emergency injunction/temporary restraining to allow illinois catholic charities to continue foster...

8/6/2019 Emergency injunction/temporary restraining to allow Illinois Catholic Charities to Continue Foster and Adoption Services

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUITSANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS

vs.Plaintiffs, Hon. John SchmidtPresiding Judge

Case No. 20ll MR 254

Defendants.

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE )OF SPRINGFIELD.IN-ILLINOIS, an Illinois )non-profit corporation,CATHOLIC CHARI )TIES OF THE DIOCESE OF PEORIA, an )Illinois nonprofit corporation, and CATHOLIC)CHARITIES OF THE DIOCESE OFJOLIET, )INC., an Illinois non.profit corporation, ))))))))))))))))))))

STATE OF ILLINOIS, LISAMADIGAN, inher official capacity as the Attorney Generalof the State of lIIinois, ERWIN McEWEN,in his official capacity as Director of theDepartment of Children & Family Services,State of lIIinois, the DEPARTMENT OFCHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES,State ofIllinois, ROCCO J. CLAPPS in his officialcapacity as Director of the Department ofHuman Rights, State of Illinois, and theDEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,State of lIIinois,

AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTALCOMPLAINT FORDECLARATORY JUDGMENT, TEMPORARY RESTRAININGORDER, PRELIMINARY AND PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS,WRITS OF PROHIBITION, AND OTHER RELIEFPlaintiffs, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfieid-in-lilinois, an Illinois non-

the Utllee,;e Peoria, an l I l1 l1U" nm'-mmand Cmholic ('hill-iiiI" of ofwhich are hercinaft(11 or


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undersigned attomeys, herehy complain of the defendants, the State of !Binois, Lisa Madigan, inher official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of !Binois, Erwin McEwen, in hisofficial capacity as Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the State of!Binois, the Department of Children & Family Services, State of lllinois, Rocco J. Clapps, in hisofficial capacity as Director of the Department of Human Rights, State of lllinois, and theDepartment of Human Rights, State of Illinois, as follows:

Nature of the CaseI. Plaintiffs, Catholic Charities social service agencies for three Roman Catholic

Dioceses in the State of Illinois which have provided extensive adoption and foster familyservices in lll inois for decades, bring this lawsuit in a pro-active effort to avert an imminent riskof irreparable harm to plaintiffs as well as many thousands of vulnerable and needy children,families, and adults across the State of lllinois, and to avoid the collapse of a critical network ofsocial service agencies at a time when a budgetary crisis already has stretched vital socialservices resources to the breaking point. In order to stave off this crisis and avert harmful andpotentially cruel disruption, discontinuity, and destabilization in the lives of so many of Illinois'needy young people, families, and others, plaintiffs are asking this Court to resolve a pair ofactual controversies that have arisen between them and the State of Illinois, the Attorney Generalof the State of lIlinois, the Director of the Department of Children & Family Services of the Stateof lIlinois ("DeFS"), DCFS itself, the Director of the lIlinois Department of Human Rights

COfISClenllOllS fultlllment the his'lone. atlosto!an mUlvoldable

instant COlltf(WCTSles tum on two questions of law. The initialbetween, on the one hand,

wi e of the l{omlfiis whether

in Or0Vl r l " ,O cmup:asS10!1:ate2 of 40 Case 20i! :viR


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specifically, adoption and foster care - by means and methods that are faithful to the integral andessential tenets of the Roman Catholic religious faith, and on the other hand, (ii) the defendantAttorney General's enforcement duties and responsibilities, as well as the enforcement dutiesand responsibilities of the Director of IDHR and lDHR with respect to the provisions of theIllinois Human Rights Act (e.g., 775 ILCS 5/101(A)(I2)), which proscribe discrimination on thebasis of, inter alia, sexual orientation and/or marital status by "placelsl of publicaccommodation" within the State of llIinois. Plaintiffs are asking for entry of a declaratoryjudgment in this lawsuit to the effect that the "place of public accommodation" provisions of theHuman Rights Act do not apply to them because they are "sectarian" and religious and,therefore, they are excluded from the scope of the llIinois Human Rights Act, which covers onlythose "adoption agencies" which are "non-sectarian." Plaintiffs provide vital social services,including adoption and foster care, as part of their religious ministry, rooted in the HolyScriptures, and carried on in relationship to the Roman Catholic Church and under the spiritualgovernance and practical oversight of each Diocesan Bishop. As a result, plaintiffs plainly do

not and cannot qualify as "non-sectarian adoption agencIies\," within the meaning of the HumanRights Act. Nor are the plaintiffs otherwise covered by, or subject to, the "publicaccommodation" provisions of the Human Rights Act or the duties incumbent on Illinois placesof public accommodation or any related duties incumbent on state contractors with DCFS.

of the "m , hL" acCt}mmrldation'2. Even assuming, arguendo. that these explicit provisions restricting the coverage

of the lIIinoi, Hnman Rights Act somehow might heas to cover and another H" I lV :O statute. nmnel:y the

Reli gions Freedom Kesroratlon Act 7751LCS le tto authorize an apIJIl(,atiofl of these

2011 MR


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provisions of the Human Rights Act to plaintiffs. Pursuant to IRFRA, defendants' reading of theHuman Rights Act to require the plaintiffs to process applications for adoption or foster care byunmarried couples, regardless of whether they are same sex or opposite sex, would "substantiallyburden Iplaintiffs'l exercise of religion." It would infringe plaintiffs' rights protected by ArticleI, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which guarantees that "Itlhe free exercise andenjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination, shall forever beguaranteed and no person shall he denied any civil or political right, privilege or capacity, onaccount of his lor herl religious opinions ...." Therefore, pursuant to IRFRA, in order to prevail,the defendants would bear a heavy burden they could not even remotely satisfy, namely, (a)proving that coercing plaintiffs to process such applications, contrary to the tenets of theirreligious faith, would serve a compelling govemmental interest, and (b) proving that suchmandatory processing of applications by unmarried couples, regardless of their sexualorientation, would he "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmentalinterest." Even assuming that forcing Roman Catholics to process such applications or place

children in unmarried couples' households, contrary to the essential tenets of their religious faith,could be said to serve a "compelling governmental interest," defendants could adequately servethat interest by a far less "restrictive alternative" than by forcing plaintiffs to flout the tenets oftheir faith, Defendants enjoy a medley of options apart from requiring plaintiffs to process suchapplications, etc, in contravention of their professed religious faith, as indeed an entire host of

ao()ption or foster care ,w,'nC'H'S do no t share Roman Catholic religious beiiefs

andrefer apf,l!catl(J!1s such no

care serV1Ci'S were

4 40 I I


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plaintiffs guaranteed the right to free exercise of their religious faith. Therefore, defendants'insistence that plaintiffs themselves process all such applications for foster care or adoption isneither narrowly tailored nor the least restrictive means by which defendants could adequatelyserve the interest of providing adoption or foster care services to unmarried couples who areeither of same-sex or opposite sex orientation. This is because other agencies already processtheir applications for adoption or foster care, and such applications may be referred to suchagencies in the future.

