elections in the philippines, may 2001

673Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 649–680

A further notable feature of Berlusconi’s second administration is the strong pres-ence of ministers (no fewer than eight) from the Lombardy region. This strengthensand highlights the link between the economic capital of Milan and the political andadministrative capital of Rome. It also, of course, highlights the links between Berlu-sconi’s business headquarters and his newly founded political empire on the Tiber.

References

Goodman, L., 1953. Ecological regressions and the behaviour of individuals. American SociologicalReview 18 (6), 663–664.

The Economist, 2001. Fit to Run Italy? 28 April 2001.

0261-3794/02/$ - see front matter 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.PII: S026 1-3 794( 02) 00006 -9

Elections in the Philippines, May 2001

R.J. May ∗

Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asia Studies, AustralianNational University, Canberra, Australia

1. Background

The elections on 14 May 2001 in the Philippines were perhaps the most significantin that country since the People Power Revolution (or EDSA)1 that removed Presi-dent Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. The background to these elections is described first.

In 1998 Joseph Estrada was elected as the Philippines’ third post-Marcos president(under the 1987 constitution the president is elected for a single six-year term).Estrada, a former movie star, mayor, senator, and, since 1992, the country’s vice-president, campaigned as a man of the masses. Despite opposition from several quar-ters, including the church, which disapproved of his reputation for drinking, gam-bling, and adultery, he won by a solid margin over his nearest rival. In the vote forthe vice-presidency, which is contested separately, however, Estrada’s running mate,Senator Edgardo Angara, lost out to Dr Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the daughter ofa former president.

From an early stage in the Estrada presidency, it seemed that Estrada’s critics

∗ Tel.: +61-2-6125-4452; fax: +61-2-6125-5523.E-mail address: [email protected] (R.J. May).

1 The popular demonstrations which precipitated the ‘People Power Revolution’ mostly took place onEpifanio de los Santos Avenue; hence the ‘EDSA Revolution’ .

674 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 21 (2002) 649–680

were vindicated. Estrada’s administration was erratic; promised social reforms failedto materialise, and there were increasing complaints of cronyism and corruption.Then, in October 2000, Luis Singson, a provincial governor, told the media that hehad paid Estrada millions of pesos from an illegal numbers game (jueteng). Congressundertook to investigate the allegations. Shortly after, Vice-President Macapagal-Arroyo resigned from the cabinet, and a number of Estrada’s supporters in Congresscrossed the floor, depriving the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino (Partyof the Filipino Masses, LAMP), of its majority in the House of Representatives. Inthe same month, the House began impeachment proceedings against the President,accusing him of bribery, graft, corrupt practices, betrayal of public trust, and culpableviolation of the constitution. In November, Estrada was impeached and the case sentto the Senate, which has the power to convict and remove a president from office.

The subsequent proceedings were televised and reported in detail in the local press.Thus, when it was announced that evidence would be presented showing that, sincehis election as President, Estrada had accumulated some P3.3 billion (at the timeabout US$60 million) and that he had signed bank documents using a false name,there was considerable public interest and outrage—even though Estrada retained agood deal of mass support. In January 2001, when the trial resumed, in full viewof a national TV audience, 11 of the 21 senators comprising the court voted againstopening a sealed envelope containing the incriminating bank records, thereby effec-tively acquitting the president. In a quick sequence of events, the prosecutors andthe head of the Senate impeachment court resigned, mass public protests began call-ing for Estrada’s resignation, and the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippinesannounced the withdrawal of his support from President Estrada. On 21 January,Estrada left the presidential palace with his family, the Supreme Court declared thepresidency vacant, and Vice-President Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President.

Although in some quarters, in the Philippines and overseas, there was unease overthe role of mass demonstrations, and the military, in bringing about the change ofpresident, the event was mostly hailed as another victory for ‘people power’ . Sincethen, 21 January is popularly referred to as ‘EDSA II’ . In April, the Supreme Courttwice upheld its ruling in favour of Macapagal-Arroyo’s elevation to the presidency.

