya

- Pramanava'rttikapanjika: P 5717

(b), Tshad ma, Che, l-390a.8; D4217, Tshad

ma, Che lb-326b

PVSV - Pramanavarttikasvavrtti

PVSV (Mai)

PVSVT

Pramanavarttika, Svarthanumana-Pariccheda

by Dharmakirti, ed. by Dalsukh Bhai

Malvaniya, Varanasi 1959, Hindu

Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit

Series, vol. 2

Acarya DharmakTrteh Pramanavarttikam

(Svarthanumanaparicchedah) svopajnavrttya,

Karnakagomiviracitaya tattikaya ca

sahitam, ed. by Rahula Samkrtyayana, Kitab

Mahal, Allahabad 1943; Reprint: Karnaka-

gomin's Commentary on the Pramana-

varttikavrtti of Dharmakrrti, Rinsen Book

Co., Kyoto 1982, Rinsen Buddhist Text

Series I

P W Pramanavarttikavrtti: Dharmaklrti's Pramana-

varttika with a commentary by Manorathanan-

din, ed. by R. Samkrtyayana, JBORS 24-26

Page 18: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XVI

PW(S) Pramanavlrttika of Acharya Dharmaklrti

with the commentary 'Vritti1 of Acharya

Manorathanandin, crit. ed. by Swami

Dvarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968, Bauddha

Bharati Series 3

PVT Pramanavarttikatika Tib. translation in P

5718, Tshad ma, Je, l-402a.8; Ne,

l-348a.8; PVT I, Je lb.1-Ne 85b.2, PVT II,

Ne 85b.2-Se 187a.8

Randle

Randle Frag

Randle, H.N. , Indian Logic in the Early

Schools, Humphrey Milford, Oxford Univer-

sity Press London, New York, Bombay,

Calcutta, Madras 1930, Indian Reprint,

Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1976

Randle, H.N., Fragments from Dinnaga,

Indian Reprint, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi

1981

Ruben

Steinkellner 1961

Steinkellner 1966

Steinkellner 1967

Steinkellner 1971

- see NS (R)

- Steinkellner, E. , Die Literatur des

Alteren Nyaya, WZKSO 5, 1961, p. 149-163

- Steinkellner, E. , Bemerkungen zu

Tsvarasenas Lehre vom Grund, WZKSO 10,

1966, p. 73-85

- Steinkellner, E., Dharmaklrtifs Hetubinduh

I-II, Teil I Tibetischer Text und rekon-

struierter Sanskrit-Text, Teil II Uber-

setzung und Anmerkungen, OAdW, Wien 1967

- Steinkellner, E., Wirklichkeit und Begriff

bei Dharmaklrti, WZKS 15, 1971, p. 179-211

Page 19: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XVII

Steinkellner 1973 Steinkellner, E. , Dharmaklrti's Pramana-

viniscayah, Zweites Kapitel: Svarthanu-

manam, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und

Sanskrittexte, OAdW, Wien 1973

Steinkellner 1974 Steinkellner, E., On the Interpretation of

the Svabhavahetuh, WZKS 18, 1974,

p. 117-129

Steinkellner 1979 Steinkellner, E. , Dharmaklrti's Pramana-

viniscayah, Zweites Kapitel: Svarthanu-

manam, Teil II, Ubersetzung und Anmer-

kungen, OAdW, Wien 1979

Steinkellner 1981 Steinkellner, E. , Philological Remarks on• _

Sakyamati's Pramanavarttikatika, in:

Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus,

Gedenkschrift fur Ludwig Alsdorf, Franz

Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1981, p. 283-295

Steinkellner 1982 Steinkellner, E. , The Spiritual Place of

the Epistemological Tradition in Buddhism,

Nanto Bukkyo 49, 1982, p. 1-18

Tillemans 1984 Tillemans, Tom. J.F., Sur le Parar-

thanumana en Logique Bouddhique, Asia-

tische Studien / Etudes Asiatiques, 38.2,

1984, p. 73-99

TTP - see P

Tucci 1929 Tucci, G. , Pre-Dignaga Buddhist Texts on

Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda 1929,

GOS

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XVIII

Tucci 1930 Tucci, G., The Nyayamukha of Dignaga, The

oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, after

Chinese and Tibetan Materials, Heidelberg

1930, Materialien zur Kunde des

Buddhismus, 15. Heft

Vetter 1964 Vetter, Tilmann, Erkenntnisprobleme bei

Dharmaklrti, OAdW, Wien 1964

Vetter 1984

Vip

- see PV II trsl Vetter

- Vadanyayaprakarana of Dharmaklrti with the

commentary Vipancitartha of Santaraksita,

crit. ed. by Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi

1972, Bauddha Bharati Series 8

Wezler 1968 Wezler, A., Die "Dreifache" Schlussfol-

gerung im Nyayasutra 1.1.5, IIJ 11,

1968-1969, p. 109-211

Wezler 1979 Wezler, A., Dignaga's Kritik an der

Schlusslehre des Nyaya und die Deutung von

Nyayasutra 1.1.5, ZDMG, Suppl. 1.3, 1969,

p. 836-842

WZKM Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde des

Morgenlandes

WZKS - Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Stidasiens

WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Slid- und

Ostasiens

ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen MorgenlMndischen

Gesellschaft

Page 21: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XIX

Introduction

In this book I present an interpretative translation with ex-

haustive commentary of Dharmaklrtifs Pramanavarttika (PV)

II.1-7 . These seven verses put forward and briefly discuss two

general definitions of the notion 'pramana', 'means of valid

cognition1, the most basic notion in old Indian epistemology.

Before Dharmaklrti wrote these verses, no general pramana-

definitions had been given in any of the older epistemological

treatises. Therefore Pramanavarttika II.1-7 occupies a rather

unique place in Indian epistemology.

The two definitions are meant to provide a sound epistemolo-

gical basis for a long discussion in the rest of PV II on the

specific causes and characteristics of the religious authorita-

tiveness of the Buddha and the most important aspects of His

doctrine, as well as the possibility and the boundaries of such

an authoritativeness .

The conciseness of Dharmaklrti's style of writing, especially

in PV II.1-7, forced me to provide the translation with supple-

mentary words, phrases or even whole sentences between square4

brackets in order to make for intelligible reading, as a mere

word-for-word rendering would hardly convey any meaning. This

method I have used throughout the book. Apart from PV II.1-7

itself, I have translated (for the first time in a European

language) the relevant exegetic passages from the oldest

commentary on PV II-IV, the Pramanavarttika-Panjika (PVP), of

Dharmaklrti's direct pupil Devendrabuddhi . My representation of

what is taught in PV II.1-7 is thus supported and verified by a

commentary which indigenous tradition explicitly or implicitly

has always regarded as authoritative. In explaining PV II.1-7 I

have also drawn on Dharmaklrtifs first work, the Pramanavarttika

(PV) I, together with the Pramanavarttika-Svavrtti (PVSV), in

which he has formulated for the first time his new system of

logic, his philosophical semantics, and his ideas on the relia-

bility of language as a means to communicate correct knowledge.

Some notions in PV II.1-7 originated from DharmakXrti*s philo-

sophical predecessors among whom Paksilasvamin and Dignaga stand

out because of their original and fundamental contributions to

epistemological and logical thought.

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XX

In my commentary on PV II.1-7 I quote important passages from

these authors in order to show the extent to which Dharmaklrti

has used their ideas in this own doctrine.

In the first chapter I describe the epistemology and logic of

the Nyaya-Sutra (NS) and the Nyaya-Bhasya (NBh) . The NS is one

of the earliest purely philosophical treatises which consistently

defines its basic concepts and makes the discussion on the

sources of correct knowledge its prime concern. It is also the

source of a specific scheme of inferential reasoning that later

culminated in Dignaga's system of logic. The NS has to a great

extent provided the terminology and theoretical framework of

subsequent epistemology, logic and dialectics. The NBh discusses

(for the first time) the possibility of acquiring correct know-

ledge, its verifiability and its practical use. Furthermore, it

propounds a logic more refined than that of the NS and submits

(also for the first time) some epistemological criteria to verify

metaphysical statements.

My second chapter shows how the immediate predecessors of^ 8

Dharmakirti, the Buddhist philosophers Vasubandhu and Dignaga,

improved on the epistemology and logic of the NBh. Vasubandhu

wrote two small treatises on epistemology, logic and dialectics,

the Vadavidhana and the Vadavidhi. In these works he offers a

theory of perception that is slightly different from that of the

NBh, but more importantly, he creates a completely coherent

system of logic by drawing the necessary conclusions from some

logical doctrines that had remained scattered and unconnected in

the NBh. Vasubandhu1 s system is described in the first part of

chapter II. The second part is devoted to Vasubandhu1s philoso-

phical successor Dignaga. Dignaga summed up his own theories on

epistemology, logic, dialectics and philosophical semantics in the

Pramanasamuccaya (PS), a handbook which became the main source of

advanced epistemology and logic for Buddhist as well as non-

Buddhist philosophers until it was eventually superseded by

Dharmaklrti"s works. I describe Dignaga's epistemology and logic

almost exclusively by quoting relevant passages from the PS. In

relation to his logic, I also quote from an earlier work of his.

In this way the reader can get a clear picture of (a) the

development from Vasubandhu to Dignaga and

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XXI

(b) he has before him those doctrines of Dignaga on which

DharmakTrti has built his own system.

In chapter III I present an outline of Dharmakirti's first

attempt at formulating a new and effectual system of logic.

Taking Dignagafs logic as his starting-point, DharmakTrti greatly

simplifies its inferential procedure and shows how the logical

connexion of concepts must have its basis in reality.

Dharmakirti had not yet formulated his own theory of percep-

tion (the first pramana in Dignagafs as well as his own episte-

mology) when he wrote PV I and PV II. He discusses perception at

length in PV III, which was composed after PV II. Therefore it is

very likely that Dharmakirti, while putting forward his pramana-Q

definitions in PV II. 1-7 , still used as his main point of

departure what Dignaga had said about perception as pramana in PS

I. Hence I have not devoted a separate chapter to Dharmakirti's

perception-theory, but in commenting on the perceptional aspect

of the pramana-definitions in PV II.1-7 I am often referring to

the relevant passages dealing with perception in PS I.

The first three chapters as a whole should be regarded as a

rather lengthy general introduction to the translation of PV

II.1-7. Chapter II and III should be regarded as a commentary on

the notion pramana as it is defined in PV II.lab. For this reason

I do not elaborately explain this word again in the actual

commentary in chapter IV which contains the translation and

interpretation of PV II.1-7.

Untill now, there has been only one publication that exclu-

sively deals with the pramana-definitions and discussions of PV

II.1-7 , namely the article by Sh. Katsura, "Dharmakirti•s

Theory of Truth", which appeared in 1984. In this article Katsura

presents an interpretative translation of PV II.1-6 with a

philosophical commentary of his own in which he explains the two

definitions and summarizes DharmakTrtifs ontological and episte-

mological views. The article is a useful general introduction to

the epistemological problems PV II.1-6 raises. Still, it does not

make my representation of PV II.1-7 in this book superfluous, as

I try to describe those epistemological and logical developments

that have led to Dharmakirti•s theory, translate parts of the

oldest commentary on PV II and show how Dharmakirti uses his two

pramana-definitions to lay down the epistemological and religious

authority of the Buddha.

Page 24: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XXII

NOTES

1. The famous Buddhist philosopher DharmakTrti lived 600-660 AD

according to Frauwallner 1961, p. 137-139, but Lindtner 1980

proposes ca. 530-600 AD. Lindtner's proposal, which is not

universally accepted, rests on the assumption that

DharmakTrti was the author of a Tattvaniskarsa from which

some verses are quoted in Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradipa.

2. This chapter is also called Pramanasiddhi, 'The establishing

of (the Buddha as) a means of valid cognition1. About the

order in which the four chapters of PV were written cf

Frauwallner 1954, p. 143, 145, 148-149. This order of the

chapters was kept by the old commentators (the earliest of

whom is Devendrabuddhi). The late commentator Manorathanandin

changed the received order in the following way: chapter I

becomes III, II becomes I, I LI becomes II, IV remains IV.

Manorathanandin1s order is retained, curiously enough, in

Miyasaka's edition of the PV, PV (Mi). In the present book

the original pre-Manorathanandin order is kept.

3. I refrain from giving a detailed exposition as Vetter 1984,

p. 13-35 already deals with the contents of PV II in a very

readable and thoroughgoing manner.

4. This procedure of interpretative translation is adopted by

Vetter in his translation of PV II.121c-279 (PV II trsl

Vetter).

5. According to Frauwallner 1961, p. 145 Devendrabuddhi lived

ca. 630.689 AD.

6. According to Frauwallner Gesch II, p. 22 and Steinkellner

1961, p. 151 the Brahmanic Nyaya philosopher Paksilasvamin

could have lived in the 5th cent AD. He is the author of the

influential Nyaya-Bhasya (NBh), the earliest commentary on

the Nyaya-sutra (NS) that has survived. The Buddhist philo-

sopher Dignaga who lived ca. 540 AD (according to Frauwallner

1961, p. 137) wrote quite a number of works (cf Frauwallner

Page 25: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

XXIII

1959, p. 83, 139-164). His most famous book is the Pramana-

samuccaya (PS).

7. The Nyaya-Sutra is the oldest systematic handbook on epis-

temology and metaphysics (cf Ruben, p. XV-XVI) and was

written probably in the 1st or 2nd cent AD (cf Tucci 1929,

p. XXIIIf and Potter 1977, p. 220).

8. This Vasubandhu should have lived ca. 400-480 AD (Frauwallner

1961, p. 129). Thus, he is either a bit later than, or

contemporary with, Paksilasvamin.

9. In the present book, only the first seven verses of PV II are

being translated and discussed. A second publication will

contain the translation and interpretation of PV II.8-34

which contains, among other things, a refutation of various

proofs of the existence of a supreme Creator-God. DharmakXrti

refutes these proofs with the help of his own system of logic

as put forward in PV I and the PVSV.

10. The epistemological and logical English terminology that is

used throughout this book to translate the Sanskrit terms

derives mostly from the following works: S. Chandra

Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, Calcutta 1920,

reprint Delhi 1979; H.N. Randle, Fragments from Dignaga,

London 1926, reprint Delhi 1981; G. Tucci, The Nyayamukha of

Dignaga, Heidelberg 1930; S. Mookerjee and H. Nagasaki, The

Pramanavarttikam of DharmakTrti, Nalanda, Patna 1964;

C. Goekoop, The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the

Tattvacintamani, Reidel, Dordrecht 1967; M. Hattori Dignaga,

On Perception, Harvard 1968; E. Steinkellner, On the Inter-

pretation of the Svabhavahetuh, WZKS 18, 1974, p. 117-129.

11. Before Katsura 1984, we find a few valuable remarks on this

passage in Vetter 1964, p. 27-28, 31-32, Steinkellner 1982,

p. 10-13 and there is the Japanese translation of the whole

PV II by T. Kimura, Dharmaklrti ShukyS Tetsugaku no Genten

Kenkyu, Tokyo 1981 (but cf also the remark on it in Vetter

1984, p. 7).

Page 26: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority
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I The Beginnings of Systematic Epistemology and Logic

1.1 The highest Good

The first Indian school of thinking which explicitly

teaches that the supreme good, defined as emancipation

from all suffering, can be the object of rational inquiry

and which, moreover, propounds a system of epistemology,

logic and dialectics in order to give definite shape to

this rational inquiry, seems to be the old Nyaya-school .

The oldest written document of that school is the Nyaya

Sutra (NS), a text consisting of some 530 aphoristic sen-

tences (sutras) arranged in 5 chapters, in which the basic

concepts of the school are defined and discussed. Tradi-

tion has it that the text was written or edited by the

somewhat mythical figure Aksapada Gotama, but there is ho

certainty concerning this personality or when he lived .

Although the NS combines heterogeneous philosophical no-

tions such as ultimate liberation (in the religious sense)

with natural philosophy, epistemology, logic and dialec-

tics, we find in this text a much stronger tendency to-

wards systematic exposition and coherency than in the

philosophical writings that preceded it .

Even though the NS was a more consistent philosophi-

cal work than previous * works and created the conceptual

framework of much of subsequent epistemological and logi-

cal thinking, definite form to the old Nyaya-philosophy

was given by Paksilasvamin Vatsyayana in his Nyaya Bhasya,

the earliest extant commentary on the NS. We do not ex-

actly know when Paksilasvamin lived or where, but it must

necessarily be after the date of composition of the NS and

some time before Vasubandhu, one of the first known Bud-

dhist logicians who improved upon the epistemology, logic

and dialectics of the NS and the NBh4. On the authority of

Frauwallner, we believe Vasubandhu the logician to have

lived between around 400-480 AD (cf Frauwallner 1961, p.

129-131); thus Paksilasvamin wrote his commentary any time

before 480 AD (if we allow for the possibility of these

two having been contemporaries) . Paksilasvamin not only

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quite accurately interprets the NS-aphorisms themselves,

he also sets forth many important new theories in addition

to some seminal ideas found in the aphorisms he is explain-

ing. The NS by its systematic framework and the NBh by its

formulating some fundamental epistemological and logical

principles for the first time, gave the impetus to the

Buddhists (Vasubandhu, Dignaga and even to some extent

Dharmaklrti) to develop their own form of "Nyaya", their

own systematic treatment of epistemology, logic and dia-

lectics (cf Steinkellner 1961, p. 150-152).

True knowledge (tattvajnana) is of great importance

to the adherent of the Nyaya-philosophy and hence the

school lays a great deal of stress on epistemology and

logic. However, true knowledge is not sought for its own

sake; it is valued as a necessary condition for acquiring

the supreme good in life6. We find this in NS 1.1.1, an

aphorism which at first sight simply reads like a table of

contents:

pramanaprameyasamsayaprayojanadrstantasiddhantavayavatar-

kanirnayavadaj alpavitandahetvabhasacchalaj atinigraha-

sthananam tattvajnanan nihsreyasadhiqamah,

'The obtainment of the supreme good [proceeds] from the

knowledge of the truth [ie true knowledge] of [ie concern-

ing] (1) the means of valid cognition, (2) the objects

[deserving] to be cognized [through those means of valid

cognition], (3) doubt, (4) motive, (5) generally accepted

fact, (6) established tenet, (7) the members [of the syl-

logism], (8) reasoning, (9) ascertainment, (10) discus-

sion, (11) sophistry, (12) [capricious] faultfinding, (13)

fallacious [logical] reasons, (14) deliberate misunder-

standing, (15) futile rejoinders and (16) grounds for

losing [an argument]1. These sixteen topics as a whole

define the specific nature of the Nyaya-philosophy as

mainly consisting of epistemology, logic and dialectics.

The true knowledge of this philosophy enables one to at-

tain (adhigama) to the highest good (nihsreyasa), after-

wards defined as complete freedom from suffering; it is

said in the NS 1.1.22, tadatyantavimokgo 'pavargah, 'The

complete liberation from that [ie from suffering] is

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[final] emancipation17. The ablative case tattvajnanat in

NS 1.1.1 suggests that true knowledge is not the instru-

ment itself by which the highest good is obtained, for in

that case we expect the instrumental case tattvajnanena,

but that true knowledge is an indispensable prerequisite

for obtaining the highest good, so that the good really

proceeds from the knowledge8. The next sutra describes how

the highest good as final emancipation arises from true

knowledge:

duhkhaj anmapravrttidosamithyaj nananam uttarottarapaye

tadanantarapayad apavargah

(NS 1.1.2),'When, of suffering, birth, activity, moral

flaws and false knowledge, every next [item which is men-

tioned here] disappears, then it [ie every item which is

mentioned] immediately [before, and which is the result of

every next item] disappears [and] thereby emancipation

[is won]'.

What is meant in this aphorism is that these five

should disappear in the reverse order. Paksilasvamin makes

this quite clear in his commentary:

yada tu tattvajnanan mithyajnanam apaiti# tada mithya-

jnanapaye dosa apayanti, dosapaye pravrttir apaiti

pravrttyapaye janmapaiti lanmapaye duhkham apaiti,

duhkhapaye catyantiko 'pavargo nihsreyasam iti,

'When on account of knowledge of the truth [ie true know-

ledge] false knowledge disappears, then at the disap-

pearance of false knowledge moral flaws disappear; at the

disappearance of moral flaws activity disappears, at the

disappearance of activity [a new] birth disappears; at the

disappearance of [a new] birth suffering disappears; and

at the disappearance of suffering everlasting emancipa-

tion, the supreme good [is won] (NBh 20.3-5)'. Since false

knowledge indirectly causes suffering — according to NS

1.1.2 and the commentary thereon — , it follows that true

knowledge, being the contrary of false knowledge, ulti-

mately ends all suffering, as is maintained in the NBh-9passage .

Although the source of tattvainana is not specified

in the NS, it is necessarily so that true knowledge ori-

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ginates from a source which can be nothing else but the

means of valid cognition, the pramanas. For true knowledge

of a thing, true cognition of reality, is acquired — as

will be explained in the sequel -- through the means of

valid cognition10, a term which renders the Sanskrit word1pramana', also meaning 'measure1, 'standard1, 'criterion1

and 'authority'11 .

1.2 Theory of Knowledge, the four means of valid cognition

Before describing the epistemology and logic of the NS, I

will quote the statements made by Paksilasvamin on the

function and advantages of correct knowledge. In the open-

ing phrase of the NBh he says:

pramanato 'rthapratipattau pravrttisamarthyad arthavat

pramanam,

'A means of valid cognition possesses the object, because

of the appropriateness of [human] activity [with regard to

the object] when the object is cognized through a means of

valid cognition (NBh 1.5) *. The correct knowledge brought

forth by a means of valid cognition enables the cognizer

to act with regard to objects, and enables him (or her) to

make the appropriate choices concerning these objects. The

veracity of the cognition is gauged precisely from this

ability to make the right choices; practical utility is

thus the measuring-rod of truth. The NBh continues:

pramanam antarena narthapratipattih, narthapratipattim

antarena pravrttisamarthyam. pramanena khalv ayam jnata-

rtham upalabhya tarn artham abhipsati jihasati va. tasye-

psajihasaprayuktasya samlha pravrttir ucyate. samarthyam

punar asyah phalenabhisambandhah. samlhamanas tarn artham

abhipsan jihasan va tarn artham apnoti jahati va*. arthas tu

sukhafl sukhahetus ca, duhkhaifi duhkhahetus ca. so 'yam

pramanartho 'parisaiftkhyeyah pranabhrdbhedasyaparisam-

khyeyatvat.

'Without a means of valid cognition there is no cognition

of an object, without cognition of an object there is no

appropriateness of [human] activity. For, when a cognizer

has cognized an object with a means of valid cognition, he

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either wishes to obtain that object or to avoid it. The

striving of him who is [thus] instigated by the wish to

obtain or to avoid is called "activity". And furthermore,

the appropriateness is this [activity1s] connexion with a

result. He who is striving, being desirous of obtaining or

avoiding an object, [finally] obtains that object or

avoids it. As to the object, it is happiness and a cause

of happiness, as well as suffering and a cause of suffer-

ing. And the [number of] objectfs] for the means of valid

cognition is limitless, owing to the fact that there are

innumerable kinds of sentient beings (NBh 2.1-3.1)'. Cor-

rect knowledge has practical value inasmuch as it permits

us to choose between what gives happiness and what will

cause grief. What is to be abandoned is that which gives

us pain and misery. With true knowledge we can get to know

the causes of pain and remove them.

Paksilasvamin points in the foregoing statements to a

more secular, practical use of the Nyaya, a use nowhere

explicitly mentioned in the NS. For in the NS the only

good seems to be liberation from suffering in the highest

religious sense (cf NS 1.1.1-2). Paksilasvamin on the

other hand, without in the least detracting from the ul-

timate religious goal, explicitly shows how the Nyaya

philosophy can also help us in making the proper choices

in daily life. The universal applicability of the Nyaya is

implied in the assertion that 'the [number of] object[s]

for the means of valid cognition is limitless, owing to

the fact that there are innumerable kinds of sentient

beings (NBh 3.1-2)'. And we find elsewhere in the NBh:

yam artham abhlpsan j ihasan va karmarabhate tenanena sarve

praninah sarvani karmani sarvas ca vidya vyaptah

tadasrayas ca nyayah pravartate,

'The object which one wishes to obtain or to avoid [and

for the sake of which] one undertakes action, that [very

object] pervades all sentient beings, all actions and all

[forms of] learnedness. And the Nyaya [as system] operates

with that [aforementioned object one wishes to obtain or

avoid] as its basi^ (NBh 8.1-3)f. All activity and learn-

ing eventually aim at procuring the desirable and shunning

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the undesirable.

The utility of correct knowledge being in this way

established, we will now have to elaborate on the produc-

tion of knowledge by the four means of valid cognition. NS

1.1.3 enumerates them:

pratyaksanumanopamanasabdah pramanani,fThe means of valid cognition are: perception, inference,

comparison [based on analogy] and [reliable] statement'.

This implies that these four instruments produce all the

knowledge we can possibly acquire. Perception here pri-

marily means sensory perception, ie direct perception by

the eyes, ears, nose, tongue and touch. Inference is a

judgement following on direct perception and revealing ob-

jects indirectly, objects that are not perceived at the

time of inferring. Paksilasvamin glosses:

anumanain, mitena linqenarthasya pascanmanam anumanam,

'inference: the subsequent cognition of an object, with

the help of a property [of that object] which is [already]

known [through a means of valid cognition], is an inferen-

ce (NBh 10.18)'. Thus the internal process of deductive

reasoning as it happens in one's mind is briefly descri-

bed. To give one famous example: if someone sees smoke on

a mountaintop, he can infer that there is fire on the

mountain, for he knows that wherever there happens to be

smoke there is fire. He does not see the fire directly on

the mountain, he 'sees1 it indirectly through the coin-

cidental smoke. Hence it is a cognition subsequent to

(pascad) another cognition. Comparison means to know a new

thing through its similarity to a given thing, a simila-

rity which was previously described by a person who saw

the new thing himself.

upamanam sarupyajnanam yatha gaur evaifl gavaya iti,

Comparison [based on analogy] is knowledge of the sameness

of form: "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow", (NBh 24.2)'. Reli-

able statement gives verbal information on things we do

not presently perceive or infer ourselves, sabdah sabdyate

anenartha ity abhidhlyate jnapyate, 'Reliable statement:

by it an object is verbally expressed, thus it [the

object] is pointed out, made known (NBh 24.4) *.

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1.3 Perception

Every form of cognition starts with the direct perception

of an object by the senses. In so far as perception con-

veys true knowledge, it is to be regarded as a means of

valid cognition.

indriyarthasannikarsotpannaiTi jnanam avyapadesyam

avyabhicari vyavasayatmakam pratyaksam,

'Knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses

with an object, is perception [as a means of valid cog-

nition, in so far as that knowledge is] not [yet] express-

ible [in language], not erroneous and consisting in [the]

ascertainment [of what that object really is] (NS 1.1.4)1.

It is clear from the Sanskrit-sentence that sensory per-

ception, pratyaksa, is primarily defined as knowledge,

j_nana_, that issues from the senses and their objects, and

secondarily (but no less important) as not expressible in

language, avyapadesya, etc. The contact of the senses with

an obj ect,indriyartha-sannikarsa, determines knowledge,

such knowledge determines sensory perception in general,

while 'not expressible in language', 'not erroneous' and

'consisting in ascertainment* determine the aforementioned

perception as a means of valid cognition, pramana.

In Gupta 1962, p. 26-27 it is suggested that this

definition originally could have run:

indriyarthasannikarsotpannaiti jnanam pratyaksam,

while the other three qualifications were added later. It

cannot be established with absolute certainty that this

has really happened, but Gupta makes out a good case by

referring to the older perception definition in Vaisesika

Sutra III.1.18,

atmendriyarthasannikarsad yan nispadyate tad anyat,

"Was aus dem Kontakt von Seele, Sinnesorgan und Gegenstand

entsteht, das ist etwas anderes (als die Schlussfolge-

rung)" (Gupta 1962, p. 27).

It seems to me that NS 1.1.4 also defines a means of

cognition in general as not erroneous and consisting in

ascertainment. The first qualification avyapadesya, 'not

expressible in language' can only refer to pratyaksa as

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8

pramana, since the knowledge produced by the other means

of valid cognition is of necessity expressible and ex-

pressed in language, viz the knowledge produced by in-

ference, analogy and reliable statement. However, all

four pramanas have to be non-erroneous and consisting in

ascertainment, for if they were not so, they would cease

to be means of valid cognition.

In the NBh the three specific qualifications of per-

ception as pramana are explained one by one. About the

condition that perception should be a mode of knowing that

is not yet expressible in language Paksilasvamin writes;

yavadartham vai namadheyasabdas,tair arthasampratyayah,

arthasampratyayac ca vyavaharah. tatredam indriyartha-

sannikarsad utpannam arthajnanam rupam iti va rasah ity

evam va bhavati, ruparasasabdas ca visayanamadheyam. tena

vyapadisyate jnanam rupam iti janite rasa iti janlte

namadheyasabdena vyapadisyamanam sat sabdam prasajyate,

ata aha avyapadesyam iti

(NBh, p. 28.1-29.1), 'Indeed, there are [so many] words

[being] names [signifying objects] as there are [real]

objects. By means of these [denotative words alone] [the

perceiver gets] the [firm] cognition of objects and from

the [firm] cognition of objects [proceeds on the part of

the perceiver intentional] activity [with regard to these

objects; therefore direct perception of objects is always

determined by the denotative words for the objects]. As

regards this [contention we say,] the object-knowledge

that has arisen from the contact of a sense with an object

thus becomes [afterwards for the perceiver the internal

notion] "form" or "taste", and the words for form and

taste are the [denotative] name of a [real, outer] thing.

By the [denotative name] [perceptual] knowledge is expres-

sed, [ie the perceiver] knows for himself "[this is a]

form" or "[this is a] taste". While [this perceptual know-

ledge] is being expressed through a word which is a name

[denoting an outer object], it [ie perceptual knowledge]

[could wrongly] be considered verbal [knowledge, ie know-

ledge determined fully by words and not by the outer ob-

jects at all]. Therefore [in order to avoid such a mis-

Page 35: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

taken view of perceptual knowledge] he [Aksapada] says

"not [yet] expressible in language".

At the beginning of this passage it is suggested that

knowledge is, and can only be, received through language,

ie that there is no form of direct perception in which

language is not involved. But the Bhasya refutes this view

by saying that the impressions derived from the senses

receive their names like "form" and "taste" afterwards in

the mind of the perceiver. Those sensory impressions are

the objects that are verbally designated, but they have

no direct connexion with the words that denote them. In

order to distinguish perceptual knowledge from all the

other modes of knowing in which language jjs necessarily

involved, it is said that perceptual knowledge is not ex-

pressible in language, ie it is an immediate and purely

non-verbal form of cognition of outer objects.

In order to be pramana this purely non-verbal

knowledge should not be erroneous:

grisme marlcayo bhaumenosmana samsrstah spandamana

durasthasya caksusa sannikrsyante, tatrendriyarthasanni-

karsad udakam iti jnanam utpadyate, tac ca pratyaksaiti

prasajyate ity ata aha avyabhicarlti.

'In the hot season, rays of sunlight which are connected

with the heat of the soil and are vibrating [because of

the heat], come in contact with the eye of a [person, an

observer] standing at a great distance. [And] there [in

the observer] on account of the contact of the senses

with the object, arises the judgement "water". Now that

can also [wrongly] be considered perception [as pramana],

therefore [in order to avoid this wrong idea] he [Aksa-

pada] says "non-erroneous" (NBh 30.1-3)'. Perceptual

judgements that contain errors are obviously ineffective,

as they give no valid information at all.

The last special characteristic of perception is its

consisting in ascertainment:

durac caksusa hy ayam artham pasyan navadharayati dhuma

iti va renur iti va» tad etad indriyarthasannikarsotpannam

anavadharanajnSnam pratyaksam prasajyata ity ata aha

vyavasayatmakam iti.

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10

1 [If ] this [observer] at a great distance is watching with

his eye a thing and does not determine whether it be smoke

or dust, [then] such indeterminate knowledge springing from

contact of the senses with an object can [wrongly] be con-

sidered perception [as pramana]; therefore [in order to

avoid this error] he [Aksapada] says "consisting in ascer-

tainment" (NBh 30.5-7) '. As long as a sensory impression

remains indecisive, it cannot function as an instrument of

valid knowledge and such indeterminate knowledge would be

quite unsuitable for procuring what is desirable and

avoiding the undesirable (cf NBh 1.1-2 quoted above).

1.4 Inference

We have already seen Paksilasvamin's description of in-

ference as 'the subsequent cognition of an object with the

help of a property [of that object] which is [already]

known through a means of valid cognition (NBh 24.1 )'. Now,

first we must look at the cryptic NS-definition of in-

ference, which as yet seems to elude explanation. It runs:

atha tatpurvakam trividham anumanam purvavac chesavat

samanyatodrstam ca,

'And preceded by this [ ie by sensory perception] there is

three-fold inference, [namely inference] possessing [ ie

concerning] what was previous, possessing [ie concerning]

the rest, and [inference based on that which is] seen from

similarity (NS 1.1.5)'. This translation is only tenta-

tive. The first part of the definition does not present

too many difficulties^2. It is both conceivable and ra-

tional that inference takes place only on the basis of

correct knowledge acquired through the senses, so that

inference is 'preceded by that1, tatpurvakam. Paksila-

svamin *s commentary on the initial part of this definition

is easy to follow.

tatpurvakam ity anena lingalinginoh sambandhadarsanaih

lingadarsanam cabhisambadhyate,

'Preceded by that, this refers to seeing the connexion be-

tween a property and the property-bearer and to seeing the

property [connected with the property-bearer) (NBh 33.3) '.

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11

Thereupon Paksilasvamin depicts the process of inference

itself:

lingalinginoh sambaddhayor darsanena lingasmrtir

abhisambadhyate. smrtya linqadarsanena capratyakso1rtho 'numlyate,

'The recollection of the property is related to [the fact

that one] has seen that the property and the property-

bearer are connected [with each other]. By bringing [that

connexion] back to memory and seeing the property, an in-

visible object, [ie the presently invisible property-

bearer] is inferred (NBh 33.4-5)'. If we would substitute,

for example, fire for property-bearer and smoke for

property, this assertion becomes clear. At a certain time

we saw for ourselves that smoke and fire are connected; we

have often observed fire producing smoke . If we remember

this, and after a while we see some smoke but no fire, we

may infer the presence there of fire on the grounds of

smoke. In short, we see thing A and thing B connected, the

connexion being that of property-bearer and property. When

at a certain time we see thing B alone, we infer thing A

to be present as well. In the case of smoke and fire,

smoke is considered to be the property of fire. One might

question the admissibility of these substitutions, but

consider the following use made by Paksilasvamin of the

terms property, linga and property-bearer, lingin.

apratyakse lingalinginoh sambandhe kenacid arthena

lingasya samanyad apratyakso lingi gamyate, yatheccha-

dibhir atma, icchadayo gunah gunas ca dravyasamsthanah,

tad yad esaiti sthanam sa atmeti,

'When the connexion between property and property-bearer

is not directly perceivable, a not-perceivable property-

bearer is cognized in so far as the [same] property is

common to some [other visible] object, as for instance:

the soul [is connected] [with perceivable properties such

as] desire etc. Desire etc. are [perceivable] attributes

and [all] attributes have as their abode a substance. The

locus of these [attributes such as desire etc.] is the

soul [hence it is proved that the soul exists] (NBh 36.2-

4) f . The property-bearer, lingin, in the example is the

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12

soul, while the properties, lingani, are the soul's

attributes, gunah, such as desire etc. . In a syllogism

one would have to predicate the possession of a soul of

some subject; eg this man possesses a soul on the grounds

that he shows signs of desire etc, which must be regarded

as attributes necessarily inherent in a substance. In the

syllogism (as will be made clear later), the property-

bearer and its properties are themselves considered pro-

perties of a subject, sadhya, of which some property is

inferred on the grounds of the subject's possessing an-

other property connected with the first property. So far,

inference as described in the NS and the NBh does not give

great difficulties of interpretation. The interpretation

of NS 1.1.5 becomes problematic with the term 'threefold1.15

This qualification is not explained in the Bhasya, so we

may assume that Paksilasvamin takes it to refer to the

three qualifications enumerated in the sequel of this

aphorism.

As for the terms 'possessing what was previous1,

purvavat, 'possessing the rest',sesavat, and 'seen from

similarity1, samanyatodrsta, Paksilasvamin gives two

divergent explanations. A remarkable fact indeed, and in-

dicative of the confusion that existed about these three

terms already in Paksilasvamin's time. The first set of

explanations runs as follows:

purvavad iti, yatra karanena karyam anumlyatef

'Possessing what was previous, when an effect is inferred

from a cause (NBh 34.1)'.

sesavat tat, yatra karyena karanam anumlyate,

'Possessing the rest is that [inference] in which a cause

is inferred from an effect (NBh 34.2)*. Samanyatoidrstfr,

'seen from similarity1, is explained thus:

samanyatodrstarn, vrajyapurvakam anyatra drstasyanyatra

darsanam iti, tatha cadityasya tasmad asty apratyaksapy

adityasya vrajyeti,

'Seen from similarity: seeing at one place an [object that

was previously] seen at another place [while this seeing

it now] is preceded by the movement [of the object] and

thus, [seeing that] the sun [has changed position, one

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infers] that on those grounds also the sun possesses mo-

tion [albeit] not immediately perceived (NBh 34-3.5)'. If

objects are seen to always be in motion when they change

places, it is possible to infer the motion of the sun be-

cause it changes its position in the sky during the day.1 Similarity', in all cases, is the observed change of po-

sition, and from this fact motion is inferred of things

that are not actually seen to be moving.

In the next set of explanations Paksilasvamin inter-

prets purvavad quite differently.

athava purvavad iti yatra yathapurvam pratyaksabhutayor

anyataradarsanenanyatarasyapratyaksasyanumanam yatha

dhumenagnir itiy

(NBh, p. 34.6-35.1), 'Or purvavad [means: that case] in

which -- by seeing one of two [objects] of direct percep-

tion in the way (yatha) [they have] previously (purvam)

[been seen] — the other [thing that is now] not perceiv-

able is inferred [to be present], as [the presence of]

fire [that is now not seen is inferred] by [seeing]

smoke*.

This explanation runs opposite to the first, which

said purvavad meant inferring an effect from a cause. Ac-

cording to this second explanation, the "previous", purva,

refers to the fact that previously two things were seen

together, while the presence of the one thing that is now

not directly perceived is inferred from the presence of

the other connected thing that ijs perceived.

As regards sesavad, too, Paksilasvamin gives an alter-

native explanation.

sesavan nama parisesah sa ca prasaktapratisedhe 'nyatra-

prasangac chisyamane sampratyayah,

'Possessing the rest means the remainder, and that is the

firm conviction as regards [the only] remaining [logical

possibility] in so far as one other [of several possibili-

ties] is not absurd when [all] absurd [possibilities] have

been negated (NBh 35.1-2)'. In this explanation sesavad is

interpreted as "having the remainder" (sesa) in the con-

text of NS 1.1.5. Moreover, this alternative interpreta-

tion deviates very much from the previous one, according

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14

to which sesavad refers to the inference of a cause from

an effect.

The second explanation of samanyatodrsta is given in

the passage already quoted in connexion with the terms

'property1 and 'property-bearer1 in NBh 36.2-4, There it

is maintained that a property-bearer which is not directly

perveived can be inferred to exist on the grounds that it

has properties similar to those of a perceivable property-

bearer. The "invisible" property-bearer is "seen" (drsta)

from its similarity to (samanyatah) "visible" property-

bearers. This explanation differs from the previous one of

samanyatodrsta; for in the first, in NBh 34.3-5, the

property-bearer was not invisible but a property of it,

motion, was invisible. In the second explanation the pro-

perties are visible but the property-bearer is not

visible.

In the concluding paragraph on inference, Paksila-

svamin remarks:

sadvisayam ca pratyaksam sadasadvisayam canumanam,

'The realm of perception is that which is [now manifestly]

present; the realm of inference is that which is [now]

present as well as that which is not present [now] (NBh

37.1 ) f .

kasmat ? traikalyagrahanat, trikalayukta artha anumanena

grhyante bhavisyatlty anumlyate bhavatlti cabhud iti ca,

asac ca khalv atltam anagatam ceti,

'Why ?, Because [inference] grasps the [totality of the]

three times. Objects connected with the three times [past,

present and future] are grasped by inference, [because] it

is inferred "[this] will be", "[this] is [now]" and

"[this] was", and indeed [a thing of] the past and [of]

the future are not present [now] (NBh 37.1-3)'. This seems

to summarize the discussion on the three types of in-

ference by suggesting that the threefoldness refers to the

fact that we can draw inferences about things in the past,

present and future16.

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15

5 Comparison based on analogy

The third means of valid cognition is comparison based on

analogy, upamana. It is defined thus:

prasiddhasadharmyat sadhyasadhanam upamanam

(NS 1.1.6), Comparison [based on analogy] is the demon-

stration of a probandum [ie a thing that is to be demon-

strated or indicated] on the grounds that [the probandum]

possesses [in some degree] the same properties as a [thing

or property-bearer that is] well known ~[to the hearer to

whom the analogy is pointed out]1. Paksilasvamin has al-

ready briefly explained comparison in NBh 24.2 cited

above, 'Comparison [based on analogy] is knowledge of the

sameness of form: "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow1. On the

NS-definition itself he comments:

prajnatena samanyat prajnapanlyasya prajnapanam upamanam

iti. yatha gaur evam gavaya itif

'Pointing out of what is to be pointed out in so far as

the [thing to be pointed out] is similar to a known thing,

is [called] comparison [as for instance when we say]: "a

bos Gavaeus is like a cow" (NBh 37.6-7)'. And moreover:

yatha gaur evam gavaya ity upamane prayukte gava samana-

dharmam artham indriyarthasannikarsad upalabhamano ^sya

gavayasabdah sanjneti sanjnasanjnisambandham pratipadyata

iti,

'After the comparison "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow" has

been employed [by a speaker], a person who cognizes from

the contact of the senses with the object [ie by pra-

tyaksa] a thing whose properties are similar to those of

a cow, knows the connexion between the designation and the

designated, namely: the word bos Gavaeus is the designa-

tion of this [cowlike animal] (NBh 38.2-3)'• Comparison,

or rather, gaining knowledge of an unknown thing through

testimony and the perceivable resemblance of the unknown

thing to a known thing does not constitute what at first

sight seems to be an inference. For by inference we come

to know a hitherto unknown property of a given subject

from seeing another intimately connected property. And

since we observed that the two properties were always

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16

connected, we legitimately infer the first property to be

present in the subject. The two properties themselves are

known to us, the subject is known, but the relation of one

of the properties to the subject is not known; it is in-

ference that makes such a relation known. As for compari-

son, we know one particular object and its properties,

whereas there may be a multitude of objects that partly

resemble our known object. Another expert person has to

point out to us such an unknown object by saying it great-

ly resembles the known thing. This speaker must of neces-

sity know both objects. We know only one, but as soon as

we see an object closely corresponding to the speaker's

description (and our recollection of the known thing), we

know that we have discovered the unknown thing. Through

comparison we proceed from a known object to an unknown

object on the strength of our perception and reliable

testimony, whereas in inference we proceed from two known

objects to an unknown relation between one of these two

with a third known object. The basis of inference and com-

parison remains sensory perception, the fundamental means

of valid cognition.

1.6 Reliable Statement

The fourth and last means of valid cognition is a way of

knowing objects solely by verbal designation. Of course

the perceiver must perceive the statements which contain

this knowledge with his own organ of hearing, but the new

knowledge that is brought to him does not come into being

through his own sensory perception as in inference and

comparison. The latter could be regarded as a combination

of perception and a reliable statement, because the first

element in that cognitive process, the object to which the

unknown object is compared (by a reliable speaker) is

known, and needs to be known, through sensory perception.

In the case of a reliable statement, the object is fully

unknown to the hearer and the validity of the knowledge

rests entirely on the validity of the statement and hence

on the reliability of the speaker.

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17

NS 1.1.7 defines reliable statement as a means of

valid cognition in this way: aptopadesah sabdah,

'[Reliable] statement is the instruction of an expert1.

The word apta has various meanings among which 'expert1,

'trustworthy1, 'reliable' and 'skilful'. It is intended in

this aphorism that the reliability of the statement or in-

struction depends on the trustworthiness of the speaker

and his expertise. Moreover, it is quite clear that not

simply any statement could be pramana, but only those that

contain true information in the form of valid instruction.