3. A second and similar controversy has arisen between plaintiffs, on one hand, andthe defendant Director of the Department of Children & Family Services ("DCFS") and thedefendant DCFS itself, on the other hand, over another new Illinois statute, entitled the ReligiousFreedom Protection and Civil Union Act, Public Act 096-1513, codified at 750 ILCS 75/l etseq., whose effective date was June 1,2011. Said Act provides, inter alia, for the registrationand recognition of "civil unions" in Illinois between persons of the same sex or between personsof the opposite sex. It further provides that "Ial party to a civil union is entitled to the same legal

obligations, responsibilities, prott..'Ctions, and benefits as are afforded or recognized by the law ofIllinois to spouses, whether they derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, orany other source of civil or criminal law." !d., Par. 20. In view of the claim by the defendant,Illinois Attorney General, that her office has had "notice" that plaintiffs are engaged in unlawfuldiscrimination in their "provision of adoption and foster care services" (Exhibit A attacbed

dcl:endarlt, DCFS. and both said defendants'

the flOWthat one or more the deti'endams lllll ' ~ ! i l U Y thn,m,m to take

are In the effective F r c , , ~ l l D m Protection40 11 MR 254


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Union Act. Given that plaintiffs' estahlished religious practice is not to process applications foradoption or foster care by unmarried heterosexual or same sex couples, whose applications maybe referred for processing by other social service agencies, plaintiffs fear that defendants DCFSand its Director, McEwen, may declare plaintiffs in default on their contractual obligations toDCFS to comply with "applicable law."

4. Thus, these threatened actions trigger another "case or controversy" that also turnson a question of law, which plaintiffs ask this Court to resolve and adjudicate by means of adeclaratory judgment. Plaintiffs believe here, too, that they are exempt from coverage under thisnew statute, the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, equally as they are exemptedfrom the restrictive provisions of the place of public accommodations provisions of the IllinoisHuman Rights Act. Plaintiffs cite Section 15 of the new Act, which provides, true to the Act'stitle, that:

Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or regulate the religious practice of anyreligious body. Any religious body, Indian Nation or Tribe or Native Group isfree to choose whether or not to solemnize or officiate a civil union.

As plaintiffs' adoption and foster care services are essential parts of their religious mission andreligious practice, the new Act is clearly inapplicable to them. Any question concerning thescope of this express exemption on the face of the new law was put to rest on the noor of thellIinois Senate on December 1,20\0, when Senator Koehler, sponsor of the bill which wasadopted later that day, answered specific, explicit questions put to him by Senator Haine, to theeffect that the two sentences in Se\:ticm 15. supra, are to be read separately so as to refer to

the WC'''lCm "\\ihether or not to ororac!r.:es on of

faith toIi 40 j I VIR 254


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with the new law on ci vii unions as part of their contractor's certification of compliance with"applicable law," Moreover, on June 20, 2011, plaintiffs met with representatives of both of thedefendants, the Attorney General (who also represents defendant IDHR) and DCFS, and duringthat meeting said defendants made it crystal clear that they expected plaintiffs forthwith to optout of any ongoing contractual relationship with DCFS and that, should plaintiffs abide by theirreligious commitments, and that, should plaintiffs proceed to enter into new contracts with DCFS(as they now propose to do), their aforesaid religious practices necessarily would render them inviolation of their undertaking to comply with all applicable Illinois laws, including, iflter alia,the Human Rights Act non-discrimination mandates incumbent on all places of publicaccommodation as well as the new Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act.Thus plaintiffs, exercising their right to continue to provide adoption and foster care services aspart of their religious and charitable mission, are also imminently threatened with an array ofimmediate and irreparable harms insofar as defendants, including the Attorney General and herclients, DCFS and lDHR, have so far failed or refused to recognize and acknowledge:

(a) that plaintiffs are not covered by the new Religious Freedom Protection and CivilUnion Act but are excluded and exempt from it as the new law explicitly recites thatits provisions do not "interfere with or regulate religious practice";

(b) that any ambiguity arising from the text of the new law was eclipsed by SenatorKoehler's explicit assurances on the floor of the Illinois State Senate; andthat the !Ilioo!, Freedom Restoration Act, ILCS 351 I et seq" wouldrer"m'p that such sulJst:al1tml hn::denirlgthem "I;'U""

CUl : ( " , , , a:ppiica'llO!lS for care8 Case ~ 5


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justitled by a "compelling governmental interest," and that such a substantial burdenon plaintiffs' religious practice be further justified by showing that it is the "leastrestrictive alternative" narrowly tailored to satisfy such an allegedly compellinggovernmental interest. Furthermore, anyone of defendants' many options for referralof civil union couples to other agencies willing to entertain and process theirapplications would manifestly constitute such a "least restrictive alternative" fullyadequate to satisfy any needs posed by recognition of civil unions, while also fullyprotecting plaintiffs' religious freedom as the Act's very title would require,

Jurisdiction and Venue6, This Court has j urisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to the Declaratory

Judgment provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 235 ILCS 5/2-701(a), as there arenow two actual controversies over the construction of a pair of Illinois statutes, namely, thelIlinois Human Rights Act and the Illinois Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act,both of which must be construed and enforced in light of the provisions of a third Illinois statute,namely, the lIlinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("IRFRA"), 775 ILCS 35/ I et seq.More specifically, the dispute between plaintiffs, on the one hand, and defendants, on the otherhand, is whether 775 ILCS 5/5-10l(A)(12) of the Illinois Human Rights Act, which defines thephrase, "place of public accommodation," to include only any "non-sectarian adoption agency,"may be interpreted to encompass the plaintiffs, even though plaintiffs do not qualify as "non-:;ectarian are ""Q"",1n:m adoption agencies whose mission andcharacter are malspmamy to Se,:ticm 20 ofIRFRA()l iIUc"' ' ' J in stOlat,lon this Aot . assert that violation as a or

has beenin a JUUllU!:dl

9 ( ~ a $ e No. 20t MR


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of the At1:onlcv {1"",,,raL Statc

proceeding and may obtain appropriate relief against a government."7. Moreover, there is a second actual controversy hetween plaintiffs and defendants

over the construction of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil Union Act, namely, whetherthe provision in Paragraph 15 of that Act renders it inapplicable to plaintiffs, to the extent thatdefendants purport to regulate or interfere with plaintiffs' "religious practice," namely, itsdeclining as a matter of conscience to process foster care and adoption applications fromunmarried cohabiting couples, whatever their sexual orientation. That controversy, too,implicates the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 lLCS 3511 et seq., as defendants'

threatened action against plaintiffs would constitute a significant burden on the free exercise oftheir religious faith, triggering in turn the imposition of a burden on defendants that they cannotmeet, namely, having to prove that Illinois has a compelling governmental interest in forcingplaintiffs to go against their fundamental religious beliefs and that said compelling interest couldnot be adequately served by a less restrictive alternative than forcing plaintiffs either to suppresstheir religious faith or to cease furnishing the vital adoption and foster care they have beenproviding for years to Illinois citizens in furtherance of plaintiffs' religious mission andcharacter. Indeed, the defendants' referral of unmarried couples to other agencies that do notshare plaintiffs' conscientious objections would adequately serve the defendants' stated interests.

The Controversies At Bar Are Real, Aetnal, Ripe, And Jnsticiable8. These controversies hetween plaintiffs and defendants are real, actual, and

far remote, and none is hypothetical or speculative in the slightest. On or about

ngfleld in as \veH as to the(ither that the AHonlev Gener;al

to 40 Case No. Ii MR


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Charities "discriminates against Illinois citizens" in violation of the lIIinois Human Rights Act(Exhibit A, attached hereto), Specitically, the defendant Attorney General's office stated its"understanding" that Catholic Charities "has requirements for potential foster or adoptive parentsthat are not required by Illinois law - for example, requirements about religious beliefs - orrefuses to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in violation of Winois law - forexample, refuses to provide services based on the marital status or sexual orientation of apotential foster or adoptive parent:' The defendants' letter went on to request that CatholicCharities respond to a detailed request for "information and documentation," relative toplaintiffs' "Foster Care and Adoption Practices," including:

All contracts with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services("DCFS");

All policies, procedures and manuals relating to services provided pursuant tocontracts with DCFS;

All policies and requirements for (a) foster parents; and (b) adoptive parents; All services provided by the Organization and location(s) where each service is

provided; The Organization's tinancial statements, including, but not limited to (a) IRS Form

990; (b) Illinois Charitable Organization Annual Reports filed with the Illinois Officeof the Attorney General: Annual Reports; and (d) all other tinancial statements

whether or not are HlKHlUJ , Orgarlizilticm s nV-ia\\iS or articleiS Tbe Org:miziHion nW:Slcm statement or other dOCUl11cnts fPg iWIi

40 254


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as tonn1l10r!v bring

issuesadjudication, andpe

asking that it 11""I,',

appropriate circuit court.

10. Plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodations provisions of the Illinois

***

(6) If any person fails or refuses to file any statement or report, or obey anysubpoena, issued pursuant to subdivision (A)(2) of this Section, the AttorneyGeneral will be deemed to have met the requirement of conducting a preliminaryinvestigation and may proceed to initiate a civil action pursuant to subdivision(A)(l) of this Section.

(2) Prior to initiating a civil action, the Attorney General shall conduct apreliminary investigation to determine whether there is reasonable cause tobelieve that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern and practice ofdiscrimination declared unlawful by this Act and whether the dispute can beresolved without litigation. In conducting this investigation, the Attorney Generalmay:(a) require the individual or entity to file a statement or report in writing underoath or otherwise, as to all information the Attorney General may considernecessary;

(b) examine under oath any person alleged to have participated in or withknowledge of the alleged pattern and practice violation; or(c) issue subpoenas or conduct hearings in aid of any investigation.

Human Rights Act and, therefore, they need not comply with defendants' request for such

Rights Act, as contended by the defendant Attorney GeneraL and her clients, defendants DCFS

voluminous data and documentation, to the extent that it is predicated on those provisions relatedto public accommodations. Nor do plaintiffs believe in the slightest that they are illegallydiscriminating, within the meaning of the public accommodations proscriptions of the Human

and its Director, and the State of Illinois, by virtue of their faithful religious practice in

UH1mlve lSV that isconnection with adoptions and foster care, The parties are, therefore, caught up in an actual

which empov/cre,d to a

3 of 201 i MR 254


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carrying out their apostolic ministry, with benefits flowing directly to needy and vulnerableIllinois children and families. Under the circumstances, plaintiffs have a legally protectableinterest in continuing contractual relations with DCFS, and they are fully entitled to apply to thisCourt to invoke the benefit and protection of Illinois law against legally baseless threats tointerfere with their provision of these vital services or to sunder plaintiffs' ongoing contractualrelations with the State of Illinois. Nor might DCFS's refusal to continue plaintiffs' socialservice provider contracts or to declare a default in any of said contracts on account ofdefendants' baseless claims of discrimination be assailed, adjudicated, or restrained in any

available administrative forum. This ease deserves an adjudication before this Court.Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies Is Neither Feasible Nor Required

13. There is no requirement that plaintiffs exhaust any administrative remedy beforeDCFS or the Illinois Human Rights Commission, because there is no such remedy. The IllinoisHuman Rights Act provides that defendants' claims of pattern or practice discrimination must beadjudicated before the Illinois circuit courts, "whether or not a charge has been filed" before theCommission. 775 ILCS 5110-I04(A). Nor does IDHR have any jurisdiction to entertain orinvestigate any other charge of discrimination against thc plaintiffs which might be predicated onthe baseless claim that they are places of public accommodation and thus bound by theproscriptions of the Illinois Human Rights Act in their adoption or foster care programs.

Plaintiffs Reasonably Fear An Imminent Threat Of Adverse Legal Action

munic:ation5 to them about the14. Plaintiffs also are informed and based on defendants' prior

based onServices

15 , et seq", and alsoI MR


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based upon the defendants' unequivocal and adamant assertions during their recent June 20 faceto face meeting, that as plaintiffs will abide by their religious faith and practice in declining toprocess applications of. and make adoption and foster care placements with, unmarried same sexor heterosexual couples, DCFS, its Director, and the Attorney General all threaten to takeadverse action against them, which may include plaintiffs' having to relinquish and cease theircontractual relations with DCFS and the State of lIIinois, pursuant to which they have beenproviding these as well as other vital social services for many years, or to submit to a lawlessinvestigation and prosecution on the part of the Attorney General premised on the false assertion

that they are public accommodations. This again poses a dilemma, in light of which plaintiffsare forced to choose between abiding by their religious beliefs and commitments, on the onehand, and complying with defendants' invalid and overbroad interpretations of the ReligiousFreedom Protection and Civil Union Act, by which plaintiffs do not believe in good faith thatthey are bound, on the other hand. Plaintiffs, therefore, seek entry of another declaratoryjudgment herein to the effect that they are excluded and exempt from that law, too, in continuingtheir "religious practice" in performing adoption and foster care social services. Thiscontroversy, too, is actual, imminent, and fully justiciable.

Venue Is Properly Laid Here15. Venue is properly laid as both plaintiff, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of

Springfield in lllinois, a non-protlt corporation, and all of the defendants maintain offices withingnolon ' . v u u , y, which encompasses the of Springfield, the capital city of Illinois.

The Partiesi6. ' l iU lUI" of Ditxese IS an

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lllinois.\7. Plaintiff Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Peoria is an Illinois non-prallt

corporation with its principal place of business in the city of Peoria, Peoria County, Illinois.18. Plaintiff Cathol ic Charities of the Diocese of Joliet is an Illinois non-profit

corporation with its principal place of business in the city o f Joliet, Will County, lllinois.19. Defendant, State of lllinois, is a political entity amenable to suit in this Circuit

Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, lllinois, the seat of lllinois' StateGovernment.

20. Defendant , Lisa Madigan, sued herein on ly in her off icial capaci ty, as theAttorney General of th e State of lllinois, has a principal oftice within the city of Springfield,Sangamon County, Illinois.

21. Defendant, Erwin McEwen, sued herein only in his official capacity, is theDirector of th e Department of Children & Family Services (DCFS), State o f Illinois, an ddefendant, DCFS, have a principal office in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois.

22. Defendant, Rocco J. Clapps, sued herein only in his official capacity, as theDirector of the Department of Human Rights (lDHRJ, State of lllinois, and defendant, lDHR,have a principal office in Springfield, Sangamon County, Illinois.

CAUSES OF ACTIONCOUNT I(Declaratory ,Judgment - Sectarian Adoption Agencies Exempt from Unman Rights Act)

1-22 r e - a l ! ( ~ g e each an d aliegatl.on ccmta'med 1022 Jr 'le l l"" ' " h."."Awith the same and as if set fOlth

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23. The Attorney General, acting in her official capacity on behalf of the defendantState of Illinois, has asserted that plaintiffs are bound by the public accommodations provisionsof the Illinois Human Rights Act, as set forth supra and as evidenced by Exhibit A, attachedhereto. Said defendants also have alleged that they have "received notice" that plaintiffs arediscriminating against !!linois citizens based inter alia on marital status and sexual orientation intheir provision of adoption and foster care services. More specitically, said defendants havefocused on plaintiffs' "requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not requiredby Illinois law.,. or refuslall to provide services to potential foster or adoptive parents in

violation of Illinois law - for example, refuselal I to provide services based on the marital statusor sexual orientation of a potential foster or adoptive parent." !d.

