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Handbook for selecting government employees loyal to political parties and how to retaliate against federal service workers. A guide to whistleblower retaliation and discrimination.


FEDERAL POLITICAL PERSONNEL MANUAL The "Malek Manual"l NTRODUCTIONBecause of the many appointees that come from the business world into an Administration, there is a great tendency for managers to equate Government with corporate life and to manage accordingly. There are indeed similarities in terms of size and budget, manpower and scope of activities, but there are some very essential differences which must be understood by those with personnel or management responsibilities. A corporation will have a board of directors elected by a majority of shareholders. That board of directors designates the principal officers of the corporation who in turn can hire and fire subordinate employees. There is no inherent conflict between the board of directions and i t s principal officers. The success of the corporation can be easily measured;EDITOR'S NOTE: Spelling errors and other syntactical problems have been corrected; emphasis has been added, where noted, by fhe editors o f The BUREAUCRAT; and much of the extensive underscoring which appeared in the original manual has been deleted. The appendices t o the Manual, and their in-text references, have also been deleted from this printing. With these exceptions, the manual has been copied from the source document (U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Presidential ampaign Activities, Executive Session Hearings, Watergate and 9 Related Activities: Use of Incumbency-Responsiveness Program, Book 1 , 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 8903-90171 with no alterations.T H E B U R E A U C R A T , Vol. 4 No. 4, January 1976

0 1 9 7 6 Sage Publications, ~ n c .


you subtract cost from income and you arrive at a profit which i s measured in dollars. On the other hand, however, Government i s not so streamlined. You have one group of majority shareholders that elects the "board of directors" being the Congress. Like a board of directors, the Congress through authorizing legislation determines the programs of the Government, through appropriations allocates the resources of the Government and through tax legislation, bond authorizations, etc., determines the sources and amount of funding for the Federal Government. Meanwhile, another group of majority shareholders elect the President, the principal executive officer of the Government, who in turn appoints the balance of the principal officers of the Government. They form a Cabinet which in many ways acts like another board of directors. As in the case of the last four years, the officers of the Government owe their loyalty to one group of "shareholders," while the majority in Congress owe their loyalty to another group of "shareholders." And of course this creates a constant tension between the officers of the Government and the Congress who appeal to the shareholders to turn out each other in the hope of getting officers and a Congress who are loyal t o the same group of "shareholders" and to each other. This places the career bureaucrat i n the unique position of remaining loyal to his "government," while choosing whether he'll be loyal to the officers or t o Congress, or to use the fact of tension between the executive and legislative branches to do his own thing. Further, because of the maze of rules and regulations with regard to the hiring and firing of Federal employees, the executive i s more often than not frustrated with its ability to insure a loyal chain of command. Yet the executive i s answerable to the electorate, every four years, for its management of the Government. Further, not only can we disagree on the programs of the Government, but there is constant controversy over what are the measuring devices of success or failure. In short, in our constitutional form of Government, the Executive Branch is, and always will be, a political institution. This is not to say that the application of good management practices, sound policy formulation, and the highest caliber of program implementation are not of vital importance. The best politics is still good Government. But you cannot achieve management, policy or program control unless you have estab//shed political control [emphas~s added]. The record is quite replete with instances of the failures of program, policy and management goals because


of sabotage by employees of the Executive Branch who engage in the frustration of those efforts because of their political persuasion and their loyalty t o the majority party of Congress rather than the executive that supervises them. And yet, in their own eyes, they are sincere and loyal t o their Government. The above facts were not lost on John and Robert Kennedy. Shortly after Kennedy's nomination the Kennedy campaign reportedly hired a management consulting firm which made a survey of the Executive Branch of Government. I n that survey they pointed out every position, regardless of grade, regardless of whether i t was career or noncareer, which was thought t o be an important pressure point i n the Executive Branch. They did a thorough research job on the incumbents occupying those positions. After Kennedy's inauguration, they put Larry O'Brien in charge of the effort t o "clean out the Executive Branch" all incumbents of those positions whom they felt they could not rely upon politically. Larry O'Brien, with the assistance of the Departments and Agencies, reportedly, boasted that he accomplished the task in 180 days. I t i s widely believed, and probably true, that we did not come close t o meeting Larry O'Brienfs record in 180 days. Quite to the contrary, at the end of three times that 180 days in this Administration, Republicans only occupied 61% of the noncareer positions that were filled below the PAS and PA level, Republicans only filled 1708 out of 3391 Presidential appointments, and this Administration had only bothered to utilize 899 out of 1333 Schedule C (GS 15 and below) authorities granted to the Departments and Agencies, with incumbents of any persuasion. Lyndon Johnson went a step further. He appointed John Macy to two positions simultaneously. He was the Special Assistant t o the President for personnel matters directly in charge of the recruitment of ranking Administration officials, the political clearance system a t the White House, and the Johnson White House political control over the personnel in the Executive Branch. He was also appointed Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the "guardian of the Civil Service and the merit system." Ludwig Andolsek, formerly Administrative Assistant t o Rep. John Blatnik (D-Minn.), and the staff man in charge of Democratic patronage matters for the House of Representatives Democratic Caucus, was the Vice Chairman o f the Civil Service Commission and "vice guardian of the Civil Service and the merit system." Together they formed the two man majority on the three man commission. Naturally, there wasn't a ripple of concern f r o m a Democratic Congress, only the covert clapping of hands and salivatioil at the opportunities that now were theirs.

[4321 THE BUREAUCRAT 1 J A N U A R Y 1976

Of course, Congress proceeded t o more than double the number of supergrade positions and Executive Level positions in the Government. And naturally the White House did a thorough job of insuring that those appointed t o those positions were politically reliable. Documents left behind reveal that even nominees for career positions at the supergrade level, and the equivalents, were cleared and interviewed at the White House. The documents substantiate that the interview process was conducted by Marvin Watson's office prior to, or simultaneously, with submission of paperwork to the Civil Service Commission. And in many instances a little "insurance" was obtained with respect to the loyal performance of the appointee by appointing him or her under Limited Executive Assignment and converting that person t o career status a year later. A final objective of the Johnson Administration was t o insure the continued loyalty of the bureaucracy t o the Democratic programs and the Johnson polic~es after the takeover by the Nixon Administration. They did this by several reorganizational processes in 1968 which allowed them to freeze in both the people and the positions they had created into the career service. They also made some startling last minute appointments. HEW is a department which serves as a startling example. After Nixon's inauguration there were but 47 excepted positions (including Presidential appointees and confidential' secretaries) available t o the Administration out of 115,000 positions. In the Social Security Administration there were two excepted positions out of 52,000. In the Office of Education there were only four, and even the Commissioner of Higher Education of the United States was a career GS 18. The Office of Education reorganized between November 8, 1968 and January I I , 1969 creating nearly 125 new branch chief positions all filled on a career basis. In the health field the Public Health Service was essentially reorganized out of any meaningful existence in 1968, and in its place the National Institutes of Health in charge of all health research, the Health Services and Mental Health Administration in charge of controversial areas of health delivery and mental health programs and the Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Services in charge of all preventative health programs were created. Though a Public Health Service Officer, carefully selected, was put in charge of CPEHS, new Executive Level IVs were created for the other two. The career appointment t o the Directorship of NIH was given to one who had been brought into NIH a few years previously, cleared through Marvin Watson's office at the White House. The head of HSMHA went to a close Kennedy family fr~end. was mentioned in "Death of a President" as the He


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