Paksilasvamin writes about this aphorism;

aptah khalu saksatkrtadharma yathadrstasyarthasya cikhya-

payisaya prayukta upadesta. saksatkaranam arthasyaptih.

taya pravartata ity aptah. rsaryamlecchanam samanaiti

laksanam. tatha ca sarvesam vyavaharah pravartanta iti,

'Now, an expert is an instructor who has directly per-

ceived the dharma [righteousness, the moral order in the

cosmos] and who is urged by a desire to describe a thing

as he has seen it. Expertise concerning a thing is the

direct perception [of it] and he who acts with that [ex-

pertise] is an expert. [Expertise can be] the common char-

acteristic of sages, honourable people [following the or-

thodox way of life according to the Vedas] and barbarians

[those that do not follow the orthodox way of life, ie the

foreigners]. And [it is a fact that] in this way [with the

help of expertise] the [daily] affairs of all [beings] are

carried out (NBh 40.1-3)'. A person who has directly per-

ceived the dharma, a saksatkrtadharma, seems to denote

Vedic rsis, for the term occurs already with Yaska, the

author of the Nirukta (cf Chemparathy 1983, p. 21, 78 note

20 which mentions some relevant literature on dharma and

Oberhammer 1974, p. 50, note 29 on saksatkrta-dharmata-).

In the broader context evidently intended in the NBh,

dharma seems simply to mean 'the true state of a thing or

fact1, 'the true nature of things'. The immediate ex-

perience of a thing or fact constitutes the expertise of

the expert. In a rather democratic spirit the commentator

acknowledges that all sorts of people, from Vedic seers to

barbaric foreigners, can be an expert in something. In ac-

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18

complishing many of our everyday concerns, we need practi-

cal information in the form of reliable statements made by

those who know something thoroughly. And yet reliable

statement, sabda, does not denote only practical informa-

tion. The sutra says:

sa dvividho drstadrstarthatvat,

'it [reliable statement] is of two kinds according to

whether the object [it refers to] is [something] manifest

[to the senses] or not manifest [to the senses] (NS

1.1.8)'. Paksilasvamin comments:

yasyeha drsyate frthah so drstarthah. yasyamutra pratlyate

so 'drstarthah. evam rsilaukikavakyanam vibhaga iti,

'If the object of a [statement] is [something] seen here

[on earth], the [statement] refers to [something] manifest

[to the senses]. If the [object] of a [statement] is ex-

perienced in the other world, the [statement] refers to

[something] not manifest [to the senses]. In this way we

divide the assertions of sages and ordinary people (NBh

41.1-2)f. The commentator continues:

kimartham punar idam ucyate ? sa na manyeta drstartha

evaptopadesah pramanam arthasyavadharanad iti; adrstartho

'pipramanam arthasyanumanad itif

'For what purpose is this [division] enunciated ? One

should not think that the instruction of an expert is a

means of valid cognition only [if] [the instruction]

refers to something manifest because the object of the

statement can be ascertained directly [by the senses].

Also a [statement] referring to something not manifest [to

the senses] is a means of valid cognition because the ob-

ject [of the statement can] be inferred [to exist] (NBh

41.2-4)'. The first kind of reliable statement gives in-

formation about visible thingsf and these statements can

be validly made by both proficient sages and proficient

common persons. We are capable of verifying such state-

ments, as the objects they describe are always somehow

visible to our senses. Thus, it is said that the object of

this kind of statement can be ascertained directly. The

second kind gives information on invisible things, espe-

cially of course on religious topics such as the hereafter

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19

and final liberation from suffering. It is not possible

for us to verify such statements directly by the senses,

because the objects these statements refer to elude our

perception. Hence it is maintained that the existence of

those invisible objects can only be proved through in-

ference, which probably means that we must infer the ex-

istence of those objects from the trustworthiness of the

ones who speak about them as is asserted later in NBh

225.1-2.17

Observing the four pramanas in the given order of

perception, inference, analogy and reliable statement, one

discovers an increasing remoteness on the part of the per-

ceiver from the object to be cognized. This would explain

the particular order in which they are treated in the NS.

This order implicitly evinces the increasing distance of

the perceiver from the object, besides demonstrating the

prime importance of direct perception in knowing reality.

Perception is the most direct and closest way of cognizing

an object. Inference is a correct but indirect form of

cognition in which perception plays some part so that it

is not as direct as perception. Comparison is still less

direct than inference, since it requires the reliable tes-

timony of another for its correct functioning, unlike in-

ference which can be performed by oneself. Reliable state-

ment functions entirely without our own perception, unlike

comparison which requires that we perceived the object

with which the unknown object is compared. We cannot per-

form the latter two acts of cognition without the outside

help of a reliable speaker, while we can correctly carry

out the former two acts of cognition by ourselves • Hence

we can say that the order of pramanas, beginning with

perception, suggests a decreasing directness, which means

a greater cognitive distance from the object to be cog-

nized. It is almost a truism that an accurate description

of an object in no way equals the direct sensory percep-

tion of the object; for an accurate description is what

reliable statement, sabda, really amounts to.

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20

7 The Syllogism

It is through philosophical debate that the true nature of

a fact is ascertained:

vimrsya paksapratipaksabhyam arthavadharanam nirnayah,

Ascertainment is determining a thing [concerning which]

doubts have arisen [; determining is done in discussion]

by means of a [philosophical] position and an adverse po-

sition (NS 1.1.41)1. Ideally, a philosophical debate pro-

ceeds in the form of a discussion (vada) in which deduc-

tive arguments, syllogisms, are put forward;

pramanatarkasadhanopalambhah siddhantaviruddhah

pancavayavopapannah paksapratipaksaparigraho vadah,

'Discussion consists in keeping up [a thesis] by means of

a [philosophical] position and an adverse position [; in

this keeping up] there is the establishing [ ie the affir-

mation of something] and censure [ie the negation of some-

thing] through the means of valid cognition and reasoning

[meant to know the truth about a knowable thing; and fur-

ther, this keeping up a thesis] is not contrary [ ie ought

not to be contrary] to established tenets and [it] is ac-

companied by the five members [of the syllogism] (NS

1.2.1 )*. In this definition of a genuine philosophical in-

quiry meant to find the truth about a thing, the instru-

ments for getting valid knowledge, the four means of valid

cognition, as well as the syllogism are explicitly men-

tioned. Even though, ultimately, the means of valid cogni-

tion produce all true knowledge, the syllogism is in fact

-- according to this definition -- the moving force of

dialectically putting forward a doctrinal point of dis-

pute, for it is said that this putting forward, keeping

up, parigraha, is accompanied by, upapanna, the five mem-

bers of the deductive syllogism. Deduction means validly

inferring a particular fact from given general facts which

function as major and minor premises. It is regarded in

the Nyaya as the supreme kind of reasoning, paramo nyayah

(NBh 12.1). Paksilasvamin writes:

kah punar ayam nyayah ? pramanair arthaparlksanaitt

nyayah. pratyaksagamasritam anumanaft sanvlksa.

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21

'But what is this nyaya (sound reasoning)? Nyaya (sound

reasoning) is investigating an object with the means of

valid cognition. Such investigation is [actually] in-

ference based on perception and tradition [which when

valid is reliable statement] (NBh 8.3-4)'. These words

signify that the correct syllogism is an explicit

inference.

A complete syllogism consists of five members:

pratij nahetudaharanopanayanigamanany avayavah,1 The members [of the syllogism] are: thesis, reason,

example, application and conclusion (NS 1.1.32) " . I will

now give the NS' s definitions of these terms along with

some of Paksilasvamin1s clarifications.

sadhyanirdesah pratijna,

'The thesis means indicating what is to be demonstrated

(NS 1.1.33)1. The thesis should specify the subject and

the property of which it must be proved that it occurs in

the subject: in other words, the thesis is a proposition

which specifies the subject and the probandum.

prajnapanlyena dharmena dharmino visistasya

parigrahavacanam pratiina,

'The thesis is keeping up [as a hypothesis] that a par-

ticular property-bearer is possessed of a property that is

yet to be shown [to occur in that property-bearer] (NBh

81.7)'. And elsewhere, Paksilasvamin says:

sadhyasya dharmasya dharmina sambandhopadanaiTi

pratij narthah y

'The purport of the thesis is accepting that there is a

connexion of a property-bearer with a property that is to

be proved [to occur in the property-bearer] (NBh 91.3)'.

The example of a thesis given by Paksilasvamin is:

anityah sabda iti,

'Sound is non-eternal (NBh 81 .*8 ) ' . This necessarily means

all sounds, but unlike Aristotelian logic, NS- and NBh-

logic do not use an explicit quantifier. Here, sound is

the property-bearer, while non-eternity is the property of

which we wish to prove that it occurs in the property-

bearer, sound.

As such, this statement is not yet a piece of solid

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22

knowledge? for being that it requires a valid logical

reason, hetu. The next sutra defines the reason:

udaharanasadharmyat sadhyasadhanam hetuh,

'That [property, probans] which demonstrates the probandum

is the logical reason in so far as the same property [the

probans] occurs in the example (NS 1,1.34)'. It is neces-

sarily implied here that the probans (hetu) occurs in the

subject of which the other property, the probandum, must

be proved to occur in it. If the probans would not be a

property of the subject, the whole reasoning of the syl-

logism becomes nonsensical. The example in which the

probans must occur too, is a commonly acknowledged fact,

drstanta; in the drstanta brought forward as exemplifica-

tion in the syllogism, the probans and probandum are seen

together as related or connected (sambaddha) properties .

The commentary states:

udaharanasamanyat sadhyasa dharmasya sadhanam prajnapanam

hetuh, sadhye pratisandhaya dharmam udaharane ca pratisan-

dhaya tasya sadhanatavacanam hetuh. utpattidharmakatvad

iti. utpattidharmakam anityam drstam iti,

'The reason is that which demonstrates [or] shows the pro-

perty that is to be proved through similarity with the

example; the reason is the verbal expression of the fact

that the [particular property now occurring in the sub-

ject] is the probans, after it is remembered that the pro-

perty [the probans] occurs in the subject and after it is

remembered that it [also] occurred in the example. [As in

the illustrative syllogism: sound is non-eternal] because

it possesses the property of production [ie of being pro-

duced]. It is seen [and hence well-known] that [every-

thing] which has the property of production is non-eternal

(NBh 82.2-4)', Paksilasvamin clearly states that the pro-

bans, the hetu, is present in the subject. In the illus-

trative syllogism, 'the property of production1 serves as

probans; 'being non-eternal1 is the probandum. Whatever is

produced is acknowledged by all to be ephemeral, non-

eternal. The only logical connexion between probans and

probandum, according to Paksilasvamin, is the fact that

both are always seen (drsta) together in the commonly ac-

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23

knowledged fact (drstanta) serving as example (udaharana).

In order to be valid, the reason must not occur in

examples in which the contrary of the probandum is found.

Thus, for example, the property of production which is

probans, must not be present in things that are eternal,

which is the contrary of being non-eternal. Hence the NS

declares: tatha vaidharmyat, 'And in so far as that

property [ie the probans] does not occur [in a contrary

example] (NS 1 • 1•35) *• We have to supply the beginning of

NS 1.1.34 to give the proper sense to this sutra: 'That

[property] which demonstrates the probandum is the reason

[also] in so far as this property does not occur [in a

contrary example]'; this would have been the complete

formulation.

Paksilasvamin explains it at some greater length:

udaharanavaidharmyac ca sadhyasadhanaffl hetuh,

'The reason is that which demonstrates the probandum also

in so far as this property [the probans] is absent from

[contrary] examples (NBh 83.2)'. For if the probans would

also occur with a property contrary to the probandum, the

probans would never conclusively prove the probandum and

consequently the syllogism would sometimes fail.

Paksilasvamin continues:*

katham anityah sabdah utpattidharmakatvat.

anutpattidharmakam nityam yathatmadi dravyam iti,

'How [as in our illustrative syllogism:] is sound non-

eternal?; because it possesses the property of production.

That which is eternal does not possess the property of

production such as [all the unborn, eternal] substances

beginning with the soul (NBh 83.2-3)'. Paksilasvamin im-

plies here that being a product and being impermanent al-

ways go together, and that being unborn and being eternal

always go together, whilst being a product and being per-

manent or being unborn and being non-eternal never go

together.

The validity of the syllogism is based on the example

in which a commonly known fact is put forward in support

of the logical reason. The definition of the example is as

follows.

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24

sadhyasadharmyat taddharmabhavi drstanta udaharanam,fA generally-accepted fact which possesses the property

[to be demonstrated, the probandum] of the [subject] is a

[valid] example [in the syllogism] in so far as the same

property [the probans being a known property] of the sub-

ject occurs [in the generally-accepted fact] (NS 1.1.36)1.

In this aphorism it is emphasized that the probans (hetu)

must be found in the subject, as well as in the positive

example where it occurs with the probandum. The positive

example is a drstanta which is positive because of the

following two facts: a. in it occurs the probandum

(taddharmabhavin); b. in so far as it also possesses the

probans, a known property of the subject (sadhyasa-

dharmyat ), this drstanta can function as a valid, true,

and positive example in reasoning. The ablative sadhya-

sadharmyat expresses the condition under which the

drstanta is positive, namely: the drstanta which possesses

the probandum should also possess the probans. The example

is not simply an analogous instance cited to make the

thesis more plausible, but the mentioning of a fact that

is acknowledged to be true by all. One is tempted to say

that what is implied here is: a drstanta is a fact con-

sisting in an indefinite number of cases where the probans

and the prodandum have been seen together, not a fact con-

sisting in one single case in which the probans and the

probandum have been seen together. But this interpretation

of drstanta is not explicitly given in the NS, even though

it is a very likely one. It seems that the syllogism as

outlined in the NS itself already offers the framework of

a sound deductive proof.

The phrase sadhyasadharmyat Paksilasvamin glosses as

follows:

sad-hyena sadharmyam samanadharmata,1Sadharmya with the subject means being [endowed] with the

same property [as the subject] (NBh 83.5)'. The fsame pro-

perty1 refers to the known property of the subject; this

known property acts as logical reason because it is seen

together with the property to be proved. In the drstanta

we notice that it is always the case that whenever there

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25

is the probans there is the probandum.

The phrase taddharma is glossed*

tasya dharmas taddharmah. tasya sadhyasya,1Taddharma [means] the property of that; of that [means]

of the subject (NBh 84.1 ) f • The property of the subject

here refers to the property that is to be proved, of which

it is said that it occurs in the drstanta. The definition

in the sutra itself is constructed as follows: the

generally-accepted fact has the probandum, and because it

also has the probans, it serves as a valid example in the

syllogism. To substantiate the importance of the drstanta

in syllogistic, deductive reasoning, I will quote the de-

finition of drstanta given in the NS with Paksilasvamin's

explanation. The sutra defines,

laukikapariksakanam yasminn arthe buddhisamyam sa

drstantah,

'A generally-accepted fact is a thing of which ordinary

people and [learned] investigators have the same cognition

(NS 1.1.25)1. Thus a drstanta is a thing, situation or

fact that is accepted to be really the case by non-experts

and experts alike. The term drstanta by itself already

evokes this idea of universal acceptance, for it literally

means ascertainment, definite settlement (anta) seen, di-

rectly perceived, acknowledged (drsta) [by all]. For

example, everyone, non-experts and experts, knows that

wherever there is smoke there is fire, or that everything

created must some day perish, is non-eternal.'

Paksilasvamin says somewhere about drstanta:

atha drstantah pratyaksavisayo 'rthah. yatra laukikapari-

ksakanam darsanam na vyahanyate,8Now drstanta is a thing which is an object of direct per-'

ception concerning which the vision of both ordinary

people and [learned] investigators is not confused (NBh

10.3-4)'. And a little further he describes the importance

of the drstanta:

tadasrayav anumanagamau. tasmin sati syatam anumana-

gamav asati ca na syatam,

"inference and tradition [consisting of reliable state-

ments] are both based on a [drstanta].

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26

When this [drstanta] is present, inference and [reliable]

tradition are possible [ie can be regarded as pramanas],

when the [drstanta] is absent, [inference and reliable

tradition] are impossible (NBh 10.4-5)'• These two pas-

sages explicitly state that a drstanta should be used in

drawing a correct inference; this means that a syllogism

(in which drstantas are formulated) could simply be con-

sidered a verbalized inference. The idea that reliable

statements (sabda, agama) too, should be based on a

drstanta suggests that the ideal reliable statement is not

different from syllogistic reasoning.

In the commentary on NS 1.1.25 Paksilasvamin

delineates the function of drstanta in dialectical discus-

sions and the syllogism;

drstantavirodhena hi pratipaksah pratiseddhavya

bhavantiti drstantasamadhina ca svapaksah sthapanlya

bhavantlti; avayavesu codaharanaya kalpata itiy

'For, the opposite positions must be contradicted through

[their] disagreement with a generally-accepted fact, and

one's own positions must be established through [their]

agreement with a generally-accepted fact; and [moreover]

in the syllogism [the generally-accepted fact] adequately

serves as the example (NBh 73.2-3)'.

Returning to the discussion on the example, we find

that Paksilasvamin shows its use in the illustrative

syllogism: sound is non-eternal because it has the

property of production.

sabdo fpy utpattidharmakatvad anityah sthalyadivad iti.

udahriyate dharmayoh sadhyasadhanabhava ity udaharanam,

'Also sound, because it possesses the property of produc-

tion, is non-eternal like [all produced] things [such as]

vessels etc. By this [well-known fact] it is exemplified

that the two properties function as probandum and probans;

in this manner the example [works] (NBh 85.1-2)'. The

well-known fact here, is that all visible and tangible ob-

jects like cooking vessels etc. are seen to be made by

someone, and are seen to be subject to decay. It is im-

plied although not clearly stated that the two properties

are invariably concomitant .

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27

To the phrase in NS 1.1.35 'And in so far as that property

[the probans] does not occur [in a contrary example]1 cor-

responds a definition of the contrary example.

tadviparyayad va viparltam (NS 1.1.37), f0r [the example

is] contrary in so far as the [generally-accepted fact

constituting the example] is contrary [ie a generally-

accepted fact which does not possess the probandum is a

valid contrary example in so far as the probans does not

occur in it either]1. It has been said in NS 1.1.35 that

the probans should never occur with properties contrary to

the probandum, which is the same as saying that the pro-

bans should not occur without the probandum. The contrary

example shows that when the probandum is absent, the pro-

bans is likewise absent. Paksilasvamin illustrates this

through the familiar syllogism on sound:

anityah sabda utpattidharmakatvat. anutpattidharmakam

nityam atmadi. so 'yam atmadir drstantah sadhyavaidharmyad

anutpattidharmakatvad ataddharmabhavl; yo 'sau sadhyasya

dharmo 'nityatvam sa tasmin na bhavatlti,

'Sound is non-eternal because it possesses the property of

production. [Every substance that] is eternal [like] the

soul etc. does not possess the property of production.

This generally-accepted fact, starting with [unborn, eter-

nal substances like] the soul, while not possessing the

property [the probandum] of the [subject, namely non-

eternity] is [a valid logical example] in so far as in it

[ie in the drstanta] does not occur the property [the

probans] of the subject, [that is to say] the property of

production; ie this property [the probandum ie] non-

eternity of the subject is not present in this [drstanta]

(NBh 86.1-3)1.21

The fourth step in the syllogism is called upanaya,

'application1•

udaharanapeksas tathety upasamharo na tatheti

va sadhyasyopanayah,

'The application of the subject is [its] summing up based

on the [positive and contrary] examples: either [some-

thing] is thus [the case], or it is not (NS 1.1.38)1. In

the application, we must ascertain whether the property,

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28

being present in the subject, is really the same property

(as probans) we saw in the positive examples to be con-

nected with the probandumf and in the contrary examples to

be never connected with the contrary of the probandum,

which implies that when the probandum is absent, the pro-

bans is absent. Application means that the general rule of

the drstanta and the particular fact of the hetu is ap-

plied to, literally brought near (upa and verb, root nlE),

the subject, sadhya; the latter is compared to the posi-

tive examples and found to possess the same property (pro-

bans ) or compared to the contrary examples found to be to-

tally different from them. In the Bhasya it is shown how

the application is used,1••.sthalyadi dravyam utpattidharmakam anityam drstam

tatha sabda utpattidharmaka-iti sadhyasya

sabdasyotpattidharmakatvam upasamhriyate ffIt is seen that a substance [like] a vessel etc. which

is non-eternal has the property of production, [and]

thus [in the same way], sound has the property of produc-

tion; in this manner, the fact that sound, the subject,

possesses the property of production is summed up (NBh

87.3-4)'. This is the application based on a positive

example; the application according to a contrary example

runs as follows:

atmadi dravyam anutpattidharmakam nityam drstam na tatha

sabda iti: anutpattidharmakatvasyopasamharapratisedhenot-

pattidharmakatvam upasamhriyate,

'It is seen that a substance [like] the soul etc. which is

eternal does not have the property of production, [and]

sound is not like that; in this way, the fact that [sound]

has the property of production is summed up by means of a

negation, being the summing up of the fact that

[substances contrary to sound] possess the property of

non-production [ie are never created] (NBh 87.5-6)'.

The last step in the syllogism is the conclusion:

hetvapadesat pratijnayah punarvacanam nigamanam,

'After [again] pointing out the reason, the repetition

of the thesis [becomes] the conclusion [of the syllogism]

(NS 1.1.39)'. In the application it was decisively estab-

Page 55: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

29

lished that the subject resembles the positive examples in

so far as the probans occurs in all; now it remains to

come to the logical conclusion of the syllogism. By point-

ing out the reason — the probans which was seen to be

connected with the probandum — and by stating that a cer-

tain subject is endowed with that probandum, the unfounded

thesis is made into a proved assertion, a true proposi-

tion. Paksilasvamin shows the workings of the conclusion

in his syllogism on sound:

tasmad utpattidharmakatvad anityah sabda iti nigamanamy

'Therefore [ie on the strength of the application and

the drstanta], because it possesses the property of

production, sound is non-eternal, thus [runs] the conclu-

sion (NBh 88.3-4)'.

The complete syllogism on the perishableness of sound

has the following form:

thesis : sound is non-eternal,

reason : because it is produced,

positive example : every substance that is

produced is non-eternal,

counter example : every substance that is not

produced is eternal

application : it is known that sound is

produced, like all substances

mentioned in the positive

example, while it is also

known that every eternal sub-

stance mentioned in the con-

trary example is not produced

conclusion : therefore sound is non-

eternal, because it is

produced .

The deductive reasoning as set forth in this syl-

logism was not done in quite the same order in the mind of

the speaker of the syllogism when he first drew the in-

ference. He must have started from the generally-accepted

fact, ie an object of direct perception (pratyaksa),

remembered this perceived fact and when a certain thing

was not perceptible, he hit on the reason and consequently

Page 56: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

30

inferred the imperceptible thing to be present. To give an

an example: it is common knowledge that smoke is always

produced by fire (this piece of knowledge is drstanta);

once a person who knows this sees smoke somewhere without

fire, he infers (hetu) the necessary presence of fire on

the strength of the remembered drstanta. When he expresses

his judgement in this syllogism, however, that same person

first states as a thesis the fact he inferred, for he will

wish to start by making clear what he is going to prove;

only then will he give the reason and the commonly-known

fact from which the conclusion, that was initially offered

as a thesis, is drawn. Thus the order of steps in the

Nyaya-syllogism is not a natural but an effective rhetori-

cal one.

1.8 Trustworthiness of the speaker

It was shown above that reliable statements (sabda) are

of two kinds. Firstly, statements about visible things,

statements that might ideally take the form of correct

syllogisms; and secondly, statements about invisible ob-

jects, statements that are incapable of direct verifica-

tion. Especially as regards the latter, the truth of the

statement is wholly dependent on the trustworthiness of

the speaker, whereas the truth of the former kind of

statement is verifiable by direct perception and by test-

ing the logical validity if the statement is a syllogism.

True statements on invisible things ultimately refer

to statements concerning religious beliefs and values that

go beyond the ken of the empirical world. These values,

like final emancipation and the liberation from suffering,

are propagated by teachers of religion who have to be re-

liable if their doctrines are to be taken seriously. For

the Nyaya-philosopher, the supreme religious values are

those that are laid down by the ancient seers ( rsi ) in

the sacred texts of the Vedas. Hence, the follower of the

Nyaya (in accordance with his own epistemology) will

regard these holy texts as the trustworthy utterances

(sabda) of reliable expert speakers (apta). The trustwor-

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31

thiness of the Vedas rests upon the trustworthiness of the

ancient seers, while the trustworthiness of the latter

must be inferred from their moral excellence. Religious

authority can only come from ethical superiority and the

usefulness of the religous precepts. In general, religious

instruction will call attention to the supreme good of

complete freedom from suffering, and reveal the way to

that exalted goal. In NS 2.1.69 we find only one rationale

of religious authority: the salutariness of the religious

doctrine.

mantrayurvedapramanyavac ca tatpramanyam aptapramanyat,

'And the fact that the [Vedas] are a means of valid cogni-

tion [ie have authority] like the fact that incantations

and medical science are a means of valid cognition [ie

have effective authority, is derived] from the fact that

experts are a means of valid cognition (NS 2.1.69)*. The

authority of the Vedas and the authority of the medical

science and certain magical charms derive from the autho-

rity of their authors. Medical science and charms refer of

course to reliable statements about something manifest to

the senses (drstartha). The alleged effectiveness of a

charm or medical prescription can be tested in daily life,

its utility is perceptible to the senses. The Vedas are

reliable statements about what is not manifest to the sen-

ses (adrstartha). Both kinds have their proper utility;

charms and medical prescriptions are meant to ward off

temporary suffering, ie illnesses, while the Vedas are

meant to remove suffering altogether, in that they des-

cribe the road to final emancipation, the highest good

(nihsreyasa). The usefulness of these texts (Vedic as well

as medical) derives from the authoritativeness of the ex-

perts who compiled them. It is possible to interpret this

sutra, as Paksilasvamin did: the expert authors of* the

medical texts known as Ayurveda are also the authors of

the Vedas, and since the medical texts are useful in des-

cribing effective cures for diseases, the Vedic texts are

useful too, especially as regards final liberation from

suffering.

ya evapta vedarthanafo drastarah pravaktaras ca ta

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32

evayurvedaprabhrtinam ity ayurvedapramanyavad

vedapramanyam anumatavyam itiffThe same experts, (that is) those who see the objects

[described] in the Vedas and who relate [them to others],

are those ones [that see and communicate] the medical

texts etc; thus the authority of the Vedas, [which is]

like the authority of the medical texts, is inferred [from

the authority of the reliable experts] (NBh 225.1-2)f.

In what does the reliability and authority of these

experts consist? This question is not put forward in the

NS; Paksilasvamin brings it forward and proposes to answer

it. According to him, authority (pramanya) comprises:

saksatkrtadharmata bhutadaya yathabhutarthacikhyapayiseti,

'The fact of having directly perceived the dharma [the

true state of things], compassion for living beings, and

the desire to communicate the thing as it really is (NBh

223.5)'. The reliable authoritative speaker must have per-

ceived a particular thing for himself, he must know it

through his own direct perception. Further, he must have

compassion on others2**; and thirdly, through compassion he

wishes to inform others of his knowledge exactly as that

knowledge is. Only such experienced experts are assumed to

give good advice to people.

aptah khalu saksatkrtadharmana idam hatavyam idam asya

hanihetur idam asyadhigantavyam idam asyadhigamahetur iti

bhutany anukampante,

'The experts, having directly perceived the dharman [the

true state of things], show compassion on living beings in

the following way: this is [something] to be abandoned,

this is the cause of the abandonment for him [ie for the

living being the expert wishes to instruct], this is

[something] to be attained by him, this is the cause of

the attainment for him (NBh 223.5-7)*. The instruction of

the experts must have practical value for the unenlight-

ened ordinary person who wishes to know what is harmful

for him and what is beneficial. (As regards the term

dharma the reader is referred to the discussion on NBh

40.1-3).

Only practical, valuable instruction given by

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33

trustworthy experts can be regarded as reliable statement.

As a means of valid cognition, such a reliable statement

is verifiable for the hearer only in so far as the state-

ment yields the desired result in daily life. This means

that the object described by the reliable speaker must

eventually become perceivable to the hearer. The truth of

a reliable statement depends on the subsequent direct

perception by the hearer of the described object.

Paksilasvamin expresses this view in NBh, p. 25.8-26.2:

sa ceyam pramitih pratyaksapara. iijnasitam artham

aptopadesat pratipadyamano linqadarsanenapi bubhutsate#

lingadarsananumitam ca pratyaksato didrksate, pratyaksata

upalabdhe 'rthe jijnasa nivartate.1 Moreover, [all] this resultant cognition [acquired by in-

ference and reliable statements] has as its ultimate [aim]

the direct perception [of a thing, ie sound inference and

statements are based on direct perception and must ulti-

mately lead to an object of direct perception]. [For] a

person who cognizes through the instructions of an expert

a thing he wishes to knowf seeks to cognize [this thing]

also through seeing a property [of the described thing by

which property he can infer the presence or the existence

of this thing], and then he wants to see through direct

perception the [thing] he has inferred through seeing a

property [of it]. When the [previously described and sub-

sequently inferred] object has been cognized through di-

rect perception, [only then] the seeking to know stops1.

According to Paksilasvamin, the process of cognizing a

thing is only completed with the direct perception of it

if this thing has been first announced to the perceiver by

way of a reliable statement about it. Cognition acquired

through reliable statements and inferences remains in-

decisive as long as it is not corroborated by direct per-

ception. Assertions made by a certain speaker about things

that are not manifest to the senses (adrstartha) can only

be relied upon in so far as the speaker has made correct

assertions on visible things.

drstarthenaptopadesenayurvedenadrstartho vedabhago1numatavyah pramanam iti.

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34

'Of the portion of the Veda of which [portion] the object

is not manifest [to the senses], it must be inferred that

it is a means of valid cognition by [analogy with] the

medical texts which are [the same] experts1 instructions

of which the object jjs manifest [to the senses] (NBh

224.5-6)'. Still, whether the assertions of a reliable

speaker are about visible or invisible things, the main

criterion of trustworthiness remains the speaker's exper-

tise and moral superiority manifesting itself as sym-

pathizing with suffering fellow-beings. The sort of in-

ference on reliability that Paksilasvamin alludes to, can

be constructed as follows: (all) expert, compassionate

persons speak the truth, their assertions on visible

things are manifestly true; therefore their assertions on

invisible divine matters (recorded in the Vedas) are also

true.

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35

NOTES

1 . Since most of the assertions -- including those on meta-

phycial problems such as final emancipation and the eter-

nity of the soul -- in this school are supported by

reasoned discussion, nyaya, the whole system came to be

called Nyaya, cf Oberhammer 1964a, p. 308 f. The foremost

characteristic of the system was philosophical debate,

epistemology and logic, and it was precisely its episte-

mology and logic that provided a basis for further

developments in that province of learning; cf also

Ruben's remarks in NS (R) p. XIV, '... das war die

geschichtliche Tat des Begrdnders des Nyaya-Systems,

Aksapada Gautama, dass er die Behandlung der Erkenntnis-

mittel vor den GegenstSnden der Erkenntnis als neues

Kapitel der Philosophie festlegte1. And further, NS (*R),

p. XV: 'Aksapada stellt...die Reihe von 12 Erkenntnis-

gegenstSnden auf, die die Seele als Subjekt der Erkennt-

nis, die Sinne usw. als Werkzeuge zur Erkenntnis und den

Erlflsungsweg als Frucht der Erkenntnis behandeln. Aksapada

wurde damit der Begrflnder einer neuen Philosophie, indem

er die Erkenntnismittel, diese Erkenntnisgegensta*nde und

dialektische Begriffe der Debattierkunst in den Kategorien

des Nyaya als Inhalt seines Systems feststelltef.

2. It is very difficult to fix an exact time of compositon for

the NS; Tucci sums up various possibilities ranging from

200 AD to 450 AD, Tucci 1929, p. XXIII-XXIV. The same

dates are repeated in B.K Matilal, Nyaya-Vaisesika,

A History of Indian Literature, Vol VI Fasc. 2, Wiesbaden

1977, p. 78.

3. One only has to compare the Mimamsa Sutra, the Brahma

Sutra and especially the different versions of the

Vaisesika Sutra with the NS to see how much more sys-

tematic the latter is. By the time the final redaction of

the NS took place, these other texts already existed in

some form. It seems that the Vaisesika system of natural

philosophy especially had considerable influence on chap-

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36

ters 2-4 of the NS, cf Frauwallner Gesch. II, p. 7, 73 and

Tucci 1929, p. XXVIIf, as well as Oberhammer 1963, p. 70,

And yet chapters 2-4 should be regarded as the rational

inquiry into the validity of the definitions given in

chapter 1 . This inquiry sometimes entails lengthy digres-

sions, so much so that they almost seem to be interpola-

tions. Ruben called NS 2-4 the polemical chapters and

thought some of these chapters might well represent the

contents of the (oral) commentary given by Aksapada on the

definitions of NS 1, NS (R), p. XVI.

4. Frauwallner maintains that Vasubandhu's little manual on

epistemology, logic and dialectics, the Vadavidhi, fol-

lows the traditional arrangement of any such handbook, an

arrangement of which NS 1 and 5 are a classical example,

cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 107, 129 as well as Frauwallner

1959, p. 93.

5. Frauwallner thinks Paksilasvamin wrote his commentary in

the first half of the 5th century AD, Frauwallner Gesch.

II, p. 22; Potter too gives nearly the same time, 425 to

500 AD, Potter 1977, p. 239.

6. The Buddhist Dharmakirti, who wrote centuries later and

whose epistemology and logic goes far beyond the achieve-

ments of the NS and the NBh, has never lost sight of this

practical value of true knowledge; for he opens his NB

with an assumption that is very similar to NS 1.1.1,

samyagjnanapurvika sarvapurusarthasiddhir iti tad

vyutpadyate (NB 1.1),

'The [succesful] accomplishment of every human goal is

preceded by correct [true] knowledge [as a necessary con-

dition for succesful accomplishment], therefore this

[correct knowledge] is [further] explained [in NB] f.

7. It is noteworthy that final emancipation (apavarga) is

considered an object of valid cognition, or rather an ob-

ject deserving to be cognized through the means of valid

cognition, as it is the last of the 12 prameyas (objects

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37

of valid cognition) enumerated in NS 1.1.9. This list

also contains such metaphysical objects and notions as the

eternal soul (atman) and the hereafter.

atmasarlrendriyarthabuddhimanahpravrttidosapretyabhavapha-

laduhkhapavargas tu prameyam (NS 1.1.9),

'That which deserves to be cognized [through means of

valid cognition, ie that which is the object of valid

cognition] is [the following:] the soul, the body, the

senses, the objects [of the senses], cognition, the mind,

activity, moral flaws, existence in the hereafter, results

[of good and bad acts], suffering and emancipation [from

suffering]1. Thus, these matters are all capable of being

cognized and rationally inquired into through the means of

valid cognition, the pramanas.

8. Cf Ganganatha Jha's remark in NS (G) vol I, p. 83 (number

at the bottom of the page) 'The Sutra does not mean that

the knowledge of all the categories enumerated is the

direct cause of the attainment of Highest Good; what it

means is that the knowledge of these is conducive to that

end1, hence he translates NS 1.1.1 'it is the knowledge of

the real essence (or true character) of the following

sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the

Highest Good ' op cit p. 37.

9. Freedom from suffering as the highest goal of Nyaya

reminds us of Buddhism, in which the cessation of suffer-

ing is also an important aim. It is the subject matter of

the third noble truth, duhkhanirodha, 'the cessation of

suffering'.

10. It may seem strange, even contradictory, that NS 1.1.1

says 'true knowledge pj[ or concerning the pramanas 'when

true knowledge is itself the result of pramanas. But this

could be explained thus: although the pramanas produce all

our real knowledge, it is still possible and necessary to

specify our sources of knowledge by determining their num-

ber and defining the functions proper to them. We might go

so far as to say that the pramanas as sources of true

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38

knowledge gradually define themselves with increasing

precision. This actually happened in the course of time,

when more precise definitions of the pramanas and their

number were offered by subsequent thinkers as Vasubandhu,

Dignaga, Uddyotakara, Dharmakirti etc. The epistemologi-

cal as well as the logical thinking originating from the

NS and the NBh, became increasingly elaborate with these

authors.

11. Mr H. Krasser in Vienna has drawn my attention to an ar-

ticle by T. Burrow, in which it is argued that the root

ma from which the epistemological term pramana is derived,

should have as its basic meaning "to ascertain" rather

than "to measure" (T. Burrow, Sanskrit M£- 'to ascertain1,

Transactions of the Philological Society, Oxford 1980, p.

134-140). Our present interpretation of pramana as "means

of valid cognition" is based on the following paraphrase

of the term in the NBh:

upalabdhisadhanani pramananiti samakhyanirvacanasamarthyad

boddhavyam (NBh, p. 24.5),

'Pramanas are means (sadhana) [by which to acquire

correct] cognition (upalabdhi); [this meaning of the word

pramana] must be understood on the strength of the etymo-

logical explanation of the term'. The reference to this

NBh-passage I owe to Prof Steinkellner in Vienna.

12. Many, from Paksilasvamin to modern authors, have tried to

interpret the definition in NS 1.1.5, but, it seems, in

vain. The second part of the sentence remains as unintel-

ligible as ever. One only has to compare Oberhammer's

thoughts set forth in Oberhammer 1966, p. 70-71 and

Wezler's reaction thereon in Wezler 1968, p. 198 and his

own explanation brought forward in op cit p. 208-209, with

the older discussions in NS (V), p. 4 and NS (R), p. 3; p.

159-161, note 16. Strangely enough, we find no mention of

all this literature in Chakrabarti 1977, although that

monograph on NS-logic devotes a whole chapter (chapt. 2 to

be exact) to the threefold inference. Chakrabarti just

accepts Paksilasvamin's exposition as if it were per-

Page 65: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

39

fectly intelligible and harps upon the third variety,

samanyatodrsta.

13. This simple idea of connexion developed into the logical

theory of positive and negative invariable concomitance,

anvaya and vyatireka, found in later logic. The very

validity of the inference, and hence of the syllogism,

came to be based on invariable concomitance, as will be

shown in the account of Dignaga's and Dharmakirti's logic.

The inference, as presented by Paksilasvamin, constitutes

nevertheless in barest outline the workings of deduction;

the presence of fire, for instance, is deduced from the

presence of smoke which must always be accompanied.by

fire. Using the terminology of Aristotelian logic to for-

mulate the Nyaya-type of deduction, we might say: the

major premiss is that everything that has smoke has fire;

the minor premiss is that at this given place we observe

smoke, so that it follows that this place has fire. Yet

the invariable concomitance of the two objects, necessary

for a valid inference, is not referred to by Paksila-

svamin. He only says

hetudaharanayoh samarthyam paramasuksmam duhkhabodham,fThe efficacy of the reason and the example is very

subtle, difficult to understand (NBh 86.11)'. This means

that we must find out for ourselves whether the reason is

always accompanied by the probandum and whether the ex-

ample actually proves that the probans and the probandum

are connected.

14. "Desire etc." refers of course to NS 1.1.10:

icchadvesaprayatnasukhaduhkhajnanany atmano lingam,

'Desire, aversion, effort, joy, grief and knowledge are

the mark of the soul1. It is interesting to note that the

word linga can also mean logical mark; thus NS 1.1.10

seems to foreshadow Paksilasvamin1s inference on the soul.

15. Unfortunately, the problems of interpretation of NS 1.1.5

and the NBh on it are too numerous to be treated at length

in this context, but in sum we might say that the problems

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40

arise from the fact that NS 1.1.5 is no real definition at

all; the process of inference as such does not seem to be

defined, all we find is the definiendum "inference"

without an intelligible definiens. The three terms

purvavad, sesavad and samanyatodrsta have especially

puzzled everyone, even an old commentator like Paksila-

svamin, as is evident from his divergent interpretations.

16. An elaborate treatment of the threefold division of anu-

mana in the NS and the NBh would certainly take up too

much space and go far beyond the scope of this treatise.

For the present, it suffices to summarily recount Paksila-

svamin's own ideas on inference which shaped later epi-

stemological and logical thinking far more than this

single dark statement of NS 1.1.5.

17. Later, we will get acquainted with the criteria of trust-

worthiness as developed by Paksilasvamin in his commentary

on NS 1.1.69. That passage in the commentary is quite im-

portant as it bears upon Dharmaklrti's conception of the

trustworthy speaker, and hence his conception of the Bud-

dha as the ideal reliable preacher of religious doctrines.

18. In Chakrabarti 1977, p. 35, we find this translation of

NS 1.1.34: 'The reason (hetu) is [that from which we get]

what proves the probandum by virtue of the [universal]

concomitance (sadharmya) [stated] in the Exemplification1.

But such universal concomitance, although most probably

implied, is not taught here in the NS nor the NBh. As a

major logical doctrine it was developed later by the Bud-

dhist logicians Vasubandhu and Dignaga. Of course it is

true that probans and probandum must be so connected as to

yield a valid inference and a valid syllogism, but an

elaborate theory of concomitance is not found in the old

Nyaya. Chakrabarti's book -- though containing many useful

observations — is written on the basis of the unfounded

assumption that invariable concomitance is an integral

part of the logical theories in the NS, cf for example op

cit p. 7.

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41

Vidyabhusana, on the other hand, translates NS

1.1.34: !The reason is the means for establishing what is

to be established through the homogeneous or affirmative

character of the example1 NS (V) p. 14; the term sadharmya

carries more weight than homogeneity, for it can be inter-

preted as fthe fact of possessing the same property1,

which means possessing the same property as the subject

(sadhya). This 'same1 property acts as the hetu in the

syllogism. The translation of sadharmya with homogeneity

leads to the idea that the example in the syllogism is

simply an analogous instance to make the reason more plau-

sible, thus creating in the mind of the reader the impres-

sion that the NS is propounding a (primitive) proof by

analogy. Ruben renders NS 1.1.34 fDas Beweisen des zu Be-

weisenden durch die Gleichheit seiner Attribute mit denen

des Belegs ist die "Begrtindung", NS (R) p. 11, which is

still inaccurate because of the plurality of 'Attribute1

-- attributes -- where only one property, the probans must

be the ' same' in the subject and the generally accepted

fact, drstanta.

Jha's translation of NS 1.1.34 seems to do full jus-

tice to the Sanskrit: 'The "Statement of the Probans" is

that which demonstrates the Probandum, through its simi-

larity (ie a property common to it and) to the example1,

NS (G) p. 343.

19. Frauwallner always thought that the Nyaya-syllogism con-

stituted a primitive proof by analogy (Frauwallner 1957,

p. 106). Frauwallner 1959, p. 93 says the following: 'in

der Mlteren indischen Dialektik war die Beweisftthrung auf

einen blossen Analogieschluss gegrttndet. Man verwies auf

ein Beispiel [ie drstanta], bei dem der Grund mit der

Folge verbunden erscheint, und folgerte dementsprechend

auch im gegebenen Fall aus dem Vorhandensein des Grundes

das Vorhandensein der Folge [ie sadhya]. Das Gleiche

konnte auch mit Hilfe eines Gegenbeispiels geschehen. Man

zeigte an einem solchen Beispiel, dass im Zusammenhang mit

dem Fehlen des Grundes auch die Folge fehlte, und schloss

daraus, dass im Gegensatz dazu beim Vorhandensein des

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42

Grundes die Folge vorhanden sein mttsse. Die Mangelhaftig-

keit dieses Verfahrens scheint uns auf der Hand zu liegen.

Trotzdem war z.B. die Schule des Nyaya bis zur Zeit

Dignaga's nicht Uber diesen Stand hinausgekommen1. In this

passage "Grund" means hetu and "Folge" sadhya, probandum.

Even though Frauwallner does not specify the texts of the

"old Nyaya", he must be referring to both the NS and the

NBh since he says that Nyaya acknowledged only a primitive

proof by analogy up to the time of Dignaga, that, is, in

the time that the NBh already existed. Thus he believes

that the NBh too teaches only proof by analogy. His

opinion about Nyaya-logic was probably influenced by

Ruben's observation in NS (R), p. 11-12; 179 to the effect

that the syllogism taught in the NS is a simple

"Analogieschluss". This interpretation of the syllogism in

NS seems to be based on how one understands the drstanta

which in syllogistic reasoning is the example, udaharana

(drstanta is a thing or fact, udaharana the formulation of

it in the syllogism). If a drstanta is merely interpreted

as one single analogous case of which ordinary people and

learned investigators have the same cognition (NS 1.1.25),

there is justification for saying that the NS (but not the

NBh anymore) teaches a proof by analogy. On the other

hand, if drstanta is interpreted as a fact which is seen

by all to be always the case -- and such an interpretation

of NS 1.1.25 is not impossible — , then we have a real

deduction even in the NS. In the positive drstanta, the

probans is seen together with the probandum; if this is

seen to be the case only once, it is an analogous case;

but if everyone until now has seen the probans to be al-

ways accompanied by the probandum, it is no more one

analogous case but an established, perceived fact. The

root cause of the problem is whether the word "artha" in

NS 1.1.25 refers to one single case or to a fact consist-

ing in an indefinite number of observed cases. It is my

personal opinion that in NS 1.1.25 the latter is the case

(especially when drstanta is used in reasoning), so that

NS 1.1.33-39 can be understood as an (in fact far too) im-

plicit description of a deductive syllogism, ie a form of

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43

reasoning in which a particular fact is deduced from an

indefinitely large number of observed similar instances.