24. Furthermore, said defendants appear to have invoked 775 ILCS 5/10-104(A) ofthe Illinois Human Rights Act, which empowers the Attorney General of Illinois to conductinvestigations "to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that any person orgroup of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination declared unlawful by thisAct," to make sweeping requests for the production of information and documents from theplaintiffs, indicating that the defendants believe that the "diserimination" on the part of plaintitTsof which they purport to have "notice" is indeed widespread and systematic.

The public policy embodied in the Illinois Human Rights Act bans various typesof discrimination - including discrimination on the basis of marital status and sexual orientation,etc. - but only " in connection employment, real estate access to tinancial

Ine.,nrmn of an , ascarried on as their social senilces nts none of the nrst three

estate traos2tctions, or access\ lR


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The public accommodations provisions are pertinent, however, and the question is squarelyposed here whether those provisions apply to the plaintiffs, who operate sectarian adoptionagencies.

26. Before the 2007 amendment of the Illinois Human Rights Act, that Act det1ned aplace of public accommodation as "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment,recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services,facilities, privileges, and advantages of accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwisemade available to the public." 775 lLCS 5/5-101(A)(I). The Act provided, by way of examples,

a lengthy laundry listof "placel sl of public accommodation," including "facilities of thefollowing types," as follows:

Illnns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda fountains, soft drink parlors,taverns, roadhouses, barber shops, department stores, clothing stores, hat stores,shoe stores, bathrooms, restrooms, theatres, skating rinks, publie golf courses,public golf driving ranges, concerts, cafes, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice creamparlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses, buses, stages, airplanes, street cars, boats,funeral hearses, crematories, cemeteries, and public conveyances on land, water,or air, public swimming pools and other places of public accommodation andamusement. 775 lLCS 5/5-101 (A)(2).

In 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Board of Trustees of Southem Illinois Univ. v. Dcp'tofHwnan Rights, 159111.2d 206, 211 (1994), that the Illinois Department of Human Rightslacked jurisdiction under the Illinois Human Rights Act to entertain complaints alleging racialdiscrimination in the academic program of public universities. The high Court stated that thedefinition "place of public accommodation" set forth at 775 ILCS 5/5-10 I(A)( 1) had to beread in the at WI 01 Tniw,e,. supra. 159 IIIat 21 I) , :1m,!",nq the maxim knovvn as

"when a statute se';cra! classes but mc,vi,le, that the

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riot beHumanhehe rne':ln,'n

it is clear that an ot\{Jptl,on agency

"""", ."" 142 ( I" Dis!. i999)). Nor did it include itHunum

to be met by prospective students (Gilberr v. Dep'r ofHuman Righrs, 343 1Il.App.3d 904 (I"Dis!. 2003)). Nor did it encompass a company offering health insurance (Cur 'n Dried Salon v.

e;(haustive, the class of unartieulated persons or things will be interpreted as those' others such

nor include a business offering scuba diving classes which required physical and other standards

like' the named persons or things," lei, (internal citations omitted), The Court noted that the

27. The reasoning of the high Court in Board otTrusrees ( ~ l S I U was followed inof Human Rights did not fall within its jurisdiction. ld.Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the conduct allcged by the Illinois Departmentpub, or a bookstore," but not "an academic program of a higher education institution." ld.

terms "institution of higher education," "education program," and "classroom" were not

specifically requires that the 'services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations [b[e

contained anywhere in the list provided in the Act (again, this was before it was amended in2007), ld, Further, the Court observed, "the examples listed in the Act are fundamentally

overnight accommodation, entertainment, recreation or transportation." ld. "The definition212. Instead, the Court e;(plained, "[t1he cited establishments are examples of facilities fordifferent from institutions of higher education, which administer educational programs," ld. at

Dep't

several Appellate Court decisions, which held that the term "place of public accommodation" did

omitted). As a consequence, "what was anticipated by the General Assembly is a restaurant, aextended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the general public.'" ld. (citation

contend that, under

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Act.28. In 2007, the Illinois Human Rights Act was amended, and by that amendment , the

definition of "place of public accommodation" was deleted. Replacing the definition was adetailed list of specific examples, some of which had been held not to be "places of publicaccommodation" under the pre-amended wording of the statute and the cases decided under thatprior wording of the Act (e.g., insurance offices, the professional offices of health care providersand certain educational institutions), See, 7751LCS 5/5-IOI(A)(1)-(l3). But with respect to theissue posed in this litigation, the list of examples of "public places of accommodation" now

includes "a senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, non-sectarian adoption agency,orother social service center establishment ...." 775ILCS 5/5-101(A)(l2)(emphasis supplied).Plaintiffs contend that the obvious and unavoidable implication of this amended language is thata sectarian (i.e., religiously-based) adoption agency is not a "place of public accommodation,"and, therefore, does not fall within the scope of the Ill inois Human Rights Act, nor within thejurisdiction of either the defendant, Illinois Department of Human Rights, or the Illinois HumanRights Commission. By the same token, sectarian nurseries, day care centers, elementary,secondary, undergraduate, postgraduate or other places of education are also implicitly excluded.See, 775 ILCS 515-10 I(A)( 11).

29. Again, any suggestion that this text is ambiguous and may somehow be read sothat sectarian adoption agencies may be eovered, equally as non-sectarian adoption agencies, as

aCC;OIlllnDd,ltiC1I! is absolutely n e ~ : a t e d the Thethe amendment

doubt thatexempts as places

20: MRthe llf1,>!r'!'!vino biB

amendment in termsthe statute:h,sntl"s is not covered

Cllilerton. ex(,latl:led


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Nor is there any legal basis for the contention that an entity might somehow

of public accommodation '" sectarian adoption agencies" (State of illinois, 95'h GeneralAssembly, Regnlar Session, Senate Transcript, 38'h Legislative Day, 5/10/2007, p. 38)(Emphasisadded).

30qualify as a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the Illinois Human RightsAct because it receives governmental funding. Such a contention was roundly rejected by theFourth District of the illinois Appellate Court in Duffy v. Department ofHuman Rights, 3541l1.App.3d 236, 239 (4 th Dist. 2004)(claim that receipt of federal funds through Medicaid and

Medicare brought clinic within the definition of "place of public accommodation" as the HumanRights Act does not "create such an inference from the mere receipt of federal funds").

31, By reason of the foregoing, plaintiffs pray that the Court declare and adjudge thatas plaintiffs are sectarian agencies engaged in the rendition of charitable social services inconnection with adoption and foster care, they cannot as a matter of law be subjected by thedefendants, or any of them, to restrictions imposed by a statute whose coverage is explicitlyconfined to "non-sectarian adoption agencies," and so explicitly intended to exempt "sectarianadoption agencies" such as plaintiffs. Nor are plaintiffs bound by any provisions restricting theirreligious practice with reference to adoption and foster care in plaintiffs' contracts with thedefendants, DCFS or the State of lllinois, including not only their past contracts but also thecontracts for the upcoming fiscal year, July I through June 30, 2012, which they propose to enterinto in kee'pirlg with de(;ades-old partnership with DCFS. is no legal basis for

would he in forviol5ltllon of contracts.