Estrada and his supporters, however, continued to challenge the legitimacy ofMacapagal-Arroyo’s presidency and organised a series of pro-Estrada rallies, draw-ing mostly on Manila’s urban poor, and ambitiously called ‘EDSA III’ . Feelingsintensified when, on 25 April, in what Filipino journalist Amando Doronila describedas ‘a turning point in Philippines politics’ ,2 Estrada was arrested on charges of plun-der, perjury, and illegally using an alias, and taken off to gaol. On 1 May 2001, amob of pro-Estrada supporters attempted to storm the presidential palace(Malacanang). They were repelled, but in the process several people were killed. Astate of rebellion was declared and arrest warrants were issued against 11 Estradasupporters implicated in the march on Malacanang. These included Senator GregorioHonasan (a former army officer who had played a prominent role in EDSA I in 1986

2 Philippines Daily Inquirer, 26 April 2001.


but had later been involved in coup attempts against President Aquino), Senator JuanPonce Enrile (Defence Secretary under Marcos, who had supported the final moveagainst Marcos, and had become an Estrada supporter), Panfilo Lacson (chief of thePhilippine National Police under Estrada), and Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago(a prominent lawyer and failed presidential candidate in 1992). All four were candi-dates for the Senate in May 2001. The state of rebellion was lifted after seven days,and those accused of rebellion were allowed to campaign. It was against this back-ground that the 14 May elections were held.

2. The electoral system

The House of Representatives comprises up to 262 members elected under twoseparate polling systems: 209 members are elected from single-member constitu-encies at regional, provincial, and city level; the balance—20% of the membershipof the House—is elected through a separate party-list voting system. This systemwas introduced under the 1987 people power constitution in an effort to stave off areturn to pre-martial-law ‘ traditional’ politics and to ensure the representation ofmarginalised smaller parties and sectoral groups. Party-list organisations have to beapproved by the Commission on Elections (Comelec). Any group securing 2% ofthe party-list vote gets a seat; an additional seat is gained for each additional 2%up to a maximum of three seats.3

The party-list system was first implemented in 1998, but it was poorly understoodand widely criticised. In 2001, with 53 party-list seats being contested, the party-listsystem again came under fire: not only were there complaints that Comelec hadagain made little effort to explain the party-list system (resulting in low levels ofparty-list voting), but it was observed that several larger parties were putting upparty-list candidates and that a number of the 162 party-list parties and groups certi-fied by Comelec4 did not represent marginalised or under-represented groups (andin several instances had links to Estrada). On the eve of the elections, a group ofparty-list organisations led by the newly formed leftist Bayan Muna petitioned theSupreme Court to disqualify from the party-list poll candidates from the five majorparties (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, NPC, LDP, Liberal Party, and PMP) and groups notrepresenting marginalised sectors.

Also at stake in May 2001 were 13 Senate seats (half the Senate plus a ‘half-term’ , three-year seat to fill the vacancy created when Senator Teofisto Guingonareplaced Macapagal-Arroyo as Vice-President), and some 17,600 provincial andlocal-level positions. Senators are elected in a national constituency; those electedtend to have national celebrity status, including well-known political figures and asprinkling of popular media and sporting figures.

3 The party-list system is discussed in Rocamora (1998) and May (1999). For discussion of party-listvoting in 2001, see Adraneda (2001) and editorial comments by Neal H. Cruz in Philippines Daily Inquirer4 April, 9 May, and 17 May 2001.

4 As a result of several withdrawals, the number was reduced to 154.


3. The campaign

Although the presidency was not up for election until 2004, the elections werewidely portrayed, given the situation in early 2001, as a referendum on the Macapa-gal-Arroyo presidency. The filling of the 13 Senate positions, in particular, was seenby many to be an indicator of the legitimacy of the new President. Such an interpret-ation of the elections was always somewhat dubious. For one thing, voting for theHouse of Representatives, and, a fortiori, voting for provincial and municipal offices,in the Philippines tends to be dominated by local political patronage networks andparochial issues. This is reinforced by the weakness of the Philippines’ political partysystem. Before the imposition of martial law in 1972, the Philippines had an essen-tially two-party system, largely reflecting its US democratic tutelage. During martiallaw, parties were initially abolished and subsequently the electoral system was domi-nated by President Marcos’s political machine, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (NewSociety Movement, KBL). After 1986, the pre-Marcos party system did not re-emerge; indeed popular antipathy towards ‘ traditional politics’ and traditional poli-ticians (trapos)5 led to the inclusion in the 1987 constitution of the specific provisionfor a party-list component to the electoral system, as discussed earlier.