However, what seems to be implied in the NS is made ex-

plicit by Paksilasvamin who clearly interprets the posi-

tive drstanta as an indefinite number of cases in which

the probans is seen with the probandum. What is said here

about the positive drstanta equally applies to the con-

trary drstanta. Ruben already has said (contrary to

Frauwallner) that the NBh teaches more than a proof by

analogy. According to him, it teaches the rudiments of de-

ductive reasoning, since the positive drstanta is 'das die

AllgemeingUltigkeit dieses VerhSltnisses [ie of probans

and probandum] belegende Beispiel1, NS (R), p. 179, note

80. The NS offered the basic framework of syllogistic

reasoning in a very implicit manner, while the NBh turned

it into a more elaborate and explicit description of

deductive reasoning, thus laying the groundwork for

Vasubandhu*s and Dignaga's logic.

20. If they would not be, the inference and the syllogism in

which a drstanta showing the connexion of these two

properties is used, would become rather futile. It was

left to Vasubandhu in his description of inference and

the syllogism to state that the probans must be invariably

concomitant with the probandum. Since Vasubandhu, con-

comitance has become an essential part of logical theory,

since it explains why the probans proves the presence of

the probandum.

21. In later logic, we find the socalled threefold (trirupa)

reason (hetu), which teaches that the probans must be

present in the subject (paksa), must be present in the

positive examples (sapaksa) and must be absent from the

contrary examples (vipaksa). These three canons of the

correct reason in inference and the syllogism are fre-

quently attributed to Dignaga or a close predecessor of

his, but they are already present in the NS and clearly

set forth in the NBh. According to the NS and the NBh the

probans must occur in the positive drstanta, never in the

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44

contrary drstanta, while the probans is a known property

of the subject, ie occurs in it. The credit for indicating

that the threefold reason is actually found in the NS goes

to Randle who, incidentally, mentions this in Randle Frag,

p. 66, but cf also Randle 1930, p. 366-367. In all fair-

ness, we should add here that Ruben -- whose book was pub-

lished in 1 928 -- says the threefold hetu is an early Bud-

dhist 'Weiterbildung der Lehre des Nyaya, dass der Grund

und das Beispiel positiv und negativ sein ktinnen', NS (R),

p. 179-180.

22. It is possible to convert this into an Aristotelian syllo-

gism; major premiss (example): all produced substances are

non-eternal, minor premiss (reason): all sounds are pro-

duced, conclusion: all sounds are non-eternal. The dif-

ference, apart from the order of the members, is that in

the Indian syllogism it is simply said fsound' without any

quantifier; nevertheless, the idiom of Sanskrit allows us

to interpret 'sound1 as referring to all sounds, sound in

general, as we can say 'man1 meaning all men, not some or

many men. Similarly 'sound' in the Indian syllogism means

every possible sound, not many or some sounds, Chakrabarti

1977, p. 37-38 mentions the fact that in this form of

Indian logic quantifiers are absent, because the proposi-

tions in the syllogism are intended to be only general

propositions.

23. Paksilasvamin does not explain why compassion is part of

the authority (pramanya) of experts. He may, however, have

intended something like the idea that compassion could be

a guarantee for the hearer that the expert -- being com-

passionate and therefore unselfish — correctly communi-

cates his knowledge only in the best interests of his fel-

low beings.

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45

II. Buddhist Epistemology and Logic before Dharmaklrti

2.1 Vasubandhu

In order to grasp the importance of Dignaga's contribution

to epistemology and logic in PS and to recognize the

rudimentary ground on which the edifice of Dignaga1s

thinking is built, it is necessary to outline the theories

of his Buddhist predecessor, Vasubandhu. Fragments in

Sanskrit and Tibetan of two of Vasubandhufs works on

dialectics, logic and epistemology have come down to us

and were collected by Frauwallner (in two articles,

Frauwallner 1933 and Frauwallner 1957). These two works

are called Vadavidhana and Vadavidhi, the former seems to

have been a dialectical work dealing with logical proof

(sadhana) and refutation (dusana), while the latter also

sets forth a theory on perception (pratyaksa) and inference

(anumana), and thus contains some epistemological thought.

Vadavidhana and Vadavidhi treat much of the same topics as

the NS and the NBh. According to Vasubandhu there are only

two means of valid cognition -- although the term pramana

is not found in the extant fragments -- namely, perception

and inference. They are the sole means by which we acquire

knowledge for ourselves (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 120).

Knowledge is communicated in the form of logical proof

(sadhana) consisting of syllogisms. Vasubandhu regards the

syllogism as an explicit inference since he calls the pro-

bandum, ie what is to be proved by the syllogism, rjes su

dpag par bya ba, in Sanskrit anumeya, the thing to be

inferred. This we could render as 'inferendum1 (cf

Frauwallner 1957, p. 135, fragm 3).

2.2 Perception

In the Vadavidhi, perception is defined, tato ' rthad

vij nanaiti pratyaksam, 'Knowledge [that springs] from the

thing [alone] is perception (Frauwallner 1957, p. 138,

fragm 9 ) 1 . This definition is further explained,

yul gan gis rnam par ses pa tha snad bya ba de kho na las

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46

gal te de skye zin gzan las ma yin la / de las gzan las

kyan ma yin pa^i ses pa de mnon sum ste / dper na gzugs

la sogs pa^i ses pa dan bde ba la sogs pa^i ses pa bzin

zes pa"o //

'When knowledge comes from [ie is caused by] only that

[real] object [in accordance] with which [this knowledge]

can be designated, and not from another [object], then

this knowledge [which is] not also [caused] by [something]

different from this [first real object] is direct percep-

tion, as the knowledge of [outer objects such as] forms

etc.f and the knowledge of [internal objects such as] hap-

piness etc (Frauwallner 1957, p. 1371, fragm 9, lines 2-

5) 1 . It is important to note that perception is not con-

sidered to be only knowledge received by the senses -- as

in NS 1.1.4 — but perception must also include the intro-

spective awareness of feelings and emotions. Vasubandhu

seems to maintain that it is only after objects have been

directly cognized that we are able to give names to them,

when he says 'When knowledge comes from [ ie is caused by]

only that [real] object [in accordance] with which [this

knowledge] can be designated1. This can be related with NS

1.1.4, where perception is defined as avyapadesya, 'not

[yet] expressible in language1. Both Vasubandhu and the NS

1.1.4 seem to assert that a thing can be given a name only

after it has been perceived by pure sensation. The NS-

definition emphasizes the purely sensational character of

perception before it is put in words. Vasubandhu, on the

other hand, seems to emphasize that only after having per-

ceived an object is one capable of giving it a name. Yet

both say that perception is a form of cognition that may

not be constituted by language.

Vasubandhu further says that his definition is in-

tended to exclude from genuine perception, erroneous

knowledge, ^khrul pa*i ses pa, knowledge of what is con-

ventional or conceptual, kun rdzob pa"i ses pa, and

knowledge derived from inference, rjes su dpag pa"i ses

pa. He says,

*di ni "khrul pa^i ses pa bsal te / dper na na phyis la

dnul gyi ses pa lta bu"o // de ni dnul gyis ses pa"o zes

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47

tha snad byed pa la de dnul las skye be van ma yin gyi /

na phyis kho nas de bskyed par bya ba^o //

'With this [definition of perception as knowledge solely

caused by the object], erroneous knowledge is rejected [as

belonging to perception as pramana], as the [erroneous]

knowledge of silver with regard to mother of pearl. While

[in accordance] with silver this [erroneous knowledge] is

designated [by the perceiver as:] 'knowledge of silver1,

it does not also come from [ie is not caused by real]

silver, but it is caused solely by mother of pearl1. This

example is similar to NBh, p. 30,1-3 (translated and dis-

cussed in the previous chapter) where the notion 'water1

attributed to a mirage is rejected as right perception.

Vasubandhu continues,

kun rdzob pa^i ses pa yan *dis gsal te / de ltar ni bum

pa^i ses pa zes pa *di ltar de bum pa la sogs pa rnams

kyis tha snad bya zin / de de rnams las ^byun ba ni ma yin

te / de rnams ni kun rdzob tu yod pa nid kyis rgyu ma yin

pa nid kyi phyir ro // gzugs la sogs pa de ltar yan dag

par zen pa rnams kho na las de ^byun no //

'With this [definition] knowledge of what is conventional

[ie conceptual] is rejected too. Such [conceptual know-

ledge] can thus be designated [as:] "knowledge of a pot"

[in accordance] with [conventional, conceptual objects

such as] pots etc, [but] this [knowledge] does not come

from those [conventional objects] because by their only

existing conventionally [ie as concepts] they are not the

cause [of this conventional, conceptual knowledge]. This

[knowledge] comes only from forms etc that are correctly

ascertained thus [ ie as pots etc]'. Knowledge of objects

(such as pots) that exist only conventionally, that is, as

a concept projected on to a certain form or collection of

parts, is rejected here as true direct perception. Kun

rdzob tu yod pa, samvrtisat, 'what exists conventionally

or conceptually1 is explained by Vasubandhu in the

Abhidharmakosabhasya as follows,

yasminn avayavaso bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat

samvrtisat. tadyatha ghatah. tatra hi kapalaso bhinne

ghatabuddhir na bhavati

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48

(AKBh, p. 334.3-4), [When,] after [a thing] has been

divided into [its component] parts, there is no cognition

of the [thing any more], [then] that [thing] exists [only]

conventionally [ ie as a concept]. As a pot [exists only

conventionally], for when the [pot] is divided into pot-

sherds [ie its component parts], there is no cognition of

the pot [any more]1. Lastly, Vasubandhu differentiates

perceptual knowledge from inferential knowledge.

rjes su dpag pa^i ses pa yan ^di kho nas bsal te / du ba"i

ses pa dan ^brel pa dran pa dag las kyafi de byun gi me kho

na las ma yin pas so //

'With the same [pratyaksa definition] inferential know-

ledge is rejected, because, [for example,] this [inferen-

tial knowledge of fire] comes from the knowledge of smoke

[through perception] as well as the recollections of the

[inseparable] connexion [of smoke with fire], but [the in-

ferential knowledge] does not [at all] come only from

fire1 (all three passages from Frauwallner 1957, p. 137,

fragm 9 lines 5-15). Although the last two negations are a

significant improvement on the old NS-definition of per-

ception, the idea from NS 1.1.4 that perception should be

non-erroneous, is retained. The Tibetan ^khrul pa most

probably translates Sanskrit bhranta, 'erroneous1. Now,

whether we say that perception should be avyabhicari (NS

1.1.4) or not bhranta really amounts to the same state-

ment, for vyabhicari and bhranta are synonymous. With some

degree of certainty we may say that Vasubandhu used the NS

1.1.4 and the NBh as one of the starting-points for devel-

oping his own perception theory, which can be summarized

thus: perception is pure awareness of any object whatso-

ever, outer object or internal mental object; this aware-

ness, in order to have the status of means of valid cogni-

tion, must be non-erroneous, must be free from concep-

tualizations and, lastly, must not be the product of

inference.

2.3 Inference

Vasubandhu maintains, in accordance with NS 1.1.5, that

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49

inference (anumana) as a means of valid cognition is

preceded by perception, because the act of directly per-

ceiving is mentioned in his definition of inference as the

basis of the inferential thought process.

nantariyakarthadarsanam tadvido ^numanam,

'The observation of an object that is invariably con-

comitant [with another object] for him who knows the

[invariable concomitance of the one object with the other]

constitutes inference (Frauwallner 1957, p. 138, fragm

10)'. If we have seen before through perception and hence

know that two things are always connected, ie are in-

variably concomitant (nantariyaka), we can validly infer

the presence of one object from seeing only the object

that always accompanies it. Vasubandhu gives an example of

invariable concomitance in the commentary on this

definition, dper na me^i du ba lta bu^o, 'for example as

smoke [is invariably concomitant] with fire (Frauwallner

1957, p. 138, fragm 10, line 3 ) 1 . We know, because we have

observed it, that whenever there is smoke, there in-

variably is fire. Only someone who knows that smoke is in-

variably concomitant with fire, ie has seen that smoke is

always produced by fire, can validly infer fire from

seeing smoke alone. This is an improvement of Paksila-

svamin who maintained that inference is 'seeing the con-

nexion between a property and the property-bearer and

seeing the property [connected with the property-bearer]

(NBh 33.3) f, for Vasubandhu explicitly states that the in-

ferendum must be invariably concomitant with the inferens

to generate a correct inference . Paksilasvamin simply

demands that they be connected. Yet, I think it is evident

that Vasubandhu built his theory of inference on Paksila-

vamin's idea of inference found in the NBh passage quoted

above. Both thinkers define inference in general as in-

directly seeing or knowing an object to be present some-

where from actually seeing an object that is connected

with the object that is to be inferred. But to this

general principle, Vasubandhu adds the principle of in-

variable concomitance. Vasubandhu describes inference

proper rather briefly, but he unfolds his theories on

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50

deductive reasoning (which is inference after all) fully

in his description of the syllogism. In this he follows

the pattern of the NS and the NBh, where deduction is only

fully set forth in the exposition of the syllogism.

2.4 The Syllogism

Vasubandhu regards the syllogism as the sole means of

soundly proving a fact to others, and hence he seems to

imply that the only way of communicating true knowledge is

through the syllogism. For he does not mention anywhere in

the extant fragments comparison (upamana) and reliable

statement (sabda) as means of valid cognition, nor does

tradition ascribe to him the acceptance of these two

pramanas. His successor Dignaga, for example, nowhere says

that Vasubandhu accepted more than two pramanas, nor does

Uddyotakara in his Nyayavarttika. From their silence on

this, we must assume that the recognition of pratyaksa and

anumana as the only pramanas originated with Vasubandhu.

In Buddhist epistemological thinking after him, the scheme

of two pramanas became authoritative.

Vasubandhu prescribes that logical proof (sadhana)

consists of three members instead of the five of the old

Nyaya (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 118). The three steps in

Vasu-bandhu's syllogism are, pratij na, thesis, hetu,

reason or probans and drstanta, generally-accepted fact.

We recognize the Nyaya-terminology here, although the

third step is not called udaharana, 'example1 any more but

drstanta, in accordance with the datum that acts as the

real basis of the logical example. Thus the term udaharana

is abolished as inessential.

Since Vadavidhi is Vasubandhufs most important work

on logic (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 105), and since it is

from that work that the largest fragments have survived

(collected in Frauwallner 1957), I will now give the logic

from Vadavidhi except in the few cases where Vadavidhana

is more explicit.

Vasubandhu first defines the subject in the syl-

logism, pakso vicaranayam isto ^rthah, 'The subject is the

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51

thing that is intended for examination (Frauwallner 1957,

p. 135, fragm 1) 1. This examination takes place in the

syllogism, the steps of which are now discussed. In the

thesis one announces that a property, the inferendum, must

occur in the subject, sadhyabhidhanam pratijna, 'The

thesis consists in mentioning what is to be proved [ie the

presence of an inferendum in the subject] (Frauwallner

1957, p. 135, fragm 3 ) 1 . Except for the term abhidhana,

this definition is identical in its wording with the NS

1.1.33, sadhyanirdesah pratijna. Vasubandhu elucidates his

definition by saying,

me dan sa bon dan mi rtag pa nid rnams rjes su dpag par

bya ba nid du dper brjod pa^i phyir chos tsam rjes su dpag

par bya ba nid du mnon par *dod do zes rtogs par bya^o,

'It must be uderstood that only [one] property [of the

subject] is intended to be the inferendum (rjes su dpag

par bya ba, anumeya) [in the thesis] because, for example,

fire, a seed and non-eternity are mentioned as inferendum

(Frauwallner 1957, p. 135 fragm 3) f. In the thesis, one

thing is mentioned of which it is to be proved that it oc-

curs in the subject. What was called sadhya, probandum, in

the NS 1.1.34 is now called anumeya, the thing that is to

be inferred; the latter term could be rendered 'inferen-

dum1. The term sadhya Vasubandhu seems to reserve here for

the relation that is to be proved between the inferendum

and the subject. In the NBh, sadhya could mean^ both the

relation of the probandum with the subject and the proban-

dum as such.3 In the examples of inferenda, we find (a)

fire which must be inferred from the presence of smoke,

(b) a seed which must be inferred to be the origin of a

plant and (c) non-eternity (of sound) which must be in-

ferred from the fact that the subject was produced.

The second step of the syllogism is the reason, ie

that which proves that the inferendum occurs in the sub-

ject, tadrgavinabhavidharmopadarsanam hetuh, 'The reason

consists in pointing to the property which is invariably

concomitant with such [an inferendum like fire, seed, non-

eternity etc.] (Frauwallner 1957, p. 136, fragm 4)'. The

Sankrit term used here for invariable concomitant is

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52

avinabhavin, which literally means 'never occurring or

being without1 and hence 'always occurring together'. We

know that smoke always occurs with fire/ so that when we

wish to prove the presence of fire at a particular spot,

we give as a reason the occurrence of smoke at that spot.

Such a reason is valid because smoke always does occur

with fire. After this definition, Vasubandhu says,

don gan sgra mi rtag pa nid la sogs pa bsgrub par bya ba

de "draba ste / de^i rigs can med na don gan zig ^gar yan

^byun ba ma yin pa ste / rtsol ba las byun ba nid ni mi

rtag pa nid lta bu dan du ba ni me lta bu^o zes pa de ni

de *dra ba med na mi byufi ba^i chos can tey

'Such [means:] that thing that is to be proved, [like] the

non-eternity of sound etc. Whatever thing [functioning as

the probans ] does not occur when such [a thing, the in-

ferendum ] is not present, that [thing] is the property

[probans] which is invariably concomitant with such [a

thing, the inferendum], like the fact that production by

effort [is invariably concomitant with] non-eternity, and

like [the fact that] smoke [is invariably concomitant

with] fire (Frauwallner 1975, p. 135, fragm 4)'.

Vasubandhu gives here a definition of invariable

concomitance: the probans is invariably concomitant with

the probandum when the probans occurs with the probandum,

and does not occur when the probandum is not present.

What seems to be missing in this account of the

reason^ is the mentioning of the three criteria of a cor-

rect hetu. It was implicitly present in NS 1.1.34-37 and

NBh^ but Vasubandhu mentions it explicitly in the Vada-

vidhana. The hetu-definition in that work runs, hetur

vipaksad visesah, 'The reason is a thing [ie a property]

that is different from [the properties occurring in] the

[class of objects that are] dissimilar to the subject

(Frauwallner 1933, p. 480, fragm 7 ) 1 . In this rather short

definition, it is said that the reason — being a known

property of the subject (paksa) and occurring in all in-

stances similar to the subject (sapaksa) -- does not occur

in any instances that are contrary to the subject

(vipaksa). In NS 1.1.36-37 and in the NBh, positive in-

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53

stances were called positive example, ie the drstanta in

which the probans and the probandum were seen together,

the contrary example being the drstanta in which the

probans never occurs. In the Vadavidhana-definition of the

hetu, the presence of the hetu in the subject and in posi-

tive instances is apparently implied; all that is said is

that the hetu does not occur in the contrary instances.

Fortunately, an important sentence from Vasubandhufs com-

mentary on this definition has survived;

vrttav aha, yo dharmah paksasya sapakse siddho

vipakse nasti,fIn the commentary [Vasubandhu] said, [the hetu is that]

property of the subject which is known [to occur] in the

positive instances and [which] does not occur in the con-

trary instances (Frauwallner 1933, p. 480, fragm 7a)1.

Here it is clearly said that the probans is a property of

the subject (paksa) and it is known to occur in those in-

stances that are similar to the subject, collectively

called sapaksa, while the probans does not occur in the

instances that are dissimilar to the subject, collectively

called vipaksa.

The last step in the syllogism is the generally-

accepted fact, drstanta, from which the validity of the

probans is derived. In the Vadavidhi, the drstanta is

defined as follows: tayoh sambandhanidarsanaiTi drstantah,!The generally-accepted fact [serving as example] consists

in showing the connexion of the two [ ie the invariable

concomitance of the probans with the inferendum]

(Frauwallner 1957, p. 136, fragm 5 ) 1 . The commentary

paraphrases this definition,

de dag gi ste de *dra ba dan de med na mi *byun ba^i

bsgrub par bya ba dan sgrub par byed pa dag gi^brel pa ste

med na mi *byun ba nid gan gis nes par ston pa de dpe^o //

(Frauwallner 1957, p. 136, fragm 5), ' "Of the two"

[means:] of the probandum [ie inferendum] and the probans

that are invariably concomitant, "connexion" [means:] the

invariable concomitance [ ie the never occurring of the

probans without the inferendum], that by which [this con-

nexion] is shown, is called "generally-accepted fact"1.

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54

Through the drstanta we have to show the invariable con-

comitance of the probans with the inferendum. This kind of

drstanta corresponds to the notion of sapaksa in the

Vadavidhana-definition of the triple hetuf because the

sapaksa actually evidences that the probans always occurs

with the inferendum. What seems to be missing in Vadavidhi

is the drstanta which shows that the probans never occurs

when the inferendum is absent, ie a drstanta corresponding

to the vipaksa. Only in Vadavidhana is there a definition

of drstanta as directly referring to the triple hetu:

tatha siddho drstantah, 'The generally-accepted fact is

established in this way [ ie as sapaksa and vipaksa ]

(Frauwallner 1933, p. 301, fragm 8 ) 1 . So here we have the

generally-accepted fact showing the positive invariable

concomitance of the probans with the inferendum, and one

that shows their negative invariable concomitance.

Vasubandhu's notion of positive and contrary drstantas can

be compared with Paksilasvamin1s remark on the positive

example, 'By this [ie by this positive drstanta] is ex-

emplified that the two properties function as probandum

and probans (NBh 85.1-2)'; but why the two properties are

probandum and probans he leaves unsaid. About the contrary

example he says, 'This [negative] generally-accepted fact

... does not posses the property [ie the probandum] of the

[subject] because in it [ie in the negative drstanta] does

not occur the property [ ie the probans] of the subject

(NBh 86.2)'. Vasubandhu is much more precise because he

says why two properties are probans and probandum, namely

through positive and negative invariable concomitance,

which comes into view through the two drstantas.

Paksilasvamin1s imprecision arises from his failure to

clearly recognize invariable concomitance as a fundamental

logical principle.

2.5 Dignaga

The most accomplished Buddhist thinker on epistemology and

logic before Dharmaklrti was Dignaga who lived 480-540 AD

(Frauwallner 1961, p. 134-137). Dignaga was a very pro-

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55

lific author, as can be seen from the list of works he

wrote (cf Hattori 1968, p. 6-10). In his last work, the

Pramanasamuccaya, "Comprehensive account of the means of

valid cognition", Dignaga sums up his theories on logic

which he had unfolded in various other works and sum-

marizes his epistemological thinking.

By its contents and its systematic treatment of

epistemological and logical problems, the PS exercised

great influence on all subsequent epistemology and logic,

Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike * The PS was, moreover,

the only work of a predecessor that Dharmaklrti deemed

worthy of an extensive discussion in his Pramanavarttika,

that eventually superseded the PS.

2.6 The two Objects of Knowledge

The means of valid cognition, pramanas, are the basis of

all valid knowledge of reality. Dignaga states this prin-

ciple thus, pramanadhino hi prameyadhigamah, 'The

[intellectual] acquisition of the object of valid cogni-

tion is dependent on the means of valid cognition (PS 1.1

commentary line 14) '.8 This was also Paksilasvamin's

starting-point: pramanam antarena narthapratipattih,

'Without a means of valid cognition there is no cognition

of an object (NBh 2.1 ) ' . 9 Now, in the first chapter of the

PS the means of valid cognition are enumerated and their

respective objects defined.

pratyaksam anumanam ca pramane, de gnis kho na ste,

yasmad laksanadvayam prameyam,

'The two means of valid cognition are perception and

inference, only those two because the object of valid cog-

nition possesses two characteristics (PS I.2a-c)'. All

cognizable objects have two appearances and these two ap-

pearances can be known by only two pramartas. In this way

Dignaga derives the number of true pramanas from the two

aspects of reality.10 In the commentary on this verse11,

Dignaga explains the two aspects,

na hi svasamanyalaksanabhyam anyat prameyam asti,

svalaksanavisavam hi pratyaksam samanyalaksanavisayam

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56

anumanam,

'For there is no other object of valid cognition than the

characteristic of the [thing] proper and the characteris-

tic of the generality [of a thing]. Perception has as its

object the characteristic of the [thing] proper [ ie the

particular], inference has as its object the characteris-

tic of the generality [ ie the universal] (PS 1.2 commen-

tary lines 20-21 ) f .

The uniqueness (svalaksana) of objects is known

through direct perception (pratyaksa); the general charac-

teristic ( samanyalaksana ) , ie that which several objects

seem to have in common, is that with which inferences

operate. It is possible to translate svalaksana by

'particular' and samanyalaksana by 'universal' as is done

in Hattori 1968, p. 24. We must keep in mind, however,

that they are two aspects of one and the same object, the

real visible aspect which is revealed by perception and

the conceptualized aspect of the thing, which is the field

of inference. The two terms sva- and samanyalaksana were

not invented by Dignaga, but stem from the tradition of

Abhidharma- analysis. A passage from Vasubandhu's12

Abhidharmakosabhasya will give us a better idea of the

terms svalaksana and samanyalaksana.

kayam svasamanyalaksanabhyam parlksate, vedanam

cittam dharmams ca. svabhava evaisam svalaksanam,

'One examines the body in its proper and general charac-

teristics, as well as sensation, mind and dharmas. [Their]

own being is their proper characteristic (AKBh, p. 349.11-

12)'. Their own being, svabhava, evidently refers to the

unique character of every single thing at a given moment

in time. What all things have in common is explained in

the next sentence,

samanyalaksanam tv anityata samskrtanam

duhkhata sasravanam sunyatanatmate sarvadharmanam,fBut the general characteristic is the non-eternity of

produced [things], the fact that [everything that is] con-

nected with the [four] evil influences is [full of] suf-

fering, and the fact that all things are empty and not the

self (AKBh 349.12-13) '. If this is taken in a purely onto-

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57

logical sense, we could say that everything is ephemeral,

impermanent; that is to say that everything has its own

unique being which lasts only for a moment. This consti-

tutes the svalaksana. The general characteristics of all

things are their impermanence, painfulness, emptiness and

unsubstantiality; these marks all things have in common

and hence these marks are called samanyalaksana,

The real thing lasts only for one moment, ksana;

therefore everything is said to be momentary. The doctrine

of momentariness is described in Abhidharmakosa IV, verse

2cd and the commentary thereon, na gatir yasmat samskrtam

ksanikam, '[Bodily activity] is not a [flowing] movement

because [whatever is] produced is momentary [ie lasts for

one moment]1. The commentary explains the notion of1 moment'.

ko ^yam ksano nama, atmalabho "nantaravinasi, so 'syastlti

ksanikam. dandikavat. sarvam hi samskrtam atmalabhad

urdhvam na bhavatiti yatraiva jatam tatraiva dhvasyate,

'What is this moment ? [It is] the coming into being which

ends immediately; momentary [means:] for this [particular

thing] there is this [one moment of existence only;]

therefore [the particular thing is called] momentary, as

[we can say] 'having a stick1 [in like manner we can say

having a moment, existing for one moment, in brief 'momen-

tary']. For everything that is produced does not exist

anymore after its coming into being, [that is to say]

where [something] is born, there it decays (AKBh, p.

163.1-2)1.

As all real things (which are the object of percep-

tion in Dignaga's opinion) are momentary, they do not

remain the same at every instant. From this it follows

that the general characteristics, which have to remain un-

varying in order to be "perceptible" of many individual

things, are not really present in the things themselves,

but are conceptualized by the perceiver. Therefore,

Dignaga says, that the general characteristics, the uni-

versals, are the domain of inference, for the drawing of

an inference is a purely mental activity involving the

rearrangement of concepts. Such, at least, would be the

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58

drift of Dignaga's argument in PS 1.2 and commentary.

2.7 Perception

Dignaga defines perception in general as that form of cog-

nition which is free from conceptualizing, pratyaksam

kalpanapodham, 'Perception is [cognition] removed from

conceptualizing (PS 1.3c)1. This is paraphrased, ses pa

gan la rtog pa med pa de ni mnon sum mo, 'Perception is

that knowledge in which there is no conceptualizing (PS

1.3c commentary line 6 ) 1 . In PS 1.3d conceptualizing it-

self is defined as follows, namaj atyadiyoj ana,'[It is] the

application of a proper name, a common noun etc [to a per-

ceived object]'. Dignaga regards conceptualizing as the

mental process of giving names to the impressions of

reality received by perception. In the commentary on this

verse, Dignaga distinguishes five kinds of name-giving or

verbal designation. The first is yadrcchasabda, a proper

name denoting only one object, as the proper name

'Pittha', which designates only one person. The second is

jatisabda, a word denoting a class or genus, like the word

'cow*. The third is qurtasabda, a word denoting a quality,

like the word 'white'. The fourth is kriyasabda, action

noun or verb, like 'cooking' and the last is dravyasabda,

a word denoting a substance like dandin, 'staff-bearer' or

visartin, 'horn-bearer', 'horned' (all examples from

Hattori 1968, p. 25, 83-85).

According to Dignaga, direct perception as a means of

valid cognition should be free from all name-giving, it

should not be influenced by our linguistic consciousness.

This reminds us of NS 1.1.4 where pratyaksa has been

defined as avyapadesya, 'not [yet] expressible in lan-

guage', which means that the direct perception of a thing

should not be influenced by language. And furthermore,

Dignaga's definition is reminiscent of Vasubandhu's

perception-definition in Vadavidhi fragment 9. Dignaga's

general definition of perception in PS I.3c seems to sum-

marize and improve on the ones offered by the NS, the NBh

and Vasubandhu.

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59

As for perception/ it includes all forms of inner

awareness, feelings etcr so that in this respect also,

Dignaga follows his predecessor Vasubandhu. Dignaga dis-

tinguishes four kinds of perception: sensory awareness,

mental awareness of the sensory impressions, mental aware-

ness of emotions and lastly, the higher perceptions of the

yogins. The object of sensory perception is described

thus:

dharmino 'nekarupasya nendriyat sarvatha gatih /

svasamvedyam anirdesyam rupam indriyagocarah //

(PS 1.5)

'The sensory cognition of a property-bearer [ie a real,

outer object] whose forms [ie appearance] are many is not

[possible] in a complete manner, [but] [that outer] form

[of the particular] which is to be cognized by the self

[-awareness of cognition] and [which form] is not express-

ible in language, [that form] is the object of the [five]

senses.'

The object of pure sensory perception cannot be de-

scribed in language,which means that it cannot be concep-

tualized, but must simply be perceived as it appears to

the senses. In so far as the perceiver does not concep-

tualize the outer phenomenon, he is perceiving an object

of sensory perception. The basis of perception is the fact

that cognition is aware of its own content and does not

need another internal witness for becoming aware of the

knowledge received through the senses. fThe word "sva-

samvitti" (self-cognition: sva-samvid, -samvedana, atma-)

is expressive of the thought that cognition is cognized by

itself and does not need another cognition to cognize it-

self (Hattori 1968, p. 101 ) f . Dignaga himself says,

ses pa ni gnis su snan bar skyes te, ran gi snan ba dan

yul gyi snan ba"o. snan ba de gnis la gan ran rig pa de ni

^bras bur ^gyur ro

(Hattori 1968/ p. 183.18-19)/ '[All] knowledge has come

about with a double appearance, [namely] the appearance of

itself [ie as awareness of itself] and the appearance of

the object [to be cognized]. The awareness of itself [of

knowledge] in this double appearance becomes [in the

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process of cognizing an object] the effect [ie the resul-

tant cognition through a pramana of an object]1.

Three other types of pratyaksa are described in the

PS 1.6,

manasam cartharagadisvasamvittir akalpika /

yoginam gurunirdesavyatibhinnarthamatradrk //fAnd mental [direct perception] is [, on the one hand,]

the [mental] awareness of itself of an [outer] object

[appearing in the mind, after the object has been per-

ceived with the senses], and [on the other hand, the

awareness of itself of emotions like] passion etc. [Both

forms of mental perception are] without conceptualization.

[The perception] of the yogins is [their] seeing an object

simply as it is, completely dissociated from any descrip-

tion [made of it] by the spiritual preceptor13'.

As we have seen, Vasubandhu opposed erroneous percep-

tion, conceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge to

genuine perception as a means of valid cognition. In this

rejection, Dignaga follows him (as is noticed by Hattori,

cf his book p. 95-96).

bhrantisamvrtisaiinanam anumananumanikam /

smartabhilasikam ceti pratyaksabham sataimiram //

(PS I.7cd-8ab)

'Cognition (a) [consisting] in error and (b) of that which

exists [only] conventionally, (c) [cognition consisting

in] inference and (d) [the resultant cognition] derived

from inference, (e) [cognition] relating to memory and (f)

to desire, together with (g) [cognition blurred by] an

eye-disease, [all these cognitions] have the [false] ap-

pearance of perception'.

In the prose passage following on this verse, Dignaga

explains only why cognitions a-d are not instances of true

direct perception.

tatra bhrantijnanam mrgatrsnikadisu toyadikalpana-

pravrttatvat pratyaksabhasam. samvrtisajjnanam

samvrtisatsv arthantaradhyaropat tadrupakalpanapra-

vrttatvat pratyaksabhasam

(PS I.8ab, comiri line 10-11). 'Concerning this [list of

seeming perceptions], erroneous cognition [bears] upon

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[real objects that are liable to deceive the perceiver,

such as] mirages etc [and] has the [false] appearance of

[true] perception because [erroneous cognition] has become

active through the conceptualization [of mirages etc] as

water etc. Cognition of what exists [only] conventionally

[bears] upon [things] that exist [only] conventionally

[and it] has the [false] appearance of [true] perception

because [this cognition comes into existence through]

[mental or conceptual] superimposition [on a real thing]

of a thing that is different [from the real thing], [that

is to say:] because [this sort of cognition] has become

active through the conceptualization of the form of the

[conventionally existing thing out of the perception of

things that exist in the ultimate sense]'.13a

In this rather intricate passage Dignaga makes clear

that bhrantijnana, erroneous cognition, cognition consist-

ing in error, and samvrti salj nana, cognition of what ex-

ists [only] conventionally [ie as a concept, not as a real

thing], cannot be considered to be true perception since

these two forms of cognition are not free from conceptua-

lizations, which true perception should be free from

(according to the definition in PS I.3c). Erroneous cogni-

tion occurs when, for instance, someone perceives a mirage

and wrongly forms in his mind the notion of water about

this mirage. Consequently, his "perception" of water is

false. The same example of false perception is given in

NBh 30.1-3 in relation to the postulation that pratyaksa

should be avyabhicarin, non-erroneous.

The second type of false perception corresponds to

Vasubandhu's kun rdzob pa^i ses pa, saittvrtil nana, which is

rejected as true perception in Vadavidhi fragm 9. Accord-

ing to Dignaga, samrtisajjnana operates through the con-

ceptualization of the form of the real thing into a thing

that exists only conventionally, ie by convention or as a

concept. For instance, the form of a certain number of

atoms (which exist in the ultimate sense) is conceptual-

ized as a pot which exists only conventionally (according

to AKBh, p. 334.3-4 and Vadavidhi fragm 9, both quoted

previously on p. 51-52).

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The conceptualization of a heap of atoms as a pot

consists in conceptually superimposing the notion "pot" on

this heap. Since conceptualization comes into play in the

"perception" of a pot, this perception is denied the sta-

tus of real perception. The difference between the two

forms of false perception lies in the fact that bhranti-

jnana is the result of mentally mixing up really existing

things, eg water and a mirage, while the second type con-

sists in superimposing a conventionally existing thing on

real things.

anumanatatphaladii nanam- purvanubhutakalpanayeti na

pratyaksam,

'Knowledge [as the process] of inference and [knowledge

as] the result of that [ ie inference] etc is not percep-

tion, for [all those forms of knowledge are produced] by

the conceptualization of what was experienced before

[during actual direct perception] (PS I.8a-b), comm line

12) f. Here it is said that inference follows upon ex-

periences received from perception, and as inferential

cognition deals with concepts (which are, after all,

abstractions of real objects), it is excluded from per-

ception. We will remember that Vasubandhu too, excluded

inferential knowledge from perception. Dignaga rejects the

same three forms of seeming perception as Vasubandhu in

Vadavidhi.

2.8 Pramana and its Result are not Different

In the first chapter of the PS, Dignaga discusses an im-

portant theory of his, namely the theory that a means of

cognition and its resultant cognition are in reality not

different. He states, savyaparapratltatvat pramanam phalam

eva sat '[We say that] a means of valid cognition is iden-

tical with the resultant [cognition and not different from

it] because [the resultant cognition] is cognized together

with the activity [of cognizing a thing through a means of

valid cognition] (PS I.8cd)f. Dignaga does not distinguish

between the act of correctly cognizing an object and the

state of having correctly cognized, the state of possess-

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ing valid cognition of an object. He evidently regards

pramana as the process of knowing a thing and finds it un-

necessary to regard means and result as separate facts.

Such a distinction between the means and the result of

valid cognition was indeed made by Paksilasvamin who said,

sa yenartham praminoti tat pramanam, 'A means of valid

cognition is that by which he [who wishes to cognize a

thing,] validly cognizes the thing (NBh 3.5)'. And he

continues, yad arthavijnanam sa pramitih, 'The valid

cognition is the [true] understanding of the thing (NBh

3.6)'. It seems that Dignaga had this passage in mind when

he wrote in his commentary on PS I.8c-d the following, *di

la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bzin du tshad ma las ^bras bu don

gzan du gyur pa ni med, 'As regards this [statement in PS

I.8c-d we add that we do] not [think] that the result [ ie

the resultant cognition coming from a pramana] is a thing

that is different from the means of valid cognition [it-

self] as the outsiders [ie the non-Buddhist philosophers

maintain] (Commentary line 15, p. 182.8-9; p. 183.9-10)'.

Hattori thinks that word 'outsiders' possibly refers to

the Mlmamsakas, although primarily it seems to refer to

Paksilasvamin (Hattori 1968, p. 99). Dignaga continues,

kyi / ^bras bur gyur pa^i ses pa de nid yul gyi mam pa

can du skyes pa dan / bya ba dan bcas par rtog pa de ne

bar blafis nas tshad ma nid du ^dogs pa ste / bya ba med

par van yin no //

'But only that knowledge that is the resulting [cogni-

tion], has originated while possessing the form of the

[outer] object, and when this [resulting] cognition has

been appropriated to oneself as including the activity [ie

the process of cognizing], then it [ie the activity toge-

ther with the result] is named "means of valid cogni-

tion", although [in fact pramana] is without activity

(comm line 15-17; p. 182.9-12; p. 183.10-13)'. A passage

from Hattori's commentatorial notes may be quoted here to

throw more light on the ideas contained in these words of

Dignaga. 'in asserting the identity of pramanaphala and

pramana in this verse, Dignaga is basing his thought upon

sakarajnanavada, the theory that the cognition as pramana-

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phala is the apprehension of an object (visayadhigati).

If, ... the cognition were formless (nirakara) while the

object had form (akara), then the cognition itself . .., as

distinguished from the object, would remain the same

whether it cognized something blue or something yellow or

any other object. Accordingly, the cognition as the ap-

prehension of an object must be admitted to be sakara. ...

The sakara cognition is thus understood to possess the

function (vyapara) of assuming the form of an object

(Hattori 1968, p. 98) . Translating vyapara by 'act1 or

'activity1 seems to me to render the term in a better way,

since vyapara refers to the process, the act of cognition,

rather than to the function of assuming.

2.9 Inference for Oneself

The second means of valid cognition is inference (anumana)

which, according to Dignaga, manifests itself in two ways.

The first is svarthanumana, inference for oneself, the in-

ference that is drawn in the mind but not expressed in

words; the second is pararthanumana y inference for the

sake of others, inference verbalized in the form of a cor-

rect syllogism. The first verse of PS II says:

anumanam dvidha svartham trirupal lingato ^rthadrk

(Kitagawa 1968, p. 74)

'inference is twofold. [Inference] for oneself is seeing

an object through a property (linga) which has three as-

pects'. The commentary says about the two forms of infe-

rence, ran gi don daft gzan gyi don dan (Kitagawa 1965, p.

447.2). 'For one's own sake, and for the sake of others'.

The three aspects of the property refer, of course, to the

trirupahetu which was formulated by Vasubandhu in Vadavi-

dhana (Frauwallner 1933, p. 480 fragm 7a). But Dignaga

took the definition of the threefold hetu to also define

the property that we use to infer the presence of another

property, the inferendum. The inferring property could be

called 'inferens1, which renders the term linga used by

Dignaga, a term which, incidentally, is used by Paksila-

svamin to denote the proving property in his exposition of

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65

inference in NBh 33*3-5. The triplicity of the linga is

defined,

anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhavo nastitasati

(PS II.5c-df Randle, Frag p. 22)

'The [linga, property,] is really present in the inferen-

dum and in [the set of instances that is] resembling the

[inferendum], and [the iin^a] is not present when [the in-

ferendum is] not present1. The inferens-property can only

validly prove the presence of the inf erendum if (a) the

inferens occurs in the inf erendum (b) occurs in the in-

stances that are like the inferendum, instances where the

inferendum and the inferens are seen together, and (c) if

the inferens never occurs in instances where the inferen-

dum does not occur. The inferendum itself is defined in

the commentary,

rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi khyad par du byas pa^i

chos can no

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 455.11-12), 'The inferendum is a

property-bearer (chos can, dharmin) which is distinguished

by a [special] property1. PS II.5c-d itself seems merely

to epitomize what was said in NS 1.1.34-35 and the NBh

thereon, as well as the Vadavidhana-passage mentioned on

page 53. If these three criteria are not met, the in-

ference will not be valid, says Dignaga.

ekaikadvidvirupad va lingan narthah krto 'rthatah

(unpublished fragm found by Steinkellner in Tarkasopana p.

286.5) 'Through a property that has [in] each [case] one,

or [in] each [case] two characteristics, a thing [the

inferendum] is not established [inferred] from the [other]

thing [from the property that proves, the inferens] (PS

II.6c-d)'. There are three cases in which only one cri-

terion is met, and they are: (a) when the property is not

present in the inferendum, not present in similar in-

stances and not present in contrary instances; (b) when

the property is not present in the inferendum, is present

in similar instances as well as in contrary instances; (c)

when the property is present in the inferendum, absent

from similar instances, but present in contrary instances.

As for the three cases in which two criteria are met, they

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66

are as follows; (d) when the property is present in the

inferendum, in similar instances and in contrary instan-

ces; (e) when the property is present in the inf erendum,

absent from similar instances and absent from contrary

instances; (f) when the property is absent from the

inferendum, present in similar instances and not present

in contrary instances (cf Kitagawa 1965, p. 456-457 and

Hayes 1980, p. 253-254). There is a last possibility that

the property is absent from the inferendum, absent from

similar instances, but present in contrary instances; in

this case no criterion is met. From the Vadavidhi we have

learned that another important condition for an inference

to be valid is the invariable concomitance of the inferens

with the inferendum. This notion reappears in PS II.

linqasyavyabhicaras tu dharmenanyatra darsyate /

tatra prasiddham tadyuktam dharminam gamayisyati //

(PS 11.11, source PVSV (Gn) p. 95.8-9)

'The invariable concomitance (avyabhicara) of the

[proving] property with the property [ie the inferendum]

is pointed out with reference to another [place where the

invariable concomitance was really observed]. [If the in-

variable concomitance is remembered, then the proving

property] that is known [to be present] there [in the

subject] will indicate [the presence of] the property-

bearer [the inferendum] which is [invariably] connected

with the [proving property, the inferens]1. In the commen-

tary on this verse, Dignaga adduces the well-known proof

of fire from smoke.

gan me dan dud pa med na mi rbyun ba^i ^brel ba de gzan du

bstan par byas nas yul gzan du dud pa de *ba yzig tsam

mthon van gan na dud pa yod pa de na me yod do zes me dan

ldan par grub pa ston par byed do

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 461.5-9). 'When the connexion, that is,

the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire has been

pointed out with reference to another [place where the

connexion was really observed], then also by seeing smoke

alone at another place [different from the instance where

the connexion was seen] is pointed out the proof that

[this second place] possesses fire, since [we remember the

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67

fact observed earlier that] wherever there is smoke there

is fire f.