EREF10R.E m'otmnt to 1.2011


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intentionalso is reponed to have written that the defendant

'\VI l! be Sendlrlg out a letter to

the Illinois Human Rights Act, nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the Illinois Department

Deputy Director reportedly advised that the Department "will be revising policies and procedures

of Human Rights or the Human Rights Commission with respect to those provisions, nor are theybound to comply with any "pattern or practice" investigation on the part of the Illinois Attorney

1-31, Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in

lawsuit, nor represented by counsel for plaintiffs herein), citing the new Illinois statute entitled,

COUNT II(Declaratory Judgment - Claim That Plaintiffs Are Also Exempt From The New IllinoisReligious Freedom Protectiou & Civil Union Act)

May 5, 2011, the Deputy Director of the defendant, DCFS, wrote to another religious social32. As is hereinabove alleged, plaintiffs are informed and believe that, on or aheut

the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to which they may be entitled upon Count I hereof.

paragraphs 1 through 31 inclusive hereof of Count I with the same force and effect as if fully set

General, pursuant to the public accommodations provisions of the Human Rights Act; and that

to iuclude recognition of Civil Unions [whichl may impact potential service delivery issues (or

forth herein,

"Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act," Public Act 096-1513, due to become

services agency, Evangelical Child & Family Services of Wheaton, Illinois (not a party to this

judgmcnt to the effect that plaintiffs are not covered by the public accommodation provisions of

effective on June 1,2011. In his letter to Evangelical Child & Family Services, the DCFS'

ro rei ative to ad()ption and " It was2;tated in said leHer that

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in connection with adoption and foster care might well have a dispositive and terminal impact onthat sectarian adoption agency's future relationship with DCFS. Specifically and pointedly, theDeputy Director observed that, "IUfthe policy changes conflict with your agencies [sicl religiousbeliefs, you and your Board can opt out of your foster care contracts," and in that event, DCFSwould work "to ensure an orderly transition of cases to other service providers," usually taking"up to sixty days."

33. More recently, all of the plaintiffs received such a letter from DCFS, dated May10,20II, and addressed to "All Department Service Providers and Contractors," in whicb

DCFS' Director, defendant Erwin McEwen, bannered a string of boldface admonitions("RE.\UNDER REMINDER REMINDER REMINDER"), beneath which he advised theDCFS service providers and contractors, including plaintiffs, that the Illinois Religious FreedomProtection and Civil Union Act, 750 ILCS 751l et seq, had been signed into law in January 2011,and that it "amends and supplements existing state and federal laws which prohibitdiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation." Mr. McEwen then proclaimed, also inboldface, an additional admonition, as follows:

All federal and state anti-discrimination laws, including the Illinois ReligiousFreedom Protection and Civil Union Act, are incorporated by reference into IDCFScontracts and subcontracts,And later (Exh. B hereto, p. 2), also in boldface print, McEwen noted specifically that DCFS'standard Contract provides:

lDCFS Contractors and their subcontmctors are required to comply with theIllinois Religious Freedom Protection aud Civil Union Act and all other state andfederal equal laws,:Y!c:Evven's bullt,tm also pV'l!t"U 's standard contracts

to , 'n t , rv their cOITIplimlCe withCase 1I f'vlR 254


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body to abstain from solemnizing or oftleiating at a eivil union ceremony (id.). Rather, thereference to the law's not regulating or interfering with the religious practice of any religiousbody should be read to refer to "a wide gamut of things," encompassing religious practices suchas "social services, retreats, religious camps, homeless shelters, senior care centers, adoptionagencies, hospitals," and so forth (emphasis added). In response to Senator Haine's listing thesetypes of religious praetices and inquiring whether they were all covered by the disclaimer of anyintent to regulate or interfere with them in Section 15, Senator Koehler answered unequivocally,"Yes. The - certainly the intent of Representative Harris and I is not to at all, you know, impedethe rights that religious organizations have to carry out their- what their duties and - andreligious activities are" (136th Legislative Day, 96'h Gen. Assembly, Regular Session, Sen.Transcript, p. 81 - emphasis added; supra, pp. 6-7).

36. That the plaintilfs' involvement in foster care, adoption and other soeial servicesis a central, critical element of their "religious practice" is patent. Catholic Charities' mission issaid to fulfill the Church's role in giving charitable aid to anyone in nced by providingcompassionate, competent and professional services that strengthen and support individuals,families and communities based on the value and dignity of all human life. Catholic Charities'agencies around the entire United States form a network, which includes the plaintiffs herein,comprising more than 1,700 agencies and institutions. involving thousands of programs, over62.000 staff members, and more than 24D,OOO volunteers. Essential features of Catholic

aQ"ncies mark as indelibly Roman Cathol ic, are d0.0n:!v rooted in

the very heart the bittEca! ClJl1Cept jus:tice was thecare the stran.ger - the gauge wlwti"" one or

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homeless, sick, imprisoned, and poor.

St. Catherine of Siena, St.eter ('1o""Stt Francis of

that poor widows and children received care. This ministry of care was

continues to focus primarily on these same groups: women who are poor; children

the poor. Later in the cities, religious orders established orphanages, homes for thereligious communities cared for the widows and orphans, sick, elderly, wayfarers, andinstitutionalized and flourished in the great monasteries of the first millennium as the

her relationship to God and to one another. Catholic Charities' contemporary work

ministry was to make sure thatjustice was reflected in the life of the community andyears. In the earliest days, the apostles appointed the seven deacons whose first

who are poor; and individuals who are marginalized, including foreign workers,immigrants, refugees, racial minorities, disabled persons, those aftlicted withmV/AIDS, or other conditions that set them apart. All these needy and vulnemble

Jesus tells his followers that the world will bejudged by how they treat the hungry,among us. This was Jesus' teaching, as in the judgment scene in Matthew 25, wherehuman beings are children of the one God who is passionately concerned for the least

religious groups, such as those begun by St. Vincent de Paul, expanded and deepenedsick and elderly, hospices, and other centers for health and social services. Lay and

this work, and throngs of saints were known for ministries to the poor and vulnerable,

Catholic Charities ' ministry has been an integral part of the Catholic Church for 2,000

fv!artin and St izabeth SetorL Sisters of New \JII'"''''pioneered the mstltl,tlc,naiilZltlCin vital \vork in New World, s12irtlnf' in New

where aa orphanisge. women. care


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facility, By 19OD, there were more than 800 Catholic charitable institutions in theu.s" and now staff and volunteers serve almost 7 million persons a year with grouphomes, clderly residences, family counseling centers, hospices for HIVIAIDSpatients, soup kitchens and homeless shelters, among a vast array of social services,Plaintiffs' Catholic Charities agencies alone setve thousands of children in foster caredaily, helping children heal from abuse such as trauma and neglect, stabilizing theirlives by avoiding multiple moves among different foster homes, resolving problemsthat led to placement, and finding stable, lasting relationships for traumatizedchildren,

Catholic Charities promote the sanctity of human life and the dignity of the humanperson, Although society may exclude some people because of sickness, disability,poverty, racial bias, disease, undocumented ot imprisoned status, Catholic Charitiesreaches out to them with respect for their human dignity, a sacred concept at the veryroot of Catholic social teaching, Jesus Christ rejected no one from his healing touch,and enjoyed fellowship meals with tax collectors and sinners, Among CatholicCharities' ethical standards and values that shape their work is the preferential optionfor the poor articulated by the late Pope, Blessed John Paul ll ,

Catholic Charities are authorized to exercise their ministry by the Diocesan Bishop,All three plaintiffs herein have a formal Catholic identity in relationship to the

and their respec:tltea!Cnl:rgs and canon law

, h!n'l1lt:s respect the those whom it serves tf1r::mg/n its254


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various ministries. This respect for persons of other faiths or no faith stems from adetermined position to serve the entire community, a custom going back as far as thefourth century and, again, in this country to the Ursuline Sisters in New Orleans in1727. In the pattern of Christ Jesus, Catholic Charities feed the hungry, homeless,depressed, troubled, and frail - regardless of their religious beliefs. Thus Jesus curedthe Canaanite woman in Matthew 15 and the Centurion's servant in Luke 7. On April18, 1997, tbe Pope, John Paul II, directed that: "Actions of aid, relief, and assistancesbould be conducted in a spirit of service and free giving for the benefit of all personswithout the ulterior motive of eventual tutelage or proselytism."