It was not obvious, therefore, that voters, beyond an informed national elite, wouldnecessarily behave as though the elections were a referendum on the presidency.Nevertheless, the fact that the election was widely presented in this way encourageda degree of bipolarity. In 1998, Estrada had stood under the banner of LAMMP, acoalition comprising the Partido ng Masang Pilipino (Party of the Filipino Masses,PMP, a party he had created in 1992), the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Fightof Democratic Filipinos, LDP, headed by Angara), and the Nationalist People’sCoalition (NPC, headed by Marcos’ associate Eduardo Cojuangco). Although Estradawon by a clear margin, his supporters were successful in only about 20% of con-gressional seats. Within a few weeks, however, enough members had changed theirallegiance to give Estrada a majority.

In early May 2001, however, the three coalition partners of LAMMP formed anew coalition, Puwersa ng Masa (Force of the Masses, PnM), along with the People’sReform Party (PRP) of Defensor Santiago. Macapagal-Arroyo, on the other hand,had been elected in 1998 as a candidate of the Lakas-NUCD (National Union ofChristian Democrats)-UMDP (United Muslim Democratic Party) coalition. In 2001,Macapagal-Arroyo’s supporters formed a People Power Coalition (PPC) comprisingLakas-NUCD-UMDP, the Liberal Party, Partido Demokratiko Pilipino (PDP),Aksyon Demokratiko, Partido ng Demokratiko Reporma-Lapiang Manggagawa(Reporma-LM), and Probinsya Muna Development Initiatives (Promdi), a Visayan-based regional party.

In addition to the turbulence created by Estrada’s impeachment and arrest, thePhilippines faced other local disturbances in early 2001. The Communist NewPeople’s Army appeared to be gaining strength in parts of the countryside, and threat-

5 The Filipino/Spanish word for a rag is also trapo.


ened to target certain (mostly pro-Estrada) candidates. In the south, the armed insur-gency of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao and Sulu wasongoing, despite repeated attempts at peace talks, and the Abu Sayyaf group hadbeen staging a series of high-profile kidnappings. As a result, Comelec identified 76‘hotspots’ and elections were postponed in several areas. In the event, in the lead-up to the elections, over 70 election-related killings were reported; another 30–40occurred after the polls, making 2001 the most violent election in the Philippinessince 1986. Nonetheless, the chairman of Comelec described the elections as ‘gener-ally peaceful’ .6

As in previous elections, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL),an NGO maintained largely by church workers and school teachers, monitored thevoting and counting, and provided a ‘quick count’ once polling had closed. Anothergroup, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting, backed by the CatholicChurch and accredited by Comelec (and chaired by former Comelec chair HaydeeYorac), provided further oversight.

Comelec came in for criticism over its running of the election. Shortly before theelection, President Macapagal-Arroyo replaced the chair of Comelec, and, in thelead-up to the elections, Comelec was hampered by constant bickering betweennewly appointed officers and those appointed under the Estrada administration. Thebickering was particularly fraught over the mechanics of revising the electoral rollsand automatic voting. In the event, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philip-pines claimed that thousands of voters had been disenfranchised by faulty rolls; theAlliance of Concerned Teachers (whose members were heavily involved in monitor-ing the election) described the elections as ‘ the worst ever’ ; and a former Comelecchair called on Congress to impeach poll officials for bungling the election.

4. Election results

Some 22 parties contested the election. The two major coalitions, between thepro-Estrada and pro-Macapagal-Arroyo groupings, provided a degree of polarisation,however. Comelec identified six parties as ‘major parties’ that were permitted tofield poll scrutineers: Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, NPC, the Liberal Party, LDP, PDP-Laban, and PMP. Turnout was quite impressive, at 85% of the 36.5 million regis-tered voters.

In the Senate contest (see Table 1), predictably, the more extravagant hopes ofboth sides for a 13-0 victory were dashed; the outcome was eight seats to the PPC,four to PnM, and one independent. The independent, who clearly topped the poll,was a popular TV news anchorman, who, before the election, was adopted as a‘guest candidate’ by the PnM. The next seven places were won by PPC candidates,

6 Philippines Daily Inquirer 15 May 2001.


Table 1Results of elections to the Philippines Senate, May 2001

Rank Candidate Party/coalition

1 De Castro, Noli Independent2 Flavier, Juan Lakas-NUCD-UMDP/PPC3 Osmena, Sergio PDP-Laban/PPC4 Drilon, Franklin Independent/PPC5 Arroyo, Joker Lakas-NUCD-UMDP/PPC6 Magsaysay, Ramon Independent/PPC7 Villar, Manuel Independent/PPC8 Pangilinan, Francis Liberal Party/PPC9 Angara, Edgardo LDP/PnM10 Lacson, Panfilo LDP/PnM11 Ejercito-Estrada, Luisa Independent/PnM12 Recto, Ralph Lakas-NUCD-UMDP/PPC13 Honasan, Gregorio Independent/PnM