The power of invariable concomitance in a deduction

is, according to Dignaga, quite limited. It will reveal

the presence of a thing in a certain locus, but not its

specific qualities. The invariable concomitant inferens

can reveal the inferendum in general, not the particular

properties of the inferendum.

rtags can gan rjes *brel pa yi / rtags can de *dir

rtogs bya yin / bye brag rtogs bya ma yin te / de dag

nid las ^khrul phyir ro // tasyaiva vyabhicaritvat //

(PS II.T8, Kitagawa p. 465. 9-12; DvNC II, p. 675.11)

'Those property-bearers [inferenda] that are connected

[with a property, the inferens,] can be made known by way

of the property [the inferens], but the specific qualities

[of the property-bearers] cannot be made known [through

the inferens, because] they are not [always] invariably

concomitant with that [ ie with the inferens] alone1. In

the inferendum may occur a wealth of properties, but since

those are not all invariably connected with the inferens,

the latter cannot make them known. The inferens only dis-

closes a general notion of the inferendum, nothing more.

For the particular characteristics of the inferendum are

exclusively known through direct perception.

Dignaga discovered that inseparable connexion is not

sufficient to make a deduction valid. In the case of fire

and smoke, it is true that smoke can reveal the presence

of fire in general on the grounds that smoke is always

connected with fire. But the converse is not always true.

Fire does not necessarily indicate the presence of smoke,

for there are instances of fire without smoke, but no in-

stances of smoke without fire. So it is said that the ex-

tension of fire is greater than that of smoke. All the in-

stances of fire or instances of smoke or of anything else

can collectively be called a set or a class as in Oberham-

mer 1964, p. 136. Thus we can speak of fire as the class

of fiery objects and we can call smoke the class of all

instances of smoke. Now the class of fire has a greater

extension than that of smoke and so it is said that fire

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68

pervades (vyapin) smoke and that smoke is pervaded

(vyaptar) by fire. The class with the smaller extension

— being pervaded by a class with a greater extension --

can serve as inferens for the latter, provided the two

classes are inseparably connected. The class which acts as

inferendum must have an equal or greater extension than

the class which serves as inferens. It seems that Dignaga

was the first to work out. the logical theory of pervasion

(vyapti) (cf Oberhammer 1964, p. 136) a theory still

unknown to Vasubandhu.

The inseparable connexion of two classes acting as

inferens and inferendum is explained as the relation of

the content to its receptacle.

sambandho yady api dvisthah sahabhavyangalinginoh /

adharadheyavad vrttis tasya samyogivan na tu //

(PS 11.20, Katsura 1975, p. 67)

'Although the connexion of the concomitant (sahabhavin)

part [the inferens] with the property-bearer [the

inferendum] is relying on the two [ ie on inferens and

inferendum], the occurrence of this [connexion] is like

that of a receptacle and a deposit but not like that of a

thing possessing full conjunction [between the two]'. The

situation of receptacle and what is to be deposited in it

is intended by Dignaga to be such that wherever what is to

be deposited is placed, it necessarily is always placed in

a receptacle, but the receptacle itself can occur without

any content. The receptacle must be as large as, or larger

than, what is to be placed in it. Likewise, the extension

of the inferendum is as great or greater than that of the

inferens. The inferendum can occur without the inferens,

but the inferens, on the other hand, must always invari-

ably occur with the inferendum. Yet inferens and inferen-

dum are not inseparably connected in such a way that they

are similar or equal. Therefore Dignaga compares the rela-

tion between inferens and inferendum to the relation of

the content with its container. In the commentary he

stresses that inferens and inferendum are qualitatively

different from each other in spite of their invariable

concomitance.

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69

na kadacid adhara adheyadharma bhavati napy adheya

adharadharma tatha na kadacil lingam lingi bhavati

lingi va lifigam

(PS 11.20 comm, source DvNC II, p. 679.14-15). 'The recep-

tacle never possesses the properties of what is to be

deposited, and also, what is to be deposited never pos-

sesses the properties of the receptacle; likewise, the

property [inferens] is never [the same as] the property-

bearer [the inferendum] or the property-bearer [the same

as] the property1. On the remark in the last quarter-verse

(PS II.20d), the commentary says,

samyogi tu yathaikas tatha dvitlya iti na tadvad iha,

'But a thing possessing full conjunction [with the other

thing] means "as the first thing is, so is the second

thing". Thus it is not here [in this doctrine of recep-

tacle and content symbolizing the invariable concomitance

of inferens with inferendum] (PS 11.20 comm, source DvNC

II, p. 679.15)'. This means that inferens and inferendum

may not be so connected as to be virtually the same, be-

cause in that case the inference would be an instance of

direct perception. For example, fire is not smoke and

smoke not fire; smoke has got properties that fire does

not have and vice versa. We infer fire from smoke, but if

the two were the same, seeing smoke would amount to seeing

fire.

The theory of pervasion and extension is summarized

in PS 11.25.

rva can nid kyis ba Ian khyab /

rva can min pa ldog par byed /

ba Ian rva can nid kyis khyab /

ba Ian min don ldog byed min //

(Kitagawa, p. 469.7-10).

'[The fact of being a] cow is pervaded by the fact of

having horns, [and this fact of being horned] is contrary

to [the fact of] not having horns. [But the fact that] a

cow is pervaded by the fact of having horns is not con-

trary to [the class of] things [ie animals] that are not-

cows'. The extension of the class of horned animals is

much greater than the extension of the class of cows. The

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70

property of having horns is, therefore, capable of remov-

ing the notion of the class of unhorned animals, but it

cannot prove an animal to be a cow. Eg when I see a horned

animal, I do not necessarily see a cow, for I may be

seeing some other horned animal; on the other hand, I can

be quite sure that I am not seeing a dog or a rabbit —

animals that have no horns. Conversely, if I see a cow, I

will also see the horns. Thus, having horns negates every-

thing without horns, but does not imply belonging to the

class of cows, whereas belonging to the class of cows

necessarily implies being horned. In an earlier statement

in prose, Dignaga maintains the same,

visanitvena govyapitve fpi na qoprakasanam vyapitvat

tu tad eva gotvena prakasyam bhavati

(PS 11.22 comm, source DvNC II, p. 679.22). 'The fact of

having horns does not reveal [the fact of being a] cow,

although [having horns] pervades [the fact of being a]

cow; on the contrary, only this [fact of having horns],

since it pervades [cows], can be revealed through the fact

of [being a] cow1. It is not possible to infer cowhood

from being horned, although the latter pervades the for-

mer, which means that the two are in part invariably

concomitant; but it is indeed possible to infer horned-

ness from the fact of being a cow. If two classes of ob-

jects are invariably concomitant, it is the class with the

smaller extension alone that can be used as a valid reason

to infer the presence of the class with the greater exten-

sion, but the converse will not always yield a valid infe-

rence. With this theory of pervasion, Dignaga was able to

refine the possibilities of valid inference far beyond the

old Nyaya and Vasubandhu.

2,10 The Syllogism

In PS II we are already confronted with an important part

of Dignaga's logic, albeit not in the formalized ap-

pearance of the syllogism.15 In PS III.1a-b the syllogism

is defined in general, and later in detail. Verbalized

deductive reasoning is now called pararthanumana, in-

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71

ference for the sake of others. In so far as the syllogism

embodies a valid inference, it is to be regarded as a

means of valid cognition. PS III.1a-b runs,

parartham anumanaiti tu svadrstarthaprakasanam

'Now, inference for the sake of others is [an instance of]

communicating a thing that one has seen [ie has inferred]

for oneself (source Frauwallner 1957a, p. 60)'. A little

further in the text of the commentary on this verse, we

find this definition, trirupalingakhyanam pararthanumanam,

'Inference for the sake of others consists in communicat-

ing the property that has three characteristics (source

PVBh, p. 468.1; NB III.1 unpublished fragm found by

Steinkellner)'. The threefold property refers to the in-

ferens in the internal inference. When that property is

communicated to others, it becomes the reason (hetu) in

the syllogism.

That step in syllogistic reasoning which the NS, the

NBh and Vasubandhu call pratiina, thesis, is described by

Dignaga in the following way:

tatranumeyanirdeso hetvarthavisayo matah

(PS III.1c-d, source Frauwallner 1957a, p. 60) 'With

regard to this [inference for the sake of others, we]

regard the [verbal] indication of the inferendum [, the

property of which we wish to prove that it occurs in the

property-bearer, ] [not as a necessary part of the syl-

logistic proof itself, but] as [a proposition] referring

(visaya) to the purpose (artha) of the probans [, namely

to prove the presence of the inferendum in the property-

bearer in which the probans occurs]'.

The indication of the inferendum, ie the "thesis"

has, up to Dignaga's time, been regarded as a necessary

part of the logical proof (sadhana). Dignaga seems to say

here that the proof of the presence of an inferendum is

solely done by the probans (a particular proposition) and

the drstanta (a general proposition). The thesis is not an

integral part of the proof, but simply meant to make clear

the purpose of the probans. The inferendum is proved to be

present in a property-bearer. The latter is described in

the prose on PS III.2b-d,

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72

... sgrub par 'dod pa^i chos kyi khyad par du byas

pa"i chos can

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 472, text V.4), '...the property-bearer

[is] characterized by a [visible] property [ie the probans

that resides in it], which is intended for proving [that

another property occurs in it]1. A few lines below, the

formulation of the property-bearer characterized by a

property is called a bsgrub bya bstan pa, sadhyanirdesa

(op cit, text K, p. 472.7), fThe indication of what is to

be proved (sadhya) f . This same term is also used in NS

1.1.33, the NBh on it and Vadavidhi frag 3. According to

PS III.10, sadhya can refer to the property whose presence

is to be inferred, the property-bearer in which it is to

occur and the fact that the inferendum occurs in the

property-bearer.

samudayasya sadhyatvad dharmamatre 'tha dharmini /

amukhye 'py ekadesatvat sadhyatvam upacaryate //

(source PVBh, p. 580.27; Steinkellner 1967 II, p. 83 where

it is quoted as PS III.9).

'Since what is to be proved (sadhya) is [really] the ag-

gregate [of the property that is to be proved to occur in

the property-bearer together with the property-bearer

itself], the [term:] "being what is to be proved" is meta-

phorically used [to designate] the property [ ie the in-

ferendum] alone and then the property-bearer [in which the

inferendum should occur] as well, although [they are] not

directly [designated], because [both, ie inferendum and

property-bearer] are [each] an [integral] part of [of the

aggregate]'.

A correct sadhya, ie a property-bearer of which some

property must be proved to occur in it, is described in PS

III.2,

svarupenaiva nirdesyah svayam isto 'nirakrtah /

pratyaksarthanumanaptaprasiddhena svadharmini //

(source Frauwallner 1957a, p. 60)

['What is to be proved, sadhya] must be specified through

its own appearance alone; it [should be] accepted [to

exist] by [the speaker] himself and [the sadhya should]

not [be] contradicted by [another property that is] estab-

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73

lished [to occur] in his own [ ie accepted by the speaker]

property-bearer through an object of perception,through

inference or through [the words of] an expert1. The com-

mentary says,

ran gi no bo kho na zes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya

ba"i no bos yin

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 471 text V.11), 'Through its own ap-

pearance alone means: through its appearance as sadhyaf.

And further, the prose text on PS III.2b-d says,

gan sgrub par *dod pa'i chos kyi khyad par du byas pa'i

chos can

ba'i mnon

qrags pa

na bsgrub

[qal

sum

rnams

par

te]

dan

te

bya

de

/

/

ba

la

rjes

chos

kha

bsgrub par

su dpag pa

gzan gyis

na ma tho

bya ba'

dan /

ma bsal

ba med

i chos dan 'gal

lun

ba'

par

dan /

'o // de ltar

bstan pa yin

no //

(Kitagawa 1965, text V, p. 472,4-8), '[when] a property-

bearer which is intended for proving as being charac-

terized by a property, is not removed by another property

that is (a) contrary to the property that is to be proved

[to occur in the property-bearer], [and] (b) is estab-

lished [to occur] in the [property-bearer] through

perception, inference and tradition, [then] in- this way

the indication of what is to be proved is irreproachable1.

The speaker of the syllogism must personally accept

the existence of the property-bearer. That the speaker

really saw the property-bearer for himself was expressed

in the initial phrase of PS III, 'Inference for the sake

of others is communicating a thing that one has seen for

oneself1. It should not be possible to deny the existence

of the property-bearer on the grounds that it really and

observably possesses properties contrary to the properties

it is proposed to have, eg when a speaker made the propo-

sition that fire is cold, for it is established by sense

experience that fire is not cold but possesses the pro-

perty heat. Dignaga mentions the pramanas by which one

could deny the existence of a subject. They are percep-

tion, inference and (remarkably enough) reliable state-

ment, the statement of an apta, an expert, by which

Dignaga is probably referring to the syllogism, although

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74

in the commentary he calls it lun, agama, tradition. In

the commentary, he also gives a few examples of false

propositions, ie propositions invalidated by pramanas,

asravanah sabdo nityo ghata iti (PVBh, p. 454.8), '[every]

sound is inaudible, [every] pot is eternal1. The first ex-

ample is contradicted by direct experience since we do

hear sounds if they are loud enough; it is not the case

that no sound can be heard at all. The second example is

contradicted by sense experience as well as inference. We

may see a pot being made or being destroyed or both and

hence deduce its perishableness.

As with internal inference, we need a proving

property by the presence of which we can establish the

presence of another invariably concomitant property that

is as yet not immediately visible in a given property-

bearer. The triplicity of the linga described in PS II.5c-

d reappears here as the triplicity of the hetu in the

syllogism. Thus, the hetu is the property known to occur

in the subject (paksa), known to occur in the instances

similar to the subject (sapaksa) and known to be absent

from the instances dissimilar to the subject (asapaksa).

It is important to realize that Dignaga introduced in his

logic the possibility of quantification. The hetu can oc-

cur in the whole of the sapaksa or in a part of the

sapaksa, and similarly, can be absent from the whole of

the asapaksa or from part of the asapaksa. The relevant

verse is PS III.9

sapakse sann asan dvedha paksadharmah punas tridha /

pratyekam asapakse ca sadasaddvividhatvatah //

(source Randle Frag, p. 29)

[The reason as] a property of the subject is — regarding

the sapaksa [, class of instances similar to the subject,]

-- present [in it], not present, [or] in two ways [ie

present in a part of the sapaksa, not present in another

part] and in so far as [the property of the subject] is

present in, absent from, [or] in two ways [present] in [a

part of the class of] instances dissimilar from the sub-

ject [, the asapaksa]; in each one [of the possibilities,

as regards the sapaksa, we can generate] in three ways

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75

[three combinations]f.

The extreme brevity of the original necessitates this

rather lengthy paraphrasing translation in order to lay

bare the intentions of this verse. First of all, it must

be borne in mind that sapaksa refers to the class of

objects in which it is seen that the probans is in-

variably concomitant with the inferendum, and that the

asapaksa is the class of objects in which it is observed

that the probans never occurs with the inferendum. The

term sapaksa also occurred in Vadavidhana (fragm 7, 7a),

but the term asapaksa occurred there as vipaksa. There

are, according to Dignaga, three possible relations of the

probans with the sapaksa or the asapaksa. The probans is

present with the inferendum in the whole of the sapaksa,

is fully absent from it, or is present in some part of the

sapaksa, which is saying as much as being absent from some

part of the sapaksa. The same three possibilities obtain

for the asapaksa; the probans accompanied by the inferen-

dum fully occurs in all of the asapaksa, does not at all

occur in the asapaksa or occurs in some part of the

asapaksa. The probans occurring in the subject and the

three types of occurrence, of the probans in the sapaksa

and asapaksa respectively make in all nine different

combinations. These nine consitute the famous wheel of

nine reasons. ' The first condition is, without exception,

that the probans is a property of the subject, while it is

with the second and third condition that the nine combina-

tions can be made. As regards the sapaksa the three pos-

sibilities are:

a. present in the whole of the sapaksa

b. absent from the whole of the sapaksa

c. present in some part of the sapaksa

With the asapaksa we have the same three possibilities:

d. present in the whole of the asapaksa

e. absent from the whole of the asapaksa

f. present in some part of the asapaksa

The nine pairs we can make are as follows:

1. a and d 4. b and d 7. c and d

2. a and e 5. b and e 8. c and e

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76

3. a and f 6. b and f 9. c and f

Only combinations 2 and 8 yield a valid inference, that

is, when the probans together with the inferendum is

present in the whole of the sapaksa and fully absent from

t n e asapaksa, or when the probans is present in some part

of the sapaksa and fully absent from the asapaksa. In

Frauwallner 1959f appendix we find in the Tibetan transla-

tion of Dignaga's Hetucakra a worked out set of 9 syl-

logisms with these nine hetus in Tibetan. Combination 2

reads;

sgra ni mi rtag ste /

byas pa^i phyir /

bum pa bzin dan /

nam mkha^ bzin no /

mthun pa^i phyogs thams cad la yod /

mi mthun pa^i phyogs la med /

rtags yan dag go /

'Sound is non-eternal (thesis)

because it is produced (reason, probans)

like a pot (sapaksa)

[sound is not unproduced] like space (asapaksa)

[the probans] is present in the whole of the sapaksa

not present in the asapaksa

the reason (rtags, hetu) is correct1.

The fact of being produced occurs in the whole of the

sapaksa, for pots and the like are all seen to be produced

and non-eternal. The fact of being produced does not occur

at all in the asapaksa, for space and the like are well-

known to be unproduced as well as eternal. In the sapaksa

we observe the invariable concomitance of the probans with

the inferendum and the extension of the inferendum and the

probans. In this syllogism, the inferendum has the same

extension as the probans, for everything that is non-

eternal is produced and everything that is produced is

non-eternal. When the sapaksa would show that the exten-

sion of the inferendum is greater than the probans, the

syllogism is also valid, because wherever the probans oc-

curs there the inferendum occurs too. This can be ex-

emplified by the smoke-fire syllogism, where we see in the

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77

sapaksa that the probans always occurs with the inferendum

fire, and yet the inferendum itself can occur without the

probans, smoke. The example of combination 8 is as

follows:

sgra ni mi rtag ste /

rtsol ba las byun ba"i phyir /

bum pa dan glog bzin dan /

nam mkha^ bzin no /

mthun pa^i phyogs la gnis ka /

mi mthun pa^i phyogs la med /

rtags yan dag go /

'Sound is non-eternal

because it is caused by [some intentional]

effort like a pot and a flash of lightning

[sound is not] like space [which is not caused by inten-

tional effort]

[the probans] is in two ways [present] in the sapaksa

not present in the asapaksa

the reason is correct.1

Although the fact of being caused by some intentional

effort (prayatnotthita) is invariably concomitant with

non-eternity, it does not occur in the whole of the

sapaksa. For the sapaksa actually contains the class of

objects that are produced (krtaka), but are not all neces-

sarily produced by intentional effort. Pots are made with

intentional effort, but lightning is not, though it is

produced by some cause. The fact of being caused by inten-

tional effort has a smaller extension than being-produced.

The latter fully contains the former, so that we could say

that intentional effort is invariably concomitant with

production. And since production is invariably concomitant

with non-eternityf intentional effort is also invariably

concomitant with non-eternity. The third condition is com-

pletely met, the probans does not occur at all in the

asapaksa. Space — being not non-eternal — is not

produced and not caused by intentional effort. Thus, the

probans being present in the subject, in a part of the

sapaksa and absent from the whole of the asapaksa, yields

a valid syllogism.

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78

In all the remaining 7 cases, the reason generates

incorrect syllogisms. The reason is present in the

subject, but the other two criteria are either not, or

only partly, met. There is one case, namely 5, where the

probans does not occur in the sapaksa nor in the asapaksa.

Such a reason is called asadharana, uncommon reason, a

reason peculiar to the subject alone, a reason not sup-

ported by any example. In the cases 4 and 6, the probans

is not present in the sapaksa but present in the whole or

in a part of the asapaksa. The reason is then called

viruddha, contradictory, proving the contrary of what one

wished to prove. In cases 1, 3, 7 and 9, where the probans

is present in the whole or in a part of the sapaksa as

well as in the whole or in a part of the asapaksa, the

reason is called anaikantika, inconclusive, because the

reason does not conclusively establish the presence of the

inferendum in the subject. In all these cases, the logical

error arises from the circumstance that the probans is not

seen to be invariably concomitant with the inferendum in

the sapaksa and not seen to never to occur with the in-

ferendum in the asapaksa.

When in the course of the syllogism the sapaksa and

the asapaksa are mentioned, they are regarded as

drstantas, generally-accepted facts. The function of the

drstanta is explained in PS IV. Dignaga opens that chapter

with the following statement.

trirupo hetur ity uktam paksadharme ca samsthitah /

rudhe rupadvayam sesam drstantena pradarsyate //

(PS IV.1 occurs in Vip, p. 88.27-28)

'It is explained [what] the triple reason is [in PS II-

III] and [that the reason] is established as regards [its

presence in the subject as] a known (rudha) property of

the subject [the first criterion]. [As for] the other two

criteria, they are pointed out by means of a drstanta1 .

The other two critera are, of course, the condition that

the probans must always be found with the inferendum in

the sapaksa and that wherever the inferendum is absent

the probans is also absent, a fact that is seen in the

asapaksa. We disclose the positive invariable concomitance

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79

of the probans with the inferendum by means of the

sadharmya-drstanta which really is the sapaksa. We dis-

close the negative invariable concomitance with the help

of the vaidharmya-drstanta which is the asapaksa. Dignaga

continues:

sadhyanuqamo hetuh sadhyabhave ca nastita /

chos mthun cig sos dan bcas gnis //

dpe la rab tu bstan par bya //

(PS IV.2a-b source Tucci 1930, p. 21; 2cd Kitagawa 1965f

text V p. 518.3-4) 'The reason [is the property that

always] follows what is to be proved (sadhya) and [the

reason] is not present when what is to be proved is

absent. The fact of possessing the same property (chos

mthun, sadharmya), which [fact] is related to the other

two [criteria of a valid reason], must be shown in a

drstanta (dpe)'. The fact of possessing the same property,

sadharmya, relates to the sapaksa in which we see that the

inferendum is connected with the probans, and thus the

sapaksa possesses the same proving property as the sub-

ject, which is here called sadhya in order to emphasize

that what is to be proved by the hetu is the residence of

the inferendum in the subject (cf PS III.10 quoted above).

In the commentary on this verse Dignaga says,

chos mthun pa ni re zig sgra mi rtag ste byas pa"i

phyir zes bya ba lta bu"oy1 In the first place, sadharmya (chos mthun pa), the fact

of possessing the same property [as the subject functions]

thus: sound is non-eternal because it is produced

(Kitagawa 1965, text V p. 518, 6-7)'. This phrase ex-

emplifies the reason in a syllogism (again the famous syl-

logism on the non-eternity of sound). The next step is the

enunciation of the drstanta,

gal te gan rtsol ba las byun ba de mi rtag par bum pa la

sogs pa la mthon ba de bzin du chos mi mthun pa la yan

rtag pa rtsol ba las ma byun bar nam mkha^ la mthon ba^i

phyir ^dir van sgrub byed kyi sgo nas bsgrub bya sgrub par

brjod par bya^o.

'[And further] if it is seen in [the sapaksa, the

similar instances like] pots etc [used as drstanta]

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80

what is caused by [intentional] effort is non-eternal,

[then] in like manner regarding the fact of not possess-

ing the same property (chos mi mthun pay vaidharmya) it

is seen in [the asapaksa, the dissimilar instances like]

space that what jjs eternal is not caused by [intentional]

effort. Therefore, in the [vaidharmya-drstanta] too one

has to state that the proof of the sadhya is [being done]

by the probans (sadhana, sgrub byed) ( Kitagawa 1965,

text V p. 513.7—11)'. As we will remember, the use of a

positive example and a contrary example in the syllogism

was taught in NS 1.1.36-37 and the NBh thereon. According

to those texts, the reason is established by a sadharmya-

udaharana and a vaidharmya-udaharana. Dignaga has

retained this practice also in the PS, for here the

reason is based on a sadharmya-drstanta, showing the

positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the

inferendum as well as a vaidharmya-drstanta, showing the

negative invariable concomitance which evidences the ab-

sence of the probans at the absence of the probandum.

2.11 Reliable Statement

The only two means of valid cognition, according to

Dignaga (and probably Vasubandhu), are perception and

inference. Thus, Dignaga denies all the other pramanas

the status of real means of valid cognition. The number

of two valid pramanas was -- as we have seen — based on

the idea that there exist only two sorts of objects, viz

the particular (svalaksana) and the universal (samanya-

laksana). The particular is cognized by perception, the

universal by inference (cf PS 1.2). This seems to leave

no room for reliable statement, apart from being con-

sidered a kind of inference, as a source of knowledge

about reality. The most perfect form of reliable state-

ment would be the syllogism, the inference put in words.

But even if a reliable statement does not assume the form

of a correct syllogism, Dignaga wishes to include it in

inference. For in PS II.5a-b he mentions reliable state-

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81

ment which he calls aptavada, 'discourse, statement1 of

an fexpertf.

aptavadavisamvadasamanyad anumanata

(source PVSV Gn p. 108.1, 109.5)

'The statement by an expert is [to be regarded as] in-

ference in so far as there is similarity in trustworthi-

ness [between real inference and reliable statement]1.

The cognition which results from both reliable statement

and inference seizes upon the universal, and in so far as

the cognition derived from reliable statement is valid,

it is qualitatively similar to inferential cognition --

at least this seems to be the drift of Dignagafs argument

in PS II.5a-b. The commentary does not say much more, al-

though we discern a tendency to base the validity of

aptavada on direct perception.

yid ches pa^i tshig nid bzun nas kyan mi bslu bar

mtshuns pa^i phyir de van rjes su dpag pa nid du brjod

do / de skad du yan / min gi las rnams kyi don du mnon

sum son ba^i phyir ro zes^byun no,

'And further, after we perceived [ie heard] only a state-

ment of an expert, we call also this [kind of statement]

inference [ ie of inferential nature] on account of the

similarity in trustworthiness [between inference and

reliable statement]. And thus [by way of trustworthiness,

a reliable statement] is produced because the activities

of giving names [to things] is [inevitably] preceded by

direct perception (mnon sum, pratyaksa) (Kitagawa 1965,

text V, p. 455.1-4)'. Dignaga is actually saying here

that the trustworthiness of statements is based on the

fact that the objects they refer to were really perceived

by the speaker. Thus, direct perception (pratyaksa) is

the source of valid inferences as well as correct state-

ments that do not assume the form of an inference. And

since the validity of inferences (and thus of reliable

statements) can be verified by the very fact that correct

inferences are drawn in accordance with the rules of

logic, Dignaga does not have to further discuss the

reliability of the speaker, as Paksilasvamin did in NBh

223.5-7. The correct inference depends for its validity

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on the impersonal laws of valid deduction, not on the

moral qualities of its speaker.

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83

NOTES

1. Thi£ article is reprinted in Frauwallner, Kleine

Schriften, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 716-758. The article itself

is numbered there p. 2-44, whereas in the journal in which

it was originally published it occupies p. 104-146.

2. In fact, the notion of invariable concomitance (avina-

bhava, nantariyakatva) as the basis of valid inference

does occur in the NBh, although not in the description of

the inference and the syllogism, where we would expect it.

In NS 2.2.2 various other pramanas are subsumed under

reliable statement or inference. The pramana called

sambhava, 'the fact [that two things] are together1 is

subsumed under inference. Paksilasvamin comments on this

with the following remark,

avinabhavavrttya ca sambaddhayoh samudayasamudayinoh

samudayenetarasya grahanam sambhavah, tad apy anumanam eva

(NBh, p. 229.5-6), 'The fact [that two things] are

together [, as a separate pramana] consists in grasping

the second [object, ie the part] by [grasping] the whole

by [way of] the presence of the never occurring without

(avinabhava) [ie always occurring together, hence invari-

able concomitance] in a whole and its part that are both

connected [with each other] ; also this [kind of grasping]

is only inference [and not a separate pramana ] ' .

Paksilasvamin says here that if a part and the whole of

which it is a part are so connected that the whole never

occurs without its part, that is to say that the two are

invariably concomitant, it is possible to infer the pre-

sence of the part through the presence and observation of

the whole. In his commentary on NS 2.2.1 Paksilasvamin ex-

plains sambhava thus,

sambhavo namavinabhavino 'rthasya sattagrahanad anyasya

sattaqrahanam. yatha dronasya sattaqrahanad adhakasya

sattaqrahanam adhakasya sattagrahanat prasthasyeti

(NBh, p. 228.2-4), 'What is called sambhava is grasping

[ie perceiving] the presence (satta) of another [ie a

second] [thing] through grasping the presence of a thing

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that is never occurring without [the second thing, ie that

is invariably concomitant with the second thing], as

grasping the presence of [the weight of] an adhaka [1/4 of

a drona] through grasping the presence of [the weight of]

a drona [4 adhakas with which 1 adhaka is invariably

concomitant, and grasping the presence] of [the weight of]a prastha [1/64 adhaka] through grasping the presence of

an adhaka [64 prasthas, with which 1 prastha is invariably

concomitant]1. Paksilasvamin says here that a smaller

weight is always concomitant with, always included in, a

greater weight. For instance, 100 grams of sugar is in-

variably concomitant with, and included in, 500 grams of

sugar. Vasubandhu, in all probability, used this doctrine

of avinabhava between two things to describe in Vadavidhi

the basis of valid inference in general, not only of

saifibhava as a special type of inference as Paksilasvamin

does.

3. NBh, p. 84.1-2, sadhyam ca dvividham dharmivisisto va

dharmah sabdasyanityatvam dharmavisisto va dharmi anityah

sabda iti,

'That which is to be proved (sadhya) is twofold: either it

is a property characterized by a property-bearer, [as the

property] non-eternity of [a property-bearer] sound, or it

is a property-bearer characterized by a property, [as the

property-bearer] sound is non-eternal [ie characterized by

the property non-eternity]'. In the first example, the

property that is to be proved to occur in the property-

bearer is called sadhya; in the second, the property-

bearer of which it must be proved that a certain property

occurs in it is called sadhya.

4. Cf note 2 about this term.

5. Cf the description of NS- and NBh-logic in the previous

chapter and note 22.

6. At least in this description of the syllogism. But he did

know about invariable concomitance as the basis of some

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85

special type of inference, sambhava, cf note 2. It is the

achievement of Vasuandhu to have made avinabhava the basis

of correct inference in general and of syllogistic

reasoning.

The MImamsa author Kumarila and the Vaisesika author

Prasastapada, for instance, borrowed a great deal of their

logic from Dignaga. The Nyaya author Uddyotakara heavily

attacked Dignaga and yet made good use of Dignagafs logic,

cf Oberhammer 1964b, p. 136-137 and Steinkellner 1961, p.

152-153.

In an appendix without page numbers, Hattori 1968 gives

the surviving Sanskrit fragments of PS 1.1-11 with the

missing parts supplied from Tibetan. Thus we have a com-

plete running text partly in Sanskrit partly in Tibetan.

Whenever I quote PS I it is from this mixed text of Hat-

tori 1968.

It is strange to find in Hattori 1968, p. 76 that the

first statement of the NBh (NBh 1.5) should have an af-

finity with this assertion of Dignaga. NBh 1.5 says,

pramanato 'rthapratipattau pravrttisamarthyad arthavat

pramanam,fA means of valid cognition possesses the object, because

of the appropriateness of [human] activity [with regard to

the object] when the object is cognized through a means of

valid cognition1. This passage is not similar to Dignaga*s

statement, for NBh 1.5 tries to explain the practical

utility of the pramanas; but my quotation (NBh 2.1) and

Dignaga's statement are indeed affirming the same

principle, namely, that true knowledge of an object

depends on and is produced by pramanas.

In the Nyayamukha, Dignaga says, '... there are only two

pramanas, I mean: inference and direct perception ...

since [the other pramanas admitted by different schools]

such as tradition (sabda), analogy (upamana) etc. are in-

cluded in these two. Thus there are only two pramanas, by

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86

which we can apprehend the thing in itself (svalaksana)

and its generality (samanyalaksana)', Tucci 1930, p. 50.

11 . Whenever I am referring to the commentary on the PS, I am

referring to Dignaga*s own commentary on the verses.

12. According to Frauwallner 1961, p. 131-132 this is the same

Vasubandhu who wrote the Vadavidhana, Vadavidhi,

Vimsatika and Trimsika. That Dignaga was well-acquainted

with the Abhidharmakosa is an established fact, because he

wrote an abridgment of that work called Abhidharmakosa-

Marmapradipa which exists in a Tibetan translation in TTP

vol. 118, Thu 144a.8-286b.1 (cf Hattori 1968, p. 3, 8).

13. In PS, Dignaga does not say more on yoga and the ex-

perience of yogins, yogipratyaksa than PS I.6b-c. For fur-

ther details on his conception of yoga we could turn to

his Yogavatara (published in Frauwallner 1959, p. 144-

145). In this little tract Dignaga says that the yogin,

after having heard the elevated doctrine (v. 1), having

shaken off all kinds of concepts (v. 2), having regarded

everything as illusory and having torn to pieces that

which binds him to the body (v. 4), sees his own mind or

pure consciousness (citta) and the highest reality:

svakaramatrasesam pasyati cittam svam adyanutpannam /

yenapi pasyatldam tad api tathaivavalokayati // 5 //

so 'nupalambho 'cintya tathatokta bhutakotis ca // 6ab //f[The yogin] sees that his own consciousness [or mind,

citta], having as its remainder (sesa) [after all concepts

etc are shaken off] nothing but (matra) the form (akara)

of itself (sva), has never originated from a beginning

[ ie the pure consciousness is beginningless]. This

[consciousness] too, through which [the yogin] sees the

[beginningless consciousness], he beholds in the same way

[ namely, as beginningless] 5.

This non-perception [ie beginningless consciousness only

beholding itself as such] is called [in Prajna Paramita

Sutras] the inconceivable [or unthinkable, acintya]

reality (tathata) and the highest limit of being

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(bhutakoti) 6ab*. This should give us some idea of what

Dignaga has in mind when he speaks of perception / ex-

perience of yogins, yogipratyaksa.

13a I have interpreted the locative mrgatrsnikadisu in the

first sentence as referring to bhrantijnana. However, the

locative could also refer to kalpana. Then the sentence

would state, fAs regards this [list], erroneous cognition

has the [false] appearance of perception because

[erroneous cognition] has become active through the con-

ceptualization of water etc with regard to [things that

are not water etc but in fact] mirages etc1. If this

second interpretation of the locative is applied to the

parallel phrase samvrtisatsu in the next sentence, ie if

we regard it as referring to adhyaropa and/or kalpana in-

stead of referring to samvrtisaj j nana, then we get the

rather surprising and indeed improbable notion that con-

ceptualization — which in fact produces samvrtisat out of

things that exist in the ultimate sense, paramarthasat —

acts on its own product (samvrtisat) in order to produce

precisely that, namely samvrtisat. The sentence would ab-

surdly, maintain that 'cognition of what exists [only] con-

ventionally has the [false] appearance of perception be-

cause [this cognition comes into existence through]

[mental] superimposition [on a real thing] of a thing that

is different [from the real thing]; [ie samvrtisaiinana]

has become active through the conceptualization of the

form of the [conventionally existing things] with regard

to the [things] that exist [only] conventionally1. The in-

terpretation I have adopted — ie samvrtisatsu as refer-

ring to the immediately preceding samvrtisaj1nana — does

not yield a very elegant statement either, but it is still

preferable to the one just mentioned. It could be said

that the Sanskrit original, samvrtisajjnanam samvrtisatsv,

is clumsily formulated (it must be the correct reading as

it is supported by the Tibetan translations, cf Hattori

1968, p. 180.36-37, p. 181.35-36).

I have interpreted the ablative tadrupakalpanapra-

vrttatvat (a) as the reason for regarding samvrtisai1nana

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as false perception and (b) as an explanatory paraphrase

in the same case of arthantaradhyaropat. It seems per-

fectly evident that adhyafopa has the same function as

kalpana, namely to mentally superimpose or conceptualize

a thing that exists only conventionally on a thing that

exists in the ultimate sense, eg to superimpose "pot" on a

heap of atoms or to form the concept "pot" about a heap of

atoms. Dignaga may have used the term adhyaropa to indi-

cate wherein samvrtisaj i nana originates, and may have

paraphrased adhyaropa by kalpana in order to make quite

clear that samvrtisajjnana is no true perception because

it is not free from conceptualization (kalpana). The only

other interpretation of the two ablatives would be that

arthantaradhyaropat expresses the cause of kalpana. The

conceptualization of the form of samvrtisat would then be

brought forth by a mental or conceptual superimposition of

a different thing on the real thing. This would amount to

the conceptualization of a mental superimposition (ie

again a conceptualization) of a real thing as something

that exists only conventionally. As a double concep-

tualization of a thing seems very unlikely in this con-

text, we could safely stick to the first interpretation.

14. Most of the Sanskrit fragments of PS II and III I owe to

the kindness of Prof. Steinkellner in Vienna who gave me a

copy of his unpublished collection of fragments of the PS.

Some of these fragments are quite well-known and occur in

Kitagawa 1965 or Randle Frag. After the Sanskrit fragment

I will cite the source, while the Tibetan text is taken

from the edition in Kitagawa 1965.

15. In Tillemans 1984 it is argued that the pararthanumana as

taught in the PS and PV should not be called syllogism. On

p. 94 Tillemans states, 'Une inference - pour - autrui

PS-PV n'est pas un "syllogisme" bouddhique, puisque ses

criteres de validite ne ressemblent pas a ceux d'un syl-

logisme dans une loqigue formelle", and on p. 87 he says

'... les differences fondamentals qui separent une

inference - pour - autrui et un syllogisme aristotelicien

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... la validite d'un syllogisme ne depend que de sa forme

logique, tandis que la cognition ... joue un role majeur

dans la validite selon la logique bouddhique. ... un syl-

logisme ... doit avoir une conclusion, alors que c'est un

point logicophilosophique fondamental de la version PS -

PV que lfexpression de la these (paksavacana) ne figure

pas dans l'enonce d1 une inference - pour - autrui.• Now

his first objection to calling pararthanumana a syllogism

seems to be that a pararthanumana, an inference for the

sake of others, does not constitute a system of formal

logic in the modern sense of the word, which is, of

course, true. It would be misleading and incorrect to call

Dignaga and Dharmakirti's logic a formal logic, for its

main purpose is to arrive at correct knowledge of reality.

Thus their logic is a pramana, a means of valid cognition.

However, I am not so sure that Aristotelian logic, ie the

Aristotelian syllogism could simply be regarded as part of

a system of formal logic in which the correctness, the

validity of the syllogism merely depends on its logical

form, as Tillemans maintains. Moreover, Tillemans does not

make clear whether he means the syllogism as taught by

Aristotle himself or the medieval developments based on

Aristotle. In any case, it seems that Aristotle meant his

logic to be an instrument to gain correct knowledge, cf

the following remark in Kneale p. 67, 'Aristotle's account

of general propositions prepares the way for his doctrine

of the syllogism. At the beginning of the Prior Analytics

he defined a syllogism as a discourse in which from cer-

tain propositions that are laid down something other than

what is stated follows of necessity. This formula is wide

enough to cover almost any argument in which a conclusion

is inferred from two or more premisses1. What is important

here is that from general true propositions another propo-

sition necessarily follows. If this general notion is kept

in mind, we are able to see the correspondence of this

with the pararthanumana, for in the latter the drstanta

functions as a proposition enunciating a general fact

while the hetu enunciates a particular fact. The thing

that was announced for proof follows from both proposi-

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tions. Tillemans is right when, with regard to Buddhist

logic, he says that cognition (ie direct perception) plays

a major role in the validity of the statements. But I

think he is not quite right in saying that the absence of

a thesis (on which his interpretation of the pararthanu-

mana as not being a syllogism seems to rest) is a funda-

mental logical and philosophical characteristic of the

pararthanumana, As we will see in my description of the

pararthanumana, Dignaga discusses some sort of enunciation

of what is to be proved (sadhyanirdesa) in PS III.1cd-2,

although he makes it clear that this is not a separate

step in syllogistic reasoning as his predecessors thought.

I would say that, for convenience's sake, we could still

use the word syllogism for pararthanumana, provided we

keep in mind that the pararthanumana does not have the

actual form of the Aristotelian syllogistic, nor is it a

kind of formal logic in the modern sense.

16. A class can be regarded as an indefinite number of in-

dividual occurrences or, in other words, a collection of

objects, itself considered as a single abstract object, a

set. In our case, this set or class consists of all the

occurrences of the invariable concomitance of the probans

with the inferendum and the negative invariable concomi-

tance of the probans with objects dissimilar to the

subject. If the notion of sapaksa is taken to denote a

class (as in Frauwallner 1959, p. 85 and more explicitly

in Oberhammer 1964, p. 136-138) we can refer to sapaksa. in

the singular. If the sapaksa is taken to denote a number

of similar instances (as in Randle Frag, p. 30), we can

refer to it in the plural. Thus, saying that the probans

is present in all the sapaksas or in the whole of the

sapaksa, really amounts to the same proposition and,

similarly, to saying that the probans occurs in some

sapaksas or in a part of the sapaksa. But one should be

careful in using terms like fallf and 'some1 because they

suggest real logical quantifiers in the original, whereas

Dignaga never used any quantifiers in the Aristotelian

sense of the word. Dignaga himself, at all events, refers

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to sapaksa and asapaksa in the singular.

17. Cf Vidyabhushana, A History of Indian Logic, reprint Delhi

1971, p. 283-285; Randle Frag, p. 31-33; Tucci 1930, p.

26-30; Frauwallner 1959, p. 85-87; Hayes 1980, p. 230-237.

According to Frauwallner 1959, the Hetucakradamaru which

expounds the nine reasons is one of Dignaga's earliest

writings on logic, cf op cit p. 89.

18. It is interesting to compare Dignaga's syllogistic with

the illustrative syllogism on the non-eternity of sound

offered by Paksilasvamin in his commentary on NS 1.1.33-

39. In spite of the absence of the upanaya and nigamana,

Dignaga's syllogism has the same structure as Paksila-

svamin 's. One could say that Dignaga submits a highly

improved version of Paksilasvamin1s syllogism.

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III Dharmaklrti's Logic

In spite of his widespread renown, Dignaga is greatly

overshadowed by his philosophical successor Dharmaklrti/

who lived later, ca 600-660 AD according to Frauwallner

1961, p. 137-139, but according to Lindtner 1980, p. 29,

ca 530-600 AD. Dharmaklrti was the one who gave definite

shape to Buddhist epistemology and logic by his various

works, of which PV I with PVSV and PV II-IV are the

earliest. PV II-IV were intended to be an exhaustive com-

mentary on the PS, a commentary in which Dharmaklrti also

allowed himself to elaborate his own epistemological and

logical theories. PV II comments on the first verse of PS;

PV III refers to PS I, while PV IV refers to PS III, PV I

with PVSV are shown by Frauwallner to be the oldest part

of PV, coming before PV II-IV. PV I together with PVSV is

an independent treatise on topics related to PS -- parti-

cularly logic and semantics — without being a direct com-

mentary (Frauwallner 1954, p. 146, 148, 152). Not only is

PV I a separate work, it is, moreover, Dharmaklrti's first

treatise (Frauwallner 1954, p. 152-153), and PV II-IV can

only be fully understood in the light of PV I and, of

course, of Dignaga's philosophy.

3.1 The utility of inference

Before finally examining PV II itself, it is necessary to

show how Dharmaklrti in PV I with PVSV fundamentally

revised and improved Dignaga's theory of inference. The

first prose sentence of the PVSV specifies the utility of

drawing valid inferences (anumana).

arthanarthavivecanasyanumanasrayatvat tadvipratipattes

tadvyavasthapanayaha

(PVSV, p. 1.8-9). 'In so far as the distinguishing between

what is meaningful (artha) and what is not meaningful

(anartha) [in epistemology and logic] has [correct] in-

ference as [its] basis, [and] because there is perplexity

[ie a variety of conflicting opinions] about it [ ie about

correct inference], [therefore] he [ ie Dharmaklrti] says

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[the following verse, PV I.1] in order to [clearly] deter-

mine it [is inference]1. One of the pramanas that is used

to acquire valid knowledge about reality is inference,

which primarily means internal inference, svarthanumana,

but also refers to the syllogism, pararthanumana, as the

latter is, in Dharmaklrtifs opinion, nothing but an ex-

plicitly formulated inference. The importance of infe-

rence as the only second pramana along with pratyaksa com-

pels Dharmakirti to dissipate the conflicting and con-

tradictory opinions on inference by clearly describing a

correct process of drawing inferences and the circum-

stances in which an inference can be valid. What is impor-

tant to Dharmaklrti is that an inference be valid as a

pramana, that it may give true knowledge about reality;

for it is correct knowledge that enables one to make the

right choices between what is useful and what is not.