Catholic Charities recognize that some services require attention to physical, mental,and spiritual needs. Addiction treatment programs that involve 12-step programshave a distinctive spiritual component, involving recognition of a higher power. Insuch programs as well as in marriage and family counseling, grief ministries, andother services it is appropriate and necessary to recognize and respond to the physical,

mental, and spiritual needs of those whom Catholic Charities serve. Catholic Charities have a special relationship to the Catholic diocese and to Catholic

parishes within the diocese. Catholic Charities agencies often have formal programswhich support and encourage Roman Catholic parishes in their ministry to thecommunity and its needs, assisting parishioners in the exercise of their baptismalcommitment to poor

,tbe Coune:il. asCatholics mandated as welt as

of No"


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and other people of good will to serve the needs of the larger civic community. Catholic Charities support an active public-private partnership with government at all

levels. The Church has a long and strong tradition of teaching about theresponsibilities of government in promoting the common good and protecting theleast among us. Catholics are also charged with a responsibility to support their rolesas citizens and taxpayers and to actively participate in civic life. These teachingshave impelled and authorized Catholics to seek out and accept partnerships withcities, counties, states, and the federal government to facilitate and insure theprovision of needed services for the wider community that are judged to be consistentwith the Church's own mission. These relationships are sometimes contractualrelationShips, as between plaintiffs and DCFS, to deliver particular services such asadoption and foster care application processing, placements and related services.They also may involve voucher payments from the government, such as Medicaid, orgovernment funding of construction, such as housing. The Church providesadditional funding, volunteers, efficiency, values, community credibility, anddedication to service for the benefit of local communities and their needy families.

Catholic Charities blend advocacy for those in need and public education about socialjustice with service to vulnerable and needy individuals, families, and communities.Consistent with its special concern for the poorest and most vulnerable human beingsd""me us, over the last the been increasingly outspoken about tbeneed the of the theU.S. bishops, attlOlle Ch,uili"q have for a more ,OCiletyan

service.201 i rvlR


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37. Nor could plaintiffs' observance of their conscientious religious obligations beheld, in any event, to violate any provision of the Religious Freedom Protection & Civil UnionAct. The core protection embodied in the new statute is set forth at Section 20 thereof, whichprovides:

Section 20. Protections, obligations, and responsibilities. A party to a civilunion is entitled to the same legal obligations, responsibilities, protections, andbenefits as are afforded or recognized by the law of Illinois to spouses, whetherthey derive from statute, administrative rule, policy, common law, or any othersource of civil or criminal law.

Catholic Charities' religiously grounded practice of declining to entertain or process applicationsfor foster care or adoption on the part of unmarried same sex or heterosexual cohabiting couples,together with defendants' options to refer such applicants to other agencies willing and able toaccommodate them, does not even remotely deny any "legal ... benefit" to a civil union couplethat would be available to a ntarried couple, let alone effect such a denial by "statute,administrative rule, policy, common law, or any other source of civil or criminal law." Couplesin civil unions - same sex or opposite sex - remain perfectly free to contact and obtain all

relevant services from other adoption or foster care agencies or to make private adoptionarrangements, all without the slightest interference of obstruction on the part of plaintiffs or anyhindrance arising as a matter of law. Thus there is no underlying predicate for any application ofthe new Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act against plaintiffs, even if plaintiffswere not deemed exempt as provided on the face of the Act itself, and also as recited in thestatllte's own text

that the Court issue a ilel.:lar"li1rvludgment to the that plamt"Us are not , 'n\J,'n'li the neVi' Freedom Pn)tectiol &

Union its iCEI'SlatiVe , and that in any40 viR


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event plaintiffs' assertion of their conscientious religious objections, together with defendants'capacity for referral of same sex or unmarried cohabiting couples to other agencies which do notshare plaintiffs' religious objections and may provide all requested social services in connectionwith adoption or foster care, does not deny any unmarried cohabiting same sex or heterosexualcouple any legal benefit whatsoevcr; and that the Court grant plaintiffs all other relief to whichthey may be entitled on the premises pursuant to Count II hereof.

COUNTlII(Declaratory Judgment - Claim Under The Illinois Religions Freedom Restoration Act. 775ILCS 35/I et seq)1-37. Plaintiffs hereby repeat and re-allege each and every allegation contained in

paragraphs I through 37 inclusive of Count II hereof with the same force and effect as if fully setforth herein.

38. The Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq. wasenacted in reaction to the U.s. Supreme Court decisions in Employment Divisioll v. SmUh, 494U.S. 872 (1990), which articulated a narrow, compound test for evaluation of constitutionalclaims asserting infringements of the First Amendment freedom to exercise one's religious faith,and in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997), which struck down an attempt by Congressto overrule Smith by legislation. Both of these U.S. SupremeCourt cases are referenced in thefindings and purposes of the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, supra, 775 lLCS

IO(a)(4),(5).39 Section 15 the RellgiOlls Freedom Restoration ILCS 35115, provides

Government not sniGsta11l1Ully burden a pel'sola' exercise evenif the results . unless it demonstratesapt:llc:CltH:,n of a conlpel

32 201 i MR


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governmental interest and (ii) is the least restrictive means of furthering thatcompelling interest.40. "Exercise of religion" is defined in turn to mean "an act or refusal to act that is

substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory orcentral to a larger system of religious belief." 775 ILCS 35/5. And "government" includes "abranch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color oflaw) of the State of Illinois or a political subdivision of the State, including a home rule unit."ld.

41. Pursuant to Section 20 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 lLCS35/20:

If a person's exercise of religion has been burdened in violation of this Act, thatperson may assert that violation as a claim or defense in ajudicial proceeding andmay obtain appropriate relief against a government. A party who prevails in anaction to enforce the Act against a government is entitled to recover attorney'sfees and costs incurred in maintaining the claim or defense.42. Plaintiffs contend that the State's coercion of plaintiffs' religiously based

adoption agencies, under penalty of law, to act in a way that directly conflicts with their sincerelyheld, fundamental religious convictions with respect to the morality of sexual cohabitationoutside of marriage, and the morality of placing children for adoption or foster care in the homesof unmarried cohabiting couples (regardless of their heterosexual or homosexual orientation)would, indeed "substantially burden" their eonstitutionally protected rights to free exercise ofreligion. According!y. pursuant to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, it would benc::ml:e!1t on theto plalnt1:ffs was the

",v;cnnmenlallnterest ." 7751LCS !5,

33 40 20t


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35/52


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beneficiary to an alternate provider." While plaintiffs do not purpart to invoke these principlesas any cause of action herein, as the Executive Order explicitly disclaims that it creates any"right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity, by any party,"plaintiffs do allege that their state funding, which defrays only part of their financial burden inproviding foster care and adoption services, is largely derived from federal grants, Thus thosefederal funds should be administered in a manner that assures the availability of the very referralprocedures which plaintiffs have been providing to "prospective beneficiaries" of their fostercare or adoption services over their decades-long partnership with the defendant, DCFS.