Source: Commission on Elections.

while the PnM’s four candidates7 were ranked towards the bottom of the list. Thisresult gave President Macapagal-Arroyo a small majority in the Senate.8

In the House of Representatives constituency contests, where party allegiance inthe past has been quite fluid, Lakas-NUCD-UMDP won 78 seats, and the NPC won48 (see Table 2). These two were comfortably the largest parties, and dominatedtheir respective coalitions. Overall, of the 197 seats with officially declared results,the PPC took 103 and the PnM took 73. In the vote for Speaker (which attractedeleven contenders), Jose de Venecia of Lakas-NUCD-UMDP put together a ‘Sun-shine Coalition’ (including the NPC) which carried the vote by 184 to 17.

In the party-list contest, 10 groups secured more than the required 2%, and one,Bayan Muna, more than 10%. In late June, however, in a majority decision on thepetition of Bayan Muna and others, the Supreme Court confirmed that party-listcandidates must represent marginalised and under-represented sectors, and shouldnot represent organisations funded, in whole or in part, by the government. Religiousgroups were not eligible to participate in the party-list system; and political partiesrunning under the party-list system had to establish that they represented the interestsof the marginalised and under-represented. The Supreme Court also ordered Comelecnot to proclaim any party-list winning candidates until it had conducted ‘summaryevidential hearings’ on the qualifications of all groups. In late July, Comelec submit-ted a partial compliance report, which reportedly disqualified 9 of the top ranked 24party-list groups.

Another feature of the results was the widespread success—notwithstanding ‘anti-

7 The four included Lacson and Honasan who were still facing charges over their role in the 1 Mayriots.

8 In the vote for the new Senate President, in July, the PPC candidate won by 13 votes to 11.


Table 2Results of constituency elections to the Philippines House of Representatives, May 2001

Party Seats

Lakas-NUCD-UMDP 78Liberal Party 19PDP-Laban 2Reporma-LM 2Aksyon Demokratiko 2People power (PPC) 103NPC 48LDP 22PMP 3Force of the Masses (PnM) 73Regional and minor parties 13Independents 8Total declared 197Seats not declared 12Total 209

Source: Commission on Elections.

dynasty’ legislation enacted in the early post-Marcos years—of long-establishedpolitical clans. These included the Marcoses in Ilocos Norte, the Singsons in IlocosSur, the Josons in Nueva Ecija, the Cojuangcos in Negros, the Ortegas in La Union,and the Dys in Isabela. Also among the winning candidates were Estrada’s wife,Luisa Ejercito Estrada (elected to the Senate) and son, J.V. Ejercito (who followedfamily tradition in becoming mayor of San Juan), and Macapagal-Arroyo’s son, Mig-uel Arroyo (who won the vice-governorship of Pampagna).

5. Conclusion

To the extent that the 14 May elections could be seen as a test of support forPresident Macapagal-Arroyo, her supporters could regard the outcome as satisfac-tory. Certainly, in the aftermath of the elections, except for the inevitable few dis-gruntled losing candidates, there has been no serious questioning of the president’slegitimacy. But it may have been that other factors, particularly local politics, cameinto play.

A more interesting question concerns the future of party politics in the Philippines.With the demise of Estrada, it seems likely that the Puwersa ng Masa will alsodecline, and the bi-polarity which emerged in early 2001 will fade away. The once-predicted return to a two-party dominant system still looks unlikely in the foreseeablefuture. However, the success of the Bayan Muna, which topped the party-list votesand stood to gain three party-list members of Congress, is noteworthy; another leftistparty, Akbayan! (Citisen’s Action Party), also won over 2% of the party-list vote.If peace negotiations currently ongoing (at the time of writing, December 2001) in


Oslo between the Philippine government and the Netherlands-based National Demo-cratic Front (the major political organisation of the left) achieve a settlement, thereis a possibility of the left emerging as a significant electoral force, after being mar-ginalised by its non-participation in events following the downfall of Marcos in 1986.

References

Adraneda, K.G., 2001. Comelec begins party-list review. CyberDyaryo, 12 July (www.codewan.com.ph/CyberDyaryo).

May, R.J., 1999. Philippines: Electoral Innovation. ASEAN Focus Group, April, Sydney(www.aseanfocus.com).

Rocamora, J., 1998. Party-list elections: making the best out of a bad deal. Conjuncture 9, 1–5.

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