3.2 A compendious definition of the probans

In the verse that now follows, Dharmakirti defines what

was called by Dignaga the inferens, linga in the internal

inference and reason, hetu, in the syllogism.

paksadharmas tadamsena vyapto hetus tridhaiva sah /

avinabhavaniyamad dhetvabhasas tato "pare //

(PV 1.1)3

'The reason is a property of the subject pervaded by a

part [ie another property] of the [subject]. The [reason

as valid probans] is only of three kinds owing to the

restriction of the positive invariable concomitance [of

the reason with the probandum]. [Reasons] other than this

[one] are fallacious reasons'. This programmatic verse

contains various propositions:in the words of Sakyamati's

Tika on PV I and PVSV,

tshigs su bead pa ^di las [la] ni rtags kyi mtshan nid

dan / grans nes pa dan /nes pa^i rgyu dan mi mthun pa^i

phyogs las ldog pa bsad de /

(PVT, Je, p. 7.6-7, cf PVSVT, p. 8.24-25), 'in this verse

are expressed; a definition of a [correct] reason, a

restriction of the number [of correct reasons, ie only

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95

three], the cause of this restriction [ie the positive in-

variable concomitance of the probans with the probandum],

and the absence [of the correct probans] from [all in-

stances that are] contrary [to the definition of the cor-

rect probans]1. If the reason (hetu) conforms to this

definition, it is a correct reason; if it does not, it is

a false reason (hetvabhasa). Sakyamati explains his last

remark as follows,

gtan tshigs ltar snan de las gzan zes bya ba ni mi

mthun pa^i phyogs las ldog pa ste / gtan tshigs gsum po

de las gzan pa ni gtan tshigs ltar snan ba dag yin no

(PVT, Je, p. 7b.1, cf PVSVT, p. 8.28-29), f "Other [kinds

of reasons] than this [one] are fallacious ^reasons"

[this means:] the absence [of the correct reason] from [all

instances that are] contrary [to the definitions]; [ie

reasons] other than these three [valid] reasons are falla-

cious reasons1. In the above verse, the reason is defined

as a property of the subject, which means that it is a

known property of the subject; this is the first of the

three criteria of a valid inferens (linga) and reason

(hetu) as defined by Dignaga in PS II.5c-d and PS III.9.

Not only must the probans be a known property of the sub-

ject, it must also be invariably concomitant with, and be

pervaded by, the probandum, another hitherto unknown pro-

perty of the subject. This other property 'pervades1 the

reason, which is a different way of saying that its exten-

sion is greater than, or as great as, that of the invari-

ably concomitant reason. What is to be established by the

valid reason is, of course, the presence of the pervading

property in the subject. The probans, in this verse, is

implied to be the threefold probans. The first criterion

is already mentioned; it is a property of the subject. The

second criterion demands that the probans must be known to

always occur with the probandum in the sapaksa (PS II.5c-

d, PS III.9), and the third criterion that the probans in

the asapaksa must be known never to occur when the proban-

dum is not present (PS II.5d, PS IV.2b). All this has al-

ready been discussed in the chapter on Dignaga. According

to Dharmakirti, the second and third criteria are met

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96

through the principle of positive invariable concomitance.

If it is known that the reason is fully pervaded by the

probandum, then it is always true that wherever the reason

is found, there the probandum must be found too. And it is

always true that wherever the probandum is not found, the

reason is not there either, precisely on the grounds that

the probans, having the smaller extension, is invariably

concomitant with the probandum. Dignaga already has said

as much in PS IV.2a-bf

sadhyanugamo hetuh sadhyabhave ca nastita

(Tucci 1930, p. 21), fThe reason [is the property that

always] follows what is to be proved (sadhya) and [the

reason] is not present when what is to be proved is

absent1. But Dignaga does not draw from this the conclu-

sion that Dharmakirti draws. In the commentary on PV 1.1,

Dharmaklrti interprets the second and third criterion as

follows,

sajatlya eva sattvam iti siddhe^pi vijatlya-vyatireke

sadhyabhave"sattvavacanavat,

[The statement of the second criterion that the reason --

being a known property of the subject — ] is present only

in the [class of objects] similar [to the subject] is com-

parable to the statement [of the third criterion, ie] of

the absence [of the reason] at the absence of the proban-

dum [when this statement is made] with regard to the nega-

tive invariable concomitance [of the probans with the

probandum] in [all classes of objects] dissimilar [to the

subject], although [this third criterion] is [already] es-

tablished [with the second criterion, namely, with the

statement that the probans occurs only in the class of ob-

jects similar to the subject] (PVSV, p. 2.5-6) '.

Dharmakirti is saying here that the establishment of the

positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the

probandum and the presence of the probans in the subject

suffice for validly inferring the presence of the proban-

dum in the subject. He implies that the explicit mention-

ing of the third criterion of a valid reason is super-

fluous, for the second criterion, ie the positive invari-

able concomitance of the probans with the probandum in the

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sapaksa, logically entails the negative invariable con-

comitance of the probans with what is not the probandum in

the asapaksa. This aspect of Dharmaklrti's logic will be

further elaborated in the sequel.

About the pervasion (vyapti) of the probans by the

probandum, Dharmaklrti says,

vyaptir vyapakasya tatra bhava eva, vyapyasya va tatraiva

bhavah,

(PVSV, p. 2.12-13), 'Pervasion [of the probans by the

probandum means]: the pervading [property, the probandum]

is only present there [ie with the probans] or [pervasion

of the probandum by the probans means:] the [property that

is] to be pervaded [ie is pervaded, the probans,] is

present only there [ ie with the probandum]1. In this

passage, the two aspects of pervasion are described. From

the point of view of the probans, pervasion means that the

probandum as pervading (vyapaka) property only occurs with

the probans. From the point of view of the probandum, per-

vasion means that the probans as pervaded (vyapya)

property is found only with the probandum.

The 'only three kinds1 of reasons according to PV 1.1

does not refer to the three criteria of a valid reason,

but to a new theory of Dharmaklrti' s own make. PV 1.2-3

define the three kinds of valid reason. A short explana-

tion of this new threefoldness already appears in the

prose following on PV 1.1.

ta ete karyasvabhavanupalabdhilaksanas trayo hetavah,

yatha^gnir atra dhumat. vrkso "yam simsapatvat.

pradesavisese kvacin na ghata upalabdhilaksana-

praptasyanupalabdheh,

'These three reasons [referring to the term tridha in PV

1.1] are defined as effect, essential property^ and non-

perception; [they function as valid reasons] as [in the

propositions:] there is fire here because there is smoke

[effect as probans], this is a tree [in general] because

it is a simsapa [a particular kind of tree, ie a smaller

essential property as probans], at some particular spot

there is not a pitcher because there is no perception of

[the pitcher which is a thing] that has got characteris-

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tics for cognition [ie can be cognized] (PVSV, p. 2.14-

17)f. Effect as logical reason is illustrated by the well-

known example of fire and smoke. Smoke being an invariably

concomitant effect of fire, with a smaller extension than

fire (because some fire occurs without smoke), can be used

as a valid reason to infer the presence of fire. The fact

of being-a-simsapa, that is, the class of simsapa-trees,

is invariably concomitant with the greater class of trees

in general. The svabhava of simsapa-ness, the essential

property of being a simsapa- tree is logically contained

in, and pervaded by the essential property of being a tree

in general, and hence simsapa-ness can be used as the

probans to validly infer the presence at a given spot of

tree-ness in general. Non-perception, at a given spot, of

a perceivable thing like a pitcher can be used to validly

infer the absence of it at that spot.

As for the logical necessity that in the sapaksa the

probans is observed to be invariably concomitant with the

probandum, Dharmakirti maintains there are only two pos-

sible cases in which the positive invariable concomitance

(anvaya) of the probans with the probandum can be estab-

lished beyond any doubt. Either the probans shares its es-

sence with the probandum or the probans is an invariably

concomitant effect of the probandum. Therefore Dharmakirti

teaches in the first verse of PV I that '[the reason as

valid probans] is only of three kinds, owing to the

restriction of positive invariable concomitance1. That is,

the three above-mentioned kinds of valid reason are all

generated by invariable concomitance, which can only exist

when the probans possesses the same essence as the proban-

dum, or when the probans is brought into being by the pro-

bandum. In both cases, there is a connexion of probans

with probandum through an essence, svabhava. In the words

of Dharamaklrti,

svabhavapratibandhe hi saty artho *rtha?ti na vyabhicarati,

sa ca tadatmatvat,

'When there exists an [inseparable] connexion through an

essence (svabhava), [one] thing [possessing that essence]

never deviates from [ie is invariably concomitant with the

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other] thing [possessing the same essence]. And that

[connexion] exists on the grounds that [the object acting

as probans] is [in reality] the essence of the [object ac-

ting as probandum] (PVSV, p. 2.19-21)'. As is explained in

the example of simsapas and trees in general, both classes

of objects possess the same essential property of tree-

ness, and they are connected with the same svabhava;

therefore simsapas are invariably concomitant with trees

in general. About the connexion of an effect (acting as

probans) with an essential property, Dharmaklrti says,

karyasyapi svabhavapratibandhah, tatsvabhavasya

tadutpatter iti,

'Also for an effect there exists an [inseparable] con-

nexion through an essence, because the essence of the

[effect] is produced by the [cause] (PVSV, p. 3.3-4)'. We

might say that Dharmaklrti derives the invariable

concomitance, which is the basic principle in his concep-

tion of valid reasoning, from the actual connexion of the

probans with the probandum through an essence. This es-

sence through which probans and probandum are connected is

either their factual essence or else, the essence of the

probans is produced by a specific complex of causes which

complex constitutes the probandum. In the first case, by

probans and probandum the same essence is meant; in the

second case, the essence of the probans can only spring

from the essence of the probandum.

3.3 Effect as probans

The effect (karya) used as probans is explained in PV

I.2a-c.

karyam svabhavair yavadbhir avinabhavi karane /

tesam (PVSV, p. 3.14)

hetuh,

'With as many essential properties the effect is invari-

ably concomitant [and present] in the cause, for those

[essential properties, the effect] is the logical reason,1.

Only an effect that is invariably concomitant with certain

properties of the cause, can be used to validly infer the

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presence of those properties, as in the example of smoke

and fire. Since smoke is produced by fire alone and is,

therefore, invariably concomitant with fire, it can be

used as logical reason to infer the presence of fire. But

how can a thing be established as the effect of something?

Dharmakirti answers:

yesam upalambhe tallaksanam anupalabdham yad upalabhyate,

tatraikabhave^pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya karyam,

'A [thing] which, unperceived [elsewhere and] possessing

characteristics for it [ ie for perception], is perceived

when other [things] are perceived [and] which is not per-

ceived in the absence of even one [of those other things],

that [thing] is the effect of that [assemblage of things

acting as cause] (PSVS, p. 22.2-3)' .7 The idea is that an

object is the effect of an assemblage (samagri) of other

objects if the said object is not perceived elsewhere but

together with the assemblage, and if the effect is not

perceived when at least one element in the assemblage is

missing. Therefore, it could be said that the object is

brought forth only when the assemblage of causes (karana-

samagri), ie all required causes, are present and

cooperate in producing the effect. In another prose

passage, Dharmakirti elucidates his thought on the as-

semblage of causes a bit more.

kathaift tarhidanim bhinnat sahakarinah karyotpattir

yatha caksurupader vijnanasya. na vai kimcid ekam

janakam tatsvabhavam. kirn tu samagri janika tatsvabhava.

saivanumlyate. saiva ca samagrl svabhavasthityasrayah

karyasya.

'Now, how then is there the arising of an effect from a

particular cooperating [cause] as [for instance the

arising] of cognition from [particular causes like] the

eye, forms etc? Surely there is not some one single

productive cause that possesses the essence of [bringing

forth the effect], but [, on the contrary ,] it is a pro-

ductive assemblage [of causes] that possesses the essence

of [bringing forth the effect]. And that [assemblage]

alone [is what] is inferred. And that same assemblage is

the substratum on which rests the essence of the effect

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(PSVS, p. 23.18-21)'.8 One particular effect is always

produced by an assemblage of causes, and thus, the exten-

sion of the effect is always equal to, or smaller than the

extension of the cause, ie the assemblage of causes. This

is truly so because the effect arises only when all con-

stituent causes are present. And thus the effect is also

always invariably concomitant (avinabhavin) with the as-

semblage of causes, for the assemblage is necessarily

present when the effect has arisen.

Dharmaklrti sums up his thought on effect as logical

reason (karyahetu) by referring to the causal relation be-

tween smoke and fire.

agnisvabhavah sakrasya murddha yady agnir eva sah /

athanagnisvabhavo^sau dhumas tatra katham bhavet //

dhumahetusvabhavo hi vahnis tacchaktibhedavan /

adhumahetor dhumasya bhave sa syad ahetukah //

(PV 1.36-37)fIf an anthill possesses the essence of fire [namely to

produce smoke], then it is fire. But if it does not pos-

sess the essence of fire, how could there be smoke near it

[ie arising from it]? For fire [alone] possesses the es-

sence of [being] the cause of smoke, [since fire alone] is

distinguished by the power to [produce] it [ie smoke]. If

the occurrence of smoke from [a thing that is] not the

cause of smoke [were possible], it [ie smoke] would be

without cause [, which is absurd]10 (36-37)'.

3.4 Essential property as probans

Essential property (svabhava) as logical reason is

described in PV I.2c-d.

svabhave bhavo^pi bhavamatranurodhini //

'Also something (bhava) [is a logical reason] with regard

to an essential property that conforms to the mere

[actual] existence [of the first thing]1.

What is said here is, that the essential property with a

smaller extension serves as the logical reason for infer-

ring the presence of a property with a wider extension and

in possession of that same essence. In the commentary,

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102

Dharmaklrti adds,

tadatmyam hy arthasya tanmatranurodhiny eva nanyayatte,

'For the fact that an object possesses the essence of the

[other object belonging to the same class] is [possible]

only in [an object] conforming to being solely [ie in the

fullest measure] the [class of similar objects], not in

[an object that is] dependent upon another [object or

class of objects for its being] (PVSV, p. 4.2-3)1.11 The

example of a svabhava with a small extension as probans of

a probandum with a wider extension has already been given

before in PVSV, p. 2.16, vrkso"Vam simsapatvat, 'This is a

tree [in general] because it is a simsapa-tree'. Since the

essence tree-ness is present in both classes, the probans

with the smaller extension is invariably concomitant with

the probandum. It is always the case that wherever there

is a simsapa-tree, there is also tree-ness in general, for

simsapa-ness is materially, and therefore logically, con-

tained in general tree-ness. The invariable concomitance

of the probans with the probandum is the fact that the es-

sential property of general tree-ness pervades all in-

dividual classes of trees.

3.5 Non-perception as probans

The third kind of valid probans consists in negating the

presence of a thing at a particular given place

(pradesavisese kvacid) on the grounds that the thing is

not perceived there. First, non-perception in general is

described.

apravrttih pramananam

anupalabdhih (PVSV, p. 4.6)

apravrttiphala^sati / PV I.3ab

'The inactivity of the means of valid cognition is non-

perception which results in the absence of activity [on

the part of the perceiver] with regard to [a thing] that

is not present [at a particular place]1.

Dharmakirti regards non-perception of a thing at a

particular place as the logical sign of the absence of

that thing. Something that is not perceived through any

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means of valid cognition is not present. To exist

(somewhere) according to Dharmaklrti, is the same as being

perceived. This epistemological doctrine is quite clearly

expressed in the following passage from the commentary on

this verse;

sajjnanasabdavyavaharapratisedhaphala, upalabdhi-

purvakatvat tesam iti. idam sadasatpratisedhavidhihetvos

tulyam rupam. tatha hi sattvam upalabdhir eva

vastuyogyatalaksana tadasraya va jnanapravrttih

(PVSV, p. 4.8-11), [The inactivity of the means of valid

cognition, ie non-perception] results in the negation of

cognizing, naming and treating a [thing as] present [at a

certain place], because these [ ie cognizing, naming and

treating a thing as present] are preceded by the cognition

[of a thing at a certain place]. This [result] is the same

(tulyam rupam) in both [kinds of] reasons [whether they]

negate [something as] present [or] affirm [something as]

not present. In this way the presence [or existence of a

thing] is [its] perception , being defined (-laksana) as

the capability [on the part] of the thing [to be

perceived]; or [the presence of the thing is] the activity

of knowing [this thing, which activity of knowing] is

based on the [capability of the thing to be perceived]1.

Non-perception is not meant to refer to total absence

of any cognition, but to refer to the absence of a

specific cognition with regard to a particular place. Only

absence of a particular piece of cognition can be used to

infer the absence of certain objects.

asajjnanaphala kacid dhetubhedavyapeksaya //

'A specific [inactivity of the means of valid cognition]

results in knowing that [a thing] is not present [some-

where] [only] in dependance on a particular character of

the cause (PV I.3c-d)'. In the commentary Dharmaklrti

says,

hetur anupalabdhih, bhedo^sya visesanam

upalabdhilaksanapraptasattvam,fThe cause is the non-perception [of a thing]. "Particular

character" is a distinguishing property of this [non-

perception], [namely] the existence that has got marks for

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perception [ie is capable of being perceived] {PVSV, p.

4.14-15) '• Only the non-perception of a perceivable par-

ticular object is a logical reason to infer the absence of

the thing. And thus, only the non-existence or absence of

particular perceivable things can be proved. Dharmaklrti

maintains that a meaningful negation can only be made of

particular things which are perceivable, for a meaningful

negation consists in communicating the non-perception of

something;

yavan kascit pratisedhah sa sarvo^nupalabdheh,

'Any [meaningful] negation whatsoever is [derived] from

non-perception [of something] (PVSV, p. 5.9)'. Dharmaklrti

says further,

tatha sa dvidha kriyeta kasyacid vidhina nisedhena va#

'and that [meaningful negation] can be made in two ways,

either by affirming some [particular] thing or by denying

[some particular thing] (PVSV, p. 5.9-10)'.

3.6 Four kinds of non-perception

PV 1.4 enumerates four ways in which non-perception by way

of affirmation or denial gives knowledge of the absence of

a thing.

viruddhakaryayoh siddhir asiddhir hetubhavayoh /

drsyatmanor abhavarthanupalabdhis caturvidha //

'The establishment [amounting to an affirmation] of a con-

trary [thing] or an effect of a contrary [thing] and the

non-establishment [amounting to a denial] of a cause or an

essence, the essences of [which two pairs, ie a contrary

thing and the effect of a contrary thing as well as a

cause and an essence] are [normally] perceivable, con-

stitutes the fourfold non-perception whose purpose it is

[to prove] the absence [of a particular thing somewhere]1.

Dharmaklrti enumerates the only four cases of non-

perception. The first two consist in perceiving something

contrary to what was expected or an effect of something

that is contrary to an expected cause. The second two con-

sist in not perceiving a cause or not perceiving an

essence. This general principle of fourfold non-perception

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as a valid probans seems to be based on the two kinds of

essential relations accepted by Dharmaklrti, ie tadatmya,

the fact that two things have the same essence and karya-

karanabhava, the fact that two things are connected as ef-

fect and cause* The absence of something is either estab-

lished directly through its non-perception or the non-

perception of its cause. The absence may also be estab-

lished indirectly through the perception of something

contrary, or the effect of something contrary. By applying

the positive invariable concomitance of an effect with its

cause, or of a greater essence with a smaller one to these

four non-perceptions, a certain number of specific non-

perceptions as probans can be made. In PVSV, p. 6.1-6

Dharmakirti gives eight possibilities. Later, in PVin ten

examples, and in NB II eleven examples are given (cf

Steinkellner 1979, p. 60 note 178).

viruddhasiddhya yatha na sitasparso^tragneh etena

vyapakaviruddhasiddhir ukta veditavya yatha na

tusarasparso^tragneh,

'[A negation based on non-perception is expressed] by es-

tablishing a contrary [thing], as: there is no sensation

of coldness here, because there is fire. By this [sort of

negation] the establishing of a pervading contrary [thing]

must be understood to have been expressed, as: there is no

sensation of frost here, because there is fire (PVSV, p.

6.1-3)'. In the first example, fire is the contrary of the

sensation of coldness. If there is fire, there cannot be

at the same time the sensation of coldness at the spot

where the fire is. The presence of coldness is negated by

referring to the contrary of coldness, ie fire. According

to Dharmaklrti, it is also legitimate to prove the absence

of an invariably concomitant essence with a smaller exten-

sion than the sensation of coldness by referring to the

presence of the contrary of coldness, fire. The sensation

of frost is an invariably concomitant essence of the sen-

sation of coldness with a smaller extension than coldness.

Thus, if fire by its heat drives away coldness, it can

also drive away an invariably concomitant essence, namely

the sensation of frost. If coldness goes, frost inevitably

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also goes. Fire is the contrary, viruddha, of the pervad-

ing object (vyapaka), the sensation of frost. The text

continues,

viruddhakaryasiddhya yatha na s I ta spars'o"tra dhumat

(PVSV, p. 6.3-4), '[A negation is expressed] by estab-

lishing the effect of a contrary [thing], as: there is no

sensation of coldness here, because there is smoke1. Here

the presence of coldness is negated by the presence of an

invariably concomitant effect of the contrary object,

fire. Since smoke invariably points to the presence of

fire, it also points to the absence of the contrary of

fire, coldness.

So far, the non-perception and absence of a thing are

established by the perception of the contrary thing.

Subsequently, Dharmaklrti describes the actual non-

perception of a thing, which proves its absence.

hetvasiddhya yatha natra dhumo^nagneh,1[A negation is expressed] by the non-establishment of the

cause, as: there is no smoke here, because there is no

fire (PVSV, p. 6.4) '. When we see no fire at a particular

spot, we will certainly see no invariably concomitant

smoke. If the thing with the greater extension is absent,

then the invariably concomitant thing with the smaller ex-

tension is necessarily also absent, ie its presence is

negated. The commentary continues,

svabhavasiddhya yatha natra dhumo^nupalabdheh,

'[A negation is expressed] by the non-establishment of the

essence, as: there is no smoke here, because there is no

perception [of smoke at this spot] <PVSV, p. 6.5) '.

Dharmaklrti continues,

etena vyapakasvabhavasiddhir ukta yatha natra simsapa

vrksabhavat,fWith this [kind of negation] is expressed the non-

establishment of the pervading essence [ ie the essence of

the class with the wider extension], as: there is no

simsapa here, because there is no tree at all [here]

(PVSV, p. 6.5-6) f. The presence of a class of objects is

negated by referring to the total absence of the class of

objects with the wider extension. When, at a certain spot,

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there are no trees at all, the spot is also necessarily

devoid of simsapas that possess general tree-ness as their

essence.

Dharmaklrti concludes this explanatory passage by

saying,

sarvatra casyam abhavasadhanyam anupalabdhau drsyatmanam

eva tesam tadviruddhanam ca siddhir asiddhis ca veditavya,

'And it must be understood that in all [these cases of]

non-perception proving the absence [of something], there

is the establishment and the non-establishment of only

those [objects] that possess a perceivable nature and of

[those objects that are] contrary to the [objects that are

to be negated] (PVSV, p. 6.6-7)'. A meaningful negation

can only be made of things whose nature it is to be

perceivable. Non-existence or absence can be predicated

only of perceivable things.

3.7 The drstanta

In the classical syllogism before Dharmaklrti, mention had

to be made of two generally-accepted facts, drstantas

showing the positive invariable concomitance (anvaya) of

the probans with the probandum and the negative invariable

concomitance (vyatireka) of the probans with what is not

the probandum. The second drstantaf showing the vyatireka,

must prove that the probans never occurs with things that

are not the probandum. With Dharmaklrti' s new theory of

positive invariable concomitance, these two drstantas# but

especially the second, have become superfluous. The valid

probans as defined by Dharmaklrti suffices for making the

syllogism valid, for the invariable concomitance of the

probans with the probandum is necessarily present when the

probans is the actual product (karya) of the probandum, or

when the probans shares its essence (svabhava) with the

probandum. With this simplification Dharmaklrti deviates

from, and improves upon, the received logic of Dignaga in

PS II-IV, set forth in the previous chapter. Dharmaklrti

provides a solid and unerroneous material basis for the

positive invariable concomitance, which Dignaga did not

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108

provide.

About the necessity of a drstanta in the syllogism,

Dharmaklrti says in PV 1.27,

tadbhavahetubhavau hi drstante tadavedinah /

khyapyete, vidusam vacyo hetur eva hi kevalah //1 For in the generally-accepted fact (drstanta), the

[reason's being] the essence of the [probandum] or [the

reason1s] having the [probandum] as [its] cause, are com-

municated to him who does not know that [ie the invariable

concomitance]. To those who know [the invariable concomi-

tance], only the bare reason needs to be told1. Dharma-

klrti reduces the syllogism to a proposition which con-

tains a thesis and a well-founded reason, the sound basis

of the reason being the known invariable concomitance of

the reason with the object acting as the probandum. If the

hearer of the syllogism is not completely familiar with

the invariable concomitance, the speaker could refer to

the positive drstanta, in all instances of which it is

known that the reason invariably occurs with the pro-

bandum. Dharmakirti demands, however, that this drstanta

also shows why the probans and the probandum are in-

variably concomitant, namely in so far as the probans is

the effect of the probandum or has the same essential

property as the probandum. But if the connexion between

the probans and the probandum is known, it is enough to

mention only the reason, because the valid reason will im-

mediately evoke the probandum that is connected with the

reason.

About the positive and contrary drstantas,

Dharmakirti says in PV 1.28 that either one of them im-

plies the other when it is established that the probans is

the effect or the essence of the probandum. Thus only one

of the two drstantas would have to be mentioned in a syl-

logistic proof.

tenaiva 1natasambandhe dvayor anyataroktitah /

arthapattya dvitlye"pi smrtih samupaiayate //

'Therefore when [the probans] has a known connexion [with

the probandum, either by being the effect of the probandum

or by being the essence of the probandum] — recollection

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109

arises by implication''3 [in the hearer of the logical

proof] also as regards the second [drstanta] by the men-

tioning of either one of the two [drstantas, ie the posi-

tive and the contrary drstanta]'.

In the prose after this verse, Dharmakirti explains

the function of the negative invariable concomitance

(vyatireka) and its relation with the positive invariable

concomitance. He uses the well-known inference of fire

from smoke as example.

tasmat karyaiti dhuma ity anvayena viditatatkaryatvasya

dahanabhave dhumo na bhavatlty arthad vyatirekapratipattir

bhavati.

'By implication the cognition of the negative invariable

concomitance [of smoke with what is not fire], ie that in

the absence of fire there is no smoke, arises for him who

knows that [smoke] is the effect of that [ie of fire] by

means of the positive invariable concomitance [of smoke

with fire alone] (PVSV, p. 19.8-9) '. The cognition that

smoke can only be produced by fire, and that on these

grounds smoke is invariably concomitant with fire alone,

implies also the cognition that smoke is negatively in-

variable concomitant with what is not fire. When there is

no fire at a certain spot, there is no smoke, from which

fact conclusively follows that smoke is only produced by,

and only occurs with, fire.

tatha"saty agnau dhumo nastlty ukte"gnir dhurrie bhavaty

avasyam ity arthad anvayapratipattih,

'Thus, when it is said that in the absence of fire there

is no smoke [which statement constitutes the negative

drstanta], there is by implication the cognition of the

positive invariable concomitance that there is necessarily

fire in [case there is] smoke (PVSV, p. 19.10-12)'.

There is a verse which neatly epitomizes

Dharmakirti's theory on the real basis of positive invari-

able concomitance and the use of the two drstantas.

karyakaranabhavad va svabhavad va* niyamakat /

avinabhavaniyamo ^darsanan na na darsanat //

(PV 1.31)

'The restriction of the positive invariable concomitance

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110

[of the probans with the probandum is possible] either on

account of a restrictive occurrence of effect and cause

[, restrictive in the sense that the effect is invariably

concomitant with the cause,] or on account of a restric-

tive essence [, restrictive in the sense that the probans

is the essence of the probandum]. [But the restriction of

the positive invariable concomitance is] not [established

beyond doubt merely] on the grounds [that two things] are

seen [together in the sapaksa] and not seen [together in

the aspakasa]'•

Here, it is explicitly stated that the restriction of the

positive invariable concomitance is protected when two

things are related as effect and its cause, or when two

things have the same essence — which makes them belong to

the same class of objects. And from this it follows that

all instances in which two things are seen together and

all instances in which two things are not seen together

cannot prove the invariable concomitance of the two

things. For Dharmaklrti's logic demands that positive in-

variable concomitance, being the basic principle that

makes all reasoning valid, is a real connexion such as ex-

ists between products and their causes and things sharing

the same essence.

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111

NOTES

1 . This interpretation (one among several possibilities) is

based on an important passage in the PVT, a passage to

which Prof. Steinkellner in Vienna has drawn my attention.

don ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glan pos mdzad pa"i tshad ma

yi mtshan nid la sogs pa yin te rigs pa dan ldan pa^i

phyir ro // don ma yin pa ni mu stegs kyis byas pa yin te

/ rigs pa dan mi ldan pa*i phyir ro //

(PVTr p. 6b.6-7) (cf Sanskrit fragm),

acaryadignagapranltam pramanalaksanadikam artho yuktatvat.

tlrthikapranitam na yuktatvad anarthas

(PVSVT, p. 6.2-3), fWhat is meaningful is [ie refers to]

[the epistemological science] starting with the defini-

tions of the means of valid cognition as promulgated by

the teacher Dignaga, because [his epistemological

thinking] is correct. What is not meaningful is [ie refers

to] [the epistemological science] as promulgated by the

adherents of other doctrines [ie the non-Buddhist

philosophers] because [their epistemological, thinking] is

not correct.f

2. As will become clear in the seguel of the PVSV, Dharma-

klrti describes inference without differentiating between

internal inference, svarthanumana, and the syllogism,

pararthanumana, since both are based on the same logical

theory, cf also Steinkellner 1967 II, p. 82, 'Die von

Dignaga tlbernommene Unterscheidung von svarthanumana und

pararthanumana wird bei Dharmaklrti beibehalten, doch

fSllt fttr ihn, filr den die Verknflpfung allein das

wesentliche Thema der Logik ist, der Unterschied weit-

gehend weg'.

3. According to Frauwallner 1954, p. 145 the beginning of

this verse must come from a lost work of Dignaga1s, as it

is quoted by Uddyotakara in the Nyayavarttika, NV, p*

131.17, in a slightly different wording:

grahyadharmas tadamsena vyapto hetuh.

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112

4. According to Frauwallner, Sakyamati could have lived ca

660-720 AD and was a pupil of Devendrabuddhi, a direct

pupil of Dharmakirti, Frauwallner 1961, p. 145.

5. The same passage is repeated in Hetubindu and is commented

upon in Steinkellner 1967 II, p. 90, "Eine Umfassung liegt

seitens dessen, was umfasst ... vor, wenn die umfassende

Beschaffenheit da, das heisst an dem Beschaf fenheitstra1-

ger, an welchem auch die umfasste Beschaffenheit vorhanden

ist, ausschliesslich vorhanden ist, das ist nicht nicht

vorhanden ist... Seitens dessen, was umfasst wird ...

liegt eine Umfassung vor, wenn die umfasste Beschaffenheit

ausschliesslich da, das ist an dem Beschaffenheitstra'ger,

an welchem auch die umfassende Beschaffenheit vorhanden

ist, vorhanden ist1.

6. The meaning of the term svabhava in Dharmakirti's work is

discussed in Steinkellner 1971 and 1974. As it is not easy

to find suitable English equivalents, I translate 'own

being1, svabhava, as 'essence1 and 'essential property'

thus following Steinkellner. The notion of svabhava plays

an important role in Dharmakirti's logic and epistemology.

The following remarks by Steinkellner may throw some light

on the import of svabhava, 'Aus diesen Stellen [ie from

PVSV] entnehme ich dass Dharmakirti den Svabhava als eine

Beschaffenheit (bhavah, dharmah) bestimmt, die nicht von

einer anderen Sache bedingt ist, d.h. mit der Sache selbst

(sva-) gegeben ist (Steinkellner 1971, p. 206)'. And fur-

ther, 'In the ontological context the svabhavah of some-

thing is the totality of causal possibilities, usually

determined only with regard to one major aspect, whereas

in a logical context the various aspects of the causal

possibilities have been separated by abstraction. If we

... translate "essential property, wesentliche

Beschaffenheit" in logical contexts, the translation

"essence, Wesen" would be quite appropriate in ontological

contexts...1, Steinkellner 1974. p. 124.

7. Cf the translation in Steinkellner 1971, p. 204, note 93,

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113

'Welches [zunSchst] nichtwahrgenommene [Ding]/ das an sich

wahrnehmbar ist (tallaksanam), bei der Wahrnehmung

bestimmter [anderer Dinge] (yesam) [selbst] wahrgenommen

wird und nicht wahrgenommen wird, wenn unter diesen

[anderen Dingen] (tatra) ein einziges fehlt, das ist

dieses [Ursachenkomplexes] Wirkung'. Cf also Y. Kajiyama,

Trikapancakacinta, Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia, Nos.

4-5f 1963/ Kyoto University/ Kyoto, p. 2-3.

8. Cf Steinkellner 1971/ p. 185/ note 26 which contains the

following remark on this passage, 'Damit ist die ... Frage

... beantwortet/ wie man ... aus dem Rauch auf Feuer

schliessen kann. Feuer als Mitursache im Ursachenkomplexf

der allein den Rauch hervorbringt/ wird fflr sich allein

gar nicht erschlossen, sondern ist als logische Folge

(sadhyam) immer im Sinne eines Symbols fUr den

Ursachenkomplex zu verstehen, in dem die Mitursachen

Feuer, Holz, Feuchtigkeit/ Wind/ etc. vereinigt sind1.

9. Cf Steinkellner 1971, p. 202, 'Dharmakirti's Verdienst ist

es/ die Frage nach dem Grund f(lr den logischen Nexus

beantwortet zu haben. Und das Wesentliche seiner Antwort

ist/ dass er zeigt/ dass und wie der logische Nexus auf

einer realen Verbindung beruht und bei welchen Begriffen

diese Verbindung in der Wirklichkeit gegeben ist1.

10. These two verses are also translated in Steinkellner 1979,

p. 105 representing Pramanaviniscaya 11.60-61, 'Wenn der

TermitenhUgel das Wesen des Feuers (nMmlich Rauch

hervorzubringen) hatr dann ist er eben Feuer. Und hat er

nicht das Wesen des Feuers, wie kflnnte Rauch aus ihm

entstehen? (v.60) Das Feuer hat nSmlich das Wesen der Ur-

sache fflr Rauch und unterscheidet sich durch diese (Rauch

hervorbringende) F&higkeit (von anderen Ursachen).

Entstflnde der Rauch aus etwas, das nicht Ursache fflr Rauch

ist, dann wSre er ursachelos (v.61)1.

11. A simpler translation than mine is found in Steinkellner

1971, p. 205, 'Die reale IdentitSt (tadatmyam) dieser

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114

Sache besteht nSmlich nur mit dem, was sich bloss an sie

anschliesst, nicht [aber] mit dem, was von einem anderen

abhMngt'.

12. Paksilasvamin seems to foreshadow Dharmakirti's

epistemological principle that the existence of a thing is

the perception of that thing.

••.pramanena sati qrhyamane tad iva yan na grhyate tan

nasti, yady abhavisyad idam iva vyajnasyata vijnanabhavan

nastlti tad evam satah prakasakam pramanam asad api

prakasayatiti ,

'When an existent [thing] is being perceived through a

means of valid cognition, than that which is in no way

(iva) perceived is not [present or not existent]. If this

[unperceived thing] would have been [present], it would

somehow (iva) have been cognized, [but] because there is

no cognition [of it], it is not present. Thus, a means of

valid cognition, while revealing what is present, reveals

also that which is not present (NBh, p. 4.2-4)'.

Paksilasvamin's last remark, that a means of valid cogni-

tion reveals present as well as absent things, formulates

a principle that seems to be implied in Dharmakirti's

theory on non-perception, anupalabdhi, as a valid probans.

13. In this verse Dharmaklrti alludes to a passage from

Dignaga's Nyayamukha. He quotes this passage in the prose

following on this verse (cf PVSV p. 18.17 and the critical

apparatus).

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115

IV The Pramana-definitions of the Pramanasiddhi-chapter of

PV, v 1-7 (PV II.1-7)

In PV II Dharmaklrti exhaustively discusses the topics

that relate to the first half of PS I., a half-verse in

which Dignaga expresses his respect for the Buddha.1 PSV

I.1a-b runs:

pramanabhutaya jagaddhitaisine

pranamya sastre sugataya tayine /

'After paying obeisance to Him who is'a a means of valid

cognition, who strives for the welfare of the world, who

is the Teacher, the Well-gone, the Saviour1.

This verse praises the Buddha by simply enumerating five

of his outstanding virtues. The verse does not tell us

that the Buddha is a pramana on the grounds that he pos-

sesses the four other virtues. However, in the commentary

on this verse, Dignaga briefly explains why he thinks the

Buddha is a pramana, an authoritative speaker on religious

subjects2*

atra bhagavato hetuphalasampattya pramanabhutatvena

stotrabhidhanam sastradau gus pa bskyed par bya ba^i

don du"o

(PS 1.1 comm line 1-2), 'As regards this [verse], there is

at the beginning of this treatise a sentence praising the

Lord [Buddha] as one who is a means of valid cognition [or

religious authority] through [his] perfection in cause and

effect, in order to produce reverence [for the Buddha in

the hearers of this book]1. The perfection in cause (hetu)

and effect (phala) makes the Buddha the religious

authority that he is, makes him a pramana. In the rest of

the commentary, it is taught that cause refers to the

Buddha fs striving for the welfare of the world

(jagaddhitaisin) and his being the Teacher (sastr), while

effect refers to the Buddha's being the Well-gone (sugata)

and Saviour (tayin). Thus, according to Dignaga, the last

four gualities are meant to describe the nature of the

Buddha's religious authority .

tatra hetur asayaprayogasampat. asayo jagaddhitaisita.

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116

prayogo jagacchasanac chastrtvam

(PS 1.1, comm line 2-3),

'With regard to this [foregoing statement, it is so that]

the cause is the [Buddha's] perfection in disposition of

mind and [his perfection in] practice. Disposition of mind

is [the Buddha's] being one who strives for the welfare of

the world. Practice is the fact that [the Buddha] is the

Teacher [by excellence] on the grounds that [he] teaches

the world'. In this way, the second and third virtue men-

tioned in PS I.1a-b are said to produce the cause of the

Buddha's authority.4 The effect is explained as follows:

phalam svapararthasampat. svarthasampat

sugatatvena trividham artham upadaya

(PS 1.1 comm line 3-4), 'The effect is the [Buddha's] per-

fection [in the virtues ] for himself as well as for the

sake of others. The perfection [in the virtues] for him-

self [is clear] from [his] being the Well-gone [which]

comprises three meanings'. These three meanings are the

following,

prasastatvam surupavat. apunaravrttyartham

sunastajvaravat. nihsesartham supurnaghatavat

(PS 1.1 comm line 4-5), '[namely] [the meaning of] (a)

being extolled like one who has got a beautiful form [ ie

body]^; (b) the meaning of not returning [anymore to the

world of birth and death the Buddha is called Well-gone]

like one whose fever has fully gone; (c) the meaning of

[his being] complete [ie perfect] like a jar that is com-

pletely full1. In the next sentence, Dignaga emphasizes

that the term sugata is an epithet of the Buddha alone.

don gsum po de yan phyi rol pa^i^dod chags dan bral ba

dan, slob pa dan, mi slob pa rnams las ran don phun sum

tshogs pa khyad par du bya ba^i phyir ro

(PS 1.1, comm line 5-6), 'And these three meanings [of the

term well-gone] are also [mentioned here] because [the

Buddha's] perfection [in the virtues] for himself should

be distinguished from [the achievements of] those non-

Buddhist [saints] who are freed from passion, [as well as

the achievements of] those [Buddhist saints] who are

[still] undergoing religious training, and those who no

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117

[longer] need religious training [ie who are arhats]'.

This passage completes Dignaga's explanation of sugata.

The fifth epithet of the Buddha is his being the Saviour.

Dignaga says about this,

pararthasampaj jagattaranat tayitvam

(PS 1.1, comm line 6-7), 'The [Buddha's] perfection for

the sake of others is the fact that [he] is the Saviour

because he enables the world to cross [the waters of birth

and death]1. This continuous prose passage (PS 1.1, comm

line 1-7) gives a brief synopsis of the religious impor-

tance of the Buddha's personality. The Buddha has per-

fected and saved himself, but also saves others by teach-

ing them a road to ultimate salvation, a road which he has

travelled himself. This constitutes, according to Dignaga,

the Buddha's being a pramana.

Since Dignaga, in the Pramana-samuccaya, does not

elaborate on the relation of the concept of pramana with

the Buddha and his doctrines, it was left to Dharmakirti

to write and comment extensively in PV II on this verse

and its short commentary.

Even though we may say with Steinkellner that PS 1.1

'was conceived with a stroke of genius around 530 A.D.,

and can be considered the cornerstone that marks the his-

torical border between the dialectical and the truly epis-

temological period of our [ie Buddhist] tradition'

(Steinkellner 1982, p. 7), the verse still does not say

much more than that the Buddha is a pramana and possesses

four other qualities. The rest of the PS deals with the

two pramanas, perception and inference, as well as with

syllogistic reasoning, dialectics and semantics, but these

things are not related to the religious message of the

Buddha.6

Dignaga simply asserted that the Buddha is a means of

valid cognition and Dharmakirti considered it his task as

a commentator to explain this assertion. It presented to

him the following epistemological problem: Dignaga ac-

cepted only two means of valid cognition in PS I.2a-c; if

the Buddha is also a means of valid cognition, that is, if

his teachings are pramana, then his teachings must either

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118

be regarded as inference or constitute a third kind of

pramana, namely reliable tradition (agama), in addition to

the accepted two pramanas. On the one hand, Dharmaklrti

does not simply posit tradition (agama) or reliable state-

ment (sabda, aptavada) as a separate pramana; on the other

hand, he does not regard the words of the Buddha as mere

inference , since they refer sometimes to things that are

not accessible to the perception and inference of the

hearers. But if the words of the Buddha give valuable non-

inferential information about the highest goals of

religious aspiration, it should be rationally established

to what extent these words are pramana.8 That it is neces-

sary to logically prove the trustworthiness (avisamvada)

of reliable statements on things that are beyond ordinary

perception (paroksa) is maintained by Dharmaklrti already

in PV I in discussing PS II.5a-b (see note 7).

tasya casyaivambhutasyaptavadasyavisamvadasamanyad

adrstavyabhicarasya pratyaksanumanagamye^py arthe

pratipattes tadasrayatvat tadanyapratipattivad avisam-

vado^numlyate

(PVSV, p. 109.7-9) ,

'And in so far as the statement by an expert [as taught by

Dignaga in PS II.5a-b] is of such a nature [as we have in-

vestigated in PV 1.214], is in general (-samanyad)

trustworthy, (analysis of the compound aptavadavisam-

vadasamanyad of PV 1.216a-b, then follows a loose

paraphrase:) it is inferred (anumlyate) that this [expert

statement] of which no error (vyabhicara) [in cases that

can be verified] has been observed is trustworthy also in

[the specific case of] an object that is [at present] not

accessible to perception and inference, on the grounds

that [also in the latter case] cognition [referring to the

invisible object and not only to the intention of the

speaker, cf PVSV, p. 109.10] has the [expert statement] as

its basis, [just] like cognition [referring] to [objects

that are] different from the [invisible objects, ie cogni-

tion referring to directly verifiable objects]1. Here

Dharmaklrti in fact acknowledges that information about

invisible things can only come from expert statements

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119

(aptavada), but he demands that the truth of such informa-

tion should be inferred from the trustworthiness of the

information about visible things. In another passage from

the same work he says that, in the absence of other

pramanas, man needs reliable traditions (agama) in the

form of statements made by experts9 in order to know the

at-that-time invisible results of good and bad acts.

nayam puruso^nasrityagamapramanyam asitum samarthah.

atyaksaphalanam kesamcit pravrttinivrttyor

mahanusamsapapasravanat tadbhave virodhadarsanac ca

(PVSV, p. 108.2-5),1 Man cannot [safely] exist without resorting to the

[reliable] authority of tradition [consisting of reliable

statements], because [from reliable tradition, agama

alone] he hears the great advantage and the [great] disad-

vantage of engaging in or abstaining from certain [acts]

whose results are not [at present] perceivable, and [also

he cannot safely exist without reliable tradition] in so

far as he does not observe any contradiction [with the

reliable tradition] when the [results predicted by the

tradition] are [actually] there1. In PV II Dharmaklrti

says that the Buddha too made proper use of certain infor-

mation which he had got from reliable tradition, agama,

for example, information about the cause of suffering.

This is said in PV II.132cd-133ab, trsl Vetter, p. 40:

yuktyagamabhyam vimrsan duhkhahetum pariksate // 132 cd

tasyanityadirupam ca duhkhasyaiva visesanaih / 133 abf[Der Anwendung der Mittel geht voraus:] Forschend mit

Hilfe von Argumenten und Uberlieferung stellt er eine

Ursache des Leids fest und ausserdem, dass diese [Ursache]

eine nichtewige usw. Natur hat, [und zwar stellt er dies

fest] an Hand von Bestimmungen, die dem Leid selbst

[anhaften]'.