Plaintiffs further allege, therefore, that the Illinois General Assembly could hardly have intendedto flout these Federal guidelines for the "administration and distribution of Federal financialassistance," by discriminating against plaintiffs - denying plaintitTs referral options toaccommodate their conscientious objections while providing referral options to beneficiaries orprospective beneficiaries who object to plaintiffs' religious character. Such patent discriminationagainst plaintiffs, moreover, would constitute a gross affront to the religious liberty guarantees inthe Illinois Constitution. The 'avoidance canon' of statutory interpretation, therefore, would alsomilitate in favor of reading the Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Union Act, together withthe Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act, to require that plaintitfs be guaranteed a legalright to 'opt out' of processing foster care or adoption applications against which plaintiffs havedeep-scared religion-based conscientious objections, lest the newly effective Act be struck downas l!m;of1sti I:ution:al

'KltJmt:nt to the effectto Count

in the event the lIIinois Humanthat the issue a de,claratory

that toto to the Kell grm" Freedom

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77S

Ivlareh 8, 20 II

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERALSTATE OF ILLlNOISLisa Madigan

\ ' r r { ) R ~ F " Y t ;E ' t l t \ ! "

Dear Mr. Roach:

Steven E, RoachCatholic Charities of the Diocese of Springtleid-in-lllinois1625 W. WashingtonSpringfield, II. 62702

VIA CERTIFIEDMAIL

The Civil rights Bureau of the Omce for the Attorney General for the State of Illinois, LisaMadigan, is charged with the responsibility of investigating al! violations of laws relating to civilrights and undertaking the necessary enforcement measures when such violations are established.

Re: Foster Care and Adoption Practices

This office received notice that Catholic Charities ofthe Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois (the"Organization") discriminates against Illinois citizens based on race, marital status and sexualorientation in its provision of adoption and foster care services. Sped tically, we understand thatthe Organization has requirements for potential foster or adoptive parents that are not tequired bylllinois law - for example, requirements ahout religious heliefs - or refuses to provide services topotential foster or adoptive parents in violation of minois law - lor example, refuses to provideservices based on the marital status or sexual orientation ofa potential foster or adoptive parent.Please be advised that the fliinois Human Rights Aet C'IHRA") makes it a civil rights violation

any person to "denyor refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods.and services of any public place of accommodation" on the basis of unlawful discrimination.775 ILeS 5"5-1 Unlawful discrimination includes discriminatiDn on the bd.-'}is of

sex, national , age, order status. statL-IS,


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Human Rights' Equal Opportunity requirements (44 Ill. Adm. Code750) am incorporatedby reference . . . In compliance with the illinois and federal Conslitutions, the IllinoisHuman RightsAct, the U. S. Civii Rights Act, and Section 504 of the federalRehabilitation Act and other applicable laws and rules, the Stete does notunlawfully discriminate in employment, contracts, or any other activity."

Paragraph 5.2 (Standard Certifications): "Vendor certifies it and its employees andsubcontractors will comply with applicable provisions of the U.S. Civil Rights Act,. . . and applicable rules in performance under this Contract." Paragraph 5.22 (Standard Certifications): "Vendor certif ies i t complies with theIll inois Department of Human Rights Act and rules appilcable to public contracts,including equal employment opportunity, refraining from unlawful discrimination,and having written sexual harassment policles (J75 ILCS 5/2-105)."

Additional anU-discrimination requirements are reflected in Paragraphs 2.2 (Suppliesand/or Services Required) and 5 (Standard Certif ications) of the Contract and IDCFSRules 308 (Nondiscrimination Requirements of Department Service Providers), 357(Purchase of Service), and 429 (Equal Employment Opportunity Through The Departmentof Children and Family Services).loeFS Contractors and their subcontractors are reqUired to comply with th e IllinoisReligious Freedom Protection and C i vi l U ni on Ac t and al l other state and federalequal opportunity laws. A Contractor's execution of the IDCFS Contract shall be itscertification of compliance with the applicable laws, regUlations, and rules. IDCFS Rule357.110 (Compliance During the Contract Period) specifies that "Purchase of Serviceproviders under contract to the Department must comply with Federal and State laws andregulations and Department rules. When the prOVider signs the purchase of servicecontract. this signature shall be the provider's certification of compliance with theapplicable laws, regulations and rules."A Contractor's or its subcontractor's failure to comply with the Ill inois Religious FreedomProtection and Civil Union Act and other non-discrimination requirements will adverselyaffect the contractual relationship. Paragraph 5.1 of the IOCFS Contract notifiesContractors that "As part of each certification. Vendor acknowtedges and agrees thatshould vendor or its subcontractors provide false information, or fail to be or remain incompliance with the Standard Certification requirements, one or more of the followingsanctions will apply: the contract may be void by operation of law, the State may void thecontract. and the Vendor and its subcontractors may be SUbject to one or more of thefollcwing: suspension, debarment, denial of payment, civll fine, or criminal penalty."Please do not hesitate to contact the IDCFS Office of Contract Administration al406 E.MOioro'3, Station 455. Springfield, illinois 62701 shOUld you have any questions.

2


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the followingl

Federal RegisterVol. 75, No. 224Monday, November 22, 21}10

Title 3 -The President

71319Presidential Documents

Executive Order 13559 of November 17, 2010Fundamental Principles and Policymaking Criteria for Partnerships With Faith-Based and Other Neighhorhood OrganizationsBy the authori ty ves ted in me as P residen t by tbe Constitution and thelaws of the United States of America, and in order to guide Federal aganciesin formulating and developing policies with implications fur faith-basedand other neighborhood organizations. to promote compliance with constitutional and other applicable legal principles, and to strengthen the capacityof faith-based and other neighborhood organizations to deliver services effectively to those in need. it is hereby ordered:Section 1. Amendments to Executive Order 13279. Executive Order 13279of December 12, 2002 (Equal Protection of the Laws for Fai th-Based andCommunity Organizations), as amended, is hereby further amended:(a) in section 1, by s tr iking subsect ion (e), and inserting in l ieu thereofthe following:"(e) 'Specified agency heads' meens:(i) the Attorney General;(il) the Secretary of Agricqlture;(iii) the Secretary ofComierce;(iv) the Secretary of Labor;(v) the Secretary ofHealth and Human Services;(vi) the Secretary ofHou,ing and Urban Development;(Vii) the Secretary of Education;(viii) the Secretary of Veterans Affairs;(ix) the Secretary of Homeland Security;(x) the Administrator of tbe Environmental Protection Agency;(xi) the Administrator of the Small Business Administration;(xU) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International D e v e l ~apm.nt; and(xiii) the Chief Executive Officer of the Corpora tion for National andCommunity Service,";(b) by striki.ng section 2, and inserting in Heu thereof

"Sec. Z. Fundamental Y ~ ; n ~ : f u ~ l ; " , J : : n : d f o r m u l a t i n g and n : ; ; ~ i ~ ~ ' : i ' ~ ~ ~ :that have for a n U d ~ ~ o ~ t h ~ . : r , ~ ' ~ ; ~ ~ ~ : I : ~ : ~ ~ 0administer social SEirvlcB p

awards or sulb,aw,:rdsJ; ~ , a ; : ~ ; : ~ v a ~ ~ s : : g i g f , t l 1 a n ' d c , e , m , m t a l TITrr'L l lp18l"the "-, r{a) financial assistance for sodal service pr