In PV II.1-7 Dharmakirti proposes to define and ex-

plain the first word of PS 1.1, pramanabhuta, in connexion

with the Buddha. In PV II.1-6 the term pramana is defined

and discussed, in PV II.7 the results of this discussion

are applied to the doctrines of the Buddha. What follows

now is a translation of PV II.1-7 with elaborate discus-

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120

sion of its contents. In explaining the verses, I will

make use of the oldest and therefore most authoritative

commentary on PV II, Devendrabuddhifs Pramana-varttika-

panjika (PVP), preserved only in Tibetan.10 Devendrabuddhi

usually explains quite satisfactorily, but when certain

theories of Dharmaklrti are only hinted at in PVP, I ex-

plain them in greater detail by quoting relevant passages

from PV I which was written before PV II (cf Frauwallner

1954, p. 148, 152-153).11 The text of PV II I utilize is

PV I (Mi), so that PV II.1-7 corresponds to PV I (Mi) 1-7.

Below every part of the Sanskrit of PV II.1-7 I give

references to various other standard editions in which the

text of PV II occurs.

Devendrabuddhi introduces Dharmaklrti's general

definition of a means of valid cognition with the follow-

ing words:

tshad mar gyur pa zes bya ba ni tshad mar ^khruns pa^o //

tshad ma daft ^dra bas na tshad ma ste bcom ldan ^das so //

tshad ma^i no bo de ci zig yin na gan gis de dan ^dra bar

dam bca^ bar byed ce na

(PVP (P), p. 2a 1-3), '[In Dignagafs introductory verse it

is said that the Buddha] "has become a means of valid

cognition" which means fhe came into existence as a means

of valid cognition1. By being similar [in validity] to a

means of valid cognition, he is a means of valid

cognition, namely the Lord [Buddha]. [Question:] "What is

this nature of a means of valid cognition, that it is as-

serted that [the Lord Buddha] is similar to [a means of

valid cognition] ?".

The answer to this is given, according to

Devendrabuddhi, in Dharmaklrtifs definitions and their ex-

aminations offered in PV II.1-7.

1 a-b

pramanam avisaifivadi jnanam

(PVBh p. 3.21; P W , p. 3.14; P W (S), p. 3.5)

'A means of valid cognition [in general] is knowledge pos-

sessing trustworthiness.

The commentary of Devendrabuddhi says:

bslu ba yod pa ma yin pa can ni bslu ba med pa can te /

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121

gan la bslu ba med pa zes bya ba^i don to //

(PVP (P), p. 2a,4-5), 'That in which untrustworthiness

does not occur is trustworthy; in which trustworthiness

occurs, [that is possessing trustworthiness], this is the

meaning [of Dharmaklrti's expression "possessing trust-

worthiness, avisamvadin"]'. According to PVP (P), p. 2a. 5-

2b. 1 it is possible to interpret Dharmaklrtifs expression

in two ways: (a) a means of valid cognition is knowledge

of a trustworthy thing, and thus knowledge possessing,

grasping, revealing the trustworthiness of the object; (b)

a means of valid cognition is knowledge which itself pos-

sesses trustworthiness, hence trustworthy knowledge. In

the first interpretation, trustworthiness is predicated of

the object of knowledge, in the second interpretation, of

knowledge itself. Although the second interpretation of

avisamvadin seems more natural and obvious, the first can-

not be wholly rejected as fanciful, for it occurs also

with Dharmaklrti himself in PV 1.215-217 and PVSV, p.

108.17-109.20 as we will soon see. It is conceiveable that

these passages have led Devendrabuddhi into thinking that

in PV II. 1a trust-worthiness is said to exist of the ob-

ject and the knowledge of it. He writes thus:

mi bslu ba de van don yons su bead nas "jug pa na don gyi

ran

no

de"

yul

q± nus

bo'i

i de

can

mi

lta

gyi

pa grub pas j

slu ba ni

bur qyur

chos yin

(D.

pa

no

i ltar "dod

p. 1b5; P.

rtoqs pa na

// de qan la

pa^i

'i>ses

yod

don

yul

pa'i

pa

de

qyi

mi

de

lta bu'i

chos

bslu

dan /

ba ni

ni bslu ba

med pa can gyi ses pa^o //

(PVP (P), p. 2a.5-2b.1),

'And further, this trustworthiness — when [on the part of

the perceiver] there is activity [directed towards a

thing] after the thing has been fully ascertained [by him

through means of valid cognition] — being the trustwor-

thiness of [this thing] whose form conforms to [the

thing's] desired purpose [ie desired and expected by the

perceiver] through the establishing [ie ascertainement] of

the thing's own power [to serve the desired purpose], is a

property of the object (yulf visaya) [of cognition]. And

when there is the cognition that has become [of] such [a

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122

form, ie of the form] of the [thing], then the trustwor-

thiness of this knowledge is a property of [the valid

cognition] related to the object (yul canf visayin). This

[knowledge] in which the [trustworthiness of the object

and the trustworthiness of the cognition] is present, is

"knowledge possessing trustworthiness".

It seems that Devendrabuddhi interprets the double

trustworthiness in this manner; the power of a real thing

to serve an intended purpose for the perceiver constitutes

its trustworthiness, while the valid cognition of the

thing's power constitutes the trustworthiness of the cog-

nition of the thing. That is to say, we proceed from the

trustworthiness, the power of the thing, to the trustwor-

thiness of the cognition of the thing. Both forms of

trustworthiness eventually unite in the knowledge which is

the essence of a pramana.^

That trustworthiness (avisamvada) should be an essen-

tial quality of a pramana is not an entirely new doctrine

stemming from Dharmaklrti himself. For it is implied in

Dignaga's definition of a reliable statement by an expert.

aptavadavisamvadasamanyad anumanata /

(PS II.5ab)

'The statement by an expert is [to be regarded as] in-

ference in so far as there is similarity in trustworthi-

ness [between real inference and reliable statement]'.

Note that according to this definition aptavada and

anumana must share the essential quality of

trustworthiness, avisamvada (the same word as in PV II.1),

in order to be pramanas. Dharmaklrti evidently used this

term avisamvada to define the essential quality of pramana

in general in PV II.1ab. In PV 1.216-217 he interprets

avisamvada of Dignaga's definition in two ways, (a) as the

trustworthiness of the reliable statement and (b) as the

trustworthiness of the object of the statement; in this we

recognize Devendrabuddhi's two interpretations of the term

in PV II.1.

Before interpreting Dignaga, Dharmaklrti defines the

general characteristics of the expert statement;

sambaddhanugunopayam purusarthabhidhayakam /

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123

parlksadhikrtam vakyam ato^nadhikrtam param //

(PV 1.214)

'A sentence [an expert statement]: (a) whose [words] are

coherent, (b) for [which] there are means that are

suitable [for acquiring the desired ends], and (c) which

expresses what is useful to man, is [alone] made the sub-

ject of an investigation [into the validity of such a sen-

tence as a pramana]. A [sentence] which is different from

[such] a [sentence having these three characteristics] is

not made the subject [of an investigation into its

validity]1. Only the statement of an expert which has

characteristics a-c could be regarded as a pramana,

provided the statement can be proved to be trustworthy.

kah punar asyavisaitivadah (PVSV, p. 108.16), 'But what is

the trustworthiness of this [useful sentence as defined in

PV 1.214]?'. Dharmaklrti answers:

pratyaksenanumanena dvividhenapy abadhanam /

drstadrstarthayor asyavisamvadas tadarthayoh //

(PV 1.215)1 The trustworthiness of this [useful sentence] about

visible and invisible things which are [ie can be] objects

of the [two pramanas, perception and inference], consists

in the fact that [the information contained in such a

sentence] is neither contradicted by perception nor by

twofold inference1.

'Twofold inference1, according to Karnakagomin, means:

anumanena ca dvividhena vastubalapravrttenaqamasritena ca

(PVSVT, p. 392.14-15), 'And "by twofold inference" [means:

by inference] that has operated through the power of a

[perceived real] thing and [inference] that is based on

tradition1. In PV 1.215 Dharmaklrti asserts that for an

expert statement to be trustworthy, two requirements

should be fulfilled — first, the information in the

statement must have been obtained by the speaker through

his own power of perception and inference? and second, the

information may not be contradicted by the subsequent per-

ception and inference of the hearer.

In the next verse Dharmaklrti uses this general con-

ception of trustworthiness to give his first explanation

Page 150: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

124

of PS II.5ab.

aptavadavisamvadasamanyad anumanata /

buddher agatyabhihita parokse^py asya gocare //

(PV 1.216)

'In so far as a statement by an expert [ie by the Buddha]

is in general [ie in directly verifiable cases] trustwor-

thy [and thus reveals an object in an indirect manner as

does inference, therefore Dignaga] has designated [in PS

II.5ab] the cognition [derived from this statement] as in-

ference [ ie as of an inferential nature] also in [the

specific case, ie a case that is not directly verifiable,

of] an invisible object [to which] this [expert statement

refers], since there is no [other] possibility [but to

also regard the latter kind of statement as an inference,

ie in so far as no contrary results are perceived there is

no cause for deviating from Dignaga's rule that an expert

statement is like an inference]1.

In this first interpretation trustworthiness is

regarded as an essential quality which the statement as a

pramana and valid inference as a pramana have in qommon.

The second interpretation says that the expert statement

is inference in so far as the hearer knows that the main

object which the statement described is trustworthy.

heyopadeyatattvasya sopayasya prasiddhitah /

pradhanarthavisamvadad anumanam paratra va //

(PV 1.217)

'Or [introducing the second explanation of PS II.5ab, an

expert statement] about another [object, ie one that is

not visible to the hearer] is inference in so far as the

main thing [which the statement describes] is trustworthy

on the grounds that [this main thing, being the four noble

truths taught by the expert, ie the Buddha:] [namely] the

truth of what has to be avoided [ie suffering] and ob-

tained [ie the destruction of suffering] together with the

causes [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the

destruction of suffering, the eightfold path], is estab-

lished [ie ascertained by the hearer to be trustworthy

through his own power of perception and inference]1.

In the prose following on this verse Dharmaklrti adds,

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125

heyopadeyatadupayanam tadupadistanam avaiparltyam

avisamvadah

(PVSV p. 109.15-16), fThe fact that what is to be avoided

[ ie suffering] and obtained [ ie the destruction of

suffering] and the causes thereof [ie the cause of suffer-

ing and the cause of the end of suffering, the eightfold

path] which have [all] been taught by the [expert speaker,

the Buddha] are not contrary [to the perception and in-

ference of the hearer] constitutes the trustworthiness [of

these objects that have been indicated by the Buddha]1.

These excerpts from PV I and PVSV lend support to

Devendrabuddhifs interpretation of PV Il.lab that a means

of valid cognition in general is trustworthy knowledge as

well as knowledge of a trustworthy object, the difference

being that PV I refers to reliable statement and

inference, whereas PV Il.lab refers to every means of

valid cognition.

Devendrabuddhi also makes clear why the general

definition in PV Il.lab is valid for both perception and

inference, the only two pramanas recognized by Dignaga and

Dharmaklrti.

skyes bu ma slus pas ni mi bslu ba ni mnon par "dod pa"i

don dan phrad par byed pa"i mtshan nid can gyi mnon sum

dan / rjes su dpag par khyab par byed pa yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 2b.2), '[The term] "trustworthiness" [in the

general definition, meaning: trustworthy] "by not having

deceived a person [with regard to the intended effect of a

real thing]", comprises perception as well as inference [,

in so far as both pramanas are] characterized by the fact

that they lead to the intended [ie intended and expected

by the perceiver] effect [of a real thing]1.

In PV II.1bc Dharmaklrti defines the trustworthiness an-

nounced in PV Il.lab.

1bc

arthakriyasthitih /

avi saitivadanam

(PVBh, p. 4.1-2; P W , p. 3.18-19; P W (S), p. 3.7-8)

'Constancy [on the part of the thing and the cognition of

it] with respect to the production of a [useful] effect

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126

[by the real particular thingf svalaksana] is the

trustworthiness [of the knowledge of the thing and of the

thing itself]f.

The reliability of the cognition of an object is

determined by the realness of the object. An object must

produce an effect (artha-kriya) in order to be real, and

if the object is constant in doing this, it is trust-

worthy. The cognition of this effect-producing object must

likewise be constant in order to be trustworthy cognition.

If it is true that Dharmakirti, in defining pramana,

predicates trustworthiness of both the object and the cog-

nition of the object in PV Il.lab, then the same trustwor-

thiness which is defined here in PV II.1bc must apply to

the object and its cognition. Thus sthitif "constancy" can

be consistently predicated of the object -- ie the real

object must be constant in its production of a (useful)

effect — as well as of the cognition of this object,

meaning that the cognition must be constant in its ac-

tivity of cognizing the production of an effect by the

real object. These two modes of constancy define the

trustworthiness, the reality of the object of cognition

and the truth, the pramanata, of the cognition of the ob-

ject respectively.

The definition in PV II.1bc is paraphrased by

Sakyamati in his commentary on PVP:

don ni sreg pa la sogs pa"o // de^i byed pa ni skyed pa"o

// de"i gnas ni rtogs pa ste khams kyi don sna tshogs pa

nid kyi phyir ro //

(PVT II (P), p. 88b.2), f "Effect" means [for example the

effects of a real fire like] burning [and useful effects

like cooking] etc. "Production" of this [effect] means

bringing [it] about. "Constancy" of the [production of an

effect by the real object] means the cognition [of the

effect-production], because the root [sjtha, to stand, from

which the noun sthiti, constancy is derived] has various

meanings' . The last remark seems strange, as the root

SPtha, "to stand" cannot mean "to cognize", but Sakyamati's

paraphrase is influenced by Devendrabuddhi's commentary

which says about PV II.1bc;

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127

tshad mas yons su nes pa"i don gyis sgrub par bya ba^i don

byed par rtogs pa^o // ji ltar mnon sum gyis ses nas me

bsreg pa dan / "tshed pa la sogs pa^i nus pa la *jug pa

de"i dro ba^i reg pa la sogs pa^i yul can gyi mnon sum

dan ji ltar *ga* zig gi tshe me nid la rnam pa mtshuns pa

la sogs pa *ga* zig gis ^khrul pa du ba las me nes par

byas pa*i rjes su dpag pa^i *jug pa mi bslu ba yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 2b.3-5),

'The cognition of the production of an effect to be

brought about by a thing that is fully ascertained [by the

perceiver] through the means of valid cognition — like

[the cognition coming from] the direct perception refer-

ring to [effects] such as touching etc something hot when

[an object such as a real fire] is actually present —

[this perception is trustworthy cognition] with regard to

the power of fire to burn and [the conseguent useful power

to] cook [food] etc after [a real fire and its powers]

have been [correctly] known through direct perception; and

as the activity of inferring is trustworthy when at a cer-

tain time the [inference] has ascertained [the presence of

real] fire on the grounds that there is smoke [an in-

variably concomitant effect of fire with a smaller exten-

sion than fire] even though [the inference] is erroneous

with regard to the essence of [a real] fire because

[inference] operates with a [kind of] similarity of forms

etc [among real particulars, ie inference deals with con-

ceptualized and therefore ultimately unreal universals,

not with real particulars]1.

In this passage Devendrabuddhi maintains that it is

the cognition of a useful effect of a real thing, which

constitutes a pramana. The definition in PV II.1bc is dis-

cussed here in connexion with both pramanas. First, with

direct perception (pratyaksa), the ultimate source of all

knowledge — when perception of fire reveals some constant

effect to the perceiver, like heat, the power to burn and

thus the power to cook food etc, then these perceptions

are trustworthy in so far as they reveal to the perceiver

a real and trustworthy object. For a real fire will in-

variably produce such effects as burning and heat, which

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128

can be used to cook dinner on it. Inference, on the other

hand, cannot show the real object, but it can and does

convey to the perceiver a general notion of the real

object, when the perceiver observes another real object

that is invariably concomitant with the first one and has

a smaller extension than the first one. The actual percep-

tion of smoke at a certain place conveys the general no-

tion of fire, with which smoke is invariably concomitant.

If the direct perception of the probans, smoke, is trust-

worthy, and if the invariable concomitance of the probans

with the probandum, fire, has been observed before in a

trustworthy way, then the inference of the presence of

fire will also be trustworthy, as the general notion of

fire which the inference conveys, can bring the perceiver

to the actual, real fire. The trustworthiness of both man-

ners of cognizing — through perception and inference —

of fire is warranted by the constancy of the production of

effects by the real fire. For fire is constant in produc-

ing actual heat as well as potential smoke. Even though

fire does not always produce smoke, when smoke is produced

it is only by fire, and thus smoke will invariably point

to the presence of real fire.

The notion of arthakriya, "production of an effect"

plays an important role in Dharmaklrtifs ontology.15 The

term did not originate with him, it occurs in older Bud-

dhist texts in the sense of "useful, beneficial action"

(Nagatomi 1967/68, p. 60) and it occurs with the same

meaning in NBh, p. 117.4; 445.3 (cf Nagatomi op cit p.

63). In Dharmaklrti's ontology however, arthakriya is the

essential power of a real thing, vastu, the particular,

svalaksana, visesa. In PV 1.166 together with PVSV, p.

84.4-11 Dharmaklrti defines the particular, real object

and its contrary, the conceptualized, unreal universal in

the following way.

sa paramarthiko bhavo ya evarthakriyaksamah / 166ab

idam eva hi vastvavastunor laksanam yad artha-

kriyayoqyata ^yogyata ceti vaksyamah.

sa ca

arthakriyayogyo^rthah nanveti yo^nveti

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129

na tasmat karyasambhavah // 166cd

tasmat sarvam samanyam anarthakriyayoqyatvad avastu.

vastu tu visesa eva tata eva tannispatteh

(PVSV, p. 84.4-11),

'Only that which is able to produce an effect is a thing

which is real in the ultimate sense (PV I.166ab);

For this is the sole characteristic of a real thing

(vastu) and of that which is not a real thing (avastu),

namely the capacity [in the real thing] to produce an ef-

fect and the absence of this capacity [in what is not a

real thing], this we will explain.

And this object which is capable of producing an ef-

fect is not inherent [in other similar particulars as a

universal]. That which is inherent [in other particulars

as a seeming similarity, ie a universal] does not bring

about an effect (karya) (PV I.166cd).

Therefore, every universal is an unreal thing

(avastu), because [the universal is] not capable of

producing an effect. But only a particular (visesa) is a

real thing, because only the [particular, real thing]

brings forth the [effect]1.

This passage clearly demonstrates that arthakriya is

the essential power of a real thing (vastu)• Significantly

enough, the term is paraphrased as karyasambhava,

"bringing about an effect (karya instead of artha)" in PV

1.166d. Thus, valid cognition of a real thing and its

effect-production (arthakriya, karyasambhava) is not gen-

erated only by direct perception, but also by inference.

For the real thing that is not directly perceived is in-

ferred to be present on the grounds of perceiving an ef-

fect that is produced by, and therefore invariably con-

comitant with, the real thing that is its cause. This

logical reason is called karyahetu, "effect as probans".

Dharmakirti illustrates this kind of probans in PV 1.37:

dhumahetusvabhavo hi vahnis tacchaktibhedavan /

adhumahetor dhumasya bhave sa syad ahetukah //fFor fire [alone] possesses the essence of [being] the

cause of smoke [since fire alone is] in possession of a

particular power for the [production of smoke]. If the oc-

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130

currence of smoke from [a thing that is] not the cause of

smoke [were possible], then it [ie smoke] would be without

a cause [, which is absurd}1. From this example of a

karyahetu/ it is clear that fire not only has the power to

produce effects such as heat which is useful for cooking

dinner, it can also, to quote here Devendrabuddhifs

example, produce an effect (arthakriya) such as smoke.

Smoke is a useful effect of fire when it indicates the

presence of a real fire.

In PV II.1cd Dharmaklrti applies his definition of

trustworthiness to meaningful, coherent verbal expressions

in order to make clear to what extent they can convey

valid knowledge to the hearer, ie how they function as

pramana.

1cd

sabde^py abhiprayanivedanat //

(PVBh, p. 4.21; P W , p. 4.11; PVV (S), p. 4.2)f[This trustworthiness] also occurs with [knowledge] con-

veyed by words, in so far as [these words forming a

coherent meaningful sentence] make known [to the hearer]

the intention [, ie the concepts in the mind of the

speaker]'.

Devendrabuddhi briefly explains this assertion,

sgra "byun van / bsam pa dag rii ston phyir ro (PV II.1cd)

// mi bslu ba yin te zes bya ba rjes su *jug go // skyes

bu^i bsam pa ston par byed pa de ltar na de ston pa^i

phyir / *di ni tshad ma nid yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 3b. 4), 'Also with [knowledge] conveyed

through words, in so far as [these words forming a

coherent meaningful sentence] make known the intentions

[ie the concepts in the mind of the speaker] (PV II.1cd),

there is trustworthiness, this [term] is [what should]

follow [in the verse]. The making known [through words in

a meaningful sentence] of the intention in a person ['s

mind] is a means of valid cognition in so far as making

known this [intention is done] in this way [ie by describ-

ing a trustworthy, real particular to the hearer]1.

A meaningful sentence can convey to the hearer

knowledge of a thing, namely knowledge of the intention

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131

present in the mind of the speaker• When the knowledge

contained in the meaningful sentence leads the hearer to

directly perceiving a trustworthy and real object, then

the sentence itself is also trustworthy.

I understand sabda, "[knowledge] conveyed by words" as

referring to words used in a coherent, meaningful sentence

which teaches suitable means and expresses what is useful

to man, as such a sentence alone is regarded by Dharma-

klrti as a possible candidate for being a pramana. He made

this clear in PV 1.214 which I have quoted earlier.

Coherently formulated sentences which refer to practicable

methods to gain something and which, moreover, disclose a

desirable human goal (especially in the religious sense),

can really communicate practical knowledge about real ob-

jects to the hearer, even though such statements do not

reveal particular objects themselves as direct perception

does. For denotative words in sentences are mere mental

symbols of real objects. The use of informative sentences

is explained in PV 1.92-93.

sabdah samketitam prahur vyavaharaya sa smrtah /

tada svalaksanam nasti samketas tena tatra na // 92 //

api pravarteta puman vijnayarthakriyaksaman /

tatsadhanayety arthesu samyojyante" bhidhayakah // 93 //

'[Denotative] words express a [concept derived from real

objects, a concept] that is agreed upon [by linguistic or

philosophical convention]. This [agreement, ie linguistic

convention] is regarded [to be useful] for activity [on

the part of the hearer towards the real object, but] at

the time [of acting,] the [real object, being a momentary]

particular, is not present [to the perception of speaker

and hearer anymore], therefore the agreement [with regard

to the concept] is not [made with direct referece] to the

[momentary real particular] (92). [And yet] a person [ie the

hearer] who [— on the basis of words in a meaningful sen-

tence — ] has got [conceptual] knowledge of [real objects]

that are capable of producing [useful] effects, can act

for the accomplishment of these [for him useful effects];

thus [on the strength of linguistic convention] denotative

[words in a coherent meaningful sentence] are [fruitfully]

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used to [point out] real objects (artha) [to the hearer]

(93) '.

Words do not express real things but the conceptual

pictures of real things as they are present in the mind.

This aspect of Dharmaklrtifs philosophical semantics will

be further elucidated in our comments on PV II.2. What

words denote in ordinary and philosophical or scientific

speech is something that is mutually agreed upon by the

users of these words. Words by themselves do not express a

thing; it is on the strength of a particular linguistic

convention (samketa) that denotative words put in a mean-

ingful sentence are made to express certain intentions

(abhipraya) or denote real objects by the speakers who use

these words. The intentions of the speaker are meaningful

constructions made out of concepts which are mentally

derived from perceived real objects, momentary particulars

(svalaksana). Therefore, these concepts are unreal; they

are not as real as the particulars from which they were

derived.

But these "unreal" concepts are very useful tools when

they can impart information about real objects that

produce useful effects.17 Such information is correct in

so far as the receiver, on the basis of it, strives for

and really acquires the desired effect-producing objects .

In PV II.2 Dharmaklrti makes clear what he means by

the "intention" of the speaker and defines the power of

words to convey valid knowledge to the hearer.

2

vaktrvyaparavisayo yo^rtho buddhau prakasate /

pramanyam tatra sabdasya narthatattvanibandhanam //

(PVBh, p. 7.23-24; PVV, p. 4.17-18; PVV (S) p. 4.3-5.1)

'[For the hearer] a [coherent meaningful] statement

(sabda) [coherently expressing suitable means to reach the

desired end and good human goals] is a means of valid cog-

nition [only] with regard to the thing which appears in

the mind [of the speaker] as the object of the [mental]

activity [ ie the intention] of the speaker, [but the

validity of such a statement] is not [in a direct manner]

based on the true [absolutely individual] nature of the

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[real particular] object [ie the statement cannot reveal

the true nature of the particular]1.

As I have already shown, Dharmaklrti believes that

words in a meaningful statement do not reveal any real ob-

ject but only its mental image as it appears in the mind

of the speaker. A meaningful statement does not reveal the

true nature of the object, the real particular, for if it

really could, it would be equal to direct perception,

which it, by its very nature, is not. The trustworthiness

of perceptual cognition can be tested immediately, because

perception directly grasps the effect-production of the

particular. But the trustworthiness of a meaningful state-

ment is tested only afterwards, when the hearer really

perceives and acquires for himself the effect of the par-

ticular that was described in the statement.

Devendrabuddhi paraphrases this verse;

"chad pa po"i byed pa ste / van dag par "dod pa dan brjod

par "dod pa zes bya ba"i bar du"o // de"i yul gyi don gan

yin pa rab tu gsal zin (2b) so sor snan ba"o // gan la ze

na / rnam par rtog pa"i bio la"o (2b) // brjod par "dod

pa"i yul gyi don de la sgra "di ni tshad ma nid yin no

(2c) // "chad pa po"i don der snan ba can gyi rnam par

rtog pa sgra las rtogs par "gyur te / don de ses pa na "di

ni tshad ma nid yin no zes bya ba"i don to //

(PVP (P), p. 3b.5-7), '"The [mental] activity of the

speaker" means as much as [the speaker1s] real intention

and [his] desire to verbally communicate [the concepts he

has in his mind], the "thing which" is the object of the

[intention of the speaker] "appears" [meaning] becomes

manifest; in what [does the intention appear]?, [answer:]

in the conceptualizing "mind". "With regard to the" thing,

being the object of the intention [of the speaker], this

"[coherent meaningful statement] is a means of valid

cognition" (2c). Through the [meaningful] statement a con-

cept is cognized [by the hearer] which shows (pratibhasin)

the thing [ie the mental semblance of the real object] [in

the mind] of the speaker. [For the hearer] this

[meaningful statement] is a means of valid cognition with

respect to the [abstracted conceptual] knowledge the

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134

[speaker has got] of the real thing [, the particular per-

ceived by the speaker]1.

In this passage, Devendrabuddhi makes it clear that

meaningful statements reveal only the concepts in the mind

of the person who is speaking, and such statements are in

a direct manner pramana only with regard to the concepts,

but not with regard to the actual objects which generated

the concepts.

Dharmaklrti has based his philosophical semantics on

the idea that words are symbols of concepts derived from

the real objects. Concept-making, in his opinion, is done

by the mind through its faculty of apohay "[mentally]

separating / excluding [a thing from other things]11. The

conceptualizing mind separates certain perceived objects

from other objects that are not quite like them, as well

as from those that are totally unlike them. Through this

separation / exclusion, the mind arrives at certain

(general) concepts. These concepts can be used to describe

real objects: either a single concept refers to a number

of objects or a certain number of concepts is made to

refer to a single object.

I will now quote a passage from PVSV which shows that

Dharmakirti regards words as images or symbols of concepts

(vikalpa):

nanu sarvato vyavrttasya rupasyabhidhanam na sambhavati /

na vai tad eva rupaffl buddhau samarpyate / anatlndriyatva-

prasangat / kevalam ayam tathabhutam pratyayayisyamlti

sabdena srotary asamsrstatatsvabhavam vikalpapratibimbam

arpayati

(PVSV, p. 37.23-27), 'Surely an [adequate] denotative ex-

pression for the form [of the momentary real particular

that is completely] separated [ie different] from all

[other momentary particulars] cannot exist nor indeed is

this very same form communicated to the mind [of the

hearer by a denotative expression], because [if it could

be communicated in its real essence] then it would wrongly

follow that [a word denoting a momentary particular] is

not above the senses [so that a denotative word could act

as if it were equal to the direct perception of the

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denoted particular]. The [speaker] - while thinking "I

will make known [to the hearer a particular] that is of

such a [specific] nature" - through a denotative word [or

meaningful sentence] merely communicates to the hearer a

conceptual image with which the essence of the [momentary

particular itself] is not [directly] connected1.

Next, I will quote the famous passage with which

Dharmakirti starts his apoha-doctrine in PV I. this pas-

sage defines how, through apoha, correct concepts are

formed in the mind of the person who perceives a

particular.

sarve bhavah svabhavena svasvabhavavyavasthiteh /

svabhavaparabhavabhyam yasmad vyavrttibhaginah // 40 //

tasmad yato yato^rthanam vyavrttis tannibandhanah /

jatibhedah prakalpyante tadvisesavagahinah // 41 //

tasmad yo yena dharmena visesah sampratlyate /

na sa sakyas tato^nyena tena bhinna vyavasthitih // 42 //

(PV 1.40-42)

'As all things [, real, momentary particulars,] through

[their individual] essence, partake of [total] separate-

ness from their own being1^ [ie separateness from similar

things], and from another essence [ ie separateness from

unlike things] -- because [all particulars] abide

[exclusively] by their own essence — (40) therefore

specific classes which penetrate [ ie grasp] the specific

properties of the [real separate particulars] are [merely]

conceptually constructed [in the mind of the beholder];

[the concepts constituting these specific classes of

similar objects] are based on the [conceptual] exclusion

of every [unlike object] from the things [, ie from that

number of not so different particulars which in the mind

of the beholder produces the concepts of classes of

similar objects](41).

Therefore, through which [conceptualized general] property

[and words denoting this property] a special property [of

a particular] is known, [only] through this [general but

correctly circumscribing property], not through another

than this one, can the [specialness of the particular be

known and made known; for this [reason each concept has

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its] separate existence [ ie its proper range of

applicability, so that qualitatively different concepts

referring to the same particular are not identical in

content] (42) .'

In verse 40 Dharmaklrti defines the uniqueness of the

momentary real particular: every particular is in reality

totally different from every other seemingly similar, as

well as dissimilar, particular. Every particular has its

own unique essence and therefore partakes of total

separateness from every other particular. In verse 41 he

described the mind's function of conceptual separation,

vyavrtti, apoha.

After particulars have been perceived, the mind concep-

tualizes specific classes of objects and certain general

properties. These are not based on the actual essence

(svabhava) of every real particular, but on some common

differences among real particulars. When a given number of

different particulars makes a somewhat similar impression

on the mind, it is possible to say that these particulars

share the same properties, and thus it is imagined that

they belong to a class of objects. But the similarity

among them is not based on their really sharing a real

universal by which they look similar; there is a seeming

similarity in them in so far as ' they are less different

from one another than from other more dissimilar

particulars. The mind envelopes the slight differences and

thus conceptually creates similarity. In verse 42 it is

said that the concepts which are thus created by mentally

excluding the too dissimilar particulars can be used to

denote (but never precisely) the special aspects of real

particulars. Concepts made by conceptual exclusion are

general and factually unreal, but those that correspond

most to the unique features of a particular have the

capacity to symbolize these unique features. Other con-

cepts that do not correspond very much to these features

cannot symbolize them. The idea that concepts and denota-

tive words circumscribe the particular only by excluding

from it all that is very dissimilar is unfolded in greater

detail in the following verses.

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137

kvacid drste^pi yaj jnanam samanyartham vikalpakam /

asamaropitanyamse tanmatrapohagocaram // PV 1,48 //

'Also with regard to a [real particular] that has been

directly perceived somewhere and to which no parts [ie

properties] of other [particulars] have been [wrongly]

attributed, the conceptual knowledge [of it] has as its

object the [conceptualized] similarity [of things] and

operates in the sphere of merely excluding [from this

particular] the [wrong attributions] (48)'.

niscayaropamanasor badhyabadhakabhavatah /

samaropaviveke^sya pravrttir iti gamyate // PV 1.49 //

'Since an ascertaining [conceptual] cognition [of a

particular] prevents [wrongly attributing certain

properties to this particular] and since [whatever mode

of] cognition which [wrongly] attributes [these

properties] is what is to be prevented [by correct concep-

tual ascertainment, ie correct concepts], therefore the

[usefulness] is discerned [of the] operations of this

[ascertaining conceptual cognition] with regard to the

isolation of [wrong] attributions [from the mental image

of a real particular] (49)f.

In the next two verses Dharmaklrti equates the use of

denotative words with the correct conceptual ascertain-

ments (niscaya-manas) derived from exclusion,

yavanto^msasamaropas tannirase viniscayah /

tavanta eva sabdas ca tena te bhinnagocarah // 50 //

anyathaikena sabdena vyapta ekatra vastuni /

buddhya va nanyavisaya iti paryayata bhavet // 51 //

(PV 1.50-51 )1 There are just as many [conceptually constructed] ascer-

tainments [of a single particular] and [significative]

words [for these ascertainments] in order to expel [wrong

attributions to the particular] as there are [wrong] at-

tributions [to it] of parts [ie properties of other

particulars]. For this [reason] these [ascertainments and

words] have their various ranges [of applicability, ie

correct ascertainments and words have their own content

apart from the real particular they refer to, and since

this is so, they can be used to meaningfully refer to one

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particular without being tautological] (50) .

Otherwise, if one single real [particular] object could be

[fully] comprehended [ie grasped in all its uniqueness] by

one [single] word or [one single instance of conceptual]

cognition, then there would be no other aspect [of the

particular left that is not expressed by this one concept

and word] and thus [all concepts and words referring to

this one particular] would be fully equal in meaning

[which in fact they are not]1 (51).

Significative words and the concepts they symbolize

do not grasp the real essence of a particular but only

remove wrong notions about a particular. It is possible to

entertain a great variety of wrong notions about a single

particular, and many words can be used to keep away these

wrong notions. Hence it is said 'there are just as many

ascertainments and words in order to expel [wrong notions]

as there are [wrong] attributions1. By removing as many

wrong imaginations about a particular as possible with the

help of ascertaining concepts and significative words, one

is not left with the real essence of the particular but

only with a useful delineation of, and a negatively-

defined boundary around, the particular. In verse 51

Dharmakirti gives a reductio ad absurdum: if it were true

that one conceptual ascertainment and one single word

could describe the absolute singularity of one given

particular, then all other words that denote this par-

ticular would carry exactly the same meaning as the first

word. But this is in reality not so, for we can and do use

different concepts and words such as "sweet", "heavy",

"cold" etc. to refer to and circumscribe one particular,

without these concepts and words being identical in

meaning, and these same concepts and words are used to

circumscribe other different particulars.

Regarding PV II.3ab I will first quote a passage from

PV I, which explains how the mind abstracts concepts of

things from the direct perceptions of real particulars.

According to Dharmakirti, the conceptualizing mind men-

tally envelopes or encloses (samvrti) the perceived, ab-

solutely singular appearance of the particular. In this

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way, the absolute singularity is obscured by the mind and

the particular can be conceptually analysed into

substances, properties as well as put in classes of seem-

ingly similar objects. Thus, all notions of singularity,

classes and universals (samanya) are constructions of the

mind and do not have an existence independent of the mind.

According to Dharmaklrti, a universal is not a real thing

present in many particulars, but simply a convenient con-

ceptual image that can be used in inference or verbal com-

munication of knowledge.

pararupam svarupena yaya samvriyate dhiya /

ekarthapratibhasinya bhavan asritya bhedinah // 68 //

taya samvrtananarthah samvrtya bhedinah svayam /

abhedina ivabhanti bhava rupena kenacit // 69 //

tasya abhiprayavasat samanyam sat praklrtitam /

tad asat paramarthena yatha samkalpitam taya // 70 //

(PV 1.68-70)

'The [unique] form [of real particulars] which is

[absolutely] different [from the form of the concept] is

enclosed by the [conceptualizing] mind through [its

equalizing and generalizing] own form, [the conceptualiz-

ing mind] contains the [uniform] appearance of one object,

[although this seemingly uniform appearance] depends on

[various] separate [unique particular] things (68). These

things which are in themselves [absolutely] distinct, but

whose particularity has been [conceptually] enclosed by

the [conceptualizing mind which is] the enclosure, appear

[in the mind of the perceiver] in some [general] form or

other as if non-distinct [ie as if really similar] (69).

On account of the intention [ie attributing one uniform

appearance to various unique.particulars] [present] in the

[mind], the [seeming] similarity [of particulars] is

called real, but in the manner in which this [similarity]

is conceptually constructed by the [enclosure through the

mind] the [conceptualized similarity] is not real in the

highest sense [not as real as a particular] (70) f .

The mind's faculty of enclosing (samvrti) the unique

appearance of a particular and thus creating universals

(samanya) brings us back to PV II. In PV II.3ab Dharma-

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klrti describes to what extent cognition produced by men-

tal enclosure is not a pramana.

3ab

qrhltaqrahanan nestam saitivrtam

(PVBhf p. 21.3; P W , p. 5.1; PVV (S), p. 5.2)

'[The conceptual knowledge present in the mind of the

speaker, which is] produced by [conceptually] enclosing [a

particular perceived by him, we] do not regard [as a means

of valid cognition for the perceiver nor for the hearer]

because it [only] apprehends [a blurred, conceptualized

image, a concept characterized in general by the inability

to produce an effect, this concept is derived from an

effect-producing particular] that has been [already fully]

apprehended [by the power of direct perception belonging

to the perceiver]1.

The internal mental cognition of concepts as a means

of valid cognition for the perceiver and the hearer of

statements about them is rejected here, because the con-

cepts that are apprehended by this conceptual knowledge

are ultimately unreal things that do not produce an

effect, unlike the particulars that do produce effects.

Verse 1ab teaches that only knowledge which possesses, viz

grasps the effect-production by real particulars may be

called pramana, which leaves no room for knowledge of con-

cepts as a pramana, precisely because concepts do not

produce a real noticable effect and cannot thereby warrant

their trustworthiness; or to put it bluntly: a real fire

gives heat, a concept of fire does not.

The adjective samvrta, 'produced by [mental,

conceptual] enclosure1, that is, produced by samvrti, ob-

viously refers to the samvrti-theory in PV 1.68-70,

quoted just before, consequently, Devendrabuddhi inter-

prets samvrta as 'knowledge of a particular as it is con-

ceptually enclosed and put in a category of similar ob-

jects (samanya); thus samvrta could also simply mean1 concept'• His commentary runs:

"di ltar bum pa dan / yod pa nid dan / grans dan *degs pa

la sogs pa^i yul can qyi kun rdzob kyi ses pa ni tshad ma

nid du mi ^dod do // ci"i phyir ze na / bzun ba *dzin pa^i

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141

rgyu^i phyir ro // de la dan por mthon ba nid tshad ma nid

de "jug par byed pa yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 4a.1-2), •in this way, the knowledge which is

produced by [mental, conceptual] enclosure and which has

as its object [abstracted concepts] such as "pot" [or

potness], "existence", "number", "upward motion" etc is

not regarded as a means of valid cognition. Why not? Since

[this kind of knowledge] apprehends [in a conceptual man-

ner a particular] that has [already] been apprehended [by

direct perception], [therefore it is not a pramana]. With

regard to this [particular], only the first perception,

only this means of valid cognition, makes [the perceiver]

act1 .

Conceptual knowledge of a particular becomes

knowledge of abstract concepts like "existence", "number"

and "potness", but these concepts do not share the reality

of the particulars that generated them. The particulars

themselves and their effect-production can only be com-

pletely cognized through direct perception, which is thus

the sole source of every other mode of valid knowledge. °

Now one might ask to what extent conceptual knowledge is

useful in daily practice and therefore valid. Dharmaklrti

answers this in PV II.3bd.

3bd

dhipramanata /

pravrttes tatpradhanatvad dheyopadeyavastuni //

(PVBh, p. 21.23-24; P W , p. 5.1-2 PVV (S), p. 5.2-3)

'[Conceptual knowledge, ie knowledge of concepts produced

by the conceptualizing] mind is a means of valid cognition

[only] in so far as [succesful] activity [on the part of

the hearer] with regard to a real [effect-producing] ob-

ject that is to be avoided or obtained, has this

[knowledge formulated in a coherent, meaningful sentence

teaching suitable means to acquire the desired ends, as

well as expressing ultimate human purposes] as [its, ie of

succesful activity] basis1.

According to verse 3ab samvrtay the knowledge of a

concept is not a means of valid cognition, as it does not

grasp the effect-production of a real object. In this

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passage, however, — as in verse 4ac — , it is not the

conceptual knowledge but the conceptualizing mindf dhl,

itself which is called a pramana. There seems to be a dif-

ference between the mind (dhl) and its products, the con-

cepts (samvrta). This apparent difference does not pose a

problem, because in Dignaga's and Dharmaklrti's epistemol-

ogy the pramana, here the dhl and its result, the pramana-

phala, here the samvrta, are not thought to be different,

savyaparapratitatvat pramanarti phalam eva sat /

(PS I.8cd)f[We say that] a means of valid cognition is [identical

with] the resultant [cognition and not different from it]

because [the resultant cognition is] cognized together

with the activity [of cognizing a thing through means of

valid cognition]1. This is what Dignaga says and what

Dharmaklrti accepts as principle.

Devendrabuddhi interprets dhl as conceptual knowledge

in his paraphrase of PV II.3bd.

blan bar bya ba dan dor bar bya ba^i dnos po^i yul can

dan / skyes bu^i don zes bya ba can gyi "jug pa de"i la /

de gtso bo nid kyi phyir te / ses pa gtso bo nid yin pa^i

rgyu^i phyir / bio ni tshad ma nid yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 4a.6-7), MI0f that activity" which refers to

(yul can) the real object that is' to be avoided or ob-

tained and is called "the object of human pursuit ", "in

so far as the [conceptual knowledge, formulated in

coherent, meaningful sentences which teach means that are

suitable for acquiring the desired goals of human

pursuit], is the basis [of this activity]", [this means:]

because [conceptual] knowledge is the basis [of this ac-

tivity on the part of the hearer], [therefore] the

[conceptualizing] mind [of the speaker] is a means of

valid cognition [for the hearer]1.

Assemblages of correct concepts do not reveal the

real individual nature of a particular, but they can, and

do, give some sort of useful information about a

particular. This useful information is conveyed through

coherent meaningful sentences to a hearer, who can after-

wards act in order to avoid or obtain the described

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particular. This means that only statements on real par-

ticulars that produce useful effects are considered here.

The idea that a hearer of such statements can use the

statements as a kind of reliable pramana is found in PV

1,93 quoted before in my commentary on PV II.1cd.

The terms heyay 'what is to be avoidedf, and upadeya,fwhat is to be obtained1, are used in PV 1.217 and the

prose passage following on it, PVSV, p. 109.15 ff to

describe the scheme of the four noble truths taught by the

Buddha•

heyopadeyatattvasya sopayasya prasiddhitah /

pradhanarthavisamvadad anumanam paratra va // 217 //

'Or [introducing the second explanation of PS II.5ab, an

expert statement] about another [object, ie one that is

not visible to the hearer,] is inference in so far as the

main thing [which the statement describes] is trustworthy

on the grounds that [this main thing, being the four noble

truths taught by the expert, ie the Buddha:] [namely] the

truth of what is to be avoided [ie suffering] and obtained

[ie the destruction of suffering] together with the causes

[ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the destruc-

tion of suffering, the eightfold path] is established [,

ie ascertained, by the hearer to be trustworthy through

his own power of perception and inference]'.

In this verse heyopadeya and upaya refer to the four

noble truths whose trustworthiness can be directly

verified by direct perception and inference. If the four

noble truths, being the main object (pradhana) of the

statement, are proved to be trustworthy, then by inference

it is to be established that the invisible object of the

statement is also trustworthy. The prose more explicitly

relates heyopadeya to the four noble truths.

heyopadeyatadupayanam tadupadistanam avaiparltyam

avisamvadah / yatha caturnam aryasatyanafli vaksyamananltya

(PVSV, p. 109.15-16), 'The fact that what is to be avoided

[ie suffering] and obtained [ ie the destruction of

suffering] and the cause thereof [ie the cause of suffer-

ing and the cause of the end of suffering, the eightfold

path] which have [all] been indicated by_ the [expert

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144

speaker, the Buddha] are not contrary [to the perception

and inference of the hearer] constitute the trustworthi-

ness [of these objects that have been indicated by the

Buddha]. As is the case with the subsequently explained

[ie in PV II) scheme of the four noble truths1. What is to

be avoided (heya) obviously refers to the first noble

truth that there is suffering, for suffering is what one

wishes to avoid. The cause (upaya) of heya, is the cause

of suffering, the second noble truth. What is to be ob-

tained (upadeya) is the destruction, the end of suffering

which is the third noble truth. The cause (upaya) of

upadeya, here the cause of what is to be obtained, the

cause of the end of suffering, is the fourth noble truth.

The term heyopadeya in PV II.3bd clearly alludes to these

passages in PV I and PVSV.

The notion of an object that is to be avoided or ob-

tained as the object of valid useful knowledge is older

than Dharmaklrti. We find it also in NBh, p. 6.1-2:

heyam tasya nirvartakam hanam atyantikam

tasyopayo^dhigantavya ity etani catvary arthapadani

samyag buddhva nihsreyasam adhiqacchati,

'What is to be avoided, the cause of what [is to be

avoided], the complete avoidance, and the means of this

[avoiding what is to be avoided] must be known; having

perfectly understood these four words [designating four]

facts [that must be realized] one obtains the supreme

good1. We should compare this assertion with another one

at the beginning of NBh:

pramanena khalv ayam jnata^rtham upalabhya tarn

artham abhlpsati jihasati va

(NBh, p. 2.2), 'When a cognizer has cognized an object

with a means of valid cognition, he either wishes to ob-

tain (abhlpsati) that object or to avoid (jihasati) it1.

Paksilasvamin uses the verbal forms that correspond seman-

tically to the verbal adjectives heya and upadeya. About

the object one wishes to obtain or avoid, Paksilasvamin

says:

arthas tu sukhaiti sukhahetus ca duhkhaiti duhkhahetus ca

(NBh, p. 3.1), 'As to the object, it is happiness and a

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cause of happiness, as well as suffering and a cause of

suffering1. To my mind, it is possible to relate NBh, p.

6.1-2/with this passage. We get the following relation:

sukhay happiness, corresponds to hana atyantika, complete

avoidance of suffering; sukhahetu, the cause of happiness,

corresponds with upaya, the means of avoiding suffering;

duhkha, suffering, is heya, and is to be avoided;

duhkhahetu, the cause of suffering is tasya nirvartaka,

the cause of what is to be avoided. Without much

difficulty, we may recognize the four noble truths of Bud-

dhism here. According to Paksilasvamin, the avoidance of

suffering and the obtainment of happiness is achieved on

the basis of correct knowledge acquired through the

pramanas. In this way, he wishes to prove the practical

value of the pramanas. For almost the same purpose

Dharmakirti seems to use the same terms heya and upadeya

in PV II.3bd, in order to show the practical value not of

every pramana, but especially of reliable statement, for

the practical value of the conceptual knowledge contained

in the statement, the being a pramana of conceptual

knowledge, consists in the fact that it gives the hearer

of the statement useful information about things that

should be avoided or obtained. If we ask ourselves why

Dharmakirti uses these terms, heya and upadeya, in PV

1.217 and PV II.3bd, the answer could be that these two

terms can be used to describe in a short basic formula the

kind of objects regarding which the pramanas have practi-

cal value, and the formula also defines briefly the

central doctrine of the Buddha, namely the four noble

truths. As we have seen, Dharmakirti interprets heya and

upadeya in this way in PVSV, p. 109.15-16, thus making

quite explicit the covert Buddhism of NBh, p. 6.1-2; p.

2.2; p. 3.1.

The mind is not only a means of valid cognition on

the grounds that it can produce useful concepts that give

images of useful or unuseful real objects, but is is also

a means of valid cognition when it correctly grasps the

unique features (cognized through direct perception) of

the real objects. This is explained in PV II.4ac.

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4ac

visayakarabhedac ca dhiyo^dhigamabhedatah /

bhavad evasya tadbhave

(PVBh, p. 22.20; p. 23.9? P W f p. 5.10; 5.15; PVV(S), p.

5.4-5)

'And [the conceptualizing mind of a reliable speaker is

also a means of valid cognition for the hearer] in so far

as the [conceptualizing] mind (dhl) has a specific cogni-

tion (adhigama) [of the particular] owing to the specific

form of the [real] object [ie the particular], because the

[specific mental cognition of the particular] is only

present [in the conceptualizing mind of the speaker], when

the [specific form of the particular] is present [before

the perceiver who is the speaker after he has conceptual-

ized the specific form of the directly perceived par-

ticular and communicates the concepts of it to the

hearer]f.

Dharmaklrti says here that the specific form in which

a directly perceived object appears in the mind cor-

responds to the specific form of the object as it has been

grasped by direct perception (pratyaksa). And yet, the

conceptual image of the object is not equal to the real

proper form of it. Even if the image presents a very good

likeness, it still remains an incorrect copy of the

original particular. Dharmaklrti makes this clear in PV

1.87:

samrjyante na bhidyante svato^rthah paramarthikah /

rupam ekam anekaffi ca tesu buddher upaplavah //

'Objects that are real in the highest sense [ie the real

momentary particulars] are by [their] own [nature] neither

united [in order to form a class of real universals], nor

are they [, each individually, further] divided [into sub-

stances and properties]. [Thus,] a single or manifold form

[which seems to be present] in these [particulars] is a

disturbance [ie an error] of the [conceptualizing] mind

[ie the single or manifold appearances of the particulars

are simply created by the mind]1. As has been explained in

PV 1.68-70, the specific mental image of a particular is

created in the mind by conceptually enclosing (samvrti)

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the perceived appearance of the real particular. The con-

ceptualizing mind of the speaker makes the semblance into

concepts and words which are spoken to the hearer. In so

far as the verbal communication about the particular

enables the hearer to find the particular for himself, is

it a pramana; not because the communication reveals the

particular itself. The conceptualizing mind itself (namely

the mind of the speaker) is a pramana in so far as it has

more or less correctly conceptualized the particular. For

the correctness of the conceptualization by the mind is

the basis of the correctness of the statement that is af-

terwards made regarding the conceptualized particular. Yet

the solid basis of all these mental conceptual operations

remains direct perception (pratyaksa), for perception

alone can give birth to correct concepts abstracted from

actually perceived particulars. All correct concepts

derive from the actual perception of particulars and from

nothing else. By demanding that perception alone must be

the source of accurate concepts (as is done here in PV

II.4c), Dharmaklrti can warrant the truth, the being a

pramana of the mind that conceptualizes. The mind can only

be a source of valid cognition for others if it apprehends

and conceptualizes really perceived and existant

particulars. Imaginations and fancies which could also be

derived from the direct perception of things are here not

considered to be pramana.

4d-5a

svarupasya svato gatih //

pramartyam vyavaharena

(PVBh, p. 25.2-3; P W , p. 5.20-p 6.15? PVV (S), p. 6.2-3)

The cognition (gati) [by the conceptualizing mind] of the

proper form [of cognition as such takes place] by the self

[-awareness of the mind's cognition], [but the cognition

by the mind] is [known to be] valid cognition [only]

through activity [based on this cognition and directed

towards the cognized particular]1.

Devendrabuddhi paraphrases PV II.4d as follows;

raft rig pa las tshad ma zes bya ba"i ses pa de^i ses pa

yod pa nid grub pa yin gyis / tshad ma nid ni ma yin no //

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148

(PVP (P), p. 5b.5-6),'Even though by the self-awareness

[of the mind's cognition] the cognitive nature (ses pa yod

pa nid) of this cognition which is called "means of valid

cognition" is established, [still the cognition by the

conceptualizing mind] is not a means of valid cognition1.

Devendrabuddhi interprets svatah as ran rig pa las,

svasamvedanat, 'mental self-awareness'. This theory that

mental cognitions cognize themselves and do not need

another inner witness to be mentally perceived, is

Dignaga's theory of mental self-awareness, svasamvedana,

which is formulated in PS 1,9 and its commentary (Hattori

1968, p. 183.18-19). This passage has been discussed in

the chapter on Dignaga (p. 59).

Along with Devendrabuddhi, we could ask ourselves:

"o na ji ltar tshad ma nid nes par bya ze na

(PVP (P), p. 6a.1), 'And how is it to be ascertained that

[the cognition by the mind] is a means of valid

cognition?'. The answer to this question is given in PV

II.5a, pramanyam vyaharena, which Devendrabuddhi paraph-

rases thus,

dus phyis ^byun ba can gyi don byed pa^i yul can gyi ses

pas so

(PVP (P), p. 6a.1-2), '[The cognition by the conceptualiz-

ing mind is a means of valid cognition only] through the

cognition which refers to (yul can) the [actual] produc-

tion [by the particular] of the [expected] effect which

takes place at a later time.1 This means that every cogni-

tion is a pramana after the effect-production of a par-

ticular is actually perceived. Before that happens, there

is no criterion by which one can ascertain the validity of

a cognition. This would imply that coherent statements

that form a philosophical or scientific reliable treatise

(sastra) really serve no purpose, since their validity as

pramana is proved only afterwards, not immediately.

Devendrabuddhi introduces Dharmaklrti's solution of this

epistemological problem with these words:

gal te tha snad kyis tshad ma nid rtogs pa yin pa de^i

tshe bstan bcos don med pa can yin pa"i phyir brtsam par

bya ba ma yin par *gyur ro // don med pa can ma yin te

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149

qan qi phyir

(PVP (P), p. 6a. 2-3), 'If the validity [of the cognition

by the mind] is known [only] through activity [based on

this cognition and directed towards the cognized

particular], then, since a [meaningful scientific]

treatise [made up of sentences mediating such cognition]

is useless [as its validity can only be established after

the indicated particular has really been experienced],

[such a treatise] should not be composed [at all].

[However, Dharmaklrti says that a scientific treatise] is

not useless, because...1.

5b

sastram mohanivartanam /

(PVBh, p. 29.19; PVV, p. 7.18; PVV (S), p. 7.2)

[The correct conceptual knowledge concerning particulars,

formulated by a reliable speaker in a coherent scientific

or philosophical] treatise [only serves to] dispel the

confusion [or ignorance of the hearer regarding these

particulars]f.

A scientific treatise is a set of coherent meaningful

sentences — ideally in the form of valid syllogisms, al-

though this is not always necessary — which convey more

or less correct and useful conceptual images of a real ob-

ject to the hearer. A treatise does not reveal the object

itself, it only describes the useful effects the object is

expected to produce. Thus, the validity of the treatise

depends on the actual effect-production of the denoted

particular. The real use of the reliable treatise lies in

its power to remove the confusion and ignorance in the

mind of the hearer. For the hearer is capable of forming

some more or less correct notions, ie correct mental

pictures, of a particular on the strength of the informa-

tion from the treatise. Devendrabuddhi gives a reason for

this description of the purpose of a sastra:

"jug par byed pa^i tshad ma^i mtshan nid mi ses par "jug

pa na bslu ba srid pa"i phyir ro //

(PVP (P), p. 6a.3), '... because errors are possible if

one acts without knowing the definition of the means of

valid cognition as inducing [the hearer] to act [in order

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150

to get the expected particular and its intended effect-

production] ' *

The prime use of a treatise or a reliable tradition

is, of course, its information about real objects that the

hearer does not at present perceive for himself. The

treatise or tradition can incite the hearer to act in or-

der to acquire the at present invisible thing. This is

pointed out by Dharmaklrti in PVSV, p. 108.2-5:

nayam puruso 'nasrityagamapramanyam asitum samarthah,

atyaksaphalanam kesamcit pravrttinivrttyor

mahanusamsapapasravanat tadbhave virodhadarsanac ca,

'Man cannot [safely] exist without resorting to the

[reliable] authority of tradition [consisting of reliable

statements], because [from reliable tradition alone] he

hears the great advantage and the [great] disadvantage of

engaging in or abstaining from certain [acts] whose

results are not [at present] perceivable, and [also he

cannot safely exist without reliable tradition] in so far

as he does not observe any contradiction [with the reli-

able tradition] when the [results predicted by the

tradition] are [actually] there1. In the last clause,

Dharmaklrti describes the validity of reliable tradition

(agama), which must be the same as the validity of a

scientific treatise (sastra), as both must necessarily be

composed of meaningful, coherent sentences. Tradition and

a scientific treatise are both valid in so far as the pre-

dicted results, the predicted particulars and their

arthakriya, are afterwards experienced by the hearer.

Dharmaklrti now proceeds with a statement which

grammatically looks like a continuation of the assertion

sastram mohanivartanam, but which is interpreted by

Devendrabuddhi and all his successor commentators as an

alternative, second general definition of pramana.

5c

ajnatarthaprakaso va

(PVBh, p. 30.2; PVV, p. 8.1; P W (S), p. 8.2)

'Or [perceptional and conceptual knowledge in order to be

a genuine pramana not only possesses trustworthiness, but

also] reveals a [particular] object that was [previously]

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151

not known [ie not cognized by any pramana]1.

Devendrabuddhi explains this passage as follows:

qzan mtshan nid gnis pa yin no // rtogs pa pos mi ses pa^i

don gyi dnos po^i de kho na nid kyi gsal bar byed pa ste /

mnon par gsal bar byed pa^i ses pa yan tshad ma yin no //

don byed par mi bslu ba nid kyi phyir de dan de rtog par

bya'o //

(PVP (P), p. 6b.1-2), 'This is another, second definition

[of pramana]; that which reveals an object, [ie] the

reality of a thing (dnos po^i de kho na nid) that was

[previously] not cognized by [the person] who [now] cog-

nizes [it]: cognition which clearly reveals [such an

unknown object] is also a means of valid cognition. This

[knowledge which reveals an unkown thing] must be inves-

tigated on the grounds of [its] trustworthiness with

regard to the effect-production [by the particular that is

revealed by this knowledge] together with that [cognition

which is trustworthy]'. Dharmaklrti in his definition, and

Devendrabuddhi in his explanation of it, demand that a

pramana, apart from being trustworthy, should reveal sound

knowledge to the perceiver, of particulars that were

unknown to him before he cognized them. In short: a

pramana should produce new, valid knowledge. This epis-

temological requirement as formulated in PV II.5c comple-

ments the definition of a pramana given in PV II.1ab. We

might say that a genuine means of valid cognition should

reveal an effect-producing particular that was not known

before. With the second definition in PV II.5c Dharmaklrti

seems to justify the possibility of continuously acquiring

more and more new, reliable knowledge of reality. If we

apply this definition to the individual pramanas, we find

that, in fact, it only refers to direct perception, for

only through direct perception is it possible to directly

cognize new objects, previously unknown particulars.

Through inference it is not possible to directly cognize

new objects, but only previously unknown relations between

objects. For example, we infer the presence of a par-

ticular A at a certain spot because that spot possesses

particular B which is known to be invariably concomitant

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152

with particular A. If PV II.5c is applied to reliable

statement, tradition (agama) and a scientific treatise

(sastra), it seems to define them as well in a way. For it

is tenable to say that a correct statement describes an

effect-producing particular that the hearer of the state-

ment has never perceived for himself. Thus, a statement

can also reveal a previously unknown particular. This in-

terpretation of PV II. 5c as referring to inference and

reliable statement as well does not contradict the defini-

tion in PV II.1cd that the trustworthiness of a pramana

occurs with knowledge conveyed by words, in so far as they

make known to the hearer a correct conceptual image with

which he can search for the corresponding effect-producing

particular. However, since sound, verifiable knowledge of

particulars can only be had through direct perception

which has a direct relation with particulars, it is jus-

tifiable to interpret PV II.5c as defining direct

perception. The validity of the other pramanas is based on

the validity of direct perception, for only through direct

perception of a thing is the validity of inference and

reliable statement made certain.

According to Devendrabuddhi, the use of the term

"artha", the real object, in PV II. 5c implies that

Dharmaklrti wants to exclude false appearances, illusory

objects from being appropriate objects of valid cognition.

don smos pas ni zla ba gnis la sogs par snan

ba tshad ma nid ma yin par bsad de

(PVP (P), p. 6b.2-3), fSince he speaks of "objects"

[Dharmaklrti] has explained that [cognition of unreal,

false] appearances such as two moons etc, is not a means

of valid cognition1. Cognition of illusory objects is not

a means of valid cognition, because such unreal things —

even though they may have been previously unknown to the

perceiver -- do not, and cannot, produce any useful ef-

fects (arthakriya) for him.22 Devendrabuddhi further

argues that the word artha means the presence or absence

of a particular:

don smos pas kyan dnos po^i yod pa dan med pa

nid kyi de kho na nid yin par bzed do

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(PVP (P), p. 6b.4), 'By saying "object" [Dharmaklrti] also

assumes that [this object] is the reality (de kho na nid)

of the presence and absence of a thing1. A means of valid

cognition can reveal the presence of an effect-producing

particular. In both cases, the knowledge is useful.

Through direct perception it is possible to directly know

the presence of a thing, for instance of a real fire;

through inference we know only indirectly the presence of

fire, namely through the concomitant smoke (if there is

smoke). When a particular is not directly cognized through

pratyaksa, we can infer the absence of this particular.

This inference constitutes -- as we will know -- Dharma-

klrti' s third kind of valid probans (hetu) , namely the

anupalabdhi-hetu, the non-perception of a perceivable ob-

ject as the logical reason to infer the absence of this

object. Devendrabuddhi has this probans in mind when he

says that the pramana as defined in PV II.5c reveals the

hitherto unknown presence of a particular, as well as the

hitherto unknown absence of a particular. By saying this,

Devendrabuddhi makes this definition refer to direct per-

ception and the valid inference as taught by Dharmaklrti

in PV I.23

After giving his second definition of a real pramana,

a definition primarily referring to direct perception,

Dharmaklrti goes on to show how this second definition

would affect the possible validity of the conceptual

knowledge of universals.

5d-6a

svarupadhiqateh param / /

praptam samanyaviinanam

(PVBh, p. 30.28-29; PVV, p. 8.17-18; PW (S), p. 84-5)

'Following upon cognition [through perception] of the

proper form [of the pa r t i cu l a r ] , the [conceptual]

knowledge of the [seeming] similarity (samanya) [of the

perceived object with other objects] would be (prapta)24

[a genuine pramana, which i t is not according to our

definition in PV II.5c in so far as conceptual knowledge

does not reveal any hitherto unknown aspects of a

particular, that would not have been perceived through

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154

perception]'.

By rejecting conceptual knowledge of similarity as a

pramana, Dharmakirti is asserting here that the source of

all concepts (when they are correct, ie corresponding

somewhat to the appearance of the real particular) is the

direct perception of particulars. For the conceptual

knowledge of similarity (samanyavij nana) is abstracted

from the appearance of particulars. Conceptual knowledge

of an object is acquired only after (param) the cognition

(adhigati) of the particular, or rather the proper form

(svarupa) of the particular. Devendrabuddhi paraphrases

verse 5d-6a as follows:

ran gi mtshan nid khofl du chud pa las dus phyis spyi^i

rnam par ses pa gan yin pa de mnon sum gyis ma bzun ba nid

kyi spyi yul nid du bdag gir byed pa^i phyir / de yan

tshad ma nid thob na mi *dod do

(PVP (P), p. 6b. 5-6), fIf -- after the cognition [through

perception] of the particular -- the [conceptual] cogni-

tion of the [seeming] similarity [of this particular with

other particulars] is acquired [ie is regarded] as a means

of valid cognition, in so far as it is assumed that this

[conceptual cognition] has as its object a [special]

similarity which cannot be apprehended through perception,

[then we say that this] is not intended [ie no conceptual

knowledge of similarity is pramana]1. The reason that con-

ceptual knowledge is rejected here as a means of valid

cognition must be the fact that conceptual knowledge does

not reveal anything new about the perceived particular (cf

in this connexion also what was said in PV II.3a).

All mental abstractions in the form of universals,

and the similarity in a certain number of objects, are

made by the mind through its power of apoha, vyavrtti y ex-

cluding wrong concepts from a perceived particular. What

Dharmakirti briefly refers to in PV II.5d-6a, namely ac-

quiring knowledge of similarity, he explains more fully in

PV 1.87-88:

samrjyante na bhidyante svato "rthah paramarthikah /

rupam ekam anekam ca tesu buddher upaplavah // 87 //

bhedas tato^yam bauddhe^rthe samanyam bheda ity api /

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155

tasyaiva canyavyavrttya dharmabhedah prakalpyate // 88 //

'Objects that are real in the highest sense [ ie the real

momentary particulars] are by [their] own [nature] neither

united [in order to form a class of real universals] nor

are they [each individually further] divided [into sub-

stances and properties]. [Thus,] a single or manifold form

[which seems to be present] in these particulars] is a

disturbance [ie an error] of the [conceptualizing] mind

[ie the single or manifold appearances of the particulars

are simply created by the mind] (87) '.

Therefore, also this [seemingly real] difference

[between] "similarity" [among various particulars] and

"particularity" [of one particular] is [in reality only

made] with reference to an object which is conceptualized

[by the mind]. Specific properties of this one [single,

real particular] are conceptually constructed [in the mind

merely] by way of excluding other [wrong attributions from

this real particular] (88)'.

In the ontology of Dharmaklrti, reality is built up

exclusively of evanescent momentary particulars (cf also

the chapter on Dignaga). From this assumption it follows

that every notion a perceiver might have of a lasting

similarity, a universal, inherent in an indefinite number

of particulars, is an erroneous mental construction of the

mind. But also the lasting particularity of a single ob-

ject is a mental construction since the single particular

itself changes every moment, even though this may not be

noticed by the perceiver. The only pramana that could

really convey a true notion of the particular is direct

perception, for as long as the noticeable effect of the

particular (arthakriya) is conveyed, direct perception is

the only verifiable pramana. Conceptual knowledge, on the

other hand, lacks this verifiability as it does not ap-

prehend the actual effect-production.

In PV II.6bc Dharmakirti gives the reason for not

regarding conceptual knowledge as a means of valid

cognition.

6bc

avijnate svalaksane /

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156

yaj jnanam ity abhiprayat

(PVBh, p. 31.3-4; PVV, p. 8.21-22; PVV (S), p. 9.1-2)

'Because [our] intention [with the definition in PV II.5c

is] that [only sound, perceptual] knowledge of a

[hitherto] unknown particular is [a genuine means of valid

cognition]'.

Evidently, Dharmaklrti is merely paraphrasing the

definition offered in PV II.5c. Devendrabuddhi rephrases

PV II.6bc as follows:

^khrul pa med pa kho na yin no // ran gi mtshan nid ma

rtogs pa^i yul can gyi ses pa gan yin pa de ni tshad ma

yin pa de ltar na / khyad par dan bcas pa^i mtshan nid

bsad pas spyi ses pa ni tshad ma ma yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 6b.8-7a.2), f[The definition given by

Dharmakirti in PV II.5c] is certainly (kho na) non-

erroneous [in so far as it only refers to the apprehension

of the effect-producing particular]. [Only] knowledge

which refers to a [hitherto] unknown particular is a means

of valid cognition; by thus explaining the definition [in

PV II.5c] with a [limiting] specification, [Dharmakirti

makes clear that conceptual] knowledge of similarity is

not a means of valid cognition1.

In conclusion, we might ask along with Devendrabuddhi

why only knowledge of hitherto unknown particulars is a

means of valid cognition.

ci"i phyir ran gi mtshan nid rtogs pa^i ses pa gan yin pa

de tshad mar ^dod kyi gzan ma yin ze na

(PVP (P), p. 7a.4), 'Why is [only] knowledge consisting in

the cognition of a particular regarded as a means of valid

cognition, but not [any] other [form of knowledge]?1 The

answer to this is given in PV II.6d.

6d

svalaksanavicaratah //

(PVBh, p. 31.4; PVV, p. 9.5; PVV (S), p. 9.3)

'on the grounds that [a person who seeks to obtain useful

things] examines [with the means of valid cognition]

[real] particulars [which alone are capable of producing

the intended useful effects]1.

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157

Reality is built up of particulars, and a person who

needs what is useful can only strive to obtain particulars

which produce an effect that meets his demands. The

criterion of truth of the pramana is, therefore, its being

helpful in making the perceiver obtain the desired effect

of a particular. If knowledge is not instrumental in gain-

ing the useful effects of a thing, then that knowledge is

not a trustworthy pramana. Devendrabuddhi says about PV

II. 6d

ran gi mtshan nid kho na don gyi bya ba byed pa de ltar na

de^i don du skyes bu ran gi mtshan nid don byed pa^i rten

^dod pa yul de nid la tshad ma tshol bar byed kyi / don

byed pa ma yin pa^i yul gzan la ni ma yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 7a.4-5), 'Only a particular brings about the

production of an effect; thus, for the purpose [of gaining

what is useful and avoiding what is damaging,] a person

who regards the particulars as the basis of the effect-

production, searches for a means of valid cognition con-

cerning only that [effect-producing] object, but not con-

cerning other objects, [ie other than particulars, namely

the conceptualized universals] that do not produce any ef-

fects [because the universals are not real in the highest

sense]1. With this observation of Devendrabuddhi's, we can

round off the discussion on the two pramana-definitions of

Dharmaklrti. We might summarize the epistemological posi-

tion of the latter by saying that a true means of valid

cognition should be verifiable knowledge of real objects

that produce certain perceivable effects which are useful

for the perceiver. Such knowledge is verifiable only in so

far as the effect-production by the particulars is ac-

tually experienced (PV II.1). In order to be a source of

new information about reality, a means of valid cognition

should reveal particulars that were unknown before (PV

II.5c).

In PV II.1-6 Dharmaklrti has discussed pramana in

general, thus defining the first word of PS I.1ab. He then

applies the results of this discussion to the religious

authority of the Buddha.

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158

7a

tadvat pramanam bhagavan

(PVBh, p. 32.4; PVV, p. 9.11; PVV (S), p. 9.5)

The Lord [Buddha] is a means of valid cognition such as

that [which we have discussed in PV II.1-6]1.

Dharmaklrti implies here that the teachings of the

Buddha constitute trustworthy knowledge and reveal to the

hearer facts that were not known to him before. This im-

plication is clearly set forth by Devendrabuddhi in his

commentary.

*di tshad ma dan yan ci zig mtshuns na / gan gis tshad ma

dan *dra bas tshad ma nid yin / tshad ma^i mtshan nid rnam

pa gnis nid dan mtshuns pa yin no // ji ltar mnon par *dod

pa bzin du sgrub par bya ba^i don la mi slu ba^i don la mi

slu ba"i phyir dan / mi ses pa*i don gsal bar byed pa"i

phyir tshad ma nid yin no // de ltar na bcom ldan *das

kyan nes par legs pa la sogs pa*i mtshan nid can gyi skyes

bu*i don la mi slu bar mdzad pa dan / rtogs pa po"i skyes

bu^i don bsgrub par bya ba mi ses ston par mdzad pa de^i

phyir tshad ma nid yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 7b.2-5),

'In what way is the [Buddha] equal to a means of valid

cognition, that through similarity to a means of valid

cognition He is a means of valid cognition? He is equal to

the two ways [in which] a definition of a means of valid

cognition [has been given in PV Il.lab and 5c

respectively]. In accordance with what has been admitted

[in PV II.1-6 about a genuine pramana, the Buddha] is a

means of valid cognition in so far as [He] is trustworthy

with regard to the [useful] thing that is to be realised,

and in so far as [the Buddha] reveals [ie points out to

others] a [real] thing that has been unknown [to them].

Thus, also the Lord [Buddha] does not deceive (avisam-

vadayati, mi slu bar mdzad pa) with regard to [ultimate]

goals of human [aspiration, goals] defined as the highest

good (nes par legs pa, nihsreyasa) etc and [the Lord

Buddha] explains to a person who understands [Him] objects

of human [interest] that have to be realised [by the

hearer] and that are not [as yet] known [to the hearer];

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159

therefore [the Buddha] is a means of valid cognition [as

defined in PV II.1-6]1.

The trustworthiness of the Buddha is proved by the

extent to which a person really acquires for himself the

objects taught by the Buddha. The Buddha's teaching is

trustworthy when the hearer finds the objects that con-

stantly produce desired useful effects (arthakriyasthiti)•

This is the trustworthiness with regard to visible things,

things that are accessible to the perception and inference

of the hearer. The Buddha's trustworthiness about in-

visible things must be inferred from his trustworthiness

about visible things. This has been set forth by Dharma-

klrti in PVSV, p. 109.15-19:

heyopadeyatadupayanam tadupadistanam avaiparltyam

avisamvadah / yatha caturnam aryasatyanam vaksyamananltya/

tasyasya purusarthopayogino^bhiyoqarthasyavisamvadad

visayantare^pi tathatvopagamo na vipralambhayanuparodhat,

nisprayojanavitathabhidhanavaiphalyac ca vaktuh,

'The fact that what is to be avoided [ie suffering] and

obtained [ie the destruction of suffering] and the causes

thereof [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the

end of suffering, the eightfold path] which have [all]

been indicated by the [expert speaker, the Buddha] are not

contrary [to the perception and inference of the hearer]

constitutes the trustworthiness [of these objects that

have been indicated by the Buddha]. As is the case with

the subsequently explained [ie in PV II] scheme of the

four noble truths [ie suffering, the cause of suffering,

the destruction of suffering and the path leading to the

destruction of suffering]. Because this [teaching] of the

[Buddha about trustworthy facts that are accessible to the

perception and inference of the hearer] is trustworthy [in

so far as this teaching] is conducive to [ultimate] human

goals and [in so far as this teaching] is capable of being

put into practice [by the hearer], [therefore] one [must]

admit the truth [of this teaching] also [when it is

dealing] with another object [that is not accessible to

the perception and inference of the hearer], [the

hearer] is not deceived [with this second kind of

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160

teaching] since [the first kind about visible facts] is

not disproved [by his own perception and inference] and

[the second kind of teaching is true also] because a

[reliable] speaker [of the greatness of the Buddha] does

not gain [anything] by [uttering] untrue statements that

[do] not [set forth human] aims1.

As for the invisible object that is indicated in the

teachings of the Buddha, it seems that this sort of object

will, in the course of time, have to become visible to the

hearer. For if it can never be experienced at all, we

could not with certainty call it existent. Moreover, the

Buddha himself at some time should have experienced the

object that is invisible at present, if he is to sig-

nificantly talk about it. According to the definition in

PV II. 1 meaningful, coherent statements, in order to be

pramana, should refer to particulars that are constant in

producing useful effects. But also statements about in-

visible things should ultimately refer to effect-producing

particulars, not to things that remain absolutely

imperceptible. It seems, therefore, that Dharmaklrti with

his definition in PV II.1 introduces a more effective and

explicit means of verifying the truth of statements about

invisible things than the theory in PVSV, p. 109.15-19.

According to the latter passage, the invisible object

could theoretically remain invisible forever and still the

hearer is obliged to believe in the existence of this in-

visible object, only because the reliable expert, ie the

Buddha, who described the invisible object, does not

profit by uttering false statements. According to PV II. 1,

however, a reliable statement about invisible objects

should explicitly refer to real particulars that are only

at present not perceptible to the hearer but will be so in

the future, when the hearer actually perceives them.

As we have seen, Devendrabuddhi applies in his com-

mentary the definitions of PV II.1 and 5c to the teachings

of the Buddha, and says that the Buddha's doctrine reveals

facts that the hearer did not know about before. This idea

is not entirely new, because already Paksilasvamin says

that the reliable speaker reveals facts that his hearers

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161

did not know themselves. The hearer could only know these

facts from the correct instruction of the reliable

speaker, the expert (apta);

tesam khalu vai pranabhrtam svayam anavabuddhyamananaiTi

nanyad upadesad avabodhakaranam asti

(NBh, p. 223.7-8), 'Now, when these [ordinary] living

beings do not know for themselves [through their own power

of cognition those things that should be avoided or

obtained], then there is no other cause of [correct]

knowledge [left for them] than the [valid] instruction

[given by the expert speaker]1. It is very well possible

that this statement influenced Devendrabuddhi when he

wrote to the effect that the teachings of the Buddha

reveal hitherto unknown facts to the hearer. Of course in

Devendrabuddhi's view, the ideal and most elevated expert

is the Buddha. Even Dharmakirti may have been influenced

by this NBh-passage, as he maintains in PV II.7a that the

Buddha is a means of valid cognition equal to the sort of

pramana he has defined in PV II. 1-6, thus implying that

the words of the Buddha evince trustworthiness and revela-

tion of new facts.

After explaining the term pramana in connexion with

the doctrine of the Buddha, Dharmakirti explains the term

bhuta, "has become" of PS 1.1a.

7 be

abhutavinivrttaye /

bhutoktih

(PVBh, p. 32.8-9? PVV, p. 9.15; P W (S), p. 9.6-7)

'In order to [make his readers] dismiss [the notion that

something] that has not become [, ie something eternal

like the Vedas or a Supreme God, could be a real means of

valid cognition, Dignaga uses] the expression "has become"

[in PS I.1a, thus saying that the Buddha is only a pramana

because he has become so as the result of a process of

becoming],1

The Buddha has become an authoritative speaker on

religious subjects because he has trained himself over

many lives to become a fully enlightened one, a Buddha.

The Buddha's authority is the result of a process of

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162

growth, of becoming. By saying "has become" Dharmaklrti

makes Dignaga reject the idea that an eternal supreme

being or everlasting Vedic utterances could be regarded as

a means of valid cognition. In PV II.8-9 Dharmakirti

rejects the possibility of the existence of an eternal

pramana.

Yet the process of becoming alone does not warrant a

person's being a means of valid cognition; the authorita-

tive speaker must have practiced certain moral excellences

which are the conditions and cause of his authority. On

the grounds of the speaker's possessing the required moral

excellences, the hearer can validly infer the authorita-

tiveness of the statements made by the speaker, as will be

made clear later. Devendrabuddhi writes about 7bc:

bcom ldan ^das kyi ye ses gan yin pa de dan de ni skyes pa

yin gyi / no bo nid kyis grub pa ni ma yin no // gan gi

tshe skye ba yin pa de^i tshe yul dan dus dan ran bzin gyi

nes par mi run ba^i phyir de ni glo bur bar rigs pa ma yin

no zes don gyis (PVP (D), p. 7a.2 gyi) ran gi rgyu ston

par byed do //

(PVP (P), p. 7b.6-7),

'That which is the higher knowledge (ye ses) of the Lord

[Buddha], even though all that (de dan de, tattat) has

come into existence, [yet it] is not perfected (grub pa,

siddha) [as pramana] [merely] through its own nature. When

[this higher knowledge of the Buddha] comes into being,

then — since it is not correct that [this higher

knowledge] is limited (nes par, niyata) to [some

particular] place, time and nature (ran bzin, svabhava)

[but developed over many lives] — this [knowledge] is not

suitable for being [regarded as merely] incidental (glo

bur bar, akasmikam P W , p. 10 note 1) [ie as something

that emerged by accident, not through conscious effort

over an enormous period of time]. Thus, he [Dharmakirti]

shows [in PV II.7cd], according to the [implied] sense,

the proper cause (raft gi rgyu, svakaranam PVV, p. 10 note

1 ) [why the higher knowledge of the Buddha has become a

pramana]'.

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163

PV II.7cd

sadhanapeksa tato yukta pramanata //

(PVBh, p. 32.9; PVV, p. 10,2; PVV (S), p. 9.8)

'The validity of the Buddha as a pramana] depends on

[specific] means, therefore [the Buddha] is an appropriate

[ie correct and reliable] means of valid cognition1.

Devendrabuddhi says about this passage:

tshad ma de ni bcom ldan "das kyis // sgrub byed la bltos

pa (sadhanapeksa) / gan gi phyir bcom ldan "das tshad ma

nid du bzugs pa dan / de"i sgrub par byed pa dag "chad par

"gyur ro // de"i sgrub par byed pa nan tan du byed pa las

kyan tshad ma nid yod par "gyur ba de"i phyir (tato) /

bcom ldan "das ni tshad ma nid (pramanata) yin par rigs so

(yukta) // sbyor ba ni gan gis sgrub par byed pa gan phyin

ci ma log par nan tan du byas pa des ni / de thob par

"gyur te / dper na nad pas nad med bsgrub par byed pa

phyin ci ma log pa nan tan du byas pa lta bu"o //

(Skt fragment in PVV p. 11 note 1:)

yo yatsadhanam aviparitam anutisthati tasya tatpraptir

bhavati / yathaturasyarogyasadhanam aviparltam

anutisthatah. bcom ldan "das kyan tshad ma nid kyi sgrub

par byed pa phyin ci ma log pa nan tan mdzad pa can yin no

zes bya ba ni ran bzin gyi gtan tshigs so /

(PVP (P), p. 7b.7-8a.2) (cf Skt fragment PVV, p. 11 note

1:)

anusthitapramanyaviparltasadhanas ca bhagavan iti

svabhavahetuh,

'The validity [of the Buddha as pramana] depends on

[specific] means' [developed] by the Lord [Buddha]. On

which [grounds] the Lord [Buddha] is at present a means of

valid cognition and the means for [becoming] that, will be

[elaborately] explained [in the sequel of PV II]. Because

[the Buddha] too undertakes [certain intentional] actions

with regard to [acquiring] the means for the [higher

knowledge], [His] being a pramana could come into

existence; therefore the Lord [Buddha] is an appropriate

means of valid cognition. The formulation [of the proof in

PV II.7cd] [runs] as follows: He who undertakes [specific]

action (anutisthati, nan tan du byas pa) with regard to a

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164

means [for obtaining] something [, in so far as this means

is] correct [ie leading to the intended results], obtains

that [for which he practiced the means], just as for a

sick person who undertakes [specific] actions with regard

to the means for [regaining his] health [, in so far as

this means is] correct [ie really leading to health],

[health will come back]. The Lord [Buddha] too is one who

has undertaken [specific] action with regard to a correct

[ie leading to the intended results] means for [becoming]

authoritative [ ie for becoming a means of valid

cognition]. This is [an inference in which] the essential

property ["correct means" is used] as probans .

The implied svabhavahetu-inference Devendrabuddhi is

formulating in the last part of this passage can be con-

structed as follows.

Two essential properties are involved; the first, with the

wider extension, is "practicing a means (sadhana) which

invariably leads to the intended results (aviparita)"; the

second, with the smaller extension, is "practicing this

means with the specific purpose to become an authority

(pramana)". The logical connexion between these two es-

sential properties, ie their invariable concomitance, is

based on the fact that both are forms of specific inten-

tional actions (anusthana, nan tan). Thus, it is possible

to infer the epistemological authoritativeness (pramanata")

of the Buddha from His having practiced correct means

(sadhana), since the latter by being the wider essence of

the former, invariably includes the former. Devendrabuddhi

had introduced the notion of intentional action (anustana)

in order to warrant the invariable concomitance of

pramanata with sadhana and the possibility of inferring

pramanata from sadhana, for sadhana has a wider extension

than pramanata. The only other possibility would have been

to regard pramanata as an invariably concomitant effect of

sadhana (which it in reality seems to be), but then one

could not validly infer the presence of pramanata as ef-

fect from the presence of sadhana, the hypothetical cause

°f pramanata. For, according to Dharmaklrti's logic, the

inference of an effect from its cause is not conclusive.

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165

In PV II.34a (Mi) Dharmaklrti tells us the means

(sadhana) of the validity of the Buddha: sadhanam karu-

nabhyasat, 'The means [by which the Lord Buddha has become

a means of valid cognition] is [his great29] compassion

[on all living beings; this compassion is the solid ground

of his authority] because [he has without end] practiced

[his compassion]1. The Buddha's practice of compassion in

many lives became the foundation of his authority, of his

now being a means of valid cognition, because his inten-

tional effort at being compassionate is not limited to one

life, but it can bef and is, made over an enormous period

of time. For this reason, it becomes the solid basis of

the epistemological truth and trustworthiness of a Buddha.

In another passage Dharmaklrti says about the Buddhafs

compassion:

tayah svadrstamarqoktir vaiphalyad vakti nanrtam /

dayalutvat parartham ca sarvarambhabhiyoqatah // 145 //

tatah pramanam

(PV II.145-146a trsl Vetter, p.52)fDas Beschtitzen (taya) besteht im Verkilnden eines Pfads,

den er selbst [als zum Ziel der Leidlosigkeit filhrend] er-

fahren hat. [Er ist also sachkundig.] Er verkilndet [aber

auch] nicht [mit Absicht] Unwahres; denn [filr sich selbst

braucht er] nichts mehr zu erreichen und er tut alles, was

er unternimmt, da er ganz von Mitleid erf (lilt ist, urn an-

derer willen. Daher ist er Erkenntnismittel'.

In this verse Dharmaklrti sums up the religious and

epistemological authority of the Buddha and his doctrine.

The Buddha has realized for himself (svadrsta) the supreme

goal; he teaches (ukti) the way (marga) to this goal in a

reliable manner because he would not profit by making

untrue statements (anrta), for there is not anything he

has to gain (vaiphalya). This disinterestedness is caused

by his great compassion (dayalutva), and it is out of com-

passion that the Buddha acts, lives and teaches (sarvaram-

bhabhiyoga) in order to promote the supreme welfare of the

world (parartham). This statement by Dharmaklrti on the

validity of the Buddha strongly reminds us of Paksila-

svamin's three criteria of the reliability of an expert

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166

speaker:

kim punar aptanam pramanyam saksatkrtadharmata

bhutadaya yathabhutarthacikhyapayiseti

(NBh, p. 223.4-5), 'Now, what is the [epistemological]

validity of the expert [speakers]? It is the fact of

having directly perceived the dharma [the true state of

things], compassion on living beings, and the desire to

communicate the thing as it really is1. Now Dharmaklrti's

svadrstamarga corresponds to Paksilasvamin's saksatkrta-

dharmata (cf about this term Oberhammer 1974, p. 50),

Dharmakirtifs vakti nanrtam, "the [Buddha] does not utter

untrue [statements]11, is similar to Paksilasvamin' s

yathabhutarthacikhyapayisa, while both regard compassion

as a criterion of validity (dayalutva in PV 11.145 and

daya in the NBh). It is very likely that Dharmaklrti more

or less adopted Paksilasvamin's three criteria, at the

same time giving compassion priority over the other two in

order to emphasize the specialness of the Buddha's

authority. For according to Dharmaklrti, the first cause

and driving force behind the Buddha's religious and epis-

temological authority is his compassion, as an attentive

reading of PV II trsl Vetter will show (consult the index

of that book on karuna, krpa, daya). Paksilasvamin1s list

suggests a temporal order of the criteria. The authorita-

tive speaker first has perceived a thing or fact himself,

then he is compassionate, and out of compassion he seeks

to correctly describe the thing or fact to others.

aptah khalu saksatkrtadharmana idam hatavyam idam asya

hanihetur idam asyadhigantavyam idam asyadhigamahetur iti

bhutany anukampante. tesam khalu vai pranabhrtam svayam

anavabuddhyamananaiti nanyad upadesad avabodhakaranam asti

... hanta vayam ebhyo yathadarsanaiti yathabhutam upadisamas

ta ime srutva pratipadyamana heyam hasyanty adhigantavyam

evadhigamisyanti iti evam aptopadesah

(NBh, p. 223.5-224.3), 'The experts having directly per-

ceived the dharma [the true state of things], show compas-

sion on living beings in the following way: this is

[something] to be abandoned, this is the cause of the

abondonment for him [ie for the living being the expert

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167

wishes to instruct], this is [something] to be attained by

him, this is the cause of the attainment for him. For,

when these [ordinary] living beings do not know for them-

selves [through their own power of cognition those things

that should be avoided or obtained], then there is no

other means of [correct] knowledge [left for them] than

the [valid] instruction [given by the expert speaker]...

[the compassionate experts think:] Let us instruct these

[helpless living beings about the things that should be

avoided and obtained] in the way [we have] perceived

[these things for ourselves] and according to how [these

things] really are. When these [helpless living beings]

have heard [our accurate instructions], then, while

[correctly] understanding [them] [ ie in so far as they

correctly understand the instructions], they will avoid

what is to be avoided and attain what is to be attained;

in this way the instruction by the experts [is a

pramana]•'

The real difference between Paksilasvamin and

Dharmaklrti seems to be the following: Paksilasvamin does

not say how or why the apta has directly perceived the

true state of things (saksatkrtadharmata); the apta simply

has acquired his direct experience of higher things. Out

of compassion, he relates his experience and knowledge to

others and therefore his reliable statements can be

regarded as pramana (cf also Oberhammer 1974, p. 50 ff on

this). Dharmaklrti, on the other hand, does tell us how

and why the apta par excellence, the Buddha, has acquired

his direct experience of important religious facts; the

Buddha was moved by compassion and therefore exerted him-

self to attain the complete freedom from suffering in or-

der to teach others the way to that same goal. Before he

reached the goal himself, the Buddha had heard from reli-

able tradition (agama) about the cause of suffering, so

that he knew what to strive for, namely the ultimate end

of suffering for the sake of teaching to others the way to

it. Dharmaklrti says this in these two verses.

daya~v5n duhkhahanSrtham upgyesv abhiyujyate //

paroksopeyataddhetos tadakhyanam hi duskaram //

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168

(PV II.131cd-132ab trsl Vetter, p. 39)

'[Nach langer tlbung nun] voll Mitleid wendet er [ie the

Buddha] die Mittel an, urn [sein eigenes] Leid zu

tiberwinden [obwohl er als einer, der voll Mitleid ist, die

eigene Erltisung gar nicht mehr anstrebt, Dennoch ist es

ntitig, die Mittel anzuwenden, urn das eigene Leid zu

flberwinden;] denn wer das Ziel [der Erlflsung vom Leid] und

die Mittel dazu nicht selbst erfahren [und angewendet] hat

(paroksa), dem dilrfte es kaum gelingen, sie [d.h. Ziel und

Mittel] [anderen gut] zu verkflnden1,

yuktyaqamabhyam vimrsan duhkhahetum parlksate //

tasyanityadirupam ca duhkhasyaiva visesanaih /

(PV II.132cd-133ab trsl Vetter, p. 40)

'[Der Anwendung der Mittel geht voraus:] Forschend mit

Hilfe von Argumenten und Oberlieferung stellt er eine Ur-

sache des Leids fest und ausserdemf dass diese [Ursache]

eine nichtewige usw. Natur hatf [und zwar stellt er dies

fest] an Hand von Bestimmungen, die dem Leid selbst

[anhaften]'.