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71320 Federal Register/ VoL 75, No. 224/Monday, November ZZ, 2010/Presidential Documents

orr : ~ ; : ~ . ~ ~ : ; s Federal Hnancialp for benendariesball

(cJ No organization should be discriminated against on the basis of religionor religious belief in the administration or distribution of Federal financialassistance under social service programs.(dJ All organizations that receive Federai financial assistance under socialservice programs should b. prohibited from discriminating against bene

ficiaries or prospective benef ic iar ies of the social service programs on thebasis of religion or religious belief. Accordingly! organizationsl in providingservices supported in whole or in part wi th Federal financial assistance,and in their outreach activities related to such services, should no t beallowed to discriminate against current or prospective program beneficiarieson the basis of religion, a religious belief, a refusal to hold a religiousbelief, or a refusal to attend or participate in a religious practice.(eJ The Federal Government must implement Federal programs in accordance with the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of theFirst Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as other applicable law, and mus t monitor and enforce standards regarding the relationshipbetween religion and government in ways that avoid excessive entanglementbetween religious bodies and governmental entities.(f) Organizations that engage in explicitly religious activities (includingactivities that involve overt religious content such as worship. rel igious

instruction, or proselytizationJ must perform such activities and offer suchservices outside of programs that are supported with direct Federal financialassistance (including through prime awards or sub-awards) , separately int ime or location from any such programs or services supported with directFederal financial assistance, and participation in any such explicitly religiousactivities must be voluntary for the beneficiaries of the social service programsupportedwith such Federal financial assistance.(gJ Faith-based organizations should be eligibie to compete for Federalfinancial assistance used to support social service programs and to participatefully in the social service programs supported with Federal financial assistwUfice without impairing their independence, autonomy, expression outsidethe programs in question, or religious character. Accordingly, a faithbasedorganization that applies for, or participates in, a social service programsupported with Federal finandal assistance may retain its independenceand may continue to carry out its mission, including the definition, development, practice. and expression of its religions beliefs, provided that it does

not use direct Federal financial assistance that it receives (including througha prime award or sub-award) to support or engage in any explicitly religiousactivities (including activities that involve overt religious content such asworship, religious instruction, o.r proselytizationl, or in any other mannerprohibited by law. Among other things, faith-based organizations that receiveFederal financial assistance may use their facilities to provide social servicessupported with Federal financial assistance, without removing or alteringreligions art, icons, scr iptures, or other symbols from these facilities. Inaddition, a faith-based organization that applies for, or participates in, asocial service program supported with Federal financial assistance may retainterms in its name, select its board members on a religious basis,include re ligious references in its organization's mission statementsand other chartering or documents.Each fDrassistance service

of such progtl!1lls pmsuftnt t6to an Alternative Provider.of a social serv ice program3ss1stance to the: character that pr,nv,ct".services the n - ; ; j ~ t h ~ a ~ : t ) ; r ~ : : ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ , ~ \vithin a reasonablet ime after the date CJ oeoe,hclary to an alternative


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Federal RegismrlVoL 75, No. 2241Monday, November 22, 2010lPresidential Documents 71321Federal financial assistance shan establish policies and procedures designed to ensure that (1) appropriate and timely referrals ar


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Order

l(C}, "community" and

71322 Federal RegisterI VoL 75, No. 224 IMonday, November 22, 2010lPresidentiaJ Documents(c) Guidance. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),following receipt of a copy of the report of the Working Group, and incoordination with the Department of Justice, shall issue guidance to agencieson the implementat ion of this order, including in particular subsections

2(hHiJ(d) Membership of the Working Group. The Director of the Office ofFaith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships and a senior official from theOMB designated by the Director of the OMS shall serve as the Co-Cbairs

of the Working Group. The Co-Chairs sha ll convene regnlar meetings ofthe Working Group, determine its agenda, and direct its work. In additionto the Co-Chairs. the Working Group shall consist of a senior official withknowledge of policies that have implications for faith-based and other neighborhood organizations from the following agencies and offices:

(i) the Department of State;(ii) the Department of Justice;(iii) the Department of the Interior;(iv) the Department ofAgriculture;(v) the DepartmentofCommerce;(vi) the Department of Labor;(vii) the Department ofHealth and Human Services;(viii) the Department of Housing and Urban Development;fix) the Department ofEducation;(x) the Department ofVeterans Affairs;(xi) the Department ofHomeland Security;(xii) the Environmental Protection Agency;{xiii} the Small Business Administration;(xiv) the United States Agency for International Development;(xv) the Corporation for National and Community Service; and(xvi) other agencies and offices as the President, from time to time, maydesignate.(e) Administration of the Initiative. The Department of Health and HumanServices shall provide funding and administrative support for the WorkingGroup to the extent permitted by law and within existing appropriations.";and(d) by striking in the title, preamble. and sectioninserting in lieu thereof '"'other n e i g h b o r h o o d 1 t ~

Sec:. 2. General Provisions.This order amends the contained in Executive

13279, Thia order supplern811ts, does not s ~ ~ O e ; s f ~ ~ ~ ; a ~ t h e rSf!uirerueotscontained in Executive Orders 13118 and 13199 of 29, andExecutive Order 13498 of 5, Wa9.this order shaH be CODSUUBd to

law to an executiveor 0 t . ~ & n v i s e affect:

agency, or thefunctions Df thB Director of the OMB relJ,tirig to bwdg"jd!y


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Federal Register/Vol. 75, No. 224/Monday, November 22, 2010/Presidential Documents 71323(d) This order is not intended to, and doos not. create any right orbenefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by anyparty against the United States t its departments. agencies. or entities. itsofficers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

THE WHITE HOUSE,November 17, 2010.~ ; : R Doc. 2010-29579fJled 11-19-10; 11:15 Bmlnillir.g CQile 3195-Wl-P


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VERIFICAnONSteve Roach, upon his oath, deposes and states as follows:I am the Executive Directorof one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities ofthe

Diocese of Springfieid-in-Illinois, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties ofperjury pursuant to Section I-I 09 of the Code ofCivil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735ILCS 5/1-109, I hereby certify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs'Amended and Supplemental Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order,Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, Writs ofProhibitions, and Other Relief, that saidallegations of fact are true and correct to the best ofmy knowledge and belief insofar as theypertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Springfield-in-Illinois and its charitable activitiesin connection with the provision of professional social services for adoption and foster care, andotherwise, and insofar as said allegations offact may pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I aminformed and believe said allegations to be true, as aforesaid.

Further this Declarant sayeth not, this 5th day ofJuly, 2011.


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VERIFICATIONTrish Fox, upon her oath, deposes and states as follows:I am the Chief Executive Officer of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the

Diocese of Peoria, an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties of perjury pursuant toSection 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Illinois, 735 ILCS 511-109, I herebycertify that I have read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs' Amended and SupplementalComplaint for Declaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and PermanentInjunctions, Writs of Prohibitions, and Other Relief, that said allegations of fact are true andcorrect to the best of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of theDiocese of Peoria and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professionalsocial services for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of factmay pertain to other plaintiffs herein, I am informed and believe said allegations to be true, asaforesaid.


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VERlFICATlONGlenn Van Cura, upon his oath, deposes and states as follows:I am the Executive Director of one of the plaintiffs herein, Catholic Charities of the

Diocese of Joliet, Inc., an Illinois non-profit corporation, and under penalties ofperjury pursuantto 735 ILCS 5/1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State oflllinois, I hereby certify that Ihave read the allegations of fact recited in plaintiffs' Amended and Supplemental Complaint forDeclaratory Judgment, Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions,Writs ofProhibitions, and Other Relief, that said allegations offact are true and correct to thebest of my knowledge and belief insofar as they pertain to Catholic Charities of the Diocese ofJoliet, Inc. and its charitable activities in connection with the provision of professional socialservices for adoption and foster care, and otherwise, and insofar as said allegations of fact maypertain 10 other plaintiffs herein, I am infonmed and believe said allegations to be true, asaforesaid.

Further this Declarant sayeth not, this S- day of July, 2011.