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169

NOTES

1. Cf Frauwallner 1954, p. 143; Nagatomi 1959, p. 264, 266;

Vetter 1964, p. 32; Hattori 1968, p. 73-74.

1a. Vetter interprets pramanabhuta as fder Erkenntnismittel

istf in Vetter 1984, p. 14 and note 6 on the same page.

2. It seems that Dignaga is deliberately playing with two

connotations of the term pramana; the first is of course

"source of valid knowledge" in a purely epistemological

sense, the second more general connotation is "authority",

"right measure" (cf Burrow 1980 on the etymology of

pramana). If pramana, in both connotations, is predicated

of the Buddha it would mean that he has become an expert

or authority on religious questions of ultimate concern to

mankind and that his statements on religious matters could

safely be regarded to b£ as valid as the knowledge derived

from perception and inference. Cf also Hattorifs remark on

pramanabhuta, fThe term "pramanabhuta" is used in a double

sense. First it means "authoritative" or "standard"...

Second, it has the more technical meaning, "to have to

come into existence" (bhuta) as a "means of valid

cognition" {pramana)f, Hattori 1968, p. 74, note 1.2.

3. Cf the scheme in Hattori 1968, p. 74, note 1.2.

4. Cf Steinkellner 1982, p. 8, 'The fact that the Buddha has

become a means of valid cognition is the result of the

development of certain qualities to perfection. The

qualities are further differentiated as perfections in

cause (hetu) and perfections in effect (phala), where the

two terms "cause" and "effect" bear the meaning they have

as categories of describing the career of a Bodhisattva'.

5. Cf Hattori 1968, p. 75, note 1.5: "Mahavastu, I, 92,13 and

Avadanasataka, 1,188,1 ff, relate the story of Surupa, a

legendary king, who, in exchange for religious

instruction, gave up his son, his wife, and himself to be

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170

eaten by an ogre. His religious ardor is praiseworthy.

However, here "surupa" is to be taken as a common noun ac-

cording to Durvekamisra, who states, in explaining

"prasastata", that those who make a living by their beauty

of form are called surupa; see DhP, p. 3.15: surupa

rupajIvah . "

6. Steinkellner seems to object to what he calls11 secularistic" interpretations of the Buddhist epis-

temological tradition (Steinkellner 1982, p. 6-7). He dis-

agrees with certain modern scholars who praise the Bud-

dhist epistemological tradition (as founded by Dignaga

with the Pramanasamuccaya) 'highly for the very reason

that it is assumed to present a development of rational

secularization within Buddhist monastic culture ... that

it presents dawning of "modern, Western" progress within

the "dark ages" of traditional religious India1

(Steinkellner 1982, p. 6). According to Steinkellner, the

'secularistic1 understanding by modern authors of Buddhist

epistemology is mistaken as it represents this epis-

temological tradition as 'an essential deviation from the

spirit of Buddhism1 (op cit, p. 6). The fact remains that

the Pramanasamuccaya can very well be regarded as a

'secularistic1 work on epistemology (only two means of

valid cognition are accepted, ie perception and

inference), syllogistic reasoning, dialectics and

semantics, since -- apart from PS I.1ab — the book does

not link its theories to Buddhist spirituality. Of course

Dignaga did write about Buddhist spirituality, but not in

the Pramanasamuccaya. Thus, it is not hard to understand

why some modern scholars, reading the Pramanasamuccaya (as

well as a good many works of Dharmaklrti), have come to

the abovementioned judgement that Buddhist epistemology is

'secularistic1 and even 'modern'. One could only say that

these modern scholars show a too great positive bias

towards what they consider to be 'western progress1. In

the Pramanasamuccaya the only link with the Buddhist

religion is PS I.1ab and the commentary on it by Dignaga

himself; therefore Steinkellner has to say that 'its [ie

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171

of PS I.1ab] importance is not only underlined by the

literary masses written as a commentary to it, but also by

the attitude toward it in later Buddhist history1 (op cit,

p. 7). To me it seems that this 'important1 verse (or

rather half-verse) is made important by the earliest and

most important commentary on it, Pramana-siddhi chapter,

being Pramanavarttika II. In this work Dharmakirti is

trying to put (secular) epistemology, the pramanavada, in

the context of Buddhist religion and spirituality. This

explains very well the 'literary masses written as commen-

tary to1 and the 'attitude toward1 PS 1.1ab; in fact the

really important Pramanavarttika II could be regarded

as the starting-point of the blending of epistemology and

Buddhist spirituality, rather than the statement in PS

I.1ab itself.

We will remember that Dignaga regarded the statement by an

expert, aptavada, as a kind of inference in PS II.5ab:

aptavadavisaitivadasamanyad anumanata /

'The statement by an expert is [to be regarded as] in-

ference in so far as there is similarity in trustworthi-

ness [between real inference and reliable statement]'. In

accordance with this thesis, Dignaga could interpret the

words of the Buddha as a kind of valid inference; this is

probably the reason why he did not, in the PS, further

discuss the epistemological problems with regard to the

doctrines taught by the Buddha. The notion that reliable

statements — in so far as they are trustworthy — are a

kind of inference, seems to be adumbrated in the following

passage from NBh:

tadasrayav anumanagamau. tasmin sati syatam

anumanagamav asati ca na syatam

(NBh, p. 10.4-5), 'Inference and tradition [consisting of

reliable statements] are [both] based on a [generally-

accepted fact, drstanta]. When that is present, inference

and [reliable] tradition [as pramanas] are possible; when

that is absent, [ inference and tradition] are

impossible*. The point here in the NBh is that the

validity of inference and reliable tradition / reliable

Page 198: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

172

statement is necessarily based on a fact perceived by all

to be true. If both inference and tradition are only valid

through a sound drstanta, it follows that both are similar

in that respect. There is yet another NBh-passage in which

it is said that the validity of an expert statement can be

inferred when it is possible to infer the existence of the

object the statement refers to and when finally the

described object is directly perceived by the hearer of

the statement.

asty atma ity aptopadesat pratiyate, tatranumanam

icchadvesaprayatnasukhaduhkhajnanany atmano lingam iti,

pratyaksam yunjanasya yogasamadhijam atmamanasoh

samyogavisesad atma pratyaksa iti

(NBh, p. 25.1-4), lnThe soul [really] exists11, this is

known from the [reliable] teaching of an expert. With

regard to [the existence of this object and the validity

of] this [teaching about it], there is [the following]

inference: "Desire, aversion, effort, joy, grief and

knowledge are the mark [ie the traits in a person through

which we can infer the existence] of a soul [which has

these properties, in that person] (NS 1.1.10)". The direct

perception [of the soul] for him who exercises himself [in

yoga] is brought forth by contemplation [taught] in a

Yoga[-system]; the soul is directly perceivable through [a

yoga-contemplation consisting in] a special union of the

soul with the mind1. This passage teaches that a

metaphysical object (like the soul), at present not per-

ceived by the hearer, is known to him at first through a

statement by an expert. After that, the hearer infers the

existence of the object the statement has referred to, and

by inferring this, he has also inferred the reliability

and the truth of the statement. If the hearer makes cor-

rect efforts to exercise contemplation (samadhi), he can

direclty perceive the object of the statement. This would

be the ultimate proof of the trustworthiness of the

statement. Thus, Paksilasvamin seems to imply that state-

ments on metaphysical objects can be and must be subjected

to rational inquiry before they are accepted as pramana.

The next logical step would be to say that ultimately

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173

there are only two pramanas, perception and inference, and

to subsume reliable statement under inference, as Dignaga

has done.

8. Vetter 1964, p. 31.: 'Keinesfalls soil das uberlieferte

Buddhawort als solches schon AutoritMt sein, nur weil es

jemand gesagt hat, der ftir heilig gilt, und es von vielen

ftlr massgebliche Oberlieferung (agamah) gehalten wird.

Erst wenn gezeigt ist: diese Worte stammen von jemand, der

durch seinen Wandel beweist, das er nicht lttgt und etwas

zu sagen hat, was nicht jedermanns Besitz ist, kann er als

Erkenntnismittel angenommen werden. Das hBchste Ziel des

Handelns muss von einer solchen AutoritSt gegeben werden.

Es ist nSmlich nicht unmittelbar gegeben, sonst wMre es

nicht das h8chste Ziel1.

9. That Dharmaklrti regards tradition, agama, as a statement

by an expert, aptavada, is evident from PVSV, p. 108.1

where he quotes PS II.5ab in which the term aptavada

occurs, and says: ity agamasyanumanatvam uktam (PVSV, p.

108.1-2), 'thus [Dignaga] has said that tradition is

inference1•

10. According to Frauwallner, Devendrabuddhi "is said to have

been a personal pupil of Dharmaklrti; a fact which is in

itself worthy of credence. He must, therefore, have lived

about 630-690 A.D." (Frauwallner 1961, p. 145) ; or

earlier, if we believe Lindtner 1980.

11. My method of interpreting is as follows: I try to under-

stand PV II.1-7 by examining earlier texts that are im-

plicitly or explicitly referred to in it, and which have

formed the basis of the theories propounded in this text.

Since the NBh, the PS and PV I preceded PV II, it is, to

my mind, a sound method to understand theories in PV II as

having grown out of these earlier works, especially in so

far as these earlier texts have formulated a particular

theory for the first time. In order not to neglect the

authoritative explanations given in later times, I have

Page 200: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

174

made use of the oldest commentary, the PVP by

Devendrabuddhi, who was a direct pupil of Dharmaklrti.

Therefore, it is very likely that the PVP is closest to

Dharmaklrti's own intentions, rather than later commen-

taries such as, for instance, Prajnakaragupta1s PVBh. This

interpretative translation and explanation of PV II.1-7

are, above all, intended to investigate and make clear

what Dharmaklrti himself wished to say, not what later

commentators thought he said, or should have said.

12. The term avisamvadin is a derivative of avisamvada. Al-

ready in Pali the term avisamvada and variants like

avisamvadaka and avisamvadana occur, cf The Pali Text

Society's Pali-English Dictionary under these entries and

the entries of this term without the privative a_-. For

avisamvadaka and variants it gives the following meanings,

"not deceiving", "not lying", 'honest", "faithful", while

the Critical Pali Dictionary vol I gives for this "not

deceiving", "not breaking one's word", "not false". The

PTS Pali Dictionary gives for visamvada etc, "deceiving",

"untrustworthy", "disappointing", the Critical Pali Dic-

tionary vol I, p. 477 gives "untrustworthiness". Vetter

interprets the word avisamvada as "sich bewMhren" (Vetter

1964, p. 27) and Katsura as "non-contradictoriness"

(Katsura 1984, p. 219). Taking into consideration the

meanings of avisamvada in Pali and the interpretations of

this term in relation to Dharmaklrti's epistemology and

ontology by Vetter and Katsura, it seems to me that

"trustworthiness" renders the various aspects of the term

quite well in English.

13. In PV Il.lab Dharmaklrti equates the means of valid

cognition, pramana, with the resulting cognition, valid

knowledge, jnana. In this, he follows Dignaga who has

stated in PS I.8cd:

savyaparapratitatvat pramanam phalam eva sat //

'[We say that] a means of valid cognition is the resultant

[cognition and not different from it] because [the resul-

tant cognition is] cognized together with the activity [of

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175

cognizing the thing through means of valid cognition]'.

For more details about this tenet, consult the chapter on

Dignaga, p. 58 ff.

14. Frauwallner thinks that Sakyamati could have been a direct

pupil of Devendrabuddhi; Sakyamati lived ca 660-720,

Frauwallner 1961, p. 145.

15. My rendering of this term follows Hattori 1968, p. 80. For

a fuller discussion of the interpretation and translationo f arthakriya consult Vetter 1964, p. 13; Nagatomi 1967/68

and Steinkellner 1971, p. 182. Vetter proposes to inter-

pret it as "das ErfMien (kriya) eines Zweck (artha)". He

says '... der Gegenstand alles Erkennens, auch mittelbar

der Schlussfolgerung, [ist] ein Individuel1es

(svalaksanam), nach Raum und Zeit Einmaliges und

Unteilbares, das fShig ist, einen Zweck zu erfilllen

(arthakriyasamartham)', Vetter 1964, p. 13. Nagatomi,

however, criticizes various interpretations, among them

Vetter1s, of arthakriya (in Nagatomi 1967/68, p. 53-54)

for not being satisfactory in all contexts. He thinks

arthakriya has two distinct meanings, first an ontological

one: padarthasya kriya, "the action of a thing, its causal

efficiency", and second an epistemological meaning:

prayoianabhuta kriyaf "action that serves a purpose" (op

cit, p. 53-54, 72), I fail to see a significant difference

between the ontological and the epistemological meanings,

since in both cases arthakriya is a fact, a power predi-

cated of a thing, not an aspect of the knowledge of the

thing. Consequently, arthakriya would only be an ontologi-

cal notion, not an epistemological notion. Steinkellner

sums up the problem as follows: 'Die Dinge "erfilllen einen

Zweck" durch ihr Wirken (kriya), sofern der Mensch eine

solche Zweckerf tlllung von ihnen erwartet (arthah); sie

(arthah) erfflllen einen Zweck (kriya) aber auch -- im

Sinne ihres Zugewandtseins auf ein Ziel — unabhSngig von

dieser Erwartung des Menschen. Nimmt man also die kleine

Undeutlichkeit in Kauf, dass "Zweck" im rein ontologischen

Kontext den Sinn von "Ziel" hat, scheint es wohl am

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176

besten, ftlr das Deutsche bei . •, "Erfullen eines Zweckes"

zu bleiben1 , (Steinkellner 1971, p. 182). To me it seems

that the English "production" (kriya) of an "effect"

(artha) is as neutral as the German interpretation of Vet-

ter discussed by Steinkellner in the above quotation.

16. Cf Vetter's interpretation of PV II.1-2 in the following

extremely compressed passage: 'Erkenntnismittel ist

Wissen, das sich in (wir ktinnen ergSnzen: auf die ErliJsung

gerichtetem) Handeln bewShrt. Auch wenn dieses Wissen

durch das Wort Ubermittelt wird, ist es doch

Erkenntnismittel, da man erkennt, was der Sprecher meint,

und was er als Gegenstand seines Handelns hat, auch wenn

einem die Sache selbst nicht unmittelbar zugSnglich ist

(Vetter 1964, p. 32)'.

17. Vetter 1964, p. 59-60, 'Begriff ist ein Wort, wenn es im

Satz steht. Satz ist ein Hinweis im Zusammenhang des

Handelns. wMhrend die Dinge beim einzelnen eine Vorstel-

lung auslttsen, die ihre Beurteilung enthSlt, versucht man,

wenn ein anderer Mensch da ist, durch Worte in diesem

Vorstellungen zu erregen, die ihn auf das entsprechende

Ding ftthren. Dazu mUssen zuerst Wflrter vereinbart werden.

Sie sind nicht von Natur mit den Vorstellungen oder gar

Dingen verknllpft.. • VerstSndigungsmittel ist das Wort also

nur unter Menschen, die eine gleiche Bedeutung mit seinen

Klang verbinden'.

18. Cf Steinkellner 1971, p. 198, note 66: 'Die Lesart mthun-

dnos (Skt sabhava, "having the same nature"] ist ...

sinngemSss richtiger. Eine Konjektur gegen alle

Oberlieferung und die anderen tibetischen Versionen mflchte

ich ... nicht vorschlagen. Dennoch bleibt nicht

einsichtig, warum Dharmakirti an dieser Stelle svabhava-

schreibt1. It is, however, possible to interpret svabhava

here as "being" (bhava) belonging to their own (sva)

[being]", hence "sharing in similar being", "having the

same nature", which semantically would be similar to

sabhava. We must keep in mind that the use of homonyms is

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177

a confusing peculiarity of Dharmaklrti's style of writing,

cf for instance his playing with words such as bhava,

arthay bheda/ bhinnay hetu etc in PV I.

19. This sound epistemological principle is already formulated

in NS 1.1.5 in connexion with correct inference when it

says: atha tatpurvakaiti trividham anumanam, 'And preceded

by this [ie by direct perception as pramana] there is

threefold inference1. Here it is maintained that valid in-

ference is generated by valid perception. When this prin-

ciple is applied to Dharmaklrti's epistemology, which ac-

cepts only perception and inference as pramanas, we could

say that valid inferences are drawn only on the basis of

correct and valid direct perceptions of things, and

furthermore, that a valid reliable statement, aptavada,

must be verified by valid perception and inference. Thus,

the ultimate source of knowledge is direct perception. Cf

also NBh, p. 25.1-4 quoted in note 7.

20. Prof. E. Steinkellner in Vienna called my attention to a

passage in Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya which seems to imply

the same principle, viz that a pramana must make known

hitherto unknown facts. In the commentary on PS 1.3b we

read;

dper na dran pa dan "dod pa dan ze sdan la sogs pa snar

rtogs pa^i don la tshad ma gzan ma yin pa bzin no //

(Hattori 1968, p. 176.25-26), "... Like [various instances

of knowledge] such as recollection, desire, repugnance etc

[which operate] with regard to an object that has pre-

viously been cognized [by direct perception] are not dif-

ferent [ie separate] means of valid cognition1. The im-

plication here seems to be that the first instance in

which an object is cognized, is an instance in which a

previously unknown object is cognized. This constitutes

the direct perception of it, whereas recollection of an

object or desire for and repugnance to an object are sub-

sequent mental reflections, but not means of valid

cognition, precisely because they do not cognize any new

aspects of an object.

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178

21. Katsura 1984, an interesting article investigating PV

II.1-6, mentions the two pramana-definitions and notices

that direct perception alone generates new knowledge of

particulars. The two pramana-definitions are called by

Katsura 'the pragmatic criterion of true knowledge1

whereas the fact that perception alone can reveal hitherto

unknown particulars is called by him 'the purely epis-

temological criterion of true knowledge1 (Katsura 1984, p.

214-215). On p. 230 he states his conclusions: '(1) from a

pragmatic point of view ... both perception ... and in-

ference (including verbal knowledge) are non-contradictory

and true in the sense that they can lead to the fulfill-

ment of a human purpose and give new information about the

object. (2) From a purely epistemological point of view ..

only perception is non-erroneous and true in the sense

that it alone possesses the true representation of its

object1. This distinction between pragmatic and purely

epistemological does not seem to have been made by

Dharmaklrti himself in this way, nor by Devendrabuddhi. If

it is to be maintained, we should say that the definition

in PV II. 1 and the discussion on it in PV II.2-5b is the

pragmatic one and the definition offered in PV II.5c is a

purely epistemological one. This is done by Prajnaka-

ragupta in PVBh, p. 30.22 (referred to in Katsura 1984, p.

232, note 28):

tatra paramarthikapramanalaksanam etat,

purvam tu samvyaharikasya,

'With regard to the [passage PV II.5c], this is a defini-

tion of a means of valid cognition related with what

[exists] in the surpreme sense, but the previous

[definition given in PV II.1] is [one] of [a means of

valid cognition as] related with practical [results]1. But

since epistemology, according to Dharmaklrti's own theory,

has got value only in so far as it leads to the effect-

producing particular, that is, in so far as it has prag-

matic value, we need not make this distinction, as it adds

nothing to our understanding of Dharmaklrti's thoughts

about epistemology.

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179

22. The notion that knowledge of illusory objects is not

pramana is already expressed in the pratyaksa-definition

in NS 1.1.4; knowledge arising from the contact of the

senses with an object is a means of valid cognition in so

far as this knowledge is avyabhicarin, non-erroneous. Cf

the first chapter which deals with the old Nyaya.

23. More details about anupalabdhi are found in the third

chapter of this book.

24. Grammatically, prapta means "has been acquired", but Prof

Steinkellner in Vienna suggested that I should interpret

it as indicating an unacceptable consequence. Thus prapta

would mean something like prasajyatey "it [wrongly] fol-

lows that". Even though this interpretation of the perfect

passive participle prapta seems somewhat forced, it agrees

with Devendrabuddhi's commentary.

25. The term nihsreyasa is used in NS 1.1.1 to designate the

ultimate goal of Nyaya-philosophy, namely the highest

good, defined in NS 1.1.22 as complete freedom from

suffering, tadatyantavimoksa.

26. Already in the Nyaya-Sutra, we have come across the divi-

sion of reliable statements into those that deal with

visible objects and that describe invisible objects:

sa dvividho drstadrstarthatvat

(NS 1.1.8), fIt [reliable statement] is of two kinds ac-

cording to whether the object [it refers to] is

[something] manifest [to the senses] or not manifest [to

the senses]'.

27. In the translation I follow the Sanskrit which seems to be

the original text on which the Tibetan translation was

based. I owe the Sanskrit fragment to Prof. Steinkellner

in Vienna.

28. We will remember from the chapter on Dharmaklrti's logic

that the svabhava which functions as probans in a

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180

svabhavahetu - inference/syllogism must be the same

property (with a wider extension) as the property that is

to be proved. For example, this thing is a simsapa-tree

because it is a tree in general. Simsapa-ness as probandum

has a smaller extension than the probans "treeness in

general"•

29. That the compassion of the Buddha is great is expressed in

PV II.198cd trsl Vetter, p. 99:

tisthanty eva paradhina yesam tu mahatl krpa //

'Diejenigen aber, die [weil sie dies frtiher schon getlbt

hatten] grosses Mitleid haben, leben in der Tat urn anderer

willen [auch nach dem vom Karma festgelegten Lebensende]

weiter1.

30. Cf PV 11.136, trsl Vetter, p. 44:

bahuso bahudhopayam kalena bahunasya ca /

gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra gunadosah prakasatam //fIhm, der intensiv (bahuso) und tlber eine lange Zeit hin

(kalena bahuna) auf vielerlei Weise (bahudha) ein Mittel

tlbt [urn die aus Oberlieferung und Nachdenken gewonnene

Einsicht zu verwirklichen und dann diese und die zu ihrer

Verwirklichung einsetzbaren Mittel anderen zu lehren],

gelangen diesbeztiglich [d.h. beztlglich der verschiedenen

Mittel] die Vor- und Nachteile zu [voller] Klarheit1.

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181

Index

A

AKBh

163.1-2 57

334.3-4 48, 61

349.11-12 56

349.12-13 56

Abhidharmakos"a IV, verse

2cd 57

Abhipraya 132

Activity 4, 5

Adhigama 2, 146

Adhigati 154

Adhyaropa 87, 88

AdrstSrtha 31• • •Affirmation 104

Xgama 74, 118, 119, 150,

151, 167, 173

Aksapada Gautama 1, 35

Analogy 41

Anumana 10, 50, 122

Anumeya 45, 51

Anupalabdhi 103, 114

Anupalabdhi-hetu 153

Anvaya 39, 98, 107

Application 27

Apoha 134, 135, 136,

154

Spta 17, 161, 167

Aptavada 118, 122,

171, 173, 177

Aristotelian logic 89

Aristotelian syllogism

44, 89

Aristotelian syllogistic

90

Artha 129, 152

Arthakriya" 126, 128,

129, 130, 150,

152, 155, 175

Arthakriy5sthiti 159

Asapaksa 74, 75, 76,

77, 79, 97

Assemblage 100, 101

Authoritative 115

Authoritativeness 164

Authority 31, 32, 44,

161, 162, 164,

166

Avinabh^va 83, 84

Avinabhavin 52, 101

Avi sarhvada 118, 122,

174

Avisamvadayat i 158

Avisamva:din 1 2 1 , 174

B

Beschaffenheit 112

Beschaffenheitstrager

112

Bhrantijn3na 61, 87

Buddha 115, 116, 117,

119, 124, 125,

143, 157, 158,

160, 161, 162,

163, 164, 165,

166, 167, 168,

169, 171, 180

Buddhism 37

Buddhist epistemological

tradition 170

Buddhist epistemology

170

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182

Cause 12, 99, 100,

105, 108, 169

Class 70, 74, 90, 98

Classes 135, 136

Cognition 38, 146, 147,

152, 153, 154

Coldness 105

Commonly acknowledged

fact 22

Comparison 6, 14, 15,

50

Compassion 32, 44, 165,

166, 180

Concept 131, 140, 141

Concepts 86, 132, 134,

136, 138, 141, 142

Conceptual 46, 132

Conceptual ascertainments

137

Conceptual image 1 46

Conceptual knowledge

137, 141, 142,

145, 155, 156

Conceptual superimposition

88

Conceptualization 48,

61, 62, 87, 88

Conceptualizing 58

Conceptualizing mind

134, 147, 148

Concomitant 68

Constancy 126

Contrary 106

Contrary example 27, 54

Contrary examples 43

Contrary instances 65

Conventional 46

Correct knowledge 4

Criterion of truth 157

Deduction 50, 67

Deductive reasoning 71

Denial 104

Denotative words 131,

136

Devendrabuddhi 173

Dharma 17, 32, 166

DharmakTrti 36, 38,

39, 40, 93

Dharman 32

Dhi 141, 142

Dignaga 38, 39, 40

Dpe 79

Drstanta 22, 23, 24,

26, 28, 30, 42,

43, 50, 53, 71,

78, 79, 171, 172

DrstSrtha 31

E

Effect 12, 99, 100,

101, 105, 106,

108, 126, 127,

129, 169

Effect-production 141,

155, 157

Enclosure 139

Erroneous 48

Erroneous knowledge 46

Erroneous perception 60

Essence 98, 99, 104,

105, 107, 108,

,112, 136

Essential property 98,

99, 101, 107,

108, 112

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183

Example 22, 23, 27

Exclusion 134, 135

Expert 16, 17, 31, 81

122, 124, 125,

160, 161, 165,

171

Expert statements 118

Extension 68, 70, 98,

101, 102, 105, 106

False perception 61, 87

Fire 52, 67, 69

98, 100, 101,

105, 106, 109,

127, 129

Four noble truths 124,

145, 159

Frauwallner 1933, p 301,

fragm 8 54

Frauwallner 1933, p 480,

fragm 7 52

fragm 7a 53

Frauwallner 1957, p 135,

fragm 1 51

fragm 3 51

fragm 4 52

Frauwallner 1957, p 137,

fragm 9, lines 2-5

46

fragm 9 lines 5-15

48

Frauwallner 1957, p 138,

fragm 9 45

fragm 10 49

fragm 10, line 3 49

Frauwallner 1957, p 36,

fragm 5 53

Gati 147

General definition 120

Generally-accepted fact

23, 27, 53

108

H

Hattori 1968

183.18-19 59

Hetu 22, 52, 74, 76,

89, 94, 95 153,

169

Heya 143, 144, 145

Heyopadeya 143, 144

Highest good 2, 158

Implication 109

Inference 6, 10 14,

29, 40, 49, 56,

57, 62, 64, 73,

94, 118, 123,

151, 152, 153,

159, 164, 171,

172, 177, 180

for oneself 64

for the sake of others

64, 71

Inferendum 49, 51, 65,

66, 67, 71, 72

Inferens 49, 65, 67,

94, 95

Inseparable connexion 67

Intentional effort 77

Intentions 132

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184

Invariable concomitance

39, 54, 66, 67, 79,

83, 90, 94, 96, 98,

102, 105, 107, 109,

110, 164

Invariable concomitant

51

Invariably concomitant

49, 52, 70

95, 98, 99,

101, 106, 108,

127, 128

Invariable concomitant

effect 164

J

Jnana 174

K

Kalpana 87, 88

Karya 99, 107, 129

Karyahetu 101, 129

Karyakaranabhava 105

Karyasambhava 129

Kitagawa 1965

447.2 64

455.11-12 65

461.5-9 66

472, text V.4 72

74 64

text V, p 455.1-4

text V, p 472.4-8

Krtaka 77

81

73

Liberation

Linga

Lingin

11/

94,

11

264,

95

74,

Linguistic convention

131, 132

Logic 39, 44, 89

Logical reason 21

Logische Nexus 113

Lun 74

M

MeaningfulMeaningful

Meaningful

Meaningful

Meaningful

160

Means 164,

133sentence

sentences

statement

135

142

133

statements

165

Means of cognition

142

120,

Means of valid cognition

3,

48,

117,

142,

153,

163,

174,

Mental 60

Momentary

N

NB 1.1 36

NBh

10.18 6

10.3-4

10.4-5

12.1 20

1 .5 85

2.1 85

2.2 144

20.3-5

6, 31,

55, 11

121 , 1

148, 1

156, 1

165, 1

177

57

25

171

3

4,

33,

51,

58,

69,

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185

223.4-5 166

223.5-224.3 166

223.5 32

223.5-7 32, 81

223.7-8 161

224.5-6 34

225.1-2 19, 32

228.2-4 83

229.5-6 83

24.2 6, 15

24.4 6

24.5 38

25.1-4 172, 177

25.8-26.2 33

28.1-29.1 8

3.1 144

3.1-2 5

3.5 63

3.6 63

30.1-3 9, 47, 61

30.5-7 10

33.3 10, 49

33.4-5 11

34.1 12

34.2 12

34.3-5 12

34.6-35.1 13

35.1-2 13

36.2-4 11

37.1 14

37.1-3 14

37.6-7 15

4.2-4 114

40.1-3 17, 32

41.1-2 18

41.2-4 18

6.1-2 144

6 . 1 - 2 ? p 2 . 2 ; p 3 . 1

1 4 5

NS

73.2-3 26

8.1-3 5

8.3-4 21

81.7 21

81.8 21

82.2-4 22

83.2 23

83.2-3 23

83.5 24

84.1 25

84.1-2 84

85.1-2 26

86.1-3 27

86.11 39

87.3-4 28

87.5-6 28

88.3-4 29

91.3 21

1.1.1 2 , 36, 37,

179

1.1.10 39, 172

1.1.15 39

1.1.1-2 5

1.1.2 3

1.1.22 179

1.1.25 25, 26

1.1.3 6

1.1.32 21

1.1.33 72

1.1.33-39 91

1.1.34 23, 40, 5

1.1.34-35 65

1.1.34-37 52

1.1.35 23, 26

1.1.36-37 52

80

1.1.37 27

1.1.38 27

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186

1.1.4 7, 46

1.1.41 20

1.1.5 10, 1

48, 177

1 .1 .6 15

1.1.69 40

1 .1 .7 16

1.1.8 18, 1

1.1.9 37

1.2.1 20

2.1.69 31

2.2.1 83

2.2.2 83

NV 131 .17 111

Nantariyaka 49

Nantariyakatva

Negation 104,

106, 107

Nihsreyasa 31,

Niscaya-manas 1

Non-perception

103, 104,

107, 114

Nyaya 5, 20,

70

Nyayamukha 85

P

PS

1.1 117, 11

1.1a 161

I.1ab 157,

1.2 80

I.2ac 117

1.3b 177

1.3c 58, 61

1.5 59

1.6 60

I.6bc 86

, 48

2, 40,

79

83

105,

158, 179

37

102,

106,

35, 37,

9

170, 171

I.7cd-8ab 60

I.8ab 62

I.8ab, comm line 10-11

I.8cd 62, 63, 142,

174

1.9 148

II 64

II.5ab 118

II.5ab 122, 123,

124, 171, 173

II.5cd 95

II.5d 95

11.11 66

11.18 67

11.20 68, 69, 70

11.25 69

II.5ab 81

II.5cd 65, 74

II.6cd 65

111.9 95

111.10 72, 79

I l l . lab 71

Il l . icd 71

III.2 72

III.9 72, 74

IV.1 78

IV.2ab 79, 96

IV.2b 95

PS 1.1

comm line 1-2 115

comm line 1-7 117

comm line 2-3 115

comm line 3-4 116

comm line 4-5 116

comm line 5-6 116

comm line 6-7 117

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187

PV

1.1 94, 97

1.1ab 115

1.166 128

I.166d 129

I.2ac 99

1.2-3 97

1.27 108

1.28 108

1.214 118, 122, 123

1.215 123

1.215-217 121

1 . 2 1 6 124

1 . 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 122

1 . 2 1 6 a - b 118

1 . 2 1 7 1 2 4 , 1 4 3 , 145

1.31 109

1 . 3 6 - 3 7 101

I . 3 a b 102

I . 3 c d 103

1 .4 104

1 . 4 0 - 4 2 135

1 . 4 8 136

1 .49 137

1 . 5 0 - 5 1 137

1 . 6 8 - 7 0 1 3 9 , 1 4 0 ,

146

1 .87 146

1 . 8 7 - 8 8 154

1 . 9 3 143

I I . 1 1 5 7 , 1 6 0 , 178

I I . 1 - 6 1 1 9 , 1 5 7 ,

1 5 8 , 178

I I . 1 - 7 119

I I . 1 3 1 c d - 1 3 2 a b t r s l

V e t t e r , p 39 167

I I . 1 3 2 c d - 1 3 3 a b t r s l

Vetter, p 40 168

II.132cd-133ab, trsl

Vetter, p 40 119

11.136, trsl Vetter, p

44 180

11.145 166

II.145-146a trsl

Vetter, p 52 165

II.198cd trsl Vetter,

p 99 180

Il.lab 122, 125,

151, 158

II.1bc 126, 127

II.1cd 143, 152

II.2 132

II.2-5b 178

II.34a (Mi) 164

II.3ab 138

II.3bd 144, 145

II.4c 147

II.5a 148

II.5c 151, 152,

153, 156, 160,

178

II.5d-6a 154

II.7a 161

II.7cd 162, 163

PV I (Mi) 1-7 120

PV 1.92.93 131

PV II.1 122

PVBh

30.22 178

PVP 120

PVP (P)

2a 1-3 120

2a.4-5 120

2a.5-2b.1 121

2b.2 125

2b.3-5 127

3b.4 130

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188

3b.5-7 133

4a.1-2 140

4a.6-7 142

5b.5-6 147

6a.1 148

6a.2-3 148

6b.1-2 151

6b.2-3 152

6b.4 152

6b.5-6 154

6b.8-7a.2 156

7a.4 156

7a.4-5 157

7b.2-5 158

7b.6-7 162

PVSV

108.1 173

108.1-2 173

108.16 123

108.17-109.20 121

108.2-5 119, 150

109.10 118

109.15-16 125r

143, 145

109.15-19 159r 160

109.7-9 118

18.17 114

19.10-12 109

19.8-9 109

2.12-13 97

2.14-17 98

2.16 102

2.19-21 99

2.5-6 96

22.2-3 100

23.18-21 101

3.14 99

3.3-4 99

37.23-27 134

4.14-15 104

4.2-3 102

4.6 102

4.8-11 103

5.9 104

5.9-10 104

6.1-3 105

6.1-6 105

6.3-4 106

6.4 106

6.5 106

6.5-6 106

6.6-7 107

84.4-11 128, 129

PVSVT

392.14-15 123

6.2-3 111

8*24-25 94

8.28-29 95

PVT

Je, p 7a.6-7 94

Je, p 7b.1 95

p 6b.6-7 111

PVT II (P)

p88b.2 126

PVV

p 10, note 1 162

p 11, note 1 163

Paksa 53, 74

Paksilasvamin 36

Paksilasvamin Vatsyayana

1

Paramarthasat 87

Pararthanumana 71, 88,

89, 90, 111

Particular 56, 80, 125,

128, 129, 134,

134, 136, 141,

146

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189

Particulars 132, 135,

136, 139, 157

Perception 6, 8, 14,

33, 46, 56, 57,

58, 59, 73, 81

86, 123, 127,

146, 147, 151,

152, 153, 155,

159, 172, 177

Perfection 116

Pervade 68

Pervaded 95, 97

Pervading 97, 106

Pervasion 68, 69, 70,

97

Phala 169

Positive example 28

Positive examples 43

Pramana 3, 4, 7, 37,

38, 55, 63,

115, 117, 118,

119, 123, 124,

126, 134, 142,

145, 147, 148,

150, 151, 153,

154, 155, 157,

158, 163, 164,

167, 169, 172,

174

Pramana-definitions 1 57

Pramana-phala 63

Pramanabhata 11 9

Prama"nata 164

Pramanya 32, 44

Prameyas 36

Pratijna 71

Pratyaksa 7, 50, 58,

60, 81, 127,

146, 147, 153

Prayatnotthita 77

Probandum 21, 22, 23,

24, 51, 98,

107, 108

Probans 22, 24, 50, 52,

71, 95, 98, 99,

102, 105, 107,

108, 114

Produce an effect 129

Produced 77

Product 107

Production 126

Production of an effect

128

Properties 73

Property 11, 14, 21,

52, 64, 65, 66

Property-bearer 11, 14,

72, 73

Reason 21 , 43, 50,

94, 95, 98,

101, 104, 108

Referring 71

Reliability 32

Reliable statement 6,

16, 18, 19, 26,

30, 33, 50, 73,

118, 152, 177

Religion 30

Religious authority 31

Sabda 19, 30, 50,

85, 118, 131

Sadhana 164

Sadharmya 79

Sadharmya-drstanta 79

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190

Sadhya 51, 72, 73,

79, 84, 96,

113

Samagrt 100

Samanya 139, 140, 154

Samanyalaksana 56, 80, 85

Sambhava 83, 84

Samketa 132

Samvrta 140, 141

Samvrti 138, 139, 140,

146

SamvrtijnHna 61

Samvrtisaj j fiana 61, 87, 88

Samvrtisat 47, 87

Sapaksa 53, 54, 74,

75, 76, 77, 78,

79, 90, 95, 97,

98

Sastra 148, 149, 150,

152

Secularistic 170

Self-cognition 59

Separation 134, 136

Significative words 138

Similar instances 65

Similarity 154

Simsapa" 98, 99, 102,

107

Smoke 52, 67, 69,

98, 100, 101,

106, 109, 127

128, 129

Statement 122, 132,

145, 172

Sthiti 126

Subject 21, 22, 28,

43, 74

Superimposing 62

Supreme good 3, 31, 144

Sva-samvitti 59

Svabh5va 98, 99, 101,

102, 107, 112,

136, 176, 179

Svabhavahetu 164, 179

Svalaksana 56, 57, 80

85, 128, 132,

175

Svarthanumana 64, 94, 111

Svasamvedana 148

Syllogism 11, 23, 29,

30, 41, 42, 43,

44, 50, 70, 79,

88, 89, 91, 94,

107, 108, 111,

180

Syllogistic proof 108

Tadatmya 105, 113

Thesis 21, 50, 71, 108

Tradition 73, 74, 85,

117, 119, 150,

151, 167, 171,

173

Treatise 148, 149,

150, 151

Treeness 102

Trirupahetu 64

True knowledge 2, 3

Trustworthiness

30, 81, 118,

120, 121, 122,

123, 124, 125,

133, 152, 159,

161, 165, 171,

174

Trustworthy 118, 123,

124, 127, 128

Page 217: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

191

U

Uddyotakara 38, 50, 85

Umfassung 112

Uniqueness 56

Universals 56, 57, 139,

157

Upadeya 143f 144, 145

Upalabdhi 38

UpamSna 50, 85

Useful effects 152

Vadavidhana 52, 64,

65, 75

Vadavidhi 36, 45, 50,

58, 61, 66

Vaidharmya 80

Vaidharmya-drsta*nta 79,

80

Validity 148

Vastu 128, 129

Vasubandhu 36, 38, 40,

43, 45, 70

Vedas 31, 34

Vikalpa 134

Vipaksa 53, 54

Viruddha 106

Visaya 71

Visesa 128, 129

Vyapaka 97

Vya"pin 68

VySpta 68

Vyapti 97

VySpya 97, 106

Vyatireka 39, 107, 109

Vyavrtti 136, 154

W

Words 130, 131, 132,

138

Yoga 86, 172

Yogipratyaksa 86, 87

Page 218: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

IMPRESSUM

Verleger: Arbeitskreis fur Tibetische und Buddhistische StudienMaria Theresien-StrafSe 3/4/26, 1090 Wien, Austria

Herausgeber und fiir den Inhalt verantwortlich:Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Reisnerstrafte 6, 1030 Wien

Druck: Ernst Becvar Ges.m.b.H,, Lichtgasse 10, 1150 Wien

Page 219: Epistemology and Spiritual Authority

WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE

1: Ernst Steinkellner, Verse-Index of Dharmakirti*s Works (Tibetan Versions).1977. XIV, 225 p. OS 200,-

2: Lobsang Dargyay, Die Legende von den Sieben Prinzessinnen (Saptakumarika-Avadana). In der poetischen Fassung von Guhyadatta/Gopadatta aufgrund dertibetischen Ubersetzung herausgegeben, ubersetzt und bearbeitet. 1978. X, 162p. OS 200,-

3: Piotr Klafkowski, The Secret Deliverance of the Sixth Dalai Lama, as narratedby Dharmatala, Edited from the Hor Chos-' byuri and translated into English,with an introduction and comments.1979. VI, 93 p. OS 200,-

4: Gudrun Buhnemann, Der Allwissende Buddha, Ein Beweis und seine Probleme,Ratnakirti*s Sarvajnasiddhi. 1980. L, 175 p. OS 200,-

5: Helmut Tauscher, Candrakirti - Madhyamakavatarah und Madhyamakavatarabha-?yam (Kapitel VI, Vers 166-226). 1981. XXVII, 214 p. OS 200,-

6: Lobsang Dargyay, Gun than dKon mchog bsTan pa* i sgron me* i rNam thar mdorbsdus bzugs. - A Concise Biography of Gun than dKon mchog bsTan pa* i sgronme. 1981. VI, 45 p. OS 65,-

7: Ernst Steinkellner (Ed.), Gun than dKon mchog bsTan pa*i sgron me*i rNam tharsgo gsum gyi mam bzag pa Legs bsad rgya mtsho*i rba rlabs. 1981. 20 p,OS 35,-

8: Gudrun Buhnemann, Jitari: Kleine Texte, [Description of a manuscript from theBihar Research Society with 10 small texts of Jitari, and the edition of thefollowing texts in Sanskrit: Vedapramanyasiddhi, Sarvajnasiddhi, Nairatmya-siddhi, Jatinirakrti, *Isvaravadimatapariksa.] 1982. 21985. 48 p. OS 100,-

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10: E. Steinkellner / H. Tauscher (Ed.), Contributions on Tibetan Language,History and Culture. Proceedings of the Csoma de Koros Symposium held atVelm-Vienna, Austria, 13-19 September 1981, vol.1. 1983. XX, 479 p. OS 560,-

11: E. Steinkellner / H. Tauscher (Ed.), Contributions on Tibetan and BuddhistReligion and Philosophy. Proceedings of the Csoma de Koros Symposium held atVelm-Vienna, Austria, 13-19 September 1981, vol.2. 1983. XII, 334 p. OS 270,-

12: Tilman Vetter, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmaki rtis Pramanavarttika.Der Abschnitt iiber den Buddha und die vier Edlen Wahrheiten im Pramanasiddhi-Kapitel. Eingeleitet, ediert und ubersetzt. 1984. 1983 p. OS 230,-

13: Andras R6na-Tas, Wiener Vorlesungen zur Sprach- und Kulturgeschichte Tibets.1985. 397 p. OS 490,-

14: Michael Aris, Sburces for the History of Bhutan. 1986, 203 p. OS 250,-

15: Ernst Steinkellner, Dbarmottaras Paralokasiddhi. Nachweis der Wiedergeburt,zugleich eine Widerlegung material istischer Thesen zur Natur der Geistigkeit.Tibetischer Text kritisch herausgegeben und ubersetzt. 1986. 57 p. OS 80,-

16: Per K. Sorensen, Candrakirti - Trisaranasaptati. The Septuagint on the ThreeRefuges. Edited, translated and annotated. 1986. 89 p. OS 120,-

17: David P. Jackson, The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). Sa-skyaPan4ita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramana and Philosophical Debate.2 vols., 1987. 619 p. OS 620,-

18: Michael Tors ten Much, A Visit to Rahula Sankftyayana* s Collection ofNegatives at the Bihar Research Society: Texts from the Buddhist Epistemo-logical School. 1988. 35 p. OS 52,-

19: Andras R6na-Tas, Mongolisches Lesebuch. Lesestucke in Uigur-MongolischerSchrift mit grammatikalischen Bemerkungen. 1988. 65 p. OS 100,-